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4.102.4

Bosnia and Herzegovina

A decade after the Dayton Accords brought NATO, which maintains a small headquarters peace to (BiH), it in Sarajevo. EUFOR has also been proactive in remains divided into Serb and Croat-Bosniak tackling certain aspects of organized crime. entities and organized crime is widespread. Both EU missions were mandated to cooperate The country has become a test for the Euro- with the European and international agencies pean Union’s external policies. In December overseeing Bosnia’s reconstruction—their 2004, NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) was work raises policy questions over how peace replaced by a European force (EUFOR)—which operations can continue to contribute to long- at 7,000 personnel is the largest EU deployment term political transformations. to date. The year 2005 was also the third and The EUPM was launched in January 2003 last year of the mandate of the EU Police Mis- to replace the UN’s International Police Task sion (EUPM), its biggest civilian operation. Force (IPTF). It had no direct responsibility While both the Organization for Security and for law and order. Rather, it advised and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO monitored institutionally separate Bosnian continue to have missions in BiH, the interna- Serb and Croat-Bosniak forces, an arrange- tional presence there is not only about state ment that reflected BiH’s complex postwar building but also about offering the prospect of political structure. Although reduced from EU membership. their wartime levels—during which they were The EU has been involved in BiH since effectively paramilitaries—the BiH forces the outbreak of war there, and it has main- remained overstaffed. The EUPM’s primary tained a monitoring mission throughout the goal was to help them “develop a profes- former Yugoslavia since 1993 (covered in the sional, politically neutral and ethnically unbi- data on non-UN missions in this volume). But ased law-enforcement system,” with the key the prospect of membership has become explicit since the European Council’s 2002 decision to “double-hat” the international community’s High Representative in BiH, Lord Ashdown, as EU Special Representative Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) (EUSR). While Ashdown has continued to press domestic politicians to proceed down the • Authorization date 11 March 2002 (Council Joint Action “road to Europe,” 2005 saw temporary set- 2002/210/CFSP) backs as Bosnian Serb leaders blocked signif- • Start date January 2003 icant police reforms. While these difficulties • Head of mission Kevin Carty (Irish) were overcome by year’s end, they led to crit- • Budget $21.1 million icism of EUPM’s role in facilitating change. • Current strength Civilian police: 367 In the meantime, EUFOR has successfully Civilian staff: 53 managed a complex operational relationship with

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political objective being the formation of sin- lic security role was confined to liaison with gle, statewide police. domestic police and EUFOR “in extremis.” The EUPM’s scale and activities repre- Its authority rested on the right to request the sented a reduction from those of the IPTF, sacking of “noncompliant” domestic officers which was formed in 1996 after Dayton and by the High Representative. Since its incep- shifted from limited oversight of the domestic tion, observers have criticized the EUPM for police to include their democratization and not using this authority more—it has made modernization. The EUPM’s mandate was one request to date—and in tackling political less expansive, and whereas the IPTF fielded obstruction more broadly. There is consider- 1,527 police officers in mid-2002, its successor able anecdotal evidence of problems in the has typically deployed just over 400 police early phase of operations, including uncer- officers, supported by approximately 50 inter- tainty over goals and local sensitivities. national and 300 local civilian staff. It departed Once established, the EUPM worked closely from the IPTF’s strategy of co-location, by with the office of Lord Ashdown to create the which officers were present in all Bosnian State Investigation and Protection Agency to police stations. EUPM members were placed pursue war crimes and terrorist suspects. While in “medium-high level” offices only, and the it also succeeded in developing a single Serb mission concentrated on training and overall Border Service, the impact of its training on the reform. quality and effectiveness of rank-and-file police The EUPM’s advising and monitoring has been limited. function precluded “executive powers or the Progress toward the unification of the deployment of an armed component.” Its pub- Serb and Croat-Bosniak police forces proved uneasy, and the EUPM’s contribution uncer- tain. Unification was a prerequisite for BiH’s progress toward a stabilization and associa- tion agreement (SAA) with the EU—widely interpreted as a step toward membership. The EUPM played a relatively small role in the activities of the Police Restructuring Com- mission (PRC), which set out a program of rationalization and unification at the close of 2004. Talks on implementing this broke down in May 2005, with Bosnian Serb leaders re- jecting a unified police structure. With a 15 September deadline to meet con- ditions for SAA talks, the EUPM publicly en- couraged a renewed effort to break the dead- lock, although it was temporarily distracted by a highly critical report on its performance from the International Crisis Group (ICG). When, on 5 October, the Bosnian Serb parlia- ment belatedly voted to accept a unified police service, observers attributed the volte face to high-level political pressure, possibly AP Photo/Hidajet Delic linked to the EU’s decision to negotiate an German Army peacekeeper gets the new EUFOR SAA with Serbia and Montenegro. sign attached to his uniform sleeve by an at the German military base Yet the move helped open the way for Rajlovac, near Sarajevo on 30 November 2004 EU leaders to offer Bosnia SAA talks on 21 Peacekeeping_4_v11.qxd 2/2/06 5:06 PM Page 107

