TALKING TO THE ENEMY Also by G. R. Berridge

DIPLOMACY AT THE UN (editor with Anthony Jennings) ECONOMIC POWER IN ANGLO-SOUTH AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: States, Power and Conflict since 1945 INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (with Derek Heater) RETURN TO THE UN: UN Diplomacy in Regional Conflicts SOUTH AFRICA, THE COLONIAL POWERS AND 'AFRICAN DEFENCE': The Rise and Fall of the White Entente, 1948-60 THE POLITICS OF THE SOUTH AFRICA RUN: European Shipping and Pretoria Talking to the Enemy

How States without 'Diplomatic Relations' Communicate

G. R. Berridge Professor ofinternational Politics University of Leicester ©G. R. Berridge 1994

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1994 978-0-333-55655-9

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written pem1ission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the tern1s of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London WI P 9HE. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

First published in Great Britain 1994 by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978-1-349-39038-0 ISBN 978-0-230-37898-8 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9780230378988

First published in the of America 1994 by Scholarly and Reference Division, ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 ISBN 978-0-312-12152-5

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Berridge, Geoff. Talking to the enemy : how states without 'diplomatic relations' communicate I G. R. Berridge. p. em. Includes bibliographcal references and index. ISBN 978-0-312-12152-5 I. Diplomatic negotiations in international disputes. 2. Communication in international relations. 3. Hotlines (International relations) I. Title. JX4473.B47 1994 327 .2---{]c20 93-47037 CIP 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 05 04 03 02 01 00 99 98 97 To the memory of my father Charles Raymond Berridge This page intentionally left blank Contents

List of Boxes, Figures and Tables viii

List ofAppendices IX

List of Abbreviations X Preface xi Introduction xiii 1 The Shuttered Embassy 1 2 The Intermediary 13 3 The Disguised Embassy 32 4 The Working Funeral 59 5 The 75 6 The Special 101 7 The Joint Commission 117 8 Conclusion 129 Appendices 134 Notes and References 149 Select Bibliography 167 Index 170

vii List of Boxes, Figures and Tables

Boxes

3.1 Protecting powers and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961 34 3.2 The Rhodesian crisis, 1965, and the creation of interests sections by Britain 36 3.3 South Mrican diplomatic missions in Mrica, 1993 51 4.1 Margaret Thatcher's meetings at the funeral of Chernenko 62 6.1 General Vernon A. ('Dick') Walters 108 7.1 The Angola/Cuba/South Mricajoint Commission, 1989-91: composition and meetings 121 7.2 The Iran-US Claims Tribunal: membership, 1981 125

Figure

6.1 Special envoys, by proximity to policy-making circles and character of appointment 113

Tables

3.1 Interests sections in London, 1965-93: protecting powers, location and size of staff compared with former embassy 37 3.2 British interests sections, 1971-93: protecting powers, location and size of staff compared with former embassy 40

viii List of Appendices

1 New Breaks in Diplomatic Relations, 1976-89 134 2 Funerals, 1945-93 140 3 The Leaders of State Delegations at the Funeral of Leonid Brezhnev, 15 November 1982 142 4 Dulles's Guidance to U. Alexis Johnson in the Ambassadorial Talks with Communist 145 5 The Brazzaville , 13 December 1988: Annex on the Joint Commission 148

ix List of Abbreviations

ANC Mrican National Congress ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations CIA Central Intelligence Agency EC European Community FRELIMO Front for the Liberation of Mozambique FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States [documents on] HCDeb House of Commons Debates IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IMF International Monetary Fund MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation OAS Organisation of American States OAU Organisation of Mrican Unity OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation POW/MIA Prisoners of War/Missing in Action [in S. E. Asia] PRC People's Republic of China PRO Public Record Office [British] Renamo Mozambique National Resistance ROC Republic of China () SAR&H South Mrican Railways & Harbours Administration SWAPO South-West Mrica People's Organisation TRNC Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus UDI Unilateral Declaration of Independence [Rhodesian, November 1965] UN United Nations UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group [in Namibia]

