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The Rise of Abir Moussi

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The Rise of Abir Moussi The Counterrevolution Gains Momentum in Tunisia: The Rise of Abir Moussi Anne Wolf November 2020 SNAPSHOT SUMMARY • Abir Moussi, a ruling party official in the Ben Ali dictatorship and now an opposition leader in parliament, is making headlines in Tunisia on almost a daily basis with her anti-revolution stance and uncompromising positions. • Though elected only in October 2019, Moussi has since emerged as one of Tunisia’s most controversial, and influential, politicians. Her Free Destourian Party (PDL) is leading in public opinion polls, even though it currently holds just 17 out of 217 parliamentary seats. • Moussi not only openly defends many aspects of the dictatorship, she denies that a revolution even took place in 2011. She advocates banning the Ennahda Party and backs other illiberal policies. Moussi’s speeches are provocative, if not outright defamatory, and her sit-ins regularly paralyze parliament. • At a time when broad sections of Tunisian society feel disenchanted by persistent unemployment, governance gridlock, and insecurity, Moussi’s populist anti-revolution rhetoric is gaining ground. INTRODUCTION People (ARP) only in October 2019, Moussi has since emerged as one of Tunisia’s most Her speeches are provocative, slanderous, influential and widely followed politicians. Her if not outright defamatory. Abir Moussi, a Free Destourian Party (PDL) is now leading in former official in the Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali public opinion polls, even though it currently dictatorship and now an opposition leader in holds just 17 out of 217 parliamentary seats. parliament, is making headlines in Tunisia One recent poll placed the PDL’s support base on almost a daily basis. Though elected to among likely voters as high as 36 percent, the Assembly of the Representatives of the 13 points ahead of the moderate Islamist PROJECT ON MIDDLE EAST DEMOCRACY THE COUNTERREVOLUTION GAINS MOMENTUM IN TUNISIA: THE RISE OF ABIR MOUSSI Ennahda party, which came first in last year’s 1 parliamentary elections. MOUSSI DENIES THE VERY Moussi not only condones but openly lauds FACT THAT A REVOLUTION many aspects of the Ben Ali regime, for which she served as a senior official of the ruling party, TOOK PLACE AND INSTEAD the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD). CLAIMS THAT OFFICIALS She praises what she claims were decades of “stability” in Tunisia, even though this stability FROM THE BEN ALI REGIME was maintained through harsh repression and WERE THE MAIN VICTIMS OF masked wider social discontent that ultimately exploded in the December 2010–January 2011 A “PLOT.” revolution. But while Moussi has acknowledged that “there were some transgressions” during the dictatorship,2 she has skillfully crafted her own version of Tunisia’s recent history. Moussi denies the very fact that a revolution took place Moussi ran for president in the September 2019 and instead claims that officials from the Ben election, but fared quite poorly, finishing in ninth Ali regime were the main victims of a “plot.” She place with just 4 percent of the vote. At the time, vows to restore security and stability through Moussi was simply not as well known as she is measures reminiscent of the dictatorship. now, and her divisive style did not appear as a good fit with the presidency, which is supposed to be a unifying position. In addition, some THE RCD’S LAST ADVOCATE Tunisians are not ready for a female president. Moussi arguably is better at parliamentary Moussi first rose to prominence immediately politics. In the October 2019 ARP elections, after the fall of the Ben Ali regime, when she some supported her PDL to get back at parties was the only lawyer who agreed to take on the with which they were dissatisfied, or out of task of defending the RCD in court. (Moussi lost: nostalgia for the past, rather than because of her the judiciary ruled on March 9, 2011, to dissolve vision and program. Since being elected to the the party.) At that time, her pro-regime activism ARP, Moussi has shrewdly used this platform to was still a societal taboo, and resulted in Moussi attract more attention to herself. being insulted and harassed in public.3 But these assaults did not prompt her to take a backseat in Indeed, today Moussi draws a wide range of politics. In 2013, Moussi joined the Destourian supporters, not only Ben Ali-era officials and Movement party, founded by Ben Ali-era Prime other ex-regime nostalgics, but even previous Minister Hamed Karoui. When the party failed to revolutionaries whose hopes for a better life under win a single seat in the 2014 legislative elections, democracy remain unfulfilled. Many Tunisians many members left—but not Moussi. Indeed, lament that other parties, whether religiously despite having little financial support and a very tinged or secular-leaning, have failed to deliver limited support base, Moussi pursued her party on their promises and have engaged in so much activism, and in 2016 she took over the leadership political compromise that it is no longer clear of the then-renamed PDL. what their leaders stand for. Moussi, by contrast, 1. B.L., “Le PDL passe de 28% à 36% dans les intentions de vote aux législatives” [PDL rises from 28% to 36% in voting intentions in the legislative elections], Realities, September 7, 2020, https://www.realites.com.tn/2020/09/le-pdl-passe-de-28-a-36-dans-les-intentions-de- vote-aux-legislatives/ 2. Author’s interview with Abir Moussi, Tunis, May 31, 2016. 