IV. Concerning the Relation of Mind and Medium in Aesthetic Appre- Ciation Little Need Be Said
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MIND AND MEDIUM IN ARTf. (1V.j BY EDWARD BULLOUGH. I AGREE with Mr Walkley’s criticism of Mr Marriott’s proposal to base an aesthetic theory upon Medium and its technical manipulation. The attempt has been made more than once-the example of Semper has been mentioned by Mr Watt-and has always broken down in the face of objections such as are urged by Mr Walkley-in the last resort because Art is a manifestation of mind and cannot be satisfactorily accounted for by the nature and treatment of the material it employs. The second part of Mr Walkley’s paper rests upon the theory of Benedetto Croce. I am in doubt how far I agree or disagree with him. Croce’s aesthetic theory does not stand by itself, as is far too commonly supposed. It is part of a general philosophical, and in addition monistic, system and is exposed to all the difficulties created by such a depen- dence. I feel doubt about the fourfold division of the activities of the spirit; about the precise limits of the theoretical and practical activities; about the ultimate implications of his general point of view; as regards the aesthetic sphere in particular, about the nature of the ‘intuition’ and the essential ‘lyricism’ of Art, and their consequences. Indeed, I am inclined to agree with the objections recently urged by G. A. Borgese in the Preface to the new edition of his Storia della critica romantica in Italia2. I readily admit that Croce’s conception of intuition as the A contribution to the Symposium presented at the Congress of Philosophy in Oxford, 24-27 September, 1920. “Compiutosi in De Sanctis lo svolgimento della critica cosidett,aromantica, due vie restavano ape&; o attuare ulteriormente e piii risolutamente quells restaurazione del senso classic0 dell’ arte che in Italia paradossalmente si cbiami, romanticismo, 0, traverao quell0 peeudoromanticismo, pervenire ad un romanticismo autentico. I1 Croce s’ avvib, senza notevoli perpleasiti, per questa seconda strada, e sempre pih si raffermb nel considerare 1’ arte come inetinto, come ‘Genie,’ come irreducibile individua- lit&,come ‘hohe Intuition’ anteriore alla logica e alla volont&,come liricith pura, come interiezione, come grido. 11 suo metodo critic0 si and6 sempre pi5 precisando in tre canoni: (1”) negare qualunque continuith di sviluppo nella storia dell’ arte, tutta frantn- mandola nelle monadi senza finestre delle singole individualit& poetiche; (2’) cercare in ogni poeta 1’ opera fondamentale e genuina, generalmente di prima e spontanea gioventh, rifiutando come aovrapposizioni logiche e volitive i suoi pretesi progressi di matiwith; (3”) leggere ogni poeta ed ogni opera come un’ antologia in cui alcuni frammenti lirioi EDWARDBULLOUGH 27 kernel of the artistic attitude, his antagonism to the current treatment of the history of Art and to the sterile discussions of the differences and relative position of the arts, and his insistence on the unity and unique- ness of Art, etc. have rendered immense services to aesthetic studies; yet I cannot but feel a certain sympathy with the complaint of Professor Hosanquet (with whose aesthetic views I otherwise disagree) that Croce’s theory yields little enlightenment on the particular subject now under discussion. Croce’s theory is a philosoghical, not a psychological, statement, and there is much that seems psychologically obscure in it. Moreover, the subject of the present debate is in itself, as a matter of psychological fact, so obscure that its elucidation would appear to me as little furthered by a philosophical treatment which deals with it from an ideal point of view, as by Mr Marriott’s hypothetical illustrations which substitute assumptions for experience. I. What do we actually know about the relation of Mind and Medium in Art? By Medium I assume we mean the material or physical datum which the artist handles: paint and canvas; chalk and paper; marble or bronze; brick or stone or concrete; the tones of an instrument or the human voice; the human body, its gestures and attitudes, whether in actual space as in dancing or acting, or in imaginary space as in the cinematograph film. By Technique I mean the manipulation of these media. The Mind refers, I take it, to the mind of the artist as well as of the spectator or listener (recipient), but chiefly to the former. As regards the term Art, I must beg leave to make one or two more extensive observations. In the first place we would, I believe, all agree that Art represents but a segment of the whole range of aesthetic activity. The aesthetic attitude embraces the appreciation of natural objects as well as of artefacts; it covers certain borderlands of Art such as cere- monial and ritual which have admittedly artistic sanities; it permeates ordinary human intercourse in what we vaguely call ‘ manners.’ As a matter of personal conviction, I hold that there is nothing in the whole range of personal experience from sheer sense-experience to the most abstract thought which may not be the object of aesthetic contemplation. To speak of medium in this case becomes exceedingly difficult, because the medium is, I presume, one’s very self-as, in fact, it is in certain siano artificialmente ricuciti per 1’ illusione extraestetica di raggiungere 1’ unit&. Con particolare evidenze i suoi saggi recenti, specie quello su Goethe, mostrano la volonth di sottoporre quasi ogni dramma, quasi ogni poema all’ analiii disgregatrice che la filologia romantica sperimentb sui poemi omerici.” (pp. xix-xx.) G. A. Borgese, Xtoriu ddla critim romntica in Italia, Treves, Milano. 1920. 28 Mind and Medium in Art types of acting: la plastique de l’cime. Of this vast realm of sometimes most tenuous and elusive experience, the title restricts us to the most condensed-if I may use a contradiction in terms-the most material, but also the most deliberate and most intentional form of the aesthetic state. 11. Further, I believe it to be important to point out the distinction between Art in its static and Art in its dynamic aspect. The distinction is important because, though it is constantly overlooked, it affects the relation between mind and mdumin several particulars, and incidentally also the conception of a history of Art, the interplay of social and individual factors and the continuity of artistic and aesthetic tradition. By Art in its static aspect I mean what I cannot do better than describe as “the objective world of Art,” i.e. the accumulations of art- treasures in our museums and collections, the art-objects as material things, independently of all considerations of their subjective origins, the intentions and ideals of their creators; independently also of our aesthetic attitude to them, regarded merely as objects, as remains of antiquity or illustrations of the past. Art in its dynamic aspect is Art regarded from the point of view of the creative artist or actively appreciating recipient; as an aesthetic object. There is of course a constant interchange between these two conceptions of Art. An art-object which today is dynamic for me, may to-morrow have become static. A picture may one day belong in my eyes to the objective world of Art and the next day may assume a dynamic aspect. To say that as a static object it had no aesthetic exist- ence for me, is of course true-that is precisely the distinction-; yet I knew all along that it was an art-object and was regarded as such by others for whom it had become dynamic. And its claim to become dynamic for me also was there with it and exercised a certain moulding influence upon my aesthetic attitude. This silent, collective and largely anonymous pressure of the “objective world of Art” is probably the most potent agency in the art-education of the individual. It represents in its cumulative force, created by the forgotten but combined verdict of past generations-to whom it also owes its preservation-a tremendous standardising power upon the schooling of appreciation and produces adaptations, expectancies, apperceptions and emotional reactions which in their varying degree of rigidity and durability result in more or less fixed habits of taste. This applies to generations as well as individuals. The “objective world of Art” and dynamic Art are naturally never co- EDWARDBULLOUGIH 29 extensive. For the majority of persons the vast number of art-objects never become dynamic; but the appeal to become so remains and is satisfied in proportion to the powers of imagination, the emotional elasticity and the extension of the organised interests of the individual appreciator. The same standardising pressure is exercised upon the artist. The beginnings of every artist are necessarily imitative. What should he imitate but what was there before him? This necessity is reinforced by the capacity of absorption and of admiration which distinguishes the artist as a psychological type. It is further forced upon him by +he perpetual technical struggle in which every actively creative artist lives. Defeat in this struggle means incapacity or mannerism. Indeed, it is precisely on the technical side that static Art exercises its strongest influence upon the artist, for it represents the continuity of technical development-distinct from, though not unrelated to, the aesthetic discontinuity of Art history-and technique is the one thing in Art that can be taught-up to a certain point. Incidentally static Art acts as a kind of background for the ricochet of general public sentiment and its attitude towards Art upon the artist, and as a reaction both to this sentiment and to the technical teaching beyond the point where in the artist’s development technique ceases to be impersonal, common know- ledge and becomes an intimately personal process interwoven with his artistic imagination, static Art becomes the spring-board of reaction, revolt and revolution.