X Preface

A long time before it occurred to me to write this book I was studying topics that took me, either directly or indirectly, deep into important areas of its subject. These included diplomacy at the UN, South Mrica's foreign relations, and the theory and practice of Henry Kissinger. The UN work was directly relevant because its focus was on how hostile states exploited their prox• imity in New York to make discreet contacts. There are echoes of this work in Chapter 5. The study of South Mrican foreign policy provided many insights into unconventional diplomatic techniques because after 1948 the introduction of apartheid forced this country into ever greater formal isolation. As for Henry Kissinger, he, of course, was the high priest of 'back• channel' diplomacy, in relations with the Soviet Union (espe• cially in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) as well as with North Vietnam and China. I decided to use all of this work as the basis for this book for two reasons: first, because (except in regard to intermediaries) little has been written on the subject from a general perspective; and, secondly, because it seems to me to be of great practical importance. I would like at this point to pay tribute to my former Leicester colleague, Maurice Keens-Soper, whose original and sometimes provocative work on diplomacy first stimulated my interest in the area. I am also in great intellectual debt to two other fellow workers in this area, Raymond Cohen and Alan James, the latter being so kind as to cast a careful eye over this manuscript. Among others who have helped me I must single outJohn Fitch, my part-time research assistant on this project, who has not only laboured hard on some wearying tasks (nota• bly in connection with Appendix 1) but generated new lines of inquiry. I am also grateful for help in various ways to the fol• lowing: Bob Borthwick, Stephen Chan, Adrian Guelke, James Hamill, Izak Human, Franz Knispel (European Funeral Direc• tors' Association), and John Young. Members of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office have helped me, too, and I am grateful to them. For generous financial assistance, efficiently and sym• pathetically administered, I would like to thank the Nuffield Foundation.

XI xii Preface An earlier version of Chapter 4 appeared in Diplomacy and Statecraft in July 1993, and I am grateful to the editors for permission to reproduce this here.

Leicester G. R. BERRIDGE Introduction

The dramatic breakthrough in 1991 in the crisis involving Western held for years in Lebanon - which saw the release, among others, of special envoy of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Terry Waite, and US journalist, Terry Anderson - was one of the latest and most significant examples of success• ful diplomacy conducted substantially by unconventional methods. This had been unavoidable not only because the -takers themselves were nongovernmental groups but because the governments with influence over them - Iran, Syria and Libya - had for varying periods of time no formal diplomatic contact with the governments of which the hos• tages were citizens, notably the United States and Britain. (The itself, as its foreign secretary, Douglas Hurd, pointed out in the House of Commons in the previous year, was in danger of having no embassy between the Khyber Pass and the Mediterranean.) 1 If the hostage diplomacy of 1991 demonstrates the value of unconventional diplomatic meth• ods, the hostage diplomacy of 1985-6 (which generated the Iran-Contra affair), also illustrates the catastrophe that can fall on policy- and reputations- when such methods are handled badly.2 In view of the chequered history of the hostage negotiations in the Middle East in the 1980s and early 1990s, it is not sur• prising that they generated considerable debate. Nevertheless this tended to revolve chiefly around the two following ques• tions. First, is it right to talk to the enemy? Secondly, and bear• ing in mind the risk of appearing weak that this might entail, is it prudent to talk to the enemy? These are certainly important questions, the answers to which are influenced by religious and ideological considerations, by political priorities - and by cir• cumstances. However, on the assumption that talking to the enemy is considered both prudent and morally defensible, there is a third question that also needs to be answered: How does one talk to the enemy? The diplomatic methods them• selves, in other words, require at least equally great scrutiny. How do they work? And what are the advantages and dis• advantages of each kind? These are the questions, therefore,

