CUWS Outreach Journal #1108

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal

Issue No. 1108, 28 March 2014 Welcome to the CUWS Outreach Journal! As part of the CUWS’ mission to develop Air Force, DoD, and other USG leaders to advance the state of knowledge, policy, and practices within strategic defense issues involving nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, we offer the government and civilian community a source of contemporary discussions on unconventional weapons. These discussions include news articles, papers, and other information sources that address issues pertinent to the U.S. national security community. It is our hope that this information resources will help enhance the overall awareness of these important national security issues and lead to the further discussion of options for dealing with the potential use of unconventional weapons. The CUWS is seeking submissions for its annual General Charles A. Horner award, which honors the best original writing on issues relating to Air Force counter-WMD and nuclear enterprise operations. The deadline for submissions is March 31, 2014. For more information, please visit our web-site. The following news articles, papers, and other information sources do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the Air University, U.S. Air Force, or Department of Defense. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved.

FEATURED ITEM: “Next Steps in Nuclear Arms Control with Russia: Issues for Congress”. By Amy F. Woolf, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy; January 6, 2014. Published by Congressional Research Service; 37 pages. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/219953.pdf In his 2013 State of the Union Address, President Obama stated that the United States would “engage Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear arsenals.” These reductions could include limits on strategic, nonstrategic and nondeployed nuclear weapons. Yet, arms control negotiations between the United States and Russia have stalled, leading many observers to suggest that the United States reduce its nuclear forces unilaterally, or in parallel with Russia, without negotiating a new treaty. Many in Congress have expressed concerns about this possibility, both because they question the need to reduce nuclear forces below New START levels and because they do not want the President to agree to further reductions without seeking the approval of Congress.

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U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1. U.S. Tactical Nuclear Arms Mission Could Shift Among NATO Jets 2. Air Force Removes Commander, 9 Others after Cheating Scandal 3. At Core of Nuke Cheating Ring: 4 'Librarians'

U.S. COUNTER-WMD 1. 35 Nations Sign Up to Tougher Nuclear Security Standards

HOMELAND SECURITY/THE AMERICAS 1. Uranium Stockpile Quietly Exported Back to U.S., Canada Reveals 2. U.S. Aims to Correct Issue Behind 2013 Failed Missile Defense Test 3. Obama: Nuclear Blast a Bigger Concern than Russia 4. Inside the Ring: Defense Talks Scrapped/More Sophisticated Missile Threats

ASIA/PACIFIC 1. Japan to Return Weapons-Grade Plutonium to U.S. 2. North Korea Fires 16 Short-Range Rockets into Waters on Sunday 3. N. Korea Fires Two Ballistic Missiles, Prompting Seoul to Take Countermeasures Issue No.1108, 28 March 2014 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama 4. N.Korea Hints at 4th Nuke Test 5. USFK Chief Says N. Korean Missile to be Capable of Hitting Mainland U.S. by 2024 6. China to Have Nuclear Missiles on Subs Soon: US admiral 7. British Components in North Korean Rockets, UN Finds

EUROPE/RUSSIA 1. Russia to Beef Up its Arctic Force 2. Dutch Nuclear-Arms Base Infiltrated on Eve of Summit 3. Ukraine Rules Out Resumption of Nuclear Status 4. US-UK: Expand Missile Defense in Eastern Europe 5. Russian Nuclear Subs to Conduct Bulava Missile Launches in Summer-Autumn 2014 6. Cuts to Armed Forces Undermine Nuclear Deterrent, MPs Warn 7. Russia Launches Nuclear-War Drill, Saying It Was Long Scheduled

MIDDLE EAST 1. U.S. Senators Call for a Tougher Stance on Iran's Nuclear Weapons 2. Syria may Miss Final Deadline for Chemical Weapon Destruction 3. US Official Can’t Say Syria Chemical Weapons Fully Tracked Down

INDIA/PAKISTAN 1. India Tests New Underwater Nuclear Missile 2. Nuclear-Capable Prithvi II Missile Test-Fired Successfully

COMMENTARY 1. World Leaders Fear Ukraine Crisis Will Harm Nuclear Cooperation 2. A Global Zero World Would Be MAD 3. Be Wary of Japan's Nuclear Ambitions 4. Getting Missile Defense Right 5. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: After Ukraine, Time to Reassess Strategic Posture 6. A Wobbly Nuclear Order

Global Security Newswire U.S. Tactical Nuclear Arms Mission Could Shift Among NATO Jets By Rachel Oswald, Global Security Newswire March 26, 2014 If NATO partners eventually cease to maintain attack aircraft capable of delivering fielded U.S. nuclear bombs, then allied jets could "pick up the load." Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Welsh raised that possibility during a congressional hearing earlier this month when asked about contingency planning for a potential future in which some European nations that currently host U.S. nuclear weapons opt to retire -- and not replace -- today's aircraft that are capable of carrying either nuclear or conventional munitions. Five NATO countries -- Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey -- are understood to host a net total of fewer than 200 B-61 gravity bombs, though the United States does not formally acknowledge nuclear-basing details. "As NATO nations -- if they choose not to upgrade their own nuclear aircraft capabilities, then other NATO nations that have those capabilities from an operational perspective will pick up the load," Welsh said during a March 14 appearance before the House Armed Services Committee. "That'll be a NATO policy decision. The U.S. will be part of that discussion. We do have the capacity to pick up the load."

