Trends in Korean rice and soybean exports to Japan Rice Unit price of rice Rice Soybean Unit price of Soybeans Year (yen) (yen/sŏk) (sŏk) (yen) soybeans(yen/sŏk) (sŏk) 1885 27,201 4.00 6,800 53,505 2.57 20,819 1886 10,523 3.58 2,939 74,413 2.75 27,059 1887 128,948 3.33 38,723 402,924 2.76 145,986 1888 21,472 3.39 6,333 605,358 2.65 228,436 1889 54,304 5.62 9,662 710,808 3.61 196,899 1890 2,540,652 5.82 436,538 1,340,773 3.81 351,908 1891 2,225,043 4.90 454,090 1,198,963 3.83 313,045 1892 1,348,796 5.12 263,436 1,084,879 3.69 294,055 1893 470,208 5.40 87,075 843,114 4.34 194,265 1894 810,475 6.51 124,496 629,416 4.63 135,942 1895 888,022 6.05 146,780 1,172,437 4.88 240,253 1896 2,852,033 6.92 412,143 1,534,069 4.93 311,170 1897 6,009,050 7.99 752,071 1,817,314 6.40 283,955 1898 2,704,887 10.57 255,902 1,172,301 7.03 166,756 1899 1,689,909 7.50 225,321 1,667,324 6.82 244,475 1900 4,694,167 7.91 593,447 2,417,471 6.23 388,037 1901 6,009,641 7.55 795,978 2,498,298 5.56 449,334 1902 3,961,312 9.29 426,406 2,173,871 5.60 388,191 1903 4,781,218 10.18 469,667 2,116,740 5.91 358,162 1904 1,578,629 10.38 152,083 2,592,737 8.04 322,479 1905 1,268,502 10.18 124,607 2,933,598 8.01 366,241 Source：Hayashi Yusuke (林雄介), “The Masses’ Perception of Japan in late 19th century Korea (一九世紀末、朝鮮民衆の対日認識について)”, Bulletin of Society for Study in Korean History (朝鮮史研究会論文集), Vol. 33, 1995, p. 126. The above trend saw the Japanese merchants engaged in trade with Korea used the nationwide relaxation of restrictions on commercial activities in Korea in 1885 as their opportunity to directly control the local distribution of grain through the implement known as the advance payment mechanism(Japanese merchants would provide advance payments to Koreans in order to secure the necessary grain). The widespread use of such practices in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War led to the outbreak of conflicts with local Koreans.20 The debate over the export of Korean grain to Japan first surfaced right Yamada Ryosuke 103 after the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876. Concerned about the possibility for the excessive export of its grain abroad following Chosŏn’s opening, the Chosŏn government demanded its Japanese counterpart to exclude grains from the list of tradable items. However, citing the possibility that grain might in fact be exported from Japan to Chosŏn when the latter suffered poor harvests and the need to ensure a steady supply of food for the Japanese residents in Korea, the Japanese government managed to persuade its Korean counterpart to include grains on the list of the tradable items that was included in the Trade Rules (貿易規則) agreement signed in August 1876. However, the growing amount of grain being exported from Chosŏn to Japan eventually compelled the Chosŏn government to call for the prohibition of the export of such grains. In the end, the Chosŏn government’s request was accepted by the Japanese and a Grain Export Prohibition provision was included in Article 37 of the Chosŏn-Japan Regulations Pertaining to Commerce and Trade (朝日通商章程) signed in July 1883. More to the point, Article 37 reads as follows:
When the outbreak of riots or natural disasters such as floods or drought compels Chosŏn to temporarily prohibit the export of its grains because of the inability to secure the basic amounts of such goods needed for its own population, provincial governors should convey the relevant information to the Japanese Consul one month before the implementation of such a ban. The Japanese Consul should in turn convey to the Japanese merchants operating in individual ports the projected duration of the export ban, and ensure that the latter abide by this provision.21
Ha Wŏnho, who conducted an in-depth study on the implementation of the Panggongnyŏng (防穀令, Grain Export Prohibition order) on the Korean peninsula following the opening of the three ports, has argued that the Panggok (防穀, Grain Export Prohibition) was in reality a form of economic policy designed to use administrative might to curb the export 104 Japanese Residents in Korea and the Modernization of Chosŏn of grains to other regions.22 This Panggongnyŏng was actually invoked in the following cases. 1) In cases when the Chosŏn government perceived the need to prohibit the export of grain from the Open Ports(開港場) in order to curtail the general depletion of grains; 2) In instances where a local governor felt the need to impose such a ban to counter the phenomenon through which social instability mounted as a result of the skyrocketing of grain prices occasioned by the heavy trade in grains being conducted by Japanese merchants active outside of the Open Ports(開港 場); 3) In cases where such a ban was perceived as a means to exact taxes from Japanese merchants; 4) To curb the growing threat to the commercial rights of Chosŏn merchants caused by the expansion of the activities conducted by Japanese merchants; 5) As a means of securing grain taxes; 6) To