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November. Two days later, the country’s leaders agreed to subordinate their political EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) structures to a single presidency, replacing the Dayton system by which three presidents • Authorization date 12 July 2004 (EU Council Joint Action representing Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs had 2004/570/CFSP) participated in a rotating presidency. This 9 July 2004 (UNSC Res. 1551) constitutional shift was welcomed as the most • Start date December 2004 significant step yet to political stability. • Head of mission General David Leakey (Britain) As the successor to NATO’s Stabilization • Budget as of $86.3 million (2005) Force, EUFOR’s mandate in BiH derives from 30 September 2005 the Dayton Accords. After taking over from • Strength as of Troops: 6,656 the original Implementation Force in Decem- 30 September 2005 ber 1996, SFOR gradually reduced from 60,000 troops to 7,000, as stability grew. In parallel with this reduction, the percentage of US inform NATO of developments. Surprisingly, troops in SFOR declined from a third in 1996 this structure has worked well in practice, and to 12 percent in 2004, fueling discussions of relations between the two organizations have the possibility of its transformation into an proved effective in the field. EU mission. These were slowed by doubts Non-EU nations are permitted to con- over European capabilities, exacerbated by tribute troops to the mission, and 15 percent political differences arising from the Iraq of EUFOR’s manpower comes from outside crisis. the European Union, most notably from EUFOR was finally authorized by the Bulgaria, Canada, and Turkey. While there European Council in July 2004. UN Security is no residual US presence in the mission, Council Resolution 1575 confirmed the mis- there have been significant public informa- sion’s Chapter VII mandate. On 2 December, tion efforts to emphasize the continuity from EUFOR duly replaced SFOR. Operation SFOR. EUFOR’s approval rating among all Althea is open-ended, to be terminated at the Bosnian citizens in the wake of the transfer European Council’s discretion. Whereas sen- was just over 44 percent, roughly on a par ior US officials had argued that EUFOR with other international organizations and its would essentially “police” Bosnia, the EU predecessor. has underlined the mission’s continuity with To maintain deterrence, EUFOR units are SFOR as a “deterrent” force, maintaining deployed throughout Bosnia in a pattern sim- troop levels at approximately 7,000. While ilar to that employed by SFOR. Additionally, analysts think this number is higher than a 500-strong integrated police unit (IPU) is strictly necessary in military terms, EUFOR based in Sarajevo, to be deployed as gen- has also assumed the role of regional reserve darmerie to handle civil crises. EUFOR has for NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR). yet to face an outbreak of disorder, but exer- EUFOR’s formal relations with NATO cises have been conducted through 2005 to are labyrinthine, as the EU lacks autonomous demonstrate the IPU’s readiness and robust- command structures of its own. While its ness. The larger Operation Rehearsal was held force commander is an EU officer, he is in January to simulate a NATO reinforcement, answerable to EU cells at NATO headquarters emphasizing the possibility of its intervention in Italy and Belgium. The operation com- in any future crisis. EUFOR has also contin- mander is thus NATO’s Deputy Supreme ued SFOR’s Harvest operations, targeting ille- Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR). But gal weapons in collaboration with local in issues regarding Althea, DSACEUR reports authorities and police. It has been closely solely to EU bodies in , which in turn involved in intelligence-gathering against war Peacekeeping_4_v11.qxd 2/2/06 5:06 PM Page 108

108 • MISSION NOTES

crimes suspects and in operations against or- the Serb entity to suspend all recruit and con- ganized crime, from drug smuggling to illegal script training at the base involved, removing a logging. senior officer deemed to be responsible for EUFOR’s force commander has also exer- failing to handle the incident satisfactorily. cised statutory powers over Bosnia’s military, This incident was treated as further proof of which, like the police, has remained divided EUFOR’s expansive interpretation of a strong on ethnic lines since Dayton. These powers mandate, contrasted with self-imposed limita- were of particular relevance in April 2005, tions on the EUPM. when Bosnian Serb recruits swore allegiance While EUFOR maintains security in BiH, to the Bosnian Serb entity rather than the state NATO has a headquarters in Sarajevo. The at an induction ceremony. EUFOR required US senior military representative in charge of this mission also commands US forces based in northeastern BiH, maintained under a bilateral agreement between Washington and NATO Headquarters Sarajevo the Bosnian government. These troops can be deployed in the pursuit of war crimes sus- • Authorization date 28 June 2004 (Communiqué of NATO pects, for which NATO headquarters shares Istanbul Summit) responsibility with EUFOR.1 22 November 2004 (UNSC Res. 1575) Politically, NATO headquarters also assists • Start date 2 December 2004 and monitors BiH’s efforts to enter NATO’s • Head of mission Senior Military Representative, Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, a goal Brigadier-General Louis Weber approved by the Defense Reform Commission (United States) in September 2005. The military corollary of the SAA, this would require unification of Peacekeeping_4_v11.qxd 2/2/06 5:06 PM Page 109

