STUDIA ORIENTALNE 2021, nr 2 (20) ISSN 2299-1999 https://doi.org/10.15804/so2021209 Haesung Lee1 Joseon Literati’s Righteous Principles (Yiriron) as a Moral Practice in the Political Realities – Its Meaning and Limitation in a Historical Context Introduction:Dohak – the Joseon Neo-Confucianism Neo-Confucianism flourished as a central ideology and absolute social order during the Joseon dynasty (朝鮮 1392–1910). “Neo-Confucianism” is a gen- eral term commonly applied to the revival of the various strands of Confucian philosophy during the Chinese Sòng dynasty (宋 960–1280 C.E.), re-exam- ined and reconstructed by Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130–1200 AD.) It provided Koreans with philosophical speculation, moral and social norms, and a most strongly functional lifestyle. However, the terms of Joseon Neo-Confucianism con- note some specific characteristics, compared to classic Confucianism and the Chinese version of “Neo-Confucianism”2. The term of Dohak (道學 Chin. Dàoxué) – Dao (Way) Learning – already existed in classical Confucian context. However, in Korea, it is generally called Dohak (道學), which concerns Neo-Confucianism of the Joseon dynasty in a holistic scale. Thus, a proper understanding of the term Dohak is essential to comprehend the essence and particular characteristics of Korean Neo-Con- fucianism. Among the similar terms which refer to Neo-Confucianism, such as Jujahak (朱子學 Chin. Zhūzǐxué: Zhu Xi’s Science) and Jeongjuhak (程朱學 1 University of Wrocław, Poland, ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5185-3586, e-mail: [email protected]. 2 The Korean Neo-Confucianism 1) was condensed rather into an anthropological, centripetal, and inward way such as the “Four-Seven” theory and Human Nature; 2) pursued to seek religious an ethical legitimacy under the name of Confucian teaching, even beyond logical rationality; 3) put much more emphasis on Righteousness and Fidelity in a macroscale; 4) clarified the Righteousness as a theoretic speculation on moral propriety. See. Lee Haesung,Neo-Confucianism of Joseon dynasty – its theoretical foundation and main issues, “Asian Studies” 2016, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 193–194. 140 Artykuły • ARTICLES • СтAтьи Chin. Chéngzhūxué: Cheng Xi and Zhu Xi’s Science), are overly concentrated on particularly great masters; while Songhak (宋學 Chin. Sòngxué: Science of Sòng dynasty) and Songmyeonghak (宋明學 Chin. Sòngmíngxué: Science of Sòng and Míng dynasty) are limited within the Chinese dynasties and neglect the Korean Confucian tradition. In a similar vein, though Seongrihak (性理學 Chin. Xìnglǐxué: Science of Nature and Principle) and Ihak (理學 Chin. Lǐxué: Science of Principle) are major academic spheres of Dohak, they are insufficient to cover it entirely. Moreover, Sinyuhak (新儒學 Chin. Xīnrúxué: New Confucian- ism) covers not only Zhu Xi’s school but its opposing Wáng Yángmíng’s school of Mind (心學 Simhak chin. Xīnxué: Science of Mind), i.e., Yangmyeonghak (陽明 學 Chin. Yángmíngxué) as well which values the Gi (氣 Chin. Qi: Matter) higher than the Ri (理 Chin. Lǐ: Principle)3. Hence, Dohak is the only term that suffices for the requirement of the necessary and sufficient condition regarding the Neo-Confucianism of the Joseon dynasty. Dohak covers these items of Korean (Neo-)Confucian issues4: 1) Seongrihak (性理學 the philosophical spheres: theory of Great Absolute, theory of Principle and Material Force, the theory of The Mind and True Self, etc.); 2) Yiriron (義理論 the matters of world view and morality: Righteousness, Sino-centrism, the theory of Fidelity to Principle, etc.); 3) Yehak (禮學 the Ritual Formalities: state, provincial, family, etc.); 4) Suyangron (修養論 the matter of individual cultivation: theory of Sincer- ity and Reverence, the theory of Preservation, Nourishment and Self- examination, etc.); 5) Byeokidanron (闢異端論 Confucian Apologetics: the theory of rejecting heresy, etc.); 6) Gyeongseron (經世論 statecraft: governing norms, etc.). These issues were closely connected and developed to be a totality of science and morality. In other words, Dohak during the Joseon dynasty was a holistic approach to cosmological truth included the promotion of individual mindfulness, sincerity, and duties through moral practices for justice through earnest research to acquire wisdom and skills for the administration of social welfare based on insights from (Neo-)Confucian classics. 3 Keum Jang-tae, Hankkuk Jongyo Sasangsa II. 韓國宗敎思想史. Part One, “Yugyo Sasangsa” (History of Korean Confucianism) 儒敎思想史, P’aju 2002, pp. 58–59. 