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Despite the considerable attention United Nations (UN) peacekeeping has

received fiom scholars, the origins of it are still rnisunderstood. In Canada, the popular

perception for over forty years bas been that Lester B. Pearson invented peacekeeping in

1956 during the Suez Cnsis. Contrary to this, peacekeeping existed even before the

creation of the UN. Mile there is some suggestion that peacekeeping is an ancient

concept, more recent and familiar exarnples exist. One notable precursor to UN

peacekeeping was the League of Nations' Saarforce.

The Saarforce was an international force mandated to help keep law and order in the Saar Territory during the plebiscite of 193 5 that was to decide if the inhabitants wanted to join with France, Germany, or remain under the League. This force matched the modem concept of peacekeeping before it was even recognized.

This concept existed in the minds of the international community long before the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force. Pearson had knowledge of it as early as 1945 and actively supported the concept within the UN. ûthers also expresseci an understanding of the concept, some before Pearson and some independently fkom him.

The peacekeeping concept was a popular idea with a broad following. Therefore it did not spring fully formed fiom Pearson's mind during the Suez Cnsis in 1956 as popularly believed. While he did work hard to brhg it into the world that November, he was peacekeeping's midwife, not its father. Acknowledgements

"Are you done yet?"

This thesis would not have been completed without the support and

encouragement (and sometimes nagging) of a number of people. Special thanks go to

my partner in life - Tara Crouse, my family, the Crouse family for generously allowing me unlimited access to their cornputer, and the Smith family for their hospitaiity, rwm and board during my research trip to Ottawa.

This thesis would not have attained the level of quality it has without the support of many others. Professor David Charter provided coaching and extensive proof reading. The Inter-Library Loans ofice were invaluable to the research for this paper, as were the staff in the Government Documents section at the Harriet Irving Library.

The staff of the Directorate of History for the Department of National Defence and the staffat the National Archives of Canada were also very helptiil. A thanks also goes to the faculty and staff of the Hiaory Departments of both the University of New

Brunswick and St. Thomas University, and the Center of Conflict Studies at W.

iii Table of Contents

Abstract

Ac knowledgements

Table of Contents

Introduction

1 What is Peacekeeping?

2 Ancestry ?

The League of Nations and the Saarforce, 1934-35

3 Lester B. Pearson and the Peacekeeping Concept, 1930-55

4 Descendent:

Creation of the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956

Conclusion

Bibliography Introduction

The Lester B. Pearson International Auport, Lester B. Pearson High School, the

Lester Pearson Schofarship Fund, the Pearson Peacekeeping Center. The name Lester

B. Pearson adorns the title of many public buildings and institutions in Canada- Over a

quarter of a century afier his death, many Canadians cm still identie the name and the

significance it holds. The reason for the popularîty of this man, more than any other

single reason, is the perceived contribution he made to international peace.

Canada invented peacekeeping in 1956 when Lester Pearson, then Secretary of State for Externaf Anairs, went to the United Nations during the Suez Crisis, personally took charge of the Canadian delegation, and came up with the suggestion which saw troops deployed to the Middle East to help supervise the cease fire put into place as a stopgap masure in response to the crisis.'

Alex Momson made this statement in his opening remarks to Peacekeeping '93, a combined acadernic conference and tradeshow. At the time he was the Executive

Director of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, and the following year he founded the Pearson Peacekeeping Center. Morrison, a retired Canadian Army officer, was simply re-stating the conventional wisdom about Pearson and peacekeeping. And he was not alone. One year Iater, at Peacekeeping '94, David Collenette, the Canadian

Minister of National Defence, made a similar assertion: Canada has always been a prominent player in UN missions, with Canadians serving in the first mission back in 1947. Then in 1956 came the Suez intervention force. This was the first time the terrn 'peacekeeping' was used, and it resulted fiom an idea developed by the Honourable Lester B. Pearson, who later became Prime Minister of canada.'

Other members of Canada's governrnent have also attributed the creation of the

peacekeeping concept to Pearson. At a conference in 1995, Govemor General Romeo

Leblanc said, ". .. it was a Canadian, Lester B. Pearson who developed the modem

concept of peacekeeping that the Blue Helmets embodied for the past four decades."'

Members of the rnilitary also have accepted Pearson's role uncritically. Former

Canadian Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, himself a peacekeeper for several decades,

claimed 'the whole idea of using lightly-med forces to keep belligerents apart was

developed by a Canadian, Lester Pearson.. . the strategy worked, and the concept of UN

peacekeeping as we know it entered our vo~abular~."~

Members of the media also have adopted this truism. Paul Lewis, a UN

correspondent for the New York Times recentiy stated that "peacekeeping is found

nowhere in the UN Charter. Its invention is credited to.. . Lester Pearson and Secretary-

-- - I Alex Momson, TheChanging Face of Peacekeeping" in The Chanp3np: Face of Pacekee~ing, Russ Tychonich and Susan McNish, ed. (Toronto: nie Canadian Wture of Strategîc Smîies, 1993), p. 6,

2 David Collenette, "Openhg Address by the Honourable David Collenette, Minister of National Defence," in nie New Peacekee~innPartnershiv? Aiex Monison, ed. (Cornwallis, NS: Pearson Peacekeeping Center. 19941, p. 3.

3 Romeo Leblanc, "Message of His Excellency the Governor General of Canada," in Peacekee~inn18 15 to Todav: Proceedines of the XM Collmuium of the International Commission of

4 Lewis MacKem-e, Peacekeemr, Road to Saraievo. (Toronto: Douglas and Mchtyre, 1993), p. xiy see also p. 29, General Dag ~ammarskjold."~In John McQuarrie7s collage of photographs on

peacekeeping, a caption reads: "It was the beginning of a new type of soldier the world

would corne to know as Peacekeepers - and this would earn ME Pearson the Nobel

~rize."~

Indeed, these perceptions of Pearson can easily be traced back to his being

awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957. It is believed that the Nobel Cornmittee received a remarkable eighteen to twenty nominations for Pearson fiom various national and international institutions whose representatives witnessed his performance during the Suez crisis.' When it was announced tbat he had won, the Globe mid Md made claims like ". .. no one at the UN disputes the importance of the role Mike Pearson played during the critical days of early November. Pearson, long an energetic and resourceful negotiator, was fafher of the UN Emergency Force. Perhaps the initiative of the Canadian diplornat in proposing the creation of UNEF, more than any one factor, pointed the way to the cease-tire."' At a dinner held in his honour after retuming from

Norway with the award, Pearson received lofty praise fiom Sir Leslie Munro, the

President of the UN General Assembly. He labeled Pearson's proposal for a peacekeeping force "the most imaginative plan that any man in the post war era has conceived. Mr. Pearson is not only a Canadian but one of the world's foremost citizens s Paul Lewis, "A Short History of United Nations Peacekeeping," in Saldiers for Peace, Barbafa Benton, ed (New York: Facts on File hc., 19%), p. 30.

6 John McQuame, Between the Lhes: Canadians in the Service of Peace. (Toronto: MacMillan Canada Ltd., 1993).

7 Terence Robertson, Crisis; The inside Storv of the Suez Conmiracy. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd, 1964), p. 335,

8 Italics added by the author. See "Many Years a Peace-Maker, Rewived Nobel Nod for Egypt Peace Role," Globe and Mail, 15 October 1957, p. 10. of the ~orld."~Mer this dimer, admiren and autograph-seelcers reportedly swarmed

Pearson-

These perceptions of Pearson as the 'inventor' of peacekeeping can be excused

in light of the comments that he himself made.

The Secretariat found little in their files concerning collective measures which might give a lead on how to proceed. It was a new course on new ground. Some experience could be drawn tiom earlier activities of the military observers groups but no rdprecedent existed for a major, genuinely United Nations military operation-. - Lit] was the first of its kind in history.10

Thus, a mythology of sorts has arisen around Canadian involvement with peacekeeping.

Monuments have been built to honour peacekeepers, their images adom Canadian currency, pichire books have been published, and a centre has been established to study peacekeeping and train peacekeepers fiom around the globe. At the head of this peacekeeping mythology is its 'creator'. In a nation whose culture, unlike Our American neighbors, shuns most attempts to recognize national heroes or idolize personages, especially politicians, Pearson bas proven to be a rare exception. Virtual sainthood has been thmst upon him.

Jack Granatstein noted that ". ..virtually everyone in Canada had basked in the glow of Pearson's Nobel Prize. This was widely interpreted a sign of Canada's new maturity in the world, and in a curious way that is extraordinarily dificult to trace, peacekeeping became Canada's metier."" Many have noted this strange sense of pride

9 "Nobel Judges Award Pearson 1957 Pace Prize," Globe and Mail, 20 December 1957, p. 1.

10 Lester Pearson, "Keeping the Peaœ," in The Ouest for Peaœ, Andrew Cordier and Wilder Foate, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1%5), p. 104.

II J. L. Granatsteùi, "Peacekeeping: Did Canada Make a Differenœ? And What DiEerence Did Peacekeeping Make to Canada?" Foreign Policy and National Securiw pp. 318-9. Canadians take £iom peacekeeping. A Senate Committee investigating the issue

summed up the official viewpoint on peacekeeping's value for Canada:

Historically Canada has justifiai its activity in peacekeeping as an expression of an overarching policy of helping to maintain international peace and security.. . secunty now encompasses stability and economic well-being, as well as more traditional military considerations. Although striving to promote international security certainly contains elements of altmism, it is anchored in two quite pragmatic considerations of fùndamental importance to Canada's own Security. Fust, widespread respect for the rule of law makes the world safer and more predictable. Second, Canadians will be more secure if Canada is a stable and prosperous society within a cornrnunity of stable and prosperous societies. '*

Professor David Cox, testieing before this committee, put it in even simpler terms than that. The image of a "responsible intemationaIist state", that cornes with peacekeeping involvement, increases Canada's influence "across the broad range of international diplomatic negotiations."'3

For the average Canadian, however, the explmation for public enthusiasm for peacekeeping is much simpler. While it is certainly useful and a 'good' thing to do, to the average person on the Street peacekeeping served to uniquely identiQ Canada to

Canadians and the world. Granatstein makes this point, among others, in his article cited earlier. Dunng an era where Canadian society seemed to be under constant assault fiom foreign investors and Arnerican culture, and Canada seemed to ofien toe the line drawn by its superpower neighbour, peacekeeping was something we could do that the

United States could not.14 "Peacekeeping made us different f?om our Wends and

12 Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Afiairs. Meeting New Challenges: Canada's Remonse to a New Generation of Peacekee~ing.(Ottawa: Senate of Canada, 1993), p. 24.

13 bid, p. 25.

14 Granatstein, pp. 3 5 1, 3 52. neighbours. And while that was a gmd thing, it also had about it something of the anti-

Americanism that is part and parcel of our identity."" Or, as othenuise stated, "the

Yanks fought wars, Canadians said, .. . while Johnny Canuck kept the peace."'6

As Canada's love Haïr with United Nations peacekeeping continued, it is clear that the myth-making did as well. It is easy to over-emphasize the importance of something the public wants to hear and accept. A man with a medal is easily made a hero. Soon it is ditnailt to separate myth fiom reality, and the media, govemment, and scholars inadvertently report that myth as reality.

Did Lester B. Pearson 'invent' peacekeeping in November 1956 at the United

Nations Emergency Session on the Suez Crisis? Was he its 'father', as XI many

Canadians have fervently believed? The simple answer is no. The idea or concept of peacekeeping had been around for a long time. Some have attempted to trace it back several centuries.'' As a practice, it certaînly had been around even before the creation of the United Nations. Pearson did not invent peacekeeping; he merely proposed the impiernentation of a solution that already existed within international experience. It must be acknowledged that he worked tirelessly to lobby support for the idea and assisted UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold in the paperwork that wouid acnially create it on the UN'S books. Yet, while Pearson did play an important, even a leading role in the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and deserved much credit for his work, his role has been overstated in Canadian lore. He was peacekeeping's 'midwife', not its father.

15 Ibid., p. 352.

16 Ibid., p. 350. This thesis will show that peacekeeping did exist, both as a concept and as a

practice, long before Pearson ever proposed it in the UN. It will be demonstrated that

peacekeeping, as the UN would come to practice it, actually had existed since 1934 when the League ofNations sent an international force to police the plebixite in the

Saar temtory between France and Germany. Within the halls of the UN the concept of peacekeeping had existed since the organizat ion's inception. Pearson himselt: it will be shown, çomprehended the concept long before 1956, and that many others shared this concept with him. Finally, Pearson's personal role in the creation of peacekeeping in the UN during the Suez Crisis will be detailed to show that he was not a one-man team, but worked with many individuals to bring about the creation of the UNEF.

In the end it will be revealed that Pearson did not invent the concept of peacekeeping. Rat her, a group of like-minded individuals, of which Pearson was one, formed a specific force for a specific mission. In doing so they utilized a concept that had long existed and provided a solution for the crisis at hand. Pearson proved to be a just the Ieading figure in this endeavour because of his reputation, position, and efforts in this area of interest. Therefore, it was for Pearson's efforts in promoling this sobrion, not for its creariori, that he received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957. in the words of Dr.

Gunnar Jahn, chairman of the Nobel Cornmittee, Pearson had won ". .. because of his personal qualities, his powerful initiative, strength and perseverance displayed in attempting to prevent or limit war operations and to restore peace in situations where

If Thomas Arnold and Heather Rdand, "The 'Prehistory' of Peacekeeping," in Soldiers for Pace, Barbara Benton, ed. (New York: Faas on File hc., 19%), pp. 10-23. quick, tactfiil and wise action has been necessq to prevent unrest spreading and

developing into world-wide confiagration."'*

1 am unaware of any studies where evidence of the previous existence of

peacekeeping concepts and experience, and the role Pearson really played, bave been

brought together in an attempt to examine critically the origins of the Pearson myth.

Accurate, detailed accounts do exist of Pearson's actions in November 1956, but without

the evidence that peacekeeping prevïously existed (even in the mind ofPearson), his

accornplishments are easy to exaggerate, either on the part of the author or the reader.

Likewise, accounts exist of the practice of peacekeeping before 1956, but they have

been largely ignored since they did not link the creation cf peacekeeping to the UN.

Only when the two are brought together does it become possible to challenge the common perception that Pearson was the father of peacekeeping.

To accomplish this end, several key sources will be utilized. In examining the al1 too often neglected existence of peacekeeping practices before 1956, most notably the 1934 mission to the Saar, this study relies on a mix of secondary and published pnmary sources. David Wainhouse's Peace Observations is one of the few secondary sources that delves extensively into the peacekeeping experience both inside and outside of the UN, including that which existed before it in the League. His exhaustive list of case studies of particular missions includes the force sent to the Saar and provides a thorough overview of the mission.

Sarah Wambaugh's neSaar Piebiscite is the most authoritative, although dated, examination of the temtory, the force, and the plebiscite. An expert on plebiscites, she

18 Lester Pearson, Four Faces of Peace. (Toronto: McCleUand & Stewart Ltd., 1W), p. 3. was the technical advisor and Deputy Member of the Saar Plebiscite Commission,

which was responsible for conducting the plebiscite itself

The Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) offers another detailed and dated account of the territory and plebiscite in their article "Relations Between France and Germany Over the Saar". The RIIA is also responsible for another valuable source,

Donrmenis on InfenxztionulAfli 1934, which contains many speeches, reports, and other primary sources surrounding the creation of the force sent to the Saar.

The final key source for this section is the published report of the Commander in

Chief (CinC) of the international force, British Major-Generai J.E.S- Brind. After the plebiscite was held and the troops retumed home, Brind wrote a report for the League of

Nations and the British War Office summing up the mission he led in the Saar. This report included copies of al1 orders issued to the Saarforce, and evaluations of what the

Force did and how it could be improved upon should another international force be raised in the kture. Only published once - in 1968 - this incredibly rich document had remained ignored or umoticed by al1 but an occasional book on peacekeeping.

To tackle the development of the peacekeeping concept in Pearson's mind, and in that of others, again a range of sources is used. One of the best biographies of

Pearson is the two-volume work by John English. Thorough and extensive, it complements very well Pearson's own memoirs, which are also employed here.

English's latter volume is increasingly important in light of the fact that Pearson's last two voIumes remained unfinished afier his death and were finished and edited by his research assistants John Munro and Alex Inglis. Still, Pearson's first volume, and several chapters of the second and third volumes (including those rnost pertinent to this thesis) were written by him and do give good account of his thoughts and actions before,

during, and afler 1956, and remain an indispensable source.

Pearson's personal papers, held at the National Archives of Canada (NAC), and

the files of his statements and speeches at the Department of National Defence's

Directorate of History and Heritage, proved incredibly valuable. These sources offered

insights into the thoughts and beliefs of Pearson through confidentid or classifieci

correspondence with various diplomats, dipitaries, and niends, speeches, reports, and

Cabinet meetings. These were indispensable when it cornes to showing that Pearson and

others shared a concept of peacekeeping yean before it brought fniition in the field

under the UN.

These persona1 papers, departmental papers, and biographies are also used to

trace Pearson's actions and endeavours to bring about the creation of UNEF in 1956,

and to demonstrate that he did not do this alone. Here, however, two more sources are exploited. The published UN resolutions, reports, and letters of agreement surrounding the creation of UNEF are found in Basic Documents on United Natiom and Related

Peace-Keeping Forces. Paired with Gabriella Rosner's general account of UNEF, they tell the story of its creation and existence.

Together, these sources support the thesis that Pearson was not the father of peacekeeping, only the midwife of a specific UN force. What 1s Peacekeeping?

As of 1 December 1997, the United Nations (UN) had undertaken no Less than

47 peacekeeping operations since its creation in 1945. In fact, the number of missions in recent years had increased markedly (27 since 1990)~' The term peacekeeping has almost become synonymous with the UN. It is not surprising, then, that peacekeeping has become one of the moa popular topics for scholars on international &airs. Books have been written on every major UN operation, on key figures of the UN and international community involved with peacekeeping, on national involvement in missions, and most notably, on the future of peacekeeping.2

Despite the enormous attention peacekeeping has received, in many respects it remains an enigma. For example, despite the numerous missions deployed by the UN, and the wide array of studies on the subject, peacekeeping remains a vaguely defined term. While everyone recognizes and understands what peacekeeping is, but no

1 These statistics were obtained ftom the international Peacekeeping Organimtion, which can be found on the United Nation's Homepage on the World Wide Web. See wwwunorg.

2 For examples of what the îûture might or should hold see Lincoln Blmmfïelâ, et al, Intemational Militarv Forces (Boston: Little Brown, lm),pp. 6 18433; Larry Fabian, Soldiers Without Enemies (Washington, D.C.: Broobgs Institution, 1971), pp. 2254û; Henry Wiseman, ed,Peacekeqhq; Appraisals and Rowsals (Toronto: Pergamon Ress, 1983), pp. 341-428; David Waùihouse, International Peace Obsewations (Baltimore: John Hopkins Ress, 1%6), pp. 618-33; Michael Harbottle, The Blue Berets (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1971)- pp. 124-8. consensus exists on its definition. The UN, the most recognized and prominent peacekeeping institution, has never attempted to define it. To quote Teny Mays, "there seems to be as many definitions comected to multinational military operations mandated by international organizations as there are definitions for the international relations term 'power'. Few seem willing to accept the definitions offered by ~thers."~

The ongins of the tem are not entirely clear. It was not included in the UN

Charter. It did not exist during the UN'S early experience with observer missions or, significantly, its expenment in 1956 with UNEF. Most likely the term 'peacekeeping' came into comrnon use as a convenient label for the new endeavors that the UN was undertaking in the late 1950s and early 1960s; it served as an easy way for the media and academics to refer to these types of operations.

