C%H I rtin itf SiDoiiMtiipj mm iX% m

DIV. 10 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION VOL. 2 (1)

Involution. Creativity, and Aesthetics (.«re*jor\ I, Feist, Guest Fditor

Ernst Haeckel - Kunstformen der Natur. Tafel 74: Cypnpedium (Orchideac. Venusblumen), 1904 Sir Edward Povnter - A Comer of the Villa

Emile Mimicr - llcr '.'nai dian ain'cl

km

Sir l.iiwrcinc Mniu-Tadema f a I iii ihl\ Paradise

William Alolplw Bouguereau - L'Anwur an papillon William Adolphv Bougneremt Le Coquillage Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1)

Contents Evolution, Creativity, and Aesthetics - Gregory J. Feist, Guest Editor 33 Creativity as a Secondary Darwinian Process 2 Three Perspectives on Evolution, Creativity, and Aesthetics Dean Keith Simonton Gregory J. Feist 39 The Role of Creativity in the Dialectical Evolution of Ideas 3 An Evolutionary Perspective on the Nature of Art Robert J. Sternberg Nancy E. Aiken 7 Ars Brevis, Vita Longa: The Possible Evolutionary Antecedents of 44 Division 10 News Art and Aesthetics Message from the President John L. Bradshaw Sandra W. Russ 11 Natural and Sexual Selection in the Evolution of Creativity Message from the Past President Gregory J. Feist Robert J. Sternberg 16 Fit To Be Eyed: Genes, Culture and Creative Minds Charles J. Lumsden Editorial 20 Aesthetic Fitness: How Sexual Selection shaped Artistic Virtuosity Colin Martindale as a Fitness Indicator and Aesthetic Preferences as Mate Choice Criteria Div. 10 Executive Committee endorses Bob Sternberg for Goeffrey F. Miller APA President 25 An Evolutionary Perspective on Aesthetics Announcements Gordon H. Orians 30 Creativity in Art: Stylistic Waves and Monotonic Evolutionary Division 10 2001 APA Program Trends (Information Approach) Vladimir M. Petrov Division 10 Information

Join Division 10 Membership Application Division 10: Psychology and the Arts Name: Mailing Address: Email: Phone: (Work) (Home) Applying to Division 10 as (circle one): Fellow Member Associate Affiliate Student Affiliate APA Membership Number (if already a member) Annual Dues: $17.00 for Members, Associates, and non-APA-Affiliates; $10.00 for Student Affiliates

