Bosnia and Herzegovina Mission Notes
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Peacekeeping_4_v11.qxd 2/2/06 5:06 PM Page 105 4.102.4 Bosnia and Herzegovina A decade after the Dayton Accords brought NATO, which maintains a small headquarters peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), it in Sarajevo. EUFOR has also been proactive in remains divided into Serb and Croat-Bosniak tackling certain aspects of organized crime. entities and organized crime is widespread. Both EU missions were mandated to cooperate The country has become a test for the Euro- with the European and international agencies pean Union’s external policies. In December overseeing Bosnia’s reconstruction—their 2004, NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) was work raises policy questions over how peace replaced by a European force (EUFOR)—which operations can continue to contribute to long- at 7,000 personnel is the largest EU deployment term political transformations. to date. The year 2005 was also the third and The EUPM was launched in January 2003 last year of the mandate of the EU Police Mis- to replace the UN’s International Police Task sion (EUPM), its biggest civilian operation. Force (IPTF). It had no direct responsibility While both the Organization for Security and for law and order. Rather, it advised and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO monitored institutionally separate Bosnian continue to have missions in BiH, the interna- Serb and Croat-Bosniak forces, an arrange- tional presence there is not only about state ment that reflected BiH’s complex postwar building but also about offering the prospect of political structure. Although reduced from EU membership. their wartime levels—during which they were The EU has been involved in BiH since effectively paramilitaries—the BiH forces the outbreak of war there, and it has main- remained overstaffed. The EUPM’s primary tained a monitoring mission throughout the goal was to help them “develop a profes- former Yugoslavia since 1993 (covered in the sional, politically neutral and ethnically unbi- data on non-UN missions in this volume). But ased law-enforcement system,” with the key the prospect of membership has become explicit since the European Council’s 2002 decision to “double-hat” the international community’s High Representative in BiH, Lord Ashdown, as EU Special Representative European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) (EUSR). While Ashdown has continued to press domestic politicians to proceed down the • Authorization date 11 March 2002 (Council Joint Action “road to Europe,” 2005 saw temporary set- 2002/210/CFSP) backs as Bosnian Serb leaders blocked signif- • Start date January 2003 icant police reforms. While these difficulties • Head of mission Kevin Carty (Irish) were overcome by year’s end, they led to crit- • Budget $21.1 million icism of EUPM’s role in facilitating change. • Current strength Civilian police: 367 In the meantime, EUFOR has successfully Civilian staff: 53 managed a complex operational relationship with 105 Peacekeeping_4_v11.qxd 2/2/06 5:06 PM Page 106 106 • MISSION NOTES political objective being the formation of sin- lic security role was confined to liaison with gle, statewide police. domestic police and EUFOR “in extremis.” The EUPM’s scale and activities repre- Its authority rested on the right to request the sented a reduction from those of the IPTF, sacking of “noncompliant” domestic officers which was formed in 1996 after Dayton and by the High Representative. Since its incep- shifted from limited oversight of the domestic tion, observers have criticized the EUPM for police to include their democratization and not using this authority more—it has made modernization. The EUPM’s mandate was one request to date—and in tackling political less expansive, and whereas the IPTF fielded obstruction more broadly. There is consider- 1,527 police officers in mid-2002, its successor able anecdotal evidence of problems in the has typically deployed just over 400 police early phase of operations, including uncer- officers, supported by approximately 50 inter- tainty over goals and local sensitivities. national and 300 local civilian staff. It departed Once established, the EUPM worked closely from the IPTF’s strategy of co-location, by with the office of Lord Ashdown to create the which officers were present in all Bosnian State Investigation and Protection Agency to police stations. EUPM members were placed pursue war crimes and terrorist suspects. While in “medium-high level” offices only, and the it also succeeded in developing a single Serb mission concentrated on training and overall Border Service, the impact of its training on the reform. quality and effectiveness of rank-and-file police The EUPM’s advising and monitoring has been limited. function precluded “executive powers or the Progress toward the unification of the deployment of an armed component.” Its pub- Serb and Croat-Bosniak police forces proved uneasy, and the EUPM’s contribution uncer- tain. Unification was a