NSIAD-90-192 Space Transportation
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.]Ir1lv . 1!)!)(I SPACE TRANSPORTATION. ’ NASA Has No Firm Need for Increasingly Costly Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle -_ dFb llllll141905 II I (;A()/ NSIAI)-!ml!~2 National Security and International Affair6 JMviaion B-239670 July 31,lQQo The Honorable Robert A. Roe Chairman, Committee on Science, Space,and Technology House of Representatives Dear Mr. Chairman: As you requested, we have reviewed the National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration’s (NASA) Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV) program. Specifically, we evaluated the need to continue the OMVprogram in light of reductions in its capabilities and the reasonsfor changes in OMVprogram costs and schedules. We are sending copies of this report to the Administrator of NASA and appropriate congressionalcommittees. Copies will be made available to other interested parties upon request. This report was prepared under the direction of Mr. Mark E. Gebicke, Director, NASA Issues, who may be reached on (202) 276-6140 if you or your staff have any questions concerning the report. Major contributors to the report are listed in appendix I. Sincerely yours, Frank C. Conahan Assistant Comptroller General l3xecutiveSummary . The Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV) was conceived in 1986 as a Purpose $406 million multipurpose space tug. However, the estimated cost of the program has grown to $736.6 million. In late 1989, the National Aero- nautics and Space Administration (NASA) reduced or eliminated some of the OMV'S planned capabilities to contain growing program costs. The Chairman, House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, asked GAO to determine (1) whether NASA had established a firm need for the OMV and (2) why the program costs have grown so much. The OMV program was initiated as a way of extending the practical reach Background of the space shuttle. It was to transport satellites from the shuttle to other orbits, reboost them when their orbits decayed, retrieve and return them to the shuttle when they malfunctioned, and control their reentry into the atmosphere when their useful lives expired. Subsequent OMV enhancements would enable it to refuel satellites in orbit, perform in-orbit satellite repairs, and rescue out-of-control satellites. The OMV was to operate initially from the shuttle’s cargo bay but would ulti- mately operate from the Space Station Freedom. OMV was designed to be a free-flying, remotely controlled propulsion stage about 15 feet in diameter and 6 feet thick that would be carried into orbit inside the shuttle’s cargo bay. Once separated from the shuttle, the OMV would be remotely controlled by astronauts working at consoles on earth. The OMV'S detailed design and development phase began in fiscal year 1986. The cost-plus-award-fee contract provides for the design, develop- ment, test, verification, and delivery of one OMV flight vehicle and asso- ciated support equipment. Results in Brief A firm requirement for the OMV does not exist. NASA can accomplish the OMV'S scheduled missions of reboosting the Hubble Space Telescope and deploying and reboosting the Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility in other ways that cost less. Other potential missions may or may not materialize, but the OMV would have to be significantly enhanced before NASA could use it on most of these other missions, Since the OMV'S design and development phase began in 1986, estimated OMV program costs have increased by 82 percent, even though the Page 2 GAO/NSIAD99-192 NASA’s Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle vehicle’s capabilities have significantly decreased. The increase is attrib- utable to (1) schedule stretchouts caused by internal NASA budget reduc- tions, (2) program changes, and (3) contract cost growth. Further cost increases appear likely, especially if NASA is to make maximum use of the OMV. Principal Findings OMV Is Not Needed for In late 1989, NASA reduced or eliminated a number of planned OMV per- Scheduled Missions formance capabilities. The OMV is now being designed principally to reboost the Hubble Space Telescope and deploy and reboost the Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility. Several NASA studies show, how- ever, that the shuttle can perform these missions without the OMV. A recent performance assessment shows that the OMV will not be needed to deploy the Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility if advanced solid rocket motors are available on the shuttle. According to the assessment, the shuttle with these motors will be able to deliver this observatory to its desired orbital altitude without the OMV. The first shuttle flight using the advanced motors is scheduled for late 1995-well before the obser- vatory’s April 1997 deployment schedule. Other NASA studies show that the shuttle can