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A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick Permanent WRAP URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/136077 Copyright and reuse: This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright. Please scroll down to view the document itself. Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page. For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: [email protected] warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications The Myth o f Psychical Distance in Aesthetic Experience Jacqueline H.M. Bazin Submitted for the Degree of Ph.D. University of Warwick Department of Philosophy October 1997 TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements 1 Summary 2 PART ONE The Concept of ‘Distance’ in Aesthetic Experience Chapter I Introduction to the Concept of ‘Aesthetic Experience’ 3 Chapter II An Account of Psychical Distance in Aesthetic Experience 9 Introduction 9 Edward BULLOUGH’s theory of ‘Psychical Distance’ 10 Conclusion 35 PART TWO An Investigation into Modes of Aesthetic Experience Chapter III The Aesthetic Experience of Natural Beauty 40 Chapter IV A Comparative Analysis of Craftsmanship and Art 58 Chapter V Genius in Creative Art 71 PART THREE Art and Symbolic Expression Chapter VI 80 1. The Concept of ‘Expression’ in Art 80 2. LANGER’s Theory of Symbolic Art 94 Introduction 94 Symbolic Agency in Art 101 Implementation of Symbolic Agency in Art 108 Representational Symbolism in Literature 117 A View of ‘Psychical Distance’ in Aesthetic Experience 124 A Synopsis and Assessment of Langer’s Theory of Symbolic Art 128 Chapter VII The Need for a ‘Contextual’ and ‘Genetic’ Approach to the Aesthetic Experience of Art 138 continued PART FOUR The Structuralist Approach to Aesthetic Experience Chapter VIII GADAMER’s Theory of ‘Play’ as an Ontological Explanation of Art 171 Introduction to the Theory of ‘Play’ 171 A Hermeneutical Approach to Art 179 Chapter IX MERLEAU-PONTY’s Phenomenology of Perception as applied to Art 190 Introduction to the Phenomenology of Perception 190 A View of Art in the Context of the Phenomenology of Perception 196 The Phenomenology of Language 198 Synopsis 205 Conclusion 209 Conclusion 212 Bibliography 221 1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I dedicate this thesis to the memory of my parents. My sincere thanks go to my supervisor Martin Warner for his help and advice, and to Professor David Wood who initially inspired and motivated my research. I would also like to thank Professor Stephen Houlgate for his invaluable advice and encouragement. My special thanks go to Ursula Kelly for her constant dedication and care in the production of this typescript. I am also very grateful to the Department of Philosophy, the Graduate Office, the Library, and the University of Warwick for providing such a supportive research environment throughout my work. 2 SUMMARY The object of the present thesis is: 1. to question the modem and prevalent view that some kind of ‘psychical attitude’ is necessary to the emergence and success of an aesthetic experience. Edward BULLOUGH’s theory of ‘psychical distance’ has been chosen and thoroughly analyzed as a significant example of the above view. 2. to offer an alternative to the above theory, which is based on a teleological/cosmological argument, and which makes an aesthetic experience dependent on a metaphysical ‘intuition’ of our ‘attunement’ to, and ‘symbiosis’ with, the world. In support of my research, I examine and discuss: i. the aesthetic experience of ‘beautiful’ nature, ‘beautiful’ craftsmanship, and art, and I suggest some distinctions between them which have an important bearing on my rejection of ‘psychical distance’ as a viable aesthetic process. ii. how the unique nature and role of ‘genius’ in art provides us, not only with arguments supporting the views expressed in my theory, but with more reasons to believe that art is in a league apart in aesthetics, and could perhaps benefit further from its study through a philosophy of mind. iii. ‘expression’ and ‘communication’ as fundamental sources of, and constituents of art, and their application through a form o f ‘Representational Symbolism’ developed in S. LANGER’s theory of aesthetics. iv. the need for a thorough familiarization and understanding of the content, context, and genetic sources of works of art, in order to achieve a rapprochement/communion between artists and the observers of their works. v. H.G. GADAMER’s theory of ‘play’, 1) as an explanation of how the essence of works of art, though shaped by the thoughts and feelings of artists, interpreters, and observers, is protected by the work’s ‘circle of meaning’ which sets observers at an ‘absolute distance’ from the work, making therefore ‘any practical purposive share’ in it impossible; and 2) as a hermeneutical approach which allows Gadamer to solve problems of ‘contemporaneity’ in art. vi. some important aspects of M. MERLEAU-PONTY’s theory of ‘perception’; in particular, his emphasis on the necessity, for an understanding of, and communion with, the world, of a grasp of nature’s language. 