Issue No.1108, 28 March 2014 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies | Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 2 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama In his remarks, Welsh did not definitively make clear whether the U.S. Air Force or other alliance members would take on the additional aircraft mission responsibility. Still, the general's comments suggest the Pentagon is planning for its tactical nuclear weapons role in Europe to continue, irrespective of the future air-delivery capability of NATO hosting states. Arms control advocates had previously argued that the United States should withdraw its nonstrategic weapons from the continent if NATO partners do not modernize their dual-capable aircraft. The Obama administration's 2013 unclassified report to Congress on nuclear-employment guidance states that the U.S. military would "maintain the capability to forward-deploy nuclear weapons with heavy bombers and dual- capable aircraft in support of extended deterrence and assurance of U.S. allies and partners." Nuclear weapons continue to be a "core component" of NATO's deterrence against aggression in Europe, the alliance stated in its 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review. At the same time, the allies also said they were prepared to consider reductions to the current number of tactical atomic arms assigned to the defense of NATO nations. Defense Department spokeswoman Cynthia Smith in an e-mail to Global Security Newswire said Welsh's comments were in line with these U.S. and NATO policies. The Pentagon and Air Force did not respond to separate requests for comment on whether any other countries besides the United States were being considered for possibly taking on a new role in the NATO B-61 air delivery mission. However, according to issue expert Hans Kristensen, the United States is the only NATO country with the current military capacity to handle the extra burden. The Air Force has nuclear-capable jets based in Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom that could take on a larger share of the nuclear bombs, said Kristensen, who closely monitors developments in the NATO atomic mission. "The U.S. certainly has the capacity in its Air Force to pick up the slack," Kristensen, who directs the Federation of American Scientists' Nuclear Information Project, said in a recent phone interview. At the core of the issue is aging aircraft. All five host nations of the nuclear bombs field either dual-capable F-16 or Tornado strike aircraft slated for retirement in the 2020s. Some of the countries have said the attack-plane replacements they plan on purchasing would be dual capable, while others have hinted they would allow the nuclear-delivery role to expire along with the aircraft retirements. Most of the current hosting nations are signed up or in talks to acquire the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which is intended to include a future version capable of carrying the B-61 nuclear bomb. "There is one overall trend, which is none of them can afford as much as they wanted," Kristensen said of the NATO partner states' ability to buy the new aircraft. The Dutch government in January confirmed that some of the Joint Strike Fighters it plans to purchase could have a nuclear role, ignoring a 2012 resolution by its parliament urging that the jets not have a dual capability. "The Belgians will probably follow the Dutch in whatever they do," in terms of deciding whether to buy new multirole aircraft, Kristensen said. He noted that the Belgian parliament had passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the country. Belgium reportedly is in talks to also purchase the Lockheed Martin-produced F-35 to replace its aging fleet of F-16 jets. Turkey is planning on replacing its F-16 fighters with F-35s. Some of those new jets are expected to be dual- capable, so that Ankara can maintain its role in NATO's nuclear-deterrence mission, according to Aaron Stein, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London.

Issue No.1108, 28 March 2014 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies | Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 3 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Italy also is planning to acquire the Joint Strike Fighter, though ongoing budget cuts could mean that Rome reduces its current order of 90 planes. The Italians have been cutting back their JSF plans for several years -- not just in terms of unit quantity, but also in the amount of training hours their pilots will get on the planes, according to Kristensen. Of all the NATO nuclear-weapons hosts, Germany has given the strongest indications it will allow its participation in the role to eventually lapse. Berlin is replacing its dual-capable Tornado aircraft with the Eurofighter Typhoon, which is not designed to carry the B-61 bomb. The German government already has extended the service life of its Tornados until the 2025-to-2030 time frame, Kristensen said. "Beyond that, it begins to get shaky, because aircraft only fly for so long," he said. "It is up to each ally to decide what military capabilities they acquire or retain. This includes aircraft which can carry nuclear weapons," a NATO official based at alliance headquarters in Brussels said in a written statement. "We would expect allies who contribute to NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements to inform allies should their contribution change." The official provided the comments to GSN on condition of not being named. Some NATO member states in Central and Eastern Europe favor continued deployment of the gravity bombs as a signal to Russia, but it remains unclear how that might affect which nations play a role in the mission. The NATO pro-nuclear contingent is seen to have gotten a boost following Russia's recent annexation of Crimea, which has prompted new concerns about potential further incursions into former Soviet or Warsaw Pact states. However, Steven Pifer, head of the Brookings Institution's Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, said there is little chance of these nations taking on the tactical-bomb delivery role. "I think from NATO's perspective, moving nuclear weapons into a Central European country would be seen as provocative [toward Russia], but also militarily more vulnerable," the onetime U.S. ambassador to Ukraine said to GSN. If any NATO countries from Eastern Europe were interested in hosting U.S. nuclear bombs, there would be "enormous political obstacles" standing in the way, Kristensen agreed. NATO leaders know it would be destabilizing to shift deployed U.S. tactical warheads eastward, perhaps even more so in the context of the current sky-high tensions with Russia over its incursion in Ukraine, Pifer suggested. "I've actually heard a central European representative say half-jokingly, if the German's don’t want them, we'll take them," he said. Moreover, "none of the countries in the western part of NATO would touch this with a 10-foot pole," said Kristensen. The matter of continuing to deploy U.S. tactical weapons in Europe at all remains considerably controversial. A growing view in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands is that the nuclear bombs serve little military value and should be withdrawn. Some argue the nuclear arsenals based in France, the United Kingdom and the United States are sufficient for providing deterrence for the entire alliance. This all makes Washington the most likely NATO member to take up the additional nuclear-delivery responsibility, analysts agreed. The U.S. military already has fighter wings in Europe with the capability of delivering the B-61 bomb. Nuclear- capable U.S. jets that could be given the mission include F-16 aircraft based at Aviano Air Base in Italy, F-15E jets at Royal Air Force Lakenheath based in the United Kingdom, and F-16s fielded at Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany, according to recent data compiled by Kristensen and fellow FAS nuclear analyst Robert Norris.

Los Angeles Times – Los Angeles, CA Air Force Removes Commander, 9 Others after Cheating Scandal The senior officers at Malmstrom Air Force Base are found to have been unaware of widespread cheating on proficiency tests by nuclear missile crew members. By David S. Cloud March 27, 2014, WASHINGTON — The Air Force said Thursday it was replacing the commander and nine other senior officers at a Montana air base responsible for 150 nuclear-armed missiles after finding they were unaware of widespread cheating by missile crews on proficiency tests. Col. Robert W. Stanley, commander of the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base, is retiring and the other officers, all of them either colonels, lieutenant colonels or majors, have been removed from the unit and will face administrative reprimands, Lt. Gen. Stephen Wilson, head of the Air Force Global Strike Command, said at a Pentagon news conference. "They weren't aware this [cheating] was going on in any way, shape or form, and I think they should have been," said Wilson, explaining the decision to remove the wing's entire operational chain of command. An investigation into the cheating scandal at Malmstrom, which came to light in January, has now implicated almost half of the base's launch crew members, who either texted one another answers on multiple tests over a two-year period or knew about the practice and failed to take action, Wilson said. Of the 190 launch officers at Malmstrom, 91 were found to be involved in the cheating or are still under investigation. Nine officers were cleared, the Air Force said. The discovery has been a serious blow to the Air Force, which has long insisted that its nuclear missile crews operate by the highest standards of performance. Even more embarrassing, the case has grown steadily larger. Initially, the Air Force said it involved only a few dozen captains and lieutenants who allegedly cheated only on one test. Some former launch officers say cheating in various forms on the tests has been common for decades, though they say the pressure to achieve perfect scores has increased in recent years, ironically, even as the importance of nuclear weapons to U.S. national security has declined with the end of the Cold War. Wilson acknowledged Thursday that in some cases classified information was being transmitted over cellphones, either in texts or as photographs — a breach of security procedures. Eight missile crew members remain under investigation for mishandling classified information. Stanley's retirement after a 25-year career was voluntary, Wilson said. But as wing commander, Stanley was facing the prospect of disciplinary proceedings that probably would have ended his Air Force career. In a message Thursday announcing his retirement, Stanley said: "We've seen the reputation of our beloved wing, and America's ICBM mission, tarnished because of the extraordinarily selfish actions of officers entrusted with the most powerful weapon system ever devised by man. As you are now learning, the ramifications are dire. Many lives will be permanently changed as a result."