protect the existing distribution mechanism centered on Seoul from the threat occasioned by the formation of new distribution mechanism centering on the Open Ports(開港場); or 7) Was implemented by a local governor to line his own pockets by profiting difference of grain prices before and after the implementation of Panggongnyŏng.23 However, although this Panggongnyŏng was also implemented in some instances for tax collection purposes and to advance the personal interests of local governors, it can be regarded as having basically been used as a means to protect common people’s lifestyles by warding off any sudden increases in the price of grain. As far back as the Kabo Peasants’ War of 1894, which provided the momentum for the Sino-Japanese War, peasant army were commandeering the grains of landowners and wealthy farmers as part of their efforts to sell such staples at lower prices or implementing their own forms of Panggongnyŏng.24 Cho Kyeungdal regards these actions as ‘being part of a struggle launched based on a notion of justice that was grounded in the concept of a moral economy’. To this end, Cho argued that the goals of the peasant soldiers were to save the poor by bringing to light unjust economic activities such as delays in the sale of grain designed to augment prices, and the usurping of grain from the common people for such purposes. Cho viewed the implementation of the Panggongnyŏng as Yamada Ryosuke 105 not constituting an effort to sever the relationship with Japan, but rather nothing more than an attempt to forcefully bring an end to the limitations of the grain trade.25 In addition, Cho also pointed out the fact that the strong willingness of the peasant army to implement the Panggongnyŏng represents an important element which should not be overlooked.26 The invigoration of chivalrous bandits’ activities and growing number of riots which erupted in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War can also be regarded as other signs of the growing demands for the implementation of the Panggongnyŏng. The list of policy corrections put forth by the Yŏnghaktang (英學黨)-led movement that surfaced in Jeollabukdo in the spring of 1899 - included the demand that the persons who bring the grains to the ports be clearly recorded.27 As mentioned above, the serious fluctuation in grain prices occasioned by the fact that grains accounted for in excess of 80% of overall exports to Japan, and the rapid commodification of grain wrought by the increased use of currency to pay taxes, had the effect of turning the stabilization of grain prices into a major social problem. Therefore, the peasants and wage laborers who had to purchase grains can be regarded as having been at the forefront of the movement to implement the Panggongnyŏng.28 Although not completely removed from agricultural society, it was said that the majority of the participants in the Yŏnghaktang occupied the ranks of the conomically-strapped peasantry. As such individuals belonged to the social class that had to purchase their grains, fluctuations in grain prices had a direct impact on their everyday lives.29 This same period also saw the rise of a group of chivalrous bandits called the Hwalbindang (活貧黨) in the southern region of the Korean peninsula. In this regard, peddlers, the unemployed, (semi-proletariat) peasants, and (primitive-level) laborers constituted the majority of the participants in the Hwalbindang.30 The manifesto of the Hwalbindang, known as the Taehan samin nonsŏl (大韓士民論說) argued that many individuals had actively engaged themselves in the practice of shipping grain to foreign countries. As a result, grain prices had risen so high that many people had starved to death. To this end, there was an urgent need 106 Japanese Residents in Korea and the Modernization of Chosŏn to implement the Panggongnyŏng and to take measures to provide relief to such people. Moreover, because so many foreign merchants had expanded their activities outside of the ports, the people of Chosŏn had been thrown into a degree of abject poverty in which death had become a virtual reality; As such, steps needed to be taken to prohibit foreign merchants from purchasing grains from such markets’.31 The demands of the Hwalbindang, which included calls for the implementation of the Panggongnyŏng, the exclusion of foreign merchants, and the stabilization of grain prices, can be regarded as having been anchored in values based on the notion of a moral economy.32 The incident which occurred in P΄yŏngyang in 1898 can be identified as a prime example of a case in which fluctuations in grain prices spurred members of the lower urban class to demand the implementation of the Panggongnyŏng, and to subsequently undertake the forced blockade of the loading of grains to Japan. On March 15, 1898, about 2,000 residents of P΄yŏngyang presented a petition in which they demanded that the export of grains to Japan be prohibited. Unpleased with the ambiguous response provided by the