4 Ibidem. Haesung Lee • Joseon Literati’s Righteous Principles (Yiriron) 141 Theoretical Backgrounds Righteousness and Fidelity “Righteousness” (Yi 義 Chin. Yi) – is generally regarded as a virtue of “the right thing in social norms” or “proper way as a human being”. Righteousness is the original, conscience-based distinction between good and evil, which ripens in the form of genuinely moral wisdom (Ji 智 Chin. Zhi). It also defines doing what is right or virtuous. In the book Confucius named “Spring and Autumn (Chunchu 春秋 Chin. Chūnqīu) – the history of ancient Lǔ state” (魯 1048–256 BCE), he institutes the new sacrament of the contract of allegiance called the “Code of Honour” (Daeyimyeongbun 大義名分 Chin. Dàyìmíngfēn). This sacrament is therefore of- ten and generally spoken of as the “Great Principle or Code of the Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunchudaeyi 春秋大義 Chin. Chūnqīudàyì)” and was perceived as the principle of loyalty even when the state was collapsing in relation to its historical background. This concept was much stressed by Mencius (385–302 BC) in the frame of Five Constant Virtues of Confucianism (五常 Chin. Wuzhang)5. For him, righ- 5 They are: benevolence/humaneness (仁) , righteousness/justice (義), propriety/rituals (禮), wisdom/ knowledge (智) and faithfulness/trust (信). 孟子曰：人皆有不忍人之心。先王有不忍人之心，斯有不忍 人之政矣。以不忍人之心，行不忍人之政，治天下可運之掌上。所以謂人皆有不忍人之心者，今人乍 見孺子將入於井，皆有怵惕惻隱之心。非所以內交於孺子之父母也，非所以要譽於鄉黨朋友也，非惡 其聲而然也。由是觀之，無惻隱之心，非人也；無羞惡之心，非人也；無辭讓之心，非人也；無是非 之心，非人也。惻隱之心，仁之端也；羞惡之心，義之端也；辭讓之心，禮之端也；是非之心，智之 端也。人之有是四端也，猶其有四體也。有是四端而自謂不能者，自賊者也；謂其君不能者，賊其君 者也。凡有四端於我者，知皆擴而充之矣，若火之始然，泉之始達。苟能充之，足以保四海；苟不充 之，不足以事父母。[公孫丑章句上 六章] Mencius said, “All men have a mind which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others. 'The ancient kings had this commiserating mind, and they, as a matter of course, had likewise a commiserating government. When with a commiserating mind was practiced a commiserating gov- ernment, to rule the kingdom was as easy a matter as to make anything go round in the palm. When I say that all men have a mind which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others, my meaning may be illustrated thus: even now-a-days, if men suddenly see a child about of all into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress. They will feel so, not as a ground on which they may gain the favour of the child's parents, nor as a ground on which they may seek the praise of their neighbours and friends, nor from a dislike to the reputation of having been unmoved by such a thing. From this case we may perceive that the feeling of commiseration is essential to man, that the feeling of shame and dislike is essential to man, that the feeling of modesty and complaisance is essential to man, and that the feeling of approving and disapproving is essential to man. The feeling of commiseration is the principle of benevolence. The feeling of shame and dislike is the principle of righteousness. The feeling of modesty and complaisance is the principle of propriety. The feeling of approving and disapproving is the principle of knowledge. Men have these four principles just as they have their four limbs. When men, having these four principles, yet say of themselves that they cannot develop them, they play the thief with themselves, and he who says of his prince that he cannot develop them plays the thief with his prince. Since all men have these four principles in themselves, let them know to give them all their develop- ment and completion, and the issue will be like that of fire which has begun to burn, or that of a spring which has begun to find vent. Let them have their complete development, and they will suffice to love and protect 142 Artykuły • ARTICLES • СтAтьи teousness is not to be calculated for profit or to achieve something for oneself but extends itself for the good of others6. Likewise, he illustrated coherent logic that righteousness is the very passion for appropriate conscience. So, in that sense, that righteousness is realized when society perceives virtue as a higher value than profit and justice as more precious than property. The meaning of “Righteousness” has been further broadened and expanded in the Neo-Confucian view of the world. Neo-Confucianism undertook a her- meneutic shift from the exegesis and annotation of textual particulars to the elucidation of a text’s “great significance/righteousness” (Daeyi 大義 Chin. Dàyì) or “Righteous Principles” (Yiri 義理 chin. Yiyì). This term has been used as the embodiment of Righteousness and Rational Principles Yiriron( 義理論 Chin. Yiyìlùn). Along the same lines, the compound word of “Fidelity” (Jeolyi 節 義) in Korean comes from “integrity (Jeolgae 節槪) and “righteous principles” (Yiri 義理)7. Simultaneously, these terms became subdivided and elaborated on a mac- roscale. The principles encompass: 1) the theory of Rectification of Names (Jeongmyeongron 正名論 Chin. Zhèngmínlùn)8 – against injustice and unrigh- all within the four seas. Let them be denied that development, and they will not suffice for a man to serve his parents with”. Mencius, Gong Sun Chou, part I, chapter 6. 6 孟子見梁惠王。王曰、叟、不遠千里而來、亦將有以利吾國乎。孟子對曰、王何必曰利。亦有仁 義而已矣。王曰、何以利吾國。大夫曰、何以利吾家。士庶人曰、何以利吾身。上下交征利、而國危 矣。萬乘之國弒其君者、必千乘之家、千乘之國、弒其君者、必百乘之家。萬取千焉、千取百焉、不 爲不多矣、苟爲後義而先利、不奪不饜。未有仁而遺其親者也、未有義而後其君者也。王亦曰仁義而 已矣、何必曰利. [梁惠王上一章] Mencius went to see King Hui of Liang. The King said: “My good man, since you haven’t thought one thousand li too far to come and see me, may I presume that you have something with which I can profit my kingdom?” Mencius said: “Why must you speak of profit? What I have for you is humaneness and fairness, and that’s all.