Washington Examiner – Washington, D.C. At Core of Nuke Cheating Ring: 4 'Librarians' Associated Press (AP) Staff Writer March 28, 2014 WASHINGTON (AP) — Investigators dubbed them "the librarians," four Air Force nuclear missile launch officers at the center of a still-unfolding scandal over cheating on proficiency tests. "They tended to be at the hub" of illicit exchanges of test information, said Adam Lowther, one of seven investigators who dug into details of cheating that has embarrassed the Air Force and on Thursday brought down virtually the entire operational command of the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont. At least 82 missile launch officers face disciplinary action, but it was the four "librarians" who allegedly facilitated the cheating, in part by transmitting test answers via text message. One text included a photo of a classified test answer, according to Lt. Gen. Stephen Wilson, who announced the probe's findings Thursday. Wilson said the four junior officers were at "the crux of it," and that three of the four also are accused of illegal drug activity. The rest of the accused either participated in cheating or were aware of it but failed to blow the whistle, Wilson said. Lowther said the investigation team examined evidence from cellphones allegedly used to transmit the offending text messages but was unable to interview the accused because all four obtained legal counsel at the outset of the probe. In response to the scandal, the Air Force fired nine midlevel commanders at Malmstrom and announced it will pursue a range of disciplinary action against the accused 82, possibly to include courts-martial. A 10th commander, the senior officer at the base, resigned and will retire from the Air Force. Air Force officials called the discipline unprecedented in the history of America's intercontinental ballistic missile force. The Associated Press last year revealed a series of security and other problems in the ICBM force, including a failed safety and security inspection at Malmstrom, where the exam cheating occurred. Lowther said the investigation team interviewed missile launch officers and others at the Air Force's two other ICBM bases and found no indication of cheating there.

Issue No.1108, 28 March 2014 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies | Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 6 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama "Folks clearly crossed the line at Malmstrom," Lowther said in a telephone interview. He is a faculty member at the Air Force Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. The investigators found what Lowther described as "a persistent cultural problem" inside the ICBM force — a perception among the crews "that you don't want to be there," in part because of a sense that the mission is not highly valued. In an emotion-charged resignation letter titled "A Lesson to Remember," Col. Robert Stanley, who commanded the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom, lamented that the reputation of the ICBM mission was now "tarnished because of the extraordinarily selfish actions of officers entrusted with the most powerful weapon system ever devised by man." Stanley, seen as a rising star in the Air Force, had been nominated for promotion to brigadier general just days before the cheating scandal came to light in January. Instead he is retiring, convinced, as he wrote in his farewell letter Thursday, that "we let the American people down on my watch." Separately, another of the Air Force's nuclear missile units — the 90th Missile Wing at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyo. — announced that it had fired the officer overseeing its missile squadrons. It said Col. Donald Holloway, the operations group commander, was sacked "because of a loss of confidence in his ability to lead." The 90th Missile Wing offered no further explanation for Holloway's removal and said it "has nothing to do" with the firings announced by the Air Force in Washington. Together, the extraordinary moves reflect turmoil in a force that remains central to American defense strategy but in some ways has been neglected. The force of 450 Minuteman 3 missiles is primed to unleash nuclear devastation on a moment's notice, capable of obliterating people and places halfway around the globe. In a bid to correct root causes of the missile corps' failings — including low morale and weak management — the Air Force also announced Thursday a series of new or expanded programs to improve leadership development, to modernize the three ICBM bases and to reinforce "core values," including integrity. Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James, the service's top civilian official, told a Pentagon news conference that a thorough review of how testing and training are conducted in the ICBM force has produced numerous avenues for improvements. "We will be changing rather dramatically how we conduct testing and training going forward," while ensuring that performance standards are kept high, James said. More funds will be invested in refurbishing the underground ICBM launch control centers and making other infrastructure improvements, she added. Wilson, head of all Air Force nuclear forces as commander of Global Strike Command, said the changes in training and testing will be far-reaching. "We're not just putting a fresh coat of paint on these problems," he said. "We're taking bold action." James had promised to hold officers at Malmstrom accountable once the cheating investigation was completed and the scope of the scandal was clear. None of the nine fired commanders was directly involved in the cheating, but each was determined to have failed in his or her leadership responsibilities. Wilson said investigators determined that the cheating, which officials originally said happened in August or September last year, began as early as November 2011 and continued until November 2013. A total of 100 missile launch crew members were identified as potentially involved in the cheating, but nine were cleared by investigators. Another nine of the 100 are being handled separately by the Air Force Office of Special Investigation; eight of those nine involve possible criminal charges stemming from the alleged mishandling of classified information.

The Nation – Lahore, Pakistan 35 Nations Sign Up to Tougher Nuclear Security Standards Constant vigilance, preparedness must, says Nawaz By Agencies March 26, 2014 The HAGUE - Thirty-five countries pledged Tuesday to step up nuclear security, backing a global drive spearheaded by US President Barack Obama to prevent dangerous materials falling into the hands of terrorists. Wrapping up the third biennial Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), which gathered together 53 countries, Obama urged world leaders to work closer together to stop nuclear terrorism that he dubbed “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security”. “It is important for us not to relax but rather accelerate our efforts over the next two years, sustain momentum so that we finish strong in 2016,” said the US leader, when he will host a return meeting. “Given the catastrophic consequences of even a single attack, we cannot afford to be complacent,” he stressed. Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, hosting the talks, said that ‘major steps’ had been taken in terms of the three main goals of the summit: reducing the amount of dangerous nuclear material; improving the security around this material and bolstering international cooperation on the nuclear issue. And in a joint statement unveiled with much fanfare on the sidelines of the NSS, 35 of the 53 countries pledged to work closer together and submit to “peer reviews periodically” of their sensitive nuclear security regimes. The nations - including Israel, Kazakhstan, Morocco and Turkey but not Russia - vowed to “realise or exceed” the standards set out in a series of guidelines laid down by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguard nuclear materials. These are the “closest things we have to international standards for nuclear security”, US Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz told reporters as he presented the pledge.

