Winning the Hearts and Minds
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Winning the Hearts and Minds Legitimacy in the Namibian border war Lieneke de Visser 3183823 Utrecht University 13 August 2010 A thesis submitted to The Board of Examiners In partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in Conflict Studies and Human Rights 0 Supervisor: Dr Mario A. Fumerton Date of submission: 13 August 2010 Program trajectory followed: Research and Thesis writing only (30 ECTS) Word Count: 22.645 1 Contents Acknowledgements 3 1. Introduction 4 2. Background of the Namibian border war 8 3. Doctrine and Implementation: An Assessment 12 3.1 International 13 3.2 Political 14 3.3 Military 17 3.4 WHAM 21 3.5 Conclusion 26 4. The Relationship between WHAM and Legitimacy 27 4.1 Winning Hearts and Minds 28 4.2 Legitimacy in Counterinsurgencies 30 4.3 Legitimacy and Coercion 34 4.4 Conclusion 37 5. Historical context 38 6. International context 42 7. Unity of effort 47 7.1 The Politicians 47 7.2 The Administration 52 7.3 The Police 56 7.4 Within the South African Defence Force 59 7.5 Conclusion 63 8. Conclusion 64 Bibliography 73 2 Acknowledgements I would like to thank all those who generously gave their time to sit through lengthy interviews and who shared their thoughts and insights on the Namibian border war with me. First and foremost they are the former members of the South African Defence Force, but also the writers and experts from the academic field. A special word of thanks to Dr. Abel Esterhuyse of the South African Military Academy who first suggested the idea of researching the Namibian border war. Apart from support and help, he suggested candidates for interviews, and in many cases put in a word on my behalf. I also wish to thank my supervisor, Dr. Mario Fumerton, for his unflagging enthusiasm, inspiration and well-placed advice. During my fieldwork in South Africa I was blessed with friends who helped me in every way they could, many thanks to you all. On the home-front I want to thank my children, family and friends who offered their support and encouragement. Finally, to the person who made it possible, my husband Deon, much love and gratitude. Lieneke de Visser Utrecht, August 2010 3 Chapter 1 Introduction Since counterinsurgency theories agree that the objective in an insurgency war is the support of the population, a focus on winning their hearts and minds (WHAM) makes intuitive good sense. The British counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya continues to serve as an example of how an insurgency may be defeated by winning the hearts and minds of the people. However, a reinterpretation of the British Malaya campaign by Paul Dixon (2009:368) showed that it was in fact highly coercive and sparked my interest in the subject of WHAM. Specifically my question was: does WHAM work at all? It proved to be the starting point for the research for this thesis. The reasons for choosing the Namibian1 border war as a case study were twofold. The first one being that it was an example of a recent counterinsurgency (1966 - 1989) where great effort was put into winning the hearts and minds of the people. The second reason was personal. Having grown up in South Africa and therefore being a native speaker of Afrikaans, this would facilitate my access to those who were involved in the war. In addition my husband, who served in the South African Defence Force and spent six tours of duty in Namibia, was an instant source of valuable information. The research was informed by three questions. A first question concerned the purpose and doctrine that underpinned efforts of the South African Defence Force (SADF) to win the support of the people. A second question was how WHAM strategies were implemented, and third, what sort of problems were encountered. During the research it became clear that many former members of the SADF regarded legitimacy, or lack thereof, as a serious problem for the South African authorities. Some of them were of the opinion that South African legitimacy was too compromised for WHAM to make any difference at all, and that the Namibian conflict was a colonial struggle that would not be over until the hated oppressor was thrown out. Others thought that although the SADF efforts at 1 At the time of the war Namibia was still known as South-West Africa. The name was changed to Namibia by the UN Security Council in 1968 and officially became the Republic of Namibia in 1990. Throughout this document the name Namibia will be used. 4 WHAM were comprehensive and sincere, and might well have been successful in the long run, they were hampered by problems that undermined the South African authorities’ legitimacy. Since legitimacy constitutes a belief within members of society that there are adequate reasons to voluntarily cooperate with authorities (Tyler 1997:323), this provided a link to WHAM doctrine, the essence of which is that authorities