prerequisite for BiH’s progress toward a stabilization and associa- tion agreement (SAA) with the EU—widely interpreted as a step toward membership. The EUPM played a relatively small role in the activities of the Police Restructuring Com- mission (PRC), which set out a program of rationalization and unification at the close of 2004. Talks on implementing this broke down in May 2005, with Bosnian Serb leaders re- jecting a unified police structure. With a 15 September deadline to meet con- ditions for SAA talks, the EUPM publicly en- couraged a renewed effort to break the dead- lock, although it was temporarily distracted by a highly critical report on its performance from the International Crisis Group (ICG). When, on 5 October, the Bosnian Serb parlia- ment belatedly voted to accept a unified police service, observers attributed the volte face to high-level political pressure, possibly AP Photo/Hidajet Delic linked to the EU’s decision to negotiate an German Army peacekeeper gets the new EUFOR SAA with Serbia and Montenegro. sign attached to his uniform sleeve by an officer at the German military base Yet the move helped open the way for Rajlovac, near Sarajevo on 30 November 2004 EU leaders to offer Bosnia SAA talks on 21 Peacekeeping_4_v11.qxd 2/2/06 5:06 PM Page 107 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA • 107 November. Two days later, the country’s leaders agreed to subordinate their political EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) structures to a single presidency, replacing the Dayton system by which three presidents • Authorization date 12 July 2004 (EU Council Joint Action representing Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs had 2004/570/CFSP) participated in a rotating presidency. This 9 July 2004 (UNSC Res. 1551) constitutional shift was welcomed as the most • Start date December 2004 significant step yet to political stability. • Head of mission Major General David Leakey (Britain) As the successor to NATO’s Stabilization • Budget as of $86.3 million (2005) Force, EUFOR’s mandate in BiH derives from 30 September 2005 the Dayton Accords. After taking over from • Strength as of Troops: 6,656 the original Implementation Force in Decem- 30 September 2005 ber 1996, SFOR gradually reduced from 60,000 troops to 7,000, as stability grew. In parallel with this reduction, the percentage of US inform NATO of developments. Surprisingly, troops in SFOR declined from a third in 1996 this structure has worked well in practice, and to 12 percent in 2004, fueling discussions of relations between the two organizations have the possibility of its transformation into an proved effective in the field. EU mission. These were slowed by doubts Non-EU nations are permitted to con- over European capabilities, exacerbated by tribute troops to the mission, and 15 percent political differences arising from the Iraq of EUFOR’s manpower comes from outside crisis. the European Union, most notably from EUFOR was finally authorized by the Bulgaria, Canada, and Turkey. While there European Council in July 2004. UN Security is no residual US presence in the mission, Council Resolution 1575 confirmed the mis- there have been significant public informa- sion’s Chapter VII mandate. On 2 December, tion efforts to emphasize the continuity from EUFOR duly replaced SFOR. Operation SFOR. EUFOR’s approval rating among all Althea is open-ended, to be terminated at the Bosnian citizens in the wake of the transfer European Council’s discretion. Whereas sen- was just over 44 percent, roughly on a par ior US officials had argued that EUFOR with other international organizations and its would essentially “police” Bosnia, the EU predecessor. has underlined the mission’s continuity with To maintain deterrence, EUFOR units are SFOR as a “deterrent” force, maintaining deployed throughout Bosnia in a pattern sim- troop levels at approximately 7,000. While ilar to that employed by SFOR. Additionally, analysts think this number is higher than a 500-strong integrated police unit (IPU) is strictly necessary in military terms, EUFOR based in Sarajevo, to be deployed as gen- has also assumed the role of regional reserve darmerie to handle civil crises. EUFOR has for NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR). yet to face an outbreak of disorder, but exer- EUFOR’s formal relations with NATO cises have been conducted through 2005 to are labyrinthine, as the EU lacks autonomous demonstrate the IPU’s readiness and robust- command structures of its own. While its ness. The larger Operation Rehearsal was held force commander is an EU officer, he is in January to simulate a NATO reinforcement, answerable to EU cells at NATO headquarters emphasizing the possibility of its intervention in Italy and Belgium. The operation com- in any future crisis. EUFOR has also contin- mander is thus NATO’s Deputy Supreme ued SFOR’s Harvest operations, targeting ille- Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR). But gal weapons in collaboration with local in issues regarding Althea, DSACEUR reports authorities and police.