magistrate(郡守) of P΄yŏngyang, the residents decided to take their cause to the governor(観察使) of P΄yŏngannam-do and to cause problems in stores owned by Japanese merchants along the way. These individuals argued that the shipment of grains to Japan should be cancelled because people of P΄yŏngyang were starving. Simultaneously, an incident emerged in which about 300 people forcibly impeded the start of ships loaded with grain.33 This incident has been evaluated as an anti-Japanese action designed to protect the people’s everyday lives.34 Although there were some people who threw stones at Japanese nationals, the Japanese policemen called to the scene recorded the language and methods used as overall being very gentle in nature during the negotiations with Japanese merchants; moreover, no calls for the complete exclusion of Japanese residents were cited. Rather, the decision on the part of Japanese merchants to sell grains to Chosŏn people at 50% of the market price for about 1 month in order to resolve the turbulence reveals that the main issue for the lower urban Yamada Ryosuke 107 class was in fact that of bringing grain prices back down to the proper level. 35 Therefore, they perceived the solution to their problems as lying in a temporary cessation of the flow of grain to Japan occasioned by Japanese merchants, an action which they perceived as having caused the fluctuation in grain prices. In conclusion, this incident should not be understood as a purely anti-Japanese action, but rather as having been caused by the perception of the need to do something to improve the worsening of the living environment occasioned by the fluctuations in grain prices.36
Japan’s response to the Panggongnyŏng
One instance in which the implementation of the Panggongnyŏng became a diplomatic issue between Korea and Japan was the so-called Hamgyŏngdo Panggongnyŏng Incident(咸鏡道防穀令事件) of 1899. This particular incident revolved around claims made by Japanese merchants to the effect that they had incurred serious losses as a result of the implementation of a Panggongnyŏng in Hamgyŏng Province without the usual one month notice being given to the merchants. Following a heated debate within the Diet, the Japanese government adopted a hard line stance in which it demanded compensation for this instance, as well as for two other cases involving the implementation of a Panggongnyŏng in Hwanghae Province. This incident was officially brought to a close in May 1893 when the Chosŏn government agreed to provide 90,000 yen as compensation for the incident in Hamgyŏng Province.37 For the Japanese government and merchants in Korea, the proclamation of Panggongnyŏng was regarded as a means of curtailing their ability to export grain to Japan. The Japanese Chambers of Commerce (日本人商業會議所) in Kyŏngsŏng(Seoul), Inch΄ŏn, Pusan, and Wŏnsan responded to the announcement of a nationwide Panggongnyŏng to be put in place from December 1893 to March 189438 by banding together and dispatching representatives to Seoul to lobby officials from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to compel the Chosŏn government to 108 Japanese Residents in Korea and the Modernization of Chosŏn promptly cancel this move.39 Moreover, another attempt was made to abolish the Panggongnyŏng by then Minister of Foreign Affairs Mutsu Munemitsu (陸奥宗光) during the negotiations that took place between Japan and Chosŏn over the reform of Chosŏn (朝鮮內政改革問題) which followed the Kabo Peasants’ War of 1894. 40 Meanwhile, a consular official residing in Kyŏngsŏng during the same period expressed his opinion that the Panggongnyŏng was in fact a tool to line local governors pockets, Pointing out that while the Panggongnyŏng was ostensibly put in place because of bad harvests and famine, huge profits were in fact recorded by repealing this order after having lowered the price of grain by in effect flooding the grain market.41 In terms of the moral-economy based actions undertaken in P΄yŏngyang in 1898 introduced above, here again Japan showed an unwillingness to understand the actions taken by the people of Chosŏn. As such, although an agreement was reached among the Japanese merchants in P΄yŏngyang on the need to take steps to sell grains at a lower price in order to bring an end to the turmoil, this agreement also contained provisions that prohibited any attempts to stop the shipping of grain, and which called for measures to ensure that this kind of ‘unpleasant’ precedent, including efforts to bargain over grain prices, not be repeated.42 During the famine of 1901, a Japanese policeman conducting an assessment of food shortages in the areas from Inch΄ŏn to Haeju in Hwanghae Province submitted a report in which he stated that the price of grain had risen by as much as 20-30% or 40-50% from the previous year in these particular areas.43 In this same report, the policeman described a tragedy beyond anything he had ever seen in his life, and pleaded for measures to be taken to help these people.
