“Attempts at Decommunization in Russia Upset de-Stalinization” May 5, 2018 marked the 200th anniversary of Karl Marx’s birth. Whatever the attitude towards this philosopher, nobody denies that his heritage largely shaped the 20th century and that today’s demand for Marxist-related ideas is much above supply. What has happened to left- wing and Communist ideas following the collapse of the Soviet Union and how does decommunization influence societies? Russia in Global Affairs editor Alexander Solovyov discusses these and other related topics with Sergei Solovyov, editor-in-chief of Skepsis magazine. – What made Eastern Europe and some post-Soviet republics launch decommunization? – firstly, it is the ideological embodiment of what in eastern europe is commonly called “regime change.” a key element of a newly- invented myth of the fundamental break with the so-called Communist past, which is a clue to the legitimation of the new elite. This policy, as far as I can judge, is enforced more radically the stronger the real ties are between the elite’s nomenklatura and the previous political regime. a clear example of this is hungary, where the technocratic mid-level career functionaries began to insist (as soon as they laid hands on the previous regime’s property) on the most resolute ideological break with the country’s past. on this soil hungarian nationalism soared and Jobbik—the movement for a Better hungary party—emerged in the limelight … I should say that in hungary today we have what I would Sergei M. Solovyov is an Associate Professor in the Social Psychology Department at the Mos- cow State Institute of Psychology and Pedagogy. He is also Chief Expert of the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2018-16-4-186-205 186 RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS “Attempts at Decommunization in Russia Upset de-Stalinization” describe as a wildlife preserve of ideological reaction, determined to whitewash the darkest pages in hungary’s history on the pretext of decommunization. The way I see it, the situation in Poland is slightly different.l ustra- tion there was far more serious and the struggle over lustration was quite fierce, in particular, in the 1990s. But even there the Institute of National Remembrance has created its own ideological myth, and in doing so enjoys support from right-of-center and outspokenly rightist forces. If it is to be believed, Poland languished for a long time under the yoke of a Communist regime, utterly alien to the Polish people and Polish ethnic identity. That regime, they argue, was imposed by the Soviet union. Some bad guys—collaborationists—had agreed to work for that regime, so the mission of the Institute of National Re- membrance is to expose the criminal nature of that regime and let everybody see how very hostile it was to the rest of the Polish people. In other words, a pure snow-white image of a victim is contrasted to a no less pure dark image of enemies and butchers. The purpose of such schemes is not new. It can be seen very well in the events in ukraine, for instance: to distract attention from real problems stemming from the effects of an unbridled market economy, neoliberal economic reforms, the income gap between the overwhelm- ing majority of the population and the relatively small group of the mid- dle class and bourgeoise that made fortunes in the process of regime change. The wider the social gap, the more vigorous the discussion over historical identity, over the ethnic identity of historical memory. – Are these new elites somehow connected with the leaders of the dissident movement of the 1950s and 1960s? Is there any conti- nuity? Or are they a new generation who has decided to capitalize on the dissidents’ heritage? – It is hard to say anything for sure. In the Czech Republic, for instance, such continuity is far more obvious than in hungary. Po- land, I guess, is somewhere in between. The situation in Yugoslavia is totally different. In a sense, Yugoslavia stands far apart from com- mon logic, because the nature of the standoff we see there is totally VOL. 16 • No. 4 • OCTOBER – DECEMBER • 2018 187 Sergei M. Solovyov different. It’s between the nationalist ideology and the liberal, free market economic one. Whatever the case, at first there did exist such continuity, but at a certain point most of the classical dissidents faded into the back- ground—for reasons of age and also because their abstract system of humanitarian values did not fit in well with the new realities, where private commercial and concrete ideological interests mattered much more than they had wished or ever imagined. lustrations and disclosures in Poland were a very convenient tool of manipulation, in contrast to the situation of the early 1990s, when the process had just begun. In the Baltic states it all happened appar- ently in the same way, but the situation was more complex; firstly, due to the large Russian-speaking population and, secondly, because of far worse problems with becoming integrated into the european union, which entailed terrible migration, depopulation, and the elimination of ethnic identity. In particular, this is true of latvia. In situations like these, ideological manipulations are more valuable than the desire to discuss real problems and the second-rate status these countries have received in the european Community—the status of backyard and workforce donors. – Can these countries find a common language on the ground of decommunization? Can it be the platform for unification, or is it a means of creating a purely national identity? – first, it is all about creating a national, in some cases, national- ist myth—in hungary or, say, in ukraine. as any myth, it should be devoid of internal contradictions and look homogenous, while every- thing that does not fit in with it must be excluded in one way or an- other. But myths in differente astern european countries are different, of course. In their common past there had been too many conflicts, and it is far easier for them to build bridges of ideological (and not histori- cal) continuity. Poland, for instance, finds it far easier to do business with Germany than with ukraine, which now and then enters into fierce debates with Poland over the Wolyn massacre. 188 RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS “Attempts at Decommunization in Russia Upset de-Stalinization” here belong the conflicts and rifts betweene astern european countries that have no immediate anti-Communist implications. for example, Poland and Czechoslovakia fell victim to Nazi aggression during World War II, while hungary and Romania were among the aggressor states. Poland sees the idealization of the regime of Sanacja (Sanation) and resistance to what is regarded as joint aggression by hitler and Stalin in 1939. While hungary is idealizing the rule of hitler’s ally miklos horthy. even some monuments to him have been erected. This is not exactly the type of situation that is good for unity. on the contrary, outright schizophrenia is growing far and wide. Just consider what can be heard in hungary: We are against globalization, the horthy regime was not very bad at all, Jews are the enemies of the hungarian people, and the Soviet era is a gap in hungarian history (but at the same time we are reliable partners of modern Russia). It turns out that one concept is good for domestic use and a quite different one for foreign audiences. – Does Russophobia play any role in shaping new nationalist identity and if so, what is that role? In today’s Russia it looks like a favorite pursuit to look for and find Russophobia wherever possible. – I should say that in Poland, for instance, and to a large extent in the Baltic states, the Soviet union is portrayed as a reincarnation of the Russian empire. So is Putin’s Russia. This picture is logical and devoid of internal contradictions. It comes in handy for domestic use. The Baltic countries, latvia for instance, are discussing in full seriousness the risk of looming Russian aggression. Research being done by historians is seen as aggression, as ideological aggression, considered merely as part of preparations for military aggression. – It turns out that the fear of Russian aggression is a commodity and it sells well enough, right? It can be traded for a chunk of NATO aid… – Certainly. Preferences related to building an internal political or- der are unmistakably present here, too… overdoing it is just impos- VOL. 16 • No. 4 • OCTOBER – DECEMBER • 2018 189 Sergei M. Solovyov sible. any absurdity—however weird it may look—is highly welcome in the modern political context. even if one imagines that Russian- u.S. relations get better someday, the financing of the Baltic countries’ military and wider cooperation between Poland and NaTo (although there seems to be no place for it to grow further) will not end. These variables are utterly independent from each other. – These guys seem to have found a very convenient niche (which had never existed before) for interaction with Western Europe, a way of integration with its institutions and the sphere of its influ- ence by monetizing their status of potential victims? In other words, the peripheral countries have gained an opportunity to exploit this threat and, in this way, to earn preferences. Is that correct? – absolutely. and it happened a while ago. It is a rather stable pat- tern of relations. Back in the early 1990s there was far greater openness in this field and the proclaimed goal was cooperation with a demo- cratic Russia. But then there was a turn towards new isolationism (in no way related to the turn Putin’s Russia made).