Fill out and mail to: American Psychological Association, Division 10: Psychology and the Arts, 750 First Street, NE, Washington DC 20002-4242 ¥ ¥ Vol 2 (1) Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Three Perspectives on Evolution, Creativity, and Aesthetics sures, whereas the more ornamental forms of creativity (art and aesthetics) Gregory J. Feist are shaped most by sexual selection pressures. Lumsden is one of the pio­ College of William & Mary neers in applying evolutionary theory to the study of creativity and along with E.O. Wilson has proposed a theory of gene-culture coevolution. In This special issue of Bulletin of Psychology this theory he argues that biological evolution in and of itself is not enough and the Arts signifies a shift, perhaps even a revo­ to explain human evolution, but rather human evolution is a dual function lutionary paradigm shift, that has taken place in of genetic change and the mind's ability to shape and change its own devel­ the social sciences over the last 20 years. Darwin's opment. In this sense Lumsden can be placed in both the primary and the theory of evolution is no longer reserved for the cultural perspectives and may well be foreshadowing the next phase of biological and life sciences, but has become a pow­ evolutionary theory as applied to creativity. Miller's contribution rests on erful force in the social sciences, especially psy­ the assumption that human creative and aesthetic abilities are a function of chology. sexual selection pressures through mate choice because they are reliable Which is not to say evolutionary theory has signals of fitness. These abilities indicate not only the individual has good become the dominant power within psychology, genes but is in good health and possesses superior intellectual capacity. for it clearly has not and still meets with much resistance and criticism. Miller goes on to argue that aesthetic judgment has an adaptive function Some of these reservations are justified and some of them are not. Indeed, and is not merely a co-opted by product as other theorists (such as Pinker as anyone who attempts to think hard and deeply about the issues must and Gould) have recently argued. Finally, Orians argues that we have acknowledge, there are real difficulties with applying Darwin's theory of evolved preferences for certain kinds of ancestral environments. These natural and sexual selection to the complex behaviors of humans, espe­ evolved preferences revolve around 4 basic problems of survival: safety, cially the "higher reaches of human nature" seen in creativity, aesthetics, food acquisition, shelter, and choosing associates for reproduction, forag­ and intelligence. I do. however, predict that some time in the future (maybe ing, protection, and gaining status. Sensory preferences are the result of distant, maybe near) that the evolutionary perspective will reach the level evolved and adaptive sensory constraints and filters. Aesthetic and emo­ of importance in psychology that it has in biology if for no other reason tional preferences adaptive responses to these basic problems of survival. than if one does acknowledge the fact that humans are the result of evolu­ tionary forces, and the human brain is one such product, then human be­ Secondary Darwinism, by contrast, applies Darwinian theory metaphori­ havior ultimately must be viewed as a product of evolution. This includes cally to the cognitive processes involved in creativity. That is, evolutionary the human mind. processes are analogous to how creative ideas are born and survive and therefore become a model of creative thought. Simonton argues that cre­ If we are to understand how the mind of modern //. sapiens got to ative behavior and achievement is the result of a process of "blind-varia­ where it is and allows the species to behave in the ways that it does, espe­ tion and selective retention" (BVSR). Simonton integrates and review evi­ cially its unique capacity for creative thinking and behavior, then under­ dence from cognitive, personality, developmental, and social psychology standing its evolutionary history becomes essential. Why has only one spe­ consistent with the BVSR model of creativity. He goes on to argue that the cies of one genus in the history of life on this planet developed religion, model not only explains and organizes known data in these fields, but can art, and science? The answer has to lie in the evolutionary pressures that also provide specific predictions about the kinds of career paths, aesthetic shaped the bodies—and brains—of modern humans. stylistic change over time, and the probabilities of "multiple discoveries" After much underground and latent growth the evolutionary perspec­ occurring in certain conditions. tive is slowly but now steadily catching hold. Dozens of books have ap­ The third perspective offered by various contributors could perhaps be peared in the last 10 years on the evolution of mind and the present special conceptualized as a subset under the secondary Darwinian perspective, but issue is in many respects a refinement of this movement. Creativity and I feel it is distinct enough to warrant its own category. This viewpoint sees aesthetics are to my way of thinking two of the most fascinating and pow­ the evolution of culture as the central theme in understanding the creative erful expressions of the human mind and a critical mass of scholars who and aesthetic process. In this sense, the third position could be labeled study creativity and aesthetics from an evolutionary perspective has now "cultural evolution" in contrast to biological evolution. As mentioned above, been reached. We have been fortunate to get many of the key figures in the Lumsden's model of gene-culture coevolution falls under the rubic of pri­ field to contribute to this special issue. mary Darwinism as well as this third perspective of cultural evolution. Petrov There are 3 distinct perspectives presented by the authors of the special takes an informations approach to analyzing the aesthetic stylistic patterns issue. Two of these perspectives fall along the lines of what Simonton (1999) over historical time periods. Specifically he sees the opposing aesthetic has termed the "primary v. secondary" forms of Darwinism. Primary Dar­ styles of "analytic and synthetic" or "left and right hemispheric" as the two winism focuses on the biological evolution of the organism. For the special competing and vacillating styles. The essence of these two styles is the issue, the primary perspective plays out in its focus on the literal evolution degree to which literary, architectural, musical, painting, and poetic styles of creative and aesthetic abilities, namely how did//, sapiens come to have exhibit symmetry, rationality, order, and logic on the one hand (left hemi­ the creative and aesthetic abilities that it currently possesses. Aiken pre­ spheric) or asymmetry, irrationality, chaos, and emotion on the other (right sents both an historical and philosophical overview of aesthetics. She then hemispheric). Petrov then presents evidence that the predominant trends argues that evolutionary theory can improve upon the historical view that and styles vacillate between these two extreme at roughly 50 year intervals. the aesthetic response is cool, rational, and disinterested as well as great art Sternberg views cultural evolution as the result of dialectical tension be­ imitates nature. From an evolutionary perspective the aesthetic response is tween three sets of psychological phenomena: intelligence, creativity, and not cool and disinterested but rather a part of the inherent affective re­ sponse system. In this sense it is quite utilitarian. Aiken argues that an wisdom. Intelligence is the conservative thesis, creativity the radical an­ evolutionary perspective can and does address questions such as "What is tithesis, and wisdom the balancing synthesis ofthe two. Intelligence is (In­ aesthetic response?" "What is beauty?" "What is good art?" and "What is ability to adapt, creativity the ability to change, and wisdom the ability (o universal value?" Bradshaw addresses the question of the evolutionary an­ balance. tecedents of art and aesthetics from the perspective of neuroscience, spe­ These three distinct perspectives demonstrate just some ofthe richness cifically the rules for perceptual processing. He looks for answers of the that an evolutionary understanding of human behavior can bring: behavior origins of art in early archeological record of artifacts, namely nonrepre- that includes complex phenomena such as creativity and aesthetics. The sentational dots, lines, and curves, as well as ochre crayons, objets trouves human mind did not just appear fully formed on this planet and if we are to and manuports of interesting pebbles, crystals and fossils. He argues that understand its internal workings, we must appreciate how it came to be. antecedents of art can be seen in primates, and the Acheulean (erectus) and The theory of evolution can provide us with some answers, and the contri­ Mousterian (Neanderthal) cultures of early hominids. Feist attempts to butions presented here offer a glimpse as to what these answers may be. apply principles of Darwinian theory, cognitive archeology, and evolution­ ary psychology to the phenomenon of human creativity, specifically focus­ Gregory J. Feist ing on the role of natural and sexual selection. He argues that both natural Department ofl\syilioli>|/y and sexual selection pressures have shaped the human capacity to be cre­ College of William & Mary ative, but different forms of selection have shaped different forms Williamsburg. VA ,MIH/ K /<)S ol creativity. The more applied forms of creativity (technology, sci ence and engineering) are shaped most by natural selection pres Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) the Greek Ideal. In the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, which is the main journal of philosophical aesthetics, are papers which cite Plato, An Evolutionary Perspective on the Nature of Art Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel. In fact, in the fall, 2000 issue is an article on Nancy E. Aiken Aristotle (Worth, 2000) and an article which derives directly from Plato in Guysville, OH 45735 its contention that the value of a work of art is independent of the experi­ ence of the work of art (Sharpe, 2000). Postmoderism (poststructuralism Abstract or deconstructionism) is a reaction against Platonism, but it has not es­ Aesthetics, the philosophy of art, is built upon Plato's Idealism, but caped Platonic ideas. Led by Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault in France, this structure has brought theory to nihilism, and the legacy of traditional the deconstructionists refute Plato but offer in return only the notions that aesthetics has obscured the potential role that post-Darwinian science might we cannot really know anything and that everything is relative (See Caputo, offer. Nevertheless, scholars from many disciplines from the humanities to 1997; Derrida, 1987; Evans,1991; Sallis, 1987; and for a carefully rea­ the social and life sciences have been thinking about art from the view­ soned discussion of deconstructionist theory and an evolutionary alterna­ point of evolution. This paper briefly discusses the route most aestheticians tive see Carroll, 1995). How did these scholars, mainstream and postmodern, have taken toward ascertaining the nature of art, suggests why a new ap­ arrive at these conclusions and what are the "seeds of their own destruction"? proach is needed, offers a brief introduction to what evolutionary theory The Greek ideal can provide as a framework for thinking about art, and notes some of the progress already made by evolutionists who have been studying the nature of art. Plato had a grand plan of what we are and what we should do, includ­ An Evolutionary Perspective on the Nature of Art ing ideas on religion, ethics, society, culture, and art. At the core of Plato's philosophy was the notion that our everyday doings are but mere shadows A number of years ago as a student in a graduate class in aesthetics, I of reality. Reality was the "Ideal" or what ought to be. Our purpose in life was told that I asked the wrong kind of questions about art. The professor should be to aspire to know what is the ideal person, the ideal way to live, informed me that the appropriate philosophical questions were "What is the ideal government - to obtain knowledge of what ought to be. Accord­ art?" and "How can it be defined?" The questions I was asking were "Why ing to Plato, the gods made the "forms" or the "ideals." For example , there do we make art?" and "What is aesthetic response?" These questions, he is a Divine Realm in which exists the form or Ideal of a bed; a carpenter emphasized, were psychological questions - not philosophical questions. makes beds after the Ideal of a bed; and a painter makes copies of the Since my questions were "psychological" questions, I began my research carpenter's beds. A carpenter is a craftsman and a maker of things after the with psychology and soon included neuroscience and the study of emo­ Ideals, but a painter is an imitator, third from the Ideal, because the painter tional response. In the process I discovered two scholars who took evolu­ tries to imitate not the Ideal but the work of craftsmen. Therefore, painters tionary theory as the basis for scientific inquiry into the nature of art, Rich­ imitate appearances and not the truth of the object; painters draw beds only ard G. Coss and Ellen Dissanayake, and I felt confident that I was now on from certain angles and the whole truth of the bed cannot be discerned my way to making progress in my quest to learn about the nature of art. (Plato, Bk. X, pp. 597e-598a). In the same way poets, such as Homer, may Since the time of Plato and Aristotle, it has been realized that art evokes "imitate images of virtue" but have no grasp of the truth of virtue (Plato, emotion; Aristotle, unafraid of the kind of questions he should ask, gave Bk. X, p. 600e). Plato thought that poets strengthen the worst in people by considerable attention to the question "How does art evoke emotion?" That arousing and nourishing their emotions. To him, reason is good; emotion is the question I wanted to answer. I felt that the answer to that question, if is bad. Because they arouse emotions, Plato would not allow "imitative one could be found, would open many more doors to discovering the na­ artists" in his Utopia (Plato, Bk. X, pp. 602a - 608c). ture of art. I believe, now, that I was correct. I have found a way that art evokes emotion, and that has explained the neural mechanism which causes Looking at what Plato thought about art, I find at least two major prob­ feelings to arise in the presence of art, and, enroute, has begun to open lems. First, his idea about art does not hold true for all art. While his idea those many doors (Aiken, 1998a, 1998b). The key factor in the success of may have seemed appropriate for his time and culture, it does not apply to this quest is taking evolutionary theory as the framework from which to non-imitative art or to the arts of pre-industrial cultures, which comprise work. I am not alone. Besides Coss, Dissanayake and me, several other the preponderance of examples of art over many tens of thousands of years. scholars have based their study of art on evolutionary theory and the re­ How can one argue that one of Picasso's cubist portraits is, indeed, an sults are very exciting. Currently, I am preparing a review article on the imitation of an image of an Ideal person? What Ideal does a performance study of the nature of art from an evolutionary viewpoint and an overview artist imitate when he stands on a street corner and cuts himself with razor of this work can be seen there (Aiken, in preparation). Here, 1 will discuss blades? How can African or Oceanic art be explained in terms of Platonic the route philosophical aesthetics has traveled to answer questions about Ideals? One way out of this difficulty for the Platonist is to assert that none the nature of art, provide a little of the evolutionary framework which schol­ of these examples is art. Given, however, the overwhelming acceptance of ars have used to think about art, and discuss some of the progress made by all of these examples as art, that method of defense is, no doubt, overruled. evolutionists who see art as a necessary part of being human. A definition must be comprehensive or it has no value as a definition. A Aesthetic theory theory of what art is must be comprehensive, and for an evolutionist, it should include everything from decorated spear throwers to the performance Historically, most aestheticians have regarded art as superfluous, as artist spattered in blood. icing on the cake of culture. (Clive Bell and John Dewey are two notable Second, Plato's argument is inconsistent. Plato characterized artists as exceptions.) Most recently Stephen Pinker in his best-selling How the imitators of things as they ought to be, e.g. craftsmen of sculptures of Ideal Mind Works asks "What is it about the mind that lets people take pleasure men and women and not just ordinary men and women. In Plato's view art in shapes and colors and sounds and jokes and stories and myths?" (Pinker, should help people learn about the Ideals. Although Plato would exile 1997, p. 523). This is a good question and one that scholars who take an poets such as Homer who arouse emotions, he also felt that "education in evolutionary perspective are beginning to answer. However, Pinker adopts music and poetry is most important" (Plato, Bk. Ill, p. 401e). In Plato's the prevalent attitude and assumes art is nonutilitarian. He discusses the Utopian Republic the only poets allowed would be "austere and less plea­ mysteriousness of art and concludes that a reason for this obscurity is that sure-giving" and would "imitate the speech of a decent person" (Plato, Bk. the arts are not adaptive in the evolutionary sense. He writes, "As far as Ill, p. 398b). The proper music and poetry were important to Plato "be­ biological cause and effect are concerned, music is useless." (Pinker, 1997, cause rhythm and harmony permeate the inner part of the soul more than p. 528). Furthermore, he suspects that "music is auditory cheesecake" anything else, affecting it most strongly and bringing it grace, so that if (Pinker, 1997, p. 534). Pinker is assuming the stance of over 2000 years of someone is properly educated in music and poetry it makes him graceful, philosophical thought about art, but he notes that "Theories of art carry the but if not, then the opposite." Also, the proper education in music and seeds of their own destruction" (Pinker, 1997, p. 523) and, on this, his poetry will allow a person to "sense it acutely" when a thing has not been perception is quite clear. Those of us who have taken an evolutionary finely crafted or "made in the likeness of nature." A person so educated perspective when thinking about art have reached the same conclusion, will have the right taste and will "praise fine things, be pleased by them, but, rather than accept the conclusions of a theory that carries "the seeds of receive them into his soul, and, being nurtured by them, become fine and its own destruction," we have looked for the possibility that art has adap­ good" (Plato, Bk. Ill, p. 40le). While Plato would have art to be cerebral tive value. and coolly instructive, his description includes sensual terms. It ap­ The theories of art which "carry the seeds of their own destruc­ pears that while Plato thought art ought to be cerebral, at the same tion" are based largely on the ideas of pre-Darwinian philosophers. time it actually is visceral. James Urmson suggests that Plato's Mainstream aesthetic theory is based upon Plato and Aristotle and Vol 2(1) Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts real problem wilh poets and painters is that he thought only philosophers seems to be the case that objects depicted in paintings are not the source of could comprehend good and evil. Urmson points out that Plato, in his aesthetic pleasure, this insight of Kant's was misconstrued into the idea ••l/xil'W (p 'Id), has Soerates say, "The poets say many fine things, but that art has no utilitarian value. know nothing of that of which they speak" (Urmson, 1982, p. 130). Kant also noted that the pleasure evoked by art seems to have nothing In the years since Plato wrote about what he thought art ought to be to do with conception; that is, art can be responded to without first form­ philosophers have followed in Plato's footsteps. Perhaps Plato's succes­ ing ideas about it. The response can be visceral, as Plato admitted but dis­ sors have confused Plato's notion of what art ought to be with Plato's un- liked. Plato preferred art that is cerebral, but it took 20* century pop and happiness with art's visceral qualities. This situation has resulted, I think, concept art to make aestheticians see that art can be both cerebral and in an attempt by philosophy to provide for art criticism, which deals with visceral. Consequently, this notion of Kant's cannot answer the question of art as it is, a basis built upon what art ought to be according to Plato. As universality, without help from science. will be seen, this situation has brought aesthetic theory to a dead end which The question of universality can be answered by the visceral quality of has resulted in the nihilism and relativism of postmodern thinking. Aes­ art, however. We now know that human beings share common emotions. I thetics is in a position now much as it was when David Hume brought it to have argued that it is these universal emotions which are aroused by art nihilism and relativism in the eighteenth century (See Hume, 1965) causing (Aiken, 1998a). We now know that it is not necessary to conceive of an Immanuel Kant to react with new and positive ideas which propelled aes­ idea of an emotion for the emotion to behaviorally take place (for example: thetics as a discipline into the twentieth century (Kant, 1951). Cannon, 1929; LeDoux, 1994; Panksepp, 1998). Emotions are controlled Kantian improvements upon the Greek ideal by precortical centers in the brain and can operate without cognition or Kant, by most accounts, described the core of aesthetic thinking that conscious thought, which is controlled by centers in the cortex (LeDoux, has prevailed, at least, until the last several decades. Kant's ideas about art 1992, 1994; Panksepp, 1998). Because emotions can be generated subcon­ were concerned only with the "high" or "fine" art of Western civilization sciously, we have difficulty expressing in words what we have felt. There­ which tended to be imitative art not unlike that which provoked Plato's fore, while we feel something when we contemplate art and, as Kant ex­ views on art. Looking at some of Kant's tenets about art, we shall see where plained, it is not interest in the object depicted, it has been most difficult to they lead and how science might resolve some conflicts. describe the feeling or to determine from whence it has arisen. This is the In actual practice people agree on the "goodness" of some works of art so-called problem of expression which has interested aestheticians since some of the time. This implies a common sense assessment that people Aristotle. should agree on the "goodness" of some works of art some of the time. Because our interest in art lies not in any utilitarian value, the notion of Apparently, Kant agreed with this common sense premise because he as­ "disinterest," as accepted by aestheticians since Kant, has effectively sumed that there are "universal aesthetic judgments," (Kant, 1951) which stamped out any urge to ask if aesthetic response has any practical value is in opposition to David Hume's view that aesthetic judgments are relative (Danto, p. 105). This is an important end result of the dialectic on "pure to the person and the culture in which the person lives. If, however, Kant aesthetic reflection" because it has closed off important avenues of reflec­ were right, at least two questions come to mind: 1) What is "good" in art? tion and research. For example, the psychological and neurobiological and 2) On what basis can aesthetic judgments be universal? Kant an­ research on emotion has not been interesting to aestheticians because, I swered the first question by mirroring Plato's demand that good art be beau­ would assume, normal emotional response was not equated with aesthetic tiful and beautiful art should imitate nature. "Nature is beautiful because it response. It would seem that the assumption is that since normal emo­ looks like art, and art can only be called beautiful if we are conscious of it tional response seems to have practical value and aesthetic response does as art while yet it looks like nature" (Kant, 1951, p. 149). Kant was not not, there must be no connection between the two. Yet, no one had de­ only echoing Plato, but also the artistic convention of his own time and scribed aesthetic response in biological terms until I tried to do so, and my place when he argued that "good" art must be beautiful and to be beautiful, description is in terms of normal emotional response (Aiken, 1998a). So, art must imitate nature. As aesthetician Arthur Danto writes: "aesthetics while it can be argued that aesthetic response can have a universal quality, was hammered out as a discipline at a time when art had been singularly that quality goes beyond Kant's notion of "disinterest." Futhermore, the stable in its practice and conception over several centuries, and where such idea of "disinterest" has led aestheticians into theoretical dead ends. revolutions in art as there may have been were in the nature of reversions to What evolutionary theory has to offer aesthetics earlier conditions - from rococo to neoclassicism in the time of Kant, and Evolutionary theory can offer aesthetics a new framework for theory from romanticism to Pre-Raphaelitism in the time of Schopenhauer" (Danto, and research. It can replace Idealism with an empirically validated base 1996, p. 107). As Danto points out, Kant's idea about "good" in art has from which to work. It can provide scholars who study the nature of art become more and more difficult to defend in light of the artistic develop­ many opportunities for productive ideas and research. ments of the twentieth century (Danto, 1996). This philosophical argu­ Darwin discussed the beauty of bird song and plumage that seemingly ment, which grew out of European tradition, has also proved difficult to resulted from the pressures of sexual selection (Darwin, 1874). Following defend upon late twentieth century acknowledgment of the arts of other Darwin a number of scholars gave special attention to art from an evolu­ societies. Kant's definition of what constitutes good art simply does not tionary point of view (Aiken, 1999), but interest subsequently waned as a hold for the arts of all cultures; thus, it is exclusive and fails as a definition. result of social Darwinism. However, with the publication of E.O. Wilson's The second question raised by Kant's notion that universal aesthetic Sociobiology in 1975 scholars from various disciplines again began look­ judgments are possible is "On what basis can aesthetic judgments be uni­ ing at their research from an evolutionary point of view. They began to versal?" Aesthetician Patricia Matthews writes that Kant solves this "prob­ think of behavior as an evolved mechanism just like a wing or an arm, a lem of taste" by arguing that a particular feeling of pleasure is uniform hand or a paw. Behavior, it began to be understood, was as important to an among people and is the source of agreement in matters of taste or aesthetic organism's survival as its morphology - and the two are intertwined. Mor­ judgments, and that this feeling of pleasure is "pure aesthetic reflection" phology and behavior obviously evolved together; therefore, evolutionary which is universally valid (Matthews, 1996, p. 165). In Kant's effort to theory would apply to animal behavior as well as animal anatomy. sort out the components of aesthetic response, he noted that this pleasure Human beings, of course, pose problems for study because we have which art evokes does not seem to have anything to do with any interest in obscured our evolutionary history with cultural history. That makes our the objects depicted in paintings (see Matthews, 1996, pp. 166-167). The study more difficult than other animals, but it does not make it impossible. pleasure we get from Andy Warhol's painting of a can of soup has nothing We have discovered that our behavior revolves around the same motives to do with the soup. The quality of the painting does not depend on how that drive other animals: food in our bellies, shelter, mates, raising off­ good the soup tastes; the painting does not make us hungry for soup. (Note spring, and survival. Our cultural traditions sometimes mask these drives, that this point is relevant to the "preference" studies which evolutionary but significant progress, nevertheless, has been made in understanding why psychologists have applied to their ideas about art and which are discussed we do the things we do. Understanding why we make art has been a diffi­ later in this paper.) Kant called this aspect of aesthetic response "disinter­ cult endeavor, but the first solid breakthroughs are taking shape. est" which his followers construed to mean that since art does not interest If an evolutionary perspective is taken when studying any behavior, the people for any utilitarian reason, it must have not utilitarian value. Ever questions generally asked are: "Is this behavior more or less universal in since Kant, the assumed nonutilitarian quality of art works has been this species?" "Is this behavior rather stereotyped within the spe­ the focus of discussions about what is meant by "disinterest." Thus, cies?" "Does this behavior appear without special training?" If Stephen Pinker's comment that "music is auditory cheesecake"1 the answers are yes, then the assumption is made that the behavior (Pinker, 1997, p. 528) is the result of a long tradition. While it probably was shaped by evolutionary forces, is inherited, and has Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) purpose for the survival, well-being, or reproductive efforts of the indi­ "What is good art?" and "What is universal value?" Although the last vidual. While much animal behavior falls into this category, many human be­ three questions are not exactly the same, for our purposes here, let us group haviors do not. Therefore, those who study human behavior have the added prob­ them together as one: "What is good art?' Let us look first at this question. lem of sorting so-called innate behaviors from so-called cultural behaviors. Evolutionary theory can help clarify what is meant by "good" art. Evolu­ We readily concede that walking upright, talking, and conscious thought tionary psychologists have made some interesting discoveries about what are behaviors universal to our species, but until Ellen Dissayanake pro­ they think people consider to be good art. Kant equated good art with posed it. no one considered art making and art appreciating also to be uni­ beautiful art, and beautiful art, he wrote, looks like nature. Gordon Orians versal human behaviors (see, for example, Dissanayake, 1988,1992,2000). has studied what landscapes we prefer and points out that landscape paint­ I considered her notion in some depth (Aiken, 1998a) and argued that aes­ ings that have proved to be popular are those which include our preferred thetic response 1) appears universally in the human species, 2) requires habitat which he has found to be the savannah (see Orians, this issue; Orians little conscious thought (the emotional response requirement of aesthetic & Heerwagen, 1992). Orians has carried Kant's Platonic notion one step response), 3) requires no training for the initial emotional response, and 4) further: not only is a painting beautiful because it looks like nature, it is is relatively stereotyped in that the emotional response is predictable de­ especially beautiful because it looks like a habitat suitable for successful pending on what stimuli elicits it. These meet the requirements of highly human survival. Other researchers have found that people find symmetri­ biologically constrained behaviors (see Jolly, 1972; Keil, 1981). Art mak­ cal faces and bodies more attractive than their irregular counterparts (For ing also fits these requirements. As Ellen Dissayanake has pointed out 1) example, see Gangestad, Thornhill, & Yeo, 1994; Manning, 1995; Singh, the arts appear universally in human societies, 2) in pre-industrial societ­ 1993; Thornhill & Gangestad, 1994). The underlying theory driving these ies enormous amounts of time, energy, and resources often are devoted to studies is the notion that we, like other animals, have inherited tendencies the arts. 3) the arts are generally a source of great pleasure, and 4) young to select habitats where our ancestors thrived and mates whose regular fea­ children are naturally predisposed to engage in the arts in terms of mark- tures signaled a healthy body. These studies have merit because they give making, moving to music, singing, wordplay, dressing up, and inventing us some information on personal preferences which may have some uni­ and acting out stories (Aiken, in preparation). In fact, the rudimentary versal basis and which probably are adaptive. images universally drawn by young children are also drawn by prehistoric However, these studies cannot answer the question "What is good art?" and by traditional peoples throughout the world (Aiken, 1998a; Fein, 1993). because they make two invalid assumptions 1) art is beautiful because it Dissanayake argues that human beings have a propensity to make the ordi­ looks like nature and 2) that value in art is based on popular preference. nary extraordinary especially in biologically important circumstances where The argument that we like certain landscape paintings because they employ the outcome is significant (Dissanayake, 1988, 1992,2000). This propen­ all of the things we need for a safe habitat that also has food, water, and sity, which can be seen in ceremonial rituals in all human societies, ac­ counts for the origin of art making. Consequently, two species specific shelter is much the same as Plato's argument that painters paint pictures of behaviors, aesthetic response and art making, can be considered as highly ideal things. We have already seen that interest in art does not arise from biologically constrained behaviors, and, as such, can be considered for study interest in the objects depicted. Also, these are "preference" studies; that as behaviors that are evolved (genetically predisposed) and adaptive (con­ is, the researchers asked people what they preferred from an array of pic­ tributing to the well-being of the individual). What this analysis immedi­ tures of landscapes or faces. Aestheticians will argue that beauty or good­ ately does is to make possible a scientific inquiry into the nature of art and ness or value in art is not decided by a popular poll. If popularity deter­ to invalidate the notion that art is "cheesecake." mined good art, paintings of Elvis Presley on black velvet would be high on the list of most-wanted museum acquisitions (see Komar & Melamid, Probably, the most important thing evolutionary theory can offer aes­ 1997 and Dissanayake, 1998 for further discussion). thetics is the validation of art as a necessary part of human life rather than The question of what determines good art is a complex and difficult as a nonutilitarian extra. If one looks at art from an evolutionary perspec­ one to answer, but taking an evolutionary point of view allows us to look at tive, the pervasiveness of artful behavior is widely observable in human art from all times and cultures and the assessments of that art by peers and activities. That is, art - in one form or another - is part of every culture in those of other times and cultures. It allows us to assume a certain univer­ every known time and place. The arts result from the human behavior of sality to our aesthetic judgments, and - something aestheticians seldom making ordinary things special through elaboration and care and include have felt free to do - look for universals in aesthetic judgments. We can everything from body decoration to symphonies (Dissanayake, 1988,1992, also divide the emotional content from the cognitive content of an aesthetic 2000). Consequently, even though aestheticians have never agreed upon a judgment, and examine it from psychological, physiological, and experien­ definition of art, those of us who take an evolutionary perspective when tial angles (see my analysis in Aiken, 1998a). thinking about art, stretch the unwritten definition of art in Western culture An evolutionary perspective can help determine what is aesthetic response. to include artifact and decoration. We have found that expanding the un­ Aesthetic judgments imply aesthetic response. My research indicates written exclusive definition, which includes only "high" or "fine" art, to that aesthetic response is based on normal emotional responses which are make it inclusive of virtually anything "made special" by artful behavior evoked by unconditioned and conditioned stimuli that are part of works of allows us to examine art in ways never before attempted. This examination art (Aiken, 1998a). I argue that the normal emotional response to uncondi­ has proven to be very productive and illuminating. It has given us the oppor­ tioned stimuli in works of art accounts for the universality of our response tunity to say that art has adaptive value and to consider what that value might be. to certain works of art. My work is based on that of Richard G. Coss, who To an evolutionist, adaptive value means that the behavior or activity proposed that we respond emotionally to certain visual configurations such or organic structure is necessary for the survival and/or the reproduction of as snake-like shapes and "eye spots" or two circles placed horizontally so the organism. Behaviors and organic structures that are necessary for the that they might appear to be eyes. Coss found that subjects' eyes dilated survival and/or the reproduction of the organism possessing them tend to significantly in response to the eye spot pattern as opposed to other pat­ be wide-spread in the species. That is, most, if not all, of the members of terns with two circles (Coss, 1965). He suggested that artists use these the species under consideration are predisposed to develop the particular stimuli to evoke emotion (Coss, 1968). I found that subjects' heart rates behavior or organic structure. Just as all human beings have hearts and and finger pulse volumes changed differently in response to eye spots than lungs, walk upright, and have opposable thumbs, all human beings exhibit to other circular patterns (Aiken, 1998b). Eye spots had demonstrated their artful behavior in circumstances about which they care. Singing, dancing, ability to evoke autonomic nervous system responses which were associ­ styling hair, painting fingernails, dressing fashionably, arranging flowers ated with fear. Neuroscience research had reached a point which allowed for the dinner table, selecting the appropriate tie to go with a shirt are me not only to explain the neural mechanism which causes this uncondi­ examples of artful behavior. Artful behavior is elaborating the ordinary tioned response to such visual and auditory stimuli, but, also, how a fear (and a key question for evolutionists is why do we elaborate ordinary be­ response could be evoked by art yet be construed as pleasurable by the haviors and things). Thus, if an evolutionary perspective is adopted when appreciator of that art. Thanks to the work of Joseph E. LeDoux (and oth­ thinking about the nature of art, it becomes apparent that art must be useful ers, e.g., the work of Zuckerman, 1985) I could make such an explanation to us and that artful behavior probably holds the key to understanding the (see Aiken, 1998a): generally, and very simply, our fear response to certain nature of art. works of art is so slight that we do not realize that we have been frightened; Some progress made by evolutionists in the study of the nature of art our cognitive evaluation of our experience is that we have been "ex­ Using evolutionary theory as the framework for thinking about cited" by the work of art, and we are pleased. the nature of art has resulted in some progress in answering ancientl Emotions tend to be subconsciously generated (Cannon, 1929; questions such as "What is aesthetic response?" "What is beauty? Panksepp, 1998). While we can respond emotionally without will Vol 2 (1) Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts or cognition, as Kant suggested and as Cannon and others have proved, which African Wodaabe women choose men for sexual encounters who, evaluation of art requires conscious thought. Emotions can be felt without besides exhibiting certain desired physical attributes, are the best deco­ "thinking" but thinking about art requires more than emotional activity. rated. However, figures on the reproductive success of selected men ver­ Aesthetic response usually includes both emotional response and conscious sus unselected men are not given, and the Wodaabe standard of beauty cognition. Conscious evaluation of the art work might result from uncon­ does not apply universally. Perhaps what the Wodaabe women are judging scious emotional response evoked by the art, but the two processes are not are fitness indicators (physical attributes of the men) which have been en­ the same and should be considered as two parts of aesthetic response. While hanced with face paint and costumes. Perhaps, artful behavior is part of all people at all times might experience a similar emotional response evoked what is selected. Skill, agility, gracefulness, the quality of a singing voice, by a particular work of art (the universal aspect of aesthetic response), their and the effort - or - apparent ease of accomplishing a difficult task could evaluation or discussion of the art work will be relative to their experiences well be judged by potential mates. As Miller suggests (pp. 281 -282), dem­ with art, their cultural expectations, their personal preferences and knowl­ onstrating one's fitness through the wasteful extravagance of art making edge, and other factors such as mood, attentiveness, and personal biases. could be a factor in the evolution of artful behavior. The question of gen­ Consequently, art has both universal and relative qualities - or - evokes der specificity still nags, however. Nevertheless, sexual selection needs to both universal and relative responses. be carefully considered as a potent force in the evolution of art as an adap­ This kind of analysis of aesthetic response is possible by taking an tive behavior - doing so will greatly enhance our understanding of our evolutionary viewpoint and an interdisciplinary approach combining neu- nature. roscience, art history, aesthetics, anthropology, ethology, and psychology. Other modes of selection are probably at work. Dissanayake argues An increasing number of scholars from a variety of disciplines are thinking that art, along with religion (as ceremonial ritual) has been a means of about art from an evolutionary perspective. Fresh ideas are being gener­ attempting to impose control on nature and, as such it has strengthened ated, and new research routes are being found - thanks to a broadening of cooperation within groups which has benefited individuals within the groups perspective. in various ways (Dissanayake, 1988,1992, 2000). Elaborate ritual and be­ How is art adaptive? lief systems provide individual security, and promote cooperation and co­ If an evolutionary approach to examining the nature of art is, indeed, hesion in an insecure world. We, among animals, are alone in knowing our the correct approach, a utilitarian function must be found for the arts. That eventual fate. We anticipate dangers that might lie before us. We are social is, art making and art appreciating must have adaptive value if artful behav­ animals who need to live in-groups, but who also think for ourselves. Thus, ior is an evolved behavior necessary for our survival and/or reproductive we need ways to promote cooperation with others in the group. Dissanayake success. As a conclusion, we will look at the beginnings of a theory of the (2000) provides numerous examples of how the arts serve evolved human function of art. needs for belonging, meaning, and a sense of competence. Evolutionary psychology supports sexual selection theory. Evolution­ She also argues that artful behavior (the propensity to elaborate) has ary psychology holds tightly to Darwin's brief discussion of sexual selec­ originated, not from sexual selection, but from offspring caretaking, spe­ tion (Darwin, 1998, pp. 117-120 and his more elaborate discussion (1874)), cifically, from caretaker-infant interactions (Dissanayake, 2000). Infants which relied heavily on animal ornamentation. Animal ornamentation, he are predisposed to respond to and interact in emotionally charged ways noted, evolved due - not to environmental pressure - but to selection pres­ with caretakers. Normal talk is elaborated into baby talk; normal facial sure by the opposite sex (Darwin, 1998). Darwin's discussion of a "stan­ expressions are magnified, movements and phrases are rhythmic and pro­ dard of beauty" contributing to evolved combined with Kant's notion that nounced. Her complex argument involves this interaction as a necessary what is beautiful in art is beautiful in nature, has led some modern evolu­ prerequisite for normal development of not just individuals, but individu­ tionary psychologists not only to look for physical features in ourselves, als in-groups. The emotional attachments necessary for cooperative be­ which have evolved due to sexual selection, but, also, to construe this situ­ havior as social animals are dependent on the rhythms and modes of care­ ation into a tentative theory of art (Thornhill, 1998; Miller, 2000). The taker-infant interaction. Furthermore, this interaction, which elaborates adaptive significance of art, according to this line of thinking, would be as normal behavior and injects it with emotional quality, provides the ground­ a vehicle for sexual selection. work for art making and appreciating. Sexual selection refers to evolution by selective pressure from poten­ My research, which led to an explanation for how art can evoke emo­ tial mates. As Miller points out (pp. 13-14) adaptations from sexual selec­ tion, also suggests another adaptive function for art. Because emotion is tion (based mostly on studies of animals other than ourselves) have special evoked below the level of conscious thought - yet emotion can direct thought features: 1) adaptations for courtship are highly developed in sexually and action - art provides a means of manipulating people without their mature adults, but not at other life stages, 2) courtship display is usually by realizing that they are being manipulated (see Aiken, 1998a). This quality males (females do the choosing), 3) females find these displays attractive, of art allows leaders to control the group and focus the group while indi­ and 4) the display often includes weaponry such as big antlers for deer viduals within the group think that what they are doing is the right thing to and/or ornamentation such as the peacock's tail. do. The payoff for the leader is enhanced access to food, shelter, and mates, According to feature 1), above, young, sexually mature adults should which is what an evolutionist would expect from an evolved, adaptive be­ be our artists of the world. However, very young children are natural and havior. Other people in the group benefit also from the safety and security very productive artists. They scribble, they make up stories, they dance of a strong, cooperating group. (Groups can be anything from traditional and sing with very little provocation. If only professional artists are con­ tribes to nations to armies to sports teams to labor unions. Art, in these sidered, success for them often comes with middle age. (Rock musicians instances, is generally not the art of museums, recital hall, or printed page, are the current exception in the Western world.) Art making and appreciat­ but is the visual display of ritual, pomp and circumstance, rhythm, stirring ing occurs at every age. oratory, waving flags, parades.) Thus, art can be, but not always is, a pow­ The second feature of a behavior or trait that has evolved via sexual erful means of controlling human behavior with big payoffs in terms of selection calls for males to be the artists. Although it can be said that most survival and/or reproductive opportunities.. recognized artists historically have been men, that fact is confounded by Consequently, taking an evolutionary perspective when considering the the lack of opportunity for women. Women were not allowed to act in nature of art can lead to new avenues of research and theory and can offer Shakespeare's plays in Elizabethan England; boys filled the female roles. another look at answers to old questions. Those of us who have taken this Mary Ann Evans had a compelling reason for writing under the pen name viewpoint when thinking about art are excited by the potential it offers. George Eliot. Women have traditionally been responsible for most care of We, of course, think that this is the correct viewpoint to take. At the very offspring, food preparation, gathering food, and planting kitchen gardens. least, it offers opportunities to investigate human nature, in general, in ways However, they also wove beautiful cloth and baskets, embroidered elabo­ never before possible. rate designs, sewed decorated quilts and clothing, set beautiful tables, and References made themselves beautiful with cosmetics, hair dye, and carefully chosen Aiken, N.E. (1998a). The biological origins of art. Westport, CT: Praeger. clothes. Some have even found the time and energy to produce great art in Aiken, N.E. (1998b). Human cardiovascular response to the eye spot threat stimulus. Evolution and Cognition, 4,51-62. the Western "elite" art sense, e.g., Mary Cassett, Georgia O'Keefe, Maya Aiken, N.E. (1999). Literature of early "scientific" and "evolution" aesthet­ Lin. Feature 3) indicates that it is the women who should most ap ics. In B. Cooke & F. Turner (Eds.) Biopoetics: Evolutionary explora­ preciate art, but men are also art lovers. tions in the arts (pp. 417-431). Lexington, KY: Paragon/ICUS. Feature 4) does not hold in the usual sense of the peacock's1 Aiken, N.E. (in preparation). The influence of sociobiology on think­ tail. Miller gives one example of male ornamentation (p. 276) in ing about the arts. In U. Segerstrale & V.S.E. Falger (Eds.) Sociobiol- Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) ogy at the millennium: Comparative reception 1975-2000. A cknowledgment Cannon, W.B. (1929). Bodily changes in pain, hunger, fear and rage: An Grateful thanks to Ellen Dissanayake for a review of a draft of this paper. account of recent researches into the function of emotional excitement (2nd ed.). NY: D. Appleton. Nancy E. Aiken Caputo. J.D. (Ed.) (1997). Deconstruction in a nutshell: A conversation P.O. Box 27 with Jacques Derrida. NY: Fordham University Press. Guysville, OH 45735 Carroll, J. (1995). Evolution and literary theory. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. Coss, R.G. (1965j. Mood provoking visual stimuli: Their origins and appli­ cations. Los Angeles: University of California Industrial Design Graduate Program. Coss, R.G. (1968). The ethological command in art. Leonardo, 1,273-287. Danto, A.C. (1996). From aesthetics to art criticism and back. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 54, 105-115. Darwin, C. (1998). The origin of species. NY: The Modern Library. (Origi­ nal work published 1859) Darwin, C. (1874). The descent of man and selection in relation to sex. (re­ vised ed.) Chicago: W.B. Conkey Company. Ars Brevis, Vita Longa: Derrida, J. (1987). The truth in painting, transl. G. Bennington & I. McLeod. The Possible Evolutionary Antecedents of Art and Aesthetics Chicago: University of Chicago Press. John L. Bradshaw Dissanayake, E. (1988). What is art for? Seattle: University of Washington Press. Monash University Dissanayake, E. (1992). Homo aestheticus: Where art comes from and why. NY: The Free Press. Abstract Dissanayake, E. (1998). Komar and Melamid discover Pleistocene taste. Art is a nonutilitarian activity that may nevertheless help us identify or Philosophy and Literature 22, 486-496. characterize constants or essentials in a changing world. Its boundaries Evans, J.C. (1991). Strategies of Deconstruction: Derrida and the myth of with "pleasing" natural objects or utilitarian human artifacts are not always the voice. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. clear, but a gratifying engagement of the normal perceptual processes may Gangestad, S.W., Thornhill, R., & Yeo, R.A. (1994). Facial attractiveness, be a significant feature. The visual artist deliberately or unconsciously seems developmental stability and fluctuating asymmetry. Ethology and Sociobiol- to select channels of information processing only recently identified by the ogy, 15, 73-85. visual scientist. While the evolutionarily-adaptive pressures are unclear, Hume, D. (1965). Of the standard of taste. In K. Aschenbrenner & A. Isenberg (Eds.) Aesthetic theories: Studies in the philosophy of art (pp. 107-119). possible precursors to "artistic behavior" are seen in the higher primates. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall. (originally pub. 1757) The archaeological record reveals appealing and immediately recognizable Jolly, A. (1972). The evolution of primate behavior. NY & London: art forms in the galleries of Ice-Age Europe of 30,000 years ago. Before Macmillan. then the record is sparser, but items of decoration, ochre crayons, scratched Kant, I. (1951 edition). Critique of judgment, transl. J.M. Bernard. NY: Hafher. markings, objets trouves and manuports of interesting pebbles, crystals and Keil, F.C. (1981). Constraints on knowledge and cognitive development. fossils provide a possible window into early minds. The beginnings of art Psychological Review, 88, 197-227. may lie in nonrepresentational dots, lines, curves, intersections and con­ Komar, V. & Melamid, A. (1997). Painting by numbers: Komar and Melamid s scientific guide to art, J. Wypijewski (ed.). NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. tours, but we may have little reason to appeal to corresponding hallucina­ LeDoux, J.E. (1992). Emotion as memory: Anatomical systems underlying tory or "entoptic phosphenes" of shamanistic activity. Although links with indelible neural traces. In S.A. Christianson (Ed.) The handbook of emotion and communicatory behavior in other species may be apparent in music, art memory: Research and theory, (pp. 269-288). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. may either have proved adaptive under conditions of runaway sexual selec­ LeDoux, J.E. (1994). Emotion, memory and the brain. Scientific American, tion, or may even be of no evolutionary or functional significance whatso­ 270, (6), 50-57. ever. Manning, J.T. (1995). Fluctuating asymmetry and body weight in men and women: Implications for sexual selection. Ethology and Sociobiology 16, Terms, meanings and directions 145-153. The visual arts were highly valued in ancient Greece and Rome, and Matthews, P.M. (1996). Kant's sublime: A form of pure aesthetic reflective their appreciation was considered a mark of culture. The amousos (uncul­ judgment. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 54 (2), 165-180. tured) individual simply was not tetragonos ("four-square", or as we would Miller, G. F. (2000). The mating mind: How sexual choice shaped the nowadays say "well-rounded"). However the etymological derivation of evolution of human nature. N.Y: Doubleday. "aesthetics", aisthetikos, signifies "perceptive" or even "perceptible" in Orians, G.H. & Heerwagen, J.H. (1992). Evolved responses to landscapes. Greek, with aisthesis simply meaning "perception." We shall in fact shortly In J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind: Evolution­ address the recently described links between perceptual processes in the ary psychology and the generation of culture, (pp. 555-579). NY: Oxford University Press. brain, and aesthetic experience. The derivation of "art" comes from the Panksepp, J. (1998). Affective neuroscience: The foundations of human Latin ars, which means something like "skill in working", and, curiously, and animal emotions. NY & Oxford: Oxford University Press. equates with scientia or "knowledge", though nowadays the two ideas, art Pinker, S.( 1997). How the mind works. NY: W.W.Norton. and science, are often contrasted. Indeed the Greek techne, originally sig­ Plato (1992 edition). Republic, transl. G.M.A. Grube; revis. C.D.C. Reeve. nifying "production", seems to capture both of the above senses of ars and Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett. scientia. To the Greeks, the object of art and aesthetics was simply to kalon Sallis, J. (Ed.) (1987). Deconstruction and philosophy: The texts of Jacques or to kallos, "the beautiful"; they would not have appreciated recent ex­ Derrida. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sharpe, R.A. (2000). The empiricist theory of artistic value. Journal of ploratory assays at deliberately provoking negative emotions with the gro­ Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 58 (4) 321-332. tesque or frightening. Singh, D. (1993). Adaptive significance of female physical attractiveness: In this paper I shall ask whether art, that apparently quintessentially Role of waist-to-hip ratio. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, human activity, is indeed unique to our species, or whether its precursors 1192-1201. may be discerned amidst the relict artifacts of our hominid ancestors, or Thornhill, R. (1998). Darwinian aesthetics. In C. Crawford & D.L. Krebs even in the "works" of other primates. I shall ask what we mean by art, (Eds.) Handbook ofevolutionary psychology: Ideas, issues, and applications (pp. 543-572). Mahwah.NJ: Erlbaum. what are its limits, and whether its practice and products correspond in Thornhill, R. & Gangestad, S.W. (1994). Fluctuating asymmetry and human some necessary way to the mechanisms and workings of the perceptual sexual behaviour. Psychological Science, 5,297-302. system, whether normal or disordered. Why do we "do" art, and is it in Urmson, JO. (1982). Plato and the poets. In J. Moravcsik & P. Temko some way complementary or alternative to language and other forms of (Eds.) Plato: On beauty, wisdom, and the arts (pp. 125-135). Totowa, NJ: communication? What, if any, are the possibly adaptive evolutionary as­ Rowman & Littlefield. pects of art, and are they perhaps more prominent and relevant in music, Worth, S.E. (2000). Aristotle, thought, and mimesis: Our responses to fic­ than in the visual or plastic arts? Conversely, is art perhaps of no evolution­ tion. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 58 (4), 333-339. Zuckerman, M. (1985). Biological foundations of the sensation-seek ary or adaptive significance whatsoever, and merely a by product of ing temperament. In J. Strelau, F.H. Farley & A. Gale (Eds.) The bio­ an advanced, disengaged brain? logical bases of personality and behavior. Washington: Hemisphere 7 Mssalj Reductionism andthe "function"of art. A scientific analysis of art and aesthetics is necessarily in part Vol 2 (1) Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts reductionist, and may be abhorrent to practitioners or cultivators of the of art. Art is like an externalization of an artist's consciousness (a window arts; thus Wheelwell (2000) inveighs with undisguised bitterness against into his or her mind?), allowing us access to the artist's way of seeing, not "....sexist scientific and reductive megalomania .... Without [scientists] merely what he or she happened to see. It is, however, interesting to note being in the least conscious of their ignorance of vast areas that lie outside that recent brain-imaging studies (Kreiman, Koch & Fried, 2000) indicate science in the narrower sense, or of the dangers and malignant consequences that the same regions are active during imagery as during perception. Why, of this ignorance" (p. 42). Nevertheless art, like language, is a quintessentially however, are we not all equally good as artists at representing, physically, human attribute and activity, Mid unlike language, tool use and other prac­ the contents of such images? Miller et al. (1998) report the release or facili­ tical human activities, it seems essentially nonutilitarian, an activity to be tation of artistic creativity in the setting of dementia. Five patients, suffer­ undertaken when we have "time out" from meeting the needs of survival. ing from frontotemporal dementia which devastated their language and So what exactly do we mean by art? Hodgson (2000), an archaeologist, social skills, revealed unexpected and previously undemonstrated artistic sees it as an attempt (in the visual mode) to render permanent and tangible talent, presumably by some form of inhibitory release. Maybe we all do that which is formally intangible and fleeting - the seeking of order, the possess untapped potential. expression of a sense of pattern, harmony and even symmetry amid a cha­ Art, the savant, and symbolism otic world of confusion. Zeki (1999), a neuroscientist, similarly sees that As Kapur (1996) notes, the results of a brain lesion are not just loss of the function of art is to search for the constant, lasting essential or enduring function in a particular topographical or cognitive area, but often also features of objects, surfaces, faces or situations, and to acquire thereby a disinhibitory processes, along with efforts from the rest of the brain to re­ deeper knowledge of them. Art, therefore, is both selective and generaliz­ establish its maximal potential. Similar functional facilitation may account ing, involving search for constancies. Can we then present a natural object for the savant syndrome, where there is abnormally preserved competence (an objet trouve like a beautifully preserved fossil or a mineral crystal) as a or even outstanding abilities in the general context of fairly profound intel­ work of art, or a photographed landscape, or even (and see Goguen, 2000) lectual deficit; this phenomenon is more common in males and is often Duchamp's urinal in all its pleasing technical perfection as an artifact, and associated with autism and obsessive compulsive disorder. Although ob­ thus submitted to the 1917 New York Exhibition? We shall, after all, shortly sessive rehearsal and practice may explain some of the findings, Pesanti et discuss the role of such objets trouves in the Paleolithic Acheulian and al. (2001) studied a calculating prodigy under PET imaging; they found Mousterian cultures as possible precursors of an aesthetic sensibility. How­ that he employed different brain areas than those employed by people un­ ever Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999), while recognizing art as a cel­ dertaking normal calculations. ebration of human individuality, nevertheless note that its "purpose" is not A classic instance of savant processes in the context of art is provided merely to depict or represent reality - which can be done easily enough by Selfe (1977); Nadia, an autistic girl, had little language and severe learn­ with a camera - but to enhance, transcend or even distort or caricaturize ing disabilities, in the presence of an amazing and apparently innate capac­ reality, so as to emphasize or exaggerate what the artist sees as the key, ity at the age of 3 to 4 to draw horses, other animals, and, latterly, humans. salient or canonical aspects. They note that artists, consciously or uncon­ When with special training she acquired language by the age of 9 years, sciously, deploy certain rules or principles to activate certain brain regions she lost her extraordinary drawing talents, almost as if they occurred at the or mechanisms via grouping, contrast, closure, symmetry etc., to help in expense of language, as an alternative medium of communication. The idea the viewer's problem-solving process; such acts of discovery in the viewer, that art may indeed be an older alternative (to language) medium of com­ by invoking requisite perceptual processes, are intrinsically gratifying, just municating or even of modeling reality is not unattractive. Studies of exci­ as in solving a puzzle. Mangan (1999) agrees that "successful" art thereby sions of the left (language) hemisphere in infancy, to control intractable intensifies the emotional, perceptual and cognitive experiences that other­ epilepsy, suggest that language is highly "valued", biologically, and may wise occur in many non-aesthetic contexts, but also observes that while preferentially take over, from the right hemisphere, processing space to the moderate variations from an expected or habitual experience may be re­ detriment of spatial skills, being maintained in whatever neural substrate is warding, extreme variations are typically adversive. Similarly, Martindale available (Baynes, 1990). Humphrey (1999) even notes that the cave art of (1999) observes that where a mild exaggeration or caricaturization of the the European Upper Paleolithic (around 30,000 years ago) bears surpris­ features of "beautiful" faces may further enhance their appeal, the averag­ ing similarities to Nadia's drawings, and therefore argues, provocatively, ing of the features of quite ordinary faces has the same effect. that the artists, though anatomically modern, may nevertheless have lacked Art and the "rules " of perceptual processing essentially modern minds. Others, conversely, such as Noble and Davidson (1996), argue that you need language, or at least symbolism, to "do" art, Zeki (1999) takes further the idea above that rules govern our percep­ and that the presence of art in the archaeological record is a possible marker tion of objects from contours, colors, planes etc., and that these rules are for the presence of language. I find both arguments unconvincing, though exploited, perhaps unconsciously, by the artist. Thus he notes that visual I would indeed be surprised if the Ice Age artists of Europe could not con­ perception is modular, involving a set of parallel systems operating within verse (and see Bradshaw, 1997). a temporal hierarchy; color is seen before form, which is seen before mo­ tion. Modularity, and the grouping of cells performing such related func­ An aesthetic sense in nonhuman primates? tions, may permit the brain to discount different kinds of information, while Westergaard and Suomi (1997) gave tufted capuchin monkeys, Cebus acquiring knowledge about different attributes. Moreover, there may be a apella, clay, paint, stones, leaves and sticks. The animals reshaped por­ similar modularity or functional specialization in visual aesthetics. If area table forms with their hands and with stones, and decorated them with V4 (in the prestriate visual cortex) is damaged, we cannot see the world in leaves and paint. They also marked clay slabs manually, and with stick and color; if area V5 (lying more anteriorly to the V4 complex) is affected, our stone tools. Westergaard and Suomi also reviewed evidence that chimpan­ ability to perceive objects in motion is compromised; another closely adja­ zees readily draw with pen and paper, though "their aesthetic sense is lim­ cent area (the fusiform gyrus) mediates our ability to recognize familiar ited, at least from a human perspective" (p. 455). Lenain (1995) notes apes' faces. (Note that according to Zeki, 1993, the exact anatomical and archi­ capacities for introducing variations that appear to be formally relevant tectonic locations and boundaries of these regions in humans is still a mat­ and aesthetic, their sense of order and balance and of relevant formal varia­ ter of dispute.) The perception of form and the awareness of meaning may tions, their taste for color contrasts, and their general evidence of visual similarly be differentially lost or preserved. An artist is, perhaps, a neu­ thinking while engaging in a free and intelligent activity. Similarly Boysen, rologist manque (unrealized in ambition), or malgre lui (despite himself). Bernston, and Prentice (1987) note that chimpanzees do not mark randomly, Thus the visual brain and the artist may strive for the same goals, with the but pay particular attention to the boundaries of the paper and to the bound­ latter seeking to exploit the characteristics of the brain's parallel process­ aries of predrawn squares. Clearly, at least 5 million years ago the seeds ing systems, often even restricting himself or herself to a single system. In were sown for an artistic sense. this way we can be helped to see things "as they really are" - again, con­ The art and culture of the Mousterian and Acheulian stancy, in an ever-changing world. Zeki (1999) argues that aesthetics, like There is a reluctance among many archaeologists to accept evidence all human activities, must obey the rules of the brain, of whose activity it is for an aesthetic sense among humans prior to the (western European) Up­ a product, and any theory of aesthetics must take account of the workings per Paleolithic "creative explosion" of rock art and artifacts between 35,000 of the brain. and 40,000 years ago; this date coincides with the apparently sudden ap­ Brown (1999), a neurologist, takes an essentially similar position: art pearance of anatomically modern humans in that region, and a technology is distinguished from ordinary perception by the intensity of the of considerable sophistication. Many would reject the idea of sym­ conceptual feelings evoked by the artist in the viewer. Content alone| bolic activity occurring before the appearance of anatomically mod­ cannot distinguish an artifact (urinal, or objet trouve) from a work ern people in the Upper Paleolithic (Chase & Dibble, 1987), while accepting that there is evidence of an aesthetic sense in the Lower Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) Paleolithic; this is apparently indicated in the pleasing symmetry, which far than 35,000 years ago in other parts of the world? Did such art evolve surpasses functional requirements, of biface tools in the Acheulian, the slowly but suddenly manifest at the right place (caves, where it might be apparent use of hematite and ochre, the presence in habitation layers of preserved) and the right time (a critical cultural mass or concentration of various manuports, objets trouves and so on of rock crystals, fossils and appropriately oriented individuals)? Why was it done - art for its own sake, pebbles naturally shaped to resemble other objects. as a form of graffiti, as a personal record of events and experiences, as a rite What then is the evidence for artistic, aesthetic or even symbolic pre­ of passage, for religious significance, shamanism, fertility magic, or for cedents in the earlier cultures of the Neanderthals, archaic H. sapiens or several or all of these reasons? Can we answer these questions by analogy even H. erectus") Acheulian flint hand axes have been found constructed with similar, recent practices of cave art in Africa and Australia? Meighan around Cretaceous fossils which have been preserved in a prominent and (1996) addresses these issues from an analysis of contemporary "geoglyphs" aesthetically pleasing location (Oakley, 1981). A scoria pebble from a in Hawaii, and identifies the following themes: 250,000 year old Acheulian occupation site of Berekhat Ram on the Golan • an "I was here" message Heights has been found in the naturally occurring shape of a female figure • recording of clan symbols - a form perhaps of territorial marking (Goren-Inbar & Peltz, 1995) with the addition of lines and grooves to ac­ • commemoration of events or of the death of notable or loved individuals centuate its likeness (d'Errico & Nowell, 2000). • doodling, to while away the time, a form of graffiti, which neverthe­ Ochre seems to have been collected (and therefore perhaps used for less involves some effort and brings some aesthetic satisfaction, at least to personal or object decoration) 300,000 years ago in the Acheulian of sev­ the artist. eral regions in Europe (Marshack, 1989). From the same period bones have Quite independently, Mulvaney (1996) records the reminiscences of been reported apparently intentionally engraved with geometric designs elderly aborigines in the north west of Australia; they apparently created (Bahn & Vertut, 1988). Microwear analysis of tools seems to indicate that considerable bodies of such art in rock-shelters while detained during pro­ they had been used to work skins and for boring and reaming (Marshack, longed periods of monsoonal rain - something to do on a rainy day! How­ 1991). Indeed, Bednarik (1997) reports the presence of cut, shaped and ever the effort and inconvenient inaccessibility of many of the European reamed beads from ostrich eggshell in the Acheulian of Libya, 320,000 Upper Paleolithic sites, coupled with the eerie quality of the likely experi­ years ago, though Bahn (personal communication) urges caution. ence, does suggest a religious, mystic or ritual contribution. In the Middle Paleolithic (the Mousterian culture of the Neanderthals), the The psychology of art archaeological record becomes richer and more evocative; however we do It is facile, but dangerous, to assume that the historical development of not know to what extent this reflects better preservation of more recent art is mirrored in the ontogenetic development of children's art, as a sort of material, despite the tendency still to dehumanize this taxon as incompe­ phylogenetic recapitulation. Indeed the parietal (rock) art of 30,000 years tent at language and symbolic thought, incapable of anticipating expediency, ago in Europe is noteworthy for its sophisticated incorporation of natural lacking in society, aesthetics, symbolism or culture. There is nevertheless a rocky features, such as a curved ridge (for a spine) or a protuberance (for swing nowadays to accepting that the Neanderthals may not have been so an eye). Caves with their convoluted, complex surfaces which can be ac­ very different from ourselves in their genetic capacity for cultural behav­ centuated by the lighting employed offer endless opportunities for the per- ior, and that they may well have enjoyed significant levels of symbolism, lan­ ceiver to impose his or her own interpretative meaning (Halverson, 1992), guage, social structure, conceptual ability, technology and maybe even art just as we see images in clouds, frosty window panes, fire, or grained wood (Bednarik, 1995; d'Errico, Zilhao, Mien, Baffler & Pelegrin, 1998; Hayden, panels. Thus a natural rock feature recalling the back of an animal might 1993). lead the observer-artist to complete the image, from memory - an image of Composite use by Neanderthals of different materials shaped to prede­ a prototypical concept of that general animal, rather than a particular ani­ termined specifications, and their patterns of procurement, suggest plan­ mal engaged in a particular activity. Even 30,000 years ago, representa­ ning, organization and economic rationalization. There are now numerous tions were very economical, and suggestive with a minimum of strokes - records of bone points, awls, oval ochered bone plaques, finely incised cartoon-like, and naturalistic but lacking in photographic realism. Thus an lines and zig-zags, and pendants drilled and prepared from teeth and pha­ outline generally served as surrogate for a three-dimensional representa­ langes (Haydn, 1993; Marshack, 1989). In many respects their tool-mak­ tion. Gestalt principles of figure-ground distinction, closure, grouping and ing standards cannot easily be achieved today, and the comparatively infre­ good continuation tended to be observed, with images represented in stan­ quent finds nowadays may merely reflect the comparatively simple needs dard or canonical form or orientation so as to reveal the most salient infor­ of the time. In any case their utilitarian objects often have characteristics mation, with emphasis of distinctive features. Redundancies of color, tex­ apparently in excess of what the technology or function would demand, ture, linear perspective or completeness of representation all generally were thereby indicating apparent aesthetic dimensions. avoided (Halverson, 1992). Relative size differences, for example between The art of the European Upper Paleolithic an ibex and a horse, tended to be ignored; linear convergence perspective An interest in cave art and engraved objects first developed in the 19th was absent, and figures were often abbreviated or truncated, perhaps por­ Century, and since then archaeologists, art historians, devoted amateurs traying heads without bodies. and developmental psychologists have all imposed their own idiosyncratic An artist, ancient or modern, in representing an object, typically three- interpretations, from a largely Eurocentric viewpoint. By 35,000 years ago dimensional, must somehow create another, typically two-dimensional ob­ the Aurignacian was well established. It includes pierced or drilled ivory, ject (unless the latter is sculpted "in the round"), which is conceptually bone and soft stone beads, fossil coral, fossil belemnites, jet, hematite, equivalent. This is best achieved by representation of a canonical form from pyrite and shell, and often is very beautiful, indicative of the attainment of a characteristic angle of view (Deregowski, 1995). Thus, not all views of a modern aesthetic "sense". Material is frequently highly standardized and an object are equally recognizable. Indeed with visual agnosia subsequent labor intensive. Utilitarian and ornamental objects were cut, sawn, ground, to brain damage, objects seen from an unusual viewpoint may be particu­ carved, polished, perforated, and grooved. Figurative three-dimensional larly hard to recognize (Bradshaw & Mattingley, 1995). Hence artists, an­ images of ivory, steatite or schist were reduced by gouging, grinding and cient or modern, usually choose a predominant, salient or typical aspect. polishing, being finished with fine metallic abrasives of hematite powder. More than one perspective may be combined so as to include all relevant They represented a variety of animals or, more rarely, the human form, or information, whether it is an ancient engraving on a European rock surface, occasionally even "therianthrope'* (half-human, half-animal) creatures as­ an Australian aboriginal rock painting, or a modern Picasso. Thus an Aus­ sociated perhaps with cults or ritual (Marshack, 1988). tralian crocodile may have, for reasons of typicality, the body as viewed Though the classic Magdalenian galleries of Lascaux and Altamira are from above, and the head from the side, leading, to our eyes, to a feeling of thought to have long post-dated the early Aurignacian cultural flowering, torsion or unreality, while clearly the salient crocodilian features are well Clottes (cited by Patel, 1995) and Chauvet, Deschamps, and Hillaire (1996) preserved. While the most informationally-economical representation in­ have reported sophisticated rock paintings (e.g. of rhinoceros and bison) volves boundaries, contours and transitions (Deregowski, 1995), via out­ created between 30,000 and 33,000 years ago - images which dispel the lines especially at points of directional change or transition, inclusion within idea that the first art was simple and crudely drawn, and only later evolved these contours of color or texture adds verisimilitude. Such verisimilitude, into more sophisticated images. Cruder paintings were probably made by however, comes at a price; movement or action is more easily represented people without talent. The Chauvet-cave images are noteworthy for via the posture of "stick" or "pin" figures, though clearly the identity the techniques used to represent motion and perspective. How many of such figures is then lost. more such examples await discovery? Why is there so little evi-i Lewis-Williams (1997) notes that the fact (disputed by Bahn, dence of such art, even by anatomically modern peoples, earlier personal communication) that so much rock art is located in deep, Vol 2 (1) Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts remote caves, is suggestive of some out of the ordinary, ritual or shamanic netic component is indicated by family, adoption and twin studies. Jamison purpose. Such circumstances, possible aided by ingestion of hallucinatory (1993) traces the relation (in the manic phase) of bipolar disorder to artistic drugs, may facilitate, he argues (Lewis-Williams, 1995) the generation of creativity, energy, exaltation and productivity. As the Roman essayist, Sen­ characteristic mental images - luminous, iridescent, pulsating, expanding eca, following Plato 500 years earlier, wrote 2000 years ago, nullum mag­ or contracting; geometric forms, such as dots, meandering lines, zig-zags, num ingenium sine mixtura dementiae fuit, or loosely, genius is akin to grids, curves, circles and stars, may blend and change. He labels these "phos- madness. Post (1994) determined the prevalence of depression and bipolar phenes" or "entoptic" (sensu lato) phenomena, which, along with more disorder in outstandingly creative individuals from the fields of science, complex "migrainous" configurations, may be experienced during altered thought, politics and art. Severe personality deviations were particularly states of consciousness. However we should note that the striate cortex is frequent in the case of visual artists and writers. Similarly, Ludwig (1995) set up to process such perceptual primitives as points, simple contours and reported lifetime psychopathology rates of creative eminent people in 18 their intersections, and that similar motor primitives (and see Mussa-Ivaldi professions, and found very elevated levels primarily in those involved in & Bizzi, 2001) are coincidentally likely for purely biomechanical reasons the arts and writing. and the constraints of the basic laws of geometry. It is attractive, but not Recently we have had the opportunity to study a sizeable sample (more necessarily correct, to argue that simple dot, line, curve, circle, intersection than 150) of synaesthetes, and to subject a smaller subset (15) to detailed and finally contour drawing had to precede representational art in the ar­ experimental investigation (Mattingley, Rich, Yelland& Bradshaw, 2001). chaeological record, just as it may seem to do so in ontogeny. Note, more­ Synaesthesia is an unusual perceptual phenomenon or capacity where events over, that studies of young artist savants like the autistic child Nadia (who in one sensory modality induce vivid sensations in another. Individuals possessed superb, imaginative, pictorial draughtsmanship, with full per­ may "taste" shapes, "hear" colors, or "feel" sounds; there is a strong heredi­ spective, in her first few years of life) show that such 'bottom-up' progres­ tary component, and females are considerably over-represented. Informally, sion is not in fact the only one. we were impressed by the very high frequency, in our larger sample, of Feliks (1998) argues that fully representational art was preceded by a individuals professing an interest in the visual or literary arts; many claimed natural and already nearly-perfect representational system whose products that their unusual synaesthetic "gift" helped them in creative activity. (fossils) were observed and collected (manuports, objets trouves) by early We are left with one final possibility, depressing perhaps to the evolu­ humans. Acting as images and substitutes for the real thing, they provided tionary theorist, but maybe somewhat reassuring to the artist who is prima­ a ready basis for iconic imagery. Fossils may of course have provided tem­ rily preoccupied with his or her art; it is that art may indeed be without any plates for an iconography, but I doubt whether they were prime movers. evolutionary significance or adaptiveness whatsoever- a mere byproduct Why not other patterns in nature, tracks in the sand (or even 'doodlings' in (or "spandrel", to use the marvelous metaphor of Gould & Lewontin, 1979) the dust - other nonutilitarian human drives manifesting today as graffiti of a disengaged brain which enlarged under quite different evolutionary 'ornamentation' of an otherwise plain surface). Indeed the natural world pressures (and see also Aiken, 1998). If so, maybe we should after all just abounds with other objects (shells, nuts, leaves and flowers) and it is not sit back and enjoy it. Indeed, to deliberately misquote Plato: A life without clear why we need to invoke fossils, except to introduce the concept of the arts is just not worth the candle. substitution whereby (see above) a fossilized impression, naturally out­ References lined on a rock surface, substitutes for an image of the living leaf or shell, Aiken, N. E. (1998). The biological origins of art. Westport, CT: Praeger. and provides the idea and even the outline for its formal artistic realization. Bahn, P. G., & Vertut, 3. ( 1988). Images of the ice age. Leicester: Windward. Music Baynes, K. (1990). Language and reading in the right hemisphere: Highways Whereas the plastic or visual arts, discussed so far, operate in the spa­ or byways of the brain. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 2, 159-179. tial mode, music involves temporal extension, with patterns of sound vary­ Bednarik, R. (1995). Concept mediated marking in the Lower Pleistocene. ing in pitch and time, and apparently (like visual art) produced for emo­ Current Anthropology, 36, 605-634. tional, social, cultural or cognitive purpose (Gray, et al., 2001). It seems to Bednarik, R. (1997). The role of Pleistocene beads in documenting hominid have many commonalities with sound produced by other living creatures, cognition. Rock Art Research, 14, 27-40. notably birds, whales (whose calls have long been heard by seafaring tribes Boysen, S. T, Berntson, C. G„ & Prentice, J. (1987). Simian scribbles: A reappraisal of drawing in the chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes). Journal of Com­ through their boats' hulls), and maybe insects. The "songs" (rhythmic, re­ parative Psychology, 101, 82-89. petitive utterances) of whales have many commonalities with our own in terms Bradshaw, J. L. (2001). Developmental disorders of the frontostriatal sys­ of rhythm, phrase length, performance length, "musical" intervals between notes, tem Neuropsychological, neuropsyehiatric and evolutionary perspectives. overall song structure (theme, elaboration, return to modified theme), tone, Hove: Psychology Press. timbre, and repeating refrains. Birds, too, show many parallels - rhythmic Bradshaw, J. L. (1997). Human evolution: A neuropsychological perspec­ variations, pitch relationships, permutations and combinations of notes, tive. Hove: Psychology Press. transposition of motifs to different keys, interval inversions, simple har­ Bradshaw, J. L., & Mattingley, J. B. (1995). Clinical neuropsychology: monic relations, scales used, and countersinging by pairs. Clearly "animal Behavioural and brain science. San Diego: Academic Press. music" may have long predated that of humans, and human speech. Brown, J. W. (1999). On aesthetic perception. Journal of Consciousness Stud­ With 4 month old human infants, Tramo (2001) reported preferences, ies, 6. 144-160. indexed by for example turning biases, for consonant musical intervals (in­ Chase, P. G., & Dibble, H. L. (1987). Middle Palaeolithic symbolism: A volving major and minor thirds) compared to dissonant intervals (minor review of current evidence and interpretations. Journal of Anthropological Ar­ chaeology, 6, 263-296. seconds). Such findings are paralleled in animal studies. All this suggests Chauvet, I M., Deschamps, E. B., & Hillaire, C. (1996). Chauvetcave: Dis­ that our auditory systems for processing music may have originally evolved covery of world's oldest paintings. London: Thames & Hudson. for communicatory purposes; indeed, music, like language, is an acousti­ Deregowski, J. B. (1995). Perception-depiction-perception and communica­ cally-based form of communication with a set of rules for combining a tion: A skeleton key to rock art and its significance. Rock Art Research, 12, 3- limited number of sounds in an infinite number of ways. Could it even have 10. played a role in the evolution of language? Of course, unlike language, D'Errico, F., & Nowell, A. (2000). A new look at the Berekhat Ram figurine:implica ­ music is highly repetitious and formulaic, and any precursor in the animal tions for the origin of symbolism. Cambridge Archaeological Journal, 10, 123-167. kingdom may have been selected for under conditions of runaway sexual D'Errico, E, Villa, P., Llona, A. C. P., & Idarraga, R. R. (1998). A Middle selection by males competing for females (Miller, 2000), just as with the Palaeolithic origin of music? Using cave-bear bone accumulations to assess exaggerated plumage displays of male birds while courting. (One wonders the Divje Babe I bone "flute". Antiquity, 72, 65-79. whether the pleasing, but apparently nonfunctional symmetry of the an­ D'Errico, E, Zilhao, J., Julien, M., Baffler, D., & Pelegrin, J. (1998). Nean­ cient Acheulian hand-axe may even have played a similar role!) A perfo­ derthal acculturation in Western Europe? A critical review of the evidence and rated cave-bear femur from Neanderthal levels at Divje Babe (Slovenia), its interpretation. Current Anthropology Supplement, 39, S1-S44. dated between 43,000 and 67,000 years ago, has been proposed as the Feliks, J. (1998). The impact of fossils on the development of visual repre­ World's oldest musical instrument, a flute. However D'Errico, Villa, Llona, sentation. Rock Art Research, 15, 109-125. and Idarraga (1998) debate whether its holes could instead possibly be the Goguen, J. A. (2000). What is art. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7, 7- product of damage caused by carnivore teeth. 15. Goren-Inbar, N., & Peltz, S. (1995). Additional remarks on the Berekhat Evolutionary adaptiveness Ram figurine. Rock Art Research, 12, 131-132. An increasingly important concept in modern medical theory is that a Gould, S. J., & Lewontin, R. C. (1979). The spandrels of San Marco and the disorder may persist in the genome because, with heterozygous representa­ Panglossian programme: A critique of the adaptionist programme. Proceed­ tion or low penetrance, it may prove adaptive or protective against ings of the Royal Society of London, 205, 281-288. worse contingencies (Bradshaw, 2001). Thus the gene for sickle-a, Gray, P. M., Krause, B., Atema, J., Payne, R., Krumhansi, C, & cell disease may protect against malaria. Bipolar disorder involveststSSjIt 10 Baptista, L. (2001). The music of nature and the nature of music. Sci- episodes of elevated (mania) and lowered (depressed) mood. A ge- ence, 291,52-54. Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) Halverson, J. (1992). Paleolithic art and cognition. The Journal of Psychol­ Natural and sexual selection in the evolution of creativity ogy, 126, 221-236. Gregory J. Feist Harden, B. (1993). The cultural capacities of Neandertals: A review and re- College of William & Mary evaluation. Journal of Human Evolution, 24, 113-146. Hodgson, u. {zwv). /vrt, pcivepuLm ana iufvrmmiwn proteasing; At\ evolu­ Abstract tionary perspective. Rock Art Research, 17, 3-34. There is no doubt that the capacity of the human mind to flexibly, cre­ Humphrey, N. (1999). Cave art, autism and the evolution of the human mind. atively, and adaptively solve a myriad of survival, social, technical, and Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, 116-143. physical problems is what makes the modern mind truly unique in the ani­ Jamison, K. R. (1993/ Touched by fire: manic-depressive illness and the artistic temperament. New York: The Free Press. mal kingdom. The goal of the current paper is to apply principles of Dar­ Kapur, N. (1996). Paradoxical functional facilitation in brain-behaviour re­ winian theory, cognitive archeology, and evolutionary psychology to the search: A critical review. Brain, 119, 1775-1790. phenomenon of human creativity. Darwinian orthodoxy is based on two Kreiman, G., Koch, C, & Fried, 1. (2000). Imagery neurons in the human forms of selection, namely natural and sexual selection (Darwin, 1859, brain. Nature, 408, 357-360. 