There is no need to argue over the extent to which the harvests in these provinces have been bad. If the relevant authorities did not implement appropriate relief measures, a disastrous situation in which the majority of the public is forced to scatter or starve to Yamada Ryosuke 109
death on the road may emerge within a mere few months.44
Nevertheless, this policeman ignored the relation between the siphoning of grain to Japan and such famine. He did however include an account given to him by a Chosŏn person who claimed that the people were hard-pressed to make a living because Japanese merchants had purchased all the grain, and that this situation was particularly grave in a year such as the present. Thus, the report described the belief that the widespread purchase of grains by Japanese merchants was the cause of the worsening of the food shortages occasioned by the bad harvests.45 However, the policeman rejected this ‘ridiculous’ line of reasoning outright.46 As such, the Japanese merchants actually engaged in the trading of grains and organizations dispatched from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to protect Japanese residents remained firmly opposed to the implementation of the Panggongnyŏng. To this end, Japan’s objection to the Chosŏn government’s decision to implement the Panggongnyŏng in July 1901 stands out as a pertinent example of such opposition. In late July 1901, the Chosŏn government informed its Japanese counterpart of its desire to impose a temporary ban on the export of grains because of a severe nationwide drought.47 Japanese residents in Pusan responded to this announcement by sending a representative to visit the Japanese envoy in Kyŏngsŏng in order to voice their objections to this Panggongnyŏng.48 On July 31, the President of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Wŏnsan presented a report to the Japanese consul in Wŏnsan in which he claimed that as the provinces of Kangwŏn and Hamgyŏng did not face any food shortages, the implementation of the Panggongnyŏng, which in effect blocked any trade in grain, would have the undesired impact of worsening the lot of the people residing in these areas. 49 Simultaneously, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and the Japanese Residents Association in Chinnamp΄o and Mokp΄o dispatched members to the Japanese Legation in Kyŏngsŏng to plead their case that the implementation of the Panggongnyŏng constituted a groundless 110 Japanese Residents in Korea and the Modernization of Chosŏn action. 50 Japanese merchants in P΄yŏngyang also submitted a petition calling for the revoking of the Panggongnyŏng, arguing that there had in fact been no poor harvests.51 Similarly, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Kyŏngsŏng sent a ‘position letter’ to the Japanese consul in Kyŏngsŏng in August in which it required the cancellation of the Panggongnyŏng. In this position letter, the Japanese merchants emphasized the fact that the ban on the distribution of grain to markets occasioned by the Panggongnyŏng would not only negatively impact the Japanese, but the government and people of Chosŏn as well. This they argued was based on the reason that the majority of farmers would lose their rightful profits because grain prices would skyrocket on the demand side and plunge on the supply side. Meanwhile, for the Chosŏn government, such an order would not only complicate its ability to collect taxes, but would also result in the loss of the taxation income emanating from export tariffs. In addition, the letter also asserted that even if the Chosŏn government did not prohibit grain exports, based on basic economic trade principles, grain exports would automatically decrease when the price of domestic grain went up, which would in turn lead to a growing trend towards the import of grains from abroad. This was precisely why countries signed trade agreements and established international relationships. The petition asserted that the implementation of the Panggongnyŏng was akin to a civilization getting down on bended knee before barbarity; Furthermore, this action which ignored international friendships and individual welfare would have severe repercussions in the future.52 As we can see from this position letter, Japanese residents in Chosŏn based their objections to the implementation of the Panggongnyŏng on market principles and appealed to the Japanese government to protect their commercial and trade-related rights.53 On July 26, the Japanese government released in the name of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the following instructions to the Japanese envoy in Kyŏngsŏng:
