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High Adventure Recreational Activity Comparison China’s Strategic Nuclear Decision Making During Crisis A Major Qualifying Project Report For the United States Naval War College Submitted to the Faculty of the WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE In Partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Science By _________________________ Maxwell C. LaFrance ________________________ Date: Approved: ______________________________ Professor Helen Vassallo, Primary Advisor ______________________________ Dr. Christopher Yeaw, Co-Advisor This report represents the work of one or more WPI undergraduate students submitted to the faculty as evidence of completion of a degree requirement. WPI routinely publishes these reports on its web site without editorial or peer review. The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the positions or opinions of the U.S. Naval War College or Worcester Polytechnic Institute. Acknowledgements For their time, assistance, guidance, and support on this project, I would like to extend my thanks and sincere appreciation to: Professor Christopher Yeaw from the Naval War College, Newport R.I., for sponsoring my project Professor Helen Vassallo from the WPI Department of Management, for being my project advisor. I could not have done it without you. Maxwell C. LaFrance i Abstract The goal of this paper was to determine if the Soviet Union’s reaction to the Cuban Missile Crisis would be similar to the People’s Republic of China’s reaction to a crisis situation involving strategic nuclear assets. This was done taking into account the differences in Eastern and Western cultures, each government’s decision making structures, and the differences between the past and present situations. The result is a set of recommendations to the Naval War College on the effectiveness of this method. ii Executive Summary Understanding how decisions are made in the highest echelons of governments with nuclear capabilities is of great strategic importance for the United States. Knowing, or being able to predict how your opponent will react to a sequence of events is a prized asset. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is one of these nuclear capable nations, whom the United States would strategically have to consider as a potential opponent in modeling global threats, yet they are highly secretive about the inner workings of their higher levels of government, therefore an easy analysis on their decision making process is not possible. Only limited data exists about their internal decision making process during critical or crisis situations, and it is unknown how they might react to a crisis involving strategic nuclear assets. In an effort to overcome this lack of data, one could perform a comparative analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the United States and the Soviet Union contemplated the use of nuclear weapons against one another. The Soviet Union and the PRC have similar authoritarian style governments, so that an analysis of the incident could be extrapolated to the current situation. The limited material available on the PRC could then be compared to the result of the Cuban Missile Crisis research, to determine how accurate the extrapolation might be. This paper attempts to overcome the lack of information by using the Cuban Missile Crisis, for which there is a wealth of information and analysis available, as a proxy for a crisis involving the PRC. Using this analysis and a study of the PRC’s more recent history, we may be able to better “predict” how the PRC will respond in crisis now, and into the future. This goal was accomplished through three strategies: 1. Historical research of the CMC was compared to the PRC of today to check for similarities and differences to determine how accurate a comparison could be made. 2. Research of PRC decision making over the last 10-15 years. 3. The synthesis of the historical investigations and the development of recommendations iii Table of Contents 1. Introduction................................................................................................................1 2. Problem Statement..................................................................................................3 3. Methodology...............................................................................................................4 3.1 Historical Research .........................................................................................4 3.2 Databases ............................................................................................................4 3.3 Analysis ................................................................................................................5 4. Literature Review ....................................................................................................6 4.1 The Cuban Missile Crisis ...............................................................................6 4.2 Strategic Theory ............................................................................................ 13 4.3 Decision Making Strategies and Theories .......................................... 17 4.4 Governmental Politics Model................................................................... 20 4.5 Soviet Decision Making Structure.......................................................... 24 4.6 US Decision Making Structure................................................................. 30 4.7 PRC Decision Making Structure .............................................................. 33 4.8 Eastern Thought Process........................................................................... 39 5. Results........................................................................................................................ 43 6. Discussion................................................................................................................. 47 6.1 China’s Geopolitical Expansion............................................................... 47 6.1.1 China’s Expansion into Africa.......................................................... 47 6.1.2 China’s Expansion into Latin America......................................... 49 6.2 China’s Economic Expansion ................................................................... 51 6.3 China’s Military and Influence Expansion.......................................... 53 6.3.1 China’s Pursuit of Carriers................................................................ 56 6.4 China’s Territorial Disputes ..................................................................... 58 6.4.1 China’s Territorial Dispute with the Philippines .................... 58 6.4.2 China’s Territorial Dispute with Vietnam .................................. 60 6.4.3 China’s Territorial Dispute with Taiwan .................................... 61 6.4.4 China’s Territorial Dispute with Japan........................................ 62 6.4.5 China’s Territorial Dispute with India......................................... 63 7. Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................................. 65 8. References.................................................................................................................... i iv 1. Introduction The creation of weapons than can obliterate entire cities, fleets, or armies in mere moments require that the nations who posses them to pause and consider their actions before deploying them. The United States has been the leader of the Western World in nuclear deterrence since the inception of the atomic age. Its ability to maintain a balance between the growing numbers of nuclear capable nations comes from its ability to field superior technology and its extensive intelligence networks. One of the strengths of the United States is its ability to predict the actions of its competitors based on knowledge gathered from past incidents of high tension or conflict. This strength has been continually tested since the end of the Cold War. The United States Naval War College (NWC) has been a leader in developing national strategy for over a century. A large part of the NWC is devoted to attempting to predict, or at least better understand, an enemy’s actions. A graduate school for officers of all branches of the military and those in the national security community, the NWC is renowned for their war games, in which the faculty and students attempt to create possible scenarios that have the potential for escalating conflict. This is done to better understand the strategic and operational ramifications of the varying thought processes of opponents and how they might react to United State’s actions. Understanding how decisions are made in the highest echelons of governments with nuclear capabilities is of great strategic importance for the United States. Knowing how an opponent will react to a sequence of events is a prized asset. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is one of these nuclear capable nations and is highly secretive about its higher levels of government. Only limited data exists about their internal decision making process during critical situations. In order to overcome this lack of data, one could perform a comparative analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the United States and the Soviet Union contemplated the use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union and the PRC have similar authoritarian style governments, so that it may be valid to extrapolate an analysis of the 1962 incident to the current situation. The limited material available on the PRC could
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