1871). In this paper I argue that both natural and sexual selection pressures Lenain, T. (1995). Ape painting and the problem of the origin of art. Human have shaped the human capacity to be creative, but different forms of se­ Evolution, 70,205-215. Lewis-Williams, J. D. (1995). Seeing and construing: The making and "mean­ lection have shaped different forms of creativity. The more applied forms ing" of a southern African rock art motif. Cambridge Archaeological Journal, of creativity (technology, science and engineering) are shaped most by natu­ 5, 3-23. ral selection pressures, whereas the more ornamental forms of creativity Lewis-Williams, J. D. (1997). Agency, art and altered consciousness: A motif in (art and aesthetics) are shaped most by sexual selection pressures. French (Quercy) Upper Palaeolithhic parietal art. Antiquity, 71, 810-830. Natural and sexual selection in the evolution of creativity Ludwig, A. M. (1995). The price of greatness: resolving the creativity and madness controversy. New York: Guilford Press. The mind of modern humans is without a doubt an incredible thing. It Mangan, B. (1999). It don't mean a thing if it ain't got that swing. Journal of is the most complex single entity we have ever known. But there is also no Cognitive Studies, 6, 56-58. doubt that the capacity of the human mind to flexibly, creatively, and Marshack, A. (1988). The Neanderthals and the human capacity for sym­ adaptively solve a myriad of survival, social, technical, and physical prob­ bolic thought. Cognitive and problem-solving aspects of Mousterian symbol. lems is what makes the modern mind truly unique in the animal kingdom Paper presented at the international colloquium L 'Homme de Neandertal, Liege. (Byrne, 1998; Lake, 1998; Mithen, 1996, 1998). Whatever the traits are Marshack, A. (1989). Evolution of the human capacity: The symbolic evi­ dence. Yearbook of Physical Anthropology, 32, 1-34. that make us human, whether they be language, symbolic thought and sym­ Marshack, A. (1991). Deliberate engravings on bone artifacts of Homo erectus. bolic tool use, metaphorical thought, opposable thumbs, etc. what is most Further comment: A reply to Davidson on Mania and Mania. Rock Art Re­ remarkable is the human capacity to be creative. To think of and to make search, 8, 47-58. things that no one has ever thought of before and in ways that are useful to Martindale, C. (1999). Peak shift, prototypicality and aesthetic experience. others in our species that is human creativity. The exponential speed with Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, 52-53. which human culture grows and changes is unique in the animal kingdom: Mattingley, J. B., Rich, A. N., Yelland, G., & Bradshaw, J. L. (2001). Uncon­ humans developed the first signs of religion roughly 50-60,000 years ago; scious priming eliminates anomalous binding of colour and form in synaesthe- sia. Nature, 410, 580-582. created figurines, art and jewelry around 30-40,000 years ago; domesti­ Meighan, C. W. (1996). Human nature and rock art production. Rock Art cated plants and animals soon after the last ice age 10-11,000 years ago; Research, 13, 68-70. established cities 9,000 years ago; created written language 5-6,000 years Miller, B. L., Cummings, J., Mishkin, F., Boone, K., Prince, F., Ponton, M., ago; developed an alphabet, astronomy, math, and consistent units of time & Cotman, C. (1998). Emergence of artistic talent in frontotemporal dementia. and space about 4,000 years ago; created explicit systems of philosophy Neurology, 51, 978-982. 2,500 years ago; invented the printing press 1,000 years ago; developed Miller, G. F. (2000). The mating mind: How sexual choice shaped the evolu­ the modern scientific method about 500 years ago; and finally, created quan­ tion of human nature. New York: Doubleday. tum mechanics, nuclear energy, radio and television, air-transportation, (in­ Mulvaney, K. (1996). What to do on a rainy day: Reminiscences of Mirriuwung and Gadjerong artists. Rock Art Research, 13, 3-30. cluding space travel), the personal computer and the Internet and have se­ Mussa-Ivaldi, F. A., & Bizzi, E. (2000). Motor learning through the combi­ quenced the human genome all within the last hundred years. Scientific nation of primitives. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society ofLon­ and technological discoveries exhibit true exponential growth. don B. JJJ(T404), 1755-1770. Moreover, the natural curiosity of humans often focuses its attention Noble, W., & Davidson, I. (1996). Human evolution, language and mind: A on itself: What are the origins of the human mind? When Darwin (1859) psychological and archaeological enquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. first introduced the idea of natural selection and used it as the mechanism Oakley, K. P. (1981). Emergence of higher thought, 3.0-0.2 Ma B.P. Philo­ sophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B, 292, 205-211. to explain how evolution worked, he hit upon a terribly powerful idea, one Patel, T. (1995). Ancient masters put painting in perspective. New Scientist, that only recently has really been applied seriously to the analysis of the 17, 5. origin of mind (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Pinker, 1997). Darwin Pesanti, M., Zago, L., Crivello, F., Mellet, E., Samson, D., Duroux, B., Seron, realized that human intelligence, like all biological structures, is shaped by X., Mazoyer, B., & Tzouriou-Mazoyer, N. (2001). Mental calculation in a evolutionary forces: "The high standard of our intellectual powers and moral prodigy is sustained by right prefrontal and medial temporal areas. Nature Neu- disposition is the greatest difficulty which presents itself, after we have roscience, 4, 103-107. been driven to this conclusion on the origin of man" (1871, p. 632). Fur­ Post, F. (1994). Creativity and psychopathology: A study of 291 world-fa­ mous men. British Journal of Psychiatry, 165, 22-34. ther, he hinted that the intellect may be the result of natural selection in so Ramachandran, V. S., &Hirstein, W. (1999). The science of art: A neurologi­ far that "the intellect must have been all-important to [our ancestors], even cal theory of aesthetic experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, 15-51. at a very remote period, as enabling him to invent and use language, to Selfe, L. (1977). Nadia: A case of extraordinary drawing ability in an autis­ make weapons, tools, traps, etc., whereby with the aid of his social habits, tic child. New York: Academic Press. he long ago became the most dominant of all living creatures" (Darwin, Tramo, M. J. (2001). Music of the hemispheres. Science, 291, 54-56. 1871, p. 633). Westergaard, G. C, & Suomi, S. J. (1997). Modification of clay forms by If Darwin was among the first to recognize evolutionary forces on the tufted capuchins (Cebus apella). International Journal ofPrimatology, 18,455- 467. development of the human mind, the thrust of his work was not devoted to Wheelwell, D. (2000). Against the reduction of art to galvanic skin response. the topic. In the last 20 to 25 years, however, both archeologists and psy­ Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7, 37-42. chologists have simultaneously begun to focus their attention systemati­ Zeki, S. (1993). A vision of the brain. Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications. cally to the evolutionary origins of mind. Archeology, for instance, has Zeki, S. (1999). Art and the brain. seen the development of the new field of "cognitive archeology" that ex­ amines cognitive and symbolic processes of hominids and primates (Mithen, John L. Bradshaw 1996; Nobel & Davidson, 1996; Renfrew, 1983; Wynn, 1979,1981). These Neuropsychology Research Unit archeologists do not examine survival behaviors only (e.g., foraging, hunt­ Department of Psychology ing, reproducing, etc.) but also the thinking behind these behaviors. By POBox 17 inferring cognitive processes from the archeological record, cogni- Monash University -a—™. t've archeologists have made tremendous contributions to the study Victoria 3800 1 HwsSaof how higher cognitive functioning has evolved over the 6 million Australia year history of hominid evolution. Likewise, over the last 25 years Vol 2 (1) Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts psychology has witnessed the emerging field of "evolutionary psychology" 1999). Fisher's concept of runaway focused on the question of why fe­ (Barkow, cosmiucs, & Tooby, 1902-, Bucs, 100S; Donald. 1991; Pinker, males would develop a preference for ornamental "wasteful" male displays. 1997). The fundamental idea of this movement is to apply evolutionary His answer was that initially females prefer males based on some sign of concepts to the study of human behavior and the human mind, and in par­ strength and quality. But gradually the males that exaggerate this quality ticular to examine how psychological mechanisms evolve (due to selection are the most successful sexually and therefore these exaggerated traits be­ pressures) to solve adaptive problems. come very common. Ultimately the only reason males exhibit such orna­ The goal of the current paper is to apply principles of Darwinian theory, mental behaviors during courtship is because females prefer them. They cognitive archeology, and evolutionary psychology to the phenomenon of lose their signal value as signs of strength or vitality, and they become human creativity. Darwinian orthodoxy is based on two forms of selection, preferred for their own sake. Furthermore, once some females start to pre­ namely natural and sexual selection (Darwin, 1859, 1871). To outline my fer these signals then other females must join in as well, and the preference basic argument: both forms of selection have shaped the human capacity to and the signal spread very quickly throughout the population. The females be creative. Creativity, intelligence, and aesthetics result from both natural that do not join in preferring these traits will lose out by ultimately produc­ and sexual selection pressures, but different forms of selection have shaped ing fewer offspring. The "efficient" females would have "efficient" male different forms of creativity. Before elaborating on this argument I must offspring that would not be selected in the mating game because they would first provide a brief summary of the general principles of natural and sexual not attract females. Therefore, this preference for exaggerated qualities selection. spreads rapidly throughout the population. The exaggerated ornamental Natural selection: traits also spread quickly in the males. They do what is reinforced by fe­ In a nutshell, natural selection is competition within a species for sur­ male preference. This feedback loop is what is referred to as the runaway vival, where losing essentially means death (Darwin, 1859). It is the pro­ positive feedback loop, whereby both the preferred trait and the preference cess by which the most fit (defined in terms of a specific environment) for it are passed on to one's offspring and both spread quickly in the popu­ individuals gain access to the greatest resources and therefore are more lation. The male offspring may get the preferred trait and the female off­ likely to survive and ultimately to reproduce. This process is popularly spring may get the preference. That is, the traits and the preferences are referred to as "the survival of the fittest." Relatively early in a species' genetically correlated. In short, runaway is a positive feedback loop be­ evolution, variation between members is widespread, but over the course tween selector and selectee and between signal and preference. of time, the most fit traits become widespread within a species and varia­ But if this process spreads so quickly then what prevents it from lead­ tion decreases. Because natural selection generally leads to lack of varia­ ing to deformed exaggerations that would make males completely vulner­ tion of certain traits within a species, survival advantages can be seen both able to predation within just a few generations? Sometimes what we find within and between species. The fundamental question of a natural selec­ attractive are things that help survival (strength, speed, health, etc.) so in tion perspective is: What are species-wide traits that lead to an individual's that sense sexual selection works in the service of natural selection (the or species' adaptation to a particular environment and make them likely to traditional view held by most biologists, namely sexual selection is a sub­ survive? set of natural selection). Physical traits and healthy body structure of the The idea of natural selection is clearly very important probably the victor assure greater survivability of the offspring. Yet at other times what single most important idea in the theory of evolution. Natural selection is we find attractive conflicts with survivability e.g., bright coloration, loud the most general biological process because it applies to all living things calling and singing, and ornamental feathers (indeed, it was this very real­ (sexual and asexual organisms). So it is no wonder that it has been nearly ization that led Darwin to develop the idea of sexual selection). But they do the exclusive focus of most biologists over the last 140 years and most not lead to extinction because the positive feedback system does not re­ evolutionary psychologists over the last 25 years. Most have equated se­ main unchecked. This is were natural selection pressures enter. Survivabil­ lection with natural selection the only game in town. But even to Darwin ity is the check. Natural selection balances runaway sexual selection (Fisher, (and much to his dislike) it was obvious that some traits clearly cannot be 1930; Miller, 2000; Simonton, 1999). Some sort of equilibrium must de­ explained in terms of natural selection, because they lacked utility and sur­ velop between natural selection and sexual selection if a species is to sur­ vival function. The peacock's feathers did nothing to aid in survivability vive. and were strictly ornamental (and may even hinder chances for survival). There are a few real problems with Fisher's notion of runaway: first, it The sight of the peacock's feathers apparently made Darwin feel nauseous does not take into account why wasteful displays not only attract females (Miller, 2000, p. 35). Natural selection gets an animal to the door of repro­ but also deter males (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). If there were a complete duction, but sexual selection lets them in (or not)! There had to be another lack of congruence between display and fitness then it may attract females process at work to explain the ubiquity of ornamental displays in male but it should also be useless in deterring other males in reproductive battles. birds, fishes, and other less utilitarian traits throughout the animal king­ Yet other males are in fact deterred. Other problems with runaway are that dom. it requires real male polygyny and strong female choice, and will result in Sexual selection large sex differences (Miller, 2000). These characteristics may be wide­ That other process was sexual selection. Sexual selection occurs spe­ spread in most animals, but are at best only partly true of humans. Human cifically during the act of courtship and competition (usually between males) males are only moderately polygynous, choice is only slightly weighted for reproduction (Darwin, 1859,1871). In a nutshell, it is competition within toward females, and human sex differences (especially in brain size and one sex for mates, the success of which depends upon individual differ­ cognitive aptitudes) are not nearly as large as would be predicted if run­ ences in various fitness indicators, such as coloring, plumage, courtship away were the only explanation. dancing ability, singing, gift-giving, or in humans charm, wit, intelligence, Handicaps and fitness indicators in sexual selection. Roughly 30 years and heaven forbid, perhaps even creativity! The appropriate comparison ago, it became rather clear to evolutionary theorists that runaway could not here is not species-wide but rather sex-differences and individual differ­ do a very complete job of explaining human brain evolution (Miller, 2000). ences within one sex. Darwin realized that when sex differences occur, There had to be other explanations. After an initial period of criticism, the especially in color or ornament, they are usually the result of sexual selec­ one that has come to be recognized as the leading candidate is known as tion (Darwin, 1859). A surprising but necessary conclusion from sexual the "handicap principle" (Zahavi, 1975; Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). The handi­ selection was the idea of female choice, namely females in most every spe­ cap principle starts where Fisher's runaway process leaves off, namely by cies assess and chose with which male they will mate and likewise males examining why waste and ornaments may be reliable and accurate indica­ signal and advertise their attractiveness. Female preference therefore guides tors of fitness. The basic idea of the handicap principle is that "useless" sexual selection. and "wasteful" signals in males evolve not just because they are sexually One question that Darwin never really answered was why would fe­ selected for (Fisher's notion of runaway), but rather because they provide males develop tastes and preferences for ornamental characteristics such an indication of superior fitness. Only the most fit males can afford such as bright plumage or dances or vocalizations. It was more than 50 years "handicaps" and females thereby are not just choosing extravagant dis­ after publication of Origins that a mechanism was proposed that explained plays for their own sake but rather in the interest of creating the best off­ why and how such selection might develop. The process was labeled run­ spring they can. To return to the prototypic peacock: The male feathers are away sexual selection. actually grown during a time when food is scarce and if a male is not Runaway sexual selection. The British statistician Ronald A healthy enough the growth of these feathers is stopped, "so a male Fisher was the first to propose the theory of runaway sexual selec­ who displays a set of perfect tail feathers advertises that he has tion in the first few decades of the 20,b century (Fisher, 1915, 1930/ been in good health and has managed to find food even during the Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) molt season" (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997, p. 33). Furthermore, spreading and ral history, and linguistic. holding upright the heavy set of feathers and then roaring demonstrates not Very briefly, social intelligence consists of a number of specific abili­ only the peacocks' willingness to show the female what he is capable of, ties involving interaction between people: the ability to perceive in others but is an attempt to deter any nearby males from competing with him. In and communicate with others internal states, thoughts, feeling, and mo­ the process of such displays, of course, the peacock is also making himself tives (theory of mind); non-verbal expression and its recognition; using quite known to predatory animals. deception and detecting deception; establishing, maintaining, and know­ My argument is that both forms of selection, namely natural and sexual, ing status hierarchies; and cooperation as well as conflict. Because of its shape creative abilities in humans but each form of selection acts on differ­ complexity and expression in primates, social intelligence was probably ent forms of creativity. 1 argue that technological and applied creativity is the first distinct modular intelligence to evolve. Natural history intelligence more the result of natural selection, whereas artistic-ornamental creativity is consists of the ability to solve problems of natural resources, namely food more the result of sexual selection. Furthermore, given that natural selection acquisition (hunting, scavenging, foraging, mental maps of landscape); clas­ is competition within a species for resources and leads to relative lack of sifying plants (for food and medicine) as well as animals and their behav­ individual differences over the long run, the comparative approach (com­ ior; and knowing which landscapes are resource-rich and fertile. Technical paring functions at the species-wide level) is the best one to take for natu­ intelligence consists of the ability to solve problems of tool use (wood v. ral selection. The appropriate comparison here comes from comparing homi- stone; simple v. complex) and manipulation of inanimate objects of differ­ nids and other primates (and somewhat intraspecies as well) to the modern ent materials, as well as an intuitive understanding of physics (gravity, human mind and asking what is unique about the modern human mind. inertia, and dynamics of objects). Finally, linguistic intelligence is the abil­ With ornamental/artistic creativity and sexual selection, on the other hand, the ity to use meaningful sounds to communicate with others and understand appropriate comparison is individual differences and/or sex differences. abstract symbols. It also involves the intuitive ability to acquire syntactical Natural selection and technological and scientific (applied) creativity and semantic rules of language. We must first start by defining creativity in general and then distin­ I believe that Mithen was too conservative in the number of intelli­ guishing technological and scientific creativity from artistic and aesthetic. gences that form distinct modules and argue there is compelling evidence How we define creativity, contrary to what many outside the field may for adding at least one, and probably more, of Gardner's multiple intelli­ think, is widely agreed upon by creativity researchers and theorists. In fact, gences, namely numerical or quantitative intelligence (Butterworth, 1999; it is almost fair to say that a general consensus exists on its core definition: Dehaene, 1997; Devlin, 2000). Numerical ability actually underscores many novel and useful behavior or thought (Amabile, 1996; Barron, 1963; Feist, basic processes in the other domains of intelligence: counting and quanti­ 1999; MacKinnon, 1970; Mayer, 1999; Simonton, 1999; Sternberg & fying people, animals, rocks, stone edges, plants, food, resources, just to Lubart, 1999). Novelty and usefulness also are key processes of evolution name a few that were inherent in most every domain of life of our Pleis­ and it is easy to see why evolutionary processes provide an enticing meta­ tocene ancestors. This is neither the time nor place to elaborate on the phor for how creative thought occurs (Campbell, 1960; Hull, 1988; argument for the number of evolved intelligences and the criteria by which Kantorovich, 1993; Simonton, 1999). we make such arguments, but rather to point out that there is nothing magic The other distinction here to be made is between two forms of creativ­ about four intelligences. The basic point holds: the human mind developed ity, whether the products are technical and applied or aesthetic, ornamental distinct modules (whatever their number) dedicated to solving specific prob­ and artistic. Technical-applied creativity is much older in hominid evolu­ lems more efficiently than a generalized mind can (Tooby & Cosmides, tion, reaching back to at least the origins of stone tool making of between 2 1992). to 3 million years ago (m.y.a.). Aesthetic-ornamental creativity, on the other Phase three is marked by the cognitively fluid mind and consists of but hand, is seen only in modern humans and even then seen explicitly only in one species: our own modern Homo sapiens and therefore covers only the the last 40 to 60 thousand years, when the "creative explosion" began in last 100,000 years or so. The key idea in this stage is that the modules of various continents all over the world (Pfeiffer, 1982). mind have now become permeable, fluid, and integrated in ways never Cognitive archeology in general typifies the natural selection approach before seen. In other words, prior to 60,000 years ago no species of homi­ to technical-applied creativity. Space is too limited for any sort of detailed nid had ever merged technical ideas with social ideas. With the first jew­ review of this growing literature so I will focus on the work of Mithen, one elry (e.g., necklaces) we see just such integration. Jewelry is the use of of the key figures in this emerging field. Taking a comparative (species- technical intelligence being applied to the social "problems" of status and wide) approach, Mithen (1996, 1998) has argued for three distinct phases attractiveness. So too with religion, art, mythology, technology, and sci­ in cognitive evolution (analogous to the distinct Piagetian stages of indi­ ence, that is, with all major domains of human creativity. It is cognitive vidual cognitive development) and 4 distinct modules of intelligence. fluidity that makes the main expressions of human creativity possible. Flu­ The three phases of cognitive evolution are the generalized mind, the idity and integration is as much conceptual as it is neurological; much as modular mind, and the cognitively fluid mind. The first and therefore old­ functional fixedness prevents one from "thinking outside the box," modu­ est phase of cognitive development is what Mithen labels "generalized in­ larity without integration makes connections between domains almost im­ telligence," which is characterized by general-purpose and associational possible, and therefore creativity is severely limited. Insights are restricted learning. This phase of intelligence is seen in the first hominids 6 million to within, rather than between, domains of thought. Fluidity opens up the years ago as well as the first species of Australopithecus (4.5 m.y.a.) and divisions between the domains and allows for the flexible and broad asso­ Homo (habilis, roughly 2 m.y.a.). Learning and problem solving consists ciations seen in high levels of creativity. Whether it is more a function of mostly of Pavlovian conditional and associational processes. Something is brain size or brain organization, we do not yet know, but my hunch is that learned because it is consistently associated with and close in time to a it is more a result of brain organization than mere brain volume. In either given outcome. The mind tackles problems in a generalized manner and is case, this last stage most certainly has something to do with the enlarged not yet capable of using domain-specific rules and heuristics. frontal cortex of H. sapiens relative to all other hominids. The frontal cor­ Phase two is the modular phase. It consists primarily of three species tex allows for the level of abstraction needed to cross domains, and also of the genus Homo: erectus, archiac homo sapiens, and neanderthalensis, allows for the development of metaphorical and symbolic thought that we and covers nearly 2 million years (from 2 m.y.a. to about 30 thousand years only see in the cognitively fluid mind. ago (k.y.a.)). The key idea here is that various distinct modules of mind That then is the brief summary of Mithen's argument of the phases of developed that were domain-specific, each corresponding with kinds of cognitive evolution and their corresponding domains of intelligence. Now survival problems. Over the millennia these modules and domains became I can elaborate on the argument for natural selection pressures being the what one could label "intelligences." Referring to something as an "intelli­ causal agent for technical-applied creativity. The fundamental idea behind gence" is as much a heuristic and conceptual tool as anything there are no natural selection is that behaviors are adaptive because they have helped literal intelligences in the brain. Although as brain size grew these distinct our ancestors to win in the competition for survival. Natural selection pres­ capacities did become somewhat more and more localized in different re­ sures ultimately led to the formation of the distinct modules of intelligence gions of the brain and complex in organization. Building on Fodor's (1983) concerning technical and natural history, because they include survival notion of modules, Gardner's (1983) theory of multiple intelligences (as problems such as tool making, food gathering, hunting, finding shelter, evidenced by isolated talents of prodigies, brain damage, and distinct and avoiding predatory attacks. developmental histories among other criteria), and Tooby and Recall that one key comparison in natural selection is species- Cosmides' (1992) idea of evolved mechanisms, Mithen (1996) ar­ 13 filaKlawide and comparative. That is, what are the technical-applied cre­ gued for four distinct modules of intelligence: social, technical, natu- ative abilities of modern humans compared with other species of Vol 2 (1) Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts the genus Homo as well as other hominids and primates? Darwin himself simply because of their bodies or status (Botwin, Buss, & Shackelford, suggested that the intellect may be the result of natural selection in so far 1997). Analogous to the peacock's display, our brains are costly and relatively that "the intellect must have been all-important to [our ancestors], even at inefficient (consuming up to 20% of the body's energy while making up only a very remote period, as enabling him to invent and use language, to make about 2% of its weight). "Waste" can make sense; only the fittest and the stron­ gest can afford such inefficient qualities. Having such extravagant qualities weapons, tools, traps, etc., whereby with the aid of his social habits, he signals to others that we are fit, which in turn makes us attractive. The higher long ago became the most dominant of all living creatures." (Darwin, 1871, the "cost" the more reliable the signal is as an indicator of fitness. p. 633). Zahavi and Zahavi (1997) also argue for appreciation by others being Mithen's The Prehistory of Mind (1996; cf. Mithen, 1998) addresses the driving force behind aesthetics and art. "It may have taken humanity a the very issue of comparative intelligence and creativity and makes a rather long time to evolve the talent to use and arrange shapes and lines in effec­ compelling case for the uniqueness of modern human creativity: from the tive, satisfying ways, but at every stage of that evolution the more talented emergence of Homo (habi/is) 2 m.y.a. until emergence ofH. sapiens sapi­ ens 100 k.y.a. there were few fundamental advances in stone tool technol­ artisan could be recognized as such and rewarded" (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997, ogy. Yes, at roughly 1.5 m.y.a. we see the first handaxes and then at about p. 224). Reward here means being attractive to others and therefore Zahavi 250 k.y.a. we see Levallois flakes, and therefore one could argue these and Zahavi are making an argument for sexual selection being a force be­ were categorical advances over Oldowan stone tools, but even here there is hind the evolution of artistic creativity. but usually one hard material being used (stone, seldom bone or antler) and Power (1999) has also argued recently that body painting, especially these tools have few parts and components. The argument is not that other among women, was probably the first form of artistic expression and was species were not creative (see Kuhn & Steiner, 1998; Lake, 1998), but mainly used to signal and attract potential mates (see Miller, 2000 for a rather that the level of creativity seen in modern humans is unmatched in discussion of body art by men for attracting women). Without going into evolutionary history. detail, her argument is that this form of original artistic expression (i.e., Mithen rarely discusses selection pressures on creativity, but when he creativity) was directly sexually selected for. The women who were most does it is clear that he confounds natural and sexual selection in a manner creative at painting their bodies (usually red in order to hide phases of commonly seen among biologists, archeologists, and psychologists. As al­ infertility and to display imminent fertility) and were therefore most attrac­ ready argued, although it is quite true that natural selection may lead to tive would be most successful in attracting men's attention. These women sexual selection advantages (the strongest and most virile mating the most would in turn be the most reproductively successful. So this would suggest often), it is equally true that some traits found attractive are not adaptive. some degree of sexual selection in creative expression. Competition for survival between species or between individuals for ac­ Miller (2000) has put forth the most ambitious argument in favor of cess to natural resources is the essence of natural selection, whereas com­ sexual selection and creativity To a large extent I agree with Miller that petition within the sexes for access to reproduction is the essence of sexual language, morality, intelligence, etc. are sexually attractive and operate as selection (Darwin, 1859, 1871). It is this intrasexual competition that has fitness indicators—at least in part—but have problems with some of his shaped artistic creativity. basic argument. The four major problems I have are; First, it is clear to my Sexual selection and artistic (ornamental) creativity. mind that Miller plays up sexual selection so much because of his almost Humans recently (i.e., in the last 40,000 years) have developed a very exclusive focus on artistic creativity and humor. Science and technology- different kind of creativity than ever seen over the course of hominid evo­ to the extent that they seek a relatively veridical understanding of the world- lution, namely ornamental and aesthetic forms of creativity (art, music, are much more applied and practical and in that sense much more survival- poetry, dance). These behaviors clearly do not have the same practical and oriented. Handaxes, for instance, may have been fitness indicators but it is survival benefits that technological-applied creativity has. Although Dar­ clear that they aided in survival. In short, scientific creativity (and technol­ win tended to emphasize the role of natural selection in human intelligence, ogy) is much more likely to have been shaped by natural selection pres­ he did also imply that sexual selection is the force behind males' "contriv­ sures than sexual selection pressures and Miller fails to make this distinc­ ances for producing vocal or instrumental music..." (1871, p. 218). tion. This is precisely why I argue for both forms of sexual selection hav­ Following the lead of recent psychologists and archeologists (e.g. Miller, ing shaping different forms of creativity. 2000; Power, 1999), I argue that it is the ornamental-aesthetic form of cre­ Second, although the argument is logical and eloquently presented. ativity that has been most shaped by sexual selection (especially handicap­ Miller never gives any empirical evidence that creative people are more ping) forces. As Miller (2000) and Power (1999) argue the symbolic "higher attractive; he simply assumes it (cf. Botwin et al., 1997). This in turn, ties reaches of human nature" (language, intelligence, creativity, humor, etc.) in with my third criticism of Miller's argument: his argument is not well- can be explained as outcomes of sexual selection. "The distinctive thing grounded in the traditional creativity literatures (especially the two do­ about humans is that our courtship behavior reveals so much more of our mains most relevant to his argument, namely personality and psychopa- minds. Art reveals our visual aesthetics. Conversation reveals our person­ thology). Being creative may not make one's personality more attractive to ality and intelligence. By opening up our brains as advertisements for our members of the opposite sex, except in a general sense of being more intel­ fitness, we discovered whole new classes of fitness indicators, like gener­ ligent. Indeed, from a meta-analytic review of the literature on personality osity and creativity" (Miller, 2000, p. 105). Charm, wit, intelligence are not and creativity, Feist (1998) found that the traits most commonly associated simply good traits. They reveal an individual's genetic fitness and relative with creativity are autonomy and independence, introversion, openness to lack of mutation; in short they are fitness indicators, and operate via handi­ new experiences, norm-doubting, self-confidence, self-acceptance, drive caps. Moreover, we like these traits in others because they are the charac­ and ambition, dominance, hostility, and impulsivity. Out of these, the larg­ teristics we want our offspring to have. The ability to perceive these traits est effect sizes are on openness, conscientiousness, self-acceptance, hostil­ in others (sensory bias) and to affectively evaluate them (like or dislike) are ity, and impulsivity. As Eysenck (1995) has also pointed out, it is his important mechanisms through which sexual selection operates. Emotions psychoticism dimension that most consistently covaries with creative function to signal to us what is right or wrong with the world. Positive achievement. Finally, there is solid evidence that creative artists (including emotion tells us "everything is all right with the world; keep doing what writers, poets, musicians, and visual artists) are unusually susceptible to you are doing," whereas negative emotions tell us "something bad is hap­ various forms of psychopathology, including bipolar disorder, chemical pening; stop doing what you are doing and do something else" (Fredrickson, dependency, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and suicide (Andreasen, 1987; 1998; Lazarus, 1991). Attraction is a positive emotion and in essence is Jamison, 1993; Ludwig, 1995). telling us that what we are seeing is right and good. Of course this is not Some of these personality dimensions may be attractive (self-confi­ necessarily operating at all on a conscious level (and would often be dis­ dence, dominance, drive, and openness) but others are not (hostility, im­ ruptive if it were), but our preference for certain traits (e.g., intelligence pulsivity, introversion, manic-depression, etc.). The point is that traits of and creativity) is the glue that binds our perception of what we like to our behavior of acting on these preferences. creative people are not necessarily attractive qualities per se and may in fact lead to lower "mate values" of highly creative people. There is in fact The form of sexual selection (runaway vs. handicap) becomes impor­ evidence that creative people tend to be less likely to marry and when they tant here. Because sexual selection tends to favor traits with moderately do, have fewer children (Harrison, Moore, & Rucker, 1985; see Storr, 1988). high costs, the notion of handicaps as fitness indicators take on a I do not think this is an intractable problem, but rather one that was very important role in this argument. Therefore, Miller leans heavily not mentioned by Miller. Charm, for instance, implies a rather high on Zahavi's notion of handicaps as fitness indicators. We chooseifi(6*H[ 14 level of social intelligence, a trait that tends to be either lacking or mates because of their intelligence, charm, wit, and creativity, not deficient in many highly creative people (Feist, 1993, 1998). Ulti- Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) mately, of course, these criticisms boil down to empirical questions and difficulty by most people. In fact, our psychology, biology, physics, math, indeed, experimental studies could manipulate levels of charm, wit, intelli­ and linguistics are simply explications of the more implicit and intuitive gence, and creativity in opposite sex interactions to determine what effect intelligences we have about people, plants-animals, objects, counting, and these manipulations have on perceived levels of-attractiveness. language (Mithen, 1996). They are explicit representations of these im­ Finally, because Miller is not well grounded in the creativity literature, plicit capacities. The developmental psychologist Karmiloff-Smith's (1992) he neglects the basic definition of creativity, namely one of both novel and has described the progression from implicit knowledge to explicit repre­ adaptive behavior or thought. Creativity is not simply novel and ornate sentation as one of the cornerstones of human development. She labels this behavior; creative behaviors and products must solve problems that are process representational redescription. In evolutionary terms, it may have useful to others, whether the use be pragmatic or aesthetic. I think it is taken a few million years for these representations to become explicit, but partly for this reason that he tends to focus almost exclusively on artistic- they have—at least with the advent of civilization. It took very creative aesthetic creativity. Indeed, although Zahavi and Zahavi do not say this, work being done to make these advances, but they were made and all they their emphasis on behaviors being rewarded by others is very much in line stem from these more basic implicit skills. with the "usefulness" and "adaptiveness" criterion of creativity. That is, Finally, it is also important to point out, as Charles Lumsden (1999) other people must ultimately see the value in the creative product if it is to has, that not all surviving behaviors seen currently are the "winners" in the be labeled creative. If creative behavior and thought must be perceived by fight over natural selection. Natural selection is but one force among many others as being useful, and it is liked and valued, then it may indeed be that leads to diversity; sex, mutation, recombination, and migration are the sexually selected for. other main forces. So it is fallacious to think that "if it still exists, it must Summary and Future Directions have had adaptive natural selective significance for the species." Some dis­ Applying primary or literal Darwinism to the phenomenon of creativ­ orders may exist because they have become linked to some adaptation, but ity and aesthetics is a rather recent undertaking, with early efforts being put are not adaptations in and of themselves. For instance, bi-polar depression forth by Coss (1965, 1968), Martindale (1977) and Lumsden and Wilson can be adaptive because it is linked to creativity (see Jamison, 1993); cer­ (1981). It is still in its infancy and there are many difficult problems to be tain genetic disorders, such as manic-depression and sickle cell anemia worked out. With the recent work of cognitive archeologists, anthropolo­ have advantages for the individual as well as disadvantages. The question gists, neuroscientists, linguists, developmental psychologists, and evolu­ that needs more theoretical attention, therefore, is what role do non-selec­ tionary psychologists, however, the insights of Darwin (especially his ma­ tion pressures such as mutation, recombination, and migration play in the jor ideas of natural and sexual selection) have started to take hold and capacity to be creative. spread roots. The exciting thing about this is that they are taking root in the Darwin's theory of evolution and natural and sexual selection has been area that Darwin himself felt they should but knew they would be most one of the most important theories in the history of science. It has been controversial: human behavior. However, there is much to be done. The applied to all branches of the life sciences and recently has been applied to work most needed to be carried out in the future can be divided into its the social sciences. As Kenrick and Simpson (1997) have recently argued, empirical and theoretical components. it would be unthinkable to study the behavior of any species of animal and Empirically, we clearly need to put to the test both the natural selection to ignore the question of evolved adaptation, any species of course, except and sexual selection theories as they apply to human creativity. As men­ H. sapiens. Moreover, the richness of Darwin's theory for psychology is tioned above, the theory of sexual selection and creativity can be tested in seen in the fact that it can be used literally or metaphorically for how the various ways. First, as Buss (1989) did, cross-cultural research can be con­ brain solves problems creatively (Campbell, 1960; Simonton, 1999). Not ducted and determine the extent to which intelligence and creativity are in all agree that the Darwinian theory should be applied to the study of human fact sexually attractive. Second, experimental studies could be carried out behavior and in particular human creativity, but my own prediction is that in which levels of creativity and intelligence are manipulated in opposite 50 to 100 years from now, it will be the fundamental organizational frame­ sex interactions, and then ratings of attractiveness could be made. If sexual work for all of psychology in manner quite analogous to how it currently is selection has operated on these processes over the course of evolution they for biology. The capacity of the human mind to create novel and useful should be able to be reproduced in the lab. ideas and/or behaviors is truly unique. The remarkable thing is that it has One of the more important theoretical issues that has yet to be fully taken researchers and theorists of creativity so long to apply the principles developed is the extent to which creativity in general is either an adapta­ of natural and sexual selection to the analysis of their origin. Now that they tion or co-opted byproduct (Gould, 1991; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). As have, however, a potentially new and powerful framework for understand­ Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, and Wakefied (1998) argued an ad­ ing the creative mind is beginning to emerge. aptation is "an inherited and reliably developing characteristic that came References into existence as a feature of a species through natural selection because it Amabile, T. (1996). Creativity in context. New York: Westview. helped to directly or indirectly facilitate reproduction during the period of Andreasen, N.C. (1987). Creativity and mental illness: Prevalence rates in its evolution" (p. 535). Darwin implied that most mental abilities were writers and their first-degree relatives. American Journal of Psychiatry. 144, evolved byproducts of the brain's capacity for language: "The higher intel­ 1288-1292. Barkow, J.H., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (Eds.). (1992). The adapted mind: lectual powers of man, such as those of ratiocination, abstraction, self- Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture. New York: Oxford. consciousness, etc., probably follow from the continued improvement and Barron, F. (1963). Creativity and psychological health. New York: Van exercise of the other mental faculties" (Darwin, 1871, p. 633). Miller (2000) Nostrand. argued that intelligence and creativity are adaptations whereas math and sci­ Botwin, M.D., Buss, D. M., & Shackelford, T.K. (1997). Personality and ence are byproducts or co-opted adaptations of intelligence and creativity. mate preferences: Five factors in mate selection and marital satisfaction. Jour­ nal of Personality, 65, 107-136. Clearly the human brain did not evolve to do science, art, religion, and Buss, DM. (1995). Evolutionary psychology: A new paradigm for psycho­ music. These are all much too recent developments. Most behaviors of logical science. Psychological Inquiry, 6, 1-30. modern humans did not "evolve" in this sense. For instance, writing and Buss, DM. (1989). Sex differences in human mate preferences: Evolutionary reading, math, science—most things we learn at school in fact (not a coin­ hypotheses tested in 37 cultures. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 12, 1 -49. cidence) did not evolve through natural or sexual selection. Human evolu­ Buss, D.M., Haselton, M.G., Shackelford, T.K., Bleske, A.L., & Wakefield, tion in particular is so flexible that many behaviors have evolved that get J.C. (1998). Adaptations, exaptations, and spandrels. American Psychologist, co-opted into uniquely human behaviors, such as the ones mentioned above. 53, 533-548. Co-opted adaptations (or expatations) do not lessen the significance of Butterworth, B. (1999). What counts: How every brain is hardwired for math. natural selection. NY: The Free Press. Byrne, R. (1998).The early evolution of creative thinking. In S. Mithen (Ed.). Complex behaviors or anatomical structures by necessity do not ap­ Creativity in human evolution and prehistory, (pp. 110-124). London: Routledge. pear fully formed in nature, but rather the components must first develop Campbell, D.T. (1960). Blind variation and selection retention in creative piecemeal. Natural selection is more likely to function at the level of sim­ thought as in other knowledge processes. Psychological Review, 67, 380-400. pler components and then only additively have the more complex behav­ Coss, R.G. (1965/ Mood provoking visual stimuli: Their origins and appli­ iors developed out of more fundamentally adaptive ones, such as language, cations. Los Angeles: University of California Industrial Design Graduate Pro­ vision, and four or five basic intelligences. Culture and civilization gram. in particular has a lot to say about the development, emergence, and Coss, R.G. (1968). The ethological command in art. Leonardo, 1, 273-287. expression of these "learned" skills; one's that are not as automatic Darwin, C. (1859). The origin of species. London: Murray (reprinted as walking or speech, but that can be learned without too much in 1964 by Harvard University Press). Vol 2(1] Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Daiwin, ( ( IK/I) l'licic ///c mindcreates mathematics. England: Oxford University Press. NY: Oxloul I linvi-rsily I'icss. Wynn, T. (1979). The intelligence of later Acheulian hominids. Man, 14, 371-391. Devlin, K. (-'(Hid) The nuilh gene: I'low mathematical thinking evolved and Wynn, T. (1981). The intelligence of Oldowan hominids. Journal of Human why numbers are like gossi/i. NY: Basic. Evolution. 10,529-541. Donald, M (1991). Origins of the modern mind: Three stages in the evolu­ Zahavi, A. (1975). Mate selection: A selection for a handicap. Journal of tion o,(culture and cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Theoretical Biology, 53, 205-214. I'.ysenck, II.J. (1995). Genius: The natural history ofcreativity. Cambridge, Zahavi, A., & Zahavi, A. (1997). The handicap principle: A missing piece of England: Cambridge University Press. Darwin's puzzle. New York: Oxford University Press. Feist, G.J. (1993). A structural model of scientific eminence. Psychological Science. 4,366-371. Gregory J. Feist Heist, G J. (1998). A meta-analysis of the impact of personality on scientific and artistic creativity. Personality and Social Psychological Review, 2, 290-309. Department of Psychology Feist, GJ. (1999). The influence of personality on artistic and scientific cre­ College of William & Mary ativity. In R.J. Sternberg (Ed.). Handbook of creativity (pp. 273-296). Cam­ Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795 bridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Fisher, R.A. (1915). The evolution of sexual preference. Eugenics Review, 7, 184-192. Fisher, R.A. (1930/1999). The genetical theory ojnatural selection (A com­ plete variorum edition). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Fodor, J.A. (1983). The modularity of mind: An essay on facultypsychology: Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Fredrickson, B. (1998). What good are positive emotions? Review of Gen­ eral Psychology, 2, 300-319. Gardner, H. (1983). Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences. Fit To Be Eyed: NY: Basic Books. Genes, Culture and Creative Minds Gould, S.J. (1991). Exaptation: A crucial tool for evolutionary psychology. Charles J. Lumsden Journal of Social Issues, 47, 43-65. Hull, D. (1988). Science as process: An evolutionary account of the social University of Toronto and conceptual development of science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Abstract Jamison, K.R. (1993). Touched with fire: Manic -depressive illness and the artistic temperament. New York: The Free Press. Modern treatments of gene-culture coevolution provide an evolution­ Kantorovich, A. (1993). Scientific discovery: Logic and tinkering. Albany, ary perspective from which innovation and creative behavior can be clari­ N.Y.: State University of New York Press. fied. There are potentially crippling problems, however, with the current Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992). Beyond modularity: A developmental perspec­ modes of evolutionary reasoning about creativity and aesthetics, and with tive on cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. the achievability of radically improved methods for making evolutionary Kenrick, D.T., & Simpson, J.A. (1997). Why social psychology and evolu­ inferences in this area. The gene-culture approach is reviewed and possible tionary psychology need one another. In J. A. Simpson & D.T. Kenrick (Eds). avenues for advance briefly discussed. Evolutionary social psychology, (pp. 1-20). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. The treatment of evolutionary change as genetic change has not suf­ Kuhn, S.L., & Steiner, M.C. (1998). Middle paleolithic 'creativity'. Reflec­ ficed to account for human evolution. Humans beings and their hominid tions on an oxymoron? In S. Mithen (Ed.). Creativity in human evolution and ancestors have, for several million years at least, ridden a more subtle, prehistory (pp. 143-163). London: Routledge. complex track of evolution - a pattern of dual inheritance powered by the Lake, M. (1998). 'Homo': The creative genus? In S. Mithen (Ed.). Creativity mind's dependence on the activity of the genome and the action of social in human evolution and prehistory, (pp. 125-142). London: Routledge. learning as it shapes its own development: this is gene-culture coevolution Lazarus, R.S. (1991). Emotion and adaptation. Oxford, England: Oxford (Lumsden & Wilson, 1981; Lumsden, 1999b). It is in the description of University Press. this coevolutionary process that we find, I think, clear hints of a productive Ludwig, A.M. (1995). The price of greatness. New York: Guilford Press. new dialogue between evolutionary science and creativity studies. Lumsden, C. J. (1999). Evolving creative minds: Stories and mechanisms. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.). The handbook of creativity (pp. 153-168). Cambridge, In order to make my several principal points I shall need to sketch out England: Cambridge University Press. a road map, to put human creativity in evolutionary perspective. I will move Lumsden, C.J. & Wilson, E.O. (1981). Genes, mind, and culture. Cambrige, quickly across multiple fields, indeed whole disciplines, none of which can MA: Harvard University Press. be presented here in anything remotely approaching the depth that their MacKinnon, D.W. (1970). Creativity: A multi-faceted phenomenon. In J. current vigor and rate of advance merits. The bibliography, in turn, has no Roslanksy (Ed.), Creativity (pp. 19-32). Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing. pretensions to completeness, and does list cross-disciplinary works (with Martindale, C. (1977). Theories of the evolution of consciousness. Journal luck not hopelessly untimely) I find useful in approaching the creative mind of Altered States of Consciousness, 3, 261-278. through the perspective of gene-culture coevolution. Mayer, R.E. (1999). Fifty years of creativity research. In R.J. Sternberg (Ed.). I will need some nomenclature through which reference can be made to Handbook of creativity (pp. 449-460). Cambridge, England: Cambridge Uni­ versity Press. the creative and the aesthetic, and to their roles in human existence. Fol­ Miller, G.F. (2000). The mating mind: How sexual choice shaped the evolu­ lowing our earlier usage (Findlay & Lumsden, 1988; Lumsden, 1999b), tion of human nature. New York: Doubleday. creative process will point toward those mental events by which an organ­ Mithen, S. (1996). The prehistory of the mind: The cognitive origins of art ism intentionally goes beyond its prior experience to a novel and appropri­ and science. London: Thames & Hudson. ate outcome. Creativity will refer to that alluring complex of talents and Nobel, W., & Davidson, I. (1996). Human evolution, language and mind: A inclinations we see in people who, given some measure of free rein, spend psychological and archeological inquiry. Cambridge, England: Cambridge significant amounts of their time and energy engaged in the creative pro­ University Press. cess. An outcome is a product of the creative process, while an innovation Pfeiffer, J. (1982). The creative explosion. New York: Harper & Row. is an outcome that attains some level of adoption in the society under con­ Renfrew, C. (1983). Toward an archeology of mind. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. sideration. In regarding the aesthetic, I have found that Francis Sparshott's Pinker, S. (1997). How the mind works. NY: Norton Books. characterizations function with succinct aptness in evolutionary modeling Power, C. (1999). 'Beauty magic': The origins of art. In R. Dunbar, C. Knight, and I shall use his terminology (vigorously motivated and defended in & C. Power (Eds.). The evolution of culture (pp. 92-112). New Brunswick, NJ: Sparshott, 1982) here. To contemplate something, then is to attend to and Rutgers University Press. dwell on its appearance, rather than on what it is or on what we can do with Simonton, D. K. (1999). Origins of genius. New York: Oxford University it. An aesthetic object is anything whatsoever, so long as it is well suited as Press. an object for contemplation. When we are regarding something as an aes­ Sternberg, R.J., & Lubart, T. (1999). The concept of creativity: Prospects thetic object, I shall say we are taking or adopting the aesthetic stance and paradigms. In R.J. Sternberg (Ed.). Handbook of creativity (pp. 3-15). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press toward it. We may be said to appreciate something when we recog­ Storr, A. (1988). Solitude: A return to the self. New York: The Free nize the value it has in any respect we are prepared to defend as the Press. Ss»3ft 16 relevant one(s). A design is all aspects of any performance that Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1992). The psychological foundations of! constitute it as an aesthetic object. A work of art, or artwork, is a Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) performance considered strictly with respect to its design. This stands in the imagination (Johnson, 1987; Martindale 1990b) , personality (Feist, potential contrast to the art object, which is anything one intends to be 1999; Simonton, 1990) , intelligence (Eysenck, 1995; Sternberg, 1988), received as an artwork by a specific community of contemplators. The ques­ motivation (Simonton, 1994), socioeconomic status (Amabile, 1983), cog­ tion of how societies comprised of such contemplators come into existence nitive development (Findlay & Lumsden, 1988), mood and psychopathol- in the natural world, and manage to thrive in the face of more prosaically ogy (Rothenberg, 1990; Runco & Richards, 1997; Russ, 1993), enculturation inclined competition, takes us at once to evolution. (Lubart, 1999), and cognition (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992; Simonton, Getting Here 1999). The resulting individual potential for creativity, along with the ac­ The study of the fossil record of our human ancestors and allied evi­ tual achieved quantity and quality of novel works and innovations, are not dence (surveys in Lewin, 1998; Tattersall, 1993; Tattersall & Schwartz, distributed uniformly or shared in equally by all members of our species. 2000) suggests that around 18 to 20 million years ago the common fore­ Although creative potential and its action in everyday life are universally runners of humankind and the great apes lived in tropical forests. Several shared (Amabile, 1983; Findlay & Lumsden, 1988; Richards et al., 1988), million years later, some 15 to 12 million years ago, the climate was more marked differences characterized by power-law distributions exist in cer­ seasonal. Within this evolving group of species, those ancestral to us shifted tain areas of innovation (mainly the "competing masterpiece" canons; from a more arboreal, apelike existence to life spent foraging on the ground. Martindale, 1990a, Simonton, 1990, 1994, 1999) - even allowing for an The shift in habitat was largely complete by no later than four million years almost obsessive concentration among "creativity psychologists" on the ago, yielding a unique upright posture, two-legged locomotion similar to notions of genius and similar culture heroes highly prized in contemporary modern human walking, stereoscopic vision, and free use of the hands. North American society: Very few people produce innovations that change The ensuing complex, and still highly controversial, pattern of speciation society in a big way, more manage to get appreciated at some level, and all events within these bipedal groups produced one, about 2.5 million years of us come up with novel solutions when unexpected guests arrive at meal ago, that was a maker of simple but effective stone tools: our diminutive time. ancestor Homo habilis. The journey to Homo habilis was a remarkable The strategies of thought by which master creators do so, and by which biological adventure in itself, but the (by evolutionary standards) light­ everyone comes up with personally original responses to life's everyday ning-fast journey onward from Homo habilis to us was by far the more unexpected demands, have received increasing attention. Possible elements momentous for creativity and aesthetics. include a species-wide penchant for shuffling the parts of mental represen­ The evolution of modern humankind, and by this I mean especially the tations into new configurations and then checking the consequences (Donald emergence from prehistory of the human brain and mind, took approxi­ Campbell's (1960) influential "blind variation and selective retention", re­ mately two million years from the first tentative signs of Homo habilis to cently developed by Dean Simonton (1999) into a comprehensive treat­ the most recent, world-dominating form Homo sapiens during the past ment of creativity across the human lifespan); alterations in cognitive search 75,000 to 200,000 years. The elaboration of the human brain during this strategies that enhance the role of combinations involving "remote associ­ time was very rapid - perhaps the fastest advance recorded for any com­ ates" (Mednick, 1962; Houston & Mednick, 1963), i.e. strikingly unusual plex organ in the entire history of life on Earth. Even so, still more rapid and metaphorical relationships among ideas (Johnson, 1987; Taylor, 1989); changes took place. Almost at once, material culture pushed past the pri­ essential relations between affect and cognition (Damasio, 1995, 1999; mate level (Whiten, 2000) and began a slow, sporadically halting accelera­ Johnson, 1987; Lynn & Rhue, 1986; Picard, 1997; Rothenberg, 1990; Russ, tion. At the time of Homo habilis, simple tools of chipped stone were in 1993); solidly computational algorithms for efficiently generating and ex­ use, including crude knives and larger choppers. By 350,000 years before ploring new options (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992; Hofstadter, 1995; present (BP) Homo erectus and Homo ergaster, intermediate species be­ McCorduck, 1991; Schank, 1988; Simon, 1983; Smith & Ward, 1998); tween Homo habilis and Homo sapiens, were using fire and shaping stone radically rconcomputational processes involving the basic physical struc­ axes that were both beautiful and functional. Around 40-50,000 BP, in at ture of the brain (Penrose, 1994) or global, abduction-like (Josephson & least western Europe, the material culture produced by these growing popu­ Josephson, 1994) relations between a representation and all other repre­ lations expanded dramatically in diversity and complexity of achievement. sentations relevant to novel activity in a domain (Fodor, 2000); combina­ Slowly elaborating kits of stone tools gave way to specialized and com­ tions of apparent opposites into influential unified "wholes" (Rothenberg, pound tools, fabricated dwellings, carved figurines, the masterpieces of 1990); and nonlinear dynamical processes of reentrant excitation and con­ cave art - what paleoanthropologists sometimes call the "Upper Paleolithic trol in network-like archtictures of neural circuits subserving learning and explosion" in creativity and innovation in human prehistory, still barely imagination (Edelman & Tononi, 2000; Martindale, 1990b, 1995). The understood. By 9000 BP agriculture and animal husbandry were in place aesthetic stance also shows evidence of underlying order, emerging across in at least Asia Minor, Palestine, and the fertile hills east of the Tigris the individual lifespan as a progression from self-centered strategies of River, then over the next centuries moved outward by human migration appreciation to more disinterested modes of aesthetic engagement (Par­ and, one supposes, word of mouth. An assortment of geometric shapes sons, 1987): Nagel's (1986) "view from nowhere". pressed into clay tablets appears in the Middle East around 5000 BP: a first This is a remarkable body of knowledge and scholarly debate for an system of recording information in a relatively long-lasting medium. With evolutionary perspective to do any form of justice to, wedded as that per­ writing, urban concentration, social stratification, long-distance trade, and spective has been, till recently, to the idea that genes rigidly determine forty thousand years of innovation in place, prehistory shades over to his­ behavior, or at least constrain learning schedules so tightly that a straight tory and becomes active: the waves, pulses, and episodic revolutions in causal pathway connects genetic change to changes in behavior. Although, style and content of human works now mapped with increasing scope and so far as I am aware, evidence of a genetic role has been found in virtually precision by psychologists and historiometricians (e.g. Martindale, 1990; every creativity-related element where it has been looked for (such as per­ McAllister, 1996; Simonton, 1990, 1994, 1999). sonality and intelligence; see e.g. Eysenck, 1994), the human mind is clearly The properties of mind sustaining these social changes - the "innova- not a textbook case of genetic determinism. Culture intervenes, as does tor/contemplator phenotype", if you like - are also now less than com­ consciousness itself. In order to understand the innovations in evolution­ pletely opaque thanks to the achievements of the behavioral, cognitive, ary theory that, since 1980, have followed from paying attention to this and social sciences. Creativity and the capacity for innovation and contem­ simple fact, it will be helpful to briefly consider a principal puzzle of social plation are species universals for Homo sapiens and, to judge from the evolution among species in general. worldwide patterns of diversity in the paleoarchaeological record, for our A Paradox, Four Pinnacles, and Two More direct hominid ancestors. As a species we are both innovators (Barron's In surveying the patterns of social organization among all species whose (1955) "disposition toward originality") and contemplators. All cultures of members are known to live in groups, Edward Wilson (1975, 1978) noted which we have knowledge sustain innovation and the creation of aesthetic four pinnacles, or high points of evolutionary complexity, among the range objects, as well their appreciation, although the directions in which cre­ of possibilities: the colonial invertebrates (the corals, sponges, colonial ativity are expressed and channeled are culturally diverse (Lubart, 1999; jellyfish); the social insects (ants, bees, wasps, termites); monkeys, apes, Maquet, 1986; Martindale, 1990a). In this era of big computers and large and social mammals excluding human beings; and us. Wilson also pointed databases, the historiometry of innovation is an abundantly practical disci­ out that, a seeming paradox: as one climbs a scale arranged on the basis of pline, yielding striking evidence, noted briefly above, of non-monotonic nervous system organization and behavioral complexity, one actually de­ patterns of change in the form and content of works valued either for their scends in the quality of many traits we intuitively associate with sociality, instrumental utility and/or as art objects. Nomothetic relations be­ such as altruism, cooperation, division of labor, and social integra- tween these societal patterns of creativity, innovation, and change^p-q* i 7 lSf^3k''on' With the appearance of the human mind in evolutionary his­ and the individual human creative mind exist, involving facets 0kin selection and reciprocal ters turn out to be more closely related to each other than are mothers to altruism, traditionally envisaged to account for animal social behavior. The daughters. On the average, three-quarters of their genes, instead of half, multiple levels and scales of change produced by the coevolutionary circuit are identical by common descent and natural selection can favor the emer­ also make fertile ground for innovation-producing behaviors to sweep gence of social forms in which daughters give up their individual repro­ through the population (Findlay & Lumsden, 1988; Lumsden, 1999a). ductive interests to work on behalf of their sisters. (This is kin selection; Indeed, a key weaknesses of current writing about creativity's evolu­ see Frank, 1998.) The insect society is thus far less well integrated than tionary origins is that there are just too many good stories one can at present that of a colonial invertebrate, but is still more so than mammalian and tell about why a disposition to innovate and appreciate might help a naked human societies. The individual worker may show extreme phenotypic ape cope with natural selection and sexual selection - adapting to unex­ and behavioral specialization related to its tasks and duties in the colony. pected changes in the environment; exploiting sudden changes in group Although far from perfectly coupled to and integrated with those of its structure; persuading, cheating, duping, and seducing to the benefit of self sisters, its efforts tend to be altruistically directed to the welfare of the and kin; arresting the attention of the potentially uninterested; more el­ colony as a whole. egantly packaging culture for learning through symbolic forms that invoke Mammalian societies depart even further from the lockstep pattern of the aesthetic stance; advertising and take noticing of one's suitability as a total societal cohesion in a group of clones than do the social insects. Indi­ mate (or for collecting mates); the list goes on (Lumsden, 1999b). There is viduality matters more. The members of a monkey troop, for example, are some value in such diversity, of course, because it hints at the abductive less intimately associated (and, with a diploid process of gene transmis­ potential of the evolutionary perspective. But so far these amount to no sion, less intimately related) than are colonial invertebrates. They are also more than hints. The main reason for this state of affairs is, I think, that more likely to recognize and treat each other as individuals. Wilson sug­ human evolutionary science and creativity studies are both young disci­ gested that, due to the pattern of inheritance governing gene transmission plines. It is not simply that our understanding of primary mechanisms of in these societies, in which a complete gene complement is contributed by biocultural evolution is still rudimentary. That much certainly is true, but both the father and the mother to every offspring, the individual mammal the central issue is somewhat different: For psychology, the primary value only marginally serves the welfare of its group. In fact, the opposite gener­ of the evolutionary perspective, effectively adopted, is in answering why ally holds: social life is exploited, allegiances transiently formed, exploited, the human mind is as it is, rather than otherwise. Evolution is the science of and cheated upon, for the improvement of survival and reproduction of self "Why" questions, not functionalist "How" questions; e.g., Wilson, 1975, and immediate kin. In comparison with corals or ant workers, the mem­ 1978 and for psychology the fundamental "Why" question is why the hu­ bers of a mammalian society are self-centered, strife-ridden, and preoccu­ man mind at this point in biocultural evolution, rather than some other pied with sexual roles. possible form. This trend toward decreased societal integration is partly reversed in I am not trying to be obtuse here: We cannot achieve effective evolu­ human beings, who have thereby attained impressive levels of coopera­ tionary treatments of creativity and innovation until the specific manner in tion, altruism, division of labor, and social integration without completely which our human minds engage in those activities is established, and es­ surrendering our basic mammalian heritage of personal identity and indi­ tablished in way that allows conceivable alternatives to be stipulated and vidual welfare. How Homo sapiens has done so remains a mystery and may evaluated in terms of their effectiveness within a process of biocultural include natural selection acting within and between multiple levels of group evolution. A tall order for creativity research, but it is clear that exciting organization in human populations, just as it may have in shaping verte­ advances are being made on the specific cognitive, affective, social, per­ brate sociality generally (Sober & Wilson, 1998). But, whereas most ani­ sonality, and other processes at work in creativity and in the appreciation of mal evolution arises solely from the differential replication of genes, and novel works (vide supra). Once we know what these processes are, we will can be understood in terms of the evolutionary forces shaping that process, be in a position to ask why they are not otherwise. human evolution stubbornly resists such a reduction. Individual human There is, I think, more. Evolutionary theory, despite its in recent incur­ development depends obligatorily on both the genome and the society's sions into complex nonlinear patterns of organismic development, multiple culture. The amount a person must know is too vast, and changes too rap­ interacting levels of selection, and tightly-linked patterns of biocultural idly over a lifetime, to be squeezed into the molecular substance of the interaction, is not a fait accompli. Well into our second century after Dar­ genetic material (Lumsden & Wilson, 1981). Human evolution therefore win, we still have a scientific work in progress, and we are entitled to ask involves the differential transmission of both genetic and cultural informa­ pointedly from where will come the mysteries to best stimulate its further tion, combined with their joint effects on mind, behavior, and each other. growth. One might surmise from the last paragraph that once the long awaited "Culture", like "creativity" and "aesthetics" is a term notoriously diffi­ data from creativity studies are at last on hand, I anticipate a smooth exten­ cult to define in a manner satisfactory to all concerned with it, and sion of evolutionary science into this new domain, an inevitable ab- the notion of "cultural information" even more so. I am using "cul­ 8 JESSSlS sorption of the creative mind and its scholarly study into some com­ tural information" here reluctantly despite its facile convenience fortably enlarged neoDarwinian synthesis. Nothing, however, could Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) be further from my expectation. On the basis of what we know about human creative history, and virtually none beyond now. State spaces of the usual creativity and innovation, it is 1 think much more likely that in coming to terms conception, described just above, assume we know with complete certainty with the creative mind evolutionary theory will itself be radically altered as an everything that can "pop up next", even if evolution is extended over infi­ enterprise of scientific prediction and explanation. nite time. Such fixed mathematical arenas, with their corresponding dy­ Two issues on this agenda of radical confrontation merit a brief sketch namical systems, offer no help in treating the primary action of innovation, here. We can best approach them by returning to the idea of pinnacles or namely to do what has not yet been done. At a minimum, we have state canonical patterns of social form suspended in evolutionary time. The origi­ spaces that themselves are not fixed, but rather evolve as creativity introduces nal notion, it seems to me, can no longer suffice. Certain technological new works into a culture. innovations that have taken place since the time of Wilson's New synthesis One response to this state of affairs is that the evolutionary science has (1975) throw the early picture askew and signal the abrupt appearance of an apologetic rather than an inferential or a predictive capability with re­ two new pinnacles in the abstract landscape of social forms, bringing the spect to the bioculture histories of complex, creative beings like Homo total number from Wilson's original four (colonial invertebrates, the social sapiens. But while there is immense potential value in the careful account­ insects, mammalian societies, and us) up to at least six. Number Five, a ing of why what happened took place just so, on the whole this position consequence of artificial intelligence combined with the rapidly improving strikes me as too restrictive. It takes as given that we are hobbled by the efficiencies of computer hardware, centers on the possible achievement limitations of scientific inference done through state spaces of fixed di­ within the century of machine intelligences that exceed human and direct mension when, in fact, there might be alternatives. One is consider state their own further replication and modification - an in silico line of descent space change for creative species as itself an intelligible problem, made so from the human mind to a cybernetic future some technology watchers worry by a state-space evolutionary dynamic instantiated through the creative will hold scant place for Homo sapiens. For discussion and critique, see behaviors and innovations of the biocultural species. The state-space or its Lumsden (1999b). equivalent itself then becomes part of the formal dynamic of evolutionary What of the sixth pinnacle? Thrust into existence by an international change, rather than an inert receptacle for it (e.g. the superspace dynamics scientific effort known as the Human Genome Project, it pertains more of Findlay & Lumsden, 1988). An allied tack is to consider hypotheses immediately to organic evolution than to in silico branchings from the hu­ about the form such processes of expansion might take regardless of the man evolutionary tree. It is, however, no less eventful in its scientific, so­ apparatus selected to describe it. Thus, Kauffman (2000) has recently in­ cial, and moral implications. I will deal with only the first here; for the troduced the notion of the "adjacent possible" to describe innovations that second and third see Lumsden (2001) and Trainor (2001). Thanks to the are "just over the horizon", and proposed that the creative process expands Project, in the space of barely more than ten years our knowledge of the culture into the adjacent possible as quickly as possible - an intriguing Homo sapiens DNA sequence has gone from miniscule to massive, and conjecture resembling Findly and Lumsden's (1988) proposal that mental now approaches completion. Alongside the genetic sequences of our own representations with certain optimal information-entropic properties best and other "comparison" species has run a steady progression of innova­ facilitate creativity and innovation in a biocultural species. tions - genome authoring tools, in effect- that open up an entirely new Of course, in describing the strictures of state space I have for a mo­ creative space to human achievement: new life forms invented through the ment set aside the matter of the Human Genome Project, and Pinnacle Six. genetic engineering of extant species, including ourselves. For the first time Evolutionary thinking about creativity, innovation, and contemplation has since the appearance of life on this planet, a species has taken deliberate to date been focused on species in which phylogeny is driven by the usual hold of its own genetic material, and thus of its own evolutionary future. suspects, such as natural selection and sexual selection. This can no longer Despite current protest, it is likely now a matter of (too short) time before be the case. Evolutionary theory has to push outward into dramatic new the first efforts to re-author humankind by genetic engineering produce territory. The Universe now holds at least one species in which genetic their first viable results, and a sixth pinnacle in social space opens as our evolution joins cultural evolution as a playground of that species' creative created descendents begin their process of biocultural change. inclinations. The creative and aesthetic capacities of said species, as well Spaces of the Possible as all other aspects of mind reachable through deliberated innovation of As a theoretical physics student, the first significant biology I learned came genes and culture, may now be considered as objects of creative change. In from the earliest edition of James Watson's Molecular Biology of the Gene the Project's wake we now need, I think, nothing less than an evolutionary (Watson, 1965). Turning its lucid pages (just 494 of them), one would scarcely science of creative organisms that create themselves - their creative imagi­ have imagined that a quarter century after this tight summary of viral and bac­ nations included - as they create new genomic and cultural forms for them­ terial genetics the human genome would lie open, well on its way to being fully selves, which in turn opens new theatres of creative opportunity for its mapped. Human creativity is like that; geniuses pop up out of nowhere, inven­ members. How are we to begin writing a theory like this, and applying it tions and bright ideas burst on the scene to put even the best paid futurists to with reasoned humanity? There are important years just ahead in the dia­ shame while changing the way we think and the way we live. logue between creativity studies and the science of evolution. This, in a nutshell, is one of human creativity's two principal chal­ References lenges to evolutionary theory. How does one formulate a theory that gener­ Amabile, T. (1983). The social psychology of creativity. New York: Springer- ates predictions about that which has not yet been created? In the physical Verlag. sciences (whose axiomatic frameworks and modes of prediction-making Barron, F. (1955). The disposition toward originality. Journal of Abnormal the formal versions of evolutionary theory closely mimic), the future is and Social Psychology, 51, 478-485. dealt with the easy way. Abstract mathematical spaces are set up, each point Blackmore, S. (1999). The meme machine. New York: Oxford University in which corresponds to one condition or "state" of the system, and the Press. Bonner, J. T. (1980). The evolution of culture in animals. Princeton, NJ: total expanse of which encompasses the expected range of change within Princeton University Press. the system. Then a rule, or rules, of transformation, sensitive to the origi­ Campbell, D. (1960). Blind variation and selective retention in creative thought nal condition of the system and to external knocks and bumps it might as in other knowledge processes. Psychological Review, 67, 380-400. experience along the way (the "initial" and "boundary" conditions), are Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1994). Memes versus genes: Notes from the culture defined on this "state space". The action of the rules, which depending on wars. In D. H. Feldman, M. Csikszentmihalyi, & H. Gardner (Eds.), Changing the application might be instantiated as differential equations or finite dif­ the world: A framework for the study of creativity (pp. 159-172) Westporl. ference formulae or even quite abstract updating algorithms, is to map each CT: Praeger. point in the state space into some other - the past into the future. From each Damasio, A. R. (1995). Toward a neurobiology of emotion and feeling: Op­ erational concepts and hypotheses. The Neuroscientist. I. l')-25 initial state, the rules generate a succession of states as the forecast of how Damasio, A. (1999). The feeling of what happens: Hotly mid emotion in the the system will change over time. "Dynamical systems" theories like this making of consciousness. New York: llarcourt Unite & ('ompany. occur throughout the natural sciences, and are familiar from treatments of Edelman, G., & Tononi, G. (2000). A universe o)''consciousness: I low matter neural networks and computation, and many other applications in the be­ becomes imagination. New York: Basic Books. havioral and social sciences as well. Eysenck, H. J. (1995). Genius The natural history <•/ creativity New York: The evolution of creative minds cannot be handled this way. A state Cambridge University Press space including The Iliad as a reference beacon from which to "start" (an Feist, G. J. (1999). The infliieiue uf porsoniililv mi jiMislu- jiml seienlitic initial condition) and tracking forward to the present day would also have creativity. In R. J. Sternberg (lul |, Handbook of \ it tilivily f pp .'11 .">(>). New to hold the Mona Lisa, Boeing 747s, and Quake III in order to com­ York: ('jinihridue llniveisilv I'u-ss iMtnca 'iiidhiy. < S . .V I iiiiimIi'ii. ( I (I'MtK) I lie i iriilive iiiiimI.'1'iiwiird pute an evolutionary trajectory joining Homer to now. But we do 1^ BUEssSlaiHl cviiliiliuiiiiiy llieoiv ol ilr.invciv .mil ilium .ilinn Journal of Ilia not know all such possible states, even up to the present in human logical tun! Socltil Stmt tin*',. II. t *'S Vol 2 (I) Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts I ml.-. I' A.Win.I I II .A. Stmili.s M (I •'•>.') ( nolo, •, I'jiiiuiii riwtirw New York: Guilford Press. ii'Ni'i/fi/i 'iii,l .i/y/i. ,inon\ I ninliiulgi'. MA Mil Piess Simonton, D. K. (1999). Origins of genius: Darwinian perspectives on cre­ Imiik.s A (l''l'K| Inundations»lsin talevolution I'timclon, N.I: Princeton ativity. New York: Oxford University Press. I Iiiim'i.iIv l'n">». Smith, S. M., & Ward, T. B. (1999). Evolution and creativity. In D. H. Rosen loiloi. I (,'i;v ('uiuhrulgi-. MA; MIT Press. Praeger. IIdIsKkIu*!. I) (|W<) fluid concepts anil creative analogies: Computer Sober, E., & Wilson. D. S. (1998). Unto others: The evolution and psychol­ hi,ii/i-A of the /iinJaniciita/mechanisms <>i'thought. New York: Basic Books. ogy of unselfish behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. I Illusion. I P., At Mcilmck, S. A. (I %3). Creativity and the need for novelity. Sparshott, F. (1982). The theory of the arts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer­ ./< mi mil ol Abnormal ami Social Psychology, 66, 137-141. sity Press. Johnson, M. (1987). The body in the mind: The bodily basis of meaning, Sternberg, R. J. (1988). A three-facet model of creativity. In R. J. Sternberg imagination, and reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Ed.) The nature of creativity: Contemporary psychological perspectives (pp. losephson, J. R., & Josephson, S. G. (Eds.) (1994). Abduction: Computa­ 125-147). New York: Cambridge University Press. tion, philosophy, technology. New York: Cambridge University Press. Tattersall, I. (1993). The human odyssey: Four million years of human evo­ KaulTman, S. (2000). Investigations. New York: Oxford University Press. lution. New York: Prentice-Hall. I .ewin, R. (1998). The origin of modern humans. New York: W. H. Freeman. Tattersall, I., & Schwartz, J. H. (2000). Extinct humans. Boulder, CO: I.umsden, C. J. (1991). Aesthetics. In M. Maxwell (Ed.), The sociobiologi- Westview Press. cal imagination (pp.253-268). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Trainor, L. E. H. (2001). The triplet genetic code: Key to living organisms. Lumsden, C. J. (1999a). Cyborgs, genes, and wired planets: Sociobiology London: World Scientific, in press. and the human future. (Cyborgs, Gene und vernetzet Planeten: Soziobiologie Watson, J. D. (1965). Molecular biology of the gene. First edition. New York: und die Zukunft des Menschen.) In F. Roetzer (Ed.), Megamaschine wissen W. A. Benjamin. (pp. 176-192). New York: Campus Verlag. Whiten, A. (2000). Primate cultures and social learning. Cognitive Science. Lumsden, C. J. (1999b). Evolving creative minds: Stones and mechanisms. 24,: 477-508. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Handbook of creativity (pp. 153-168). New York: Wilson, E. O. (1975). Sociobiology: The new synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press. Lumsden, C. J. (2001). Today and tomorrow for the genetic code: Foreword Wilson, E. O. (1978). On human nature. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer­ to L. E. H. Trainor, The triplet genetic code: Key to living organisms. London: sity Press. World Scientific, in press. I.umsden, C. J., & Wilson, E. O. (1981). Genes, mind, and culture: The co- evolutionary process. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lumsden, C. J., & Wilson, E. O. (1983). Promethean fire: Reflections on the origin of mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Dr. Charles Lumsden Lubart, T. (1999). Creativity across cultures. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.),. Hand­ book of creativity (pp. 339-350). New York: Cambridge University Press. Clinical Sciences Division Lynn, S. J., & Rhue, J. W. (1986). The fantasy-prone person: Hypnosis, imagi­ Room 7313 nation, and creativity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51,404- Medical Science Building 408. University of Toronto Maquet, J. (1986) The aesthetic experience: An anthropologist looks at the 1 Kings College Circle visual arts. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Toronto, Ontario Martindale, C. (1990a). The clockwork muse: The predictability of artistic CANADA M5S 1A8 change. New York: Basic Books. Martindale, C. (1990b). Creative imagination and neural activity. In R. G. Kunzendorf, & A. A. Sheik (Eds.), The psychophysiology of mental imagery: Theory, research and application, (pp. 89-108). Amityville, NY: Baywood Pub­ lishing. Martindale, C. (1995). Creativity and connectionism. In S. M. Smith, T. B. Ward, & R. A. Finke (Eds.), The creative cognition approach (pp. 249-268). Aesthetic fitness: Cambridge.MA: MIT Press. How sexual selection shaped artistic virtuosity as a fitness indicator Maynard Smith, J. & Szathmary, E. 1995. The major transitions in evolu­ and aesthetic preferences as mate choice criteria tion. New York: Oxford University Press. McAllister, J. W. (1996). Beauty & revolution in science. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Geoffrey F. Miller University Press. London School of Economics McCorduck, P. (1991). Aaron's code: Meta-art, artificial intelligence, and Abstract the work of Harold Cohen. New York: W. H. Freeman and Company. Aesthetic ornamentation in other species almost always results from Mednick, S. A. (1962). The associative basis of the creative process. Psy­ sexual selection through mate choice, and sexually-selected ornaments usu­ chological Review 69: 220-232. i Nagel, T. (1986). The viewfro m nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press, ally function as indicators of fitness - good health, good brains, and good •pt Parsons, M. J. 1987. How we understand art: A cognitive developmental genes. This paper suggests that human art capacities evolved in the same ticcount of aesthetic experience. New York: Cambridge University Press. way, with aesthetic judgement evolving in the service of mate choice. This Penrose, R. (1994). Shadows of the mind: A search for the missing science theory draws on the biological aesthetics of Darwin, Nietzsche, Veblen, of consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press. Boas, Gombrich, and Zahavi, and on the example of bowerbird courtship. Picard, R. (1997). Affective computing. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. It revives the traditional emphasis on virtuosity in ornamental and repre­ Richards, R., Kinney, D. K., Benet, M., & Merzel, A. P. C. (1988). Assessing sentational art, in contrast to the runaway creativity celebrated by Modern­ everyday creativity: Characteristics of the lifetime creativity scales and valida­ ist art theory. It suggests that aesthetic judgement evolved as a functional tion with three large samples. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 476-485. part of social and sexual cognition, not as an side-effect of perceptual psy­ Rothenberg, A. (1990). Creativity and madness: New findings and old ste­ chology. reotypes. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. In Darwin's (1871) view, natural beauty arose through competition to Runco, M A., & Richards, R. (Eds.) (1997). Eminent creativity, everyday attract a sexual partner. His process of sexual selection through mate choice creativity, and health. Greenwich, CT: Ablex Publishing. - the struggle to reproduce, not to survive - drove the evolution of visual Russ, S.W. (1993). Affect and creativity: The role of affect and play in the creative process. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. ornamentation and artistry, from flowers through bird plumage to human Schank, R.C. (1988). Creativity as a mechanical process. In R. J. Sternberg self-adornment. Moreover, Darwin saw animal and proto-human nervous (Ed.) The nature of creativity: Contemporary psychological perspectives (pp. systems as fully capable of aesthetic judgement, used largely in the service 220-238). New York: Cambridge Univeristy Press. of choosing their sexual partners. However, when Darwin's sexual selec­ Shaw, M. P., & Runco, M. A., Eds. (1994). Creativity and affect. Norwood, tion theory fell into disfavor among Victorian biologists (Cronin, 1991; NJ: Ablex Publishing. Miller, 2000a), so did his radically naturalized and sexualized aesthetics. Simon, H. A (1983). Discovery, invention, and development: Human cre­ ative thinking. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science USA 80: 4569- This paper tries to revive Darwin's view of visual aesthetics and art­ 4571. istry as products of sexual selection through mate choice. It does so Simonton, D. K. (1990). Psychology, science, and history: An intro­ in light of the revival of sexual selection theory in evolutionary duction to historiometry. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. biology (e.g. Andersson, 1994), especially new ideas about the role Simonton, D. K. (1994). Greatness: Who makes history and why of sexual ornamentation as a reliable indicator of an animal's health, Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) fertility, fitness, and genetic quality (Johnstone, 1995; Miller, 2000a, b,c,d,e; colorful tails, innovative sounds, and musky smells. In Darwin's view, Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). In this view, the fine arts are just the most recent mate choice is mediated by animal nervous systems, so it is mid-way be­ and pretentious manifestations of a universal human instinct for visual self- tween natural selection (selection on survival ability, mostly by the inani­ ornamentation, which in turn is a manifestation of sexual selection's uni­ mate environment) and artificial selection by human breeders. This media­ versal tendency to ornament individuals with visual advertisements of their tion by animal senses and preferences is what gives mate choice such aes­ fitness. Thus, the human capacity for visual artistry is viewed here as a thetic power in evolution. 'fitness indicator', evolved like the peacock's tail and the bowerbird's bower From 1871 until the turn of the 20,h century, Darwinian aesthetics was for a courtship function. an active area of theorizing. Darwin (1871) himself viewed the human Art as an adaptation visual arts as an outgrowth of an instinct for body ornamentation. He pointed The adaptationist approach taken here considers human visual art in the out that males in most cultures indulge in much more self-adornment than functionalist framework of evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology. females, as predicted by his sexual selection theory. (He understood that Adaptationism entails identifying biological adaptations and investigating their men of his own culture ornamented themselves with country estates and adaptive functions - that is, the ways in which their survival or reproduction colonial treasures rather than tattoos and penis sheaths). Herbert Spencer benefits outweighed their costs in ancestral generations. argued that sexual selection produced most of the beauty in nature and Probably no particular type of human art or aesthetic style can be con­ culture, while Max Nordau posited a neurophysiological link between re­ sidered a genetically encoded adaptation. That is the wrong level of de­ productive urges and artistic creativity, which Sigmund Freud appropri­ scription. Rather, we should focus on the level of psychological adapta­ ated in this theory of art as sublimated sexuality. Friedrich Nietzsche tions: evolved, domain-specific mental capacities that may include percep­ developed an especially intriguing and little-appreciated biological aes­ tual, cognitive, emotional, motivational, learning, and motor control sub­ thetics in The Will to Power, in the section titled 'The will to power as art'. systems (Buss, 1999; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). It is only at this level that Nietzsche (1883-1888/1968, p. 421) also accepted a sexual display func­ evolutionary psychology has some hope of integrating the ultimate (evolu­ tion for the visual arts, writing "Artists, if they are any good, are (physi­ tionary-functional) and proximate (reductionistic) study of psychological cally as well) strong, full of surplus energy, powerful animals, sensual; adaptations. Also, the adaptationist approach emphasizes selection pres­ without a certain overheating of the sexual system a Raphael is unthink­ sures overphylogeny: if art evolved in our lineage over the last one or two able." million years, there is little reason to expect proto-art abilities in living Other theorists who were less open to sexual selection theory, such as non-human primate such as chimpanzees, which split off from us at least 5 Alfred Russel Wallace, had more trouble understanding the adaptive ben­ million years ago (c.f., Lenain, 1995; Whiten, 1976). efit of art, given its high time and energy costs but limited survival utility. The capacity to produce visual art and self-ornamentation appears to For example, in The Beginnings of Art, Ernst Grosse (1897, p. 312) argued be a genuine evolutionary adaptation unique to our species of primate that natural selection would "long ago have rejected the peoples which (Dissanayake, 1992). It fits many criteria for recognizing adaptations (see wasted their force in so purposeless a way [i.e. making art-works], in favor Buss, 1999; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). It is ubiquitous across human of other peoples of practical talents; and art could not possibly have been groups, cultures, and history. Art-making and art-viewing are pleasurable, developed so highly and richly as it has been". Throughout the 1890s, and pleasure is an evolutionary hallmark of psychological adaptation. Ar­ Darwinian art theorists H. Balfour, A. C. Haddon, and Felix Clay also tistic production entails costs in time, energy, effort, and skill, and such struggled to find credible non-sexual functions for art. costs are rarely expended without some adaptive rationale. Humans are Misled by Herbert Spencer's phrase 'survival of the fittest', many theo­ much better at producing and judging art than any artificial intelligence rists of this era suggested that art's high cost and apparent uselessness im­ program or any other primate. Art is not 'innate' in the sense of fully plied the futility of Darwinian analysis. Darwinian aesthetics also lan­ functioning at birth (almost no psychological adaptations are), but art is guished because most Victorian biologists were unwilling to follow Dar­ relatively fun and easy to learn, compared to evolutionarily novel skills win in granting female animal brains any power to choose their mates by such as following APA format. aesthetic criteria. This patronizing attitude to animal aesthetic tastes was The fitness indicator theory of art outlined in this paper is not new. reinforced by the rise of Behaviorism in early 20,h century psychology. Al­ Similar ideas were expressed not only by Charles Darwin (1871), but also though Darwin gave strong evidence for the importance of female mate by Friedrich Nietzsche (1883-1888/1968), Thorstein Veblen (1899), Frans choice in producing male ornaments, biologists after Darwin focused al­ Boas (1955), Ernst Gombrich (1977, 1982), Amotz Zahavi (1975, 1978; most exclusively on male rivalry, rejecting the possibility of female choice Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997), Frederick Turner (1991), FraserNeiman (1997), (Cronin, 1991, Miller, 2000a). For over a century, sexual selection was Marek Kohn (1999), and Camilla Power (1999). The fitness indicator seen as a process where active, competitive males struggled for "posses­ theory has also been used in my previous work on art (Miller, 1999a, 2000a), sion" of passive females, by acquiring territories and status, and repelling music (Miller, 2000b), creativity (Miller, 1997a), mate choice (Miller, rivals. Ornaments were usually interpreted as species-recognition signals, 1997b, 1998a,b), and the evolution of human mental traits as indicators to help animals avoid mating with the wrong species. Only in the last (Miller, 2000c,d,e). couple of decades has the picture changed, with a mass of support for Art as a product of sexual selection Darwin's mate choice hypothesis in thousands of experimental and theo­ If art is an adaptation, what possible function could it have served? retical studies (e.g. Andersson, 1994; Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 1998). From the viewpoint of current animal communication research, art is a Sexual selection is now recognized as a major factor in the evolution of signalling system. There is a signaller (the maker of the art), and a set of animal bodies, brains, signals, social interactions, and species. receivers (who perceive the work of art). The prototypical functions for What sort of evidence could support this sexual selection theory of art? animal signals include long-range sexual attraction, short-range sexual court­ One clue would be an example of convergent evolution: the independent ship, sexual rivalry, territorial conflict, begging by offspring to solicit pa­ evolution of art-like abilities in another species through sexual selection. rental investment, warning signals to deter predators, and alarm signals to Bower-birds offer strong evidence along this line. alert relatives of danger (Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 1998). Bowerbirds: The Darwinian aesthetics of the extended phenotype Out of these standard functions for signalling, sexual selection for court­ Bowerbirds are native to New Guinea and Australia. Each of the 18 ship produces the most complex and aesthetically pleasing signals (Dar­ species constructs a different style of display site or bower. Bowers are win, 1871; Cronin, 1991; Miller, 2000a). Insofar as we praise human art constructed only by males, and only for courtship (Borgia, 1986). Each for its complexity and aesthetic value, it seems reasonable to focus on sexual male constructs his nest by himself, then tries to attract females to copulate courtship as the most likely adaptive function of human art-production - at with him near it. Females fly around searching for the most visually im­ least in prehistory, if not in modern society. pressive bower, and copulate with the best bower-builders. Males that Sexual selection is not just a theory of sex differences. Sexual selec­ build superior bowers can mate with up to ten different females per day; tion emerges in any sexually-reproducing species as a result of competition bad bower-builders attract no females (Borgia, 1986, 1995, 1997; Lenz, within each sex to attract sexual partners of the opposite sex (for overviews 1994). Once inseminated, the females go off on their own, build their own see Andersson, 1994; Cronin, 1991; Miller, 2000a). Darwin (1871) dis­ small cup-shaped nests, lay their eggs, and raise their offspring by them­ tinguished two kinds of sexual selection: aggressive rivalry and mate selves with no male help (like Picasso's mistresses). Just as sexual choice. Rivalry, especially between males, tends to produce weap­ selection on ornamental plumage drove speciation among the closely ons, such as sharp teeth, large horns, and strong muscles. Mate 1 MaSlarelated Birds of Paradise, changes in bower fashion probably drove choice, especially by females, tends to produce ornaments, such as the proliferation of bowerbird species (Borgia, 1997; Uy & Borgia, Vol 2 (1) Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts 2000). This evidence confirms Darwin's (1871) view that bowers evolved cept Zahavi's (1975) handicap principle, but it has recently become a ma­ as courtship ornaments, through sexual selection by female choice. Func­ jor theme in sexual selection research (Johnstone, 1995). tionally, bowers attract females to copulate by advertising male fitness, and Handicaps have the counter-intuitive feature that the more vulnerable they they have no survival function. are to disruption (by poor nutrition, injury, parasites, pathogens, genetic Structurally, bowers are large and complex, show bilateral or radial inbreeding, high mutation load, or socially subordinate status), the more symmetry, are decorated colorfully, and require a great deal of time, en­ useful they are as fitness indicators. Vulnerable traits amplify the apparent ergy, material, and skill to construct. For example, the Golden Bowerbird variance in phenotypic quality across individuals (Hasson, 1990). They of northern Australia, though only 9 inches long, builds a sort of roofed take small differences in genetic quality, nutritional state, general health, or gazebo up to 9 feet high, many times its own body size and weight. Males intelligence, and turn them into dramatic differences in ornament quality - fly around searching for the most brilliantly colored natural objects (such including the quality of courtship behavior such as bower-building or art- as berries, snail shells, and flowers), bring them back to their bowers, and production. In this way, they make individual differences more visible to arrange them carefully in clusters of uniform color. When the berries and mate choice, amplifying the power of sexual selection to shape both orna­ flowers lose their color after a few days, the males replace them with fresh ment quality and underlying fitness (Rowe & Houle, 1996; Houle, 2000). material. Females mate preferentially with males who construct larger, Evolutionary psychology has revealed that many cues of human physi­ better quality, and more highly ornamented bowers (Borgia, 1985, 1986, cal beauty function as fitness indicators. These cues include height, facial 1995; Lenz, 1994). Immature males build unimpressive bowers, and it symmetry, facial averageness, facial indicators of sex hormone levels, male requires several years of practice (and survival in a hostile environment) upper-body musculature, and female waist-to-hip ratio (see Etcoff, 1999; before high-quality bowers can be achieved. The bower can be considered Gangestad & Thornhill, 1997; Manning, Scutt, Whitehouse, & Leinster, the 'extended phenotype' of the male bower-bird (Dawkins, 1982): a ge­ 1997; Thornhill, 1998; Thornhill & Grammer, 1999). For example, men netically evolved, species-specific artefact constructed outside the are sexually attracted to low waist-to-hip ratios in females, and a low fe­ individual's body, but very much in the service of the individual's genes. male waist-to-hip ratio really does correlate with youth, fertility, and health In fact, recent evidence shows that the cognitive challenge of bower- (Singh, 1995). This research concerns aesthetic tastes, not just sexual psy­ construction was the major selection pressure driving the evolution of brain chology. Insofar as the human form has been considered the prototype of size in bowerbirds. Madden (2001) found a correlation around .80 be­ beauty in every culture, this research shows the utility of using fitness indi­ tween bower complexity and relative brain size across 10 species of bow­ cator theory to understand the adaptive logic behind visual beauty. erbirds and four non-bowerbirds (such as the closely related catbirds). Indicators ofgeneti c quality Sexual selection for bower complexity almost doubled male brain size. Fitness indicators often advertise good genes, not just good bodies and For example, after controlling for body size, the brains of a complex bower- brains. By 'good genes', biologists usually mean a genotype that has a low builder C. lauterbachi were 80% larger than those of the catbird A. number of expressed deleterious mutations. Mutation is a major problem melanotis. This is not quite as dramatic as the tripling of brain size in art- for every species. New mutations are always arising, and since they hurt making humans compared to non-artistic chimpanzees (Miller, 2000a), but much more often than they help, they are continually eroding fitness. For impressive nonetheless. Madden's (2001) study was the first to show ex­ example, Eyre-Walker and Keightley (1999) estimated that in our hominid pansion of overall brain size in response to sexual selection pressures, and ancestors over the last several million years, there have been on average the first to show a relationship between brain size and the complexity of an 1.6 new, harmful, expressed mutations per individual per generation. This aesthetic display constructed outside the body. In this light, Madden's exceeds the mutation rate that natural selection alone could counter-act work suggests there was convergent evolution not only between bowers (Crow, 1999; Kondrashov, 1995). So how do species resist a 'mutational and human art, but between bower bird brains and human brains. meltdown' (Ridley, 2001)? Some biologists believe that sexual selection As Darwin (1871) realized, bowers are one of the best examples of for indicators of genetic quality is a major factor in allowing complex, long- sexual selection through mate choice, and also one of the only examples of lived species to persist in the face of mutation's entropic power (e.g., Atmar, animal art. Bowers show that mate choice can create complex psychologi­ 1991; Michod & Hasson, 1990; Pomiankowski & Moller, 1995; Rowe & cal adaptations for constructing aesthetic ornamentation beyond an animal's Houle, 1996). Indeed, many biologists believe that limiting the propaga­ body. Bowers also illustrate the idea that mate choice favors fitness indica­ tion of harmful mutations may be the reason why sexual reproduction tors. The aesthetic quality of a bower is a reliable indicator of good skill, a evolved in the first place (Ridley, 1993). good brain, and good genes, and female bower-birds have evolved the aes­ Indicators of genetic quality can be bodily traits, or behavioral traits thetic discernment to judge bowers in order to get the best genes (heritable such as bird song, bower-building, or human art-production. Behaviors fitness) for their offspring. In social cognition terms, their aesthetic tastes are often better fitness indicators simply because brains are so complex, so allow them to make fitness-attributions through the bower, as it were, to hard to grow, so costly to maintain, and so easy to disrupt, compared to the bower-builder behind. This point leads us to fitness indicator theory. other organs (Miller, 2000a). For example, a songbird's singing ability is Fitness indicator theory a potent fitness indicator. The number of different songs a male can sing In recent years, biologists have found that many sexually-selected traits (his 'song repertoire') correlates positively with his age, with the size of function as reliable indicators of reproductively important traits such as the brain area specialized for song learning, with his reproductive success, age, health, fertility, social status, and genetic quality (Andersson, 1994; and with the health and survival likelihood of his offspring; this is why Cronin, 1991; Johnstone, 1995; Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). Collectively, females prefer large-repertoire males (Catchpole & Slater, 1995; Hasselquist, these traits determine the individual's expected Darwinian fitness, so indi­ Bensch, & von Schantz, 1996). cators of these traits can be called 'fitness indicators' (Miller, 2000a,b,c,d,e). Which behavioral traits would be most valuable as good-genes indica­ By choosing sexual partners with high-quality fitness indicators, animals tors? Some behaviors summarize much more information about an are more likely to get healthy partners, competent parents, and good genes individual's genotype, by depending on more complex neurogenetic devel­ for their offspring. opmental pathways, which can be disrupted by mutations on a much larger For example, the peacock's tail works as a fitness indicator because set of genetic loci (Houle, 2000; Miller, 2000e; Rowe & Houle, 1996). unhealthy, weak peacocks cannot grow very large colorful, symmetric, well- Mate choice should evolve to focus on complex, challenging behaviors preened tails. Even if they could, their encumbering tails would make it that amplify minor differences in genetic quality between individuals into even more difficult to escape from predators such as tigers. The result is massive, easily-noticed differences in the relative qualities of their court­ that the size of a (surviving) peacock's tail correlates positively with the ship behavior - such as art-production. peacock's age, health, and heritable fitness (Petrie, 1994). By mating with This leads to an important point about assessing whether art is an adap­ a large-tailed peacock, peahens are getting good genes that will give their tation. Some evolutionary psychologists have suggested that genuine psy­ offspring survival and reproductive advantages. chological adaptations should show low phenotypic variance (small indi­ Indicators are usually subject to the 'handicap principle' (Zahavi, 1975; vidual differences) and low heritability, because selection should have elimi­ Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997) that they must have high costs in order to be reli­ nated maladaptive genetic variation. These criteria make sense for traits able. Cheap, easy-to-grow, easy-to-maintain indicators could be faked too that evolved under natural selection for survival, but they do not make easily by unhealthy, unfit individuals, so the indicator would lose its value sense for sexually selected fitness indicators (Miller, 2000c,d,e). If art as a signal, and receivers would evolve to ignore it. Technically, the evolved under sexual selection as a fitness indicator, then we should key feature is that the indicator must have a higher relative mar expect large, conspicuous individual differences in artistic ability, ginal costs to an unfit animal than it does to a highly fit animal|jy5KII[ 22 and at least moderate heritability. Moreover, if artistic ability (Grafen, 1990). It took biologists 20 years to understand and ac- evolved to advertise other underlying mental and personality traits, Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) we should expect substantial phenotypic correlations between artistic abil­ verbal handicaps that constrain vocabulary choice, thereby making poetry ity and those other traits. Thus, although art ability might be modular at the a more effective intelligence-indicator. Kohn (1999) viewed the Acheulian level of adaptive design, it might not appear very independent in a factor hand-axe as a sexually-selected part of the Homo erectus extended pheno- analysis of mental abilities. In fact, if artistic ability evolved as an indica­ type, and as a reliable fitness indicator. Power (1999) analyzed the origins tor of the fitness component known as general cognitive ability ('intelli­ of cosmetics, especially the use of red ochre, using the handicap principle. gence'), then we would expect it to show a very high correlation with intel­ Neiman (1997) analyzed the construction of Mayan pyramids as costly, ligence - such that it would be easy to mistake for an evolutionary side- wasteful displays, and Frank (1999) did likewise in analyzing runaway effect of 'domain-general human intelligence' (Miller, 2000e). American consumerism. Zahavi has also applied his handicap principle Art-works as fitness indicators insightfully to human aesthetics (Zahavi, 1978; Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). From the viewpoint of fitness indicator theory, maybe our aesthetic Developmental stability and artefact regularity preferences evolved to favor art-works that could only have been produced How can we apply fitness indicator theory to understand specific aes­ by a high-fitness artist. Art-objects may be displays of their creator's fit­ thetic tastes and artistic styles? This section develops a brief example. ness, and may be judged as such. As with the sexual ornaments on our Many physical beauty cues advertise a component of fitness known as 'de­ bodies (Gangestad & Thornhill, 1997), perhaps beauty boils down to fit­ velopmental stability', which may have some interesting analogs in the ness. visual arts. Developmental stability refers to an individual's ability to To be reliable, fitness indicators must be difficult for low-fitness indi­ grow organs in their optimal, species-typical form, despite the disruptive viduals to produce (Zahavi, 1975; Grafen, 1990; Johnstone, 1995). Ap­ effects of genetic mutation and environmental stressors (Gangestad & plied to human art, this suggests that beauty equals difficulty and high cost. Thornhill, 1997). Body symmetry is one convenient way to measure de­ We find attractive those things that could only have been produced by people velopmental stability in the lab - and in the wild. Because perfect bodily with attractive, high-fitness qualities such as health, energy, endurance, hand- symmetry is so hard to produce but so easy to assess perceptually, many eye coordination, intelligence, creativity, access to rare materials, the abil­ visual ornaments in many species have evolved to show off their bilateral ity to learn difficult skills, and lots of free time. symmetry. An art-work's beauty reveals an artist's virtuosity. This is an old-fash­ This fitness-indicating power of symmetry holds equally well for arti­ ioned view of aesthetics, but that does not make it wrong. Throughout facts. The ability to produce an art-work that incorporates perfectly sym­ most of human history, the perceived beauty of an object has depended metric elements (bilaterally or radially) is a potent indicator of artistic skill very much on its cost in terms of time, energy, skill, or resources. Objects (Gombrich, 1982; Kohn, 1999; Washburn, 1999). This may be why we that were cheap and easy to produce were almost never considered beauti­ find beautiful those ornamental art-works that incorporate symmetric mo­ ful. As Thorstein Veblen (1899, p. 80) pointed out in The Theory of the tifs. More generally, the regular repetition of ornamental motifs across a Leisure Class, "The marks of expensiveness come to be accepted as beau­ decorated surface, without noticeable errors, functions as a potent indica­ tiful features of the expensive articles". Likewise, Franz Boas (1955) found tor of artistic skill (Gombrich, 1982), and was respected as such in all cul­ that in most cultures he studied, "goodness and beauty are the same" (Boas, tures until the invention of mechanized production (Boas, 1955). 1955, p. 356), with goodness denoting the patient, resourceful, and cre­ At a more abstract level, representational art follows the same indica­ ative application of high skill and high intelligence. In his view, this thirst tor logic as body symmetry and ornamental regularity. Accurate visual for virtuosity explains our preferences for regular form, symmetry, per­ representations of recognizable objects are very easy to assess (given our fectly repeated decorative motifs, smooth surfaces, and uniform color fields excellent visual memory), but very hard to produce (given the challenge of - which are all difficult to produce under pre-modern conditions, but easy suppressing our depth perception circuitry to see with the 'innocent eye' to assess (also see Gombrich, 1982). Thus, our sense of beauty was shaped required in painting). This may be why accurate representations have been by evolution to embody a tacit awareness of what is difficult versus easy, considered aesthetically impressive in every human culture, at least until rare versus common, costly versus cheap, skillful versus slovenly, and fit the invention of photography (Gombrich, 1977). Only since then have versus unfit. students been taught to suppress our natural tendency to equate artistic From this sexual selection viewpoint, the artist's challenge is to dem­ merit with representational accuracy. onstrate his or her fitness by making something that a lower-fitness sexual Aesthetic judgement as a branch of social psychology rival could not make. Almost anything can be made aesthetically, because The fitness indicator theory of aesthetics suggests that the perception anything can be made with special care that would be difficult to imitate by of beauty in an art-work is normally just the first step in a chain of infer­ one who was not so careful. This fits with Dissanayake's (1992) view of ence that reaches all the way into our mechanisms of social cognition and making art as 'making special'. Fitness indicator theory explains why our social attribution. Aesthetic judgement normally entails some attribution aesthetic tastes are so culturally flexible at one level, yet so invariant in to the artist of intelligence, creativity, skill, maturity, imagination, consci­ their underlying emphasis on virtuosity. Just as sexual selection can make entiousness, and agreeableness - or their opposites. These in turn are taken, almost any body surface more elaborate and complex as a visual ornament, unconsciously, as inputs into other social assessment systems, principally resulting in a diversification of visual ornamentation across species, our mate choice, but also systems for evaluating offspring, relatives, friends, sexually-selected aesthetic tastes can favor the elaboration or 'making spe­ allies, and individuals in other biologically significant social roles. cial' of almost any object according to almost any set of challenging norms Perhaps the psychological study of aesthetics should be re-considered or rules, resulting in the diversification of visual styles across human cul­ as a branch of social attribution research, rather than a branch of perceptual tures. This also explains why most people rejected the 20,h century Mod­ psychology. Our ability to judge beauty as a fitness indicator is part of our ernist styles (such as abstract expressionism or conceptual art) that self­ 'social rationality' (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999), a set of inference heuristics consciously rejected virtuosity as a criterion of artistic importance (Miller, for making biologically significant decisions about other individuals on 2000a). Fitness indicator theory helps us understand why 'art' is an honor­ the basis of observable behavioral cues. The question for empirical psy­ ific term that connotes superiority, exclusiveness, and high achievement in chologists should not be whether such inferences are logically warranted almost any domain of skill, whether pottery or psychotherapy. (they rarely are), but whether they have some pragmatic utility, by virtue of Beauty conveys truth, but it is a truth about the artist's individual fit­ relying on cues (such as fitness indictors) that have objective cue validity ness, not about the human condition in general. Compared to human lan­ in Brunswik's (1956) sense. guage, the non-representational visual arts seem very poor as communica­ It makes sense to separate art-work from artist only in our modern ur­ tion media. Yet compared to human language, all animal signalling sys­ ban societies, in which art-works are commodified, transported, preserved, tems in all other species that have ever evolved seem very poor at commu­ traded, and mechanically reproduced through photography and printing. nicating propositional information about the external world. The primary When we seek the evolutionary origins of art, we should remember that function for almost all animal signalling systems is to convey fitness infor­ any art-work our prehistoric ancestors would have been able to see, would mation about the signaller, not information about the world (Bradbury & have probably been made by a living individual with whom they could Vehrencamp, 1998). In this sense, the absence of distinct propositional have interacted socially or sexually. The artist was never far from his or meaning in most of the human visual arts is biologically normal, and lan­ her work, or else the work could not have functioned as the artist's ex­ guage is the bizarre exception. tended phenotype. Since the rise of evolutionary psychology around 1990, several This is bad news for arm-chair aesthetic theorists. It means we thinkers have applied sexual selection theory, biological signalling should stop looking for formal determinants of beauty in art-works theory, the handicap principle, and related ideas to understand the themselves, and start looking for correlations between (1) varia­ human arts. Constable (1997) analyzed verse poetry as a system of tion in the design details of art-works produced by representative Vol 2 (I) Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts samples of real people, (2) variation in (he underlying Illness components Dawkins, R. (1982). The extended phenotype: The gene as the unit of selec­ {e.g., intelligence, personality, health) oft hn.se same people, ami (3) varia­ tion. Oxford, U.K.: W. H. Freeman. Dissanayake, E. (1992). Homo aestheticus: Where art comes from and why. tion in the beauty ratings assigned to those art-works by other people - New York: The Free Press. preferably young, single, opposite-sex people in the same mating market Etcoff, N. (1999). Survival of the prettiest: The science of beauty. New (for other empirical predictions, see Houle, 2000; Miller, 2000a,c,d,e). In York: Doubleday. my view, Brimswikian social psychology, not the formal mathematical analy­ Eyre-Walker, A., & Keightley, P. D. (1999). High genomic deleterious muta­ sis of exemplary art-works, is the royal road to understanding human aes­ tion rates in hominids. Nature, 397, 344-346. thetic judgements. Frank, R. (1999). Luxury fever: Why money fails to satisfy in an era of Sexual selection, sex differences, and sexual motives excess. New York: Free Press. Sexual selection often produces sex differences, but not always. In Gangestad, S. W., and Thornhill, R. (1997). Human sexual selection and socially monogamous species such as humans and most birds, both sexes developmental stability. In J. A. Simpson & D. T. Kenrick (Eds.), Evolution­ ary social psychology (pp. 169-195). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. tends to be choosy, and both sexes evolve sexual ornamentation (Kirkpatrick, Gigerenzer, G., & Todd, P. M. (Eds.). (1999). Simple heuristics that make us Price, & Arnold, 1990; Miller, 2000a). For this reason, a sexual selection smart. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. theory of art evolution need not imply higher male art-production ability Gombrich, E. H. (1977). Art and illusion: A study in the psychology of and higher female aesthetic-judgement ability. Although males have pro­ pictorial representation (5,h ed.). London: Phaidon Press. duced vastly more public art in agricultural and industrial societies Gombrich, E. H. (1979). A sense of order: A study in the psychology of deco­ (Miller, 1999a), the sexual dimorphism in art output among prehistoric rative art. Ithaca, NY: Cornell U. Press. hunter-gatherers may have been smaller. In any case, sexual selection is Grafen, A. (1990). Biological signals as handicaps. Journal of Theoretical likely to have produced more dimorphism at the level of artistic motivation Biology, 144,511-546. than at the level of artistic capacity, given the overlapping perceptual and Grosse, E. (1897). The beginnings of art. New York [no publisher indi­ cognitive abilities required to produce and to appreciate art (Miller, 2000a). cated]. Hasselquist, D., Bensch, S., & von Schantz, T. (1996). Correlation between If art evolved through sexual selection to serve a courtship function, male song repertoire, extra-pair paternity and offspring survival in the great we are not likely to be consciously aware of that function. A peacock's tail reed warbler. Nature, 381, 229-232. need not know that it evolved for a sexual-attraction function, and neither Hasson, O. (1990). The role of amplifiers in sexual selection: An integration do our brains. Contra Freud, a sexually-selected instinct for making aes­ of the amplifying and Fisherian mechanisms. Evolutionary Ecologv, 4, 277- thetically pleasing ornamentation need not have any connection with a sexu- 289. ally-selection desire to copulate, even at an 'unconscious' or 'subconscious' Houle, D. (2000). Is there a g factor for fitness? In G. Bock, J. A. Goode, & level. The proper biological function of art (which must concern survival K. Webb (Eds.), The nature of intelligence, Novartis Foundation Symposium or reproduction somehow) must not be confused with the proximate indi­ 233 (pp. 149-170). Chichester, UK: John Wiley. vidual motivations for producing art (which may include making money, Johnstone, R. A. (1995). Sexual selection, honest advertisement and the handi­ cap principle. Biological Review, 70, 1-65. inspiring religious devotion, or challenging patriarchy). No part of the Kirkpatrick, M„ Price, T, & Arnold, S. J. (1990). The Darwin-Fisher theory human nervous system needs to keep track of the fact that beautiful art­ of sexual selection in monogamous birds. Evolution, 44(1), 180-193. works often led to successful reproduction; evolution kept track for us. Kohn, M. (1999). As we know it: Coming to terms with an evolved mind. Conclusion London: Granta. After a century of neglect and obscurity, Darwin's (1871) sexual selec­ Kondrashov, A. (1995). Contamination of the genomes by very slightly del­ tion theory has been revived, and its psychological and aesthetic dimen­ eterious mutations: Why have we not died 100 times over? Journal of Theo­ sions are becoming better appreciated. This paper has argued that there is retical Biology, 175, 583-594. a reasonable null hypothesis about human art considered as a biological '#>> Lenain, T. (1995). Ape-painting and the problem of the origin of art. Human 'Evolution. 10, 205-215. adaptation: It evolved through sexual selection to serve the same courtship Lenz, N. (1994). Mating behaviour and sexual competition in the regent functions as almost all other examples of organic beauty and complex be­ bowerbird Sericulus chrysocephalus. Emu, 94, 263-272. havioral signals observable in nature. Such ornamentation often evolves Lynch, M., & Walsh, B. (1998). Genetics and analysis of quantitative traits. as a reliable, costly indicator of the signaller's good health, good brain, and Sunderland, MA: Sinauer. good genes. This leads to the further proposal that many design features of Madden, J. (2001). Sex, bowers and brains. Proceedings of the Royal Soci­ art function as indicators of the artist's virtuosity, creativity, intelligence, ety, London B, 268, 833-838. conscientiousness, and other important heritable mental and physical traits. Manning, J. T, Scutt, D., Whitehouse, G. H., & Leinster, S. J. (1997). Breast This 'aesthetic fitness' view suggests that aesthetic judgement is a natural asymmetry and phenotypic quality in women. Evolution and Human Behavior, part of mate choice and social cognition, in which an art-work is viewed as 18, 1-13. the extended phenotype of the artist. Michod, R. E., & Hasson, O. (1990). On the evolution of reliable indicators of fitness. American Naturalist, 135, 788-808. References Miller, G. F. (1997a). Protean primates: The evolution of adaptive Atmar, W. (1991). On the role of males. Animal Behavior, 47,195-205. unpredictability in competition and courtship. In A. Whiten & R. W. Byrne Boas, F. (1955). Primitive art. New York: Dover. (Eds.), Machiavellian Intelligence II: Extensions and evaluations (pp. 312- Borgia, G. (1986). Sexual selection in bowerbirds. Scientific American, 340). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge U. Press. 254(6), 92-100. Miller, G. F. (1997b). Mate choice: From sexual cues to cognitive adapta­ Borgia, G. (1995.) Complex male display and female choice in the spotted tions. In G. Cardew (Ed.), Characterizing human psychological adaptations, bowerbird: specialized functions for different bower decorations. Animal Be­ Ciba Foundation Symposium 208 (pp. 71-87). Chichester, UK: John Wiley. havior, ¥9,1291-1301. Miller, G. F, & Todd, P. M. (1998a). Mate choice turns cognitive. Trends in Borgia, G. (1997). Comparative behavioural and biochemical studies of bow­ Cognitive Sciences. 2, 190-198. erbirds and the evolution of bower-building. In M. L. Reaka-Kudla, D. E. Miller, G. F. (1998b). How mate choice shaped human nature: A review of Wilson, & E. O. Wilson (Eds.), Biodiversity II (pp. 263-276). Washington, sexual selection and human evolution. In C. Crawford & D. Krebs (Eds), DC: Joseph Henry Press. Handbook of evolutionary psychology: Ideas, issues, and applications (pp. Bradbury, J. W., & Vehrencamp, S. L. (1998). Principles of animal commu­ 87-129). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. nication. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer. A'Miller, G. F. (1999). Sexual selection for cultural displays. In R. Dunbar, C. Brunswik, E. (1956). Perception and the representative design of psychol­ knight, & C. Power (Eds.), The evolution of culture (pp. 71-91). Edinburgh, ogy experiments. Berkeley, CA: U. California Press. UK: Edinburgh U. Press. Buss, D. M. (1999). Evolutionary psychology: The new science of mind. Miller, G. F. (2000a). The mating mind: How sexual choice shaped the evo­ New York: Allyn & Bacon. lution of human nature. New York: Doubleday. Catchpole, C. K., & Slater, P. J. B. (1995). Bird song: Biological themes and Miller, G. F. (2000b). Evolution of human music through sexual selection. In variations. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge U. Press. N. L. Wallin, B. Merker, & S. Brown (Eds), The origins of music (pp. 329- Constable, J. (1997). Verse form: A pilot study in the epidemiology of repre­ 360). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. sentations. Human Nature, 8, 171-203. Miller, G. F. (2000c). Mental traits as fitness indicators. Expanding evolu­ Cronin, H. (1991). The ant and the peacock: Altruism and sexual selection tionary psychology's adaptationism. In D. LeCroy & P. Moller (Eds.), Evolu­ from Darwin to today. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge U. Press. tionary perspectives on human reproductive behavior, Annals of the New York Crow, J. F. (1999). The odds of losing at genetic roulette. Nature, 397, 293- Academy of Sciences, Volume 907 (pp. 62-74). New York: New York Acad­ 294. emy of Sciences. Darwin, C. (1871). The descent of man, and selection in relation Miller, G. F. (2000d). How to keep our meta-theories adaptive: Beyond to sex (2 vols.). London: John Murrav. (Reprinted in 1981 by Princetom Cosmides, Tooby, and Lakatos. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 42-46. U. Press.) Miller, G. F. (2000e). Sexual selection for indicators of intelligence. Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) In G. Bock, J. A. Goode, & K. Webb (Eds.), The nature of intelligence. Novartis tors, spiders) than to the important modern day hazards (guns, frayed elec­ Foundation Symposium 233 (pp. 260-275). Chichester, UK: John Wiley. trical wires), raising challenges for education about current dangers. The Neiman, F. D. (1997). Conspicuous consumption as wasteful advertising: A use of an evolutionary perspective in the design of spaces where people Darwinian perspective on spatial patterns in classic Maya terminal monument live and relax, has been shown to enhance people's sense of well-being and dates. In G. A. Clark & C. M. (Eds.), Rediscovering Darwin: Evolutionary assist psychological restorative processes. Results from existing studies clearly Theory in Archaeological Explanation. Archaeological Papers of the Ameri­ can Anthropological Association. No. 7, pp. 267-290. demonstrate the power of an evolutionary approach to aesthetics. They strongly Nietzsche, F. (1883-1888/1968). The will to power. New York: Vintage. indicate that we have just begun to tap the potential of the approach. (Trans. W. Kaufmann & R. J. Hollingdale from Nietzsche's notebooks 1883- An evolutionary perspective on aesthetics 1888). Humans have strong emotional responses to living organisms and to Petrie, M. (1994). Improved growth and survival of offspring of peacocks natural and human-modified environments. Depending on the circum­ with more elaborate trains. Nature, 371, 598-599. stances and the needs of an individual, nature may evoke a wide variety of Pomiankowski, A., & Moller, A. (1995). A resolution of the lek paradox. Proceedings of the Royal Society, London B, 260, 21-29. feelings, including feelings of awe, respect, fear, loathing, longing, nostal­ Power, C.( 1999). 'Beauty' magic: The origins of art. InR. Dunbar, C. Knight, gia, excitement, challenge, or belonging. These powerful emotions, which & C. Power (Eds.), 77ie evolution of culture (pp.92-112). Edinburgh, UK: are the foundations of aesthetics, influence how we respond to nature and Edinburgh U. Press. how we attempt to manipulate it. They may also help us understand why Ridley, Matt. (1993). The red queen: Sex and the evolution of human we care about elements of nature. Despite some popular current notions, nature. New York: Viking. there is a rich array of real things in our environment. Our minds (and Ridley, Mark (2000). Mendel's demon: Gene justice and the complexity of those of all animals) have been designed by evolutionary processes to iden­ life. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson. tify them, label them with words, understand their characteristics, and make Rowe, L., & Houle, D. (1996) The lek paradox and the capture of genetic variance by condition dependent traits. Proceedings of the Roval Society, Lon­ predictions about their future behavior (Pinker, 1994, p. 154). don B. 263, 1415-1421. If one accepts that life on Earth has been molded by the long-term Singh, D. (1995). Female health, attractiveness,and desirability for relation­ action of natural selection, it follows that the strong emotional responses ships: Role of breast asymmetry and waist-to-hip ratio. Ethology and Sociobi- of organisms evolved because they, on average, increased fitness; that is, ology, 16, 465-481. they improved the survival and reproductive success of the individuals that Thornhill, R. (1998). Darwinian aesthetics. In C. Crawford & D. Krebs (Eds.), expressed and acted on them. Some examples are obvious. For example, Handbook of evolutionary psychology (pp. 543-572). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. those of our ancestors who did not enjoy food and sex certainly passed Thornhill, R., & Grammer, K. (1999). The body and face of woman: One ornament that signals quality? Evolution and Human Behavior, 20, 105-120. fewer genes to subsequent generations than those who did enjoy and, hence Tooby, J.,& Cosmides, L. (1990). The past explains the present: Emotional seek out, food and sexual partners. Similarly, individuals who chose eco­ adaptations and the structure of ancestral environments. Ethology and socio- logically inferior environments in which to live should have contributed biology, If 375-424. fewer genes to subsequent generations than individuals who made better Turner, F. (1991). Beauty: The value of values. Charlottesville, VA: U. Vir­ habitat choices. ginia Press. The health, survival, and reproductive success of our ancestors depended Uy, J. A. C, & Borgia, G. (2000). Sexual selection drives rapid divergence in bowerbird display traits. Evolution, 54, 273-278. on their ability to obtain and use environmental information wisely. Evalu­ Veblen, T. (1899). 77je theory of the leisure class. New York: Macmillan. ating and responding to environmental information is difficult because the Washburn, D. (1999). Perceptual anthropology: The cultural salience of rich array of information that impinges upon us exceeds our capacity to symmetry. American Anthropologist, 101,541-562. assimilate and synthesize it. Adaptive behavior requires selective atten­ Whiten, A. (1976). Primate percetion and aesthetics. In D. Brothwell (Ed.), tion to components of the environment that strongly influence fitness. In Beyond Aesthetics: Investigations into the Nature of Visual Art (pp. 18-40). fact, the complex behavior of organisms would be impossible in the ab­ London: Thames and Hudson. sence of neural filters that emphasize, de-emphasize, or eliminate compo­ Zahavi, A. (1975). Mate selection: A selection for a handicap. J. Theoreti­ nents of information emanating from the environment. These filters operate cal Biology, 53, 205-214. Zahavi, A. (1978). Decorative patterns and the evolution of art. New Scien­ at all stages in the receipt, transmission, and processing of incoming informa­ tist, 19. 182-184. tion, including the sense organs, transmission pathways, and central nervous Zahavi, A., & Zahavi, A. (1997). The handicap principle: A missing piece of circuits (Marler, 1961). In effect, these filters embody evolutionarily stored Darwin s puzzle. Oxford, UK: Oxford U. Press. knowledge that enables us to construct hypotheses capable of describing Author Notes and understanding the external world. Extensive experiments on artificial in­ This work was supported in part by a Leverhulme Trust grant to Lord telligence have clearly shown that the rapid and efficient learning of a language Michael Young of the Institute of Community Studies, London. performed by nearly every human child is quite impossible in the absence of preformed neural structures (Dennett, 1995; Pinker, 1994). Aesthetic responses are fundamental to the ways in which organisms Geoffrey F. Miller know about and adapt to the world; they probably developed early during Centre for the Philosophy of the Natural and life's evolution (Marchett, 1998). The English word aesthetic is derived Social Sciences (CPNSS) from the adjectival form of the Greek aisthanomai, - to perceive. Thus, Tymes Court Building "aesthetic pleasure" means literally "pleasure associated with or deriving London School of Economics from perception." The central evolutionary problem in aesthetics is to ex­ Houghton Street, London WC2 2AE England plain why powerful emotions are so strongly associated with the percep­ tion and recognition of certain kinds of objects, but not with other kinds. The filters that regulate the input of, and response to, environmental information, also strongly influence what organisms learn and how readily they learn it (Seligman, 1970). In other words, evolution has predisposed organisms to develop associations or responses to certain objects or situa­ An evolutionary perspective on aesthetics tions. An important corollary is that even though modern societies have Gordon H. Orians greatly reduced both the real danger posed by the typical objects of fears University of Washington and phobias, fear and avoidance responses persist because selection against those responses is weak (Ulrich, 1993; Wilson, 1984). Conversely, fears Abstract and phobias are slow to develop to dangerous objects that are recent arriv­ The emotional responses of organisms, which strongly influence how als in our environments. organisms respond to their environments, have evolved because, on aver­ What is Beauty? age, they increased the survival and reproductive success of their bearers. Beauty, it is often said, is in the mind of the beholder. The phrase is Survival is enhanced by making better decisions about avoiding environ­ usually taken to imply that concepts of beauty are fundamentally personal, mental hazards, where to find and how to choose food, places in which idiosyncratic, and determined primarily by the culture in which an to live, and associates for various activities, including reproduc «____ individual lives. Everyone accepts that culture and learning clearly tion. Experimental studies have shown that humans have strongerR&Si. 25 exert strong influences on the ways human perceive and respond responses to evolutionarily relevant hazards (snakes, large preda to environmental information, or that they have important impacts Vol 2 (1) Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts on the symbols we attach to natural objects (Appleton, 1990; Schama, 1995). same is true for responses to information about objects that persist rela­ But these culturally influenced response norms are the result of complex tively unchanged over many human lifetimes. interactions between objects and the structure of the minds of the behold­ Aesthetics and Safety ers. Interestingly, attempts to understand and interpret human aesthetic Key ecological dangers faced by people include predators, conspecific responses to environmental features without asking why they evolved have individuals, and inanimate hazards (storms and geomorphological condi­ had very limited success, primarily because beauty is not an intrinsic prop­ tions). Fear is a normal reaction to a real or imagined situation that is per­ erty of the objects that we call beautiful. Rather, it is the product of inter­ ceived to be a threat to one's safety or well being. Fear is a mechanism for actions between traits of objects and the human nervous system that evolved avoiding or coping with dangers in many animal species (Archer, 1979; so that objects we consider beautiful have properties that result in improved Russell, 1979). In contrast, fears that are judged to be out of proportion to performance in some aspect of living if we respond positively to them the situation, cannot be reasoned away, and are beyond voluntary control, (Appleton, 1975). Conversely, we regard as ugly, objects that should be are called phobias. An evolutionary perspective suggests that phobias may avoided, modified, or destroyed. Thus, an evolutionary perspective sug­ not be as irrational as generally believed. gests that concepts such as beauty and ugliness should be viewed from a The set of objects that evoke fearful responses (snakes, spiders, heights, functional rather than a structural perspective. In other words, it is profit­ closed spaces, open spaces, blood) appears to be the same in all industrial­ able to study emotional responses by asking - "how did these responses ized societies for which data are available (Ulrich, 1993). Interestingly, help us solve problems?" these objects and situations are ones that have been associated with threat­ Aesthetic emotions are a major component of how humans solve prob­ ening situations throughout human evolutionary history. Precipitous cliffs lems, They determine how much and what kind of attention we pay to are dangerous if approached too closely. Closed spaces offer few escape routes; elements of our environments, the value we place on them, and what we try people in open spaces are vulnerable to attacks by enemies and dangerous preda­ to do when we perceive them. In other words, aesthetic emotions are ma­ tors. Venomous and predatory animals have been significant sources of human jor drivers of human problem-solving behavior. injury and mortality for many millennia. What are the problems to be solved? In addition, there is convincing evidence, especially from studies of Computer scientists have noted that computers are good at memorizing twins, that genetic factors play major roles in the acquisition and retention things but are poor at making decisions, whereas people are good at mak­ of phobias (see Ulrich, 1993 for an overview of experimental results). ing decisions but have rather poor memories (Pinker, 1994). This differ­ Environmental psychologists in Scandinavia have carried out a series of ence should not be surprising. People designed computers to be able to imaginative experiments on the acquisition and retention of fears to natural store and manipulate vast quantities of data, but the minds of animals evolved fear-evoking objects (snakes, spiders), culturally generated fearful objects not to store information but to use it to make decisions that enhance their (hand guns, frayed electrical wires), and neutral stimuli (geometric pat­ survival chances. Effective decision-making requires highly selective stor­ terns). The general finding of these experiments is that conditioned re­ ing of information, because the information impinging upon an individual sponses to natural fear-evoking objects are usually, but not always, ac­ includes both elements that are highly relevant to survival and reproduc­ quired more quickly than responses to neutral stimuli (McNally, 1987). tive success and others that are of little or no consequence. In addition, Conditioned responses to modern dangerous stimuli extinguish more quickly which components of incoming information are important varies with time, when no longer reinforced than responses to snakes and spiders (Cook, location, age, and the needs of the individual (Heerwagen & Orians, in Hades, & Lang, 1986; Hugdahl & Karker, 1981). In addition, aversive press). responses to fear-relevant natural stimuli, but not aversive responses to Although decisions vary in myriad details, the basic problems that people fear-irrelevant stimuli, can be acquired merely by telling a person that a (and other animals) attempt to solve fall into four major categories: 1) Safety: shock will be administered (Hugdahl, 1978). People also acquire much protecting themselves from being injured or killed by other people or dan­ more persistent defensive reactions when watching an experimenter's re­ gerous animals; avoiding parasites and disease-causing organisms; and pro­ actions to fear-relevant stimuli than to fear-irrelevant stimuli. tecting themselves from adverse physical conditions. 2) Acquiring suffi­ Even more striking are the results of experiments, in which slides are cient quantity and quality of food. 3) Finding a place in which to live. 4) displayed subliminally (15-30 milliseconds) before being "masked" by a Choosing good associates for reproduction, foraging, protection, and gain­ slide of another stimulus or setting. Even though the subjects are not con­ ing higher social status (Heerwagen & Orians, 1993, in press). sciously aware of having seen the stimulus slide, presentations of natural Information can usefully be classified according to which of these prob- settings that contain snakes or spiders elicit strong aversive/defensive re- Table 1. Classification of Information in Terms of the Time frame of its Relevance Category Examples Decisions Short-term (minutes to hours) Weather changes (thunderclouds, wind) Seeking shelter .initiating outdoor activities Appearance of dangerous animals, enemies Immediate defensive actions Appearance of valuable prey Immediate hunting activities. Illumination changes Moves to appropriate locations for spending the night Seasonal Day-length changes, Shifts of hunting sites, vegetative growth, flowering, planting and harvesting precipitation changes of crops Multi-year Changes Vegetation succession, Shifts of hunting sites, erosional changes (river movement of villages meanders, lake sedimentation) Long-term (decades to centuries) Topography Development of traditions lems it is most relevant, while recognizing that considerable overlap exists. actions in non-phobic persons. If a previous conditioning has already oc­ Environmental information can also be classified according the time frame curred, a masked subliminal presentation is sufficient to elicit defensive over which the information is relevant. For the purposes of this article, responses to the feared stimulus (Ohman & Soares, 1994). time is most usefully divided into categories that correspond to the time Avoiding hostile conspecifics. Throughout human history, other people frames over which decisions about them are made (Table 1). Some envi­ have been more important than other species as sources of human mortal­ ronmental information signals events of temporary significance - spotting ity. Although members of one's own social group can and do pose dangers, a prey animal, a dangerous predator, or encountering an unfamiliar conspe­ individuals from other groups pose greater risks. Not surprisingly, fear of cific individual. Adaptive responses to that information must be quick. strangers is widespread and occurs cross-culturally (Smith, 1979). It ap­ Information about seasonal changes is associated with shifts in the types pears among children as soon as independent movement is possible and locations of resources that will be available in the near future. Re­ (Bronson, 1972). In addition, children fear strange males more than they do sponses to such information can, and should, be made deliberately. strange females (Smith & Sloboda, 1986), which is not surprising given Responses to information about features of the environment, such that children are much more likely to experience harm from males than as status of vegetation and courses of rivers, which change slowly1 from females, and from unrelated than from related males (Daly & over periods of years or decades, are likely to be infrequent. The Wilson, 1988). Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) Avoiding dangerous animals. Animals have posed dangers to people tional flavorings are high-priority culinary items; immigrant groups go to throughout human history. Dangerous animals may be large (large cats, great lengths and expense to procure them in foreign settings. The deliber­ dogs, hyenas, bears, and large herbivores - elephants, rhinoceroses, etc.), ate manipulation of food by adding ingredients that reliably alter its taste is small (poisonous snakes, scorpions, spiders) or tiny (disease-causing bac­ a uniquely human behavior. No other animals are known to do so. Which teria, fungi, and protists). Otherwise non-dangerous animals may be vec­ flavorings are used probably evolved in relation to what was available in tors of disease-causing organisms. Interestingly, although the dangers posed the environment, but once established, they are remarkably persistent. They by large and small animals have been recognized for millennia, and figure probably signal that the food is safe. prominently in human phobias (Wilson, 1984), the existence of microor­ Cross-cultural similarities in which spices are used have evolved be­ ganisms was unknown during most of human history. The fact that these cause spices inhibit or kill food-spoiling microorganisms. The most widely organisms cause many human diseases was not discovered until the 20th used spices all have strong anti-microbial properties (Billing & Sherman, century. Consequently, we tend not to fear them and often fail to adapt our 1998); mixes of them, which are common in many traditional recipes, are behavior to reduce the risks they pose. even more powerful. Not surprisingly, given that disease-causing organ­ Fear of small animals develops in children soon after they are capable isms are more abundant in tropical than in temperate regions, the propor­ of independent movement (Agras, Sylvester, & Oliveau, 1969) and fear of tion of traditional recipes containing anti-microbial spices is inversely cor­ larger animals is common among children more than four years old (Muris, related with latitude. Merckelbach & Collaris, 1997). Fears of other animals, real or fanciful, Finding a Place to Live - Habitat Selection are often associated with dark and unfamiliar places. The ghosts and witches Habitat selection is a vital decision in the lives of all organisms. When of children's stories typically inhabit deep, dark forests. These environments selecting a habitat an organism responds as if it understood the signifi­ are ones in which the risk of being surprised and attacked by dangerous ani­ cance of objects, sounds, and odors for its future survival and reproductive mals is high, which may account for the strong associations (Russell, 1979) success. Initial responses typically are emotional feelings that lead to re­ Avoiding Physical Hazards. Physical hazards that have been signifi­ jection, exploration, or a certain use of the environment. Because the cant forces throughout human evolutionary history include fire, deep and strength of these responses is a key to immediate decisions about where to fast moving water, cliffs, and storms. Weather systems, earthquakes, and settle and what to do there, the emotional states habitats evoke should be fires often appear suddenly and necessitate fast responses, such as finding positively correlated with the expected survival and reproductive success shelter, getting help, or moving away from the hazard. Fears of stimuli of an organism in them. That is, good habitats should evoke strong posi­ associated with storms, such as loud noises and bright lights, appear dur­ tive responses; poor habitats should evoke weak or even negative responses. ing infancy (Scarr & Salapetek, 1972), and children aged 6 to 12 fear earth­ Three functional concepts - prospect, refuge, and hazard - have guided quakes, fire, thunder, lightning, and deep water (King, Hamilton, & recent approaches to the role of aesthetics in habitat selection (Appleton, Ollendick, 1988; Marks, 1989). Accounts of both perfect and less than 1975). Prospect refers to the ability of an individual to gather information perfect storms command high levels of attention among adults of all ages. about an environment with which to evaluate its characteristics and decide Foods, Foraging, and Aesthetics how to use it. Environments high in prospect offer rich opportunities for Eating is essential for survival, but to eat animals must do something evaluation; environments low in prospect offer fewer opportunities. Ref­ that they otherwise tend to avoid, namely voluntarily insert foreign objects uge refers to the degree to which an environment provides security from into their bodies. Sampling objects to assess their palatability is risky be­ negative agents while the individual is exploring and gathering informa­ cause toxic materials and pathogens may be ingested. Therefore, a major tion. Hazard refers to the dangers to which an individual is exposed dur­ task for all animals is to distinguish edible from inedible items as they ing information-gathering activities. These concepts have been applied pri­ search for food. Individuals of omnivorous species eat a large number of marily to the initial evaluation and exploration of unfamiliar environments, food types, and what is available varies geographically. Therefore, such but, combined with more recent developments in evaluating environmen­ species rarely have innate food-recognition abilities. Humans learn what is tal information, they are readily applied and extended to a rich array of edible by sampling items in their environments and by observation and circumstances in which people must solve problems. instruction. Observation and instruction have obvious value because the Habitat selection has been used as a perspective for a number of stud­ individuals being observed and offering instruction have survived many ies on human aesthetic responses to landscape features (Heerwagen & years of ingesting those substances. Orians, 1993). Habitats occupied by humans during most of our evolu­ Foraging animals make two major types of decisions: Which items are tionary history rarely provided resources that were reliable long enough to acceptable as food, and which acceptable items should actually eaten dur­ support permanent occupation of sites. Frequent moves through the land­ ing a foraging bout. Aesthetic responses are especially prominent in the scape were the rule even though traditional sites were often revisited. Be­ first of these decisions. The strong emotional responses associated with cause relatively few generations have passed since humans started to live foods are not surprising because vomiting and diarrhea are the only avail­ in mechanized and urban environments, evolutionarily based response pat­ able post-ingestion defenses. People accept or reject foods for complex terns of humans to landscapes are unlikely to have been substantially modi­ reasons. Direct sensory responses - tastes good or tastes bad - are impor­ fied since the rise of industrialized, urban societies. tant, but they are only one component of acceptability. People also make Responses to environmental cues vary with a person's age, social sta­ decisions on the basis of anticipated consequences, both physiological and tus, and physiological state. Nevertheless, indicators of the presence of social, of eating a type of food. In addition, particular foods may acquire food, water, shelter, and protection from predators generally evoke posi­ features that limit their acceptability to particular situations or cause them tive responses, whereas potential hazards, such as inclement weather, fire, to be categorically rejected. Because of the variety of reasons that influ­ dangerous predators, and barriers to movement, typically evoke negative ence which foods are actually acceptable, human cuisines differ more than responses. Although no direct evidence yet exists for genetic influences would be expected simply from knowing what edible resources are available in on these responses, a number of evolutionary hypotheses have generated the environments in which social groups live (Rozin, 1996). predictions, some of which have been tested experimentally. Nonetheless, a few generalizations have emerged. First, most items One approach is based on the fact that Homo sapiens evolved in Afri­ that evoke disgust are of animal origin. Plant parts rarely evoke disgust. can savannas and only recently has invaded other continents and ecosys­ On the other hand, "inappropriate" items are primarily vegetable in origin tems. Therefore, landscape features and tree shapes that are characteristic (Rozin & Fallon, 1981). Disgust may be an adaptation that deterred our of high quality African savannas are expected to be especially attractive to ancestors from eating animal tissues, such as feces, rotting meat, and soft humans today. This hypothesis has been tested by determining responses internal parts, all of which commonly harbor large numbers of potentially of people to tree shapes and by examining the features of "aesthetic envi­ harmful microorganisms. Microorganisms have the ability to multiply rap­ ronments," that is those environments, such as parks and gardens, that are idly, so there is no safe dose for ingesting them. Thus, disgust may be designed to make them attractive (Orians, 1986). evolutionarily programmed intuitive microbiology that developed long The shapes of trees that dominate savannas are good predictors of the before people knew that microorganisms existed, much less that they were resource-providing capacities of those environments. Therefore, people the causes of diseases. evolved to find the shapes of trees prominent in environments that pro­ Perhaps the most interesting feature of human cuisines is the sta vided the highest quality resources more pleasing than shapes of trees bility of the major spices and sauces that characterize them. Hu that dominated poor quality habitats. Trees that grow in the high­ mans are remarkably conservative in their food habits and are typi­ est quality African savannas have canopies that are broader than cally reluctant to try new foods or to abandon familiar ones. Tradi- they are tall, trunks that bifurcate close to the ground, and layered Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2(1) lanopies. ('tilkr.i- students m Australia, Brazil, Canada, Israel, Japan, and ronments have too few resources; complex ones have so many that choos­ ihc I IniU'il Slates preferred trees with broad spreading crowns over conical ing among them becomes difficult. Developing a suitable classification and columnar trees (Soinnicr & Summit, 1996). system to guide responses to the components of complex environments I lie changes recommended by landscape architects to their prospective may be especially difficult. customers are another source of data on human responses to landscapes. People may have evolved to respond to rare and unusual events be­ Humphrey Repton, an eighteenth century British landscape architect, pre­ cause they provide new information about the state of the environment. sented his clients with "before" and "after" drawings of their estates (Repton, Not all novel events are associated with something important, but it may be 1907). Repton changed landscapes by creating more savanna-like scenes, best to pay attention to them to find out if they are rather than to ignore increasing visual access and penetrability of closed woods, opening up dis­ them. Such events may indicate that current patterns of use of the environ­ tant views to the horizon (that is, he increased prospect), adding refuges ment should be altered. and cues signaling ease of movement, and adding evidence of resource Aesthetics and Social Interactions availability, particularly large mammals (Heerwagen & Orians, 1993). Concepts of beauty are clearly multidimensional. They are associated Although a love of flowers is a pervasive human trait, it is not obvious with all sensory modes and they are varied within single sensory modes. why we should take flowers to hospitals, bring them to dinner parties and What we consider beautiful in poetry and music is not the same thing. house warmings, and annually spend billions of dollars on them. Nor is it However, in all dimensions, feelings of beauty and ugliness strongly influ­ obvious, given that flowers did not evolve their forms and colors to attract ence responses to objects and situations. In this section I explore concepts us (we are not historically pollinators), why we should find them so es- of beauty as they relate to our intraspecific social environment. As the struc­ thetically attractive. An evolutionary perspective suggests that flowers evoke ture and size of departments in modern universities attests, we are more con­ strong positive feelings because they have long been associated with food cerned with our relationships with our fellow humans than we are with our rela­ resources. Because flowers precede fruits, flowering plants provide excel­ tionships with all of Earth's millions of other species combined. lent cues to timing and locations of future resources. In addition, flowers Beauty in Conspecifics. People are much preoccupied with assessing may attract animals that are potential human prey. In species-rich environ­ the beauty of other people. A rich body of literature demonstrates that people ments, paying attention to flowering plants may particularly enhance re­ find symmetrical objects - especially faces - but also including abstract source acquisition abilities in the future. Until the 19th Century, honey was patterns, woody plants, and human bodies, aesthetically pleasing. Other the only natural source of sugar; bee-keeping is an ancient human enterprise. vertebrates also are sensitive to very small asymmetries (see Moller and No studies have investigated which traits of flowers evoke strong posi­ Swaddle 1997 for a review of the human and animal literature). Conversely, tive feelings, but the obvious changes produced in many species of flowers asymmetries typically evoke negative emotional responses, the most ex­ by artificial selection - increased size and duplication of floral parts - result treme of which is selective infanticide of asymmetrical newborn babies in in flowers similar to those that historically produced large nectar rewards. many human cultures. Additional research on human responses to, and manipulation of, flowers Positive responses to symmetry may be adaptive because symmetrical should prove highly productive of new insights. animals perform better physically than asymmetrical animals, just as sym­ Restorative Responses metrical objects, such as bows, arrows, axes, boats, autos, and aircraft func­ If aesthetic responses evolved because they enabled people to better tion better than asymmetrical ones. Asymmetrical individuals may have solve life's problems, exposure to high quality environments should be been exposed to stressful environments that disrupted normal development, restorative; that is, it should reduce feelings of tension and stress. Stress thereby rendering them less functionally adequate. For example, alcoholic reduction consistently emerges as one of the key benefits reported by users mothers give birth to children with greater developmental asymmetries than of wilderness areas. Restoration from stress is also reported as a key ben­ do mothers who consumed less alcohol. Thus, it is not surprising that which efit from time spent in urban parks with savanna-like vegetation and water objects to use, the design of objects, and choices of social partners have (Schroeder, 1989). Patients recovering from surgery in hospitals with ei­ evolved to favor use of, and association with, symmetrical objects. ther views of natural vegetation or simulated views that depict natural scenes In addition, asymmetrical individuals may have genetic defects that with water, recover more rapidly and have less post-operative anxiety than could be passed on to offspring. For example, humans suffering from tri- patients with no access to natural views or who are presented with simula­ somy-21 (Down's syndrome) have noticeable asymmetries due to skeletal tions of abstract designs. Many studies have shown that even a brief expo­ abnormalities. Greater asymmetry in dental traits is associated with ge­ sure to nature, real or via photographs, leads to positive emotional feel­ netic disorders. Therefore, by avoiding asymmetrical individuals as mates ings, reductions in stress, and better performance on demanding tasks (see people would be likely to improve the quality of their offspring. Ulrich, 1995 for a review). Clearly, the positive responses people have to Finally, because diseases can cause asymmetrical development, asym­ nature have important implications for the design of work and living spaces metrical individuals may be avoided because they may currently harbor and healthcare facilities that are just beginning to be implemented. communicable disease-causing microorganisms. Good symmetry signals a Aesthetics and Biodiversity. long history of good health! Again, a positive aesthetic response to sym­ Although people are strongly attracted to living organisms, it is less metry developed long before humans knew about microorganisms or the causes clear that the attractiveness of an environment is consistently positively of diseases. This fact emphasizes the potential fitness value of aesthetic responses. correlated with number of species in it. On the one hand, for example, the Beauty in Language. Language is a remarkable and unique human ca­ most highly evolved garden traditions - European formal gardens and Japa­ pability whose origins are uncertain. Many theories vie for primacy, but nese gardens - are based on just a few species of woody plants. Scenes of one thing is certain. Language evolved because it increased survival and environments that contain a jumble of plants of many species receive low reproductive success, and it continues to serve those functions today (Pinker, scores in psychological tests. Subjects report that they are too difficult to 1994). As many anthropologists have noted, tribal chiefs are often both interpret; it is difficult to determine how to enter and use them (Kaplan & gifted orators and highly polygynous. Verbally skilled individuals are bet­ Kaplan, 1982). ter able to manipulate the behavior of their associates to their own advan­ On the other hand, people take great pleasure in finding as many spe­ tage than are less skilled individuals. Why we find some utterances more cies of birds as they can on a given day and from assembling "life lists" of beautiful than others, what constitutes beauty in poetry, and what makes species they have seen. Generally, seeing more species is better than see­ some prose more beautiful than others are questions that should stimulate ing fewer species. Journeys of hundreds of even thousands of miles to see much future research. a rare species not on one's life list are a regular feature in today's mobile Music. Every known human culture has music, and musical instruments society. People are also powerfully attracted to the unusual - rare species, have been recovered from deposits at least 50,000 years of age. Human mu­ individuals outside the normal range of the species, or individuals present sic-making varies dramatically among cultures, but its universal presence sug­ at unusual times of the year or in unusual habitats. gests that there is a deep human need to create, perform, and listen to music. In Because these familiar patterns of human behavior have been subjected addition, the ability to memorize, recognize and create musical patterns also to remarkably little formal study, we can only speculate about why they characterizes the music-making of whales and birds. As in human society, have evolved. It makes sense that environments with intermediate levels musical traditions in these animals may be passed from parents to offspring, of biological complexity should be preferred over both simpler and from adults to unrelated younger individuals, and between individuals more complex environments because the range of resources present of the same generation (Gray et al., 2001). in an environment and the ability to find and use those resourcestSflftBl 28 Similarities among species in the nature of music may have probably peaks at intermediate levels of complexity. Simple envi- deep roots in the sounds that characterize most natural habitats. Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) The ambient sounds in most environments resemble a modern-day orches­ Gray, P. M., Krause, B., Atema, J., Payne, R., Krumhansl, C, & Baptista, L. tra in which the sound produced by each animal has its own frequency, (2001). The music of nature and the nature of music. Science, 291, 52-54. amplitude, timbre, and duration. Many of the auditory pathways that we Heerwagen, J. H., & Orians, G.H. (1993). Humans, habitats, and aesthetics. In S. R. Kellert & E. O. Wilson (Eds.) The biophilia hypothesis (pp. 138-172). use to perceive music evolved in animals for communication, sound source Covelo, CA, Island Press. identification, and locating objects. Rats and starlings distinguish between Heerwagen, J. H., & Orians, G.H. (in press). The ecological world of chil­ chords deemed to be consonant and dissonant by Western musical stan­ dren. In P. Kahn & S. Kellert (Eds.) Children and Nature: Psychological, dards (Hulse, et al. 1995). Responses to musical form appear remarkably Sociocultural, and Evolutionary Investigations, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. early in human infants. Thus, by 4 months of age, babies prefer consonant Hugdahl, K. (1978). Electrodermal conditioning to potentially phobic stimuli: musical intervals (major and minor thirds) to dissonant musical intervals effects of instructed extinction. Behavioral Research and Therapy, 16, 315- (minor seconds). 321. Hugdahl, K. & Karker, A.C., (1981). Biological vs. experiential factors in The prevalence of octaves and fifths in music from many different cul­ phobic conditioning. Behavioral Research and Therapy, 19, 109-115. tures is probably a consequence of the way that our ears and brains are Hulse, S. H., Bernard, D.J., & Braaten, R.F. (1995). Auditory discrimination built. The first three notes of any major triad correspond to the fourth, fifth, of chord-based spectral structures by European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris). and sixth harmonics of any harmonic series. The basilar membrane of the Journal of Experimental Psychology, 124, 409-423. human inner ear behaves like guitar strings of varying thickness. As a re­ Humphries, N. (1992). A history of the mind: Evolution and the birth of sult, groups of sensory receptors along its length become activated in re­ consciousness. NY: Copernicus. sponse to sounds of specific frequencies. The pattern of hair cell excitation Kaplan, S. & Kaplan, R. (1982). Cognition and environment: Functioning is arranged as equal steps along the chromatic scale mapped out as equal in an uncertain world. NY: Praeger. King, N. J., Hamilton, D.I., & Ollendick. T.H. (1988). Children s phobias: A distances along the basilar membrane. In the auditory nerve, which trans­ behavioral perspective. NY: John Wiley & Sons. mits information in the form of action potentials from the inner ear to the Marchetti, C. (1998). Notes on the limits of knowledge explored with Dar­ brain stem, the neural excitation map encodes the octave the triad is played winian logic. Complexity, 3, 22-35, in; the timing of neural activity may indicate the pitch of each note. Marks, T. M. (1989). Fears, phobias and rituals: Panic, anxiety and their Whatever the neural mechanisms, the brain becomes highly active when disorders. NY: Oxford University Press. we listen to music, and music stimulates powerful emotional and aesthetic Marler, P. (1961). The filtering of external stimuli during instinctive behaviour. responses in nearly all people. Thus, future investigations into relationship In W.H. Thorpe, & O. L. Zangwill (Eds.) Current problems in animal behaviour, (pp. 150-166). London: Cambridge University Press. among the neurobiological foundations of the aesthetics of music have the McNalley, R. J. (1987). Preparedness and phobias: A review. Psychological potential provide insights into various aspects of the neural basis of per­ Bulletin, 101, 283-303. ception, emotions and learning. Moller, A. P., & Swaddle, J.P. (1997). Asymmetry, developmental stability, Closing Remarks and evolution. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. The central theme of this essay is that the evolution of aesthetic expe­ Muris, P., Merckelbach, H., & Collaris, R. (1997). Common childhood fears riences has been molded by the positive role of emotional responses in and their origin. Behavioral Research and Therapy, 35, 929-937. decision-making and solving problems. Evolutionary biologists assume that Ohman, A., & Soares, J.J.F. (1994). Unconscious anxiety: phobic responses to masked stimuli. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 705,231-240. both positive and negative responses to looking at particular sights or hear­ Orians, G. H. (1986). An ecological and evolutionary approach to land­ ing particular sounds evolved because the consequences of having those scape aesthetics. In E. C. Penning-Rowsell & D. Lowenthal (Eds.) Landscape emotions have been, on average, beneficial over evolutionary time. This meanings and values, (pp. 3-25). London, Allen & Unwin. concept is actually rather ancient. In 1785, seventy years before Darwin Orians, G.H. (1998). Human behavioral ecology: HOyears without Darwin published the Origin of Species, the Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid is too long. Bulletin of the Ecological Society of America , 79, 15-28. wrote: "By a careful examination of the objects to which Nature hath Pinker, S. (1994). The language instinct. NY: Harper Collins. given this amiable quality [of Beauty] we may perhaps discover some real Reid, T. (1785). Essays on the intellectual powers of man. Edinburgh, Scot­ excellence in the object, or at least some valuable purpose that is served by land: John Bell. Repton, H. (1907). The art of landscape gardening. Boston: Houghton- the effect which it produces upon us. This instinctive sense of beauty, in Mifflin. different species of animals, may differ as much as the external sense of Rozin, P. (1996). Towards a psychology of food and eating: From motiva­ taste, and in each species be adapted to its manner of life." tion to module to model to marker, morality, meaning, and metaphor. Current Thomas Reid knew nothing about geological time or the theory of evo­ Directions in Psychological Science, 5, 18-24. lution by means of natural selection, but he nonetheless clearly grasped the Rozin, P., & Fallon, A. (1981). A perspective on disgust. Psychological Re­ role of aesthetics in human life. Since then, we have made relatively slow view, 94, 23-41. Russell, P. A. (1979). Fear-evoking stimuli. In W. Sluckin (Ed.). Fears in progress in exploring the rich implications of this perspective. The slow­ animals and man, (pp. 86-124). NY: Van Nostrand Reinhold. ness of progress may be owing to our resistance to investigations into the Scarr, S., & Salapetek, P. (1972). Patterns of fear development during in­ foundations of our emotions. Evolutionary theory suggests that such resis­ fancy. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 16, 53-90. tance also may be adaptive, but that topic is beyond the scope of this essay. Schama, S. (1996). Landscape and memory. NY: Viking Books. Nevertheless, it is abundantly clear that when an evolutionary approach to Schroeder, H. W. (1989). Environment, behavior, and design research on aesthetics has been adopted, the results have been informative, interesting, urban forests. In E.H. Zube, & G. T. Moore (Eds.). Advances in environment, and sometimes counter-intuitive (Orians, 1998). Rich harvests await us as behavior, and design, (pp. 87-117). Vol. 2. NY: Plenum. we continue to explore the power of an evolutionary approach to both deepen Seligman, M. E. P. (1970). On the generality of the laws of learning. Psy­ chological Review, 77,406-418. and broaden our understanding of aesthetics. Smith, P. K. (1979). The ontogeny of fear in children. In W. Sluckin (Ed.). References Fear in Animals and Man (pp. 164-198). NY: Van Nostrand Reinhold. Agras, S., Sylvester, D., & Oliveau, D. (1969). The epidemiology of com­ Smith, P. K, & Sloboda, J. (1986). Individual consistency in infant-stranger mon fears and phobias. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 70,151-156. encounters. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 4, 83-91. Appleton, J. (1975). The experience of landscape. NY: John Wiley & Sons. Sommer, R., & Summit, J. (1996). Cross-national rankings of tree shape. Appleton, J. (1990). The symbolism of habitat: An interpretation of land­ Ecological Psychology, 8, 327-341. scape in the arts. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press. Ulrich, R. S. (1993). Biophilia, biophobia, and natural landscapes. In S. R. Archer, J. (1979). Behavioral aspects of fear. In W. Sluckin (HA.) Fear in Kellert & E. O. Wilson (Eds.). The biophilia hypothesis (pp. 763-137). Covelo, animals and man. (pp. 164-198). New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold CA: Island Press. Billing, J., & Sherman, P.W. (1998). Antimicrobial functions of spices: Why Ulrich, R. S. (1995). Effects of healthcare interior design on wellness: Theory some like it hot. Quarterly Review of Biology, 73, 3-49. and recent scientific research. In S.O. Marberry (Ed.)Innovations in healthcare Bronson, G. W. (1972). Infants' reactions to unfamiliar persons and novel design, (pp. 88-104). NY: Van Nostrand Reinhold. objects. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development 37, Wilson, E. O. (1984). Biophilia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Number 3. Zentner, M. R., & Kagan, J. (1998). Infants' perceptions of consonance and Cook, E. W., Hades, R.L., & Lang, P.L. (1986). Preparedness and phobia: dissonance in music. Infant Behavior and Development, 21, 483-492. effects of stimulus content on human visceral conditioning. Journal of Abnor­ mal Psychology, 95, 195-207. Gordon H. Orians, Daly, M., & Wilson, M. (1988). Evolutionary social psychology and Department of Zoology family homicide. Science, 242, 519-524. University of Washington, Dennett, D. C. (1995). Darwin's dangerous idea: Evolution andthe\ meaning of life. NY: Simon and Schuster. Seattle WA 98195 Vol 2 (1) Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts 1972). Conclusions of both directions of investigations can be described Creativity in Art: Stylistic Waves and Monotonic Evolution­ by the following model. ary Trends (Information Approach) Any complex system of information processing, irrespective of its Vladimir M. Petrov "material nature" (its components being neurons, or persons, or technical elements, etc.) is nothing else than a multilevel structure. Each M-th State Institute for Art Studies, Moscow level of this structure processes information and transmits a part of it up­ Abstract wards to the next, M+l-th level, and this higher level formulates the crite­ Recent investigations are reviewed dealing with the creativity in the ria to choose information for its own needs (and gives these criteria to the arts, which are analyzed in the light of information theory. The main lower, M-th level) and also transmits part of the information processed to contraposition of "analytic" and "synthetic" mechanisms of the informa­ the next higher (M+2-th) level, and so on. So two types of processes tion processing occurs connected with the prevalence of left- or right- regarding information are inherent in such a system: First, information pro­ hemispheric activity. Appropriate stylistic features reveal themselves in cessing at a given level, organized according to definite rules (paradigm); the results of creative processes of composers, architects, painters, drama­ small portions of the information received are processed in consecutive tists, poets, etc., i.e., the stylistic features of their works. According to order, with very high precision; this type of activity is characterized by the theoretical model, each sphere of creativity should show periodical analytic and rational features, an important role for logic, and so forth. "switches" between the above two types of stylistic prevalence. This Second, information transmittal from one level to a higher one; this activ­ mutability is correlated with changes of generations, hence it should pos­ ity is characterized by a change of paradigm (rules of information pro­ sess the full period of oscillations of about 40 - 50 years. Besides, mono- cessing); rather large amounts of information are processed parallel to tonic trends were predicted, that is, the long-range "synthetic growth" (in each other, but with relatively low precision; this activity may be de­ each kind of creativity) needed to compensate the "analytic growth" in the scribed as synthetic, emotional, intuitive, and so forth. entire socio-psychological sphere. The evolutionary dependencies obtained A significant difference thus exists between these types, the first be­ characterize both separate features of creativity in each kind of art and its ing primarily analytic; the second, mainly synthetic. In the case of a human "index of asymmetry". The resulting evidence favors both the 50-year sty­ being, these two types may be attributed respectively to the left- and listic cycles and the predicted monotonic trends in each of the spheres con- right-hemispheric activity of the brain. Naturally, such an identification