Yamada Ryosuke 111
Should an assessment of the current state of drought be deemed impossible, Japan should pursue the revoking of the Panggongnyŏng from the standpoint of the need to protect its commerce and trade.54
The Japanese envoy responded to this instruction by using the reports submitted by the Japanese consul in each province to repeatedly petition the Chosŏn government to revoke the Panggongnyŏng. Such persistent efforts eventually resulted in the cancellation of the Panggongnyŏng on November 15.55 In November of that same year, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Pusan, Mokp΄o, Kyŏngsŏng (Seoul), and Inch΄ŏn participated in the 1st Conference of Japanese Chambers of Commerce in Chosŏn (在韓國日本人 商業會議所連合會). During this conference held in Inch΄ŏn, the participants expressed their appreciation to the Japanese envoy for his ability to have the Grain Export Prohibition Order cancelled in relation to the movement of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In its response to the Japanese consul’s inquiries regarding potential changes to the Japan-Chosŏn Regulations Pertaining to Commerce and Trade(韓日通商 章程) submitted in April 1902, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Kyŏngsŏng introduced 17 demands, which included calls for free trade in grain to be brought about through the removal of the provisions related to the Panggongnyŏng and the abolition of grain import tariffs. Similar calls were made during the 2nd Conference of Japanese Chambers of Commerce in Chosŏn held in Pusan in May 1902.56
Conclusion
As mentioned above, as far as the Panggongnyŏng was concerned, a repetitive cycle emerged in which Japanese merchants would petition organizations dispatched from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to pursue the revoking of the Panggongnyŏng, and in which the latter would subsequently respond to such entreaties by applying pressure to the 112 Japanese Residents in Korea and the Modernization of Chosŏn
Chosŏn government to remove such measures in the name of the protection of Japanese merchants’ interests. Conversely, fearing the possibility of provoking Japanese ire, the Chosŏn government refused the majority of the requests for the implementation of Panggongnyŏng submitted by local governors conveying the wishes of the Chosŏn minjung.57 The above-mentioned incident in P΄yŏngyang in March 1898 in which the Provincial Governor of P΄yŏngannam-do required to implement the Panggongnyŏng. However, it seemed not to be permitted.58 Ha Wŏnho has argued that based on the documentation available, the final Panggongnyŏng aimed at Japanese merchants appeared to be implemented by the governor of Hamp΄yŏng, Jeollanam-do in March 1904. To this end, he argues that the Panggongnyŏng disappeared as the Resident General’s Office( 統監府) of Chosŏn expanded its control following the Russo-Japanese War.59 Meanwhile, Kim Kyŏngt΄ae’s study revealed that in order to counter poor harvests the Chosŏn government resorted to importing grains from China in 1898, and from Vietnam and Japan in 1901. Thus, by importing lower quality grain from areas such as Vietnam at lower costs, the Chosŏn government in effect established a dichotomous grain policy in which imported grain was provided to the lower classes while Chosŏn grain was exported at higher prices.60 As such, the effectiveness of the Panggongnyŏng can be regarded as having been gradually eroded by the treaty-based notion of ‘justice’ adopted by Japanese residents in Chosŏn and the Japanese government. To this end, in order to better comprehend the relationship between the decline of the sway of the ‘moral economy’ on the Korean peninsula and Japanese residents in Chosŏn, further in-depth studies based on other cases and phases which developed after the era of the Resident General’s Office of Chosŏn should be conducted.61
Keywords : Japanese residents in Korea, moral economy, Grain Export Prohibition Order, ‘modernization’, political culture
Yamada Ryosuke 113
Notes :