3 CHAPTER I Introduction to the Concept of ‘Aesthetic Experience’ The etymology of the word aesthetic directs us to the concept of sensation; whatever else it may involve, a theory of aesthetics deals with human sensitivity. This assessment should not, however, mean that we agree with Nietzsche’s extreme view that . aesthetics is but an applied physiology, or with Armand CUVILLIER who writes that ‘the sensation becomes aesthetic matter only after having undergone a “purification”, a shedding which frees it from the utilitarian interpretations of everyday life.' (1954, II, 204, my transl.) For L.A. REID, aesthetic experience is more than sheer perception. ‘On the one hand’, he says, ‘we apprehend the perceptual data.... On the other hand, our interest is interest in appearance for the sake of a meaning, a significance, a value, which could not be contained literally in a mere perceptual appearance, but must in some sense transcend it... and when that embodied meaning is enjoyed intrinsically, for its own sake, and not for its practical, or cognitive, or existential implications, then the contemplation is “aesthetic” contemplation, and the total complex before the mind we may call an “aesthetic” object.’ (1954,41-43) There are many problems involved in any attempt at giving a satisfactory definition of what constitutes an aesthetic experience. Certainly as Dian6 COLLINSON remarks, ‘No single account of a particular aesthetic experience... seems able to yield a characteristic or group of characteristics than can serve as the basis of a definition of the experience. It seems to have a variety and complexity that defy attempts to state its 4 essential conditions. It can be intense or gentle, sustained or fleeting, immediate or cumulative, or combinations of any o f these.’ (in Hanfling, 1992, 117) Another difficulty which makes of any endeavour at analyzing and defining aesthetic experience a daunting task, comes from the fact that, as Arnold BERLEANT points out, ‘while aesthetic experience has an identity, it is not set off from other modes of expression by some unique attributes. Indeed, the aesthetic is not a separate kind of experience but rather a mode in which experience may occur:... it is continuous with the whole range of human activity.’ (1970,93) Our first efforts will, therefore, bear on attempting to clarify the ‘mode’ in which aesthetic experiences are said to occur, and, for this, we need to identify the factors and signs that are commonly manifesting themselves in such experiences. For Berleant, although there is no infallible basis on which to claim that an account of aesthetic experience is authentic, one can start by ‘consciously expunging the influence - moral, religious, pedagogical, metaphysical, historical and cultural - of any a priori expectations of what that experience must be like’ (1970, 96). However, what is to be feared with such an approach is that, once the above criteria are eliminated, the analysis turns out to be exclusively based on psychological ‘attitudes’ (i.e. sensitive and emotional responses). Such analysis would thus make of what is generally regarded as a very complex and extraordinary experience in life, an oversimplified and immature phenomenon. Another possible standpoint is to try to assess which elements in the form and content of an object, or event, would, with single sufficiency or articulated joint necessity, make of that object, or event, an aesthetically valuable entity. This approach is bound to 5 raise a web of metaphysical and ontological issues, some of them very complex and as old as philosophy itself; taken on its own, it would also tend to leave unexplored the intricate, influential, and essential roles played in the aesthetic experience of art, by artists and observers of their works. Another viewpoint regarding aesthetic experience is expressed by L.A. REID who writes: ‘Aesthetic expressions may be (among other things) expressions in a finer, in a subtler... sense than, say, an “expression” which is a mere relief of tension or the mere satisfaction of some desire’ (1973, 50). This particular aspect will be given some particular attention in this thesis. For Bernard BOSANQUET, aesthetic experience is mainly distinguished by three characteristics closely connected with each other: i. a stable feeling, i.e. a pleasure in something pleasant which does not pass into satiety, as it can in eating and drinking. ‘The aesthetic want is not a perishable want, which ceases in proportion as it is gratified.’ (1923,4) ii. a relevant feeling - ‘attached, annexed to the quality of some object - to all its detail...’ (4) but unlike, for example, the hearing of a dinner-bell which is not an aesthetic experience ‘unless my feeling of pleasure is relevant, attached to the actual sound as I hear it.