Venezuela in Crisis A Backgrounder By Jorge Mejía ’21 Tis essay provides a rigorous but readable background for arguably one of the most pressing geopolit- ical issues in twenty-frst century Latin America ‒ the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela under President Nicolás Maduro of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). To this end, this essay analyzes and connects three distinct political phenomena in Venezuelan history whose interrelated development explains the country’s current instability: Puntofjismo (1958-1998), Chavismo (1998-2013), and Mad- urismo (2013-present). It frst describes the collapse of Puntofjismo, Venezuela’s pacted democracy and oil-dependent petro-state to contextualize the rise of Hugo Chávez’s political project in 1990, Bolivarian- ism. Te paper then considers how Chávez’s regime continued and ruptured with Puntofjismo through clientelism, exclusionary politics, and the creation of an illiberal hybrid regime. Based of of these foun- dations, the essay situates the current student protests, military repression, and humanitarian crisis under President Maduro. Using both English and Spanish-language source material, this paper lays bare the current complex reality that is Venezuela. COLLOQUIUM Puntofijismo (1958-1998) Chavismo (1998-2013) Madurism 1958 1998 2013 - Present Moisés Naím, a Distinguished Fellow at the Venezuela’s transition from the military dicta- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, torship of Marco Pérez Jiménez to democracy states, “Today, Venezuela is the sick man of Lat- came in 1958 after representatives of Venezuela’s in America.”1 Te humanitarian crisis in Vene- three main political parties, Democratic Action zuela, under current President Nicolás Maduro (AD), the Social Christian Party (COPEI), and Moros of the United Socialist Party of Venezu- Democratic Republican Union (URD), signed ela, is arguably Latin America’s most pressing a formal agreement to accept the results of the issue in the twenty-frst century. Te country’s December 1958 presidential election of AD can- crisis, distinguished by food shortages, political didate, Rómulo Betancourt. Tis “Pacto de Pun- instability, hyperinfation, and other crises, has to Fijo” enshrined what political scientists term garnered the attention of observers worldwide, “consociational democracy,” a power-sharing ar- such as the European Union. Tis rediscovery of rangement whereby parties agree to alternate the Venezuela, however, does not imply that current presidency, respect election results, equally ap- circumstances were altogether unexpected. Tis portion government agency positions, and pre- paper analyzes and connects three distinct yet re- vent single-party hegemony.3 Puntofjismo also lated political phenomena in Venezuelan histo- afrmed petroleum’s dominance in the economy. ry: Puntofjismo (1958-1998), Chavismo (1998- Te Puntofjisto democracy had several im- 2013), and Madurismo (2013-present). Tis portant characteristics that contextualize the essay frst describes the collapse of Puntofjismo, subsequent erosion of Venezuelan democracy. Venezuela’s post-transition style of pacted de- Venezuelan history scholars underscore two spe- mocracy, or “partyarchy,” and its oil-dependent cifc qualities, the notion of the “petro-state” and petro-state, whose loss of popular support in the “partyarchy,” or pacted democracy. Terry Lynn 1980s coincided with the rise of Hugo Chávez’s Karl, author of the 1997 book, Te Paradox of political project known as Bolivarianism in the Plenty, defnes a petro-state as a distinctive type 1990s. Te paper then analyzes Chávez’s regime of institutional setting produced by an outsized and its continuation and rupture with Puntof- jismo through clientelism, exclusionary politics, and the creation of an illiberal hybrid regime. Following this analysis, the paper seeks to explain the complex realities of modern day Venezuela, including the current protests, military violence, and humanitarian crisis under Nicolás Maduro. Te modern day phenomena of Venezuela can frst be explained by the collapse of the public governance system from 1958 to 1998, Puntofjis- mo. Daniel Hellinger writes, “Most of the recent works on Venezuela concentrate on the collapse of the Punto Fijo system and on the character of Chavismo and the Bolivarian government.”2 PAGE 43 dependence on petroleum revenue.4 Petro-states directions in oil-rich states.9 In 1983, when oil like Venezuela, a member of the Organization of prices dwindled, the stability of these arrange- the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), are ments weakened as well. Several events followed noted for their extractive and distributive state that undermined the legitimacy of Puntofjismo. capacities. Strong reliance on non-productive Among these is the