TALKING to the ENEMY Also by G
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TALKING TO THE ENEMY Also by G. R. Berridge DIPLOMACY AT THE UN (editor with Anthony Jennings) ECONOMIC POWER IN ANGLO-SOUTH AFRICAN DIPLOMACY INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: States, Power and Conflict since 1945 INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (with Derek Heater) RETURN TO THE UN: UN Diplomacy in Regional Conflicts SOUTH AFRICA, THE COLONIAL POWERS AND 'AFRICAN DEFENCE': The Rise and Fall of the White Entente, 1948-60 THE POLITICS OF THE SOUTH AFRICA RUN: European Shipping and Pretoria Talking to the Enemy How States without 'Diplomatic Relations' Communicate G. R. Berridge Professor ofinternational Politics University of Leicester ©G. R. Berridge 1994 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1994 978-0-333-55655-9 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written pem1ission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the tern1s of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London WI P 9HE. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. First published in Great Britain 1994 by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-1-349-39038-0 ISBN 978-0-230-37898-8 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9780230378988 First published in the United States of America 1994 by Scholarly and Reference Division, ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 ISBN 978-0-312-12152-5 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Berridge, Geoff. Talking to the enemy : how states without 'diplomatic relations' communicate I G. R. Berridge. p. em. Includes bibliographcal references and index. ISBN 978-0-312-12152-5 I. Diplomatic negotiations in international disputes. 2. Communication in international relations. 3. Hotlines (International relations) I. Title. JX4473.B47 1994 327 .2---{]c20 93-47037 CIP 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 05 04 03 02 01 00 99 98 97 To the memory of my father Charles Raymond Berridge This page intentionally left blank Contents List of Boxes, Figures and Tables viii List ofAppendices IX List of Abbreviations X Preface xi Introduction xiii 1 The Shuttered Embassy 1 2 The Intermediary 13 3 The Disguised Embassy 32 4 The Working Funeral 59 5 The Diplomatic Corps 75 6 The Special Envoy 101 7 The Joint Commission 117 8 Conclusion 129 Appendices 134 Notes and References 149 Select Bibliography 167 Index 170 vii List of Boxes, Figures and Tables Boxes 3.1 Protecting powers and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961 34 3.2 The Rhodesian crisis, 1965, and the creation of interests sections by Britain 36 3.3 South Mrican diplomatic missions in Mrica, 1993 51 4.1 Margaret Thatcher's meetings at the funeral of Chernenko 62 6.1 General Vernon A. ('Dick') Walters 108 7.1 The Angola/Cuba/South Mricajoint Commission, 1989-91: composition and meetings 121 7.2 The Iran-US Claims Tribunal: membership, 1981 125 Figure 6.1 Special envoys, by proximity to policy-making circles and character of appointment 113 Tables 3.1 Interests sections in London, 1965-93: protecting powers, location and size of staff compared with former embassy 37 3.2 British interests sections, 1971-93: protecting powers, location and size of staff compared with former embassy 40 viii List of Appendices 1 New Breaks in Diplomatic Relations, 1976-89 134 2 Funerals, 1945-93 140 3 The Leaders of State Delegations at the Funeral of Leonid Brezhnev, 15 November 1982 142 4 Dulles's Guidance to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson in the Ambassadorial Talks with Communist China 145 5 The Brazzaville Protocol, 13 December 1988: Annex on the Joint Commission 148 ix List of Abbreviations ANC Mrican National Congress ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations CIA Central Intelligence Agency EC European Community FRELIMO Front for the Liberation of Mozambique FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States [documents on] HCDeb House of Commons Debates IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IMF International Monetary Fund MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation OAS Organisation of American States OAU Organisation of Mrican Unity OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation POW/MIA Prisoners of War/Missing in Action [in S. E. Asia] PRC People's Republic of China PRO Public Record Office [British] Renamo Mozambique National Resistance ROC Republic of China (Taiwan) SAR&H South Mrican Railways & Harbours Administration SWAPO South-West Mrica People's Organisation TRNC Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus UDI Unilateral Declaration of Independence [Rhodesian, November 1965] UN United Nations UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group [in Namibia] X Preface A long time before it occurred to me to write this book I was studying topics that took me, either directly or indirectly, deep