One of the main reasons for a lack of consensus on a definition is that peacekeeping is a general term that has been applied to a wide variety of situations. The fact that no two missions are ever the same only adds to the difficulty of applying a single definition. Despite this, however, academe has persistently tried to define peacekeeping, and each individual that does has only served to contribute to this lack of consensus. It is not the purpose of this chapter to define or redefine the term. A brief exploration of a few definitions of peacekeeping and other related terms will be attempted. As well, this chapter will identi@ the various duties and functions of a peacekeeping force. This will provide the reader with a basic understanding of the peacekeeping concept, which is central to the argument that it existed before 1956 and did not spring, hlly formed, fiom the mind of Lester Pearson.

3 Terry Mays, Historical Dicu'onarv of Intemational Peacekeepinq. (Lenham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1996), p. .&. Peacekeeping is a genenc term, and can be compared to the term 'car'.

Everyone knows what a car is and recognizes one on sight, but it is a very vague term.

Does a car have two or four doors? What size is its engine? How many passengers can

it accommodate? How big is it? Because cars corne in so many difEerent shapes, sizes,

colours, and made for different purposes, the term had been subdivided to ailow for

clarification. People now buy and drive compacts, sub-compacts, coupes, sedans, or

hatchbacks. Even within these categories, however, there is variation. Take any two

models fiom the same category and you will discover they are not the same. So it is

with peacekeeping. Each mission is made in an ad hoc fashion to fit individual

situations with their own unique charactenstics. Hence, each mission and force is unique,

The United Nations' homepage on the World Wide Web contains a glossary of related tems. Examination of these terms reveals an organized structure in how such missions compare to each other or are categorïzed. The overall encompassing term is

Peace Opera~ions,which is defined as "peace support operations [includes preventive deployment, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, diplomatic activities such as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-building, as well as humanitarian assistance, good offices, fact-finding, electoral assistance]."4 Before exploring the definition(s) of peacekeeping, some attention must be given to these other terms. These terms are often associated or confuseci with peacekeeping. These terms either refer to efforts of a diplomatic or military nature, they occur at different stages of a conflict (Le. before, during, or afler), and they differ in their methods, so they tw must be defined so that one can differentiate between them. The following chart, Table 1, depicts the terms

included under peace operations as tools that can be applied during various stages of a

Table 1' Conflict Stage Tools Pre-War Preventive Diplomacy Preventive Deployment Wartime Diplornatic Peacemaking Peace-Enforcement Post-War Peacekeeping Peace-Building

Preventive diplomacy and preventive deployment are two tools the UN has

employed to keep a conflict fiom starting. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali

stated the foiiowing about preventive diplomacy: "The most desirable and escient

employment of diplomacy is to ease tensions before they result in conflict -.. Preventive

Diplomacy requires masures to create confidence; it needs early warning based on

information gathenng and informal or formal fact-finding; it may also involve

preventive deployment and, in some situations, demilitarized zone^."^ As Ghali noted,

this diplomatic action to stave off conflict can be undertaken alone or in conjunction

with a relatively new concept, preventive deployment. Mays defines this term as "a

proposed concept in which a threatened party could request the dispatch of a United

Nations rapid deployment force. [. ..] In theory, the fielding of this rapid deployment

force would serve as a barrier and deter aggression."' The UN has deployed such a

- 5 This chart is a modification by the author of a similar chart found in Donaid Snow, Peacekee~ing.Peacemakiag and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in rhe New Intemtiod Order. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Smtegic Studies Institute, US Anny War College, 1993), p. 20.

6 Boutros Boutros-Ghalï, An Agenda for Peace. (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. 13.

7 Mays, pp. 112-13. force, its first, in Macedonia to prevent the spread of the conflict in the former

~ugoslavia.~

Peacemaking and peace-building are two more diptomatic actions that can be

undertaken alone or accompanied by military action. Peacemaking generally ocairs

during a conflict and can be defined as diplomatic "action to bring hostile parties to

agreement, essentialiy through such peaceftl means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of

the Charter of the United ~ations."~Meanwhile, peace-building is diplomatic action "in

the aftermath of conflict; it means identifying and supporting measures and structures,

which will solidi& peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order

to avoid a relapse into conflict; often involves elections organized, supervised or

conduaed by the United Nations, the rebuilding of civil physical infiastructures and

institutions such as schools, hospitais, and economic re~onstniaion."'~The UN recently

mounted a major peace-building operation in Haiti. "

Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace-building cover al1 diplomatic action before, dunng and after a conflict, and hence suggest slightly different objectives for these actions. Military action, usually in conjunction with its diplomatic counterpart, also has different tools for the three stages of a confiict. Preventive deployment has been already covered, which comes before a confiict can occur. The other two are peace-enforcement and peacekeeping. These two terms were once conftsing and their

8 Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Codict, Preventing Deadlv Conflict- (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997), pp, 39,64,65.

II Raben Maguire, et al, Haiti Held Hosta~e:International Re-mes to the Ouest for Nationhood, 1986 to 1996. (Providence, RI: Thomas J Watson Jr. Instinite for international Studies, 19%), pp. 64-81, distinction oflen blurred. Renewed interest in peace-enforcement, however, since the

end of the Cold War and the enforcement operations in Iraq, Somaiia, and Bosnia has

given rise to improved clarification of the differences between these two concepts.

Mays uses the definitions adopted by the United States Department of Defense for these

two terms. Peace-enforcement is "military intervention to compel compliance with

international sanctions or resolutions designed to maintain or restore international peace

and ~ecurity."'~Military personnel in this type of operation go beyond the neutral

stance of peacekeepers by using force to restore and rnaintain peace. This was the case

in the Gulf War (1991), Somalia (1992-93), and Bosnia (1995). The UN mission to the

Congo (1960-64) evolved into this type. Peacekeeping, on the other hand, is "military

operations, undertaken with the consent of al1 major belligerents, that are designed to

monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing tmce agreement in support of

diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to a dispute."'3

Donald Snow makes a special effort to point out the fùndamental distinctions

between peace-enforcement and peacekeeping, of which there are basically two. First,

enforcement usually occurs during a conflict and involves the use of force, whereas

peacekeeping usually occurs after fighting has ceased and the use of force is strictly

Iimited to self-defensdlast resort situation. Second, enforcement does not require the

12 Mays, p. 108.

13 The US Department of National Defense rnakes a distinction, however, between Traditional Peacekeeping and Aggrmated Peacekeeping, This latter terrn is defined as "miliîary operations undertaken wiih the nominal consent of al1 major belligerent parties, but which are complicated by subsequent intransigene of one or more of the belligerents. poor conunand and coritrol of belligerent forces, or conditions of outlawry, banditry, or anarchy. In such conditions, peacekeeping forces are normally authorized to use force in selfdefense, and defense of the missions üiey are assigned, which may include monitoring and facilitahg implementation of an esisting tmce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement, or supporthg or safe guarding humanitanan relief efforts." See Mays, pp. 2, 108. consent of the parties involved, and in fact is often undertaken against the wishes of orie

or more parties, while peacekeeping requires the consent of the parties; peacekeeping

forces are not intended or designed to fight their way id4 For this reason, enforcers are

not perceived as neutrai, but neutrality is a key characteristic of any peacekeeper. One

other difference might be noted, however. Peacekeeping missions usually remain under

the direct controt of the UN, while every enforcement mission to date (except the UN

operaiion in the Congo) has been directed by a single nation or group of nations with

UN sanction." In Korea, the Gulf War, and Somalia, the United States played the

leading role. NATO has been the 'lead agency' in Bosnia since the summer of 1995.

As cm be seen, peacekeeping operations are just one tool of many that the

international comnity has at its disposal for addressing the existence of conflict.

Normally, it is applied only during a specific stage of a conflict (after it is over),

aithough in some cases, as in the former Yugoslavia, it has been inserted while

hostilities are still ongoing. The value and effectiveness of peacekeeping in such

circumstances has been the subject of some debate. l6 Peacekeeping, like peace

operations, can be subdivided and applied to a wide variety of international situations.

The UN'S glossary notes that there are two basic types of peacekeeping operations or

PKOs: peacekeeping and observer forces. " While peacekeepers are lightly armed and

can use force for self-defense, and so place themselves in danger to keep opposing sides

separated, observers are unarmed and can only monitor a cease-fire and report to the UN

14 Snow, pp. 2 1-29.

1s See www. unoralde~tsldpko/raa.him

16 For example, see Snow, pp. 19,2 1-9.

17 Sec wwtv.unordde~ts/d~o/~1~/~.hbn any violations; unlike peacekeepers, observers themselves don? prevent conflict, they

only furnish information to the diplomats who can Another difference is size. Most

observer missions consist of only a few dozen military off~cers,while peacekeeping

forces often reach into the thousands complete with support elements.

While observer missions are now ofien equated with peacekeeping missions, the

original architects of UN peacekeeping drew a distinction between the two. As noted in

the introduction to this thesis, Pearson was aware of the previous existence of observer

missions, but felt that UNEF was a new type of force for which there was no precedent.

Hammarskjold also believed that the type of peacekeeping missions UNEF would corne to represent was a new departure fiom the previous observer forces." Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, the term peacekeeping will not refer to unarmed observen. But since observer missions preceded UNEF,and involved using international forces to contain conflict, it seems reascnable to conclude that they were precedent setting and a format ive experience.

Just as there is a lack of consensus in a definition for peacekeeping, so too is there a lack of consensus in what it encompasses. In a 1993 article John MacKinlay and larat Chopra claim that Secortd Get~emtiottPeacekeeping (Le. peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War) can undertake a variety of tasks ranging from observation of cease-fires to enforcement action. lg However, these authors apparently fail to understand the clear distinction between peacekeeping and both observer and enforcement missions. Another misleading aspect of this article is their distinction

18 Andrew Cordier, ed, Public Pamof the Secretary-General of the United Nations. v.2, Dag Hammarskiold 1953-1956. (New York: Cotumbia University, 1%9), pp. 690- 1. between the Second Generation and Traditional Peacekeeping, which the authors

describe as peacekeeping during the Cold War, concerned primarily with cease-fire or

tmce supervision between nation states. Tasks they associate with the Second

Generarion were in some instances conducted by earlier missions dunng the

'traditional' period. For example, maintenance of law and order was conducted by the

mission sent to the Saar in 1934, and humanitarian assistance was provided by the

missions to the Congo in 1960 and Cyprus in 1964.

The UN'S glossary notes nine basic functions any peacekeeping force can be

assigned. The first basic fiinction can be to assist in the maintenance of a cease-fire or

tmce. Tasks here can include the separation of combatants, verification of cornpliance

with agreements, creation of buffet zones and monitoring troop movements or

withdrawals. These activities were common in the Cyprus operation. The second is

demobilization and reintegration- This usually occurs in civil war situations within a

state. Besides demobilizing combatants, help is provided through money, tools,

agricultural supplies, etc. to assist them in retuming to normal lives." UN forces

undertook these tasks in Haiti and ~ambodia~'

Disarmament is the third basic fiinction. Often, but not always, carried out in

conjunction with the previous fbnction, it involves the actual collection, storage andor

destruction of weapons. Fourth is the funaion of protecting the delivery of

humanitarian assistance (such as food, medicine and special services) while a conflict is

- - -- 19 John MacWay and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations," Washinrrton Ouarterly, v. 15 (Juiy 1993), pp. 1 16-17.

21 Maguire, pp. 62-3;Karl Fanis. "UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On Balana, a SUC-," Parameters, v.21 (Spring 1991), p. 43.

19 ongoing, as was the case in Bosnia and Somalia. Another fiinction cornes in the form of

electoral assistance through advice on electord laws, organizing and supervising election, observing election campaigns, bdloting and tallying results." This represented a major part of the UN'S operations in EL Salvador and ~arnbodia?

Peacekeepers can also be assigned the task of comrnunicating with local inhabitants about their treatment by governments, police, or others in positions of authority or power. This investigation and reporting on aliegations of violations of human rights such as violence that is directed at individuals based on ethnicity, race, religion, politics, or gender is the sixth ftnction. In some cases - as in the UN'S mission to Haiti - it cm also include 'institution building', the improving of policing and justice adrnini~tration.~~

Another fitnction includes the specific task of monitoring and reporbng on actions by local police to encourage respect for human rights, advise and train new police forces, and build the confidence of the public in these forces. The UN undertook this in Haiti and in Bosnia. The eighth deals with the clearance of mines (a major task in Bosnia and Cambodia) and the last is cooperation with regional organizations?

A single peacekeeping mission can include just one of these tùnctions, or it may include several in any number of combinatiow. Since each situation is unique, the force supplied is equally unique to address that particular situation. What tasks are assigned

?2 Ibid

23 Farris, p. 43; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The United Nations and El Salvador. 1990-1995. (New York: United Nations, 1995), pp. 36-7,506

24 Ibid. to a force will consequently affect its size, composition, and deployment. Because these peacekeeping forces do so many different things in each case, and each force is so uniquely tailored, one can begin to understand where there is confision about the exact nature of peacekeeping.

Despite the wide variety of fùnctions, and their unlimited combinations that can be assigned a force, there is consistency in how these tasks are carried out. Every peacekeeping force begins with a mandate. A draft document on peacekeeping domine by the Canadian military describes a mandate as "a resolution passed by the Security

Council or General Assembly (for a CM operation) or the treaty (for a non-UN operation) which provides the legal authonty for the operation. R creates and details the role and tasks of the force."26

Another important aspect of every peacekeeping mission is that it obtains the consent of the parties involved. A peacekeeping force is not intended to be a fighting force, and by obtaining the consent of those involved, peacekeepers should not find themselves in a position where they must fight. This points to another common feature of al1 peacekeeping forces: their impartiality. "The impartiality of the UN and other international organizations and of each peacekeeper, must be genuinely displayed at ail times. Al1 dealings, whether operational, administrative or even social, must be conducted without favour to either side or any single point of view. A peacekeeper must appear and act in a neutral manner by consistentiy displaying patience, restraint, cooperation, and fairne~s."~'Consent could not be obtained fiom the parties involved if

26 CFP 30 l(3), Peacekming Operations - First Draft, (Ottawa: National Defenœ Headquariets. 1992), p. 1-8/22.

27 %id,p. 1-12/22. they felt a force was going to conduct their mission in a biased fashion. Nor could their

continued cooperation or consent be rnaintained if a force did take sides in a dispute.

To help maintain this air of irnpartiality and maintain consent to the force's

presence, aU peacekeeping forces can only use force as a last resort, usually for self-

defense. "Solutions to conflias are not imposed by force ofarms."" The use of tact,

restraint, mutual respect, diplo macy and reasoning i nstead serves to strenghen the

peacekeeper 's credibi~it~."

The final characteristic that ail peacekeeping forces are supposed to share is the

right to tieedom of movement. "A force which cannot move to the required areas to conduct its assigned tasks will not be successful in accomplishing its mandate. This fundamentai must be recognized, implemented and jealously guarded to ensure mission suc ces^."'^ This was a problem in Bosnia, where consent for the UN'S operation, and thus for its Ereedorn of movement, was fiequently disputed by local combatants.

Despite the lack of an official definition for the te- and the numerous unofficiai definitions, peacekeeping can be generall y recognized by certain common characteriaics. Peacekeeping itself is just one of many tools under the umbrella concept of peace operations. It is best designed to secure or maintain peace fier a cease-fire or truce has been called, and is done usually in conjunction with diplornatic efforts to establish a permanent peace where the force may no longer be needed. Peacekeeping is neither an observer mission nor an enforcement mission, but rather lies between the two.

It can be inserted into a wide variety of international crises and can be assigned just one

29 International Peace Academy. The Peacekeemr's Handbook (New York: Parp.mon Press, i984), pp. 38. task or several, depending on the circumstances. This is one of the major reasons every

peacekeeping force is so different fiom the next. Despite the wide range of tasks that

can be undertaken, al1 are accomplished with generally the same methods: a mandate, consent of the parties involved, impartiality, the use of force as a last resort, and the fieedom to do their job without interference.

These are the general aspects of the peacekeeping concept. Any international miiitary force that meets these guidelines can delybe referred to as a peacekeeping force. In the next chapter such an international force will be described in an effort to demonstrate its cornpliance with these guidelines. Articulating exactly what peacekeeping is will also be of assistance in Chapter 3, where the argument will be made that the concept existed long before the creation of UNEF.

M CFP 30l(3), p. 1-1 1/22. 2

Ancestry? The League of Nations

and the Saarforce, 1934-35

Contrary to popular perception, peacekeeping is not a recent invention created by

the United Nations, but is probably as old as war itseK It is only recently, however, that

peacekeeping has appeared in a form recognizable to the architects and students of

peacekeeping today. After the First World War, the 'war to end ail wars', the League of

Nations was created. The League was the first tmly international organization designed to achieve and maintain peace and security.

Very early on in its existence the League began considenng the use of international forces to aid in the settlement of disputes and maintain or restore peace. In

1920-21 Poland and Lithuania were preparing to go to war over the city of Vina near their border. In an attempt to settle the dispute peacefully the League made extensive plans to hold a plebiscite in the city to decide which countv would gain it- in conjunction with this, preparations were made to deploy an international force of 1500 troops to occupy a buffer zone between the two countries and police the plebiscite itself

This was potentially the first peacekeeping force in the modem, accepted sense; however, due to objections fiom Lithuania and the Soviet Union, it failed to materialke.'

The League attempted again to estabiish an international force in the dispute

between Peru and Colombia in 1932-34 over a district calleci Leticia. In this case a

Governing Cornmission, established by the League for the temtory, made use ofa force

comprising 75 Colombian soldiers placed under its control for 1 year wit! the consent of

both Peru and Colombia This expehent proved a success. Fighting ce& and

negotiations ended with Leticia being awarded to Colombia- This force, whiie

successfÙ1, fds to meet the essential cnteria of a modem international, impartial,

peacekeeping force. Later, however, the League did create a peacekeeping force in the

modem sense. This was the international force sent to the Saar in 1934.~

The Saar basin was an area between Germany and France nch in coal and iron

deposits, and heaviiy industrialized. Once a part of Gemany, the Treaty of Versailles

ceded possession of the mines to France as payment for darnages infiicted on mines in

Northern France during the war and as credit towards reparations owed by Germany.

Since the population was almost entirely German and not likely to welcome French rule,

it was agreed that possession of the temtory be handed to the newly created League of

Nations in the Treaty of Versailles. Under the supervision of the League an International

Governing Commission was created to adrninister the temtory, consisting of a member from France, the Saar, and three more fiom countries other than France or Germany.