Caracazo, the Caracas-based and capital-intensive resources afects political ar- riots of February 27, 1989, which unfolded in re- rangements such as social classes, regime types, sponse to the government’s structural adjustment state institutions, and the decisions of policymak- program. Equally crucial were the attempted mil- ers. Regime type is especially subject to oil depen- itary coups of 1992 on February 4 and November dence due to the “symbiotic interaction between 27 led by military lieutenant Hugo Chavez fol- the…incentives created by the petro-state and a lowed by the impeachment of former President particular type of democracy.”5 Te latter hints at Carlos Andrés Pérez in December 1993, who “partyarchy,” a term coined by Michael Coppedge abandoned COPEI and later won on an anti-par- in his 1997 book, Strong Parties and Lame Ducks.6 ty platform. Levine explains the implications of Te title refers to Venezuela’s post-transition tra- these events for Venezuela’s Puntofjista democracy: dition of corporatist elite bargaining, intra-elite compromise, and economic conservatism in At each of these points a key pillar of the managing petroleum revenues and state-soci- system was undermined or removed: eco- ety relations.7 As Hellinger notes about AD and nomic strength (Black Friday); social COPEI’s talks at Punto Fijo, “Te issue was not pacts, control, and civil order (27 Febru- whether some type of system would be better… ary); a depoliticised and controlled mil- than democracy, but whether this particular de- itary (4 February and 27 November); and mocracy was delivering on the promise of ‘sowing unquestioned executive dominance and the oil’ in a project of national development that party hegemony (the destitution of Pérez would include all Venezuelans.”8 From 1958 to and the election of Caldera). Te nature 1979, Venezuela’s petro-state and pacted democ- of the crisis refects the dimensions of de- racy resulted in a system of consistent economic cline: economic decay, political ossifca- growth, strong political parties, and governability. tion and immobilism, and rising protest.10 Te erosion of government stability during the 1980s explains why Hugo Chávez’s ideol- Evidently, the 1980s issued a terminus to Venezu- ogy Bolivarianismo, or Bolivarianism, success- ela’s Puntofjista democracy. Te qualities of pet- fully channeled institutional anomie and social ro-state and pacted democracy, economic growth, demand into a revolutionary political platform. stability, governability, controlled organized so- In his 2002 article, “Te Decline and Fall of De- cial life, and military subordination to civilian mocracy in Venezuela,” Daniel Levine notes that rule, were no longer guaranteed. Factionalism, the synergy between the petro-state and pacted civil outcry, and polarization were underway. democracy reinforced certain systemic ills in Ven- Te collapse of Puntofjismo ran parallel with ezuela, such as corruption, truncated political the emergence of an alternative political project participation, corporatism, patronage, presiden- of special relevance to contemporary Venezuela, tialism, and bureaucratization. Tomas Friedman Hugo Chávez’s Bolivarianismo. Bolivarianism re- further captures these ideas in his famous “First fers to the political thought embodied in the mil- Law of Petropolitics,” which posits that the price itary movement called the Movimiento Revolu- of oil and the pace of freedom move in opposite cionario Bolivariano (MRB), which was involved COLLOQUIUM Venezuela’s systemic ills: corruption corporatism bureaucratization truncated patronage political participation presidentialism with the aforesaid coup d’état against President critique of Puntofjismo.16 Tis project critically Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1992. In his essay, “Ex- recognized civil society’s unifying plea for the plaining Political Change in Venezuela,” Pedro overhaul of Puntofjista democracy by linking the Sanoja observes, “Te ideas of Bolivarianism are Venezuela of 1830 with the Venezuela of 1990 derived from contradictions inherent to existing and drawing connections between the periods as institutions, and can only be understood in re- an unfnished Manichean struggle for freedom. lation to the values and practices embedded in In short, Chávez’s Bolivarian ideology during them, which Bolivarianism aimed to replace.”11 the 1990s made strategic use of anti-Puntof- Sanoja refers to the opportunities presented jista civil society demand. Ultimately, Bolivari- by the decay of the Puntofjista institutional or- anism and its repudiation of pacted democracy der, including the inability of AD and COPEI became institutionalized in December 1998, in the corporatist pre-Chávez institutional set- when Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías of the United ting to placate social