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA • 109

post-Dayton structures, as the Serb and Croat- Bosniak militaries have remained divided. OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress toward a single Bosnian army has been uneven but real: while Croat and Bosniak • Authorization date 8 December 1995 (Fifth Meeting of the politicians approved the transition in January Ministerial Council) 2005, their Serb counterparts only did so in • Start date December 1995 September. NATO headquarters also became • Head of mission Douglas Alexander Davidson involved in the induction ceremony incident, (United States) collaborating with EUFOR in censuring those • Budget as of $20.1 million (2005) involved. 30 September 2005 In June 2005, NATO troops raided the • Strength as of Civilian staff: 119 house of the fugitive war crimes suspect, former 30 September 2005 Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, and in August it temporarily detained his son. But Karadzic remains at large (and is thought to longer involve itself in electoral procedures, move between Serbia and Montenegro and formerly one of its main areas of responsibil- BiH), as does the former military commander ity. Nonetheless, it maintains a Department for Ratko Mladic. The long-term success of NATO Security Cooperation that is engaged in assist- headquarters and EUFOR is tied to their capture, ing BiH forces to comply with not only inter- a condition for BiH’s progress toward the EU national standards, but also intelligence reform and PfP. and political oversight of security affairs. Also involved in BiH’s security and po- While both the OSCE and NATO continue litical reform is the OSCE Mission to Bosnia to be proactive in maintaining peace in Bosnia, and Herzegovina, which both assisted the De- the Office of the High Representative may be fense Reform Commission and has supported wound down as early as 2006, with the EUSR the collection and destruction of small arms in formally becoming the principal international coordination with EUFOR. Mandated under post in BiH. This may coincide with the end of Dayton, this mission is autonomous of the Lord Ashdown’s tenure, expected in early Office of the High Representative, and while it 2006. While this process is not yet confirmed, continues to maintain field offices across the and may be affected by the EU’s own uncer- country, is gradually reducing its role. In 2005 tain political evolution, the Europeanization of the OSCE mission declared that it would no Bosnia’s security continues. Peacekeeping_4_v11.qxd 2/2/06 5:06 PM Page 110

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Box 4.10.1 The EU in Macedonia

While expanding its role in BiH and con- and its departure coincided with the to promote police reform throughout the tinuing its involvement in Kosovo within deployment of Proxima. NATO has re- country. the UN Interim Administration Mission tained a headquarters in the capital, The year in review began with ques- in Kosovo (UNMIK), the EU has also Skopje, a rear base for its Kosovo force. tions about FYROM’s commitment to maintained a police mission (the EU It also provides security sector assis- minority rights. In November 2004 the Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav tance, as FYROM had the advantage of decentralization process received popular Republic of Macedonia [EUPOL Prox- ima]) in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Launched in 2003 EU Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to operate until December 2004, its man- (EUPOL Proxima) date was extended for one year as ten- sions grew around the country’s Alban- • Authorization date 29 September 2003 (EU Council Joint ian minority. But these tensions have Action 2003/681/CFSP) dissipated, and the EU mission has con- • Start date December 2003 centrated on police and border service • Head of mission Brigadier-General Jürgen Scholtz reforms in a largely stable environment. () The situation in FYROM has been a • Budget as of $13.2 million (2005) source of concern to the international 30 September 2005 community since it withdrew from Yugo- • Strength as of Civilian police: 128 slavia in 1991. Separatist aspirations 30 September 2005 Civilian staff: 28 among segments of the Albanian commu- nity (25 percent of the population) were exacerbated by limitations on their mi- nority rights. From 1992 to 1999 the UN joining NATO’s Partnership for Peace approval through a referendum, but dis- maintained a preventive deployment force program as early as 1995. putes over the rights issue within the gov- there, complemented by an OSCE “spill- Like the EUPM in Bosnia, EUPOL erning coalition led to the prime minister’s over mission” from Kosovo, which is still Proxima has no executive authority, but resignation. While elections in February in place. Tensions mounted after Yugo- prioritizes training activities. These cen- 2005 saw minor violence, this did not es- slavia’s withdrawal from Kosovo, which ter on border security, public order, and calate and the government has remained encouraged ethnic Albanian radicals to organized crime. They also contribute to relatively stable since. become increasingly assertive in FYROM, FYROM’s overall policy of decentral- In this improved political environ- taking control of the northwestern region ization, intended to give the Albanian ment, EU Ministers offered Macedonia of the country in 2001. community increased autonomy. In police membership talks in December 2005, With Kosovo Albanians contribut- terms, this involves a considerable devo- and decided to replace Proxima with a ing to this insurgency, NATO deployed lution of authority to regional centers, security sector reform mission of approx- 3,500 troops to FYROM at the govern- and EUPOL personnel are located in both imately 30 staff. Additionally, the OSCE ment’s request in August 2001. NATO these and smaller stations, while four mission has been and will remain in- maintained operations there until March teams work alongside border police and volved in police affairs. Nonetheless, 2003, when it was replaced by the EU’s within the interior ministry. While the critics have suggested that EUPOL has first military mission—known as Con- mission originally focused on Albanian- not had time institute a new police cul- cordia. This ran until December 2003 majority areas, it has expanded its activities ture, especially within the border police.

Note 1. The headquarters is not usually defined as a peace operation and is thus not included in the non- UN data in this volume. However, its continued involvement in Bosnian political affairs leads to its cov- erage here.