Introduction
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Introduction In his third Boyer Lecture of November 2009, General Peter Cosgrove, the former Chief of the Australian Defence Force, noted several points on the subject of ‘Leading in Australia’, based on his own forty years of military experience. It was ‘a universal truth’, he said, that leaders ‘are accountable’. ‘Leaders who fail to appreciate this fundamental precept of accountability must also fail to muster the profound commitment true leadership demands’. Furthermore, leadership required a keen understanding of the nature of teamwork, and of the fact that ‘teamwork is adversarial’, whether the team be pitted against another, against the environment or against the standards that the team has set itself. The key to successful leadership is ‘to simply and clearly identify the adversary to the team’ and to overcome the team’s or one’s own shortcomings to forge a cohesive unit united against the adversary. Finally, a leader must be an effective communicator. ‘Communication is the conduit of leadership’, and ‘Leadership uncommunicated is leadership unrequited’. ‘Leadership messages must be direct, simple, [and] fundamentally relevant to each member of the team’.1 While Cosgrove was speaking broadly of contemporary leadership in the military, government and business, his general statements were as applicable to the late eighteenth century as they are today. This thesis examines the subject of leadership in the colony of New South Wales (NSW) for the period 1788 to 1794. The two principal leaders for that period were Captain Arthur Phillip R.N. and Major Francis Grose, the commandant of the New South Wales Corps who assumed command of the colony on Phillip’s departure in December 1792. There were numerous other leaders who featured in the establishment of the colony, notably Lieutenant Phillip Gidley King R.N who established the settlement on Norfolk Island, and Captain John Hunter R.N. who did not exercise command in the colony, but whose presence, excellent seamanship and quiet leadership proved of great value to Phillip.2 Other major players included Major Ross, the commandant of Marines who refused to support Phillip and influenced many of his fellow Marine officers to do so as well. Other prominent officers included Captain James Campbell, Captain-Lieutenant Watkin Tench and Lieutenant William Dawes of the marines, and 1 Peter Cosgrove, ‘Leading in Australia’, Boyer Lecture (Australian Broadcasting Commission, 2009). 2 Hunter was appointed second captain of the Sirius with the rank of post captain of the sixth-rate by Royal Warrant on 15 December 1786. Alexander Britton, ed., Historical Records of New South Wales. Vol. 1, Part 2- Phillip 1783-1792 (Sydney: Charles Potter, Government Printer, 1892), pp. 36-37. 1 Lieutenant Henry Ball of the Royal Navy, Captains Nepean, Hill, Paterson and Foveaux and Lieutenant John Macarthur of the New South Wales Corps.3 These officers did not exercise total command during the period under review and, though their leadership skills were crucial to the operations of the colony, their contributions were as subordinate officers or as assistants to the main commander.4 Their leadership credentials are therefore not a primary concern of this examination.5 While there are many leaders involved in the founding of the colony, these two men, Phillip and Grose, were pre-eminent, and it is their capabilities and shortcoming as leaders that form the primary subject of this thesis. Prior to his appointment as Commodore and Governor, Phillip had had a varied career in the Royal Navy with a period of several years as a captain on secondment to the Portuguese Navy. He had gone to sea at a young age, and his whole life up until his appointment to command the settlement at NSW, had been heavily influenced by the demands of a naval career. In 1787, at age 49, he was a well-trained and experienced naval officer, a fact that was to be evidenced in his style of leadership in NSW from 1787 to 1792. Francis Grose, who is far less known to Australians, and generally not well regarded by historians, was well suited to lead the New South Wales Corps, but not so well trained to administer a colony. Grose had joined the 52nd regiment in 1775 as a sixteen year-old ensign and fought in a number of key engagements, including the penultimate Battle of Monmouth Courthouse, during which he was severely wounded in the leg. Upon his return to England he was promoted to Captain in the 85th Regiment and after two years as recruiting officer and a further two years as a company commander, he was promoted to Major Commandant of the 96th Regiment.6 Grose, therefore, was an experienced army officer whose strengths were in leading men in battle and in recruiting soldiers. In 1789 he was given the responsibility of 3 Return of New South Wales Corps, 26 March 1792, Britton, ed., HRNSW, Vol. 1, Pt. 2, p. 604. 4 Captain Paterson took over command of the colony from Grose in December 1794 and being a loyal supporter of Grose, he continued with Grose’s style of command. His leadership is not examined in this thesis. See D. S. Macmillan, ‘Paterson, William (1755-1810)’, in D. Pike, ed., Australian Dictionary of Biography (ADB), Vol. 2 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1967), pp. 317-9. 