1 Miyajima Hiroshi(宮嶋博史), etc. (ed.), The Standpoint of Colonial Modernity – Korea and Japan(植民地近代の視座－朝鮮と日本), Iwanamisyoten(岩波書店), 2004. For a summary of the trends in the research on colonial modernity, please refer to Matsumoto Takenori (松本武祝), “Trends in the study of colonial modernity in Korea - a summary of the relevant arguments and attempts to reorganize such arguments (『植民地近代』 をめぐる近年の朝鮮史研究－論点の整理と再 構成の試み)”, (included in the above book). 2 Similarly, Itagaki Ryuta, who also summarized trends in the study of colonial modernity, suggested that the concept of colonial modernity emerged out of the critique of the contradictory axes created by separating the good and evils of modernization or development. Itagaki Ryuta(板垣竜太), “Analysis of colonial modernity –issues in the study of Korean history(<植民地近代＞を めぐって－朝鮮史研究における現状と課題)”, Rekishi hyōron (歴史評論), No. 654, 2004, p.35. 3 Cho Kyeungdal （趙景達）, The Development of Chosŏn Minjung Movements (朝鮮民衆運動の展開), Iwanamisyoten (岩波書店), 2002, p.367. 4 Ibid., p.1 5 Yamane Tetsuya (山根徹也), Bread and People – the moral economy in Prussia during the 19th Century(パンと民衆－19世紀プロイセンにおける モラル・エコノミー), Yamakawa-syuppansya (山川出版社), 2003, p.4; E. P.Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century”，Past and Present，No．50，1971． 6 Shibata Michio (柴田三千雄), The People’s Movements and the Modern world (近代世界と民衆運動), Iwanamisyoten (岩波書店), 2001, (first edition, 1983), p.29 and p.218. 7 Tsurumaki Takao (鶴巻孝雄), Modernization and the Traditional Minjung World – Minjung movements and thoughts during the transitional period (近 代化と伝統的民衆世界－転換期における民衆運動とその思想) , Tokyo University Press, 1992, p.141. 8 Studies which deal with the minjung movements in Korea from a similar standpoint, include Cho Kyeungdal, “The era of Chivalrous Bandits -the
114 Japanese Residents in Korea and the Modernization of Chosŏn
worlds of Hwazyok (火賊)and Hwalbindang (義賊の時代－火賊・活貧党 の世界)”, The Development of the Chosŏn Minjung Movement (朝鮮民衆運 動の展開), Iwanamisyoten (岩波書店), 2002. However, Cho asserted that the political culture theory was not a general issue in the study of Korean history, especially in the study of modern history. Cho Kyeungdal, “The modernity of Korea and the political culture (朝鮮の近代とその政治文化)”, Association of History Studies (歴史学研究会)(ed.), The Results and Future Tasks of Contemporary Historical Studies: Changes in the Feature of State and Society during the 1980-2000 (現代歴史学の成果と課題 1980－2000年 Ⅱ 国家 像・社会像の変貌 ), Aokisyoten (青木書店), 2003, p.258. 9 Miyazaki Katsunori (宮崎克則), “Trends in the Japanese People’s Movements during the 2nd Chosyu war (第2次長州戦争期の民衆動向)”, Journal of Historical Studies (歴史学研究), No. 729, 1999, p.100. 10 Kajimura Hideki (梶村秀樹), “The Colony and Japan (植民地と日本人)”, The Publishing and Editorial Committee of Kajimura Hideki’s Writings (梶村 秀樹著作集刊行委員会・編集委員会編), Kajimura Hideki’s Writings Vol. I: 梶村秀樹著作集第 巻 朝鮮史と日本人 Korean History and Japan ( - 1 ), Akashisyoten ( 明石書店), 1992; Takasaki S oji ( 高崎宗司), Japanese Residents in the Colony of Chosŏn (植民地朝鮮の日本人), Iwanamisyoten (岩波書店), 2002. Works on other economic activities include the series of studies compiled by Kimura Kenji (木村健二), which includes, The Social History of Japanese Residents in Korea (在朝日本人の社会史), (Miraisya (未来社), 1989. For the Korean viewpoint, please refer to Pak Yangsin’s “Government-General politics and Japanese residents in Korea (T΄onggam chŏngch΄iwa chaehan ilbonin)”, Yŏksa kyoyuk, Vol. 90, 2004. This study analyzed the media-related activities conducted by Japan and Japanese residents in Seoul. However, this study did not deal with their disputes with Koreans. For more on the changes wrought to the foreign concession system, refer to Son Chŏngmok, Changes in Korean Cities during the Opening Period –open ports, open markets, foreign concession, and foreign residential areas (Han΄guk kaehanggi tosi pyŏnhwa kwajŏng yŏn΄gu), Iljisa, 1982. For more on the changes undergone over time by Japanese autonomous organizations such as the Association of Japanese Residents in Chosŏn, please refer to Yamanaka Mai (山中麻衣), “Autonomous Japanese organizations in Seoul”, Master’s
Yamada Ryosuke 115