Issue No.1108, 28 March 2014 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies | Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 8 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama But experts cautioned that the deal lacked teeth without the agreement of other powers with large nuclear stockpiles. “The absence of Russia, China, Pakistan and India - all nuclear weapons states with large amounts of nuclear material - as well as others, weakens the initiative’s impact,” said the Fissile Materials Working Group, a collection of more than 70 experts on the nuclear issue. According to the final statement, leaders will push to reduce stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, which can be used to make an atomic bomb, and convert it to safer lower enriched uranium. Obama said leaders should consider transforming the current summit format to a more permanent body run by ministers and officials in order to “synch up the NSS with existing institutions like the IAEA, interpol.” UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has warned that the West’s failure to defend Ukraine from Russian aggression should not be seen as an invitation to other states to acquire nuclear weapons. Ukraine gave up its huge Soviet-era nuclear arsenal in exchange for guarantees from the West and Russia that its sovereignty would be safeguarded. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif stressed constant vigilance and preparedness at the national level as well as international cooperation, which were necessary to strengthen the nuclear security. “Let me clarify that there is no such thing as ‘nuclear security fatigue’. Nuclear security is a continuous national responsibility,” he said in his opening remarks at the ‘Informal Plenary on the future of the Nuclear Security Summit’. He suggested that in the years to come, the states should maintain the political will and high level focus to advance the agenda of nuclear security. “In future, while implementing our decisions, we have to strike a balance between confidentiality and openness; and steer away from both alarmism and complacency. Nuclear security must not fade off the leaders’ radar screens,” he maintained. The prime minister expressed the pleasure that President Obama would be hosting the next NSS in 2016. “It is only fitting that this process, which was launched in the United States, is also concluded there. We know we cannot hold the summits in perpetuity,” he added. He said in the past four years, three summits had made progress; and their next summit would cover fresh ground. “We have to look beyond the present process and the 2016.” Nawaz also stressed the need to broaden participation in this process for widening its ownership to enhance its legitimacy. It makes perfect sense that beyond 2016 the entire membership of the IAEA owns and upholds the decisions taken by the nuclear security summits, he opined. “In close consultation with the IAEA membership, we should dispel the impression that the NSS process is imposing new mandates on the agency.” He said, “As we go forward, we will have to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. We are not creating parallel mechanisms or a new treaty regime.” He said in post-2016, the focus should be on synergy and coordination among various components of the nuclear security architecture - which comprises the IAEA, the UN 1540 Committee, conventions on physical protection of nuclear material and the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, and relevant international forums. The IAEA could play a lead role on this in accordance with its statute, he added. He said to take this step beyond 2016 it was prudent to devolve the process to a lower level, with the backing and continuing interest of leaders. “The process, we envisage, could be supported by senior officials and experts. The exact cycle and scope of the follow-up process, led by the IAEA, could be discussed at the 2016 Summit,” he added. The PM observed that in parallel, the IAEA’s three yearly nuclear security conferences would be a mean to sustain the present momentum. Nawaz Sharif also had a meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel. They discussed matters of mutual interest including bilateral trade. Sharif termed the meeting ‘productive’.

Ottawa Citizen – Ottawa, Ontario, Canada Uranium Stockpile Quietly Exported Back to U.S., Canada Reveals By Ian MacLeod, Ottawa Citizen March 24, 2014 OTTAWA — Canada has secretly disposed of a stockpile of orphaned, weapons-grade uranium that no one has wanted to talk about. Almost six years after Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. shuttered the two troubled MAPLE reactors at its Chalk River Laboratories, the government Monday announced that thousands of “targets” made from highly-enriched uranium (HEU) imported under special licence from the United States have been sent back there. The brief statement at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague ends years of Canadian and U.S. government silence about the fate of the estimated 45 kilograms of HEU targets — enough HEU to build at least one nuclear bomb. No additional details were offered, only that the HEU was repatriated in 2013 as part of broader Canadian effort to lessen the threat of nuclear terrorism by minimizing access to HEU and plutonium, an alternative nuclear bomb material. It’s presumed the HEU targets were returned under heavy guard to their original home at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tenn., where U.S. nuclear weapons components are manufactured. The HEU targets were to have been irradiated in the MAPLEs and turned into life-saving medical isotopes. MAPLE 1 and MAPLE 2 — aka Multipurpose Applied Physics Lattice Experiment — were intended to replace isotope production at Chalk River’s aging NRU reactor as well as the NRX reactor, closed in 1992. Construction was completed in 2000. But the MAPLEs were plagued with technical problems, including an insurmountable design flaw. The reactors were designed to have a negative “power coefficient of reactivity,” or PCR. In other words, the reactivity in the core decreases as the reactor power increases. But for some reason no one understood, MAPLE 1 has a small positive PCR, which caused the reactivity to increase as the power increased. The discrepancy was important. The safety analysis for the reactor — predicting its behaviour under postulated events to demonstrate that safety margins were adequate — assumed it has negative PCR. The PCR riddle prevented the MAPLEs from achieving commercial operation. AECL finally pulled the plug in May 2008. The Crown corporation estimated the cost to get the reactors operating properly would total at least $1 billion, including more than $600 million already spent by taxpayers and Ottawa’s Nordion, formerly MDS Inc. The pre-fabricated uranium targets intended for the MAPLEs would have required extensive modifications before they could be used in the NRU, which already receives a steady supply of other U.S. HEU that is far more readily usable. Uranium: Natural and enriched Natural uranium found in the Earth’s crust consists almost entirely of an atom called U-238. About 0.7 per cent is a related atom, or isotope, called U-235. Its nucleus can release energy by splitting into smaller fragments, which Issue No.1108, 28 March 2014 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies | Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 10 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama then hit and split other U-235 atoms, and so on. Enriching uranium means ensuring there is enough U-235 to maintain that chain reaction. Low-enriched uranium is considered anything with less than 20 per cent U-235. Uranium enriched to three to five per cent, for example, is used to fuel reactors that generate electricity. When the U-235 component is enriched to 90 per cent or more and the atoms are fissioned in the controlled conditions of a nuclear reactor, some important medical isotopes — namely molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) — are created. (If the fission chain reaction is designed to run wild, tremendous energy is released in the form of heat — a nuclear explosion.) The Mo-99 and other isotopes are separated from the irradiated HEU in hot cells at Chalk River and the raw isotopes are transported to Nordion Inc. on March Road, where they are refined, purified and shipped to medical facilities and practitioners around the world. In the case of Mo-99, it is placed into special containers called generators. As it decays, it produces metastable technetium-99 (Tc-99m), the world’s most commonly used medical isotope. The Tc-99m is then “milked” from the generator as needed. The HEU that starts the process is quietly shipped to Chalk River aboard heavily fortified U.S. Department of Energy trucks. It is enriched to 93.3 per cent. Twenty-five to 50 kilograms is enough to make a simple nuclear bomb. The weapon that destroyed Hiroshima was built with about 60 kilograms of 80-per-cent enriched uranium. http://www.ottawacitizen.com/health/Uranium+stockpile+quietly+exported+back+Canada+reveals/9656528/stor y.html Return to Top