1 The potential Vilna operation and the actions of the League in Leticia are examined in Wainhouse's book dong with 12 other cases where the League undertook some fom of action to preserve or restore peace, In many of these cases national militaries were involved, either as advisors, observers, or peacekeepers. See David Wainhouse, Inteniational Peace Observations (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1%6), p. 15-19,64-8. Mer hfteen years a plebiscite was to be held to determine ifthe Saar would continue

under international rule, or unite with either France or ~emian~.'

Despite some initial problerns, by the 1930s the Saar was the benefactor of very

effective administration by the Goveming Commission. As a result, the Saar was one of

the most prosperous and peacefbl places in Europe. W1th the population being

predominantly German, t here was little doubt about the evenhral plebiscite' s outcorne, or

that any transition would occur without problems. This changed with the rise of Hitler

and the Natis in 1933.'

The rise of the Nazi party in Gemany cast some doubt on the peaceful retum of

the Saar to the Fatherland. The Nags reigned with terror. Saarlanders watched as the

Nazis bat, murdered, and imprisoned their opponents. The Nazis were also openly

hostile towards the Catholic Church, which did nothing to increase their popularity with the Saarlanders, most of whom were devout Catholics. Any return to Hitler's Germany, moreover, meant abandoning any aspirations for democracy, the lack of which was also one of the few crîticisms anyone had of the League's de. AU these factors created a conflict in the minds of Saarlanders between their conscience and their patiotism- It was no longer certain that the Saar would choose to retum to ~erxnan~.'

3 Wainhouse, p. 20; Royal Insiitute of International Afîairs, "Relations E3et-n France and Germany Over the Saar," in Survev of International AfEairs (London: O.dord University Press, 1935), pp. 578, 580-5.

4 Wainhouse, p. 23; RUA, "Relations", p- 590-

5 Wainhouse, p. 23; F.P. Walters. A Historv of the Leamie of Nations (London: Ozdord University Press, 1960). p. 587. Obviously, to have even a sizable miaonty vote agaiast rejoining Germany would have been a senous blow to Hitler's rule. To ensure a Gerrnan victory in the plebiscite the Nazis resorted to the same campaign of nationalkm combined with terror that had so successfùliy catapulteci them into power in Gennany. Gerrnan press and radio began broadcasting threats of what awaited anti-Nans, Jews, and Comrnunists derthe plebiscite when Nazi Gemany gained wntrol of the temtory. The Nazis dso spread rumors of impending nots and dernonstranons. As weU, the Nazis actively recnUted a force of young Saarlanders, estimated at between ten and sixteen thousand, gave them some para-military training in Germany, and positioned them near the Saar border. The

Nazis did ail of this to intirnidate or scare the generai population in an attempt to prevent them hmresisting Nazi designs on the temt~r~.~

With the intimidation tactics of the Nazis so prominent, they soon became a concem of the Goveming Commission, which was responsible for order in the temtory.

In a report of September 1933, the Commission stated:

Indeeâ, any impartial observer of Saar political life dunng the last quarter wiIl have noticed that the National Socialist Party has been making every effort to gain control of the whole of public life of the Saar The National Socialist Paqis carrying on more or less unscrupulous activities in al1 spheres of public and private life in the Saar, waging an incessant campaign of threats, denunciations, and disguised boycotting against inhabitants of the Temtory suspect4 of not sharing its political ideas. Reckless in its choice of the methods of imposing its will, the National Sociaiist Party never hesitates to make it clear that any persons who oppose it will be made to pay heavily for their present attitude after the plebiscite, and has aroused the opposition of other political parties that refuse to subrnit: the result has been an increase in acts of violence and terrorism.'

6 Wainhouse, p. 23; Walters, pp. 587, 59 1.

7 This quote was taken hma book written by Sarah Wambaugh. Ms. Wambaugh, an expert on

27 As tirne went on, aiam in the Saar continued to increase with the morsthat the Nazis were preparing a Putsch, an armed rebeiüon to takeover the territory, like that organized in Austria by the Nazis during the summer of 1934.'

In reality, Hitler was becoming les enthusiastic about a coup in the Saar.

Opinion polis were showing only minor opposition to union with Gennany, so there was no need to mate a rebellion if the planned plebiscite could provide the desired redts.

In fact, Hitler feared that anti-Nazi forces in the Saar, made up largely of communists and

Jews who had fled Gennany to escape Nazi persecution, wanted a coup to force the entrance of French troops and postpone any union with Gemy. In the Sam, where many local Nazis were not under direct control of Gerrnany, the situation was different.

They were becoming bolder and more violent. A coup fiom within, rather than frorn

Gerrnany, was a senous possibility. Even worse, any coup could spark a clash between

French and Gennan troops should they be drawn into the Saar, risking the start of another European warg

The carnpaign of terrorism, coupled with the possibility of an overt conquest of the temtory by the Nazis, posed a serious problem not only for the inhabitants of the

Saar, but also for the approaching plebiscite. Elections with such emotional and political piebiscites, was a technical advisor and Deputy Member of ihe Saar Plebiscite Commission, which was responsible for conducting the plebiscite itself. Her book, although dated, remains the best examination of the Saar territory and the plebiscite. See Sarah Wambaugh, The Saar Pfebiscite: with a collection of officiai documents (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwoud Pfess. 1940), pp- 14 1-2.

8 Ibid., pp. 155,257.

9 C. I- Hi14 "Great Britain and the Saar Plebiscite of Ianuary 13 1935," in JO& of Contemwrarv Historv. V.9 (April 1974), pp. 130-2, charge can become very dangerous occasions. The Goveming Commission, under the

auspices of the League, was responsible for securing the fieedorn, secrecy, and

trustworthiness of the voting as stipulated in the Treaty of ~erdes."To do so

required that the Commission ensure the maintenance of law and order throughout the

period before, during and after the plebiscite. If Saarlanders had to vote under the threat

of violence or punishment, then the plebiscite would be pointless. The means provided to

the Commission to ensure the integrity of the plebiscite and maintain law and order held

their own traps that could interfere with the vote.

The Commission's primary means of policing the Saar was a small local police

force. Approximately one thousand men had to police over 828 000 people in one of the

most densely populated areas of Europe. To make matters worse, fewer than one hundred of tMs force would be available for public order operations in case of emergency

(Le. demonstrations, parades, riots, fighting between faions, etc). " Not only would such a small force be totally inadequate in the event of trouble, which increasingly seemed possible, but it was not totally reliable either.

Recmited locally, many of those on the force had an interest in the plebiscite and its outcome. Their impartiality was fùrther hampered by Nazi influences. Many were either Nazis thernselves or too scared to be loyal to the Goveming Commission. The

Commission noted this and requested permission to increase the force and shore it up with officers recruited fiom neutral countries. Of an estimated two thousand thought

IO RUA, "Relations", p. 579; Walters, p. 589.

II Wambaugh. pp. 3, 154; Rn& "Relations", p. 599. needed, only 120 men had been recruïted intemationaüy and a Wher 236 lodybefore

the plebiscite was held. l2

In the event of a substantial disturbance in the maintenance of law and order

where the local police force was expected to be totally inadequate and unreliable, the

Governing Commission could resort to asking France for dtaryassistance. The

Commission was empowered by the League "to make use in case of necessity of any

forces which [couid'] be placed at its disposai, even if this meant, obtaining assistance

from troops stationed outside the temtory."13 Until 1925, a French garnison was

stationed in the temtory for the purposes of protecting the mines and other French

possessions gained after the First WorId War. It left, however, IargeIy because of

accusations by Germany that it was an army of occupation not permitted by the Treaty of

Versailles or the League's mandate. The Commission, though, continued to hold the nght to cal1 on French assistance, and France made it understood that it would not refùse such a cd. The League of Nations, the Governing Commission, and France realized that to have French troops enter the Saar so near the plebiscite would create a very dangerous situation for peace. Not only could it instilI resentment and revolt in the Saarianders against the Commission, but it could also give Germany reason for direct intervention to try to reclairn the temtory.14

What was needed was some means to keep law and order and ensure a £iee vote

12 Walter, p. 588; RlIq "Re1ationsn, pp. 599,602,604,607; Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs; Facinn the Dictators. (London: Cassel1 & Company Ltd, 1%2), pp. 100-1.

13 RUA, "Relations", p. 587.

14 RIiA, "Relations", pp. 587,609; Walters, p. 592; Hill, pp. 129-30.

30 that would be acceptable to everyone. Ifthis could be done, there wodd be no cause for

France or Germany to contest the plebiscite, or worse yet, to resort to force to reclaim

the territory wrongfùily denied them. With the threat of both interna1 and extemal

trouble that could ignite into violence and enguifEurope, as in the First World War, an

untested idea was proposed: an international military force to keep the peace.

Calls for an international force of some kind had been made for many years,

especially since the creation of the League of ~ations.lS Even Hitler himseif was believed to have considered proposing to the League and France that a neutrai force of Swiss soldiers police the Saar during the plebiscite, but this was impossible because

Switzerland's constitution prevented her military fiom deploying outside her temtory. l6

Seeing the need to do something to ensure law and order, and reaiizïng that it was impossible to have French troops in the territory dunng the plebiscite, the French goverrunent saw an opportunity to make use of an impmial international force to do the job. At a meeting of the League Council on 5 Decernber 1934, the French Minister for

Foreign -airs, Pierre Laval, declared that France would answer any cal1 for aid. Laval argued, however, that maintaining order should be entrusted to an international force. if

15 Many proposais for a permanent intemuonal force were made prior to, and after, the Saar plebiscite. Most were impractical, estravagant, or required more cornmitment than most nations were prepared to make. For examples see Ham Wehkrg, Theorv and Practice of Intemtional Policing (London: Constable, 1935); David Davies, The Problem of the Twentieth Cennuv: A Studv in International Relations (London: E. Benn Ltd, 1934); Major-Generai F, Maurice, "The Begiring of an International Police Force," Finhting Forces, v. 1 1 (August 1934), pp. 218-5 1; W.H.Caner, "An International Police Force At Last," Fighting Forces, v, 11 (February 1935), pp. 522-527. For a List of published material hmthis time period on this subjecî see Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Librq, International Police: Prouosals for CooDerative Defense Thmuah the Use of Intemational Armies. Navies and Air Forces. (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for Internationai Peace, 19451, pp. 1-20.

16 HiIl, pp. 13 1-2. such a force was raised, he assureci that France would not contribute to it ifGermany

would not either.l7

Britain had for some tirne been following a foreign poticy that avoided miiitary

commitments that could tie them to the continent, especidy ones that rnight drag them

into another war. The Saar was seen as a League problem and Britain wanted no part,

stating just months prior to the plebiscite that it would not participate in sending troops

to the Saar ifunrest broke out. It was due to the effons of the Lord Privy Seal, Anthony

Eden, that the British govermnent began to consider involvement. He first proposed to

the British Cabinet that Bntain and ltaly consider joining France in sending forces if

intervention was required, but changed his proposai to omit French participation. It was

realized that Britain had considerable interest in the peacettl outcorne of the plebiscite

and the fact that France was now less willing and less able to intervene if necessary

troubled some in the British government. Britain might not be able to avoid involvement

by leaving matters to the League and France after ail."

As the British cabinet considered the idea Eden becarne aware that Laval was going to ask the League to invite other nations, specifically the British, to help France if intervention was needed in the Saar. The cabinet realized at once that if Britain agreed, it would anger Germany and encourage the French, but if they refiised the Goveming

Commission would be without proper resources and locai Nazis would be encouraged to terrorize the Saar. To avoid this the British cabinet agreed to let Eden make his own

17 Wambaugh, pp. 269-70; RiIA "Relations", p. 612,

18 Hill does a good job ouilining British policy leading up to the plebiscite and the changes that occund within Cabinet to bring about British involvement in the Saar. See Hill, pp. 123-35. proposal to the League for an Ïntemational force.lg

Mer Lavai's speech in the League, Eden, who was sent to represent Britain at

the meeting, at once stated that peace between the donsof Europe was important to

Britain anthhaî peace in the Saar was required to accomplish this. To answer Lavai's

cal1 for an intemationai force, Eden claimed "prevention is better than cure? Eden

believed that while there were forces, like those of France, nearby and available for use in

the Saar, it wouId not be the best solution to htroduce them dertrouble arose- By then

peace would already be gone and the forces would be too late. It was important to

prevent trouble before it couid disrupt the peace. Eden agreed with Laval that the way to

do this was to introduce to the Saar "an international force, which should not include

troops of either of the two parties concerned, for the purpose of keeping order." *' Eden

offered a British contingent if the League decided to create such a force, and if Germany

and France consented to the force and British participation in it." The members of the

League favorably received this idea. France, of course, consented to the creation of such

a force. Germany also consented, although reluctantly. Since the territory was the

responsibility of the League of Nations, only its consent was required. Peace beyond the

plebiscite, however, depended on the acceptance of the way the vote was held as much as

on what the result was. Therefore, to avoid fbture problems the consent of the two

- 19 Hill, pp. 134-39; Eden, pp- 103-6-

20 RlfA, "Statement of the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, Lord Privy Seai, December 5, 1931," in Documents on International Affairs. 1931 (London: O.dord University Press, 1935), pp. 59-60.

21 RIIA, "Anihoriy Eden," pp. 59-60; Walters, p. 592; Wambaugh, p. 270; RUA, "Relations," pp. 612;

22 MA, "Anthony Eden," pp. 594; Hiil, p. 138. nations with interests at stake in the plebiscite was obtained. Besides, no nation would

wish to be involved with the force if participation was going to cause tension with France

In the League's resolution of 11 December 1934 that created the "Saarforce" (as

it was named by the force's Commander), Britain, Itaiy, Sweden, and the Netherlands

were asked and agreed to contribute to the endeavor. Britain and Itaiy were the only two

nations both powerful enough to make such a force work, and at the same time

acceptable participants to both France and Germany. The Netherlands and Sweden were

invited to increase the international character of the force, and since they were well-

respected neutrai countries they added to the impartiality of the Saarforce. The final

complement of the force was 1,500 troops from Britain, 1,300 fkom Italy, 250 each fiom

Sweden and the Netherlands, for a total force of 3,300.~'

This resolution also went on to outline the general guidelines under which the

Force would operate. First, the command structure was addressed. The force was

placed at the disposai of the Governing Commission, since it was their responsibility to

maintain order? This effectively kept control of the force under the League of Nations,

although indirectly, rather than handing over complete control to individuai nations who

might have interests of their own. As well, the Commission was arguably closer to the

situation and wuld make better use of the force than someone fiirther removed fiom the

23 RILA, "ReIations," pp. 612-13;Wambaugh, pp. 270, 282-

24 Wambaugh, p- 283; RUA, "Resolution adopted by the League Couacil, December 11, 1934," in Documents in International Affairs. 1931, pp. 61-2. action,

The resolution went on to outline financial rules; basically, the League agreed to

pay any costs for the Force above and beyond what the participahg nations would be

paying normaliy. Members of the force were given immunity f?om prosecution by the

courts of the Saar. The soldiers could not be held accountable in the Saar for any actions

taken in carrying out their mission. Finally, the resolution allowed the League to take

further measures if suggested by the Sub-Cornmittee that had been set up on 8 Decernber

when the idea for the Force was first proposed.26

The Sub-Cornmittee reported to the League Council on 12 December. It made four recommendations, al1 of which were adopted. The first recommendation was that

"contingents [should] be composed of infantry, armoured cars, and ancülary troops. It is important that the force be highly mobile and should be equipped with motor transport up to approximately 50 per cent of the infantry's strength."" This recommendation was subsequently appraised by the Commander in Chef (CinC) of the Sworce, Major-

General J. E. S. Brind of Britain, in a report made derthe mission had been completed.

Brind comrnented that :

The composition of the Force was on the whole satisfactory. The bulk of the Force was composed, quite correctly, of infantry, whose value was greatly increased by the mobility conferreci on them by the wise decision that sufficient motor vehicles to transport 50% of its strength should accompany each contingent. The armoured cars. .. were usehl for patroliing in outlying districts and, in case of emergency they would have had considerable moral effect as welt as being a means ... of rapid

- -- 26 RUA, "Resolution," pp. 6 1-2.

27 RUA, "Report of the Sub-Committce of the Cornmittee of Three on the International Force. December 12, 1934," in Documents on Internatio-ll Mairs, 1934, pp. 62-3. reinforcement?

This allowed the force to maintain a high level of visibility throughout the temtory and to

respond quickly to any disturbances that required the force's attention. Brind annbuted

the absence of disorder to the "moral Uitluence of the presence of the troops both as a

deterrent to disorderly elements in the population, and as an encouragement to the police

to do their duty in diflscult political circumstances.""

The second recommendation was that responnb~'iityfor maintenance of law and

order should remain with the Goveming Commission, and that the CinC of the Saarforce

would comply with any request fiom the Commission for intervention by the force. This

allowed the force to be employed in a miiitaiy capacity, not as poiice, and have duties

analogous to 'aid to the civil power' duties of the army in Great Britain. This meant that

each contingent of the Force, especially the largest contingent which was British, knew

specifically what its mission was and how to carry it out. Every participating nation's

military had a doctrine similar to Britain's 'aid to the civil power' upon which it could

draw dunng Saarforce operations. If there was a breakdown in civil order which was

beyond what the local police could handle, only then could certain designated civii

authorities cal[ on the force to re-establish order. To restore order certain rules had to be

followed. The minimum amount of force necessary to do so was tu be used; the

3 After the plebiscite, Brind woie a report summing up the mission he led in the Saar. This report induded al1 orders issued ta the Saarforce, and evduations by the CinC on what the Force did and how it could be impmed should another international force be raised by the League. See J. Brind, "League of Nations: Report by the Commander in Chief, International Force in the Saar, For the Information of the Council of the League of Nations (26 October, 1935)," PKO Documentation, vo1.29, (Febniary 1%S), pp. 1, 13. objective of any action was to be corrective rather than punitive. Opening fire, or deadly force, was to be used as a last resort, and the officer in charge had to warn those being targeted. Fire was to be "aimed for effect." Blank ammunition and shooting over the heads of a crowd was forbidden since this would oniy cause a stampede, which would hurt the innocent behind a rnob, not the individuals responsible for the disorder.

Emphasis in aid to the civil power doctrine was prevention of disorder by making the troops highly visible- If disorder broke out and the civil authorities called out the troops, restoration of order was left to the military. The officer in charge decided how to deploy his troops, if and when force was to be used, and how much force is necessa~y.~~

The third recommendation made by the Sub-Cornmittee called for the CinC and his staff:as well as the staffs of the national contingents, to proceed immediately to the

Saar and begin preparations for the arriva1 of the force. Furtherrnore, to aid administration and control of the Force, each contingent was requested to appoint an officer to the headquarters staffof the CinC. In practice, Brind went even fiirther than this and also sent liaison officers from his headquarters stawhich was British, to the headquarters of each contingent. In his report, Brind stated:

1 cannot over-emphaske the importance of good liaison and good interpreters. In this comection 1 would mention that a great deal of the success of the experiment was due to the whole-hearted way in which not oniy the commanders and senior officers, but the units of the various contingents made fXends with one another."