Table 1. Informational peculiarities of cognitive mechanisms (Maslov, 1983) Analytical mechanism Synthetical mechanism Brain localization Left hemisphere Right hemisphere, subcortex Main principle of Information processing Local work Global work Main possibilities Exact, objective sorting out variants Approximate, subjective "recognition" Methodology "Splitting' into subject and object, analysis "Getting used" to an object, synthesis Kind of operations Generating according fixed rules, splitting Integrative "deepening into properties of the whole object Principle of action Consecutive Dividing into parallel branches Results Accumulation of data, calculation of "answers" Arising "senses", re-organization of calculation algorithms Outer manifestations Constructive activeness, onward movement "Rapt inertness", immobility Degree of realizing Almost absolute Deliberately imperfect Temporal aspect Displaying in time Achronic sidered. The synchronism of the changes observed in different spheres is relative and concerns mainly functional features of processes rather confirms the theoretical prediction concerning the importance of the than their localization in the brain. Nevertheless, many clinical experi­ "general style" of the epoch. ments corroborate the connection between the predominance of the left Among numerous evolutionary models of the creativity in art (see, e.g., or right hemisphere and the prevalence of left-hemispheric processes or Martindale, 1990), those that are the most prospective are those based on right- hemispheric ones. The hypothetical distinction between these two the "information approach". This approach, being of rather general char­ types of information processing permit one to deduce their main charac­ acter (see, e.g., Golitsyn & Petrov, 1995), embraces behavior of different teristics, some of which are summarized in Table 1. systems, that is, with systems dealing with various kinds of primary mate­ On the basis of these characteristics Maslov (1983) deduced two rials. Hence, certain "invariants" may occur possible, relating to those "sets of gnoseological preferences" (Table 2) which should be observed features of creativity, which are inherent in different branches of the when strong prevalence exists for either left-hemispheric processes or right- socio-cultural life, and exactly such results are described below. In the hemispheric activity (referred to hereafter as L- and R-type processing). present paper the investigations are summarized which were fulfilled dur- The distinction between the two types of information processing permits