NBC News.com U.S. Aims to Correct Issue Behind 2013 Failed Missile Defense Test By Andrea Shalal, Reuters March 25, 2014 WASHINGTON (Reuters) – The U.S. Missile Defense Agency on Tuesday said it was optimistic it had found the cause of a failed missile defense test in July 2013 and aimed to carry out a fix for the entire fleet of ground-based interceptors by the end of the year. Missile Defense Agency Director Vice Admiral James Syring told U.S. lawmakers that officials had accounted for the problem while preparing for the next intercept test in June of the U.S. system that is aimed at defending the United States against a potential ballistic missile attack by North Korea or Iran. Syring cited rapid increases in missile development by a number of countries and said his highest near-term priority was to conduct another intercept test in June of the ground-based missile defense system managed by Boeing Co. The system includes a “kill vehicle” or warhead built by Raytheon Co and a rocket built by Orbital Sciences Corp. The Pentagon is also pressing ahead to redesign the Raytheon kill vehicle, which is meant to hit and destroy an enemy missile on contact, start work on a new long-range radar, and improve the reliability of the overall system, Syring told the strategic forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. The test planned for June involves an updated version of the Raytheon warhead that is installed on 10 of 30 interceptors in silos in California and Alaska. Additional tests were planned in fiscal 2015 through fiscal 2017, he said.

Atlanta Journal-Constitution – Atlanta, GA Tuesday, March 25, 2014 Obama: Nuclear Blast a Bigger Concern than Russia Associated Press (AP) THE HAGUE, Netherlands — President Barack Obama says he's more concerned about the prospect of a nuclear weapon exploding in New York City than Russia's recent actions and called President Vladimir Putin's country "a regional power." During a news conference Tuesday, a reporter asked Obama whether his opponent in the last presidential campaign, Mitt Romney, had a point when he described Russia as America's top geopolitical foe. At the time, Obama criticized that characterization. Since then, Russia has annexed Crimea. "With respect to Mr. Romney's assertion that Russia is our No. 1 geopolitical foe, the truth of the matter is that America has got a whole lot of challenges. Russia is a regional power that is threatening some of its immediate neighbors not out of strength, but out of weakness," Obama said at the conclusion of a nuclear security summit. He later said Russia's actions were a problem but didn't pose the top national security threat to the United States.

The Washington Times – Washington, D.C. Inside the Ring: Defense Talks Scrapped/More Sophisticated Missile Threats By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times Wednesday, March 26, 2014 DEFENSE TALKS SCRAPPED A senior Pentagon official told Congress this week that the Obama administration has halted years of unsuccessful missile defense talks with Russia that had included numerous concessions and an offer to provide classified missile interceptor information to Moscow. “With regard to talks with Russia on transparency and cooperation, Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in violation of international law led to the suspension of our military-to-military dialogues, including [Defense Department] civilians, and we have subsequently not continued to engage Russia on the topic of missile defense,” said M. Elaine Bunn, deputy assistant defense secretary for nuclear and missile defense policy. At a hearing of the House Armed Services subcommittee on strategic forces Tuesday, Ms. Bunn and other officials confirmed that the administration sought to provide Russia with U.S. missile defense secrets. But the proposal met strong opposition from the military and missile defense supporters on Capitol Hill. Ms. Bunn said the idea of giving the Russians classified information on the burnout rate for missile defense interceptors was aimed at convincing Moscow that U.S. defenses in Europe were not fast enough to hit Russian nuclear missiles and, thus, did not threaten Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. But that information is highly classified because it reveals the key capability of U.S. missile defenses. Knowing an interceptor’s speed would allow Russia and other adversaries to develop countermeasures to the systems, such as speeding up offensive missile boosters — thus nullifying decades of development and tens of billions of dollars in development and deployment costs. The offer was one aspect of the administration’s “reset” policy toward Russia, which has been abandoned following Moscow’s forced annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula. Under questioning from Rep. Mo Brooks, Alabama Republican, Ms. Bunn said she opposes any transfer of missile secrets to Russia, based on an internal potential damage study by the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency (MDA). Mr. Brooks then asked MDA Director Vice Adm. James D. Syring if an enemy would find the burnout rate data useful and whether its loss would harm U.S. national security. “In my view, yes, and the uncertainty of where that information would go, and [it is] my firm recommendation not to release it,” Adm. Syring said. Army Lt. Gen. David Mann, director of the Army Space and Missile Defense Command who testified with Adm. Syring, agreed that the transfer of interceptor secrets to Russia would harm U.S. security.

The Japan Times – Tokyo, Japan Japan to Return Weapons-Grade Plutonium to U.S. Associated Press (AP) March 24, 2014 THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS – Japan will return to the United States more than 700 pounds (315 kg) of weapons grade plutonium and a supply of highly enriched uranium, a victory for President Barack Obama’s efforts to secure nuclear materials around the world. American and Japanese officials announced the deal Monday at the two-day Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague — the meeting’s first major breakthrough. “This is a very significant nuclear security pledge and activity,” U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz told reporters. “The material will be transferred to the United States for transformation into proliferation-resistant forms.”