It was extremely important that the Sdorce act in a unified way, treating the territory

30 RIIA, "Report of the Sub-Committee," pp- 62-3;Brind, pp. 3, 17-19; Lany Fabian, Soldiers Without Enemies (Washington: Brookings Institution, 197 l), p. 32. the same way throughout. This required a consensus on orders and directives, leaving as

little room as possible for misinterpretation. Interpreters ensureci that there were no

mistakes in understanding orders (which were in English) issued to various contingents

that spoke other languages. Liaison officers would have been largely responsible for

interpreting the orders given to contingents, or voicing a contingent's opinions and

concems on policies considered at headquarters. Brind also stressed the importance of

sending reconnaissance parties to iay the foundation for the arrivai of the force and made

recommendations that he thought would improve this essentiai step should such an

international force be raised agak3*

Finally, the Sub-Cornmittee recommended that responsibility for any tùrther

matters conçeming the Saarforce should be lefl to the Goverring Commission and the

CinC of the force. This effectively handed over control of the force to Brind, who would

determine how the force was distributed throughout the Saar, dari@ the force's duties

and rules for ernployment, and handle the administration dutie~.~~

On 20 December 1934, only ten days derthe League authorized the creation of

the Force, the first contingents began to arrive in the Saar. The entire force was in place

by 23 ~ecember.~~Brind immediately issued the Saadorce's first orden. Of primary

concern were relations with the populace of the territory. Brind realited that for this

mission to be successfùl, it not only needed the consent of France and Gerrnany, but that

32 MA, "Report of the Sub-Cornmitte," pp. 62-3; Brinci, pp. 1, 1 1.1 3,2 1.

33 RIIA, "Report of the Sub-Committee," pp. 62-3.

34 Wambaugh. pp. 284-5. of the Saarlanders as weii- The mere presence of the troops aione was not enough to

ensure peace. The force also had to have the respect of the people. The best way of

achieving this was by the same means as convincing France and Gennany, impartiality.

To favour one side over the other would draw cries of bias, accusations of an unfiair

plebiscite, and possibly civil unrest. Therefore, Brind pointed out to his cornmand that

the Saarfiorce was "composed of troops drawn tiom counuies which have no direct

interest in the result of the Saar plebiscite," and ordered aii rnembers of the force to

"maintain a stnctly neutral attitude in their dealings with the in habitant^."^' Afkr the plebiscite, Brind reflected in his final report that the neutrality of the Force aided in est ablishing fiiendly relations with the population and "contnbuted very largely towards the absence of disorder dunng the plebiscite."36

Included in Brind's first orders to his new cornmand were extensive instructions on how the troops were to be calleci out and used in an emergency. As briefly noted earlier, it was agreed by al1 contingents to adopt British 'aid to the civil power doctrine'.

It was the Governing Commission's responsibility, and that of the temtory's police, to maintain Iaw and order. The Saarforce would only be called out in cases of emergency that were beyond the means of the police. When not activated, the force was to carry out training and patrols. Through respect and high visibility, Brind hoped to deter unrest.

Just in case, however, one quarter of the troops at each locality were to remain ready for employment at thirty minutes notice. On top of this, one British Company and one Italian

35 "SaarForce order No. 1," issued 22 December 1931, is included in Brind's final report. Sec Brind, p. 17.

36 Brind, p. 6; Waiters, p. 593.

39 Company were kept in the capital of Saarbrucken as a central reservee3'

If the need to deploy troops arose, only specüïc officials had the authority to cd

the force into action. Arnong these were the head of the Goverrihg Commission, the

Director of the Interior, and the Police President. As is evident in Brind's final report,

however, doubts existed about the ability of the local officials to act quickly. The

Governing Commission, out of necessity, had to employ local inhabitants as its officials.

Due to the nature of the plebiscite, these officials could not be viewed as impartial.

Therefore, it was dificult to decide who would have the power to cal1 the force out.

Eventually it was decided that the Landrat of each Kreise (the chef official of each administrative district) could do so after consulting with either the Director of the

Interior or one of the few neutral international police officers. The latter were so few in number that, in Brind's view, if a local emergency arose that required quick action then responsibility for intervention by the troops would probably fall on the military officer of the closest detachment. This would have involved "extreme difficulty and delicacy."

Any action by the force, especidly without civil authorization, could have led to accusations of favoritism for one side over the other, or worse yet undermined the authority and impartiality of the Governing Commission and delayed any hope of a fir, peacefûl plebiçcite.3g

Fortunately the Saarforce never had to respond to an emergency that required the use of force of any kind. On five separate occasions part of the Force was sent to areas

------37 Wambaugh, p. 285; Brin& pp. l7-18,20.

38 Brind, pp. 5, 18-19. where disturbances threatened, but in each case the presence of the troops prevented the

worst f?om happening." Whether it was, as Brind reporteci, that the Force's presence

had moral influence on the inhabitants and trouble-makers, or that both sides involved in

the plebiscite feared that any violence on their part would delay the plebiscite and prevent

their victory, the result was the sarne. Relative peace was maintained in the tenitory"

What resulted fiom Saadorce's potentially dangerous mission was a du1 daily

routine of marches and patrols. Troops would go on the march daily in foot patrols or

on bicycles. Sometimes troops would go out into the less densely populated regions in

motor vehicles. While patrolling, they were not only making their presence known to the

locals, but also scouting the terrain and potential objectives that would have to be

secured in any time of crisis (Le. bridges, power stations, goverrunent buildings, etc.).

Another goal of patrolling was to prevent intiltration fiom Germany or France. Of

constant worry were the French armed forces and Geman SA and SS units, of which a

large number were deployed near the border. Another concern was infiltration by persons seeking to cause civil unrest in hopes of preventing the plebiscite or trying to vote in the plebiscite and influence the o~tcorne.~'

This routine was maintained fiom the time the force was deployed until 12

Januay 1935. On the foliowing day, that of the plebiscite, Bnnd ordered that patrols of the borders be maintained, but all other patrols were prohibited. He did not want

39 Wambaugh, pp. 285,287/:

4 1 Brind, pp. 18,244; Lars Ericson, "Sweden and the Saar, A Peacekeeping Operation, 1934-35," in Peacekee~in~.18 15 to Todav: Proceedins of the XM Colloauiwn of the International Commission of accusations that the plebiscite was heid under threat of miiitary force. Therefore, he

created 'standing patrols'; patrols of not less than 20 men led by an officer stationed in a

place near each polling station, but out of sight and in constant communication with their

headquarters and civil authorities. This would dlow them to remain 'under cover', yet in a position to respond quickly to any disturbances at or near the polling stations.42

Once the polling stations closed, the Saarforce was responsible for collecting and escorting the unis that containeci the ballots to Saatbrucken where the results were to be tallied. The force was aiso responsible for security of the Counting Station. After the plebiscite, regular patrols were resumed. Al1 of this went off without any trouble. The result of the plebiscite was an overwhelming majority for reunification with Germany. Of the 539 541 registered voters, over 91% favoured reunification."

After the 13 January plebiscite, the Saarforce maintained its routine of patrols until it was finally withdrawn on 26 February. The temtory was officially handed over to

Gemany on 1 ~arch.~The force was maintained dunng this period largely to prevent any hmbeing done to those suspected of voting against reunification with Germany.

The Nazis had made threats of such actions. With tensions reduced derthe plebiscite, however, the Saartorce was subject to the tnendliness of the Saadanders. In many cases soccer and rugby games were organized between contingents of the force and with local teams. When the force left the Saar the streets were filled with well-wishers showing

- -- Militarv Historv (Quebec: International Commission of Miliîary History, 1995), pp. 594-5.

42 Bnnd, pp. 1,25; Wambaugh, pp. 302-3.

43 BM~, pp. 25-6; Ericson, p. 595; RIIA, "Relations," p. 619; Wambaugh, pp. 3023. kirgrzrtitudde to the force for a job wd done. Tfiese CO~M~~LISwere also treated to

similar fànfarr in France and Germany as they traveied home."

The Saarforce was hailed as a success for international peace preservation The absence or avoidance of French or Gennan intervention in the Saar and with the plebiscite, which couId have sparked a general European war, was attri'buted to the presence of the international force. At the same the the force deterreci any outbreak of disorder within the terrïtory, and went a long way to makias residents fèd seaxe and

ûee to participate in the plebiscite. The overwhelming acceptance of this Force and its resulting success was praised by ail. in the British Parliament, both members of the govement and opposition voiced praise for the Force. The words of Mr. Lansburg on

1 March 193 5 are representative of many:

Ifever soldiers are used, it seems to me that this is a very splendid example of how a mixed force could be used in an intelligible way to preserve law, order and peace. It is a fine example of international action for the preservation of peace, and it is one which, 1 think, gives point to those who desire an international police force generally.'b

Such sentiment was expresseci in the popular press and academic writing" Many individuals used the success of the Saarforce to cal1 for a more permanent version. There were many variations proposed as well, but al1 tended to retain the concept of an

44 Wambaugh, p. 3 1 1.

46 Parliamentaxy Debates, mcial Repori, 5' Senes. Vol. 298. 4' Session of the 34Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland. House of Comrnons, la Vol. Of Session 1931-35. (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1935), pp. 1536-7.

47 Wambaugh, p. 3 17: W.H.Carter, "An International Police Force At Last." Fi~htinaFors, v. 1 l(Febniary 1935), pp. 522-7. would be attempted again. 3

Lester B. Pearson and the Peacekeeping Concept,

1930-55

Once it was realized how successfùl the Saarforce had proven to be, a new hope and excitement was evident in al1 waiks of Me. Hundreds of people in the Saar, France,

Germany, and the United Kingdom came out ont0 the streets to wave and cheer on the contingents of the international force as they returned home. Members of government dished out praises for the force and called for the presentation of medals. Newspapers and scholan began to predict that this was finally the teeth the League of Nations needed to maintain peace and proposed the creation of a permanent international force equipped with planes, tanks, and battleships.' For a brief penod in Europe it appeared that lasting peace was attainable and the League would not fail in its mission.

It is reasonable to assume that anyone who read newspapers or followed international events was aware of the Saarforce. In the period leading up to the plebiscite, tensions and fears of war engulfed Europe. Everyone watched the Saar and held their breath, and when it was over there was a collective sigh of relief The

I For e.lesee W. H. Carter, "An intemationai Force At Last," Fighting Forces, v. 1 1 (Febniary 193S), pp. 522-7; "Pace-Tirne Victors,," The London Times, 22 Februiuy 1935, p. 15. 46 coverage of dl this by the media, scholars, and diplomats was con~iderable.~Indeed,

with the success of the Saarforce at deftsing the situation, al1 of this would be an

important influence on everyone's ideas of confîia resolution. So it rnay have been on

Lester B. Pearson.

Only 38 years old in 1935 and having only been in Canada's fledgling

Department of Extemal Anairs since 1928, Pearson was recognized as a promising

diplomat. Like so many of his generation he had participated in the Great War, and

therefore had a preoccupation with the maintenance of peace. Mer the war he had

become a professor of history at the University of Toronto. Here Pearson had adopted

an intemationalist outlook on Canadian &airs. A supponer of the League of Nations and intemational cooperation, Pearson feared strong nationalism because he believed that it led to conflict? Being a well-educated civil senant in Extemal Affairs preoccupied with prese~ngpeace, Pearson, no doubt, would have been keenly aware of the events taking place in the Saar and the League. The fact that Britain, the country with whom Canada had the closest connections, was involved only served to reinforce this.

Just after the contingents of t he Saarforce retumed home to cheering crowds,

Pearson traveled to London with Prime Minister R B. ~ennett.' While attending the

2 For instance, here in Canada the Globe andMail carrieci a front-page story on the Saar region nearly every day fram 1-20 of Jan- 1935. The London 7lmes gave simiIar average.

3 John English, Shadow of Heaven; The Life of Lester B. Pearson. vol. 1. 1897-1918. (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Demys Ltd, 1989), pp. 118,126, 143.

1 Lester B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Ri& Honourable Lester B. Pearson vol. 1. 1897- 1918. floronto: University of Toronto Ress, 1972), p. 77. Silver Jubilee of King George V's coronation in April 1935, Pearson had the

opportunity to rub elbows with British diplomats who were likely keen to discuss the

British involvement in the Saarforce and its consequent success. While Peanon never

mentions in his memoirs or personai papen disaissing this issue with anyone, the

proximity to the successful end of the Sdorce and the praises it received flom both

officials and the public make it hard to believe that the issue was not a topic of

conversation in London. Pearson wuld have witnessed first hand the enthusiasm

created by the international force's success.

Looking back fiom the twilight of his life, Pearson wrote:

During this penod, 1930-5,I attended my first international conferences. The most important of these were concemed with dismament. My studies in this subject in Ottawa had deepened the concem 1 had forrned in the twenties over the looming possibility of another war, and over what could be done to prevent it. At the university 1 wuld only read and discuss and lecture on these matters. Now, as an offtcial of the Canadian govemment, 1 couid, perhaps in a mal1 way, influence Canadian policies and the part we could play in the search for peace and secunty.'

Pearson was a well-educated person who intently followed international flairs

and was actively concemed with the maintenance of peace. More than this, he was employed by External Affairs where it was his job to follow international events.

Furthemore, the media coverage of the Saar Plebiscite and Saarforce was extensive.

Pearson also had the opportunity to meet directly with British officials teeming with pide over their recent accomplishments. Any one of these factors alone strongly suggests that Pearson was aware of the Saarforce, but when they are al1 put together the odds that he was not aware of the Saarforce are phenomenal. Although this evidence is

5 Ibid., p. 81. 48 inferential, awareness of the League's experience in the Saar could serve to explain the

ongins of Pearson's ideas on peacefùl resolution of conflicts and collective security.

Regardless of whether Pearson's awareness of the peacekeeping concept was obtained

from knowledge of the Saarforce or not, he did begin to express an understanding of

peacekeeping during this same period. This is evident in his writings and speeches. This

concept stayed with him and evolved over time, changing slightly as the world changed

around him, until finally he had opportunity to see it brought to life in November 1956.

Pearson's first exposure to the issues of collective security and international

force came through the writing of a departmental report in 1933. This report was largely

concemed with what Canadian policy should be in Iight of British and American

policies. Pearson's report begins by stating that a nation's security is guaranteed by a combination of arms and "pacts of mutual assistance and CO-operativeaction against an aggressor.'d The report goes on to sumrnarize two main theories on how these can be used. The first, called the French Thesis, could be referred to as an international military alliance. Supponed largely by France since the First World War, this thesis called for the "nations of the world. .. [to] pool theü secunty in a common fùnd of which the League of Nations would be the tmstee."' If hostilities occurred, the aggressor nation would be automatically determined and joint international action would carry out

- .- 6 Lester B. Pearson, "The Problem of Security and Sanctions in the Light of Recent Developments a1 Geneva, 20 June 1933," MG30 E157, vol, 13, File 10 A-F, lOG, p. 1, National Archives of Canada (NA0 punitive meanires against the aggressor.' This was roughly the equivalent of the

modem concept of peace-enforcement mentioned in chapter one.

The Anglo-Saxon theosr, on the other hand, could be equated with diplomacy

and non-military sanctions. Rather than sanctions and punitive military force, it called

for "the creation of international co-operation and good witl through, first, the reduction

of armaments as breeders of fear and hence insecurity, and, second, the development of

machinery for the prevention of contlicts.'" Pearson States that Canadian policy firmly

supports this second thesis and the League of Nations, which provided a forum for

discussion and moral force to peacefùlly settle conflicts. 'O

Pearson's report went into great detail analyzing British and American policies,

only to conclude that both rejected the French Thesis. Neither country wished to

become entangled by security commitments that could potentially drag them into an

unwanted war. The United States insisted on continuing its neutral rights and, therefore,

could not commit itself to anything of this nature. Without the US, Britain would not

commit to Europe's security. ' ' Without these two great powers, Pearson concluded,

there was no reason for Canada to re-evaluate its policy of non-commitment. Pearson

personally disagreed with Canada's policies of non-cornmitment when it came to

8 ibid, p. 1.

9 Md,p. 1.

10 ibid, pp. 2,45.

11 Ibid, pp. 22,38.39-40. collective security within the League, but he could do little about it at this time in his

career. I2

The French thesis and the Anglo-saxon thesis have very Mein common with

peacekeeping. In fact there is no indication that Peanon had any such concept in this

report. There are, however, basic principles evident in this report that Pearson could later apply to peacekeeping once he became exposed to the concept. In fact, this fint exposure to international security and maintenance of peace problems must have been an eye opener for Pearson. The entire report portrays how difficult it was to coordinate the wishes and activities of the international community, not to mention one's own nation, toward a single goal as important as wodd peace. It also hints at the firtility of trying to maintain peace without the devoted cornmitment of great nations who have the power and resources to ensure success.

Indeed, despite the success in the Saaq Pearson's faith in the League and the international cornmunity to prevent war soon began to disappear with the rise of the

Italian-Ethiopian Crisis later in 1935. Pearson was secretary and advisor to the

Canadian delegation of the League during the crisis. In his memoirs Pearson claimed that "if, at the beginning, the League was able to act effectively, this was because the members' and particularly the powerfùl ones wished to do so."13 He also recalled that opinion polls in Britain showed strong popular support for peace action through the

League. This, of course, was only a few months after the successful Saar mission. In

12 Pearson, "Problem of Security," pp. 10,45; Pearson, Mike. vol- 1, p. M.

13 Pearson, Mike. vol. 1, p. %.

51 the end, however, the League fàiled to stand up to Italy. The crisis confirmed

Pearson's belief that only determined collective international action could establish and

rnaintain peace and security. l4

Records of Pearson's personai views during this period are sparse, largely due to

the fact that his position within External Affairs was rather junior at this tirne. As he

began to reach more senior ranks during the Second World War, Pearson was in a

position to voice his opinions and have them heard. In his first writings on collective

security and peace maintenance since before the Saarforce, in which Pearson showed no

sign of having any peacekeeping concept, he now displayed a healthy interest in it. He

was also talking with individuals who shared similar views. In 1942 Pearson had

becorne the Minister-Counselor, second in command of the Canadian legation in

washington.15 Here he had opportunity to taik to Sumner Welles, the US Under-

Secretary of State, who also believed in the need for an international police force. After

listening to Welles lecture one day, Pearson wrote:

Sumner Welles was very good, making a plea for post-war collective security and an international police force. He is preaching the pure doctrine these days, and 1 hope he will be listened to. There seems to be more possibility of this now than six months ago.16

With hindsight, however, Pearson would Iater admit that the 'international idealism' that

existed in Washington at this time was "too imprecise and unorganized to stand up against political realities. .. while many Americans were 'idedistic as heaven', they

11 Pearson, Mike, vol. 1,92,102; English. Shadow, pp- 159, 165.

1s English, Shadow, pp. 250-1.

16 John R &al, Pearson Phenornenon (Toronto: Longmans Canada Ltd., 1964), p- 79.

52 found it difficult to ensure that these ide& shouid be reflected later in the plans and

policies being worked out by the big three.""