Table 2. Sets of gnoseological preferences typical for "left" mechanisms and "right" ones (Maslov, 1983) "Leften -clh" mechanisI ! m ur>:_!_*.!Right"» mechanisi T m Satisfied by existing model Realizes incomplete adequacy of any model Positive attitude to all "invented", artificial Inclination to all "natural", primary Inclination to schematization, revealing general features Interest for individual peculiarities, deviations from the scheme Deduction Induction and intuition Aimed at the future Achronism or fixation on the past Aimed at the search for means Interest for understanding goals Search for the truth in a dialogue Individual creative work ing last 30 years, mainly in the framework of St. Petersburg and us to draw three hypothetical conclusions: First, at every given moment, Moscow groups of researchers of creative processes. a society needs to have a definite degree of domination of one (L or R) of The model the two types in the entire socio-psychological sphere, as well as within Although there were certain differences in starting positions, theorists each of its branches (creativity in music, painting, poetry, etc.). It is al­ belonging to the above both directions came to almost identical models ways desirable to use a certain common "style of thinking" instead of a describing the information processing which is inherent in any developing Tower of Babel of different styles. Of course, this degree of L (or R) complex system. Researchers of St. Petersburg school deduced the theo­ domination need not refer to all intellectual phenomena, but it should en­ retical model of a "tower for calculations" with different paradigms at compass the majority of them; in this case any communication becomes each level (Maslov, 1983). In the framework of Moscow school on easier, otherwise, communications become more complicated, and the ef­ the basis of the "principle of the information maximum" (Golitsyn ficiency of information processing decreases. Second, the dominat­ & Petrov, 1995), the model of a "pyramid-like hierarchical struc-i ing type (or "style of thinking") has to change from time to time, ture of information processing" was built (Petrov & Kamensky, because each type possesses rather limited possibilities with re- Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) spect to further progress of the information processing. If any given person studied, were aggregated. Appropriate data for composers and paradigm of information processing dominates too long, its possibilities poets were presented by Danilova and Petrov (1990) and Koshkin and become exhausted, and no new innovations (inventions) can arise within Frizman(1991). this paradigm. Therefore, the cycles must "switch" (more or less peri­ These results give two kinds of characteristics of each creative per­ odically) between L and R dominating styles of thinking. Third, these son: First, is the mean value of each parameter (a - j) of his/her creativity. switches, in turn, possess a limitation, as far as their frequency is con­ As soon as all experts' scores were binary, the result of aggregating is cerned, because the real carrier of any style of thinking is a human being nothing else but a share of L-scores out of the totality of scores put by all who belongs to a definite generation and therefore has a definite degree experts involved. Hence, this share can change from 0 to 1, or the per­ of L (or R) domination. So any style of thinking should last at least one centage from 0 to 100%. For instance, the creativity of Canaletto was generation, giving up its dominance only after the decay of the genera­ estimated by 9 experts. On the parameter (a) "Inclination to normative tion which used it. As soon as each given generation dominates the socio- work - Inclination to originality, peculiarity" the scores of 7 experts psychological sphere for approximately 20 to 25 years (because of the were interpreted as L-evidences. So, the value of this parameter for duration of the reproductive cycle), the full period of the predicted oscil­ Canaletto's creativity is 7/9 = 0.78. Second, is the mean value of the index lations has to be 40 to 50 years or even more. Now let us turn to concrete of asymmetry (K) for the creativity of the given person. As soon as this indicators of L- and R- domination which can be observed empirically. value was obtained by averaging over indices calculated on the basis of Evolution of creativity: Procedures of studies and the results obtained the data of different experts, each of these indices could range from -1 to To describe left- or right-hemispheric prevalence in different spheres, +1. This mean value also could range in the same diapason, or if we turn to some parameters were chosen, relating to the creativity of eminent artists percentages, from -100% to+100%. For example, on the basis of the (painters, composers, poets, etc.). For each kind of art a special iterative first expert's scores, the asymmetry index for Canaletto equals 0.60 procedure was derived, using experts as specific "instruments" (Golitsyn (because this expert put L-evidences on 6 parameters and R-evidences on &Petrov, 1997; Petrov, 1992, 1994, 1996: Petrov & Boyadzhiyeva, 4 ones); on the basis of the second expert's scores this index equals - 1996; Pokorskaya, 1992; Shepeleva, Batov, & Petrov, 1997). The results 0.33 (because he put L-evidences on 3 parameters, and R-evidences on 6 of such procedures were sets of parameters, substantial for the phenom­ ones), and so forth. After averaging these values, the resulting mean index enon in question in each kind of art. For instance, for painting, the fol­ occurs to be 0.44. lowing 10 parameters were deduced, with each parameter having a form of Both kinds of characteristics were used to build evolutionary depen­ a binary opposition, left and right pole of which responded to left- and dencies. The values for such curves were received by averaging appro­ right-hemispheric prevalence, respectively: priate values for those persons who were actively working in each given a) Inclination to normative work - Inclination to originality, peculiarity; time interval; inmost cases 3-year intervals were used. As for the tempo­ b) Rationality - Intuition; ral diapason of each person's "active work", due formal criteria were in­ c) Strict form - Free form; troduced, concerning personal "creative age". For example, the time inter­ d) Laconism, asceticism of expressive means - Variety, diversity of expres­ val of 1847- 1849 was presented in the "elite" sample for musical sive means; creativity, by 12 composers: Bruckner, Chopin, Franck, etc., so the e) Graphic features - Picturesque, coloristic features; parameters of these 12 composers were averaged to obtain their mean f) Restrained, static features - Expressive, dynamic features; values for this time interval. The evolutionary dependencies were built g) Discrete elements - Continuous transitions between elements; separately for Western Europe and Russia. However it occurred that in h) Inclination to cool part of spectrum - Inclination to warm part of spec­ most cases both regions revealed almost similar behavior (especially be­ trum; ginning from the middle of the 18th century), which is in good agreement i) No color gradations - Significant color gradations; with the data of Maslov (1983). That is why the further dependencies j) Smooth painting - Textured painting. and conclusions relate to both regions are considered together, if not On the basis of such parameters, procedures were derived to measure specified especially. the creativity of each artist. Though these procedures involved expert esti­ In conformity with the above two kinds of characteristics, two mations, the results obtained were objective. At last, the "index of kinds of evolutionary dependencies were built (see, e.g., Petrov, 1992, asymmetry" was introduced for each artist, evidencing the degree of left- 1994,1995, 1998; Petrov & Yevin, 1991; Petrov & Boyadzhiyeva, 1996): or right-hemispheric prevalence in his/her creativity. first, evolutionary behavior of different "partial" parameters of the The method derived was used to study the evolution of different fields creative asymmetry in each field studied. For example, Figure la pre­ of creativity. For each field, an appropriate sample was compiled, de­ sents the evolution of such a parameter of painting, as "Rationality - pending on the specific character of the sphere considered. In most Intution". Each point of this curve designates the share of L-scores investigations the compilation concerned the so-called "elite" of the field considered, i.e., the most eminent composers, painters, dramatists, etc. Though in several investigations the compilation followed other strate­ gies. For instance, when studying the evolution of poetry, the sample in­ volved several thousands poets, that is, "mass creativity" - see, for example Ivanchenko & Kharuto (2000). To compile such "elite sample," usually fundamental encyclopaedias for each field were examined, and a preliminary list of eminent creative persons was prepared. Then out of this list those persons were chosen (by experts) who strongly influenced the evolution of the field were considered. For instance, in the field of music (Petrov & Boyadzhiyeva, 1996) on the basis of the 20-volume encyclopaedia by S. Sadie (1980) a final list of 102 such "influential" persons was compiled, consisting both of West-European and Russian com­ Figure 1. Evolutionary curves for "partial" features of painting - slum- ol posers of the 17,h to 20th centuries. For the field of painting, such a final L-evidences (S) for the parameters: list consisted of 240 "influential" painters of the 14th to 20th centuries, a) Rationality - Intuition; both West-European and Russian. b) Restrained, static features - Expressive, dynamic li-almvs Each of such creative persons was evaluated by several experts; for placed by all the experts involved to this creative Icaliin: ol all I lie paint instance, in the field of music, usually the creativity of each "influential" ers studied actively working at this time. Figure lb telait". In i|inli' ;li> composer was "assessed" by 6 to 17 experts. Each expert was firstly "cali­ analogous dependence of another feature of the paiiitnitt, luiiitrly brated" using those "contrastive" persons which had been previously "Restrained, static features - Expressive, dyiiaiiiu lialuic-," (|i:iiiiiticli'i singled out in the experiments described. On the basis of such calibration, f). Such curves were built for all the paraiiuici.s of all fields '.Mulled Nei not only "zero points" were determined for each expert (on each scale used), ond, evolutionary behavior of the "index olasvinmeliv" < liiiim ii'H/tiip but also his/her "level of competence", meaning the feeling for art each field as a whole are presented in limine ,' I In-, i utvf ileai ulit i style. Some experts who revealed low reliabilities were not the entire creativity in this field, ineaniii)' thr evolution ol llw allowed to participate in further investigations. Then the data ofEuSallL 3 1 SfSaastylistic inclination either to the left licinisplietii pole oil" the all the experts involved, concerning the creativity of each right-hemispheric one. Evolutionary dependent ies ol sm h indues Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts socio-cultural sphere (this unity was fixed earlier by many historians, though only on the level of simple, qualitative observations). One can see that the socio-political "climate" reveals the same waves, as various kinds of art. Moreover, it was shown that these waves are coordinated with the so-called "Kondratiev waves" (Kondratiev, 1989), which are inherent in V. the economic sphere. Moreover, these waves can be observed in different /Ml fields and can provide a basis for the definition of the stylistic "epoch" in — /„; \S •• . .; SJ J\ the evolution of style. It seems natural to define the epoch as the temporal range between the two neighboring changes of sign of the evolutionary curve for the index of asymmetry. Such an approach follows the above • * 1 f mentioned logic of "invariant" definitions. For instance, on the basis of the formal definition, it is possible to single out such a stylistic epoch of R- domination in painting, as the range of 1858 - 1916, which embraces the creativity of rather pronounced right-hemispheric impressionists and Figure 2. Evolutionary behavior of the index of asymmetry (K) for painting. their followers. Though quite opposite, left-hemispheric directions in paint­ ing also appeared at the end of this range, including cubism; neverthe­ were also built for each of the field studied. So the results obtained less, the general prevalence belonged to painters of R-orientation. characterize both the evolution of some concrete features of creativity Such wave-like behavior was recently supported by two additional, in different fields and general evolutionary behavior of each of them. purely statistical investigations that dealt not with qualitative parameters Namely the last kind of dependencies is of most interest for our further of creativity, but with quantitative ones. In one of these investigations consideration. (Petrov, in press), the geometrical sizes of paintings (i.e., their width and Regularities of the evolution: Cyclic behavior against monotonic trend length) were examined, and it occurred that these parameters also showed All the fields studied reveal a similar evolution of their indices of 50-year cyclic behavior tightly correlated with the above stylistic oscilla­ asymmetry, which can be illustrated with Fig. 2 for the case of painting. tions, in agreement with the model of the "arousal potential" (Berlyne, Such behavior contains two components. First, the stylistic "coloring" of 1971; Martindale, 1990). In another investigation, the "intensity of each field possesses a pronounced monotonic trend: the growing role of literary life" was measured as the number of lines (in a literary the synthetic (i.e., right-hemispheric) domination. Such a trend can be encyclopaedia) devoted to poets and prose-writers of different epochs. easily seen in Fig. 2 where we see a decreasing curve for the index. Sec­ Here also 50-year cyclic behavior was detected, tightly correlated with ond, against this background, one can see featured periodic changes (or the above stylistic waves (Kharuto, Majoul, & Petrov, 2000). maybe semi-periodic ones, because their periods possess appreciable fluc­ Turning to the long-range monotonic component of the evolution, tuations). Besides, both components can be seen also when analyzing we should mention, first of all, the general direction of this trend which "partial" curves (i.e., evolution of separate parameters), but naturally, is identical in all kinds of art: constant growth of R-domination (i.e., the curve for the index reveals these components much better - com­ decreasing L-domination - see, e.g., the negative slope of the evolution­ pare, for instance Figures 1 and 2. ary curve for the index of asymmetry in painting, Fig. 2). Such direction is The best way to divide ("segregate") these components is to use not surprising, if we take into account the so-called "compensatory" the middles between neighboring extreme points (i.e. the closest maxi­ function of art. Really, in order to arrange the entire mental life (both mum and minimum of the curve). The result of such "segregation" is shown individual and social), it is desirable to maintain a certain "balance" be­ by Figure 3a, which presents a fragment of the periodic component of the tween its analytic and synthetic constituents. Meanwhile, usually each index of asymmetry for painting. As can be easily seen, the changes system of mental life is constantly moving towards the growing role of observed are really close to periodic ones, possessing the full duration analytic processes (especially in of cycles about 50 years, which is in good agreement with theoretical such fields as technology, com­ predictions. Fig. 3b shows the periodic component of the index for music, munications, politics, etc.). One obtained by the same way. of the main ways to compensate for this tendency is to apply means of art; so the last one should increase its R- features. That is why we observe the in­ clination toward R- prevalence in all fields of art, both in the evolution of their "partial" pa­ rameters and in their indices of asymmetry. To support this thesis, let us compare the long- range components in painting, for two national schools: French and Russian (Gribkov & Petrov, 1997). Figure 4 shows the evo­ Figure 3. Fragments of the periodic components of indices of asymmetry (K) lution of this component in both for painting (a) and music (b). national schools (over the 18th to 20th centuries), presented by The mean durations of all these waves are very close: from 22 to 25 one of their "partial" parameters years for L-waves, and from 26 to 27 years for R-ones; the full cycle lasts ("Rationality - Intution") and from 48 to 52 years. The agreement between such waves in different fields their indices of asymmetry. To is not absolute, but rather good. For instance, the comparison of the -.2- "segregate" the periodical com­ evolutionary dependencies for the indices of asymmetry for painting and ponent and the long-range trend, music (curves presented by Fig.3, a and b), is evidence in favor of the Figure 4. Comparison of the coincidence of appropriate waves, which is not occasional statistically (at long-range components in French 5%-level of significance). As a rule, the changes in painting slightly and Russian painting (designated predate appropriate changes in music (approximately by 6 years). by triangles and diamonds, respectively): Nevertheless, some discrepancies take place, so the similar evo­ a) Parameter "Rationality - Intuition" (S); lution of different fields can be called "soft synchronism". 6is9K 32 b) Index of asymmetry (K). This synchronism is further evidence for the unity of the entire the above mentioned procedure was used. It occurred that the de- Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) creasing slope of L-features is much more steep in French paintings than Petrov, V.M. (2000). Divergent evolution of cultural sphere: Cross-media in Russian. This difference was observed when comparing both the evolu­ and cross-genre interactions. In P.Locher & L.F.Smith (Eds.), I6'h Congress of the International Association of Empirical Aesthetics. Proceedings, (pp. 159- tion of all 10 "partial" parameters and the evolution of painting as 161). Upper Montclair, NJ: Montclair State University Press. a whole. In all cases appropriate differences were statistically significant Petrov, V.M. (in press). Sizes of paintings: Evolution in the light of the arousal at the level better than 5%. Evidently, it can be explained by the fact that potential. Rivista di Psicologia dell'Arte, Nuova Serie, 32, in France the evolution of the entire socio-psychological sphere (espe­ Petrov, V.M., & Boyadzhiyeva, L.G. (1996). Perspektivy razvitiya iskusstva: cially in the fields of technology and politics) was much more dynamic Melody prognozirovaniya. Moscow: Russky Mir (in Russian). [Perspectives than in Russia (where the social life and technological development were of Art Development: Methods of Forecasting] "sleepy"). Petrov, V.M., & Kamensky, V.S. (1972). An informational model of emo­ Due to such "compensation" (though of course incomplete), the tions accompanying perception. In 20lh International Congress of Psychology. Abstract Guide, (p. 443). Tokyo: Science Council of Japan. entire sphere of culture reveals the "divergent evolution" which has Petrov, V.M., & Yevin, I.A. (1991). Emotional unity of the informational been theoretically deduced in the framework of the information ap­ sphere: Socio-psychological "climate", art, and economics. In L.Ya. Dorfman, proach (Petrov, 2000): each field increases its own, genuine (specific) D.A. Leontiev, V.M.Petrov, V.A.Sozinov (Eds.), Art and emotions (pp. 160- features; as a result, we observe an "Expanding Cultural Universe". For 169). Perm: Perm State Institute of Culture. example, according to Martindale (1990), the "primordial" component of Pokorskaya, Ye.Ya. (1992). The search for parameters in dramatic art. In creativity reveals long-range decline in science, whereas in the arts it is L.Ya. Dorfman, D.A. Leontiev, V.M. Petrov, & V.A. Sozinov (Eds.), Emotions increasing. In addition, two main directions of prose (oriented either on & Art (pp. 315-327). Perm: Perm State Institute for Arts and Culture. the structure of its ouvres or concrete material, i.e. either on L-processes Sadie, S. (Ed.) (1980). The new Grove dictionary of music and musicians, vol. 1 - 20. London: MacMillan. or R-ones) reveal a "splitting" and divergent evolution (Petrov, 1994a). Shepeleva, S.N., Batov, V.I., & Petrov, V.M. (1997). Left- and right-hemi­ The totality of the data reviewed confirm the "divergent" concept of the spherical features in poetry: A method of measurement. In L.Dorfman, C. evolution. Moreover, such data can be used to forecast the future of cul­ Martindale, D. Leontiev, G.Cupchik, V.Petrov, & P. Machotka (Eds.), Emo­ ture and art (Mazhul & Petrov, 1999). tion, creativity, and art, vol. 1, (pp. 287-302). Perm: Perm State Institute of References Arts and Culture. Berlyne, D.E. (1971). Aesthetics andpsychobiology. NY: Appleton-Century- Crofts. Vladimir M. Petrov Danilova, O.N., & Petrov, V.M. (1990). Brain asymmetry and creativity: A Apt. U,dom39, model and attempt of quantitative investigation. In L.Halasz (Ed.), 11th Inter­ Moscow 107120 national Congress on Empirical Aesthetics. Proceedings (pp. 45-48). Budapest: Russia Institute for Psychology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Golitsyn, G.A., & Petrov, V.M. (1995/ Information and creation: Integrat­ ing the "two cultures ". Basel, Switzerland: Birkhauser Verlag. Golitsyn, G.A., & Petrov, V.M. (1997). Styles of creativity: Measurement of changes, their cultural determination, and the problem of "free will'. In Yu.S. Zubov & V.M. Petrov (Eds.) Aesthetics: Information approach (pp. 123-136). Moscow: Smysl. Gribkov, VS., & Petrov, V.M. (1997). Hemispherical asymmetry in creativ­ ity: Long-range trend in painting. In V.P.Ryzhov (Ed.), Empirical aesthetics: Information approach (pp. 125-133). Taganrog: Taganrog State University of Radio Engineering. Ivanchenko, G. V, & Kharuto, A. V. (2000). Evolyutsionnaya dinamika sistemy poeticheskogo tvorchestva (Russkaya poeziya 1800 - 1980). In L. Dorfman, C. Creativity as a Secondary Darwinian Process Martindale, V. Petrov, P. Machotka, D. Leontiev, & G. Cupchik (Eds.), Tvorchestvo vlskusstve - Iskusstvo Tvorchestva (pp. 485-501). Moscow: Nauka; Dean Keith Simonton Smysl. (in Russian). [Evolutionary dynamics in the system of poetical creativ­ University of California, Davis ity: Russia, 1800- 1980]. Abstract Kharuto, A.V., Majoul, L.A., & Petrov, V.M. (2000). Cyclic literary life in Russia: Prose of the 18th to 20* centuries. In V.M. Petrov & V.P. Ryzhov (Eds.), Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection provided an explana­ Information paradigm in the human science (Proceedings of the international tion of how new species could emerge by a simple process of "blind-varia­ symposium) (pp. 163-165). Taganrog: Taganrog State University of Radio En­ tion and selective-retention" (BVSR). A similar BVSR mechanism pro­ gineering. vides a comprehensive theory of creativity, albeit the process is far more Kondratiev, N.D. (1989). Problemy ekonomicheskoy dinamiki. Moscow: complicated and operates on multiple levels. The empirical support for Ekonomika (in Russian). [Problems of economical dynamics] this theory is documented two ways. First, the theory's explanatory power Koshkin, V.M., & Frizman, L.G. (1991). Byt' poetom (opyt statisticheskoy is shown with respect to the cognitive processes, individual differences, literaturometrii). Chelovek, N 3. (pp. 79-82) (in Russian). [To be a poet (a trial of a statistical literature measurement)] developmental antecedents, and sociocultural influences underlying cre­ Martindale, C. (1990). The clockwork muse: The predictability of artistic ativity. Second, the theory's predictive power is demonstrated with respect change. NY: Basic Books. to creative careers, stylistic evolution, and multiple discoveries. In addi­ Maslov, S.Yu. (1983/ Asimmetriya poznavatelnykh mekhanizmov i yeyo tion, the BVSR model provides the foundation for the only computer pro­ sledstviya. semiotika i informatika, N 20. (pp. 3-34) (in Russian). [Asymmetry grams that have generated authentic creative products. Finally, by con­ of cognitive mechanisms and its consequences] ceiving creativity in Darwinian terms, the phenomenon is linked with evo­ Mazhul, LA., & Petrov, V.M. (1999). 21st century art: Components of the lutionary psychology, the only framework for a theoretical integration of midterm prognosis. In 20th century art: Achievements, traditions, and innova­ tions (pp. 345-347). St. Petersburg: State Hermitage. the biological, behavioral, and social sciences. Petrov, V.M. (1992). Evolution of art and brain asymmetry: A review of em­ Creativity as a Secondary Darwinian Process pirical investigations. In G.C. Cupchik & J. Laszlo (Eds), Emerging visions of Charles Darwin's Origins of Species can be said to contain a provoca­ the aesthetic process (psychology, semiology, and philosophy) (pp. 255-268). tive theory of creativity. In this work Darwin proposed a theory of how Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. "Mother Nature" could create all the millions of life forms that have popu­ Petrov, V.M. (1994). Problemi di stile: espressioni caratteristiche dell' lated this earth. This theory was advanced as a direct rival to the theory of emisfero sinistra e di quello destro nell' arte. Rivista di Psicologia dell' Arte, creativity based on the Bible's "Book of Genesis." In lieu of an all-know­ Nuova Serie, anno XV, nn 3/4/5. P. 23-34. Petrov, V.M. (1994a). Perception of prose: A struggle with the matter of the ing, all-powerful, and all-benevolent "Creator" placing all species on this texts (A trial of an empirical investigation). SPIEL (Siegener Periodicum zur planet in a grand miracle, Darwin substituted a gradual process that was far Internationalen Empirischen Literaturwissenschaft), Jg. 13, Heft IP. 1-21. less spectacular and much less purposeful. In a nutshell, this process con­ Petrov, V.M. (1995). Evoluzione dell' arte e asimmetria cerebrale. Rivista di sists of only two steps: (a) the production of spontaneous variations and (b) Psicologia dell' Arte, Nuova Serie, 16, 4-9. the selection of those variations that are the most fit. Neither the variation Petrov, V.M. (1996). Quantitative estimates of left- and right-hemispherical step nor the selection step was thought to exhibit any special pre­ dominance in art. Leonardo, 29, 201-205. science or foresight or divine guidance. A given variant may just Petrov, V.M. (1998). The evolution of art: An investigation of cycles as well be maladaptive as adaptive, and parents were powerless to of left- and right-hemispherical creativity in art. Leonardo, 31, 219- 224. ensure that their offspring had more of what was required to sur- Vol 2 (1) Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts vive and reproduce. Moreover, survival and reproduction was decided by According to the BVSR model, creativity almost invariably requires, environmental circumstances that had no stake in the outcome. Natural at some crucial juncture, the generation of ideational variations that are to selection might lead a particular species down an evolutionary cul-de-sac a certain degree "blind." The variations are blind to the extent that the until it became doomed to extinction. No wonder Darwin's ideas met with creator cannot completely anticipate what idea will work and what will such opposition from established religion. Besides dethroning God as a not, what idea will succeed and what will fail. As a consequence, the cre­ creative agent, the theory of evolution by natural selection suggested a ative mind must engage in a certain amount of free association, primary cruel world without neither direction nor morality. The creation of all life process, defocused attention, exploratory play, tinkering, trial-and-error, forms was a cruel upshot of an incessant "struggle for existence." or some other relatively unrestricted process or behavior. Significantly, Yet, of course, scriptural and ethical objections have no place in any the BVSR model does not require that the variation procedure always op­ scientific evaluation of Darwin's theory. Instead the judgment must be erate according to the same mechanism. Indeed, one of the most fascinat­ judged by logical and empirical criteria appropriate to science. By these ing aspects of creativity is that it results not from one process but many. standards, there is no doubt that Darwin's theory rates high. In the first Some of this variety can be illustrated in the following three examples. place, the theory was able to explain a tremendous diversity of facts that First, and as Skinner suggested, creativity can certainly work in a fash­ would otherwise be inexplicable or else would have to be explained away ion hardly distinguishable from operant conditioning. The individual may piecemeal. Furthermore, this explanatory power and comprehensiveness generate various permutations of established behaviors - often through was obtained by hypothesizing an extremely parsimonious process. playful manipulation of objects in the environment - and thereby encoun­ Darwin's theory has lots of "bang for the buck." In this sense, it compares ter a combination of acquired behaviors that serves to solve some problem. quite favorably with Newton's gravitational theory, as put forward in the K6hler( 1925) provided a classic illustration of such behavioral insights in Principia. To be sure, Darwin's theory has nowhere near the predictive his observations of how Sultan was able to join two sticks to retrieve a precision of Newton's. Indeed, it was questionable whether his theory had banana placed just out of reach. Epstein (1990, 1991), a student of B. F. any predictive utility at all. Even so, this deficiency was very largely rem­ Skinner's, has proposed a model that explicates Sultan's insight behavior edied by modern developments, such as the emergence of Mendelian ge­ in totally operant terms. Furthermore, Epstein has shown that this model netics, the New Synthesis, population genetics, and experimental evolu­ does an excellent job predicting insight behaviors in pigeons that are given tionary biology. problems comparable to those that Kohler provided his apes. Although one So impressive was the Darwinian triumph that the core variation-selec­ might be inclined to dismiss this behavioral BVSR as too primitive to sup­ tion process began to be applied to other phenomena. These applications port major acts of human creativity, this behavioral process actually has can be considered examples of secondary Darwinism, to distinguish them considerable importance. Kantorovich (1993), for instance, has argued that from primary Darwinism, which is confined to biological evolution playful "tinkering" often provides the basis for breakthrough discoveries (Simonton, 1999b). For instance, both the acquisition of immunity and in science. Such unguided exploration and manipulation is a frequent source neurological development in complex nervous systems were successfully for serendipitous events that could not have been anticipated by logic or described by variation-selection mechanisms (Cziko, 1995). B. F. Skinner's prior experience (Kantorovich & Ne'eman, 1989). conception of operant conditioning provides another explicit example of Second, for an organism with sufficient cognitive complexity, such as secondary Darwinism (Epstein, 1991). The organism emits behavioral op­ the human mind enjoys, the BVSR process can be rendered more efficient. erants that are either reinforced or punished by environmental conditions. As Campbell (1960) pointed out, both the generation of variations and the Even more strikingly, Skinner and his students soon extended the operant testing of those variations can occur covertly rather than overtly. Dennett conditioning paradigm to creative behavior (Epstein, 1990; Skinner, 1972). (1995) styled creatures that engage in this kind of problem solving But can creativity really be considered another useful application of sec­ "Popperian," in contrast to the "Skinnerian" creatures of the previous ex­ ondary Darwinism? ample. Such organisms take advantage of the fact that they contain internal The purpose of this essay is to address this question. I begin by sketch­ representations of the external world, along with representations of various ing what a Darwinian theory of creativity entails. I then turn to the reasons ways of acting on that world. The internal representation, for instance, might why I believe such a theoretical account to be particularly valuable. Next be a "cognitive map" of the physical environment, which the organism can I discuss some of the objections that are often raised in opposition to a then use to conceive alternative routes should the normal pathway be ob­ Darwinian explanation. I close by listing some of the implications for structed. By engaging in such internalized "trial-and-error," the organism future research on creativity. increases the odds that when it finally emits an overt behavior, that action Darwinian Creativity will be successful. Of course, success is not guaranteed. One problem is The first significant attempt to explain creativity in Darwinian terms is that the representation of the external world may not be completely accu­ found in Darwin's (1871/1952) The Descent of Man and Selection in Rela­ rate. As a consequence, a failed action can also be taken as a test of the tion to Sex. Darwin thus launched a research tradition that continues to the individual's representation, and thus indicative of a need for a change in present day (e.g., Miller, 2000), as is quite apparent in the principal thrust that representation. That alteration may itself require the organism to en­ of the articles making up this special issue (see also Simonton, 1999b, for gage in an overt BVSR process until that internal representation more closely review and discussion). However, these explanatory accounts all evoke approximates the environment. Once that adjustment is complete, the or­ primary Darwinist principles. That is, creative thought evolved as an ad­ ganism can return to the more efficient Popperian existence in which prob­ aptation in the face of either natural selection or sexual selection - or some lems are solved through thinking rather than behaving. combination of the two. Nevertheless, less than a decade after Darwin Third and last, although there is no doubt that much creativity operates tried to account for creativity in primary terms, William James (1880) first in the above manner - especially in everyday problem-solving situations - proposed that the creative process might operate according to an analo­ many of the more impressive acts of human creativity rely on a more so­ gous, or secondary mechanism. In particular, James argued that creativity phisticated BVSR process. Human beings have minds that contain not just involved a Darwinian cycle of spontaneous variation and selective reten­ images of themselves and the outer world, but also cultural artifacts that tion. This basic idea has been developed by many other subsequent think­ can be used in lieu of those mental images. Those artifacts include lan­ ers, including both philosophers and psychologists, often under the guise guage, logic, mathematics, graphics, symbols, and various tools and de­ of evolutionary epistemology (e.g., Popper, 1979). Of special pertinence vices, whether mechanical or electronic. Dennett (1995) called creatures here is Campbell's (1960) article advocating a "blind-variation and selec­ that can exploit these means to problem solving "Gregorian" (a term in­ tive-retention" (BVSR) model of the creative process. So important did I spired by some ideas of Richard Gregory, the British psychologist). The consider this latter essay that, when serving as the Editor of the Journal of only Gregorian creature we currently know of is Homo sapiens. Probably Creative Behavior, I made it a target article for "peer commentary" the supreme vehicle for this highly abstract form of BVSR is mathematics. (Simonton, 1998a), with Cziko (1998), author of Without Miracles (Cziko, Once a correspondence has been established between mathematical sym­ 1995), responding on Campbell's behalf (who was recently deceased). bols and the external world, the symbols can undergo efficient manipula­ Moreover, for the past dozen years I have been actively engaged in devel­ tions to yield discoveries that then can be tested against the world, and new oping my own elaborations and extensions of the BVSR model (e.g., Simonton, 1988d, 1989, 1997a, 1999a, 1999b). Another major con­ discoveries thus made. Sometimes these predictions will be derived in a tributor to these recent developments was Hans Eysenck (1993 systematic fashion from the mathematical representations, but other 1995), who attempted to provide a personality basis for what he' times the predictions will be the serendipitous result of playful tink­ termed the "Campbell-Simonton model." ering with the abstractions and their connections (Hadamard, 1945; Poincare, 1921). Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) It is critical to recognize that the "blindness" of Darwinian creativity is a bit odd, in part because they fail to filter the extraneous influence of not a qualitative attribute. On the contrary, creative thought may exhibit haphazard stimuli from their internal and external worlds. Concomitantly, various degrees of blindness, depending on the nature of creativity. Thus, they do not feel the inhibiting necessity of forcing their crazy hunches to in scientific creativity the BVSR operates under strong a priori constraints, conform to social and disciplinary conventions. This is an ideal situation such as logic and data. In contrast, artistic creativity, especially that of a for the production of ideational mutations. As I have already pointed out highly romantic or avant-garde sort, has much fewer restrictions on the in an earlier article in this journal, Darwinian theory predicts that the rates hypothesized process. Only under extremely rare circumstances would we of psychopathological symptoms should vary across disciplines according expect the process to be completely random. Furthermore, even when the to the magnitude of "blindness" each domain requires for successful cre­ process entails a considerable infusion of randomness, the ideational vari­ ativity (Simonton, 2000). For instance, artistic creators should exhibit higher ants almost always involve the combination of ideas that bear some a priori levels of psychopathology than do scientific creators, and that is in fact the or a posteriori relevance to the problem at hand (Eysenck, 1995; Poincare, case (Cattell & Butcher, 1968; Feist, 1998; Ludwig, 1995; MacKinnon, 1921). 1978; Roe, 1952). Empirical Support Developmental antecedents. Any developmental factor that enhances Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection had more explana­ the capacity of an individual to generate numerous and diverse variations tory comprehensiveness than any alternative theory. I believe the same is should have a positive impact on the development of creative potential. true of a secondary Darwinian theory of creativity. In addition, I believe One of the most obvious requirements is the early acquisition of the re­ the theory can claim impressive predictive power. quired expertise to make contributions to a domain, a requirement that usu­ Explanatory Power ally takes about a decade of intense study and practice (Hayes, 1989; To get some notion of the breadth of the theory's explanatory scope, let Simonton, 1991b; see also Ericsson, 1996). However, it is essential to us examine what it says about cognitive processes, individual differences, realize that expertise alone does not guarantee creativity (Simonton, 1996a). developmental antecedents, and sociocultural influences. The expertise must be organized in a way that it favors the production of Cognitive processes. The Darwinian theory provides a plausible inter­ multiple perspectives, and that expertise must be possessed by an indi­ pretation for the introspective reports in which eminent creators describe vidual willing to develop those divergent variations (see, e.g., MacKinnon, the mental processes by which they arrive at their most important ideas 1978; Rostan, 1994). Consequently, the development of creative talent (Campbell, 1960). This is certainly true of the reports published by such should include events and circumstances that encourage nonconformity, notables as Poincare (1920), Helmholtz (1898), and James (1880). The independence, appreciation of diverse perspectives, a variety of interests, theory also is compatible with the frequent reports of serendipity (Austin, and other favorable qualities. 1978; Cannon, 1940; Mach, 1896). In fact, serendipitous discoveries have That indeed appears to be the case. For instance, eminent creators are a role in cultural evolution similar to that of the mutation in biological more likely to have come from unconventional family backgrounds evolution (Kantorovich & Ne'eman, 1989). Both are unexpected events (Simonton, 1994). Thus, they may arise disproportionately from among that can set the course of historical change in new directions. More signifi­ immigrants (Goertzel, Goertzel, & Goertzel, 1978; Helson & Crutchfield, cantly, the theory offers the basis for understanding the results that have 1970), and they may have come from homes that suffered the loss of one or emerged from laboratory experiments regarding problem solving and in­ both parents (Eisenstadt, 1978; Roe, 1952; Walberg, Rasher, & Parkerson, sight. For instance, creative problem solving appears to be stimulated when 1980). Although creative talent is nourished by the presence of models individuals are presented with unpredictable or incongruous juxtapositions and mentors in the future domain of achievement (Walberg, Rasher, & of stimuli (Finke, Ward, & Smith 1992; Proctor, 1993; Rothenberg, 1986; Parkerson, 1980), creative potential is best nurtured by having many di­ Sobel & Rothenberg, 1980). Presumably such exposure evokes more di­ verse sources of influence rather than just one (Simonton, 1977b, 1984a, verse and unconstrained ideational variations. 1992a). Moreover, even though formal education may be necessarily to Individual differences. Secondary Darwinism can serve as a theoreti­ provide the minimal expertise for achievement as a creative individual, cal basis for understanding the psychometric instruments that purport to such training can go too far as well, restricting the diversity of perspectives assess the cognitive processes underlying creativity (Simonton, 1999a). required for true creative success (Simonton, 1976a, 1983, 1984b). In­ For instance, the tests of divergent thinking that originated with Guilford deed, many of the most innovative ideas in a domain often have received (1967) bear a clear connection with the proposition that creativity involves their initial training in other fields (Gieryn & Hirsh, 1983; Hudson & Jacot, the capacity to generate numerous and diverse variations. Even more per­ 1986; Kuhn, 1970; Simonton, 1984c). This professional marginality al­ tinent to the Darwinian account is Mednick's (1962) Remote Associates lows the innovators to proliferate variations that would be excluded a priori Test, or RAT. This test was based on the premise that creativity involves by those who received their training totally within the discipline (see the ability to make rather remote associations between separate ideas. Highly Simonton, in press-a, for more detailed discussion). creative individuals were said to have a flat hierarchy of associations in It is noteworthy that the distinction between artistic and scientific cre­ comparison to the steep hierarchy of associations of those with low cre­ ativity is also relevant here. Developmental events that tend to nurture ativity. A flat associative hierarchy means that for any given stimulus, the originality are prone to be much more frequent or intense in the lives of creative person has a great many associations available, all with roughly artistic creators relative to scientific creators (Berry, 1981; Goertzel, equal probabilities of retrieval. Because such an individual can generate Goertzel, & Goertzel, 1978; Raskin, 1936; Simonton, 1984b, 1986a; see many associative variations willy-nilly, the odds are increased that he or also Schaefer & Anastasi, 1968). For instance, rates of parental loss are she will find that one association that will make the necessary remote con­ higher among artists; artists also tend to come from more diverse back­ nection. grounds and tend to obtain less formal education. The theory also dovetails quite well with the personality traits associ­ Sociocultural influences. It has long been known that creative person­ ated with creativity (Simonton, 1999b), especially with the tendency for alities are not randomly distributed across either cultures or historical peri­ highly creative individuals to exhibit a certain amount of psychopathology ods, but rather such individuals will cluster into what have been termed (Barron, 1963; Eysenck, 1995; see also Andreasen, 1987; Jamison, 1989; "cultural configurations" (Kroeber, 1944; Simonton, 1988c, 1996b). Cer­ Ludwig, 1995). So long as incapacitating mental breakdowns are avoided, tain times and places will exhibit a "Golden Age" resplendent with numer­ psychopathological symptoms can facilitate Darwinian creativity by increas­ ous creative minds of the highest order, while elsewhere a society may be ing the number and scope of variations generated (see, e.g., Slater & Meyer, dominated by a "Dark Age" where not a single creative idea sees the light 1959; Weisberg, 1994). An excellent example is the connection between of day. This fact suggests that there are special political, cultural, eco­ creativity and moderately high scores on the Psychoticism Scale of the nomic, and societal circumstances that may serve either to encourage or Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck, 1993, 1995). Individuals repress the development and manifestation of the individual capacity to scoring at moderate levels on Psychoticism tend to display such useful generate variations. While the number of such factors is very large traits as nonconformity and independence, while at the same time exhibit­ (Simonton, 1984b), the more important of these influences would seem to ing the capacity for original thought processes (see also Eysenck, 1994; operate in a manner consistent with what we would predict from a Darwin­ Rushton, 1990). Those showing some amount of Psychoticism even pro­ ian theory (Simonton, 1988d). For one thing, the Zeitgeist seems to en­ cess information in somewhat unusual ways, including certain cog­ courage individuals to generate new variations, including new com- nitive quirks (e.g., regarding "latent inhibition" and "negative prim­ ]^^^binations of ideas. In particular, we may note the following: ing"; Eysenck, 1995). As a consequence, creative individuals are ai 35 Maall 1. Creative individuals are most likely to appear when a multi­ little bit off-beat, contemplating the world around them in a manner ethnic civilization is fragmented into a large number of separate Vol 2 (1) Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts nations, which would presumably enhance the cultural heterogeneity while Simonton, 1977a, 1984b, 1985, 1997a; Weisberg, 1994). The fascinating at the same time permitting cross-fertilization of ideas (Naroll et al., 1971; aspect of this principle is that it be would predicted from the Darwinian Simonton, 1975,1976d; Sorokin, 1947/1969). The city-states of the Greek viewpoint. To the extent that the variation process is blind, good and bad Golden Age and the Italian Renaissance offer typical instances. Moreover, ideas will appear more or less randomly across careers, just as happens for when a civilization area is dominated by a single imperial state, such as was genetic mutations and recombinations. Europe under the Roman Empire, then nationalistic rebellions will tend to Other aspects of the creative career can also be subsumed under a Dar­ resuscitate the level of creativity (Simonton, 1975). winian model, although I do not have the space to give details here (see 2. When a civilization is characterized by conspicuous ideological di­ Simonton, 1988d, 1997a, 1999b). Thus, variation-selection theory explains versity - the presence of numerous rival philosophical schools - then cre­ and predicts (a) the skewed probability distribution of lifetime output ativity tends to increase, even in those domains that have relatively little to (Simonton, 1988d, 1997a; cf. Simonton, 1999c), (b) the role of social net­ do with intellectual trends (Simonton, 1976c). works in the maintenance of creativity across the life span (Allison & Long, 3. After a civilization opens itself up to foreign influences, it tends to 1990; Simonton, 1992a, 1992b), (c) the long-term stability of a creator's become the site for a revival of creative activity (Simonton, 1997b). This reputation (Over, 1982; Simonton, 1988d, 1991c, 1998b), and (d) the dis­ alien input may take several forms, including study abroad, mentorship tinctive career trajectories, including the longitudinal location of career under a foreign master, or the immigration of individuals from the outside. landmarks and the differences across the various domains of creative The latter fits in with what we noted earlier about immigrants. Moreover, achievement (Simonton, 1991a, 1991b, 1997a). these findings are compatible with laboratory experiments showing how Stylistic evolution. Martindale (1990, 1994) has developed a Darwin­ the presence of minorities can enhance divergent thought processes (Nemeth, ian model that explains the changes seen in aesthetic styles as a particular 1986; Nemeth & Kwan, 1985, 1987; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983). The pro­ tradition evolves over time. Creative ideas result from a free-associative, cess operating here is not unlike the possible role of hybridization in the combinatory process that generates the aesthetic variations. However, each generation of new biological species (Harrison, 1993). generation of aesthetic creators - whether poets, composers, or artists - is On the other hand, other external conditions may inhibit the produc­ under unrelenting pressure to produce works that have more "arousal po­ tion of the ideational variations that feed the creative process. For instance, tential" (i.e., shock value) than the works of their predecessors. This in­ because original thought is prevented when an individual is in a state of spires the variation process to resort to ever more "primordial cognition," extremely aversive emotional arousal (Martindale, 1995), it should come or what is called "primary process" in the psychoanalytic school of psy­ as no surprise that threatening circumstances, such as war, tend to lower chology. As the variations become increasingly extreme, the style begins the level of creativity observed in a given society (Simonton, 1980,1984b). to break down. Eventually the aesthetic tradition undergoes a kind of revo­ In fact, such conditions tend to support the opposite of societal creativity, lution in which a new style replaces the old. The works produced in the namely, authoritarianism, dogmatism, and rigidity (Doty, Peterson, & Win­ new style do not rely so much on primordial cognition in order to obtain ter, 1991; Sales, 1973; Simonton, 1976e). Such circumstances tend to re­ the needed novelty, but subsequent creators will have to dig up increas­ strict the range of variations that are either generated or accepted. ingly original combinations, and the whole process repeats. The conse­ Finally, we should point out, once more, that artistic and scientific cre­ quence is a series of stylistic cycles. To test these predictions, Martindale ativity require somewhat different circumstances (Simonton, 1976b). Al­ has applied computerized content analysis to actual poetry in the French though both require a Zeitgeist that supports the free exploration of ideas, and English traditions in order to document how the theory can indeed scientific creators appear to require more stable sociocultural settings that account for stylistic change (Martindale, 1975). He has also tested his do artistic creators (Simonton, 1975). As an example, political anarchy has theory using creative products in fiction, music, and the visual arts a much more debilitating effect on the sciences and allied activities than it (Martindale, 1990). He has even made initial efforts toward extending the does on the arts (Simonton, 1975, I976d). model to creativity in the sciences and humanities. So far the results fit Predictive Power what Martindale predicted from his Darwinian model of creativity. Secondary Darwinism not only can explain a broad range of features Multiple discoveries. One of the more dramatic episodes in the history about exceptional creativity, but also it can boast a certain degree of predic­ of science is when two or more individuals independently and often simul­ tive power. This predictive power is most impressive in three areas: cre­ taneously come up with the same discovery or invention. This has hap­ ative careers, stylistic evolution, and multiple discoveries. pened enough that some sociologists and anthropologists have taken these Creative careers. The Darwinian view of creativity makes a striking events as conclusive proof of the operation of sociocultural determinism prediction about the relation between quantity and quality of output. In (Kroeber, 1944; Lamb & Easton, 1984; Merton, 1961; Ogburn & Thomas, biological evolution, those individuals who produce the most total offspring 1922). At a particular point in time and space, the Zeitgeist supposedly will usually have more offspring survive to reproduce themselves. But the makes a particular contribution absolutely inevitable, because it is "in the more prolific organisms will also tend to produce the most progeny who air." Although this social deterministic view seems to run counter to the die before reaching maturity. Thus, reproductive success is often associ­ Darwinian perspective, detailed quantitative analyses of the data on mul­ ated with reproductive failure. A similar pattern is observed in the careers tiples show that this phenomenon is actually most concordant with the no­ of eminent creators (Cole & Cole, 1973; Davis, 1987; Dennis, 1954a, 1954b; tion that science is indeed Darwinian (Simonton, 1988b, 1988d). In par­ Feist, 1993, 1997). Those who are the most prolific will have the most ticular, the distinctive probability distribution of multiple grades (i.e., the successful works, but they will also have the most unsuccessful works. So, number of independent discoveries) as well as the probability distribution quality is strongly associated with pure quantity. Produce more variations, of the time lapse between the separate discoveries can be explicated in and the odds will be increased that some variations will survive. terms of stochastic models that are completely explicable in terms of a This quality-quantity association applies to other features of careers as variation-selection theory (Brannigan & Wanner, 1983; Price, 1963; well, such as the differences seen between men and women (Over, 1990). Simonton, 1979, 1986b, 1987). In these models, diverse recombinations of Men may produce more influential works than women, but they also pro­ ideas are randomly generated in multiple individuals, with the sole con­ duce more ignored works in equal proportion, so that the hit rate per work straint that combinations that have already appeared will not be duplicated offered is not contingent on gender. Even more remarkably, this same rela­ once their appearance has sufficiently disseminated (by incorporating a tionship holds within careers, not just across careers. The mathematical "contagion mechanism" in the stochastic process). These models can still function that describes the changes in creative output across the life span is reproduce the observed probability distributions when an a priori ordering the same for successful and unsuccessful products (Simonton, 1988a, is imposed on the permissible combinations, and thereby allow that some 1997a). Those periods in which the creator produces the most total works ideas may be necessary (but not necessary and sufficient) for the appear­ will be those in which the most outstanding works appear, including the ance of other ideas. The Darwinian models also successfully predict that single best contribution (Simonton, 1991a, 1991b). In fact, the ratio of the odds of any one individual participating in a multiple is a probabilistic successful products to total output fluctuates randomly throughout the ca­ function of the person's own productivity and the aggregate output of col­ reer (Simonton, 1977a, 1984b, 1985b). In other words, the expected prob­ leagues working in the same field (and hence submitting the same ideas to ability of success stays constant regardless of the creator's age, yielding combinatorial variations; see Simonton, 1999b). what has been called the "equal-odds rule" (Simonton, 1997a). Be Conclusion cause of this principle, creative individuals are not able to increase Just as primary Darwinism encountered all kinds of criticisms, their hit rates, nor do the hit rates decline with age, nor even willisSftlll 36 so has the secondary Darwinian theory of creativity drawn an ample they exhibit some curvilinear form (Huber, 2000; Over, 1988, 1989; amount of complaints (see, e.g., Perkins, 1994; Sternberg, 1998; Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1)