X Ill XIV Introduction that this book will investigate. In regard to the second of them, it will become clear that the most appropriate methods (sev• eral are normally employed simultaneously) vary according to the kinds of state employing them, the legal status of the hos• tile relationship in which they are used, the kinds of com• munication needed (clarification of intentions, negotiation, and so on), and circumstances- among others, war or peace. In what, then, does this 'black market diplomacy', as Winston Churchill called it in a speech in 1948,3 consist? What methods of communication are available to states that either do not enjoy 'diplomatic relations' or do but find the functioning of any resident missions severely impaired by a climate of acute political hostility? There is in fact a rich variety of channels of communica• tion, so rich- and in parts so opaque- that the present book can• not encompass them all. Among those either not dealt with in detail or not treated under direct focus in the present work, two in particular cannot be ignored altogether and so I shall say a few words about them here. They are direct telecommunication and nonverbal signalling. (Since the last mentioned is also often asso• ciated in practice with verbal communication, as when a message is sent via a high-level special envoy in order both to flatter the recipient and underline the importance of the communication, we shall come across this again later.) Communication between hostile states by nonverbal means, as for example when the Nixon administration relaxed restric• tions on trade with Communist China at the beginning of the 1970s in order to signal its desire to improve relations, 4 is clearly of great importance. Historically it has been associated with the movement of military formations, including fleets. Across the range of nonverbal communication, which is vast and is often propaganda by a different name, four great virtues of its use may be identified: first, it can be presented as inno• cent of political intent to the uninitiated- public yet disguised; secondly, it may avoid the risk of rebuff because reciprocation is not required; thirdly, it can make retreat easier since exclus• ively nonverbal signals do not generate the same sort of com• mitment as explicit verbal statements; and fourthly (this is its propaganda dimension), it can generate pressure on an unfriendly power by appealing over its head to its people.5 Because of these characteristics, nonverbal communication tends to be relied on quite heavily in the early, fragile stage of a Introduction XV rapprochement between hostile powers, when the point is to manipulate atmosphere. It is, however, as easy to misinterpret nonverbal signals as verbal ones - perhaps easier when this takes place across cultures- and, besides, nonverbal communi• cation can hardly cope with details. Even at the beginning of a rapprochement such as that between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States, therefore, verbal com• munication is necessary as well, and obviously becomes more so as relations develop. In principle there is no reason why, if the occasion should seem to warrant it, the representative of one state should not pick up a telephone and call direct the foreign ministry or presidential residence in a hostile state; or use telex, fax or computer communication instead. This kind of contact is extensively employed in relations between friendly states, up to and including head-of-state level.6 However there is little evi• dence to suggest that the telephone, at any rate, is a significant form of direct communication between hostile states. (Con• trary to popular belief, the Moscow-Washington 'hot line', introduced for use in emergencies following the acute fright of the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, was a teletype link.) Nor is it surprising that the telephone is not popular. It is vul• nerable to eavesdropping, it tempts politicians to trade insults, it cannot convey (or detect) body language, and it cannot leave an interlocutor with an aide memoire or bout de papier. Even in relations between friendly states, the great advances in communications technology have not destroyed faith in the personal touch.7 Nevertheless telecommunication is almost certainly important as an ancillary means of communication between hostile states, not the least in making arrangements for communication to take place by other means. In his mem• oir of peacemaking in Angola and Namibia in the 1980s, the US assistant secretary of state for Mrican affairs, Chester Crocker, notes that his team communicated with the MPLA government in Luanda, which the United States did not recog• nise, via the secure telex facilities of the British embassy in the Angolan capital - and, since all important contacts were conducted via other routes, probably in order to make arrangements for them.8 Nonverbal signalling and direct telecommunication may each have a part to play, therefore, in communications xvi Introduction between hostile states. There seems little doubt, however, that other methods are generally more important. These are inter• mediaries, disguised resident missions (such as the increas• ingly popular 'interests section'), the diplomatic corps in third states and (where separate) at the seat of international organ• isations, the special envoy and the joint commission. Since at least the 1960s the working funeral has also become very important and, since it is usually overlooked, this also seems worthy of detailed attention. Before considering these key methods of communication between hostile states, however, it is necessary- for reasons that will become clear - to look more closely at the formal as well as substantive circumstances that make resort to them necessary.