Somewhat more redistic, Pearson still pushed for the creation of a strong

international organization &er the war that would be able to correct the failures of the

League. Indeed, as the fbture United Nations becarne more and more a reality and the

San Francisco Conference was called, Pearson becarne more involved, now as Canadian

Arnbassador to the US. After witnessing yet another Great War and the destruction it

caused, Pearson was a staunch supporter of the "development of a strong international

organization for collective secunty and economic progress."18 Primarily concerned with

the organization of security and measures to prevent and defeat aggression, which

Pearson felt would comprise the core of the Charter of the new United Nations, he felt the proposed Dumbarton Oaks Charter was insuficient. He wrote to Norman Robertson on 15 March 1945, just before the San Francisco Conference:

The State Department here goes memly along trying to convince the people that the Dumbarton Charter is much better than the old League Covenant because it has teeth in it. What is the use of having teeth if you cannot use them? What the Dumbarton Oaks Charter needs in fact is a little dentirtry.lg

So it was that Pearson sought to give the new charter a set of braces at San

Francisco to ensure that if the UN had teeth, it could use them properly. Attending the conference as part of the Canadian delegation, he was given the opportunity on 2 Apnl

1945 to address the United Nations Forum on the subject of international use and control

17 Pearson, Mike, p. 245.

18 Ibid, pp. 256,294. of force. The following excerpt fiom his speech neatly surnmarïzes Pearson's views at

the time:

What we must do is not abolish force, but put enougti force at the disposai of a world authority to prevent aggression by convincing the aggressor that he will be quickly and eff'ively chastised if he misbehaves. [.. .] if it could be achieved, would be as effective in prese~nginternational peace as Our policing system is in prese~ng domestic peace. [. .. ] This means either an international police force under international control strong enough to defeat any likeiy combination of national forces; or an agreement by the member nations of an international organization to put sufficient national forces at the automatic disposition of the world authonty for use against the breaker of peace. Unfortunately the first just isn't possible, so we might as well forget about it for the tirne being. There does not seem to me to be any valid reason, however, why we should not start with a small international force for limited purposes.. . a beginning of an international force.. . it is the ubimate and to me the only hope of peace among the nations.. . we must seek to make certain that never again shall an aggressor be permitted to strike down one nation after another before the peace-loving nations of the world organize to take concerted action against it. If we have not Iearned fiom the history of the last thirty years that that must be the supreme objective towards which we al1 strive, we are incapable of leaniing any lesson."

It is obvious that Pearson hadprevention of aggression in mind rather than peace

enforcemerit, but realized that any international body must be prepared to enforce the

peace if necessary. Pearson was tw realistic to be distracteci by grandiose dreams of a

permanent international force of any considerable size and strength. His solution was

the same as that which he would propose five yean later, after the Korean War; earmark

national troops which could be made available to the UN in emergencies. This would

20 Lester B. Pearson, "The International Use and Control of Force," Address at the United Nations Forum, 2 April 1945. MG26 N9, vol. 1, p. 5, NAC.

into action quickly as a result of an international decision which cannot be blocked by any one power. You will of course cornplain that this is impractical and impossible. My reply is that at the moment it certainly is, but that is an objective which must be reached; a pwpose that must be realized. The alternative is internat ionaf anarchy .- .22

Pearson admitteci that this would involve an infnngement on national sovereignty. He

argued, however, that every nation that signed the Charter, including the five permanent

members of the Security Council, had already done this when they joined the UN in the

interests of pater security. To benefit fiom this they must be able to carry out

"collective decisions by collective police action, which alone can guarantee collective

security. There is no other way."= Pearson went on to admit that as long as the veto

existed and was used by the permanent members of the Security Council:

.. .the international policemen would, to say the least, have some dificulty in getting a decision to use his truncheon, even if he has it, except possibly against urchins stealing apples. The experience, so far, in Palestine, shows that he may be timid in using it even in cases where only little fellows are invo~ved.~~

Although Pearson continued to stick to his views, little changed within the UN with respect to an international police force or the veto in the Security Council. It appeared that there was little hope of convincing the members of the UN to solve the problems of the Charter and adopt new masures for the creation of an international force. Due to the failure of the UN, Pearson temporarily tumed his attention to a means

2 Lester B. Pearson, "Peaçe kughthe United Nations," Ad& to the Annual Duiner of the Toronto Board of Trade, 26 January 194%.File 653.003@29), no. 18/2, p. 7, Directorate of History, Department of National Defense (DHIST). of collective security of a dif'ferent nature. To fil1 the gaps the UN's failure had left the

western nations created the Nonh Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although

designed to expand political and economic ties between signatories, the pnmary purpose

of the treaty was to ensure the security of each nation î?om aggression. This was a

totally different concept from an international police force. Although it did have a

deterrent aspect to it, NATO was primarily punitive, doing little until calleci upon to

react to overt aggression and defeat the enemy. A police force, on the other hand,

ideally would be preventive; acting to maintain the peace before it was broken. As well,

NATO was under the control of a few states, and it was geographically Iimited.

Designed to protect signatories, predominantly European and North Arnerican, this

organization would be of no benefit to providing security to the victims of aggression in

Asia, A.fiica or South America. Pearson, however, thought NATO was at least

consistent with the spirit of the UN's Charter and the best means to ensure security until

the weaknesses of the UN could be reso~ved.~'

On 25 June 1950, hostilities broke out between North and South Korea. Here

was, potentially, an event that could spur on the UN to create an international force.

When the UN did condemn North Korea's invasion and come to South Korea's aid by

creating a unifieci command structure and calling on member states to assist South

Korea in her defense, hopes for a stronger UN rose once again. Pearson claimed in his

memoirs:

25 Lester B. Pearson, Mike; The Memoirs of the Ri&t Honourable Lester B. Pearson. vol. 2. 1918- -1957. floronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973). pp, 37,10,56,59. 57 1 considered this to be a very important event; the first time in history, so far as 1 know, an assembly of nations had formaily condemned and voted against an aggressor and, unlike the League of Nations in 1935 and 1936, had followed through. 1 felt at the time very excited about this histoncal precedent. 1 have always felt since that, however it worked out in practice, it was a most valuable precedent for the fùture of the United ~ations.26

Although the international force raiseci for this crisis was large1y Amencan,

Pearson held out hope that this could be the beginning of something more lasting. On

3 1 August 1950, during a House of Commons debate on Korea and Canadian

involvement, Pearson returned to his idea of earmarking national troops for international

service, which he suggested back in San Francisco 1945:

This special force [the Canadian Brigade being sent to Korea and to remain earmarked for fùture UN service] is unique in one way arnong the offers of military forces which have been made to the United Nations as a result of the war in Korea, and provides, I thinlc, a valuable example and precedent. If other countries were, in the same way, to earmark a portion of their forces which might be available to the UN for collective defense, there would be ready throughout the fiee world national contingents for a UN force which could be quickly brought together in the face of ftture ernergency. In this way the UN would be equipped with that military strength which it was intended in the Charter it should have at its disposal but which, in fact, it never has had, largely because of !he attitude of the USSR"

Indeed, the international force raid for the Korean Crisis existed because of luck. The Soviet Union, which opposed any and al1 motions to improve upon the UN'S security masures with her veto, was absent fiom the Secunty Council at the outbreak of the war. Absent because it was protesting the fact that it could not get Communist

China seated on the Council in place of Nationalist China, the Soviet Union missed the oppominity to veto the creation of the UN Unified Command in ~orea.~'Many, like

Pearson, desired to at last find a way to reduce the power of the veto, which the

permanent members of the Securîty Council could use to prevent improvement of

collective security masures in the UN. The Korean Cnsis provided the necessary

motivation to find an acceptable solution that was consistent with the Charter. This was

the Uniting for Peace Resolution (UFPR).

Designed to supplement the existing masures of the Charter, the UFPR

provided a way to allow the UN to act in a crisis despite the Security Council's inability

to reach a consensus and use of the veto by the permanent members. Up until now, al1

authority under the Charter for creating and controlling an international force resided

with the Security Council. Any attempt to create such a force was expected to be vetoed by one of the five permanent members in a given situation. Without any consensus there was no action and the UN could do very little. Under the UFPR, the General

Assembly, where al1 member nations are present and no veto exists, could undertake to implement collective security action by a two thirds majority vote. This meant that shouId the Security CounciI ever be rendered inactive by the veto, the General Assembly could take up the issue. Basically no new powers were created, rather, existing powers were assumed by other bodies within the UN; a son of backup ~~stern.~'

2s Pearson, Mike. vol. 2, p. 117.

29 Lester B. Pearson, "Statement in Cornmittee 1 of the General Assembly of the United Nations on Question of the Resolution 'United Adon for Peace'," 11 October 1950. MG26 N9, vol. 3, pp. 3-4, NAC; Leland M Goodrich and Anne P. Simons, The United Nations and the Maintenance of Intemitionai Peaœ and Securitv. (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1955), pp. 406-8. There were some daerences in the powers granted to the General Assembly

fiorn those of the Security Council, which made the former weaker than the latter.

Pearson wamed of this in a speech to the General Assembly whiie debating the

resolution. While the General Assembly could act when the Security Council could not,

due to the Security Council's own actions, the General Assembly did not have the power

to impose its will once it was decided by a vote. Under the Charter, the Security

Council could raise an international force and, arguabiy, send this force into a nation

despite its objections. The General Assembly, on the other hand, through its vote, was

only recommending a course of action. Once recommended, it was dlup to member

nations to consent to contributing, even though they may have voted in favor of it. The

nations to host such a force would also have to consent before the force could be deployed on its temtoryM

Part of the UFPR called for members of the UN to 'earmark' particular elements of their national armed forces for UN se~cein the event that a cal1 for troops was issued by the Security Council or the General Assembly. Pearson twk great pride in this section of the resolution since Canada had already done this when it first committed ground forces to Korea in August 1950. In the New York HeraM Tribune Fonrm,

Pearson stated :

The Korean War has underlined the necessity for arrangements within the United Nations, which wouid enable a genuinely international force to be quickly assembled. The resolution which was recentty passed by the General Assembly attempts to provide such permanent arrangements; and it seems to me to be weil designed to that end. We in Canada have taken

30 Lester B. Pearson, "Statement in the Plenary Session of 3 November 1950 at the General Assembly of the United Nations," File 653.003@29), no. 50/45, p. 3, DHIST, Goodrich, pp. 408-14. speciai interest in this proposai for the creation on a permanent bais of international forces earmarked to carry out obligations we have al1 undertaken under the United Nations Charter- When we announceci in Canada the raising of our special force for service in Korea, we made it clear that this force would be available for whatever action might be necessary in any quarter of the globe in order to carry out our military obligations either under the United Nations Charter or under the North Atlantic Treaty. We were the first country, 1 believe, to eamark a portion of OUT forces in this way. And 1 think 1 am rïght in saying that that dedaration by the Canadian Government was the germ tiom which the central section of the present Assembly resolution was developed.. .3 1

Indeed, Pearson was pleased with UFPR as a whole, so much so that he aI1owed

himself to publicly dream of a permanent, truly international force, not simply made up

of national contingents. He spoke of the advantages of a UN police division created by

enlisting individuals by the UN. There would not be the usual problems of organuing,

supplying, and commanding a polyglot force. This force would be the UN'S alone.

Pearson, always the realist however, admitted that this vision was some way off,

concluding:

These developments, 1 think, mark an important step forward in the direction of providing the United Nations with effective military forces.. - progress has been made in giving reality to the ideal of international force, ready and competent to resist aggression.. . the formation of international forces has seemed the only practical and logical issue fiom these age-old and seemingly interminable conflicts.. .32

Pearson would later admit that it was the UFPR that allowed for modern peacekeeping, but with fighting in Korea dying dowq nothing fùrther would be done on the idea of a

3 1 Lester B. Pearson, "Statement made in New York Heraid Tribune Forunt," 21 Ocrober 1950. MG26 N9, vol. 3, file Sept-Dec 1930, p. 2. NAC.

32 Ibid., p. 2.

61 UN force until the next cnsis renewed the motivation of the international c~mmunit~.'~

In 1955, Pearson released a book entitled Democtacy in WorId PoIitics. Within its covers he confessed the same fear which had begun to grip the entire world since the

Second World War: nuclear holocaust- With no sign of the Cold War ending, rnany feared that another major war could be sparked at any moment by a relatively minor incident. Now that the Soviet Union also had atomic weapons, the risk of a nuclear exchange was frightening. Pearson summed up the view of many in the international cornmunity when he wrote, "it is more essential than ever to avoid by every possible and honourable means hostilities of any kind. A war which begins on an island may mon spread to the world."" This mentality obviously infiuenced Pearson's views on codict resolution and ultimately his understanding of the peacekeeping concept. Provocation and escalation were to be avoided at any cost Maximum force for maximum effect, the very concept that won the ~lliesthe Second World War, had to give way to ""the doctrine that only a limited use of force, proportionate to the circumstances and strictly necessary to accornplish specific objectives..." was acceptable in the nuclear-age."

33 Pearson, "Keeping the Peaœ." p. 103.

34 Lester B. Pearson, Democracv in World Politics. (Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders & Co. Ltd, 1955), p. 18.

35 Ibid, p- 24. It is evident from this ihat Pearson had bcen influenced by the Limited Wartheorists uiat were very popular in intemational aEairs circles, especially in rhe United States. When the Soviet Union developed nuclear weapons and effktke delivery methods, it had becorne evident that massive retaliation would not work This meant that to contain Communism there was a choie of starting nuclear \var or doing nothing. Limited War theorists argued that Lhere was an alternative. The amount of force uses in any situation was to be lïmited to that necessary to achieve the political aim nie objective was not to destroy the enemy, but persuade him to cease hostilities sho~of bis goal without resortuig to nuclear arms Weavours were to be made to not only lunit force used, but the geography of the conflid and to keep diplornatic lines open so that negotiated sdements could be attained on the basis of limiteci objectives. See Robert Doughty et al. Limited War in the Nuclear Agee (Lexùrgton, MA: D.C. Heath and CO., 1996), pp. 68-70. 62 This idea of limited force for limited goals can be clearly seen in UN

peacekeeping: minimum force, self-defense only, to avoid escalating the codia or avoid losing its neutral status. Pearson specifically stated this by saying:

The îkee world's forces should be used only for limited political objectives, of which the chief will be to deter aggression; or if it breaks out, to localize it, defeat it, and prepare the way for a peace settiement... it is less a matter of punishing the aggressor than of defending the area of freedom and preventing another confli~t.'~

In other words, unconditional surrender and total defeat of the enemy would only serve to escalate a conflia to the point of nuclear annihilation and, therefore, had no place in the UN or any force under its controt. The UN was designed to prevent codict and preserve peace, not wage war. With the outbreak of the Suez Crisis and the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), these beliefs of Pearson's were important influences in the creation of a UN peacekeeping force.

Since confiict between Israel and the Arab States of the Middle East began, tensions had remained high, and border clashes were comrnon. States such as Egypt, which had recently been at war with Israel, sheltered groups of refiigees openly hostile to Israel's existence. These groups conducted numerous raids into Israeli temtory and terrorized border towns. After the last war between Israel and the Arab States had ended and a tmce put in place, the UN deployed an observer force to report any violations of the agreement. This force, it was quickly realized, had severe limitations. Unable to prevent violations and border raids, the United Nations Truce Supe~sionOrganization

(LTNTSO) was unable to keep the opposing forces apart. There was a strong possibility

36 ibid., pp. 333. 63 that these clashes could escalate into yet another war between these states.

As early as 1953, Pearson was reported to have discussed the replacement of

UNTSO with "a police force which would have greater powers, and greater authority,

and be able to do things which the truce organization could not possibly do, thereby

making the situation easier and making war more diffi~ult."~'Peanon's talks with the

British and the Secretary-General of the UN concluded, however, that any such proposal

would fail to gain the support of Israel or the other states involved.

The topic soon came up again, this time during a tour of the Middle East by

Pearson- While in Cairo, Pearson talked to General E.L.M. Burns, a Canadian generat

who was in charge of UNTSO, about proposing to the UN the creation of a UN force to

patrol the demilitarized zone between lsrael, Egypt and Lebanon. It is conceivable that

during these talks, Burns reported on similar discussions he had with British

representatives earlier that year. Prime Minister Anthony Eden and Minister of State for

Foreign Anairs Sir Anthony Nutting had discussed with Bums the possibility of

introducing UN trwps between the armed forces of the parties involved. Burns told

them that he believed it would take great pressure to get the Israelis to agree and that

UN forces would not be able to get in without pnor intervention of great powers.

Besides this, Bums questioned the feasibility of such a force when there was division within the Security Council that severely impeded the possibility of the UN mounting

37 Lester B. Pearson Siatement during the House of Commons Debate, 29 November 1956, Debates House of Commons. Canada. 4& Special Session 1956-57, p. 166. Pearson went on to discuss with the leaders of the Arab and Israeli govemrnents

the possibility of replacing UNTSO with an improved force. Descnbing his ideas later

in the House of Commons, key characteristics of such a UN force were already forrned

in Pearson's mind. The first was to use any international force not just as a means to

restore peace, but to use it as a physical barrier between opposing arxned forces and prevent confiict tiom beginning. Second, no force could be maintaineci indefinitely, so peace negotiations would have to be an integral part of any attempt to establish an internat ional force. 39

Upon returning to Ottawa, Pearson met with Eden and Selwyn Lloyd, his new

Minister of Foreign AfFairs, who were visiting Canada at the time. Lloyd opposed any new force and favored instead an increase in the site of UNTSO. The French and

Americans nipported Lloyd's position and this eventually was done."

As bas been demonstrated, many individuals throughout the international community had sirnilar ideas on creating an international force to restore or maintain peace, and were discussing it among themselves. Members of the League had discussed it as early as 1921 for Vilna, and had actually put the concept into practice in 1934-35.

Now members of the UN were having the sanie discussions about the concept. Pearson obviously had a comprehension of the concept, and there is ample evidence that he

38 ibid-; E-LM Burns, Ektween Arab and Israeli, (Toronto: Ctarke, Irwin, and Co. Ltd, 1%2), pp. 98, 136.

39 Lester B. Pearson Sîatement durhg the House of Commons Debate, 1 Febniar). 1956, Debates, House of Commons. Canada. Session 1956, pp. 776-7. talked to many others who also did. Eden, Burns, Hammarskjold, and others al1 met

with Pearson on this issue during this period before peacekeeping became reality within

the UN. As Pearson stated in his memoirs, the idea of peacekeeping was not new. It

had been talked about much over the years. It would be novel only if accepted4'

By the early 19SOs, as is evident through his writings and speeches, Pearson had

a very good understanding of what an international force should look like, what it

should try to do, and how it should accomplish its goals. Being an intemationalist,

Pearson believed that any solution must be based in the international community,

namely the UN. Any attempt to maintain or restore peace, by whatever means, would

require international cooperation and cornmitment to the purpose at hand. The UN provided a means to this end. Any force created, while made up of contingents from member nations, had to be under the sole control of an international body. National influences would tarnish the image of neutrality or impartiality that would be vital to the success of any force placed between opposing sides. Indeed, Pearson realized that any force would be most successfiil if it had the approval or consent of al1 parties involved, both of contnbutors to the force and of the 'host nations'.

