2017 l VOLUME 8 l ISSUE 2 VICE PRESIDENCY FOR ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND KOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT Decentralization in Guinea-Bissau Yannis Arvanitis1 1 | Introduction Guinea-Bissau is a small country with a population of 1.7 With this in mind, in the current paper, I delve into the three million along the West African coast. Since gaining its dimensions of decentralization in the context of Guinea- independence from Portugal in 1974, the country has wit - Bissau, namely administrative, political, and fiscal. I analyze ness ed recurrent political upheavals, with four successful the current situation across the dimensions and discuss coups d’état, 15 coup attempts, and a short civil war in 1998– approaches that authorities could take in conducting decen - 99. In 1994, the country opened itself to “multipartyism,” with tralization. With a forward looking stance, I discuss the key hopes of political stabilization. Under the new and more ingredients for implementing decentralization. In Section II of democratic Constitution, revised in 1996, decentralization the paper, we look at decentralization as a policy objective in was put forth as an explicit political requirement, based on Guinea-Bissau. In Section III, we look at political decen - the belief that full democracy could not be achieved without tralization, while in Sections IV and V I delve into political and local elections and empowerment. Twenty years later, this has fiscal decentralization, respectively. In Section V, the approa - not been put to test. Local governance remains a distant goal. ch es to decentralization are discussed, and con clusions are presented in Section VI. Effective decentralization needs to embody political, fiscal, and administrative aspects. A vast array of literature exists on the merits and pitfalls of decentralization, with authors broadly 2 | Decentralization as a policy agreeing that, ultimately, it is a process embedded in political, objective in Guinea-Bissau historical, and societal contexts (Connerley, Eaton, Smoke 2010; Martinez-Vazquez and Vaillancourt 2011; Local There are many motivations for decentralization. First, Development International, LLC 2013). In other words, history, decentralization can in theory bring about efficiency gains.2 In politics, economics, as well as geographic, cultural, and this case, decentralization is part of a broader state reform demographic aspects come into play. Interestingly, studies aimed at improving service delivery and accountability. This are inconclusive when it comes to the links between decen - “New Public Management” approach posits that by being tralization and government effectiveness, or decen tra lization closer to the users, efficiency gains are obtained. On the and equity, or even stability (Bird and Ebel 2007). This does political front, decentralization can be necessary to improve not mean that there are no benefits to decentralization, but state–society interaction and accountability. This view some - rather that the way that it is approached (across the what posits that there is a link between decentralization and aforementioned aspects) greatly matters. It thus remains that democratization, and that the lesser the gap between govern - if properly tackled, according to the specific country context, ment and citizens, the greater the political parti cipation—in decentralization could yield benefits. particular, of the poorest (Turner 1999). In some countries, 1 Principal Governance Economist, West Africa Region, Governance and Public Financial Management Department, [email protected]. The author is grateful to Toussaint Houeninvo, Carpophore Ntagungira, Patrick McCartney, and Vincent Foucher for their reviews, as well as to John Anyanwu for constructive comments. 2 Tiebout argued that the decentralization of public goods provision allowed governments to better respond to individual needs (Brueckner 2000). Similarly, Oates (1972) theorized about the inefficiencies stemming from a uniform spatial provision of public goods and services. Disclaimer: The findings of this Brief reflect the opinions of the authors and not those of the African Development Bank,its Board of Directors or the countries they represent. 1 AEB 2017 l VOLUME 8 l ISSUE 2 l VICE PRESIDENCY FOR ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND KOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT decentralization is driven by pragmatic considerations, such Territorial configuration as pressure exerted by urban growth and ensuing policy planning challenges it presents across sectors (health, Guinea-Bissau is a diverse country with over 20 ethnic groups education, waste management, etc.). and long-standing religious cohabitation.3 The 1996 consti - tu tional revision reviewed the previous territorial grouping, In the case of Guinea-Bissau, decentralization is a long- which had divided the country into three regions (North, standing policy objective. It is embedded in the Consti tution South, and East) to introduce eight administrative regions, in —as far as political decentralization is concerned, through the addition to the “autonomous sector of Bissau.”4 Below the organization of local elections. It is on this basis that a project regions are 37 sectors/districts (Republica da Guiné-Bissau. law (projecto de código da administração autárquica) has been 1997, Decreto-Lei 04/974/97). This essentially forms the drafted in order to equip subnational entities with administrative current administrative territorial organization in the country. prerogatives that go along with the political devolution. It also Regions, which are headed by governors designated by the responds to a key developmental issues for the country: spatial central government, have direct administrative over sight over inequalities—since the city of Bissau hosts most public services districts, as well as cities, towns, and villages (tabancas in the and parts of the country are excluded from key social service local Creole).5 While, by law, cities are muni cipalities and are provision (Arvanitis, Andrianarison, and Ie 2016). Decen - supposed to be ruled by elected bodies, districts are not tralization is highlighted in the country’s most recent national endowed with a mechanism for political representation, and development plan “Terra Ranka,” presented to the international they are solely administrative divisions, each placed under the community in March 2015. According to the plan, decen - responsibility of an administrador de sector. More specifically, tralization has the following objectives (and by extension, districts are currently being managed by the Ministry of perceived benefits): (1) improved service delivery throughout Territory Administration and Local Power through the General the territory, (2) greater political participation, and (3) fostering Direction of Administrative Decen tra lization. Population is of local economic development. rather unevenly distributed, with Bissau having the highest number of citizens, together with the central and eastern While these motives are aligned with perceived benefits of regions (Oio, Bafatà, Gabu), as compared to the more decentralization cited herein, literature is awash with potential sparsely populated coastal regions and the Bolama region risks and, thus, negative effects to be incurred while pursuing (Bijagos islands) (Maps 1 and 2). decentralization. These can, for instance, include increased pressure on already weak central governments that need to According to the legal framework, municipalities should have a share resources with subnational entities, local elite capture, high degree of autonomy. They also are the centerpiece of or even conflicting legitimacies among others (Smith 1993; planned reforms outlined in a project law (projecto de código da Turner 1999; Bird and Ebel 2007). Thus, the question administração autárquica) in terms of decentralization, for becomes one of planning and pitfall avoidance for Guinea- which a series of competency transfers are scheduled in the Bissau. There have been no clear attempts at decentralization fields of education, culture, civil protection, policing, health, and reform in the country thus far. It is, therefore, not possible to rural/urban equipment, among others. Such reforms are examine “successes and failures.” What is possible, however, brought together under a project code for territorial admi nis - is to analyze the current institutional set-up to gauge the gap tration (Programa Nacional da Decentralização, PND) between what should be there and what is there. This is done ela borated with assistance from the United Nations Develop - in the following sections, with a careful analysis of legislation ment Programme (UNDP). It embodies and clarifies past and institutional set-up across the three dimensions of legislation on decentralization, forming a plan of what decentralization, leading to a discussion of the potential way decentralization should look like as opposed to current realities. forward. The plan is, however, yet to be approved, as of mid-2017. 3 | Administrative decentralization Administrative decentralization and service delivery Administrative decentralization primarily refers to transfers Spatial inequalities in the country are some of the identified related to decision-making, responsibility, and human drivers of fragility in the country (AfDB 2015a). With respect to resources for public services delivery. Decentralized entities population, 25 percent is located in the city of Bissau, which delivery on behalf of the central government, and this entails accounts for 0.25 percent of territory.