into important areas of its subject. These included diplomacy at the UN, South Mrica's foreign relations, and the theory and practice of Henry Kissinger. The UN work was directly relevant because its focus was on how hostile states exploited their prox imity in New York to make discreet contacts. There are echoes of this work in Chapter 5. The study of South Mrican foreign policy provided many insights into unconventional diplomatic techniques because after 1948 the introduction of apartheid forced this country into ever greater formal isolation. As for Henry Kissinger, he, of course, was the high priest of 'back channel' diplomacy, in relations with the Soviet Union (espe cially in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) as well as with North Vietnam and China. I decided to use all of this work as the basis for this book for two reasons: first, because (except in regard to intermediaries) little has been written on the subject from a general perspective; and, secondly, because it seems to me to be of great practical importance. I would like at this point to pay tribute to my former Leicester colleague, Maurice Keens-Soper, whose original and sometimes provocative work on diplomacy first stimulated my interest in the area. I am also in great intellectual debt to two other fellow workers in this area, Raymond Cohen and Alan James, the latter being so kind as to cast a careful eye over this manuscript. Among others who have helped me I must single outJohn Fitch, my part-time research assistant on this project, who has not only laboured hard on some wearying tasks (nota bly in connection with Appendix 1) but generated new lines of inquiry. I am also grateful for help in various ways to the fol lowing: Bob Borthwick, Stephen Chan, Adrian Guelke, James Hamill, Izak Human, Franz Knispel (European Funeral Direc tors' Association), and John Young. Members of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office have helped me, too, and I am grateful to them. For generous financial assistance, efficiently and sym pathetically administered, I would like to thank the Nuffield Foundation. XI xii Preface An earlier version of Chapter 4 appeared in Diplomacy and Statecraft in July 1993, and I am grateful to the editors for permission to reproduce this here. Leicester G. R. BERRIDGE Introduction The dramatic breakthrough in 1991 in the crisis involving Western hostages held for years in Lebanon - which saw the release, among others, of special envoy of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Terry Waite, and US journalist, Terry Anderson - was one of the latest and most significant examples of success ful diplomacy conducted substantially by unconventional methods. This had been unavoidable not only because the hostage-takers themselves were nongovernmental groups but because the governments with influence over them - Iran, Syria and Libya - had for varying periods of time no formal diplomatic contact with the governments of which the hos tages were citizens, notably the United States and Britain. (The United Kingdom itself, as its foreign secretary, Douglas Hurd, pointed out in the House of Commons in the previous year, was in danger of having no embassy between the Khyber Pass and the Mediterranean.) 1 If the hostage diplomacy of 1991 demonstrates the value of unconventional diplomatic meth ods, the hostage diplomacy of 1985-6 (which generated the Iran-Contra affair), also illustrates the catastrophe that can fall on policy- and reputations- when such methods are handled badly.2 In view of the chequered history of the hostage negotiations in the Middle East in the 1980s and early 1990s, it is not sur prising that they generated considerable debate. Nevertheless this tended to revolve chiefly around the two following ques tions. First, is it right to talk to the enemy? Secondly, and bear ing in mind the risk of appearing weak that this might entail, is it prudent to talk to the enemy? These are certainly important questions, the answers to which are influenced by religious and ideological considerations, by political priorities - and by cir cumstances. However, on the assumption that talking to the enemy is considered both prudent and morally defensible, there is a third question that also needs to be answered: How does one talk to the enemy? The diplomatic methods them selves, in other words, require at least equally great scrutiny. How do they work? And what are the advantages and dis advantages of each kind? These are the questions, therefore, X Ill XIV Introduction that this book will investigate. In regard to the second of them, it will become clear that the most appropriate methods (sev eral are normally employed simultaneously) vary according to the kinds of state employing them, the legal status of the hos tile relationship in which they are used, the kinds of com munication needed (clarification of intentions, negotiation, and so on), and circumstances- among others, war or peace.