Arirang News – Seoul, South Korea North Korea Fires 16 Short-Range Rockets into Waters on Sunday Laah Hyun-kyung, Arirang News. March 24, 2014 Thirty short-range rockets Saturday and another 16 on Sunday morning. North Korea continues to fire projectiles into the East Sea. South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff says those launched on Sunday are believed to have been Soviet-era short-range FROG missiles. The firing took place from North Korea's eastern port city of Wonsan between 12:50 and 2:20 early Sunday morning. The rockets flew about 60 kilometers -- the same distance as those launched on Saturday. Dating back to last weekend, the North has fired more than 70 short-range rockets into its eastern waters.

Yonhap News Agency – Seoul, South Korea N. Korea Fires Two Ballistic Missiles, Prompting Seoul to Take Countermeasures March 26, 2014 SEOUL/WASHINGTON, March 26 (Yonhap) -- North Korea test-fired two ballistic missiles into the sea off its east coast Wednesday as the leaders of South Korea, the U.S. and Japan held a summit in the Netherlands to pressure Pyongyang to denuclearize. Seoul condemned the launch as a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions and vowed to take countermeasures against the latest "provocations." North Korea fired the midrange missiles -- one at 2:35 a.m. and the other at 2:42 a.m. -- from the Sukchon region, north of Pyongyang, which flew about 650 kilometers before dropping into the East Sea, defense ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok said in an emergency briefing. "North Korea's ballistic missile launch clearly violates U.N. Security Resolutions and is a grave provocation to Republic of Korea (South) and the international community," Kim said. The trajectory indicated that the missiles were of the Rodong class, as they flew over at altitudes of more than 160 km and with a top speed of over Mach 7.0., the spokesman noted. The foreign ministry said the South Korean "government will begin to take countermeasures against the North's latest provocations through close collaboration with allies and the United Nations Security Council." The foreign ministry also denounced the ballistic missile launches as grave threats to international navigation activities and civilian safety, warning the North against further provocative actions. "The missile launch constitutes provocations that violate the UNSC resolutions and add tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region," the ministry said in a statement. "The government calls on the North to immediately halt such provocations and fully comply with its obligations and promises with the international community." The North fired a Rodong missile in 2006, followed by another launch in 2009. North Korea is prohibited from any launch using ballistic missile technology under U.N. Security Council resolutions that were imposed on the impoverished nation for its past nuclear tests and missile launches.

Issue No.1108, 28 March 2014 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies | Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 16 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Kim said Pyongyang is believed to have launched the missiles in protest of international pressure for denuclearization during the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague earlier this week and the ongoing joint military drills between Seoul and Washington, as well as to show off its ballistic missile capability. "We strongly urge North Korea to stop repeated provocative acts immediately," Kim said. "The South Korean and U.S. forces have stepped up their vigilance to monitor possibilities of additional launches." The latest launch came hours after the leaders of South Korea, the U.S. and Japan held a trilateral summit in The Hague on the sidelines of the global nuclear forum to seek expanded cooperation to denuclearize North Korea. In a joint press conference after the trilateral summit, South Korean President Park Geun-hye called for a unified response to the North Korean nuclear problem, while U.S. President Barack Obama said a nuclear North Korea is unacceptable. The launch also took place on the same day South Korea commemorates the fourth anniversary of the sinking of the Cheonan warship, which was hit by a North Korean torpedo in the tensely guarded western sea. Pyongyang still denies its involvement in the incident that killed 46 sailors. The communist state has fired off several short-range missiles and rockets from its east coast since late February, drawing sharp criticism from both Seoul and Washington. Compared with short-range Scud missiles the North fired earlier this month, Rodong missiles, which have an estimated range 1,000 km to 1,500 km, are considered to be more destructive as they can carry a nuclear warhead, only if Pyongyang is capable of developing a small enough warhead to fit on them. "Japan, some parts of China and Russia are within the range of Rodong missiles," Kim said. "The North's pre-dawn missile launch is believed to be aimed at protesting against South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises and demonstrating its infiltration capability in a show of force." The two-week war game Key Resolve ended in early March, while the two-month combat training Foal Eagle runs through April 18. According to military intelligence, the missiles were fired from a mobile launcher called TEL (transporter, erector, launcher), which is hard to detect using military satellites or the ground radar system. The North is believed to have about 40 TELs for Scud missiles, 40 TELs for Rodong missiles and 14 TELs for Musudan missiles with ranges of 2,500 km to 4,000 km. The North first deployed Rodong-class missiles in 1997. The U.S. military, however, evaluated that the North has up to 200 mobile launchers for ballistic missiles, more than double Seoul's assessment. In Washington, the U.S. Department of Defense said it is aware of "reports that North Korea fired a number of missiles." "We are closely monitoring the situation on the Korean Peninsula," a Pentagon official said in an e-mail, saying it's the department's formal position on the issue. "We continue to urge North Korea to exercise restraint and take steps to improve its relations with its neighbors. The onus is on North Korea to refrain from provocations." The U.S. State Department said it is considering taking "appropriate" measures in response to North Korea's firing of two midrange ballistic missiles. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2014/03/26/65/0301000000AEN20140326000553315F.html Return to Top

The Chosun Ilbo – Seoul, South Korea March 26, 2014 N.Korea Hints at 4th Nuke Test

The Korea Times – Seoul, South Korea March 26, 2014 USFK Chief Says N. Korean Missile to be Capable of Hitting Mainland U.S. by 2024 The top U.S. military commander in Korea said Tuesday Pyongyang will have ballistic missiles to reach the mainland U.S. within a decade. "We have a challenging environment in terms of North Korea's development of ballistic missiles. And they continue apace at that," Army Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti told senators at a budget hearing in Washington, D.C. Asked if he expects North Korea to have missile capability capable of hitting the U.S. homeland by 2024, he said yes. "On the pace they're on, yes," said the general, who leads the 28,500 American troops stationed in South Korea. Today, he said, the secretive communist nation "fields SCUD and Nodong missiles that are able to strike the entire Korean Peninsula and U.S. bases in Japan." "It is investing heavily in longer-range missiles with the potential to target the U.S. homeland," he added. In response, the allies are developing a "layered interoperable missile defense system that has the right components and also has the sufficient munitions," Scaparrotti said.