must provide the population with reasons to voluntarily cooperate. This leads to the premise that legitimacy is central to the long-term success or failure of WHAM. The concept of legitimacy has therefore been employed as an analytic frame by which to analyse and interpret the data gathered during the research. The purpose of this thesis then is to examine the role of legitimacy in winning the hearts and minds of the population during the Namibian border war. The relevance of the subject lies in the fact that the concept of legitimacy has been largely overlooked in counterinsurgency (COIN) theories and that it may provide a better understanding of the complexities that underlie cooperative behaviour in insurgencies. Of secondary relevance is that the research adds to the body of historical knowledge on the Namibian border war, which to date has focused mainly on details of military strategies and operations, and not on the role of the population in the war. Finally, the South African effort at WHAM may have lessons to teach in contemporary conflicts such as Afghanistan, where the allegiance of the population remains an elusive goal. Chapter outline Chapter 2 provides a short overview of the background against which the Namibian border war took place. A description of the territory, specifically the operational zone and its population, is followed by the history leading up to the war and the broad outlines of the conflict. Chapter 3 examines South African COIN doctrine in regard to the international, political, military and WHAM challenges that faced the South African authorities. As well as the doctrine, this chapter describes its implementation and offers the interviewees’ assessment of problems that arose and the success of the WHAM effort. Chapter 4 first examines the theoretical assumptions that underpinned WHAM doctrine and, since the interviews indicated that the problems that were encountered stemmed from a lack of legitimacy, the chapter relates counterinsurgency and WHAM doctrine to different dimensions of legitimacy. It follows with a short discussion on the salience of legitimacy in situations where insurgent coercion prevents the population from cooperating with authorities. 5 Chapters 5 till 8 delves deeper into the problems that were identified during the interviews. Chapter 5 and 6 rely largely on documentary research to outline a context of historical grievances and South Africa’s international lack of good standing. Chapter 7 deals with the lack of unity of effort that was seen to hamper WHAM efforts, especially between the SADF and the political authorities, the administrative authorities and the police force, but also within the SADF itself. Chapter 8 examines how factors like ethnicity, culture and race shaped the preconceptions the South Africans had about the Namibian population, as well as their expectations of the outcome of the elections upon Namibia’s independence. Finally, Chapter 9 offers a conclusion of the findings of the research and examines their relevance to the current conflict in Afghanistan. Methodology The field work for this thesis was preceded by exploratory interviews with experts on the background of Namibia, the Namibian border war, and the role of South Africa. Apart from delving into memoirs that have appeared since the end of the war, as well as the historical and military literature, my preliminary research included scrutinizing the known sources of South African doctrine at the time. Field research was done over a period of three months in South Africa. In the first place I was able to access the archives kept in the Documentation Centre of the SADF in Pretoria, where many documentary sources generated by the SADF during the war were available or could be declassified upon request. This provided important insights into South African doctrine, specifically as it regarded WHAM. In the second place I recorded in-depth interviews with twenty-nine former members of the SADF. These ranged from military leaders to troops and some of them were interviewed more than once. Where distances were insurmountable, five former SADF members agreed to answer questions by email. I also conducted expert interviews with South African academics and writers who have published on the Namibian border war or the SADF. This included interviews with seven staff members, some of them retired, of the South African Military Academy in Saldanha. In finding candidates for interviews I was assisted by Dr. Abel Esterhuyse, 6 also of the Military Academy. Further candidates were reached via the ‘snowball’ method, whereby interviewees often suggested candidates of interest and then made the first contact. Another source of data was the Missing Voices – Oral History Project of the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, where I had access to transcriptions of sixty-three recorded interviews with former SADF members on their wartime experiences.