The pnmary role of this international force would be to prevent confiict merely by its presence. ldeally neither side of a conflict would wish to attack a neutral international peace force and risk turning world opinion against them. By the same token, the international force would not seek to punish an aggressor. Anything beyond restoring and maintaining the peace would destroy the force's neutrality and the

JO Lester B. Pearson Siaternent dhgthe House of Commons Debate, 29 November 1956, Debates. Hotse of Commons. Canada. d' Special Sessîon 1956-57, pp. 166-7. 66 willingness of the host nation to have such a force in its temtory. The actual use of

armed force would be of a very limited scope, ideally for self-defense purposes only.

Force would not be needed to separate or stop opposing parties since the international

force would have already anangeci cease-tires and permission to intervene as a physical

barrier to keep the two sides apart. Once the international force was in place, an

aggressor would have to attack the force to get at its opponent on the other side.

Finally, any international force could not be maintained indefinitely, so it had to be accompanied by negotiations to establish a permanent peace. The force itself did not solve the probIem that caused a rift in the peace. Any force was merely a stop-gap masure designed to give nations time to reflect on what happened and establish diplomatic discussions that muld lead to a lasting peace without the international force's presence. Without this key element, the ultimate goal of any force was unachievable.

Remove the force and war would breakout again.

Pearson's ideas about an international force between 1940 and 1955 were influenced by the current international situation. During the Second World War and shortly aAer, Pearson adopted the same mindset as many others of the period. Mer witnessing the cooperation between the Allies and the strong support for an international organization &er the war, he had great expectations for the UN. He also had expectations for an international force, but as the Cold War emerged and harnpered the ability of the UN to establish a force, Pearson's expectations moderated in an attempt to keep the concept a possibility. If it were too much, then members of the UN, particularly the superpowers who had the ability to make it or break it, would not accept it. A force that would etforce the peace, like the one sent to Korea, would have been nearly impossible. Besides, Pearson's objective was to preserve the peace, not make more war.

Pearson's expectations were only for a moderate beginning: smail, temporary, with Iimited powers and goals. It was hoped that any force created might evolve into a more permanent force with greater powers and aims. For the time being, however, this was what UN peacekeeping, in Pearson's mind and eventually in reality, would look like. It was exactly this type of international force which Pearson, dermuch discussion and thought with his peers, proposed and helped design during the Suez Crisis in the fa11 of 1956. 4

Descendant:

Creation of the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956

For nearly thirty years, Lester B. Pearson had invested much thought and support

for the concept of an international police force of some kind. Over this period, due to

changes in international &airs, Pearson modified his ideas to make it more acceptable

to those with the power to create it and make it work Pearson, however, was not the

only one to consider the possibilities of such a force for the UN. Many individuals,

organîzations, and governments had also given thought to this topic during this same

period.

During the Second World War, an independent commission was set up by the members of the former League of Nations Association to make proposals for the creation and improvement of an international peace organization. In many different reports over several years, this commission produced a wide variety of proposals conceming the creation of an international force. These proposals, in the begiming, ranged fiom the grandiose, like a permanent international force composed of air, land, and sea components with enough power to defeat any violator of the peace, to the very 69 limited, like a permanent military headquarters and staEthat would gain troops to

cornmand from national militaries only in times of emergency.' By the Fourth Report,

produced in 1943, the commission had essentially dismissed the latter, cnticizing it as

slow and unreliabie because control was ultimately left in the hands of individuai

nations and would need near unanimous consent to operate successfùlly. From this

point on ail fùrther reports strongly lobbied for the creation of a permanent international

force in some f~rrn.~With the cooperation and success of the Allies during World War

Two, this approach certain1y seemed feasib le to many; particulad y those involved in the

writing of the UN Charter.

During the creation of the UN, measures were included within the Charter to

establish a Military Staff Cornmittee. This body was charged with the duty of making

"plans for the application of medforce. .. to advise and assist the Secunty Council on

al1 questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the

maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regdation of armaments.. . [and finally] the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security ~ouncil."~~he

Military Staff Cornmittee had a delegation of three generals or flag oficers (one from each branch of their national armed forces) from each of the permanent members of the

- - --- 1 It is intexesthg to note that Sarah Wambaugh, who parricipated in the Saar Plebiscite, ~~tnessed first hand the actions of the Saarforce, and later documented it in her book The Suar Plebiscire was a member of this Commission See Commission to Siudy the Organk~tionof Peace, 1939-1972,Buildi% Peace. V-1 (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press Inc., 1973), pp. 1 1 1- 11.

2 Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, V. 1, pp. 1 13-14, 199-200,252-3.

3 These quotes are hmArticles 46 and 47 of the UN Charter- See Leland Goodnch and J5hrd Hambro, chart& of the United Nations: Cornmeni- and Documents (Boston: World Peaœ Foundation. 1946), pp. 169-72. Security Council. Dunng the brief penod of optimism and cooperaîion that existed

among the victorious Allies who compriseci the Security Council and Military Staff

Cornmittee, it was expected that these two bodies, through their nations' support, would

provide the UN with the means to police the world. In other words, they would create a

permanent international armed force that would "continue or complete the task of

establishing and maintaining peace throughout the wor~d."~With the rise of the Cold

War, however, the mechanics of the Charter sumunding the Security Council and the

Military Staff Committee ground to a halt and prevented them from working the way

they were expected. International politics prevented the creation of any international

force.'

After the Korean War broke out, the international community began to show

renewed interest in the establishment of an international force to protect the peace. The

'Uniting For Peace resolution' (UFPR)was passed in the UN with the aim of creating

new machinery that would allow the General Assembly, as well as the Security Council,

to initiate this type of action. This resolution also created the Collective Measures

Committee which ". .xoncentrated on the preparedness of states, and on techniques,

machinery and procedures relating to the co-ordination of national and international

actions. It has dealt primarily with the political, economic, financial, and rnilitary

4 D. Colwyn Williams, "Origins and Praaices of UN Peace-Keeping", in The Future of United Nations Peaœk-ing (Toronto: United Nations Association in Canada, 1%5), p. 17.

5 For a brief summaq of the insurnountable ciifferences between the five permanent membcrs of the Security Council over issues of a permanent UN military see Evan Luard, A Histow of the United Nations. V. 1 (Lmdon: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1982), pp. 98-105. measures which would be involved in collective action by the UN?"' With the end of

the Korean War, however, there was no immediate dire need for an international force.

Therefore, the Collective Measures Committee accomplished very little, and the UFPR

remained just another unused piece of legislation on the UN'Sbooks.'

Interest in an international force did not die entirely afker the Korean War. Many

individuals remained intrigued with the concept and discussed the matter with others

who rnight share their interest. As shown in chapter two, Pearson had discussed the topic with the British govemment as early as 1953.' Obviously someone there was interested enough to listen, because in 1955 and early 1956 the British began to make their own noises over an international force9

As tensions in the Middle East continueci, the idea of an international force surfaced in the Canadian Parliament. It was not Pearson, but the leader of the officia1 opposition, John Diefenbaker, who brought it up during Question Period on 1 Febmary

1956. Diefenbaker asked Pearson if he would consider sending an international force to protect and assure the boundaries between Israel and its neighbors. Diefenbaker noted

6 Paul Martin, "Canada and the United Nations," (Reprinted hmthe Dalhousie Ralew, Winter 1953-54, v- 33, no. 4, pp. 212.26) no- 51R3, DHIST.

7 Lester B. Pearson, "Special Session of Parliament* Extemal Affairs Monthlv Bulletin, December 1956, v.8, no. 12, p. 379; Lester B. Pearson, "Keeping the Peace," in The Ouest For Peace, Andrew Cordier and W. Foote, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 103. For a brief summary of the actions of the CoUective Measures Committee see Leland Goodrich and Anne Sirnons, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Pace and SecuriR (Washington D.C.:The Brookings Institution, 1955), pp. 408-1 4.

8 Geoffery Pearson, Seize the Dav (Ottawa: Carieton University Press, 1993), p. 151; Lester Pearsoq "Special Session", p. 388.

9 As discussed in the previous chapter, Eden and Nutting both approached General Burns about his views on intrducing an imprwed UN force between Israel and the Arab nations to keep them separated See Burns, Benveen Arab and Isracli, p. 98, 136. that an Ottawa newspaper repotted that Canada and the Netherlands might agree to fonn

such a force, which was reportedly discussed by Eden and US President Dwight D.

Eisenhower. Pearson responded that he had discussed the issue with the governrnents of

Israel and the Arab nations, as well as with General Bunis. While he personally

supported the idea, as did the govemrnent of Canada, no proposal had been made to

Canada. Later, it was confirmed by Pearson that his discussions with the governments

of Israel Britain, France, the United States, and the Secretary General of the UN produced little support for any proposed force. l0

In February, after returning nom a tour of the Middle East, Secretary General

Dag Hammarskjold entertained questions from the press on the issue of an international force. Eden had expressed the desire to see UNTSO expanded or increased, and the press wanted Harnmarskjold's views on the matter. The Secretary General responded that he had nothing against enlarging UNTSO if Burns felt it necessary. This would not require any change in principle of the force. Changing the role and duties, however, would be a change in principle. While interea had been given to this possibility, its depamire from present legal status required consultation with the parties involved.

Hammarskjold went on to aate that the current situation did not require such a new departure. Any preventive action was designed to stabilize the situation and avoid or prevent incidents that might add to fiction and lead to any escalation. UNTSO was doing this, although not as well as was hoped. Another aspect to any preventive action

10 House of Commons Debates. v. 1, 1956 (Ottawa: Queen's Prinîer, 1956), pp. 777-8; Lester Pearson, "Special Sessions", pp. 379-80.388-

73 was to act as a third party and bridge the distance between the two sides in order to work

out a settiement In this regard the UN had ben unsuccessfûl."

Hammarskjold later asked Burns for his views on the matter of an international

force to replace UNTSO and what was needed to make it work. A study was done and

found that to prevent clashes on the Israeli-Egyptian border the ideal solution was a

guarantee of the borders and an assurance by the 'Three Powers' that any invasion by

either side would result in direct intervention by troops tiom the United States, Bdain,

and France. By creating a sense of security, this plan would ailow the two sides to work

out a peace settlement. With the possibility of intervention, neither side could attack the

other without risking receiving an attack by the Three Powers. Once they intervened,

lsrael and Egypt could not attack each other without attacking the troops of the Three

Powers. Burns noted, however, that this plan was not feasible. Both sides would have

objected to such a force and division within the Secunty Council made it impossible to

rnount. l2

Pearson, obviously, was not the only one wit h the idea of an international force

to police the peace. In fact, Pearson himself admitted this fiom the beginning in

Parliament. When discussing the Suez Crisis, he nated:

.. . there was nothing new in either this idea or in its proposal, and no one on this side of the House, 1 am sure, wants to take any credit for having put fonvard a novel and valuable proposal. 1 hope it was valuable but it certainly was not novel; except in the sense that it was adopted, but in no other respect.13

t1 'Transcript of Press Conference. New York, 27 Feb, 1956," in Public Pamrs of the Secreiary Generd of the United Nations. v.2. Dag Hanunarskiold. 1953-1956 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp, 690-1,6934.

II Burns, p. 136.

13 Pearson, "Special Session", p. 379. 74 The idea bad been around long before the creation of the UN, and had received considerable attention since. Many prominent fimres had disnissed if but no action had ever been taken. The ideas put forth were usually too grandiose and hence unacceptable infringements on national sovereignty or came forward at times when political and diplornatic winds did not provide the necessary motivation for nations to commit to these ideas.14

Korea proved to be a rare exception, however, to this rule. Still Korea was aIso an exception to the concept itself It lacked any tme international character because of

US domination and control. The international force sent to Korea also served to escalate the war between North and South Korea, rather than prevent or stop it.

Another exception to the rule was the UN observer forces. The UN, as the

League had before it, had experimented with peace observation since its beginnings.

Groups of observers were sent to Palestine in 1948 and Kashmir in 1949. The international community had also witnessed the sending of observers to indochina in

1954 based on the independent negotiations between France and the new nations of

Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. In each case small numbers of unarmed military personnel eom third party nations acted as observers to watch over case-fires or armistices and report on any violations to a peace commission or the UN itself

The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was probably the moa prominent of these early observer missions. It was recruited in 1948 to as& the truce commission and mediator, which were assigned the responsibility of trying to end the hostilities between Israel and its Arab neighbors. During the truce period it consisted of

682 military personnel tiom the US, France and Belgium. These observers were charged with edorcing the embargo of rnilitary shipments and entry of military personnel into Palestine. With the armistice agreements in 1949 this embargo ended and

UNTSO's focus shifled to the armistice lines where it attempted to prevent incursions by either side. The Security Council infionned the parties that they were expected to ensure their observance of the agreements and UNTSO was wnsequently redud to between 40 - 50 personnel (now recruited fiom other nations Iike Canada, Denmark,

New Zealand, and sweden). I5

Unfortunateiy, these observers found themselves spread too thin. On the

Jordanian border there were only five observers to cover 300 miles. This forced them to respond to complaints filed by either or both sides after the fact, thereby rernoving any preventive aspect of their presence. By 1955 there was a backlog of 2,150 complaints that required investigation on this border alone. UNTSO's failure to effectively preserve the peace in Palestine has been attributed to, in addition to the inadequate size of the force, limited or ambiguous tenns of reference, artificial boundary lines, a lack of cooperation on the part of the parties involved, and a large refùgee population. l6

Kashmir, a princely state between India and Pakistan, was the only one of 500 such States whose status was left undetermined after World War II. With a population that was a mix of Hindu, who associated themselves with India, and Moslem, who associated themselves with Pakistan, the temtory has been disputed over by these two

15 Wainhouse, pp. 256-75.

16 Cbid. States ever since. A cease-fire was called in 1949 and both parties agreed to a plebiscite to decide the temtory's fate (which has never been held because of a lack of agreement).

The UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), which was responsible for negotiating the arrangements for the settlement of the dispute and plebiscite, consiaed of 3 members; one chosen by India (Czechoslovakia), one by Pakistan (Argentins), and one by the President of the UN Security Council (the US). Established in 1948, it designated the first observers after the agreement of the cease-fire. In 1950, UNCIP was dissolved, but the observers remained and now reported directly to the Secretary-

General. "

The UN Military Observer Group (UNMOGIP) was responsible for supe~sing the cease-fire agreement, but ahfor maintaining order in the sparsely populated mountain areas (where it reserved the right to cal1 on the Indian army for assistance).

To do its job, UNMOGIP consisted of 32 observers (from Belgium, Canada, Mexico,

Norway, and the US) in 1949, and this number never exceeded 65 as of 1965. These observers were attached to the troops of both India and Pakistan, and with them investigated al1 complaints filed. UNMOGIP had three basic ftnctions in observing the cease-fire: investigate and settie complaints, determine the order of battle and disposition of opposing amies (for which both arrnies sent top secret reports to it revealing this), and control of civilians.'*

The observer mission to Indochina stands out for the simple reason that it did not involve any particular international organization. In 1954, France called a peace

17 ïbid., pp. 357-71.

18 ibid conference in Geneva to end its occupation of the region. This conference ted to an armistice, and to supervise the agreements made with the new countries of Laos,

Cambodia and Vietnam, an International Commission for S~pe~sionand Control

(ICC) was created. Debate over which nations should contribute to the ICC was resolved when the Communist Vietnamese leader suggested Canada, Poland, and india-

The ICC was responsible for supervising the armistice agreement, particularly the withdrawal of foreign forces, exchanges of prisoners, and the ban on the importation of rnilitary goods or personnel. Comprised of fixed and mobile teams, the fixed teams were located at specific points around the countries, while the mobile tearns had the freedom to patrol within their zones of action (Le. the border areas). Broken into three separate commissions, one for each nation, the ICCYstotal initial strength was 160

Canadians, 500 Indians, and 300 ~oles.'~

These observer forces, it often was discovered, were inadequate. They could do nothing to stop or prevent violations that might lead to an escalation of the conflict-

They could only investigate violations and report on them. They ofien suffered, as

UNTSO did, fkom unclear mandates or terms of reference. It was also blatantly clear that these types of forces could not succeed without the dedication of the international community and the constant cooperation of the parties involved.

Pearson reaiized that the concept of a peacekeeping force was a compromise between the Korean and observer experiences, and therefore liable to be more acceptable to everyone. It would be stronger than an observer force, but not a rnilitary force as such. Paramilitary in nature, it would never fight its way into a trouble spot.

19 ibid., pp. 489-5 17. 78 hstead, it would only go in after obtaining the consent of the nations involved. Once there, it would be strong enough to protect itself and to keep the opposing sides apart, but it would rely pnncipally on the agreement of the belligerents to abide by the terms of their disengagement. It was more a moral force than an armed force.

What made Pearson different fiorn most others who were interested in an international force were his realistic expectations. He kept the concept 60m being too irnposing and unacceptable to those needed to make it work, namely the hosts and potential contributors, but stiI1 strong enough that it had al1 that was needed to make it fiinctional, Pearson also had discussed his ideas with other leaders whenever the opportunity arose. Pearson was able to rnake it seem practical and possible. Thus, it came as no surprise to the international community when war broke out in the Middle

East in November 1956 that Pearson proposed the creation of such a force. As a prominent international figure with a strong reputation and a good idea, Pearson was simply the right person in the nght place at the right time when this crisis arose. This provided Pearson with the opportunity not only to propose the concept of an international force once again, but also to get it accepted by other nations who were willing to commit to its success, and help mold the new creation itself

The event that provided Pearson with this rare opportunity was the Suez Crisis.

The belligerents were the nations of Israel, Britain, France, and Egypt, and each had their own interests at stake. For Israel, security was the main issue. Surrounded by

Arab nations, which were hostile toward its existence, Israel had fought for survival in

1948 and won. The Arab nations, however, were not ready to accept Israel. Throughout the early 1WOs, the Arab nations organized an econornic boycott against Israel. The

79 most serious element of this was the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal by Egypt, which was in violation of the 1949 armistice agreement. Without access to these two waterways Israel's maritime commercial trdXc with east Atnca and Asia was practically cut OK"

Israel also feared Egypt was preparing to attack Israel again. Egypt's leader,

Gama1 Abd al Nasser, was considered a:

...mixture of radicalism and extreme Arab nationalism, coupled with an ambition to achieve leadership in the Arab world, pre-eminence in the world of Islam and pnmacy in the so-calleci 'non-aligned' group of nations (which, with President's Tito and Nehru, he founded), [which] gradually came to expression in a bitter, blind antagonism to ~srael."