degree thesis, The Catholic University of Korea, 2001. 11 Takasaki, op.cit. ,p.ⅰ. 12 Kajimura, op.cit., p.195. 13 Ibid., p.201. 14 Ibid., p.205. 15 Although mostly dealing with a latter period, please refer to Government Archives & Records Service of Korea, “10. The truth about the Japanese invasion and its despoilment of cultural properties(Ilje ch΄imnyakŭi chinsanggwa munhwajae yakt΄al)”, Compilation of Legal Precedents Pertaining to the Movement for the Restoration of Sovereignty(Kukkwŏn hoebu undong p΄an΄gyŏl munjip), 1995, for more in-depth data pertaining to criminal cases. 16 Yun Haedong also dealt with the formation of colonial modernity (Yun Haedong, “Colonial modernity and the emergence of mass society (植民地近 代と大衆社会の登場)”, Miyajima Hiroshi et al.(eds.), op.cit., p.55). However, he did not analyze such cases in depth. Further studies on the topic can be expected. 17 Hayashi Yusuke (林雄介), “The Masses’ Perception of Japan in late 19th century Korea (一九世紀末、朝鮮民衆の対日認識について)”, Bulletin of Society for Study in Korean History (朝鮮史研究会論文集), Vol. 33, 1995, p.127. 18 Ha Wŏnho, History of the Modern Korean Economy (Han΄guk kŭndae kyŏngjesa yŏn΄gu), Sinsŏwŏn, 1997, pp.160-161. The analysis of the Panggongnyŏng conducted in this paper is in large part based on Ha Wŏnho’s paper. 19 Hayashi, op.cit., p.132. 20 Ha Wŏnho, op.cit., pp.151-160. 21 For more on this, please refer to Tabohashi Kiyoshi (田保橋潔), The Japan- Chosŏn Relationship during the Modern Era (近代日鮮関係の研究), Vol. II, Governor General’s Office of Chosŏn ( 朝鮮総 督府) 、 1940, pp.54-57; Yoshino Makoto ( 吉野誠),” The Development of Rice Exports and the Panggok Order (開港期の穀物貿易と防穀令)”, Takeda Yukio(武田幸男) (ed.), Historical Development of Chosŏn society and East Asia (朝鮮社会の 史的展開と東アジア), Yamakawa-syuppansya (山川出版社), 1997, pp.446-
116 Japanese Residents in Korea and the Modernization of Chosŏn
448; The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (外務省) (ed.), The Chronicles of Japanese Diplomacy and Main Documents (日本外交年表竝主要文書), Vol. 1, Harasyobo (原書房), 1965, p.96. 22 Ha Wŏnho, op.cit., p.167. 23 Ibid, p.315. 24 Cho Kyeungdal, The People’s Heterodox Revolts ( 異端の民衆反乱 ), Iwanamisyoten (岩波書店), 1998, pp.221-223. 25 op.cit., p.222. 26 op.cit., p.223. 27 Hayashi, op.cit., pp.128-129; Yi Yŏngho, The Tonghak and Peasants’ War (Tonghakkwa nongmin chŏnjaeng), Hyean, 2004, pp.363-364. 28 Yoshino, op.cit., p.460; Yoshino, “The Development of the Grain Trade and the Panggongnyŏng Order during the Final Period of Chosŏn (李朝末期にお ける米穀輸出の展開と防穀令)”, Bulletin of Society for Study in Korean History (朝鮮史研究会論文集), Vol. 15, 1978, pp.108-110. 29 Hayashi, op.cit., p.129; Yi Yŏngho, op.cit., p.362. 30 Pak Ch΄ansŭng, “The activities and characteristics of the Hwalbindang (Hwalbindangŭi hwadonggwa kŭ sŏnggyŏk)”, Han΄guk hakpo, Vol. 10, No.2, 1984, p.150 31 Kim Yonggu(ed.), Compilation of Secret Documents related to Korea-Japan Diplomatic Relationship (Hanil oegyogan kŭkpi saryo ch΄ongsŏ), Asea munhwasa, 1995, Vol. 9, pp.37-38. 32 Ibid, pp.40-41. 33 National Institute of Korean History, Records of the Japanese Legation in Korea (駐韓日本公使館記錄), Vol. 13, 1990, p.24; Ha Wŏnho, op.cit., p.198; Hayashi, op.cit., p.131. 34 Hayashi, op.cit., p.131. 35 Kim Yonggu(ed.), op.cit., Vol. 38, pp.4-5; National Institute of Korean History, op.cit., Vol. 13, p.25. 36 Another uprising in which the implementation of the Panggongnyŏng was demanded occurred in May 1898. During this particular instance, the property of Chosŏn merchants accused of having sold grains to foreigners despite fluctuations in grain prices was destroyed. Nevertheless, no reports of attacks being carried out on Japanese merchants were recorded (National Institute of
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Korean History, op.cit.,Vol.13, p.26). The problems may have arisen because of Japanese merchants’ perception of this situation as a threat to Japanese residents –which it might very well have had the potential to become- and their armed response to the entreaties of the people of Chosŏn. However, this matter lies outside the scope of this study. 37 Yoshino, “The grain trade and the Panggongnyŏng during the opening period (開港期の穀物貿易と防穀令)”, pp.459-460; Tabohashi, op.cit., pp.127-130. 38 Han Wŏnho, op.cit., p.185. 39 Keijo Shoko Kaigisho (京城商工会議所), “The History Part(沿革編)”, The 25-year History of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Seoul (京城商工会議所二十五年史), 1941, pp.53-54. 40 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs（外務省）(ed.), Japanese Diplomatic documents (日本外交文書), Vol. 27, Part I, 1953, p.568. 41 Ibid., p.564. 42 National Institute of Korean History, op.cit., Vol. 13, p.25. 43 Kim Yonggu(ed.), op.cit., Vol. 38, pp.54-55. 44 Ibid., pp.57-59. 45 Ibid., p.56. 