Weisberg, 2000). Unfortunately, I lack the space here to respond to all of secondary Darwinian theory of creativity, at least if we apply the common- these criticisms, something that has been done elsewhere anyway (e.g., sense principle that the "proof of the recipe is in the pudding." Cziko, 1998; Simonton, 1999b). May it suffice here to observe that these The Darwinian theory of creativity has one final advantage: it subsumes complaints are almost entirely based on incorrect conceptions of what is the phenomenon of creativity under the more comprehensive framework of and is not claimed by a Darwinian theory of creativity (Cziko, 1998; Perkins, evolutionary psychology (Buss, 1995). This linkage is important for those 1998; Simonton, 1999b). Thus, the theory is often taken to task for argu­ who believe, like 1 do, that evolutionary psychology provides the only sound ing that creativity is totally random and that the creator does not take ad­ basis for the integration of the biological, behavioral, and social sciences vantage of acquired expertise in the field - when the theory claims nothing (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992). In this sense, the theory outlined of the sort. In the first place, the theory assumes that accumulated knowl­ here renders creativity a more "mainstream" topic in the discipline than it edge and skill provide a necessary but not sufficient basis for creativity. would be otherwise. Something more must be added to take the creative mind beyond the limi­ tations and constraints of that expertise, to generate truly original ideas References that go beyond what has worked before. Moreover, although occasionally Adleman, L. M. (1994). Molecular computation of solutions to combinato­ rial problems. Science, 266, 1021-1024. this additional step requires the introduction of truly random processes - Allison, P. D., & Long, J. S. (1990). Departmental effects on scientific pro­ John Watson's (1968) identification of the genetic code providing a case in ductivity. American Sociological Review, 55, 469-478. point - randomness in any strict sense is the exception rather than the rule. Andreasen, N. C. (1987). Creativity and mental illness: Prevalence rates in Much more often the creative act requires that the creator rely on the "quasi- writers and their first-degree relatives. American Journal of Psychiatry, 144, random" processes that are a natural byproduct of free association, pri­ 1288-1292. mary-process thinking, defocused attention, deficient perceptual filtering, Austin, J. H. (1978). Chase, chance, and creativity. New York: Columbia playful tinkering, and the like. The necessary repercussion of such pro­ University Press. cesses is ideational variations that tend to be more unpredictable, original, Back, T. (1996). Evolutionary algorithms in theory and practice. Oxford, and surprising even to the very creators who generated them. England: Oxford University Press. Barron, F. X. (1963). Creativity and psychological health. Princeton, NJ: Just as significant, the critics of the Darwinian theory repeatedly over­ Van Nostrand. look the fact that the ideational variations that are proposed to feed the Berry, C. (1981). The Nobel scientists and the origins of scientific achieve­ creative process are also expected to vary greatly in the degree of "blind­ ment. British Journal of Sociology, 32, 381-391. ness" displayed (Cziko, 1998; Simonton, 1999b). Some variations are highly Boden, M. A. (1991). The creative mind: Myths & mechanisms. New York. BasicBooks. constrained, almost algorithmically so, and others are almost completely Brannigan, A., & Wanner, R. A. (1983). Multiple discoveries in science: A unguided, with an unbroken continuum connecting these two extremes. test of the communication theory. Canadian Journal of Sociology, 8, 135-151. This continuous dimension is analogous to what holds in primary Darwin­ Buss, D. M. (1995). Evolutionary psychology: A new paradigm for psycho­ ism, where the variations can vary from the "clones" generated by asexual logical science. Psychological Inquiry, 6, 1-30. reproduction, through genetic recombinations governed by varying degrees Campbell, D. T. (1960). Blind variation and selective retention in creative of chromosomal linkage and epistasis, to mutations which can also exhibit thought as in other knowledge processes. Psychological Review, 67, 380-400. varying levels of a priori constraints (including differential mutation rates Cannon, W. B. (1940). The role of chance in discovery. Scientific Monthly, at distinct loci). In addition, the relative level of variational blindness will 50. 204-209. vary across types of creative products and even within various portions of Cattell, R. B., & Butcher, H. J. (1968). The prediction of achievement and creativity. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Berrill. a single product. In classical music, for example, variational freedom is Cole, S., & Cole, J. R. (1973). Social stratification in science. Chicago: Uni­ likely greater for fantasias than for fugues, and within compositions in so­ versity of Chicago Press. nata-allegro form the exposition section will display less freedom than does Cziko, G. (1995). Without miracles: Universal selection theory and the sec­ the development section. The Darwinian theory even allows for creators to ond Darwinian revolution. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. engage sometimes in mere "creative" cloning, as when artists succumb to Cziko, G. (1998). From blind to creative: In defense of Donald Campbell's self-imitation or routine mass production, or when scientists routinely ap­ selectionist theory of human creativity. Journal of Creative Behavior, 32, 192- ply the same old technique in a Procrustean manner that ignores the unique 209. features of a critical problem. Darwinian theory would only claim that Darwin, C. (1952). The descent of man and selection in relation to sex. In R. such completely "sightful" products will tend to be vastly inferior to the M. Hutchins (Ed.), Great books of the Western world (Vols. 49, pp. 253-600). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica. (Original work published 1871) best work produced by the same creators - formulaic hackworks rather Davis, R. A. (1987). Creativity in neurological publications. Neurosurgery, than inspired masterworks. 20, 652-663. This above point is reinforced by the attempts to develop computer Dennett, D. C. (1995). Darwin's dangerous idea: Evolution and the mean­ ings of life. New York: Simon & Schuster. programs that exhibit genuine creativity. These programs may be assigned Dennis, W. (1954a). Bibliographies of eminent scientists. Scientific Monthly, to two general categories. The first class consists of those programs that 79, 180-183. attempt to produce creative ideas by the application of a set of rules to a Dennis, W. (1954b). Productivity among American psychologists. American given database, deriving those ideas by a step-by-step, logical process. The Psychologist^, 191-194. best example are the discovery programs that apply a predetermined inven­ Doty, R. M., Peterson, B. E., & Winter, D. G. (1991). Threat and tory of heuristics to empirical data (e.g., Langley, Simon, Bradshaw, & authoritarianism in the United States, 1978-1987. Journal of Personality and Zythow, 1987; Shrager & Langley, 1990). Despite the provocative simula­ Social Psychology, 61, 629-640. tions these programs have produced, they still seem utterly incapable of Eisenstadt, J. M. (1978). Parental loss and genius. American Psvchologist, generating true creativity (Sternberg, 1989). Indeed, they might be better 33,211-223. styled "rediscovery programs," given that they are confined to retracing Epstein, R. (1990). Generativity theory and creativity. In M. Runco & R. Albert (Eds.), Theories of creativity (pp. 116-140). Newbury Park, CA: Sage the steps of past discoveries rather than launching new pathways. In a Publications. sense, these programs are engaged in a strange form of computer imitation, Epstein, R. (1991). Skinner, creativity, and the problem of spontaneous be­ duplicating rather than producing creative acts. These deficiencies differ havior. Psychological Science, 2, 362-370. strikingly from what is witnessed in the second class of computer pro­ Ericsson, K. A. (Ed.). (1996). The road to expert performance: Empirical grams. These uniformly require the introduction of some form of stochas­ evidence from the arts and sciences, sports, and games. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. tic mechanism, sometimes even in the form of a random-number generator Eysenck, H. J. (1993). Creativity and personality: Suggestions for a theory. (Boden, 1991). In contrast to the programs that operate by a deterministic Psychological Inquiry, 4, 147-178. logic, this second class of programs has generated impressive creative prod­ Eysenck, H. J. (1994). Creativity and personality: Word association, origence, and Psychoticism. Creativity Research Journal, 7, 209-216. ucts in both the arts and the sciences. Of special interest to the Darwinian Eysenck, H. J. (1995). Genius: The natural history of creativity. Cambridge, theory of creativity is the emergence of the set of programs known as ge­ England: Cambridge University Press. netic algorithms and genetic programming (Back, 1996; Goldberg, 1989; Feist, G. J. (1993). A structural model of scientific eminence. Psychological Koza, 1992). Not only have they produced original and adaptive solutions Science, 4, 366-371. to real problems, but in addition these programs operate in an out­ Feist, G. J. (1997). Quantity, quality, and depth of research as influences on right Darwinian manner, via the technique of blind-variation and scientific eminence: Is quantity most important? Creativity Research selective-retention (also see Adleman, 1994). The manifest sue Journal, 10, 325-335. cess of these explicitly evolutionary lends immense support to the Feist, G. J. (1998). A meta-analysis of personality in scientific and Vol 2 (1) Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts artistic creativity. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2, 290-309. note on social evolution. Political Science Quarterly, 37, 83-93. Finke, R. A., Ward, T. B., & Smith, S. M. (1992). Creative cognition: Theory, Over, R. (1982). The durability of scientific reputation. Journal of the His­ research, applications. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. tory of the Behavioral Sciences, 18, 53-61. Gieryn, T. F., & Hirsh, R. F. (1983). Marginality and innovation in science. Over, R. (1988). Does scholarly impact decline with age? Scientometrics, Social Studies of Science, 13, 87-106. 13,215-223. Goertzel, M. G., Goertzel, V. & Goertzel, T. G. (1978). 300 eminent person­ Over, R. (1989). Age and scholarly impact. Psychology and Aging, 4, 222- alities: A psychosocial analysis of the famous. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 225. Goldberg, D. E. (1989). Genetic algorithms in search, optimization, and Over, R. (1990). The scholarly impact of articles published by men and women machine learning. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. in psychology journals. Scientometrics, 18, 71-80. Guilford, J. P. (1967). The nature of human intelligence. New York: McGraw- Perkins, D. N. (1994). Creativity: Beyond the Darwinian paradigm. In M. A. Hill. Boden (Ed.), Dimensions of creativity (pp. 119-142). Cambridge, MA: MIT Hadamard, J. (1945). The psychology of invention in the mathematical field. Press. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Perkins, D. N. (1998). In the country of the blind: An appreciation of Donald Harrison, R. G. (Ed.). (1993). Hybrid zones and the evolutionary process. Campbell's vision of creative thought. Journal of Creative Behavior, 32, \11- New York: Oxford University Press. 191. Hayes, J. R. (1989b). The complete problem solver (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Poincare, H. (1921). The foundations of science: Science and hypothesis, Erlbaum. the value of science, science and method (G. B. Halstead, Trans.). New York: Helmholtz, H. von (1898). An autobiographical sketch. In Popular lectures Science Press. on scientific subjects, second series (E. Atkinson, Trans., pp. 266-291). New Popper, K. (1959). The logic of discovery. New York: Basic Books. York: Longmans, Green. Price, D. (1963). Little science, big science. New York: Columbia Univer­ Huber, J. C. (2000). A statistical analysis of special cases of creativity. Jour­ sity Press. nal of Creative Behavior, 34, 203-225. Proctor, R. A. (1993). Computer stimulated associations. Creativity Research Hudson, L., & Jacot, B. (1986). The outsider in science. In C. Bagley & G. K. Journal, 6, 391-400. Verma (Eds.), Personality, cognition and values (pp. 3-23). London: Macmillan. Raskin, E. A. (1936). Comparison of scientific and literary ability: A bio­ Helson, R., & Crutchfield, R. S. (1970). Mathematicians: The creative re­ graphical study of eminent scientists and men of letters of the nineteenth cen­ searcher and the average Ph.D. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychol­ tury. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 31, 20-35. ogy, 34, 250-257. Roe, A. (1952). 77?e making of a scientist. New York: Dodd, Mead. James, W. (1880). Great men, great thoughts, and the environment. Atlantic Rostan, S. M. (1994). Problem finding, problem solving, and cognitive con­ Monthly, 46,441 -459 trols: An empirical investigation of critically acclaimed productivity. Creativ­ Jamison, K. R. (1989). Mood disorders and patterns of creativity in British ity Research Journal, 7, 97-110. writers and artists. Psychiatry, 52, 125-134. Rothenberg, A. (1986). Artistic creation as stimulated by superimposed ver­ Kantorovich, A. (1993). Scientific discovery: Logic and tinkering. Albany, sus combined-composite visual images. Journal of Personality and Social Psy­ NY: State University of New York Press. chology, 50,370-381. Kantorovich, A., & Ne'eman, Y. (1989). Serendipity as a source of evolu­ Rushton, J. P. (1990). Creativity, intelligence, and psychoticism. Personality tionary progress in science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 20, and Individual Differences, 11, 1291-1298. 505-529. Sales, S. M. (1973). Threat as a factor in authoritarianism: An analysis of Kohler, W. (1925). The mentality of apes (E. Winter, Trans.). New York: archival data. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 28, 44-57. Harcourt, Brace. Schaefer, C. E., & Anastasi, A. (1968). A biographical inventory for identi­ Koza, J. R. (1992). Genetic programming: On the programming of comput­ fying creativity in adolescent boys. Journal of Applied Psychology, 58, 42-48. ers by means of natural selection. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Shrager, J., & Langley, P. (Eds.). (1990). Computational models of scientific Kroeber, A. L. (1944). Configurations of culture growth. Berkeley: Univer­ discovery and theory formation. San Mateo, CA: Kaufmann. sity of California Press. Simonton, D. K. (1975). Sociocultural context of individual creativity: A Lamb, D., & Easton, S. M. (1984). Multiple discovers. England: Avebury. transhistorical time-series analysis. Journal of Personalitv and Social Psy­ Langley, P., Simon, H. A., Bradshaw, G. L., & Zythow, J. M. (1987). Scien­ chology, 32, 1119-1133. tific discovery. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Simonton, D. K. (1976a). Biographical determinants of achieved eminence: Ludwig, A. M. (1995). The price of greatness: Resolving the creativity and A multivariate approach to the Cox data. Journal of Personalitv and Social madness controversy. New York: Guilford Press. Psychology, 33,218-226. Mach, E. (1896). On the part played by accident in invention and discovery. Simonton, D. K. (1976b). Do Sorokin's data support his theory?: A study of Monist,6, 161-175. generational fluctuations in philosophical beliefs. Journal for the Scientific MacKinnon, D. W. (1978). In search of human effectiveness. Buffalo, NJ: Study of Religion, 75, 187-198. Creative Education Foundation. Simonton, D. K. (1976c). Ideological diversity and creativity: A re-evalua­ Martindale, C. (1975). Romantic progression: The psychology of literary tion of a hypothesis. Social Behavior and Personality, 4, 203-207. history. Washington, DC: Hemisphere. Simonton, D. K. (1976d). Philosophical eminence, beliefs, and Zeitgeist: An Martindale, C. (1990). The clockwork muse: The predictability of artistic individual-generational analysis. Journal of Personalitv and Social Psychol­ styles. New York: Basic Books. ogy, 34,630-640. Martindale, C. (1994). How can we measure a society's creativity? In: Di­ Simonton, D. K. (1976e). The sociopolitical context of philosophical be­ mensions of creativity, ed. M. A. Boden. Massachusetts Institute of Technology liefs: A transhistorical causal analysis. Social Forces, 54, 513-523. Press. Simonton, D. K. (1977a). Creative productivity, age, and stress: A biographical Martindale, C. (1995). Creativity and connectionism. In S. M. Smith, T. B. time-series analysis of 10 classical composers. Journal ofPersonalit\> and Social Ward, & R. A. Finke (Eds.), The creative cognition approach (pp. 249-268). Psychology, 35, 791 -804. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Simonton, D. K. (1977b). Eminence, creativity, and geographic marginality: Mednick, S. A. (1962). The associative basis of the creative process. Psy­ A recursive structural equation model. Journal of Personality and Social Psy­ chological Review, 69, 220-232. chology, 55,805-816. Merton, R. K. (1961). Singletons and multiples in scientific discovery: A Simonton, D. K. (1979). Multiple discovery and invention: Zeitgeist, genius, chapter in the sociology of science. Proceedings of the American Philosophi­ or chance? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1603-1616. cal Society, 105, 470-486. Simonton, D. K. (1980). Techno-scientific activity and war: A yearly time- Miller, G. (2000). The mating mind: How sexual choice shaped the evolu­ series analysis, 1500-1903 A.D. Scientometrics, 2, 251-255. tion of human nature. New York: Doubleday. Simonton, D. K. (1983). Formal education, eminence, and dogmatism: The Naroll, R., Benjamin, E. C, Fohl, F. K., Fried, M. J., Hildreth, R. E., & curvilinear relationship. Journal of Creative Behavior, 17, 149-162. Schaefer, J. M. (1971). Creativity: A cross-historical pilot survey. Journal of Simonton, D. K. (1984a). Artistic creativity and interpersonal relationships Cross-Cultural Psychology, 2, 181-188. across and within generations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Nemeth, C. J. (1986). Differential contributions of majority and minority 46, 1273-1286. influence. Psychological Review, 93, 23-32. Simonton, D. K. (1984b). Genius, creativity, and leadership: Historiometric Nemeth, C. J., & Kwan, J. (1985). Originality of word associations as a func­ inquiries. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. tion of majority vs. minority influence. Social Psychology Quarterly, 48, 277- Simonton, D. K. (1984c). Is the marginality effect all that marginal? Social 282. Studies of Science, 14, 621-622. Nemeth, C. J., & Kwan, J. (1987). Minority influence, divergent thinking and Simonton, D. K. (1985). Quality, quantity, and age: The careers of 10 distin­ detection of correct solutions. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, guished psychologists. International Journal of Aging and Human Develop­ 77,788-799. ment, 27,241-254. Nemeth, C. J., & Wachtler, J. (1983). Creative problem solving as a Simonton, D. K. (1986a). Biographical typicality, eminence, and result of majority vs. minority influence. European Journal of Socialfm? ™r , „ achievement style. Journal of Creative Behavior, 20, 14-22. Psychology, 13,45-55. Rfiffll J° Simonton, D. K. (1986b). Stochastic models of multiple discovery. Ogburn, W. K., & Thomas, D. (1922). Are inventions inevitable? A Czechoslovak Journal of Physics, B 36, 138-141. Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) Simonton, D. K. (1987). Multiples, chance, genius, creativity, and Zeitgeist. gins of genius: Darwinian perspectives on creativity, D. K. Simonton]. Con­ In D. N. Jackson & J. P. Rushton (Eds.), Scientific excellence: Origins and temporary Psychology, 46, 589-593. assessment (pp. 98-128). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. Author Note: I thank Gregory Feist for his comments on an earlier draft of Simonton, D. K. (1988a). Age and outstanding achievement: What do we the manuscript. know after a century of research? Psychological Bulletin, 104, 251-267. Simonton, D. K. (1988b). Creativity, leadership, and chance. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of creativity: Contemporary psychological perspectives (pp. Dean Keith Simonton, 386-426). New York: Cambridge University Press. Department of Psychology, Simonton, D. K. (1988c). Galtonian genius, Kroeberian configurations, and One Shields Avenue emulation: A generational time-series analysis of Chinese civilization. Journal University of California, of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 230-238. Davis, California 95616-8686. Simonton, D. K. (1988d). Scientific genius: A psychology of science. Cam­ bridge: Cambridge University Press. Simonton, D. K. (1989). The chance-configuration theory of scientific cre­ ativity. In B. Gholson, W. R. Shadish, Jr., R. A. Neimeyer, & A. C. Houts (Eds.), The psychology of science: Contributions to metascience (pp. 170- 213). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Simonton, D. K. (1991a). Career landmarks in science: Individual differ­ ences and interdisciplinary contrasts. Developmental Psychology, 27, 119-130. Simonton, D. K. (1991b). Emergence and realization of genius: The lives and works of 120 classical composers. Journal of Personality and Social Psy­ chology, 61, 829-840. Simonton, D. K. (1991c). Latent-variable models of posthumous reputation: A quest for Galton's G. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 607-619. Simonton, D. K. (1992a). Leaders of American psychology, 1879-1967: Ca­ reer development, creative output, and professional achievement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 5-17. Simonton, D. K. (1992b). The social context of career success and course for 2,026 scientists and inventors. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 452-463. Simonton, D. K. (1994). Greatness: Who makes history and why. New York: Guilford Press. Simonton, D. K. (1996a). Creative expertise: A life-span developmental per­ spective. In K. A. Ericsson (Ed.), The road to expert performance: Empirical evidence from the arts and sciences, sports, and games (pp. 227-253). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Charles Darwin, circa 1874 Photographer: Julia Margaret Cameron Simonton, p. K. (1996b). Individual genius and cultural configurations: The case of Japanese civilization. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 27,354- 375. Simonton, D. K. (1997a). Creative productivity: A predictive and explana­ tory model of career trajectories and landmarks. Psychological Review, 104, 66-89. Simonton, D. K. (1997b). Foreign influence and national achievement: The impact of open milieus on Japanese civilization. Journal of Personalitv and Social Psychology, 72, 86-97. Simonton, D. K. (1998a). Donald Campbell's model of the creative process: Creativity as blind variation and selective retention. Journal of Creative Be­ havior, 32, 153-158. Simonton, D. K. (1998b). Fickle fashion versus immortal fame: Transhistorical The Role of Creativity in the Dialectical Evolution of Ideas assessments of creative products in the opera house. Journal of Personality Robert J. Sternberg and Social Psychology, 75, 198-210. Yale University Simonton, D. K. (1999a). Creativity as blind variation and selective reten­ tion: Is the creative process Darwinian? Psychological Inquiry, 10, 309-328. Absttract Simonton, D. K. (1999b). Origins of genius: Darwinian perspectives on cre­ In this article, I address the question of what role does creativity play in ativity. New York: Oxford University Press. the evolution of cultures, and argue that intelligence, creativity, and wis­ Simonton, D. K. (1999c). Talent and its development: An emergenic and epigenetic model. Psychological Review. dom are dialectically related. In essence, intelligence is a largely conserva­ Simonton, D. K. (2000). Creativity and psychopathology from a Darwinian tive force within a culture that serves to help individuals in adapting to perspective. Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts, 1, 38-40. already existing environments. Creativity is a largely radical force within a Skinner, B. F. (1972). Cumulative record: A selection of papers (3rd ed.). culture that serves to help individuals in shaping and redefining these envi­ New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. ronments. And wisdom is a balancing force that seeks an equilibrium be­ Slater, E., & Meyer, A. (1959). Contributions to a pathography of the musi­ tween intelligence (adaptation) and creativity (shaping). cian: 1. Robert Schumann. Confinia Psychiatrica, 2, 65-94. Sobel, R. S., & Rothenberg, A. (1980). Artistic creation as stimulated by The Role of Creativity in the Dialectical Evolution of Ideas superimposed versus separated visual images. Journal of Personality and So­ There are at least two kinds of evolutionary models of crcaliviiy thai cial Psychology, 39,953-961. have merited serious consideration in psychological research. One per­ Sorokin, P. A. (1969). Society, culture, and personality. New York: Cooper tains to how creative ideas come into existence and then conic to be at Square. (Original work published 1947) cepted; the other pertains to the role creativity plays in I In- evolution ol Sternberg, R. J. (1989). Computational models of scientific discovery: Do organisms, including humans. they compute? [Review of Scientific discovery: Computational explorations of The first kind of model, initiated by Campbell (19<>(>). deals vviili how the creative process]. Contemporary Psychology, 34, 895-897. Sternberg, R. J. (1998). Cognitive mechanisms in human creativity: Is varia­ ideas may evolve by following a process similar or even uleiiiii-iil to tin- tion blind or sighted? Journal of Journal of Creative Behavior, 32, 159-176. blind variation and selective retention that characterizes the evolution ol Walberg, H. J., Rasher, S. P., & Parkerson, J. (1980). Childhood and emi­ genes. In other words, ideas come into being through a plot ess ol liluul nence. Journal of Creative Behavior, 13, 225-231. variation. Only some of these ideas arc retained, liowcvci, lhiony.li n pio Watson, J. D. (1968). The double helix: A personal account of the discovery cess of selective retention. This basic idea has been IiiiIIki clulioi tiled by of the structure ofDNA. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Simonton (1997,1998), Findlay and Luinsden( I'JXKl.aml I iiinsdeiu !'»')«)i. Weisberg, R. W. (1994). Genius and madness? A quasi-experimental test of among many others (see also essays in Sicmbctj/ ,Kt KaiiltiMti. ,'IMII) the hypothesis that manic-depression increases creativity. Psychologi The second kind of model regards how crcaliviiy ilsell m;iy In: cal Science, 5,361-367. «P~~Sff ->q Weisberg, R. W. (2000). An edifice built on sand? [Review of Or/'-K&ijI J? an evolutionary phenomenon, for example, one that came aboul us a result of natural or even in particular sexual .selection (Millet, Vol 2 (1) Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts 2000; see also Feist, this issue, for a related view but one that contrasts strategies to solve problems, monitoring problem solving, and evaluating with Miller's). One possible such interpretation is that potential mates are problem solving. But they require these processes in different ways. more attracted to creative individuals because these individuals are more Intelligence, it seems, often requires these processes for solving prob­ interesting or successful; hence creativity is selected for. Of course, an­ lems whose definitions are conventional, such as how to adapt to a new other possible interpretation is that creative individuals disrupt societies, environment that is not much different from one's old environment (e.g., a so that creativity may be selected against if creative individuals are isolated new school, a new home, a new job). Creativity often requires these pro­ or worse. cesses for redefining problems that already have been defined in a particu­ In this article, I propose a third kind of evolutionary model, discussing lar way. For example, it might be used to see an existing business or per­ the role of creativity in the evolution of cultures and the societies that em­ sonal problem in a new way. Wisdom requires these processes to integrate body them. The basis for these ideas was first presented in Sternberg (2001). the functions of adaptation and shaping, in other words, to decide what The basic idea underlying this article is that all cultures—including the conventional aspects of the definition of a problem should stay, and what con­ cultures that comprise fields of knowledge—generate a dialectical process ventional aspects of the definition of a problem should go. (Hegel, 1807/1931) wherein intelligence represents a thesis, creativity an The research described above looked at interrelations in the functions antithesis, and wisdom a synthesis. of intelligence, creativity, and wisdom at an individual level. Might these The idea that cultures evolve and that some of them may have a selec­ constructs also be interrelated at a larger, cultural, level? Consider each tive advantage is obviously related to the idea that organisms evolve. Just construct in turn. as the genes of nonadaptive organisms eventually disappear, so do the Intelligence "memes" (Dawkins, 1976) of nonadaptive cultures disappear, or at least Although definitions of intelligence differ (Sternberg, 2000b), virtu­ become part of historical rather than contemporary life. Whole civiliza­ ally all of these definitions view intelligence as the ability to adapt to the tions, such as the Roman Empire, or, more recently, the Communist Em­ environment (see, e.g., "Intelligence and its measurement," 1921; Sternberg pire, rise and fall as their ideas either manage to adapt or do not. What role & Detterman, 1986, for multiple definitions of intelligence by experts; and does creativity play in the evolution of cultures? This article seeks to ad­ Sternberg, 1985b; Sternberg, Conway, Ketron, & Bernstein, 1981, for dress this issue. multiple definitions of intelligence by laypersons). Intelligent people are Background those who somehow acquire the skills that lead to their fitting into existing Intelligence, creativity, and wisdom are the "Big Three" of higher or­ environments. Some theorists believe that such skills are relatively do­ der functioning, and it long as been thought that there is some relation main general (e.g., Carroll, 1993; Jensen, 1998; see also essays in Sternberg between them. Sternberg (1985b, 1990c) reported a series of three studies & Grigorenko, in press), others that they are relatively domain specific investigating implicit theories of intelligence, creativity, and wisdom. (e.g., Ceci, 1996; Gardner, 1983, 1999; see also essays in Sternberg & In one study, 200 professors each of art, business, philosophy, and phys­ Grigorenko, in press). Still others believe that such skills have both do­ ics were asked to rate the characteristicness of each of the behaviors ob­ main-specific and domain-general properties (e.g., Sternberg, 1997a, tained in a pre-study from the corresponding population with respect to the 1999b). But these diverse views have in common the proposition that the professors' ideal conception of each of an ideally intelligent, creative, or skills constituting intelligence lead people, on average, to be rewarded in terms of whatever the reward structure of a society is. What is considered wise individual in their occupation. Laypersons were also asked to pro­ intelligent in one place may not be in another, as cultural psychologists vide these ratings but for a hypothetical ideal individual without regard to have appreciated in their studies of intelligence (e.g., Serpell, 2000). Intel­ occupation. Correlations were computed across the three ratings. In each ligent people are rewarded, on average, precisely because they adapt, and group except philosophy, the highest correlation was between intelligence often can adapt to multiple environments. and wisdom; in philosophy, the highest correlation was between intelli­ gence and creativity. The correlations between wisdom and intelligence Contemporary U.S. society is one of many societies around the world ratings ranged from .42 to .78 with a median of .68. For all groups, the that allocates resources in part on the basis of the perceived intelligence of lowest correlation was between wisdom and creativity (which ranged from its members. People easily can make the step from the existence of this -.24 to .48 with a median of .27). reward system to the justification of the reward system (as, I believe, did In a second study, 40 college students were asked to sort three sets of Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). But it is important to realize that it is no 40 behaviors each into as many or as few piles as they wished. The 40 coincidence that this system exists: Societies define intelligence largely on behaviors in each set were the top-rated wisdom, intelligence, and creativ­ the basis of individual differences to account for the fact that some people ity behaviors from the previous study. The sortings then each were sub­ are more successful in school, in life, or elsewhere, than are others. As jected to nonmetric multidimensional scaling. For intelligence, six com­ McNemar (1964) pointed out, a concept of intelligence, at least in the sense ponents emerged: practical problem-solving ability, verbal ability, intel­ of what has been measured by psychometric tests of intelligence, might lectual balance and integration, goal orientation and attainment, contex­ never have arisen in the absence of individual differences. Experimental tual intelligence, and fluid thought. For creativity, eight components psychologists historically have been less interested in intelligence than have emerged: connects ideas, sees similarities and differences, has flexibility, been differential psychologists, perhaps in part because of the former's has aesthetic taste, is unorthodox, is motivated, is inquisitive, and ques­ lesser interest in individual differences. tions societal norms. For wisdom, six components emerged: reasoning The mainstream culture of psychologists in the United States has come ability, sagacity, learning from ideas and environment, judgment, expedi­ close to equating intelligence with the abilities measured by g-based tests, tious use of information, and perspicacity. The overlap in the various com­ that is, tests that measure the analytical skills assessed by conventional IQ ponents suggests that intelligence, creativity, and wisdom are related, but it tests. If we look at intelligence as the ability to adapt, however, these skills is not clear from the data how or how much. may tell only part of the story of what properly constitutes intelligence. In a third study, 50 adults were asked to rate descriptions of hypotheti­ Another important aspect of intelligence may be a practical intelligence. cal individuals for wisdom, intelligence, and creativity. Correlations were Sternberg and his colleagues (see Sternberg et al., 2000; Sternberg & computed between pairs of ratings of the hypothetical individuals' levels Wagner, 1993; Sternberg, Wagner, & Okagaki, 1993; Sternberg, Wagner, of the three traits. Correlations between the ratings were .94 for wisdom Williams, & Horvath, 1995; Wagner & Sternberg, 1985; Wagner, 1987) and intelligence, .62 for wisdom and creativity, and .69 for intelligence and have taken a knowledge-based approach to understanding practical intelli­ creativity, again suggesting that intelligence, creativity, and wisdom are gence. Individuals draw on a broad base of knowledge in solving practical highly correlated in people's implicit theories, at least in the United States. problems, some of which is acquired through formal training and some of But the identities of the components of the second study as well as the which is derived from personal experience. Much of the knowledge asso­ levels of the correlations suggest that the highest correlation is between ciated with successful problem solving can be characterized as tacit. It is intelligence and wisdom, and that creativity is less related to either of them. knowledge that typically is not openly expressed or stated—it is acquired Sternberg (1997a, 1998a; Sternberg & Lubart, 1995) has also implic­ largely through personal experience and guides action without being readily itly suggested how intelligence, creativity, and wisdom may be related at articulated. the level of explicit theories. In particular, all three attributes require meta- The term tacit knowledge has roots in works on the philosophy of sci­ componential thinking (Sternberg, 1985b), that is, understanding and ence (Polanyi, 1966), ecological psychology (Neisser, 1976), and or­ controlling one's information processing. In particular, they re ganizational behavior (Schon, 1983), and has been used to charac­ quire recognizing problems, defining problems, allocating resourcesfilSjK 40 terize the knowledge gained from everyday experience that has an to the solution of problems, representing problems, formulating implicit, unarticulated quality. Such notions about the tacit quality Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) of the knowledge associated with everyday problem solving also are re­ Jar. The first exhibition in Munich of the work of Norwegian painter Edvard flected in the common language of the workplace as people attribute success­ Munch opened and closed the same day because of the strong negative ful performance to "learning by doing" and to "professional intuition" or "in­ response from the critics. Some of the greatest scientific papers have been stinct." rejected not just by one, but by several journals before being published. Research on expert knowledge is consistent with this conceptualization. For example, John Garcia, a distinguished biopsychologist, was immedi­ Experts draw on a well-developed repertoire of knowledge in responding ately denounced when he first proposed that a form of learning called clas­ to problems in their respective domains (Scribner, 1986). This knowledge sical conditioning could be produced in a single trial of learning (Garcia & tends to be procedural in nature and to operate outside of focal awareness Koelling, 1966). (see Chi, Glaser, & Fair, 1988). It also reflects the structure of the situa­ From the investment view, then, the creative person buys low by pre­ tion more closely than it does the structure of formal, disciplinary knowl­ senting a unique idea and then attempting to convince other people of its edge (Groen & Patel, 1988). value. After convincing others that the idea is valuable, which increases the Sternberg and his colleagues (Sternberg, 1997b; Sternberg & Horvath, perceived value of the investment, the creative person sells high by leaving 1999; Sternberg et al., 2000; Wagner & Sternberg, 1985) view tacit knowl­ the idea to others and moving on to another idea. People typically want edge as an important aspect of practical intelligence that enables individu­ others to love their ideas, but immediate universal applause for an idea als to adapt to, select, and shape real-world environments. It is knowledge usually indicates that it is not particularly creative. that reflects the practical ability to learn from experience and to apply that When we examine characteristics of highly creative people (see knowledge in pursuit of personally valued goals. Research by Sternberg Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Gardner, 1993; Ochse, 1990; Sternberg, 1988, and his colleagues (see e.g., Sternberg et al., 1993; Sternberg et al., 1995; 1999a), we find that they have attributes that do, in fact, set them in oppo­ Sternberg et al., 2000) has shown that tacit knowledge has relevance for sition not only with the society in which they live, but in particular, with understanding successful performance in a variety of domains. the people who best have adapted to the society in which they live. These Although analytical and practical intelligence are often contrasted with people often are independent to the point of being crowd-defying, stub­ each other (e.g., Sternberg et al., 2000), analytical (or academic) and prac­ born, obstinate, resilient, willing to surmount the obstacles, strewn in their tical intelligence have in common that their primary function in society is way, and tough. Indeed, many of the most famous psychologists have be­ one of adaptation to the environment. They thus fall into the domain his­ come famous by defying the crowd in their professional work (Sternberg, in torically suggested by theorists of intelligence as relevant to intelligence. press). On the very day this article is being written, an article has appeared Although many psychologists prefer to limit their definition of intelligence (Stolberg, 2001) describing the trials and travails of Jay Belsky, a psychologist to g, arguably, people high in practical intelligence are those who really whose research led him to the politically unpopular position that daycare may adapt best in terms of the conventional measures of "success" in society. encourage aggressive and other socially undesirable behavior. But of course Thus, these psychologists may be arguing for the importance of an attribute the same ideas apply beyond psychology. in which they themselves happen to excel, but from the standpoint of soci­ Linus Pauling's "valence-bonded theory transformed chemistry" ety, they are nowhere near the top in terms of societal prestige. In contrast, (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2001) represented a creative breakthrough top business executives and politicians may be and probably are, on aver­ that defied contemporary views in the field of chemistry. Some of Pauling's age, lower in g (at least if we are to judge by the SAT scores of Bush and other ideas, such as with regard to the structure of DNA (a triple helix) and Gore and especially Bradley, contenders in the 2000 presidential race), but with regard to the value of Vitamin C in fighting colds, also were crowd- the practical skills that have, in part, gotten them where they are have led defying, but the ideas were simply wrong, and hence their novelty was not them to the top of the societal prestige ladder. matched by their quality, with the result that they had a short half-life. Ironically, then, academic and practical intelligence, which are con­ Charles Darwin's evolutionary proposal not only turned many scientific trasted in the writings of many psychologists (including myself), serve more ideas on their head, but religious ideas as well (Gruber & Wallace, 2001). or less the same purpose—to grease the wheels of cultural adaptation. As a result, Darwin was vilified by many during his lifetime, and continues People high in both of them are perhaps in the best position to succeed in to be vilified by certain religious and other ideological groups today. Tho­ conventional ways, as is the case with doctors, lawyers, accountants, top mas Young's theory of light as a wave was so controversial that, from the consultants, and others who succeed within the traditional boundaries of standpoint of the physics of 1910, it might be viewed as a "negative contri­ the society. bution" (Martindale, 2001). Yet later it would be recognized that this prickly Creativity idea was in large part correct, because light has properties both of a wave Definitions of creativity, like definitions of intelligence, differ and of a particle. Amabile (2001) notes how the fiction of John Irving has (Sternberg, 1999b), but they have in common their emphasis on people's been described as " 'wildly inventive' " and as " 'bearing little similarity to ability to produce products that are not only high in quality, but also, novel. other recent fiction." " Similarly, Stephen Donaldson pulled off a unique Products fashioned by intelligent people are high in quality, but not neces­ combination in the world history of literature when he devised his Thomas sarily novel. Creativity thus seems in some way to go beyond intelligence. Covenant series on the basis of the combination of ideas of a character who Many highly creative individuals "defy the crowd" (Sternberg & Lubart, is a leper and an unbeliever (see Ward, 2001). Finally, in helping formulate 1991, 1995), that is, they produce products that are good but that are not Impressionism, Claude Monet changed what were the current constraints exactly, and often not even approximately, what other people expect or of the domain of painting by imposing his own novel ones, for example, in desire. This view implies that creativity is always a person-system interac­ dealing with "how light breaks up on things" (Stokes, 2001). tion: Creativity is meaningful only in the context of a system that judges it, Creative people often feel underappreciated and attacked for their and what is creative in one context may not be in another (Csikszentmihalyi, ideas (Sternberg & Lubart, 1995), which is to be expected because their 1996; Sternberg & Lubart, 1995). Hence, creativity must be viewed as a crowd-defying ideas are incompatible with conventional ways of thinking property of an individual as that individual interacts with one or more sys­ and vested interests. Many contemporaries are not thrilled to hear that not tems. For example, painters who originated the idea of painting Cubist only their work, but also the assumptions on which their work is based, are paintings, such as Picasso or Brach, were highly creative in a given time being questioned (Kuhn, 1970). The creative people are correct: Time and and given place, but might be viewed as less creative today because such again, their work and even they are attacked. What these individuals may an idea is no longer particularly novel. fail to realize, however, is their own role in producing these attacks: By Creative ideas are both novel and valuable. But, they are often rejected serving as an antithesis to one or more societal theses, they are essentially because the creative innovator stands up to vested interests and defies the creating not only their own work, but also, generating their own opposi­ crowd (Sternberg & Lubart, 1995, 1996). The crowd does not maliciously tion. An antithesis is, by its nature, oppositional. Thus, successful creativ­ or willfully reject creative notions. Rather, it does not realize, and often ity can provide a revolution in the evolution of ideas. does not want to realize, that the proposed idea represents a valid and ad­ Much of the greatest creative work is paradigm-rejecting (Kuhn, 1970), vanced way of thinking. Society generally perceives opposition to the sta­ or of a kind we have referred to as "redirecting" or "reinitiating" a field; ins quo as annoying, offensive, and reason enough to ignore innovative however, some creative work—not the kind highlighted in this article—is, ideas. in some respects, less novel, and basically forward-increments current ideas Evidence abounds that creative ideas are often rejected (Sternberg (Sternberg, 1998b; Sternberg, Kaufman, & Pretz, in press). Such & Lubart 1995). Initial reviews of major works of literature and art work is less likely to generate opposition, and its nature is closer to are often negative. Toni Morrison's Tar Baby received negative re-BaSsiff 41 that of work representing the products of intelligence: It is adap­ views when it was first published, as did Sylvia Plath's The Bell tive within existing paradigms, whether in science, literature, art, Vol 2 (1) Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts or elsewhere. Parents, teachers, supervisors, and others who appreciate leadership because they are likely to balance the need for stability (or adapt­ creative work are more likely to appreciate the forward-incremental type of ing to the environment) with the need for change (or shaping of the envi­ creativity that builds on existing ideas than they are to appreciate the redi­ ronment) (Sternberg, 1998a). recting or reinitiating kinds of creativity that defy existing ideas. Occa­ People can be intelligent without being wise. For example, they may sionally, though, people become known not for inventing new paradigms do very well in school and on cognitive tests but make a total mess not only (crowd-defying creativity) but for working extremely well within existing of their own lives, but of the lives of others (Sternberg, 1985a, 1997a). paradigms. Mozart would probably be a good example of someone whose Arguably, Robert McNamara, a principal architect of the Vietnam War, creativity was largely within rather than in defiance of existing paradigms. was more intelligent than he was wise. If much major creativity is defined by its antithetical, crowd-defying As Gardner (1993) has pointed out, many creative people also are not nature, what can be said about the psychological ingredients of creativity? wise, and they may even be foolish in their dealings with other people. The Clearly, intelligence is a prerequisite for creativity (e.g., Simonton, 1984), wise person must show, in some degree, both intelligence and creativity, because creative products are high in quality. As pointed out by Pauling but also show an emergent wisdom from their intelligence and creativity. (see Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2001), creative people not only gener­ If things go well, wisdom prevails, and some balance between the old ate a lot of ideas, but also analyze those ideas and discriminate (intelli­ and new is accepted, moving a field forward in its quest for knowledge and gently) between their better and their worse ideas. But beyond intelligence understanding. The ideal leader in science as in society is wise, blending and other abilities, creativity appears to be in large part a decision (Sternberg, the new with the old in the most skillful possible way. But the dialectical 2000a). The most traditionally intelligent people hope to lead the crowd by movement of intelligence, creativity, and wisdom never reaches a final point accepting the presuppositions of the crowd, but also by analyzing next steps (Kuhn, 1970). The nature of the dialectic is such that the synthesis be­ in thinking, and by reaching those next steps before others do (Sternberg, comes the next thesis, and ideas move forward to the next step (Hegel, 1998b). 1807/1931; Sternberg, 1999a). So the fate of ideas forms a spiral: The Highly creative people often decide, among other things, to redefine ideas of today's intelligence will be questioned by the ideas of tomorrow's rather than merely understand conventional definitions of problems (as, for creativity, only to be synthesized by the ideas of post-tomorrow's wisdom. example, did Monet), analyze their ideas (as did Pauling). They also at­ These ideas, in turn, will become the ideas of later intelligence, that still tempt to persuade others of the value of their ideas rather than expecting later will be questioned by creativity, and on the spiral will go through others readily to accept them (as did Darwin), take sensible risks (as has time. Author Notes; Preparation of this article was supported by Grant Irving in defying modern novelistic conventions), seek bizarre connections REC-9979843 from the National Science Foundation, by a grant from the between ideas that others do not seek (as has Donaldson), and realize that W. T. Grant Foundation, and by a government grant under the Javits Act existing knowledge can be a hindrance as much as it is a help in generating Program (Grant No. R206R00001) as administered by the Office of Edu­ creative ideas (as did Young) (Sternberg, 2000a). An implication of this cational Research and Improvement, U. S. Department of Education. Grant­ view is that creativity being, in part, a decision, is that anyone can adopt a ees undertaking such projects are encouraged to express freely their pro­ creative attitude (Schank, 1988) and think creatively. fessional judgment. This article, therefore, does not necessarily represent For a variety of reasons, however, people will not typically reach the the positions or the policies of the U.S. government, and no official en­ heights of the most creative individuals. Among these reasons are different dorsement should be inferred. degrees of compatibility between where people's thinking is and where a References field is at a given time in history (see Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2001). Amabile, T. M (2001). Beyond talent: John Irving and the passionate craft For example, someone who today spontaneously generates the ideas un­ of creativity. In R. J. Sternberg, & N. Dess, (Eds.). (2001). Special section of derlying Impressionism was perhaps born too late to have the impact that American Psychologist on creativity, 56(4), 333-336. Monet, Renoir, and other great Impressionists had at an earlier time. Campbell, D. T. (1960). Blind variation and selective retention in creative Creativity, then, in a sense serves as a dialectical antithesis to intelli­ thought and other knowledge processes. Psychological Review, 67, 380-400. Carroll, J. B. (1993). Human cognitive abilities: A survey of factor-analytic gence. People are regarded as high in intelligence by virtue of their suc­ studies. New York: Cambridge University Press. cessfully adapting to the customs of a society, whereas people are regarded Ceci, S. J. (1996). On intelligence . . . more or less (expanded ed.). Cam­ as high in creativity by virtue of their successfully shaping the customs of bridge, MA: Harvard University Press. the society. The most creative ones are the paradigm shakers who, at an Chi, M. T. H„ Glaser, R„ & Farr, M. J. (Eds.). (1988). The nature of ideational level, contribute toward putting the intelligent people "out of expertise. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. business." It is no wonder, then, that few societies genuinely reward cre­ Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1996). Creativity. New York: HarperCollins. ativity, much as they may talk about doing so. Creative people are a threat Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene. New York: Oxford University Press. Feist, G. (in press). Natural and sexual selection in the evolution of creativ­ to societies and a threat to the intellectual, social, and economic orders that ity. Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts. societies create. When a society wishes to create order, one of the first Findlay, C. S., & Lumsden, C. J (1988). The creative mind: Toward an evo­ things it may do is to suppress creativity, a disturbing trend seen through­ lutionary theory of discovery and innovation. Journal of Social and Biological out the world today, as in the past. Virtually every dictatorship suppresses Structures, 11, 3-55. creativity not for abstract or lofty reasons, but simply because creativity Garcia, J., & Koelling, R. A. (1966). The relation of cue to consequence in represents a threat to the dictatorial order. At the extreme, creative people avoidance learning. Psychonomic Science, 4, 123-124. are arrested and even persecuted, as has happened so many times both in Gardner, H. (1983). Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences. New York: Basic. history (e.g., Galileo) and in more recent times (e.g., Pasternak). Gardner, H. (1993). Multiple intelligences: The theory in practice. New York: Wisdom Basic Books. If people in a society were all intelligent but uncreative, the society Gardner, H. (1999). Intelligence reframed: Multiple intelligences for the 21st would not change in any dramatic way. At the same time, if people in a century. New York: Basicbooks. society were all highly creative, it might be difficult to establish any kind of Groen, G. J., & Patel, V. L. (1988). The relationship between comprehension societal order. As Kuhn (1970) pointed out, a field needs normal as well as and reasoning in medical expertise. In M. T. H. Chi, R. Glaser, & M. Farr revolutionary scientists, just as a society needs people who conform to (Eds.), The nature of expertise. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Gruber, H. E„ & Wallace, D. B. (2001). Creative work: The case of Charles greater or lesser degrees. The problem, in science as well as society, is how Darwin. In R. J. Sternberg, &N. Dess, (Eds.). (2001). Special section ofAmeri ­ to integrate intelligence, the adaptive force, with creativity, the transforma­ can Psychologist on creativity, 56(4), 346-349. tional force. Wisdom represents a third force that provides such an integra­ Hegel, G. W. F. (1931). The phenomenology of the mind (2nd ed.; J. D. tion. To be wise is to be both intelligent and creative, and to balance the Baillie, Trans). London: Allen & Unwin. (Original work published 1807) two. Herrnstein, R. J, & Murray, C. (1994). The bell curve. New York: Free Wisdom represents a synthesis of the thesis of intelligence (as tradi­ Press. tionally defined) with its antithesis of creativity. Wise individuals balance Intelligence and its measurement: A symposium. (1921). Journal of Educa­ tional Psychology, 12, 123-147, 195-216,271-275. the need for stability and continuity in human affairs with the need for Jensen, A. R. (1998). The g factor: The science of mental ability. Westport, change and revitalization. They thus are more divergent or legislative in CT: Praeger/Greenwoood. their style of thinking than are many intelligent people, but at the Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). same time more convergent and even conservative in their style of Chicago: University of Chicago Press. thinking than are many highly creative people (Sternberg, 1997c).|kwKJi[ 42 Lumsden, C. J. (1999).Evolving creative minds: Stories and mecha­ They are perhaps most effective and sought after in positions of! nisms. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Handbook of creativity (pp. 153-168). Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) New York: Cambridge University Press. Sternberg, R. J., & Wagner, R. K. (1993). Theg-ocentric view of intelli­ Martindale, C. (2001). Oscillations and analogies: Thomas Young, MD, FRS, gence and job performance is wrong. Current Directions in Psychological genius. American Psychologist, 56(4), 342-345. Science, 2, 1-4. McNemar, Q. (1964). Lost our intelligence? Why? American Psychologist, Sternberg, R. J., Wagner, R. K., & Okagaki, L. (1993). Practical intelligence: 19, 871-882. The nature and role of tacit knowledge in work and at school. In H. Reese & J. Miller, G. F. (2000). The mating mind: How sexual choice shaped the evolu­ Puckett (Eds.), Advances in lifespan development (pp. 205-227). Hillsdale, tion of human nature. New York: Doubleday. NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Nakamura, J., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2001). Catalytic creativity: The case Sternberg, R. J., Wagner, R. K., Williams, W. M., & Horvath, J. A. (1995). of Linus Pauling. American Psychologist, 56, 337-341. Testing common sense. American Psychologist, 50, 912-927. Neisser, U. (1976). Cognition and reality: Principles and implications of Stokes, P. D. (2001). Variability, constraints, and creativity: Shedding light cognitive psychology. San Francisco: Freeman. on Claude Monet. American Psychologist, 56, 355-359. Ochse, R. (1990). Before the gates of excellence. New York: Cambridge Stolberg, S. G. (2001). Another academic salvo from a "mommy wars" vet­ University Press. eran. New York Times, 150, April 21, A7. Polanyi, M. (1966). The tacit dimensions Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Wagner, R. K. (1987). Tacit knowledge in everyday intelligent behavior. Jour­ Schank, R. C. (1988). The creative attitude. New York: Macmillan. nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 1236-47. Schon, D. A. (1983). The reflective practitioner. New York: Basic Books. Wagner, R. K., & Sternberg, R. J. (1985). Practical intelligence in real-world Scribner, S. (1986). Thinking in action: Some characteristics of practical pursuits: the role of tacit knowledge. Journal of Personality and Social Psy­ thought. In R. J. Sternberg & R. K. Wagner (Eds.), Practical intelligence: Na­ chology, 49, 436-458. ture and origins of competence in the everyday world (pp. 13-30). New York: Ward, T. B. (2001). Creative cognition, conceptual combination, and the cre­ Cambridge University Press. ative writing of Stephen R. Donaldson. American Psychologist, 56, 350-354. Serpell, R. (2000). Intelligence and culture. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Hand­ book of intelligence (pp. 549-580). New York: Cambridge University Press. Simonton, D. K. (1984). Genius, creativity, and leadership. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Robert J. Sternberg Simonton, D. K. (1997). Genius and creativity: Selected papers. Green­ Yale University wich, CT: Ablex. The Yale Center for the Psychology of Abilities Simonton, D. K. (1998). Donald Campbell's model of the creative process: Competencies, and Expertise Creativity as blind variation and selective retention. The Journal of Creative P.O. Box 208358 Behavior, 32, 153-158. New Haven, CT 06520-8358. Sternberg, R. J. (1985a). Beyond IQ: A triarchic theory of human intelli­ gence. New York: Cambridge University Press. Sternberg, R. J. (1985b). Implicit theories of intelligence, creativity, and wis­ dom. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 607-627. Sternberg, R.J. (1988). The triarchic mind: A theory of human intelligence. New York: Viking. Sternberg, R. J. (1990c). Metaphors of mind: Conceptions of the nature of intelligence. New York: Cambridge University Press. Sternberg, R. J. (1997a). Successful intelligence. New York: Plume. Sternberg, R. J. (1997b). Tacit knowledge and job success. In N. Anderson & P. Herriot (Eds), International handbook of selection and assessment (pp. 201 - 213). New York: Wiley. Sternberg, R. J. (1997c). Thinking styles. New York: Cambridge Univer­ sity Press. Sternberg, R. J. (1998a). A balance theory of wisdom. Review of General Psychology, 2, 347-365. Sternberg, R. J. (1998b). Costs and benefits of defying the crowd in sci­ ence. Intelligence, 26, 209-215. Sternberg, R. J. (1999a). A dialectical basis for understanding the study of cognition. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of cognition (pp. 51 -78). Cam­ bridge, MA: The MIT Press. Sternberg, R. J. (Ed.) (1999b). Handbook of creativity. New York: Cam­ bridge University Press. Sternberg, R. J. (2000a). Creativity is a decision. In B. Z. Presseisen (Ed.), Teaching for intelligence 11: A collection of articles (pp. 83-103). Arlington Heights, IL: Skylight Training and Publishing Inc. Sternberg, R. J. (Ed.). (2000b) Handbook of intelligence. New York: Cam­ bridge University Press. Sternberg, R. J. (Ed.), (in press). Psychologists Defying the Crowd: Eminent Psychologists Describe How They Battled the Establishment and Won. Wash­ ington, DC: American Psychological Association. Sternberg, R. J., Conway, B. E., Ketron, J. L„ & Bernstein, M. (1981). People's conceptions of intelligence. Journal of Personality and Social Psy­ chology, 41, 37-55. Sternberg, R. J., & Detterman, D. K. (1986). What is intelligence? Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing Corporation. Sternberg, R. J., Forsythe, G. B., Hedlund, J., Horvath, J., Snook, S., Will­ iams, W. M., Wagner, R. K., & Grigorenko, E. L. (2000). Practical intelli­ gence in everyday life. New York: Cambridge University Press. Sternberg, R.J., & Grigorenko E. L. (Eds.), (in press). The general factor of intelligence: Fact or fiction. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Sternberg, R. J., & Horvath, J. A. (Eds.). (1999). Tacit knowledge inprofes- sionalpractice. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Sternberg, R. J., & Kaufman, J. C. (Eds.). (2001). The evolution of intelli­ gence. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Sternberg, R. J., Kaufman, J. C, & Pretz, Jean E. (in press). The creativity conundrum: A propulsion model of kinds of creative contributions. Philadel­ phia, PA: Psychology Press. Sternberg, R. J., & Lubart, T. I. (1991). Creating creative minds. Phi Delta Kappan, 5,608-614. Sternberg, R. J., & Lubart, T. I. (1995). Defying the crowd: Cultivat ing creativity in a culture of conformity. New York: Free Press. Sternberg, R. J, & Lubart, T. I. (1996). Investing in creativity. Ameri can Psychologist, 5^,677-688. Vol 2 (1) Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts I also want to thank Sarah Benolken for managing a very active Listserv for the Division. There have been a number of spirited exchanges. Finally, I urge you to attend the Business Meeting at APA (Saturday, 12-1) and the Social Hour. / look forward to seeing you there.