The West Australian – Perth, Australia China to Have Nuclear Missiles on Subs Soon: US admiral Agence France-Presse (AFP) March 26, 2014 Washington (AFP) - China for the first time will likely have subs equipped with long-range nuclear missiles later this year, part of an increasingly potent submarine fleet, a top US officer said Tuesday, The head of US Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel Locklear, said the latest class of Chinese subs would be armed with a new ballistic missile with an estimated range of 4,000 nautical miles (7,500 kilometers). "This will give China its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent, probably before the end of 2014," Locklear told the Senate Armed Services Committee. Locklear was referring to the production of China's JIN-class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine and the new JL-2 missile on board the vessel. "China’s advance in submarine capabilities is significant. They possess a large and increasingly capable submarine force," the admiral said. In October, Chinese state media for the first time showed images of the country's nuclear-powered submarines, touting it as a "credible second-strike nuclear capability." Locklear said China's submarine modernization effort was impressive.

The London Daily Telegraph – London, U.K. British Components in North Korean Rockets, UN Finds Sanctions against the secretive state have not stopped it from sourcing parts from the UK, US and South Korea for its rockets By Leo Byrne, NK News 27 March 2014 North Korea built the Unha-3 rocket, one of the most important missiles in its arsenal, using British, American and South Korean components, United Nations experts have concluded. The missile also contains off-the-shelf parts from Switzerland and China, as well as parts of Russian Scud missiles. The majority of the parts, the UN said, did not contravene sanctions and their use "shows the ability of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to assemble complex systems with globally sourced components". The Unha-3, a three-stage missile which was first unveiled when it was used to launch a satellite into space in December 2012, is the closest that North Korea has come to developing a missile which can deliver a nuclear warhead to the west coast of America. The analysis from the United Nations, released earlier this month, came just before North Korea launched two medium-range Rodong ballistic missiles into the sea on Tuesday. The UN security council is planning a closed door meeting on Thursday to discuss a response. It was the first firing of Rodong missiles in four years and comes in the annual period of tension on the Korean peninsula as United States and South Korea prepare to stage war games. The Rodong missile was a precursor to the Unha-3. Experts said the list of parts they had recovered from the Unha-3 comprised of relatively easy-to-obtain computer components, including an American video decoder and temperature and pressure sensors from the UK. The panel noted that the South Korean parts were manufactured between 2003 and 2010, but could not be traced back to individual companies due to "insufficient identifiers". Analysts said that adding these easily available dual-use components to the sanctions list would be problematic. "The current list of banned military and dual-use goods is already comprehensive. Adding more readily available materials to it would both risk infringing on legitimate non-military end-uses and be extremely difficult for member states to effectively implement," said Lawrence Dermody, an analyst specialising in illicit trafficking at SIPRI.

The Voice of Russia – Moscow, Russia 24 March 2014 Russia to Beef Up its Arctic Force For more than half a century, the Arctic ice cap has been regarded by the military as a potential theater of war. Nuclear-capable missile-carrying submarines have been secretly patrolling the Arctic seas during and after the “Cold War”. That’s where a key threat comes from, Mikhail Khodaryonok, editor-in-chief of the Military-Industrial Messenger newspaper, told the Voice of Russia. “As Arctic ice packs melt due to the continuing global warming, more ice-free areas emerge, which might serve as convenient launch spots for ballistic missile attacks. It’s one of the main threats to Russia. A surprise disarming strike involving ballistic nuclear missiles and cruise missiles might potentially come from the Arctic,” he said. The Defense Ministry is planning to build new warships, including ice-breaking ones, and create a specialized coastal taskforce. The Soviet-era Arctic infrastructure will be restored. “The Arctic airfields are the first to be restored. These are the Rogachyovo, Alykel, Tiksi, Khatanga, Nadym and many others. Airfields are crucial to ensuring the fast deployment of forces. They can also be used as bases for anti-submarine aviation and flying radars and as command headquarters,” Khodaryonok said. The Arctic holds an estimated one-quarter of the global energy resources. Some experts predict armed conflicts in the Arctic in the coming decades. Others are skeptical.

National Journal Dutch Nuclear-Arms Base Infiltrated on Eve of Summit By Diane Barnes, Global Security Newswire March 25, 2014 Protesters infiltrated a nuclear-arms base in the Netherlands last week, days before leaders gathered to discuss atomic security less than 100 miles away. Four members of the group "Disarm" entered the country's Volkel air base and photographed the exterior of a building possibly used to hold B-61 nuclear gravity bombs from the United States, the organization indicated in Dutch-language comments quoted by other activists. The installation is one of six bases in five European nations believed to hold such weapons, which Washington fields and maintains for the defense of its regional NATO allies. The group stated that its members were arrested at 8:30 a.m. last Tuesday and interrogated. Jeffrey Lewis, a nonproliferation expert at the Monterey Institute for International Studies, said the break-in and several prior incidents "would seem to demonstrate" vulnerabilities noted in a 2008 U.S. Air Force assessment of security at nuclear-arms facilities across Europe. "This is very similar to a series of intrusions several years ago at Kleine Brogel Air Base by a Belgian peace group," Lewis wrote on Tuesday on the Arms Control Wonk blog. He added, though, that it is unclear whether a B-61 storage vault is inside the structure photographed during last week's trespassing incident. Publicly available maps of the facility "mark certain bunkers as having a [B-61] vault, although I don't know why they think they know that," the analyst wrote. One Dutch-based activist said last week's infiltration was timed to coincide with preparations for the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, Netherlands. "The activists want to raise awareness for the fact that the [summit] will talk about security of nuclear materials but not those nuclear materials that are used for military purposes," Wilbert van der Zeijden wrote in a blog post for the antinuclear group PAX. NATO reportedly is poised to spend more than $154 million on security improvements at B-61 storage sites in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Turkey. However, a number of critics have pressed for full withdrawal of the arms. http://www.nationaljournal.com/global-security-newswire/dutch-nuclear-arms-base-infiltrated-on-eve-of- summit-20140325 Return to Top

Global Times – Beijing, China Ukraine Rules Out Resumption of Nuclear Status

Military.com US-UK: Expand Missile Defense in Eastern Europe By Richard Sisk March 26, 2014 The U.S. and British defense chiefs agreed Wednesday on the need for bolstering missile defense systems in Eastern Europe while stressing that the planned NATO shield was not aimed at Russia. Despite the disclaimer, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said "our main focus today was Ukraine," following discussions with British Defense Minister Philip Hammond. At a Pentagon briefing, Hammond said the talks were "dominated' by the crisis in Ukraine and ways "to force President [Vladimir] Putin to stop his bullying behavior." Both Hagel and Hammond said they were seeking to speed up the timeline for the placement of NATO missile defense systems in Poland, which were to be operational by 2018. Hammond said the "missile defense program is not aimed at Russia" but at "rogue states" such as Iran. "It's not a counter-Russia policy," Hammond said. "They know what it's aimed at and it isn't aimed at them." The planned European Interceptor Site for 10 missile silos in Poland was designed to work in conjunction with U.S. midcourse tracking radar in the Czech Republic. The NATO site in Poland was separate from Poland's efforts to develop its own missile defense shield, which was designed to protect against Russia. At a meeting in Warsaw on Jan. 30, Hagel also offered U.S. assistance to Poland for the development of its missile defense system apart from NATO's. "As Poland explores its options for its own missile defense capabilities, there is an unmistakable opportunity for us to forge even closer cooperation in this area, leveraging cutting-edge technology and enhanced NATO capability," Hagel told Polish Defense Minister Tomasz Siemoniak. "This will benefit Poland, the United States and the entire trans-Atlantic alliance," Hagel said.