In late 1955, Egypt received a major arms shipment from Czechoslovakia (230 tanks,

200 armoured troop carriers, 100 self-propelled guns, 500 artillery pieces, 200 aircrafl, and a number of destroyers, torpedo boats, and submannes). Now Egypt had the means to attack 1srae1.~~

The final reason Israel went to war with Egypt was the numerous Fedayeen raids that were staged by Palestinian guerillas from within Egypt. In 1955 these raids increased, becoming more fiequent and inflicting heavier casualties (260 kifled or wounded). By October 1956, Fedayeen raids reached an al1 time high in "intensity and

20 Gabriella Rosner, The United Nations Ernergencv Force (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 7-9; Chaim Herzog, Arab-Israeti Wars (New York: Vmtage Books, 1982), pp. 112-12; Michael Hartiottle, The Blue Ber& (Harrkburg PA: Slcickpole Books, 197 l), pp. 8-9; Fred Gaffen, In The Eve Of The Storm (Toronto: Deneau & Wayne Pubiïshers Ltd, 1987), p. 39.

21 Herzog, p. 112.

2 Ibid., pp. 112, 113.

23 Herzog. pp. 112,113; Harboctle, pp. 8-9; Wen, p. 39; Rosner, p. 10. 80 When, on 29 October 1956, Israel invaded Egypt, Britain and France were only

hours in issuing an ultimatum for both nations to cease-fire and move ten miles fiom the

Suez Canal or face intervention by British and French troops who would occupy the

Canal in order to proteçt it. This was just a façade. Fighting had not even reached the

Canal. If Egypt obeyed, it would be abandoning its temtory to an enemy. Of course,

Israel accepteâ, while Egypt refùsed. It would be discovered Later, although many suspectecl it at the time, that Bn'tain and France had conspired with Israel to attack

~gypt.'~They saw Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal on 27 Iuly 1956 as a threat to theu strategic interests, especiaily Europe's oil supply routes. Communist military aid to Egypt, Nasser's pan-Arab nationalist influence, and Egypt's support of Algerian rebels al1 served to incense Britain and France, but it was the loss of the Canal that set in motion preparations for military action by these two nation^.^'

Peacefbl attempts through negotiations and the UN were made to resolve the dispute with Egypt over the Suez Canal, but all failed. As Anglo-French preparations for a possible military seinire of the Canal were being made, France began negotiations with Israel for their involvement in the operation. So it was, when Israel made a pre- emptive attack on Egypt in 'self-defense', the potential threat to the Canal fiom military action gave the British and French a pretext to intervene and seize it. On 3 1 October

1956, with Egypt st il1 de fending itself against Israeli attacks, pre-positioned Anglo-

French forces began air attacks in preparation for the landing of tr~o~s.'~

31 Rosner, pp. 17-18;Herzog, p. 1 11; Men, p. 40.

3 Herzog, p. 1 13; Harûottle, p. 10; Gaffen, p. 39; Rosner, pp, 12-15.

26 Rosner, pp. 14-1 5; Henog, p. 1 14. 81 International response was immediate. On 30 October, General Burns and

UNTSO cailed for a cease-fire. Al1 attempts by the Security Council to cal1 for a cease-

fire were vetoed by Britain and France. With the Security Council deadlocked,

Yugoslavia proposed to enact the UFPR and cal1 an Emergency Session of the General

Assembly, which later met on 1 ~ovember."

The war in the Middle East and the actions of Britain and France alarmed the

international community. There was fear that this war would soon escalate as other

Arab nations came to Egypt's rescue. Also, with the invoivement of two great powers,

many feared that the superpowers might get drawn into the fray. Indeed, the USSR had

already approached the United States about intervening together, and threatened to send

troops unilaterally to Egypt's

In this crisis was a rare opportunity. The nations of the world were witnessing

the beginnings of a war that had the potential to escalate or spread. The crisis

atmosphere at the UN during the Emergency Sessions created a unique sense of

urgency. The international community was in a position to accept the idea of an

international force that promised to restore peace, and was motivated to make it

successful. In this situation, however, not just anyone could make this idea work. Many

key nations were directly involved or had chosen sides, while other nations did not have

the influence to get the idea accepted. More was required than jus the nght idea and the

27 United Nations, The Security Council Fails to Act," United Nations Review, December 1956, v.3,no.6,pp.9, 11.90-1, 93.

28 Rosner, pp, 22-23, 19-20; Lester Pearson, Memoirs. v.2, p. 256. nght time and place. For an international force to be accepted and go forward, it took

the right person to 'selly it to the international community.

Due to his unique position both within Canada and the international community,

Lester B. Pearson was that person. Within Canadian government Pearson was well

respected and his policies were supported. Dunng the summer and fa11 of 1956, with the

Liberal Govemment's term near an end and Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent expected

to retire, there was Iittle doubt in anyone7smind that Pearson would replace St. Laurent.

During the Suez Crisis, before going to the UN, Pearson briefed the Cabinet about his

ideas and intentions. He always received the full support of St. Laurent and the Cabinet.

Pearson basically was free to pursue any course he saw fitw During these Cabinet

meetings, rather than seeking approval, it appeared as though Pearson used the Cabinet

as a sounding board to air his ideas.

On the international stage, Pearson was just as well known and respected. He had a long history of supponing the UN and its endeavors, including his role in supporting the creation of the UFP that was enacted dunng this crisis. Pearson had been a contender for the position of Secretary General of the UN in 1945 and again in 1952.

He did hold the position of President of the Generai Assembly in 1952, however, and

£?om this he became well acquainted with most of the delegations. When the Suez

Crisis developed and Pearson went to New York for the Emergency Session to personally represent Canada, he was greeted almost as a savior. Upon reaching the UN, rnany delegates and advisors flocked to Pearson and his delegation to find out what

29 Geoffery Pearson, pp. 149, 155: Lester Pearson, Memoirs. v.2, pp. 24930; "Cabinet Conclusions 1956", RG2 Series A-5a, v. 5775, October 3 1, November 1,3,5, NAC.

83 solution he was going to propose.3o As noted by a British official years later, Pearson

was of exceptional character: "Both by his personai powers of negotiation and by the

respect in which he was held, he was able to exercise throughout the cnsis a modiQing

and humanking infl~ence."~' Early on during the Crisis, Pearson was able to keep Canada uncommitted at a

time when the nations of Afnca, Asia, and the Communist Bloc were condemning

Britain, France, and Israel, while New Zealand and Australia sided with the British. Ali

other countries made no effort to hide their disapproval of Britain, France, and Israel's

actions, and cailed on them to case their aggression. By remaining uncommitted,

Pearson kept himself and Canada in a position where they did not really offend anyone,

aithough they were Iater accused at home of abandoning their mother countries. Canada

was viewed as impartial because it did not have any significant political or economic

interests in the Third World areas of conflict, lacked a colonial or irnperial history, and

was identifieci both in and outside the UN with active, independent, intemationalism.

This neutraiity of sorts would later allow Pearson the ability to objectiveiy propose the

concept of an international police force and have it accepted by al1 si de^.'^ No one

could doubt his sincerity and desire for creating such a force. Pearson had been

discussing such a concept for years. Because of this reputation as a supporter of an

international force, and the respect he held both nationally and internationally at the

30 Lester Pearson, Memoirs, v.2, pp. 121-32; John English, The Worldlv Years:The Life of Lester Pearson. v.2. 1949-1972 (Toronto: Alfred A Knopf, 1992). pp. 63, 136; Beal, p. 1 12.

3 1 Harold MacMillan, Riding the Stonn v.2 (London: MacMillan, 197 1), p. 163.

37 English, Worldlv Years, pp 136, 137-8; Lester Pearso~Memoirs v.2, p. 216; Fabian, pp. 25-6.

84 time, there was no one else in a better position to see to its creaîion and hence Save the

peace.

With the Israeli attack beginning on 29 October, the British-French ultimatum on

the 30th deadlock in the Security Council and British-French air attacks beginning on

the 3 I st, and the &st Emergency Session of the General Assembly on 1 November,

there was very little time to prepare or plan a solution to the crisis. Yet almost

immediately Pearson had one and set the bail rolling to get it organized. This anbe

attributed to the fact that Pearson had invested much previous thought on how to go

about creating such a force, what it should look like, how it would operate, and what its

mandate might be.

On the moming of the 3 1st, Pearson informed the Cabinet that he expected the

General Assembly to meet under the UFPR to consider the crisis in the Middle ~ast."

Already Pearson was considering a UN force and had informed Norman Robertson,

Canada's High Commissioner to Britain, because the next moming Robertson met with

Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the senior British Foreign Office oficial. Dunng this meeting,

Robertson inforrned him that:

[Pearson was] turning over in [his] mind the possibility of proposing a cease-fire, to be followed by a major diplornatic conference to deal with the whole context of Middle Eastern and North Afiican questions, and that as part of this approach it would be essentiai to set up an adequate LNmilitary force to separate the Egyptians from the [sraelis."

- -- - 33 "Cabinet Conclusions", RG2 Senes A-Sa, v. 57753 1 Oaober 1956, NAC.

34 Italics added by author- See Robertson to Lester B Pearson, 1 November 1956. MG 26 N1, v.39, NAC. Kirkpatrick revealed that Eden was going to state in Parliament that aflernoon that

police action was necessary to separate the belligerents, which was what the British and

French were attempting. Eden would prodaim his willingness to hand over this task to

the UN if they would be prepared to do so by creating a "UN force strong enough to

prevent renewed hostilities.. . it would have to be.. . a substantial and properly supported

international force set up to maintain peace and prevent aggression in the Middle East,

and not just a.. . gimmick."3"t is significant that Eden, quite independently of Pearson,

was proposing an inter-positional UN force of exactly the type Pearson had in mind.

Eden, of course, had been instrumental in creating the Saarforce in 1934.

At the same time that Robertson and Kirkpatrick were discussing Pearson's

intentions, Pearson himself was proposing his idea to Cabinet. Widespread support was expected that evening in the General Assembly for a resolution condemning the United

Kingdom, France, and Israel. Pearson expected that the British "would soon welcome a proposal calling for the cessation of hostilities, the convening of a widely-based conference on Middle Eastern matters, and, in the intenm, the provision of substantial police forces stationed on the Israel-Arab borders to keep peace.'^'6

That aflernoon, on 1 November, Pearson arriveci at the UN for the Emergency

Session. Immediately he approached the Secretary-General and revealed to him (before the Assernbly convened at 5:OOpm) his idea of a UN force. Harnmarskjold was skeptical, even pessimistic, largely due to the failure of his attempts to negotiate with the belligerents over the past few months. Meanwhile, the rest of Pearson's delegation,

36 "Cabinet Conclusions", RG2 Series A-5% v. 5775, 1 November 1956, NAC. 86 chiefly John Holmes, GeoEiey Murray, and Burt MacKay, roamed the halls of the UN

in an effort to puge the attitudes of the other delegations and their opinions on

Pearson's idta3'

Mer speaking with Hammankjold, Peanon spoke with John Foster Dulles, the

American Secretary of State. Dulles apparently told Pearson that it was twlate to

change the prepared resolution he was going to introduce which called for al1 parties to

cease-fire, stop movement of troops to the area, and return to the armistice lines. Dulles

did, however, encourage Pearson to pursue the idea of a UN force?

After the debate on the American resolution, in which he did not partake, and the

vote was held, where he abstained, Pearson asked for the floor to explain his reasons for

not voting. Pearson claimed that the resolution only sought to re-establish an unacceptable status quo and that it included nothing to keep another conflict fiom arising a few months down the road. He proposed that:

the time has now come for the üN not only to bring about a cease-fire, but to move in and police the case-fire.. . I would therefore like to see a provision in this resolution.. . authorizing the Secretary General to begin to make arrangements with Member Governrnents for a United Nations force.. . My own government would be glad to recomrnend Canadian participation in such a United Nations Force, a truly international peace and police force.39

After this speech, Dulles rose and gave the US'S support to Pearson's idea, and called on him to introduce a forma1 proposal to mate such a force."

37 English, Worldlv Years, pp. 137-8;Brian Urq- Ral~hBunche. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), p. 265; Lester Pearson, Memoirs v.2, pp. 245,246, 247-8.

38 ibid

39 Lester Pearson, Memoirs. v.2, p. 247.

40 Ibid The Assembly meeting did not end until afier 2:00 am on 2 November. It was

report ed that irnmediately afterwards t hat Under-Secretary Ralph Bunche and

Hammarskjold's Executive Assistant Andrew Cordier visited Pearson at his hotel room

They were interested in discussing Pearson's idea and find out exactly what he had in

mind. These two men would later be the primary organizers of the UN force, being

charged with implernenting the plans and orders of the Secretary General who would be

responsible for creating and wmmding the forcece4'

After a short rest, Pearson had lunch with Hammarskjold to discuss the idea

further. He was still doubtfùl about the chances for success. While not rejecting the

idea, Hammarskjold pointed out the numerous dificulties to overcome. Before

returning to Ottawa to prepare a resolution, Pearson also met with Sir Pierson Dixon, the

head of the British delegation, who "was hardly more en~oura~in~."~~

Still Pearson persevered, sure of his path. On the morning of 3 November,

before meeting with the Cabinet, he received word that the British were willing to stop

military action provided that UN forces moved in, and Egypt and Israel accepted Anglo-

French forces in the Canal area until the UN force deployed. This would be totaily

unacceptable to the international community, but with British and French troops already

in position to invade, there was little hope of stopping them. Pearson, therefore,

contemplated bringing these troops under the UN flag and control, mixing them with contingents tiorn other nations. He hoped that this could prevent the condemnation of

Bntain and France. After discussing this with Cabinet, Pearson sent word to the

J I Urquhart, pp. 265-7.

42 Lester Pearson, Memok. v.2, pp. 247-8. 88 Canadian Ambassador in Washington to get the Arnerican view on this. While

interested in getting their allies 'off the hook', the Amerïcans pointed out that this would

appear as legitimizing the Anglo-French invasion and min the credibility of anyone who

proposed it."

Pearson changed the proposal because of the US advice and planned to simply

ask the Secretary General to prepare a plan for the creation of a üN force." Once back

at the UN, Pearson and his advisors began to lobby for support of his resolution.

Harnmarskjold, in a remarkable change of attitude, approached Pearson to express his

support for the idea. While not what the British had hoped for, Dixon agreed not to vote

against the proposal. The rnost important source of support twned out to be india. India

was not only the key to the support of other Asian and Afncan nations, but also served

to get the support of Egypt for the proposal. Arthur Lall, the head of the Indian

delegation, convinced the Egyptian delegation and Nasser himself to support it. This

intense Iobbying paid off, for when it came to a vote, no one opposed Pearson's

reso~ution.~~

It is of interest to note that the resolution that Pearson introduced to the UN and

made him famous for 'inventing' peacekeeping was no? even his. The American State

Department was large1y responsible for the dr& resolution Pearson used. Aware of

Pearson's intentions, they had, in the words of Pearson, ". ..evidently taken our initiative

43 Lester Pearson. Mernoirs. v.2, pp. 219-50;"Cabinet Conclusionsw,RG2 Series A-Sa, v. 5775, 1 November 1956, NAC,

44 "Resolurion 998 (ES-1)of 4 November 195C in Basic Documents on United Nations and Related Peacekee~ingForces, edited by Robert Sie- (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989). p. 3.

45 Lester Pearson, Memoirs. v.2. pp. 249,25 1,253; Geoffery Pearson, pp. 149-50. 89 to heart and had prepared a drafl for him [Cabot Lodge, US permanent representative to

the which he felt would be acceptable to the Egyptians and consequently the Afro-

Asian group. His text was simpler than ours and with some minor alterations we

adopted it as Our own."' Pearson's original proposal included the creation of a five-

member cornmittee to begin planning of a force instead of the Secretary-General, and

did not include reference to required consent of the nations concemed. Together the US

State Department and Pearson pieced together the te* ofthe resdution. No one was aware of the US involvement until well afler the crisis was o~er.~'

Finally the idea of an international police force was accepted, due in large part to the efforts of Pearson. He was not done, however. Pearson would play an important part in the actual planning and creation of the force, which had yet to be done. The moming after Pearson's resolution was accepted, 4 November, Pearson went to

Hammarskjold's office and met with the Secretary Generai, Cordier, Bunche, and the delegates from Nonvay, Columbia and India This group would eventually become

Hammarskjold's Advisory Committee. Not oficially created until the 7th this

Committee would aid the Secretary General to "undertake the development of those aspects of the planning for the Force and its operation.. . which do not fa11 within the area of the direct responsibility of the Chief of the ~omrnand."~~Members of this

Committee would discuss and debate al1 issues, and hence, played a major role in forming the force. Such matters as the necessity of consent of nations concemed before

18 "Generai Assembly Resolution 1001 (ES-1)of 7 November 1956," Basic Documents, p. 5-6. 90 the force could be established and deployed, composition of the force, withdrawal and

cooperation of Israel, setup of the UN command, use of British and French troops in the

force, regulations and mandate for the force, etc., were jua some of the many things

di~cussed.~'

This group helped Hammarskjold prepare his fust report on the creation of the

UN force, which was accepted by the Assembly less than 24 hours after it approved

Pearson's resolution. The first report simply established a UN Command for the force, appointed General Burns as Chief of Command, and called on Burns to recmit fiom

UNTSO a small nurnber of oficers (from nations other than permanent Security Council members) to form a command staff."

That next evening Pearson personally worked with Hammarskjold during the

Assembly meeting until2:OOam of6 November to drafl his second and final report. It was accepted dunng that session before the Assembly di~missed.~'This report outlined three ways such an international force could be developed. The first option was a UN- commanded operation which answered only to the Secretary General. The second was to charge a single nation or group of nations to carry out UN resolutions. Finally, the second approach could be taken, except with the understanding that it would later be

- -- 49 It is interesting to note that Hammarskjold e.upfeSSed the idea of including British and French troops in the UN force, the same idea Pearson had, since they were in the area and it would be possilbly hvo wieeksbefore troops hmother nations could be deployed. This may point to the e-xtent that others' ideas actually origùiated with Pearson and his explaining his thoughts wiih hem See Permanent Mission NY to Elqenial Affairs, 4 November 1956, MG 26 NI, v.39, Middle East-UNEF-Nov 1956, pt.1, NAC; "3rd Meeting of Advisory Cornmittee, 20 November 1956," RG2, v. 7775. 12479-A-40, pt.1.1. NAC. so "General Assembly Resolution 1000 (ES-1)of 5 November 1956," Basic Documents, p. 3.