5 Captain John Hunter R. N., the next senior officer to Phillip in the colony, held the dormant commission of Governor and circumnavigated the globe in 1788-89 in the Sirius. It was an extraordinary feat of seamanship and leadership but, as it did not involve leadership of convicts, emancipists or freemen, that feat is not included in this discussion on leadership. J. J. Auchmuty, ‘Hunter, John (1737-1821), in D. Pike, ed., ADB, Vol. 1, pp. 567- 68. 6 Francis Grose, ‘Statement of Service of Major General Grose’, 1809, Mitchell Library CY679. 2 raising and commanding the New South Wales Corps and was appointed Lieutenant Governor of NSW, arriving in Sydney on the Pitt in February 1792.7 Phillip and Grose were a generation apart in age. They were from different military backgrounds and subsequently had different methods or styles of leadership. While historians mostly view Phillip as having been highly competent and well suited to founding the colony, Grose is not as well regarded. Both men had mixed success as leaders in NSW. Phillip employed a personal and direct form of leadership, administering the colony as if he was still commanding a Royal Navy warship at sea. That aloof style was very successful with Royal Navy personnel, but there were no Royal Navy officers on shore at Sydney Cove and it was only appreciated by a few people such as Surgeon White and the two Marine officers, Captain Collins and Captain-Lieutenant Tench. Despite the recalcitrance of Ross and many of his officers, Phillip’s leadership was extraordinarily successful in the early years and the colony survived because of his strength of character and iron discipline. His leadership failed somewhat during the later phase of his administration, especially during the last year of his command when almost 500 people died. Grose, on the other hand, although he was a reluctant leader as far as the governorship of NSW was concerned, enjoyed more success than has been previously understood, largely because he was able to delegate much of the administration and control to a loyal body of officers and soldiers whose allegiance was unequivocal. It will be seen that a feature of Phillip’s leadership was his mixed success as a communicator. For example, while he communicated brilliantly with his superiors in the Home Office, writing in a manner that was succinct, measured and persuasive, his manner of communicating with his subordinate officers was not always effective. Grose, however, took some time to master the art of writing to his superiors, but enjoyed a great rapport with his officers and soldiers. Both leaders were to change during their terms in office and those changes were evidenced in their letters to the Home Office. * * * During the years 1775 to 1800 England was either at war, preparing for war, or recovering from war.8 The colony of NSW was established between epic wars that Britain fought with 7 Phillip to Grenville, 19 March 1792, Britton, ed., HRNSW, Vol. 1, Pt. 2, p. 595. 3 America (1775 to 1783) and France (1792 to 1815). By navigating through these revolutions in the New and Old Worlds, Britain became a pre-eminent industrial, financial and military force.9 In keeping with the theme of war, NSW was commanded and supervised by naval, Marine and military establishments. Moreover the Royal Commissions given to its key leaders, including Phillip, Ross, Collins, Reverend Johnson and Surgeons White and Balmain, were all issued ‘according to the rules and discipline or war’.10 War was never far from the minds of British politicians in the late eighteenth century, as indicated by the fact that the seventeen governors or acting governors of NSW from 1788 to 1846, were either naval or army officers.11 Leadership in both Britain and the colonies was seen as a right of the upper class. Aristocratic families were heavily involved in the domestic political process, and they therefore exercised leadership in the colonies. For example, William Pitt, the young Prime Minister of England, was the grandson of a former Governor of Madras.12 As Roy Porter put it, ‘Power politics was a means to wealth and a division of the spoils’.13 Corruption, political exploitation and filial patronage were accepted traits of the families who ruled the burgeoning Empire.14 Leaders by virtue of custom and wealth, they expected to dominate the political, military, social, economical and ecclesiastical sphere of society.15 In the late eighteenth century, however, they fought to maintain their leadership against the challenges posed by an emerging middle class and a vocal working class, and against a culture of protest that was most alarmingly manifested in food riots, naval mutinies and militia riots.16 The loss of the thirteen colonies in the American War of Independence in 1783 - the first war that Britain lost in the eighteenth century – and the later French Revolution, fuelled domestic dissent which heightened the fears of the upper classes.