46 Ibid. 47 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs(外務省)(ed.), op.cit.,Vol. 34, 1956, p.647. 48 Ibid, pp.647-648. 49 Ibid, pp.658-659. In Wŏnsan, joint conferences were held in early August by members of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and the Japanese Residents Association in Wŏnsan to discuss ways to have the Panggongnyŏng revoked. (Takao Shinemon ( 高尾新右衛門), The History of the Development of Wŏnsan (元山發展史), 1916, p.290) 50 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs（外務省）(ed.), op.cit., Vol. 34, p.660. 51 Ibid., p.666. 52 Keijo Shoko Kaigisho (京城商工会議所), op.cit., “The History Part (沿革編), pp.55-57. 53 In terms of Japanese domestic opinion, a petition opposing Chosŏn’s attempt to prohibit grain exports was submitted which argued that the import of foreign rice was needed to prevent the fluctuations in rice prices that might
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cause increases in labor wages. (Yoshino, op.cit., “The Development of the Grain Trade and the Panggongnyŏng Order during the Final Period of Chosŏn (李朝末期における米穀輸出の展開と防穀令)”, pp.102-103). 54 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs（外務省）(ed.), op.cit., Vol. 34, p.648. 55 Ibid, pp.680-681. 56 Keijo Shoko Kaigisho (京城商工会議所), op.cit., “The Document Part(資料 編)”, pp.5-7. 57 Ha Wŏnho, op.cit., p.194; Kim Kyŏngt΄ae, “The economic policy of the Taehan Empire and the grain trade structure – issues related to grain during the formation of Japanese imperialism (Taehan chegukŭi kyŏngje chŏngch΄aekkwa migok t΄ongsang kujo –cheguk chuŭi hyŏngsŏnggiŭi migok munje)”, Korea Cultural Research Institute, Ewha Womens University; History of the Taehan Empire (Taehan cheguksa yŏn΄gu), Paeksan charyowŏn, 1999, p.209. 58 National Institute of Korean History, Records of Provinces 36 Pyŏngan Province 8 (各司謄録36平安道篇8), 1989, pp.32-33. 59 Ha Wŏnho, op.cit., p.203; Kim Kyŏngt΄ae, op.cit., pp.195-196. However, this Panggongnyŏng was not called for by the Chosŏn government, but rather was initiated by the ŭlsa righteous army （乙巳義兵） as one of their measures against the Protectorate Treaty of 1904. According to Hong Sun΄gwŏn, some of the righteous armies in the Honam area implemented a Panggok in order to curb the siphoning of grain abroad, something which was perceived by the peasants as being a major obstacle to their ability to survive. (Hong Sun΄gwŏn, The History of Righteous Army Movements in the Honam Area during the Final Period of the Taehan Empire (Hanmal, honam chiyŏk ŭibyŏng undongsa yŏn΄gu)”, Seoul National University Press, 1994, p.346, pp.200-202) Conversely, although this unfolded during a different period, the Tongnip sinmun (The Independent) published by the Tongnip hyŏphoe (The Independence Club), which can be regarded as the representative organ of the Enlightenment group, came out strongly against the Panggongnyŏng. This difference of opinions has been explained as being rooted in the fact that, ‘the Independence Club’s preference for free trade ran contrary to the notion of protected trade inherent in the Panggok”. (Ha Wŏnho, ibid, p.201, footnote 88) As such, there is a need to analyze the conflict over the Panggongnyŏng which emerged within Chosŏn society as well.
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60 Kim Kyŏngt΄ae, op.cit., p.210. 61 Although believe that it is necessary to analyze the fishing disputes between Korea and Japan along the coastal waters of Korean peninsula from the standpoint of political culture, such a task will be undertaken at a later date.
120 Japanese Residents in Korea and the Modernization of Chosŏn
<국문초록>
在朝日本人과 朝鮮의 [近代化] - 防穀令을 둘러싼 葛藤을 事例로 한 예비적 고찰 -
山田 良介 (久留米大学)
세계사에 있어서의 보편성을 중시하면서 조선의 「근대」를 생각했을 경우, 개항 이후 소위「근대 이행기」(近代移行期)에 생기는 민중운동은, 시기적인 차 이는 있지만, 같은 상황에 있던 일본이나 유럽 등의 타 지역과 유사한 현상으로서 해석하는 것이 가능이라고 생각된다. 또, 한반도에서의 민중운동을 고찰하는 경 우, 이른바「재조 일본인」(在朝日本人、일본인 거류민)과의 관계를 간과할 수 없다. 「재조 일본인」과 한반도에 있어서의 「근대」의 문제를 연관시킨다면, 다음 과 같은 전망을 제시 할 수 있다고 생각한다. 한반도에 있어 상업 등에 종사한 일 본인은 근대적 규범-「폴리티컬 이코노미」(Political Economy)－에 의거해 그들 의 행위를 정당화했지만, 전통적 규범-「모랄·이코노미」(Moral Economy)－에 입 각해 행동을 일으키는 조선인 측과 분쟁이 생겼을 때, 그들은 정치적인 힘 관계에 의해 자신들의 주장을 관철시켰다. 이러한 분쟁처리 과정의 반복으로 인해서 조 선 내에서 종래의 전통적 규범에 의거하는 행위는 점차 효력을 잃어 가게 되었다. 한반도에 거주하는 일본인들은 이러한 의미에서 조선의「근대화」를 추진시키 는 담당자의 일부가 된 것이 아닌가？ 본고는, 이상과 같은 가설을 검증하기 위해서 청일 전쟁 후의 한반도에서의 방 곡령(防穀令)을 둘러싼 조일(朝日)간의 분쟁을 사례로 한 기초 작업이다.
주제어: 일본인 거류민, 防穀令, ‘근대화’, 정치문화