Message from the President Message from Past President Sandra W. Russ Robert J. Sternberg Case Western Reserve University Yale University It is an exciting time to be President of Division 10. There is an important It was a great pleasure to serve my year as President of Division 10. body of scholarship and research in the area of the arts and creativity. This During that year, I instituted a new service award to reward members of the work is certainly consistent with the positive psychology initiatives in the division whose service deserved special recognition (Stephanie Dudek was field today. The Division should be as active as possible in furthering this the first recipient), reconstituted the Newsletter as an expanded and more research, scholarship, and applications of what we know in practice. serious and scholarly Bulletin, and arranged with the American Psycholo­ Division 10 has benefited from the strong leadership of Robert Sternberg gist for a special section of the journal on creativity. I am happy to say that as President. His initiatives greatly improved the committee structure in this special section, edited by myself and Nancy Dess, has just come out in the Division and brought visibility to the Division with the special section the April, 2001, AP. I hope you will agree that it is marvelous. It marks the on creativity in the American Psychologist and by upgrading the newslet­ first time the journal ever has had a series of articles on creativity, and ter to a Bulletin. helps bring aspects of our field to the attention of the psychological public. Goals: The section also explicitly acknowledges Division 10 as having commis­ My goals as President are 1) to continue increasing the visibility of the sioned the section. The special section is unique in that each author writes Division, 2) to increase interaction between applied and research areas in a briefcase study, highlighting general principles of creativity by studying the arts, and 3) to increase student activity in the Division. At the last APA high levels of creativity in a single individual. I hope you all have read or meeting, I proposed establishing two Task-Forces. These proposals were will read this special section of AP and enjoy it. approved by the Executive Committee and by the membership who at­ Division 10 is a very special division. It is small and intimate, and the tended the Business meeting. people care about one another in a way I have not seen in my involvement One Task-Force is on Integrating Research and Applied Areas in Psy­ in any other division. It truly is a pleasure and an honor to be a part of such chology of the Arts. The chair of this Task-Force is Lauren Seifert. The a wonderful group of people. purpose of the committee is to find ways to bridge the gap between re­ I would like to say something about two new endeavors in which I search and practice. They will be reporting at the next APA meeting. became involved as your Past President. These endeavors have both been The second Task Force on increasing student involvement in the Divi­ very exciting for me. sion is still being established but will be in place for the APA meeting. First, I founded and am now Director of the Center for the Psychology New Developments: of Abilities, Competencies, and Expertise (PACE Center) at Yale. The Colin Martindale has been appointed as Editor of the Bulletin of Psy­ PACE Center is in a wonderful old house at 340 Edwards Street in New chology and the Arts. We are fortunate to have such an outstanding editor Haven, a house in which two presidents have slept (T Roosevelt and Taft). for our new Bulletin. Colin already has an exciting series of guest editors There are about 2 dozen of us at the PACE Center, with roughly half from in place for future issues. overseas and half from the United States. The Deputy Director is Elena The Executive Committee at APA (2000) voted for the following Grigorenko and the Assistant Director, Linda Jarvin. We have already had changes in the Bylaws: a few outside colloquium speakers, including Division 10's own Colin 1) The Newsletter would be upgraded to a Bulletin Martindale, and we have hired as a postdoc a Division 10 member (and 2) The ad hoc committees established by Bob Sternberg would be­ Martindale student), Jonna Kwiatkowski, who is directing a project on the come permanent standing committees (Awards, Fellows, Membership, nature of giftedness at different points in the life span. This project ad­ Nominations, and Publications) dresses questions such as why does someone who appears creative at one 3) The name of the Division would be changed to Society for the point in the life span often not appear so creative at another point? The Scientific Study of Aesthetics, Creativity, and Psychology of the Arts. Center welcomes visitors and has openings for postdoctoral fellows, just in These changes were supported by the members at the Business meeting. case any of you who are graduate students might be interested! Please see The issue of changing the name of the Division has been intensely our website at www.vale.edu/pace. discussed in recent years. There is a statement giving the rationale for this Second, 1 am running for APA President. 1 appreciated your voting for change by Colin Martindale in this issue of the Bulletin. I strongly support me for President of Division 10 and hope you will vote for me one more the change because I think it better reflects the activities of our members time, this time, for the Presidency of the American Psychological Associa­ and will attract new members to the Division who are active in the field. tion. I believe that you would find that, as President of the APA, I would Please let your opinions be known by getting in touch with members of the be in a unique position to further our interest in psychology and the arts. In Executive Committee or by discussing it on the Division Listserv. If you particular, a major agenda item for me, consistent with the goals of Divi­ are not already on the Listserv, Sarah Benolken (benolken(Siaol.com) can sion lOers, is to encourage the development of creativity (in the arts and put you on it. After we receive feedback, it (along with pro and con state­ also in other fields) in schools. I believe that schools do far less than they ments) will be put forward to the membership for a vote, along with the should to foster creativity. Something needs to be done! As some of you other changes to the By-Laws. may know, much of my research is devoted to understanding how best to Awards: develop creativity in school settings. And we also do interventions in Our awardees this year are: schools. Should I be elected, I would hope to use the APA Presidential Arnheim Award - John Kennedy platform to advance the agenda (which we currently pursue at the PACE Farnsworth Award - Colin Martindale Center) of teaching teachers how more effectively to teach for creativity. Berlyne Award - Co-awardees: Again, I want to thank you for having given me the opportunity to Todd Lubart serve Division 10. I hope not to disappear into the woodwork, and to Jonathan Plucker continue to play an active role in the affairs of a division I have All will be presenting addresses at APA. I want to thank Markj come to appreciate for its unique contribution to APA and to the Runco for chairing the Awards Committee. field of psychology and the arts. Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) Editorial for psychotherapy than are alternative mental-health professionals. When Colin Martindale the stakes are as high as they are in the field of mental health, psychologists should be the first point of call. In education, many programmatic reforms University of Maine are taking place in ignorance of advances that have been made in psychol­ It is an honor to have been asked to serve as editor of the Bulletin of ogy that could and should shape the reform agenda. About half of my work Psychology and the Arts. In establishing the bulletin, the Executive Com­ is in putting theory-based interventions into practice, and if elected, I will mittee of Division 10 took into account the fact that there are already sev­ strongly support both research and practice. eral journals devoted to psychology of art, aesthetics, and creativity. Un­ 3. Making the practice of psychology what it should be rather than fortunately, there is not a huge amount of research on these topics, so the what it has become. A first issue is prescription privileges for psycholo­ question arose as to whether yet another journal was needed. It was felt gists. I believe that, with proper training, psychologists should have such that a journal each issue of which was devoted to a specific theme of gen­ privileges. A second issue is managed care. Managed-care companies eral interest would be useful. At least for the moment, each issue of the have, in many instances, wreaked havoc on the quality of health care that Bulletin will be a guest edited special issue devoted to an area that the individuals can receive. APA needs to take a strong stance that psycholo­ Board of Editors and I hope will be of wide interest. In choosing themes, gists rendering treatment are the ones in the best position to decide what we tried to choose ones that members would be curious about but about kinds of care are needed and for how long. A third issue is the need for which they would not already be familiar and are not already well covered parity of insurance payments for mental and physical disorders. A fourth in readily available sources. Guest editors are needed because I don't know issue is removal of the stigma associated with psychological care. Many much about the chosen areas either. My function is to find guest editors people who need treatment do not receive it because they perceive a stigma who are experts in the area and will know the key people to invite to make to be attached to it. APA should take an active role in communicating with contributions. The excellent job that Greg Feist has done with the current the public regarding the benefits of mental-health care and help them real­ issue suggests that I chose wisely. Vol. 2(2) of the Bulletin will be on ize that there is no stigma associated with such care. The data are in: psy­ 'Psychotherapy and the arts' and will be edited by Paul Camic and Lawrence chotherapy helps! E. Wilson. Vladimir M. Petrov, Leonid Dorfman, and Elena Grigorenko 4. Advancing the Impact of Psychology on the International Scene. will edit Vol. 3(1) on 'Current Russian approaches to the study of art and Psychology has a great deal to contribute toward resolving problems on culture'. Topics under consideration for future issues include 'Current is­ the world scene. Americans need to work in collaboration with psycholo­ sues in philosophical aesthetics' and 'Beauty'. gists from around the world to help. APA should be committed to having I don't know anything about desktop publishing and would like to keep an impact not only in our own country, but also around the world at the it that way. Accordingly, Scarlett Davis has been appointed Associate Edi­ same time that we learn from people in all parts of the world. tor and Publisher. She did tell me the meaning of a number of esoteric technical terms such as kerning and leading. I forgot most of the defini­ tions but, since only experts know what they mean, have found that I can generally use such words without having the slightest idea of what they mean. We would like to thank an anonymous donor for a contribution that allowed us to have a color cover. We are also grateful to Fred and Sherry Ross for allowing us to reproduce some of the beautiful paintings in their collection. The front cover and grayscale paintings and drawings come Announcements from another private collection the owner of which allowed us to make Bulletin reproductions. We are. of course, most grateful. Please send Bulletin correspondence to: Colin Martindale Department of Psychology University of Maine Orono ME 04469 Email: Colin.Martindalefaiumit.maine.edu Division 10 Executive Committee endorses Items for the newsletter section should be sent to the email address. Bob Sternberg for APA President Such items will be included in the next issue if space is available. In announcing the endorsement, Division 10 Presi­ Division 10 Internet Resources dent Sandra Russ stated that "The Executive Com­ Members are encouraged to join the Division 10 Listserv. To join, send mittee of Division 10 endorses Robert J. Sternberg email to Sarah Benolken (benolken(S,aol.coml The listserv provides a valu­ for President of the American Psychological Associa­ able forum for ongoing discussions as well as announcements of interest to tion. He was a strong proactive leader of the Division members. who worked towards an integration of research, ap­ The Division 10 web site, managed by Jonathan Plucker, is at plications, and practice in the psychology of the arts, www.apa.org/divisions/divlO The site contains announcements of interest aesthetic, and creativity. He would be a highly effec­ to members, information about division awards, links to sites of interest, tive President of APA who would implement his vi­ listings of recent dissertations, books, and articles relevant to the division, sion." a version of the Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts, and information about When he became president of Division 10, Bob Sternberg had a set of the division including a downloadable and printable membership applica­ very specific goals, such as upgrading the Newsletter to the present Bulle­ tion form. If anyone has ideas about the site or information to be added, tin. He accomplished all of these goals not by fiat but by reaching a con­ contact Jonathan Plucker, Indiana University, 201 N. Rose Avenue, sensus with the Executive Committee, an informal advisory committee, Bloomington IN 47405 (Email: [email protected]). and the membership. Below is a brief summary of his goals for APA. We can be sure that this is not just empty rhetoric. He will work hard to achieve Proposed Bylaws Changes these goals (more detail can be found at www.yale.edu/rjsternberg): The Division 10 Executive Committee has endorsed the following 1. Unified Psychology. Psychology has become increasingly frag­ amendments to the Bylaws. Members will receive mail ballots in due course. mented and fractionalized. This fragmentation has occurred at a time in The listserv provides a nice forum for discussion of the proposed changes. which fields and approaches in psychology rely on each other more than 1. The word 'bulletin' should replace 'newsletter' throughout the by ever before. As a field, psychology needs to become unified rather than laws. Rationale: This is merely a formality. The Newsletter still further fragmented. exists but has been incorporated into the Bulletin. 2. Application of Psychological Theory and Research to Societal Health- 2. The ad hoc committees established in 1999 (see p. 48) should be Based and Educational Agendas. To increase our impact on society, made permanent and the current Committee on Nominations, Mem­ psychologists need to demonstrate the contributions they can makel|E3jflF 45 bers, and Fellows abolished. Rationale: The ad hoc committees to society. For example, clinical psychologists are better trained have worked very well. At present, the only official committee Vol 2(1) Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts of the division is the Committee on Nominations, Members, and Moscone Center - South Building Rooms 208/210 Fellows. This gives far too much work to a single committee. Chair: Donna C. Perone, Philadelphia, PA Apparently, this committee has had neither a chair nor members A Psychologist Looks at Contemporary Art (Focus 1945 to 2000) for a number of years. Stephanie Z. Dudek, Montreal, PQ 3. The name of the division should be changed from 'Psychology Art Students' Use of Compositional Balance for Creating Visual Displays and the Arts' to 'Society for the Scientific Study of Aesthetics, Paul J. Locher, Montclair State University Creativity, and Psychology of the Arts'. Rationale: The current Differences in Intensity of Emotional Responses to Film Special Effects name does not accurately reflect the interests of members of the Benjamin Meade, Joseph Anderson, William Evans, & Mitch division, whereas the proposed new name does. It is also felt Brian, Avila College that the new name will help in getting new members. Symposium: Jack Kcrouac and Isak Dinesen—Childhood Loss. Forthcoming Conferences Identity, and Creativity The 10th Anniversary Conference of the European Society for the Cog­ 8/24 Fri: 12:00 PM- 12:50 PM nitive Sciences of Music, Liege, Begium, 5-8 April, 2002. Information at Moscone Center - South Building Room 212 musicweb.hmt-hannover.de/escom/english.htm. Chair: Jerome L. Singer, Yale University The 19th International Conference on Literature and Psychology, Uni­ Jack Kerouac: Memories of Loss and Dreams of Perfection versity of Siena in Arezzo, Italy, 4-9 July, 2002. Information at Delmont Morrison, Mill Valley, CA www, clas. ufl.edu/ipsa/intro.htm. Isak Dinesen: Childhood Loss, Sexual Identity, and Creativity The 17th Congress of the International Association of Empirical Aes- Shirley L. Morrison, Mill Valley, CA thetics, 4-8 August, 2002, Takarazuka, Japan. Information at Poster Session: Psychology of Creativity and the Arts www.iaea2002.gr. ip or www.ume.maine.edu/~iaea. 8/24 Fri: 1:00 PM- 1:50 PM The 8,h conference of the International Association for the Empirical Moscone Center - South Building Exhibit Hall C Study of Literature, Pecs, Hungary, 21-25 August, 2002. Information at Cochairs: Donna C. Perone, Philadelphia, PA & Joanne Broder, Temple www.arts.ualberta.ca/igel. University Member News VDT Figurative Images Derived From K Factor John Kennedy's research on a blind painter was featured in "The Col­ Nikolaus Bezruczko & Ambra B. Vimercati, Chicago, IL ors of Darkness", a 45 minute documentary that won the Best Foreign Video Body, Self, Creativity, and Identity in Adolescent Female Dancers Award at the New York International Film Festival in December, 2000. He Libby B. Blume, Detroit, MI was also interviewed about his research with the blind in a 30 minute pro­ Using Creative Arts Therapies With Adults With Disabilities: A Two- gram on BBC 4 on February 21, 2001. Kennedy's work on picture percep­ Year Study tion and production by the blind was the focus of a Washington Post ar­ Miranda D'Amico, Anna Barrafato, Leland Peterson,& Denise ticle, "Unseen forces: what the blind draw", by Blake Gopnik that appeared Tanguay, Concordia University on April 29,2001. The article can be found at http://washingtonpost.com/ Mentoring: Applying a Systemic Model of Creativity wp-dyn/style/sundayarts/A9672-2001 Apr27.html. As noted elsewhere in Gregory C. Feldman, University of Miami the bulletin, John Kennedy is also the winner of Division 10's Arnheim Use of Projective Drawings to Improve Outcome With Latency-Age Boys award for 2001. John W. Getz, Christopher A. Petersen, & Candace R. Good, Pennsylvania State University College of Medicine The Art Renewal Center Self-Efficacy, Motivation, Learning, and Creative Accomplishment: The Art Renewal Center has a web site, www.artrenewal.org , that is A Product Inventor Study well worth having an extended look at. Its goal is to be the largest online Sheila J. Henderson, Mountain View, CA museum on the internet. It already has over 7,000 high quality images. Perceptions of Social Support Among Preprofessional Ballet Dancers Though primarily focused on 19th century academic art, it contains repro­ Elisabeth B. Morray, Maureen E. Kenny, & Melissa Van Horn, ductions of great art from all epochs. As well as images, the site has con­ Brighton, MA tains a number of interesting articles and will soon be hosting a forum for Origins of the Pictorial Representation of Man and Nature ongoing discussion. The primary goal of the Center is to foster a return to training, high standards, and quality in the arts and to combat the idea that Rafael Raffaelli, Federal University of Santa Catarina, Brazil anything an artist says is art—e.g., a Brillo box or a random pile of The Black Struggle: Metaphors of Depression in Styron's Darkness cinderbocks—is in fact art. It is at the forefront of the growing rejection of Visible modernism and call for a return to realism in the arts. Whether one believes Thomas J. Schoeneman, Katherine A. Schoeneman, & Selona that modernism is dying or already dead or not, the site is worth visiting. Stallings, Lewis & Clark College Entropy and Environmental Aesthetics Arthur E. Stamps III, Institute of Environmental Quality, San Francisco, CA Music Experience Questionnaire: Psychometrics and Analyses of Ethnic Differences Paul D. Werner, Alan J. Swope, Frederick J. Heide, Charles F. Matter, & Mandy Soland, Alliant University Invited Address DIVISION 10 PROGRAM > 8/24 Fri: 2:00 PM-2:50 PM 2001 APA CONVENTION '-" . Moscone Center - South Building Room 270 Chair: John M. Kennedy, University of Toronto Paper Session: Literature and Psychology */* / y" Pictorial Anomalies 8/24 Fri: 10:00 AM-10:50 AM ' " John Willats, The Gate House, England Moscone Center - South Building Rooms 208/210 Chair: V.K. Kumar, West Chester University of Pennsylvania Symposium: Theater and Performance—What Thev Tell Us About William Blake's Integral Psychology: Reading Blake With Ken Wilber Psychology Will W. Adams, Davis & Elkins College 8/24 Fri: 3:00 PM-4:50 PM From Hannibal to Huckleberry Finn: Mark Twain's Racial Reconstruction Moscone Center - South Building Room 238 Martin D. Zehr, Kansas City, MO Chair: Lois Holzman, New York, NY Tuesdays With Morrie: Teaching Physicians About Death Profound Drama Jeffrey M. Ring, Family Care Specialists, Los Angeles, CA Karl E. Scheibe, Wesleyan University Seven Principles of Improvisational Performance Relevant to Paper Session: Visual Art and Film the Practice of Psychology 8/24 Fri: 11:00 AM - 11:50 AM Jerry Gale, University of Georgia Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Vol 2 (1) Performing: The Human Activity Through Which We Grow Conversation Hour: Robert .1. Sternberg and Frank Farley—A Lois Holzman, New York, NY Dialogue With Audience Participation Discussant: Kenneth J. Gergen, Swarthmore College 8/26 Sun: 11:00 AM - 11:50 AM Social Hour Moscone Center - South Building Room 306 8/24 Fri: 6:00PM Robert J. Sternberg, Yale University San Francisco Hilton - Continental Ballroom 2 Frank Farley, Temple University Symposium: Everyday Creativity in a New Millennium—Personal Invited Address: Arnheim Award and Planetary Healing 8/26 Sun: 1:00 PM- 1:50 PM 8/25 Sat: 8:00 AM - 9:50 AM Moscone Center - South Building Room 276 Moscone Center - South Building Room 212 Chair: Sandra W. Russ, Case Western Reserve University Chair: Ruth Richards, Saybrook Graduate School Smart Pictures: Invisible Ties in Vision and Touch (Richly Illustrated) Creative Self-Concept: Ourselves as Open Systems John M. Kennedy, University of Toronto Ruth Richards, Saybrook Graduate School Enhancing Personal Creativity Risk Taking and Overcoming Obstacles Symposium: Fourth Annual APA Comedy Jam With the Near- Steven Pritzker, Saybrook Graduate School Stardom Plavers Creativity and Healing in Adulthood Women Challenging Breast Cancer 8/26 Sun: 2:00 PM - 3:50 PM Ilene Serlin, Saybrook Graduate School Moscone Center - South Building Room 308 Childhood Illness as a Turning Point for Creativity Chair: Frank Farley, Temple University Tobi Zausner, New York, NY Albert Ellis, Albert Ellis Institute, New York, NY How Creativity Can Help Heal the Earth Irene M. Deitch, Staten Island, NY Linda K. Riebel, El Cerrito, CA Charles L. Brewer, Furman University Discussant: Louise Sundararajan, Rochester, NY Robert J. Sternberg, Yale University Invited Address Symposium: Cross-Cultural Study of the Development of Artistic 8/25 Sat: 10:00 AM - 10:50 AM Giftedness Moscone Center - South Building Room 276 8/27 Mon: 8:00 AM - 9:50 AM Chair: Frank Farley, Temple University Moscone Center - South Building Room 274 Aesthetic Aspects of Scientific Inquiry Chair: Constance Milbrath, University of California, San Francisco Colin Martindale, University of Maine -~ Cross-Cultural Study of Artistic Talent and Creativity Susan M. Rostan, Woodbury, NY ' *• f -•£-'* Presidential Address Judging Artistic Ability: A Cross-Cultural Study of Gatekeepers 8/25 Sat: 11:00 AM- 11:50 AM David Pariser, Concordia University Moscone Center - South Building Rooms 228 and 230 Case Studies of the Purposeful Development of an Artistic Enterprise Chair: Frank Farley, Temple University Susan M. Rostan, Woodbury NY, & David Pariser, Concordia Affect and Creativity: Where Do We Go From Here? University Sandra W. Russ, Case Western Reserve University Creative Visualization: Constructing a Useful Theory of Artistic Giftedness Business Meeting Howard E. Gruber, New York, NY ' • --*•-> ' '' • v, 8/25 Sat: 12:00 PM- 12:50 PM Discussant: Constance Milbrath, University of California, San Francisco Moscone Center - South Building Rooms 228 and 230 Invited Address: Berlvne Award Chair: Sandra W. Russ, Case Western Reserve University 8/27 Mon: 10:00 AM - 10:50 AM Invited Address Moscone Center - South Building Room 274 8/25 Sat: 1:00 PM - 1:50 PM Chair: Mark Runco, California State University, Fullerton Moscone Center - South Building Room 270 Creativity: An Odyssey in Multivariate Space Chair: Frank Farley, Temple University Todd Lubart, University of Paris 5 Magical Number Seven Strikes Again: The Seven Styles of Creativity Why isn't Creativity more Important? Potential, Pittfalls, and Future V.K. Kumar, West Chester University of Pennsylvania Directions In Creativity Jonathan Plucker & Ronald Beghetto, Indiana University Conversation Hour: Albert Ellis and Frank Farley—A Dialogue With Audience Participation Symposium: Emotion and Aesthetics-Broaching the Heart of the Matter 8/25 Sat: 3:00 PM-3:50 PM 8/27 Mon: 11:00 AM - 12:50 PM Moscone Center - South Building Room 304 Moscone Center - South Building Room 274 Albert Ellis, Albert Ellis Institute, New York, NY Chair: Louise Sundararajan, Rochester, NY Frank Farley, Temple University Affective Foundation of Aesthetics Gerald Cupchik, University of Toronto, Scarborough Symposium: The Paintings of Fred Martin—A San Francisco Artist's Centra! Emotion and the Aesthetic Metaphor Methods Isaac Getz, Paris, France 8/26 Sun: 8:00 AM - 9:50 AM Twenty-Four Poetic Moods: Emotional Profiles of Creativity in Moscone Center - South Building Room 212 Chinese Poetics Chair: Will Wadlington, Pennsylvania State University Louise Sundararajan, Rochester, NY Critical Perspective: Fred Martin's Art of Abstraction and Hermeticism Discussants: Andrew S. Winston, University of Guelph & Anthony Will Wadlington, Pennsylvania State University Cascardi, University of California, Berkeley Curatorial Perspective: The Fred Martin Retrospective Philip Linhares, Oakland Museum of California Paper Session: Memory. Music, and Aesthetic Understanding Paintings Contain the Artist's Studio, Medium, Method, Body, and 8/28 Tue: 9:00 AM - 9:50 AM Mind Moscone Center - South Building Room 226 Fred Martin, San Francisco, CA Chair: Joanne Broder, Temple University Discussant: Craig E. Stenslie, Cocheco Valley Mental Health, Dover, NH Interpretation and Memorization: A Case Study of a Concert Pianist Roger Chaffin, Anthony Lemieux, & Gabriela Imreh, University Invited Address: Farnsworth Award of Connecticut 8/26 Sun: 10:00 AM - 10:50 AM Social and Aesthetic Elements of Music Preferences Moscone Center - South Building Room 272 Anthony Lemieux, University of Connecticut Chair: Sandra W. Russ, Case Western Reserve University Aesthetic Understanding as Informed Experience: A Model Observations on the Past, Present, and Future of APA Division 101 Richard E. Lachapelle, Concordia University Colin Martindale, University of Maine Vol 2 (1) Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Past presidents of Division 10 Officers of Division 10 Paul M. Farnsworth 1945-1949 President Norman C. Meier 1949-1950 Sandra W. Russ (2000-2001) Paul M. Farnsworth 1950-1951 Department of Psychology Kate Hevner Mueller 1951-1952 Case Western Reserve University Herbert S. Langfeld 1952-1953 Cleveland OH 44106 R. M. Ogden 1953-1954 Carroll C. Pratt 1954-1955 President-Elect Melvin G. Rigg 1955-1956 Frank Farley (2001-2002) J. P. Guilford 1956-1957 Department of Psychological Studies Temple University Rudolf Arnheim 1957-1958 Philadelphia PA 19122 James J. Gibson 1958-1959 Leonard Carmichael 1959-1960 Past-President Abraham Maslow 1960-1961 Robert J. Sternberg (1999-2000) Joseph Shoben, Jr. 1961-1962 Robert B. Macleod 1962-1963 Secretary-Treasurer Carroll C. Pratt 1963-1964 Constance Milbrath (1999-2002) Harry Helson 1964-1965 APA Council Representative Rudolf Arnheim 1965-1966 Clair Golomb (1998-2001) Irving L. Child 1966-1967 Robert L. Knapp 1967-1968 Members-at-Large to the Executive Committee Sigmund Koch 1968-1969 Stephanie Z. Dudek (1999-2002) Marianne L. Simmel 1969-1970 Paul Locher (2000-2003) Rudolf Arnheim 1970-1971 Ruth Richards (1999-2002) Frank Barron 1971-1972 Bulletin Editor Michael A. Wallach 1972-1973 Colin Martindale (2001-2003) Frederick Wyatt 1973-1974 Department of Psychology Daniel E. Berlyne 1974-1975 University of Maine Julian Hochberg 1975-1976 Orono ME 04469 Edward L. Walker 1976-1977 Joachim Wohlwill 1977-1978 Ad hoc Committee Chairs (2000-2001) Pavel Machotka 1978-1979 Awards: Mark Runco Ravenna Helson 1979-1980 Fellows: Mark Runco Nathan Kogan 1980-1981 Membership: Sarah Benolken Salvatore R. Maddi 1981-1982 Nominations: Colin Martindale Publications: Sandra W. Russ Stephanie Z. Dudek 1982-1983 Brian Sutton-Smith 1983-1984 Bulletin of Psychology and the Arts Henry Gleitman 1984-1985 Colin Martindale, Editor Dean Keith Simonton 1985-1986 Scarlett Davis, Associate Editor and Publisher Colin Martindale 1986-1987 Kenneth J. Gergen 1987-1988 Board of Editors Lawrence L. Marks 1988-1989 Sarah Benolken, New York NY Nathan Kogan 1989-1990 Paul Camic, Columbia College Margery B. Franklin 1990-1991 Diana Deutsch, University of California, San Diego Howard E. Gruber 1991-1992 Leonid Dorfman, Perm State Institute of Arts and Culture John M. Kennedy 1992-1993 Gregory J. Feist, College of William and Mary Robert S. Albert 1993-1994 Norman Holland, University of Florida Martin S. Lindauer 1994-1995 Paul Locher, Montclair State University Ellen Winner 1995-1996 Pavel Machotka, University of California, Santa Cruz Gerald C. Cupchik 1996-1997 Mark Runco, California State University, Fullerton Mark Runco 1997-1998 Dean Keith Simonton, University of California, Davis Louis A. Sass 1998-1999 Jerome Singer, Yale University Robert J. Sternberg 1999-2000 Robert J. Sternberg, Yale University Will Wadlington, Pennsylvania State University Ellen Winner, Boston College William Adolpht* Bouguereau - l.cs linhcnnna m. /.s / ///// // n,>ir of /•/,•

DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY Non-Profit UNIVERSITY OF MAINE U. S. Postage ORONO, ME 04469 PAID ORONO, ME PERMIT No. 8

xxxxxx/xxxxxxxxxxxftUTQxxGLL FOR ADC 07099 DR PAUL J LDCHER DEPT OF PSYCHOL MOWTCL.i--i.tr STATE UN.IU UPPER MOHTCLAIR H.J 07043-162499

iJ.iiijHiMhmJ.ii.Jim.ihnimi.l.iuiiiluiiluilili!