3. Videos taken inside the courtroom show people shouting ‘dégage’ [‘get lost’] and pulling Moussi’s hair. See for example, “Faouzi Ben Mrad et avocats font leurs cirques lors du proces rcd” [Faouzi Ben Mrad and lawyers make a fuss during the RCD trial], YouTube, March 30, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fchBLkqnDEI 2 pomed.org THE COUNTERREVOLUTION GAINS MOMENTUM IN TUNISIA: THE RISE OF ABIR MOUSSI Abir Moussi speaks at a Free Destourian Party (PDL) event, June 2, 2019. Credit: Abir Moussi Official Facebook page is perceived as totally unyielding in her politics. continues to claim that in December 2010 and And an increasing number of Tunisians, even January 2011 “foreign elements,” together with some who reject her anti-revolution stance, “Islamists” and “so-called human rights activists,” respect that she never hesitated to stand up for toppled Ben Ali.5 Moussi portrays officials of her convictions, no matter how controversial. the former regime as the main victims of this supposed “plot.” She asserts that they were violently targeted and that some even died as a DENYING THE REVOLUTION result of the assaults or psychological stress that they supposedly endured.6 In reality, of course, Following Ben Ali’s ouster, many members of his the overwhelming majority of those killed during regime quickly sided with the revolutionaries to the revolution were pro-democracy activists.7 protect themselves, but far from pursuing this The unjust and derogatory treatment of Ben self-serving strategy, Moussi openly refuted the Ali regime members, Moussi claims, continued very notion that a revolution had taken place.4 even after his ouster, when the new electoral law She came to lead a pro-dictatorship camp that prohibited them from running in the October 4. Anouar Chennoufi, “Abir Moussi ‘Parti Destourien Libre’ à Béja: Nous ne reconnaissons ni la révolution du 14 Janvier et ni la Constitution élaborée par l’ANC” [Abir Moussi ‘Free Destourian Party’ in Béja: We do not recogonize the January 14 revolution or the Constitution drawn up by the ANC], Tunivisions, January 14, 2018, https://tunivisions.net/1756/abir-moussi-parti-destourien-libre-a- beja-ne-reconnaissons-revolution-14-janvier-constitution-elaboree-lanc/ 5. Author’s interview with Abir Moussi, Tunis, May 31, 2016. See also Benoît Delmas, “Tunisie: ces favoris de la présidentielle” [Tunisia : these presidential favorites], LePoint, August 10, 2019, https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/tunisie-avec-98-candidats-un-regain-democratique- autour-de-la-presidentielle-10-08-2019-2329220_3826.php 6. Author’s interview with Abir Moussi, Tunis, May 31, 2016. 7. According to official Tunisian government figures, 338 people were killed during the revolution. See Alexis Arieff, “Tunisia: In Brief,” Congressional Research Service, November 1, 2019, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1217536/download 3 pomed.org THE COUNTERREVOLUTION GAINS MOMENTUM IN TUNISIA: THE RISE OF ABIR MOUSSI 2011 National Constituent Assembly election. (In subsequent elections, both national and IN A NARRATIVE municipal, ex-regime and RCD officials have been allowed to participate.) RESEMBLING THAT OF THE DICTATORSHIP, To lend more weight to her victimhood narrative, Moussi insists that the Ben Ali regime SHE INSINUATES THAT figures targeted during the 2010-2011 turmoil POLITICAL ACTORS WHO were the heirs to Tunisia’s nationalist Destour (Constitution) movement, which, under the DO NOT CONFORM TO leadership of Habib Bourguiba, paved the way for HER DEFINITION OF independence from France and from which Ben Ali’s RCD later evolved. Today, Moussi claims to ‘DESTOURIAN’ ARE NOT champion these supposedly nationalist ‘heroes’ 8 TRULY TUNISIAN OR through her Free Destourian Party, though most of Tunisia’s independence fighters have, NATIONALIST. in fact, passed away. In a narrative resembling that of the dictatorship, she insinuates that political actors who do not conform to her definition of ‘Destourian’ are not truly Tunisian or nationalist. For example, Moussi regularly terrorist organization.10 Yet, despite Ennahda’s seeks to discredit leftist parties by linking them Islamist roots, throughout its history it to Western ideology, sometimes even going so entertained only loose, sporadic relations with far as to claim that they are simply offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood organization founded the French Communist Party.9 in Egypt. In 2016, Ennahda leaders even distanced themselves from political Islam and announced that henceforth they constituted THE ISLAMIST ‘THREAT’ ‘Muslim Democrats.’11 By calling Ennahda the Muslim Brotherhood, Moussi denies the Moussi’s main political target, however, is party’s Tunisian origins and social base.
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