maintain the Hubble and the X-ray observatories at acceptable altitudes by reboosting them during regularly scheduled maintenance flights. One or two additional shuttle flights dedicated to reboosting the observatories could be required early in the next century if the OMV is not developed. The cost of the two additional shuttle flights to reboost the observato- ries would be about $277 million. The cost of continued development and operation of the OMV for the two missions would be about $716 mil- lion-more than two and one-half times the cost of the shuttle flights. Future Mission for the Program officials have identified other, longer-term missions that they OMV Uncertain believe the OMV could enhance. For example, an OMV-type vehicle may be needed to help maneuver materials in space if NASA undertakes staffed missions to the moon or to Mars. However, these missions have not yet d been approved, and NASA has not decided what equipment would be needed to perform them. If these missions are approved and the OMV is Page 3 GAO/NSLAD-90-192 NASA’s Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle Executive Summary used, capabilities that were removed from the design in 1989 would have to be restored. These capabilities include the addition of advanced solar arrays to allow for basing at Space Station Freedom. Estimated Costs Continue Since the design and development phase began in fiscal year 1986, esti- to Increase mated OMV program costs have incurred a net increase of $331.6 mil- lion-from $406.0 million to $736.6 million. Schedule stretchouts caused $266.1 million of the increase. Program changes such as shifting respon- sibility for OMV operations from Marshall Space Flight Center to the Johnson Space Center added another $106,9 million. The remaining $123.1 million of the increase was attributed to contract cost growth. NASA reduced the program estimate by $163.6 million by eliminating some of the OMV'S capabilities and reducing cost reserves. NASA requested $86.4 million in its fiscal year 1991 budget. The same factors that caused earlier cost increases could cause future increases. According to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight, the OMV program is not immune to future budget cuts, which could cause additional schedule delays and cost increases, Also, program changes are to be expected as a result of the critical design review scheduled for April 1991 and subsequent hardware fabrication and testing. NASA is also concerned about additional contract cost growth. A number of the subcontracts have not yet been awarded, and firm prices have not been negotiated for other subcontracts. The current estimate includes a cost reserve to cover future changes, but the reserve is about half the amount NASA normally includes in cost estimates of programs at this stage of development. OMV acquisition costs could increase to a cumulative total of $1.3 billion if NASA decided to use the vehicle for other missions, which would involve (1) restoring capabilities eliminated in the 1989 restructuring, (2) purchasing a second vehicle, (3) making the two OMVS compatible with expendable launch vehicles, and (4) purchasing an initial contin- gent of spare parts. However, NASA considered it unlikely that it would do all of these things. Continued development of the OMV is not the most cost-effective Recommendation and approach to accomplishing currently scheduled missions and future mis- sion requirements are uncertain. In its draft report GAO therefore recom- Agency ActionJ mended that the NASA Administrator terminate the OMV program. NASA terminated the OMV program 6 days after receiving GAO'S draft report, Page4 GAO/NSIAD-90.192NASA'sOrbitdManeuverhgVehicle Executive Summary citing budget pressures and the absence of a firm, near-term require- ment for the vehicle. The Congress should deny the $86.4 million requested for OMV develop- Matter for ment in fiscal year 1991, less any amount needed for termination Congressional expenses. According to a preliminary NASA estimate, about $33.2 million Consideration of fiscal year 1991 funding will be needed for termination. Agency Comments GAO incorporated NASA's comments into this report where appropriate. Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-90-192 NASA’s Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle _ _. ._ _ ____.. _ ,.. ._, ,. ,_,,, ., _ , .I.. Contentis Executive Summary Chapter 1 8 Introduction Program History 10 Program Costs 11 Program Management 11 Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 12 Chapter 2 13 NASA Has Not Program Restructuring Reduced OMV’s Capabilities 13 OMV Not Needed for Scheduled Missions 16 Established a Firm Future Mission Requirements Are Uncertain 19 Need for the OMV Chapter 3 21 Estimated OMV Costs Program Costs Have Grown Substantially 21 Further Cost Increases Are Likely 23 Have Continued to OMV Operational Costs 26 Increase Chapter 4 27 Conclusions, Conclusions 27 Recommendation and Agency