51 Lester Pearson, Manoirs. v.2. p. 257; Permanent Mission NY to Eutcd Affairs. 5 November 1956, MG 26 NI, v.39, Middle East-UNEF-Nov 1956, pt 1, NAC. brought under UN control. The Secretary General noteci that with the acceptance of his

first report, the General Assembly had opted for the first type. This international force

would be temporary, Hammarskjold noted, due to its emergency nature. Due to the

limited enforcement powers of the Assembly and the terms of the UFPR under which this force was created it would require the consent of participants and hosts before it could be deployed and operated. The mandate of the force would be to '"secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with al1 the terms' of resolution

997(ES-1) of 2 November 1956."~~Finally, the report noted that the UN should finance the mission costs that go beyond the contnbuting nations normal operating mas for their contingents.s3

With the passing of Hammarskjold's final report, the basic machinery needed to establish and operate a UN force was created. Egypt consented to the deployment of the

UN force on its temtory. Brïtain, France and Israel agreed to a cease-fire and withdrawal. Further escalation of the crisis was averted. In the following days, numerous offers to supply troops for the emergency force came in fiom members of the

UN. In the words of Bunche: ". ..this is the most popular army in history, an army which everyone fights to get into?"" The Secretary General, aided by the Advisory

Cornmittee, would choose the troops to create this new force, would draw up a set of regulations for the functioning of it, and would issue orders and receive reports from the

UN command. The UN finally had the police force so many had desired it to have for

52 "Second and Final Report of the Secretaq Generai. .. (UN Doc. M3302 of 6 November 1956)," Basic Documents, pp, 4-5. so long. Ironically, the Israeli delegation had earlier scoffed at Pearson's resolut ion

calling on the Secretary General to create a plan for an international force in 48 hours.

They commented skeptically that since the UN had been [abouring for 48 months to

create a police force without result, there was little chance of hem doing it now in jua

48 houd5

Despite Israeli doubts, the UN did manage to create the United Nations

Emergency Force (UNEF). This can largely be attrîbuted to the motivation created by the Suez Crisis. The fear of war and its spreading to other nations was very real. The outrage at Britain and France's actions was immense. As Pearson stated to the press derthe crisis: "It did seem during that dramatic night when this idea of the Force was put fonvard in the debate, that the situation was very rapidly deteriorating"" Yet, it was Pearson's long standing reputation for supporting the idea of an international peace and police force, his ability to shape Canada's Foreign policies, and the international respect for Canada, which al1 came together in this one moment in time during the cnsis and served to see the idea reach hition.

Being the right person in the right place at the right time is ofien what makes a hero. Pearson was praised as a hero. For being the instrumental figure in proposing and creating UNEF, Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October 1957. He was not, however, just in the right place at the right time in the fa11 of 1956, but was so throughout his life. It was his Methodist upbringing, his First World War experiences,

54 Urquhart, p. 270.

5s Joseph Lash, Dag Hammarskiold- (Garden City, NY: Doublyday, 1% 1), p. 87. and his university education that opened his mind to the ideas of intemationalism and

peace presewation. Most importantly, it was his probable exposure to the peacekeeping concept that got his mind turning over this specific idea of an international force to protect the peace and served as a solution when it fell upon him to help create UNEF.

- 56 "Intem-ew of L. B. Pearson by C0C United Nations Correspondent Charles Lynch, 25 November 1956," Fie 653.003@30), no. 56/34, DHIST. Conclusion

There was nothing new about the idea of a United Nations peacekeeping force. As John Holmes said, everyone had been taiking about it without being specific.. . none of those involved could say that, at any one moment, somebody proposed the United Nations Emergency Force. And, in any case, it was not the idea that was so important, but the diplornatic performance in getting it accepted. '

This quotation captures the central argument of this thesis. Lester Pearson has

been hailed as the father or inventor of peacekeeping. In an effort to demystie

Pearson's role in the creation of United Nations peacekeeping, this thesis demonstrates

that the concept had existed long before the creation of UNEF in November 1956.

Chapter two dernonstrated that the concept had been in existence as early as 192 1 when

the League of Nations considered sending an interpositional force to the region

surrounding the city of Vilna in an effort to prevent war between Poland and Lithuania.

The actual practice of the concept had started in 1934 when the League sent an

international force to aid in the maintenance of law and order in the territory of the Saar

during a plebiscite. This force, it was shown, was a modem peacekeeping force in every aspect of the concept as defined in chapter one. Possibly because of this previous

1 Peter Stursberg, Lester Pearson and the American Dilemma. (Toronto: Doubleday Canada Ltd., 1980), p. 144, existence of peacekeeping in the League, the concept was cornmon knowledge in the

international wmmunity since the early beginnings of the UN.

As the quote remarked, "everyone had been talking about it". Peacekeeping was

a popular topic of conversation before November 1956, even if it had not yet been given

that label. Lester Pearson had presented such a concept to the San Francisco Conference

during the creation of the UN, and he had continued to lobby support for the idea

throughout the late 1940s and 1950% He discussed it with the leaders of Bitah, the

United States, IsraeI, Egypt, and the UN. in particular, records show he had conversations about the issue with Hammarskjold, Eden, Lloyd, and Burns. It is reasonable to assume that there were others, especially colleagues in the Canadian government or at the United Nations.

it is obvious that Pearson was not the only one who had an understanding of the concept or the desire to see the UN with an international force to protect world peace.

Eden had been instrumental in the creation of the Saarforce and had approached Burns,

Eisenhower, and Pearson about peacekeeping. He had even proposed the concept independently of Pearson in November 1956. Private interest groups like the

Commission to Study the Organization of Peace had put forward similar concepts. The

UN General Assembly itself had passed the Uniting For Peace Resolution that envisioned the possible creation of such a force and provided measures for it establishment.

International forces had existed within the UN itself before November 1956.

The enforcement action in Korea had re-kindled interest in international forces and had raised the hopes of many that this would be the begiming of a more permanent force for the UN. The UN had deployed observer forces to Kashmir and Palestine. The ICC

involved observers in Indochina. Al1 of these forces, both the observers and in Korea,

were of a distindly different nature than peacekeeping, but did provide some limited

experience and inspiration.

As this thesis has endeavored to demonstrate, the peacekeeping concept was not

a new one when it was put forward as a solution for the Suez Crisis in November 1956.

The idea was not novel, but its acceptance and implementation was. The diplornatic performance in proposing the solution and achieving the support of the members of the

UN for the emergency force set this initiative apart fkom earlier UN efforts. This performance was what actuaily earned Pearson the Nobel Peace Prize. He had not invented anything new, but he had worked tirelessly to bring about the creation of a particular force for a particular situation based on an existing concept. The near unanimous support for such a force in a crisis of this nature was a first for the UN.

The origins of the myth that Pearson invented or created peacekeeping are vague. Pearson's son Geoffiey once stated:

1 don't think my father would have claimed authorship of the idea of using the UN for peacekeeping purposes because that was an old idea that went way back to Korea. [.. .] But the idea of the UN force was an old one which we [Canada] and my father encouraged. [. ..] Suez was only four years after the end of Korea - three years. So it was a shon time and people could easily say in 1956, 'Lets revive the idea of a [IN force.' So it wasn't anybody's idea. 1 think it was a matter of seizing the opportunity in the ~ssernbl~.*

In faa, Pearson himself refused to accept ownership of the concept. Both in Parliament during the Suez Crisis and years later in his memoirs he specifically stated that it was not a new idea and that he could not take credit for inventing it. Yet popular perception has ignored these inconsistencies, and instead has absorbed the myth. Peacekeeping

continues to be popular with the Canadian public, and successive govemments continue

to commit Canadian troops and resources to such endeavon largely because of this. As

long as peacekeeping holds that special spot in the Canadian identity, Pearson will be

one of those rare national heroes.

The myth, however, need not continue. Few have challenged the myth by

presenting what Pearson actually did along with a background in the existence of the

concept. Those who have examined the creation of UNEF or Pearson's role in it have

begun their studies with the rise of the crisis. Almost none have attempted to show that

the concept aiready existed. Without this part, the reader is prone to misinterpet what it

was Pearson really did, and bis role is exaggerated until it becomes myth. This thesis

has sought to limit the myth by presenting Pearson's role within the context of the peacekeeping concept's origins before the creation of UNEF.

Pearson did not invent peacekeeping in November 1956 at the United Nations

Emergency Session on the Suez Crisis. The idea or concept of peacekeeping had been around for a long time. Pearson merely proposed the implementation of a solution that already existed within international experience. It must be acknowledged that he worked hard to lobby support for the idea and assisted [IN Secretary-General Dag

Hammarskjold in the paperwork that would actually create it on the W's books. Yet, while Pearson did play an important, even a leading role in the creation of the United

Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)and deserved much credit for his work his role has been overstated in Canadian lore. He was peacekeeping's 'midwife', not its father. Bibliography

Primary Sources

A. Published:

Bnnd, J.E.S. 'Zeague of Nations: Report by the Commander in Chief, International Force in the Saar, For the Monnation of the Council of the League of Nations (26 October, 1935)," IPKO Documentation, no. 29, February 1968. Cordier, Andrew, ed. Public Pa~ersof the Secretary Generai of The United Nations. v.2, Dan Hammarsk-iold. 1953-1 956. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. Cordier, Andrew, ed, Public Pauers of the Secretary Generd of The United Nations. v.3, Dag Hammars~iold.1956-1 957. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. Goodrich, Leland and Habro, Edvard. Charter of the United Nations: Commentarv and Documents. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1946. Higgins, Rosalyn. United Nations Peacekee~ing 1946- 1967: Documents and Comment- Mord: Word University Press, 1969. House of Commons (CANADA), Debates. 1949 to 1957. House of Commons (United Kingdom), Debates. 1934 to 1935. Lauterpacht, E. The UN Emergencv Force: Basic Documents. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1960- Royal Institute of International -airs. Documents on International Mairs. 1934. London: Oxford University Press, 1935. Siekmann, RC.R Basic Documents on United Nations and Related Peace-Kee~inq Forces. London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989. 7he Lotidon Irmes. London, U.K. December 1934 to May 1935. The Globe rnldMaiI. Toronto, Canada. December 1934 to May 1935.

B. Unpublished:

File 653.003 @29), Lester B. Pearson, Statements and Speeches - Information Division Of the Department of Extemal Mairs, Directorate of Hiaory, Depariment of National Defence (DHIST). File 653.003 @30), Lester B. Pearson, Statements and Speeches - Information Division Of the Department of External Affairs, DHIST. MG26 N, The Pearson Papers, National Archives of Canada (NAC). MG30 E 157, The Crerar Papers, NAC. RG2, Records of the Privy Council Office, NAC. RG24, Records of the Department of National Defence, NAC. RG25, Records of the Department of Extemal Affairs, NAC. Secondary Sources

A. Books and Monographs

Beal, John R The Pearson Phenornenon. Toronto: Longmans Canada Ltd., 1964. Bloomfield, Lincoln P. International Milita? Forces. Boston: Little Brown, 1964. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros- An Agenda for Peace. New York: United Nations, 1992. Boutros-Ghaii, Boutros. The United Nations and El Salvador. 1990- 1995. New York: United Nations, I 995 - Boyd, James M. United Nations Peace-Kee~inaOperations: A Military and Politicai A~praisal.New York: Praeger Publishers, Ig?I. Burns, E.L.M, Between Arab and Israeli. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin And Co, Ltd., 1962. Canadian Department of Extemal Affàirs. Crisis in the Middle East: October-December 1956. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957. Canadian Department of National Defence. Peacekee~ine:a Canadian Contribution to the World. Ottawa: Dept. of National Defence, 1986. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Preventing Deadlv Conflict. New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 2997. Carnegie Endowrnent for International Peace Library. International Police: proposais for cooperative defense throunh the use of international mies. navies. and air Forces. Washington, D.C. : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945. CFP (Canadian Forces Publication) 301(3). Peacekeepinn Ouerations - First Dr&. Ottawa: National Defense Headquarters, 1992. Charters, David A., ed. Peacekeepinn and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution. Fredericton: Center for Conflict Studies, 1994. Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 1939-1972. Building Peace. v. 1. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press Inc., 1973. Cox, Arthur M. Prospects for Peacekeeoinq. Washington, D. C. : The Brookings Institution, 1967. Davies, David. The Problem of the Twentieth Centurv: a studv in International relations. London: E. Benn Ltd., 1934. Doughty, Robert, et al. Limited War in the Nuclear Age. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath And Co., 1996. Durch, William J., ed. The Evolution of Peacekee~ing.New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. Eden, Anthony. The Eden Memoirs: Facina the Dictators. London: Cassel1 & Company Ltd., 1962. English, John. Shadow of Heaven: The Life of Lester Pearson Vol. 1. 1897-1948. Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys Ltd., 1989. English, John. The WorldIv Years: The Life of Lester Pearson, v.2. 1949-1 972. Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992. Fabian, Larry. Soldiers Without Enemies. Washington: Brookings Institution, 197 1. Frye, William R A United Nations Peace Force. New York: Oceana Publications hc., 1957. Goodnch, Leland and Sirnons, Anne. The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. Washington, D.C.: Brwkings Institute, 1955. Gitffen., Fred. In the EY~of the Storm. Toronto: Deneau & Wayne Riblishers Ltd., 1987. Harbottie, Michael. Blue Berets. Harrisburg, PA: Staclrpole Books, 1971. Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wan. New York: Vintage Books, 1982. International Peace Academy. Peacekee~er'sHandbook. New York: Pergamon Press, 1984. James, Alan. Peacekeepinsz in International Politics. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990. James, Alan. The Politics of Peace-Kee~inq.London: Chatto & Windus Ltd., 1969- Jones, Peter. Peacek-ing: an annotated bibliomaphv. Kingston, ON: RP. Frye, 1989. Lash, Joseph. Da9 Hammarsk-iold. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961. Legault, Albert. Peace-Kee~in~O~erations: Bibliogaphv. Paris: International Information Center on Peace-Keeping Operations, 1983. Lloyd, Selwyn. Suez 1956: A Personal Account. New York: Mayflower Books, 1978. Luard, Evan. A Histop of the United Nations. v. 1. London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1982. MacMillan, Harold. Riding the Storm. v.2. London: MacMillan Press Ltd-, 1971. Maguire, Robert, et al. Haiti Held Hostane: International Res~onsesto the Ouest for Nationhood. 1986- 1996. Providence, RI: Thomas J Watson Jr. Institute for Intemationaf Studies, 1996. Mays, Terry. HistoricaI Dictionary of Multinational Peacekee~ing.Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1996. McKenzie, Lewis. Peacekeeper; The Road to Saraievo. Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 1993. McQuarrie, John, Between the Lines; Canadians in the Service of Peace. Toronto: MacMillan Canada, 1993. Miller, Richard 1. Dae Hammenkiold and Crisis Diplomacy. New York: Pyrarnid Books, 1961. Momson, Alex, ed. The Chanszinn Face of Peacekeepinq. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993. Pearson, Geoffery. Seize the Dav: Lester Pearson and Crisis Di~lornac~-Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993- Pearson, Lester B. Democrac~in World Politics. Toronto: S.I. Reginald Saunders & Co. Ltd., 1955. Pearson, Lester B. Mike: The Memoirs of the Riaht Honourable Lester B. Pearson. vol. 1. 1897- 1948. Toronto: University Of Toronto Press, 1972. Pearson, Lester B. Mike: The Memoirs of the Riaht Honourable Lester B. Pearson. vol. 2. 1948- 1957. Toronto: University Of Toronto Press, 1973. Pearson, Lester B. The Four Faces of Peace. Toronto: McClelland And Stewart Ltd., 1964. Rikhye, Indar J. The Thin Blue Line. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974. Rikhye, Indar J. The Theogr and Pradice of Peacekee~inq.London: Hum, 1984. Rikhye, Indar J. The United Nat ions and Peacekee~ing.Basingstoke: MacMillan and the International Peace Academy, 1990. Robertson, Terence. Crisisr The Inside Story of the Suez Cons~iracv,Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1064. Rosner, Gabriella. The United Nations Emeraencv Force. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. Snow, Donald. Peacekee~ina.Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in The New World Order. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Amy War College, 1993. Standing Senate Cornmittee on Foreign AfEairs. Meeting New Challenges: Canada's Response to a New Generation of Peacekeepinq, Ottawa: The Senate of Canada, 1993. Stursberg, Peter. Lester Pearson and the American Dilemma Toronto: Doubleday Canada Ltd., 1980. Taylor, Aiastair, et al. Peacekeeping international Challenge And Canadian Response. Lindsay, ON: John Deyell Ltd., 1968. United Nations. The Blue Helmets. New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1985. Urquhart, Brian. Ralph Bunche. New York: W.W. Norton, 1993. Wainhouse, David W. International Peace Observations. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966. Walters, F.P. A Histo- of the Leamie of Nations. London: Odord University Press, 1960. Wambaugh, Sarah. The Saar Plebiscite. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1940. Wehberg, Hans. Theoy and Practice of International Poticinq. London: Constable, 1935. Wiseman, Henry, ed. Peacekeeping: Ap~raisaisand Proposals.Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1983.

B. Articles and Chapters:

Arnold, Thomas and Ruland, Heather R "The 'Prehistory' of Peacekeeping," in Soldiers for Peace, edited by Barbara Benton. New York: Fact on File Inc., 1996, pp. 11-23. Carter, W.H. "An International Police Force at M"Fiehting Forces, v. 11, February 1935, pp. 522-7. Cohen, Maxwell. "The United Nations Emergency Force: A Preliminary View," International Journal, v. 12, no.2, Spring 1957, pp. 109-27. Eayrs, James. "Canadian Policy and Opinion During the Suez Crisis," International Journal, v. 12, no.2, Spring 1957, pp. 97-1 08. Ericson, Lm. "Sweden and the Saar, A Peacekeeping Operation, 1934-35," in Peacekeepina. 18 15 to Todav: Proceedinps of the XXI Colloquium of the International Commission of Militarv History. (Quebec: International Commission of Military Histov, 1995), pp. 592-6. Farris, Karl. "UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On Balance, a Success," Parameters, v.24, no. 1, Spring 1994, pp. 38-50. Gorst, Anthony and Lucas, W. Scott. "Suez 1956: Strategy and the Diplornatic Process," Journal of Strateaic Studies, v. 11, no.4, December 1988, pp. 391-436. Granatstein, J. L. "Peacekeeping : Did Canada Make a Difference? And What Di fference Did Peacekeeping Make to Canada?" in Foreign Policy and National Securitv. (Publisher and Year Unknown), pp. 343-54. Hill, C. J. "Great Bntain and the Saar Plebiscite of January 13 1935," Journal of Contemwrarv History April 1974, vol. 9, pp. 121-42. Lewis, Paul. "A Short fistory of United Nations Peacekeeping," in Soidiers for Peace, edited by Barbara Benton. (New York: Fact on File Inc., 1996), pp. 11-23. Maurice, Major-General F. "The Beginning of an International Police Force," Fi~htinq

-7Forces v. 1 1, August 1934, pp. 248-5 1. MacKinley, John and Chopra, Jarat. "Second Generation Multinational Operations," Washinaton Ouarterlv, v. 15, July 1993, pp. 451-64. Pearson, Lester B. "Keeping the Peace," in The Quest For Peace. Cordier, Andrew and Foote, W., ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 99-1 17. Pearson, Lester B. "Special Session of Parliament," External mirsMonthlv Bulletin, v.8, no. 12, Decernber 1956, pp. 362-391. Royal Institute of International Affairs. "Relations Between France and Germany Over the Saar," in Survey of International Affairs. (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), pp. 578-627. United Nations. "The Security Council Fails to Act," United Nations Review, December 1956, v.3, no.6, pp. 10-14, 80-93. Williams, D. Colwyq "Origins and Practices of UN Peacekeeping," in The Future of United Nations Peacekee~inq(Toronto: United Nations Association in Canada, 1965), pp. 10-20.