ITAR-TASS News Agency – Moscow, Russia Russian Nuclear Subs to Conduct Bulava Missile Launches in Summer- Autumn 2014 Two strategic Project 955 Borey class nuclear-powered submarines of the Russian Navy will conduct single launches of transcontinental ballistic Bulava missiles in summer-autumn 2014 March 27, 2014 MOSCOW, March 27. /ITAR-TASS/. Russian strategic nuclear-powered submarines Vladimir Monomakh and Alexander Nevsky will conduct Bulava missile launches in summer-autumn 2014, says a source in the Russian Navy. Two strategic Project 955 Borey class nuclear-powered submarines of the Russian Navy will conduct single launches of transcontinental ballistic Bulava missiles in summer-autumn 2014 as directed by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. This was reported by a source in the General Headquarters of the Russian Navy. Vladimir Monomakh is to undergo state tests in summer-autumn this year, including a sub-launch of a Bulava missile in the White Sea aquatorium. The missile will be fired toward the Kura test site in Russia’s far-eastern Kamchatka territory. “Alexander Nevsky submarine will also conduct launches of Bulava missiles,” the source added. He also specified that “the two nuclear-powered submarines are expected to conduct four Bulava launches all together.” http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/725506 Return to Top

The London Guardian – London, U.K. Cuts to Armed Forces Undermine Nuclear Deterrent, MPs Warn

Global Security Newswire Russia Launches Nuclear-War Drill, Saying It Was Long Scheduled March 28, 2014 Russia on Thursday began drilling for nuclear war in a massive, three-day exercise it asserts was planned months ago, Nezavisimaya Gazeta reports. Roughly 10,000 military personnel were expected to participate in the maneuvers, which are intended as practice for a large-scale nuclear offensive, according to the Russian newspaper. Exercise participants were set to position and prepare missile-firing units for launch, and to practice various administrative and support functions for the operation, said Col. Igor Yegorov, a Russian Defense Ministry spokesman for the strategic missile services.

Al Bawaba – Amman, Jordan U.S. Senators Call for a Tougher Stance on Iran's Nuclear Weapons Press TV, Iran March 23rd, 2014 A group of U.S. senators have urged President Barack Obama to take a firm stance on Iran amid ongoing nuclear negotiations. The Saturday letter from 22 Democratic senators and one independent hailed Obama’s two-track approach to Iran, which incorporates both sanctions and negotiations. The letter, issued from the office of Senator Carl Levin, called for tough procedures of transparency and verification, which guarantee non-diversion in Iran’s nuclear energy program. The majority of the 23 senators had declined to sign another letter issued by 83 of their colleagues earlier this week. That letter, initiated by Democrat Senator Robert Menendez, insisted that any final nuclear agreement with Iran must stipulate that Tehran “has no inherent right to enrichment under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.” Iran has repeatedly said that its enrichment rights are non-negotiable. Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – Russia, China, France, Britain and the United States -- plus Germany wrapped up their latest round of high-level nuclear talks in the Austrian capital of Vienna on March 19. At the end of the talks, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, who led the Iranian delegation, said the discussions covered “very serious issues in serious detail,” but more time is needed before starting to draft a final deal.

The Jerusalem Post – Jerusalem, Israel Syria may Miss Final Deadline for Chemical Weapon Destruction By Reuters 24 March 2014 THE HAGUE - The head of the organization overseeing the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons stockpile said he still hoped Damascus could meet a final deadline of June 30 but it might miss that target. Syrian President Bashar Assad's government agreed to destroy its chemical weapons arsenal by mid-year as part of a US-Russian agreement negotiated after a chemical attack last August that killed hundreds of people around Damascus. It has handed over roughly half of its stockpile to a joint mission with the United Nations but is several weeks behind schedule, blaming security problems for the delays. "I think that some targets have not been met, but the deadline of 30 June still remains our target, and we think we can finish the destruction by that time, or close to that time," Ahmet Uzumcu, head of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, said. An official at the OPCW, which won the Nobel Peace Prize last year, said Uzumcu meant the process could run past the June 30 deadline Damascus had agreed to. This was the first official indication it might not be met. http://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Syria-may-miss-final-deadline-for-chemical-weapon-destruction-346348 Return to Top

ABC News.com US Official Can’t Say Syria Chemical Weapons Fully Tracked Down By Ali Weinberg March 26, 2014 During a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Syria, a State Department official could not confirm that the international community has located Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s entire chemical weapons supply. Sen. Tim Kaine asked Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation Thomas Countryman whether there were any doubts about the thoroughness of Assad’s declaration of chemical weapons, all of which are supposed to be destroyed by June 30 as part of a deal brokered by Russia. “Are there significant questions we have about the extent of the declaration, whether there are undeclared weapons we need to isolate and identify?” he asked. Countryman could not categorically rule that premise out, saying there was more he could discuss in a classified setting. “I can only offer to brief you on that in a closed session,” he said, adding, “It will be illuminating.” Countryman also told the committee that while Syria has delivered half of its chemical weapons to be destroyed, 65 percent of the most dangerous weapons in the country have yet to be moved out.

The Times of India – Mumbai, India India Tests New Underwater Nuclear Missile Tamil News Network (TNN) March 26, 2014 NEW DELHI: India has test-fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with a "longer range" than that of the existing one of 750-km in the quest towards building a credible nuclear weapons triad. The new SLBM with a range over 2,000 km, tentatively dubbed K-4, was tested from a submersible pontoon in the Bay of Bengal on Monday. The test came up for discussion in the annual DRDO directors' conference, attended by defence minister A K Antony and national security advisor Shivshankar Menon here on Tuesday, said sources. The new missile, part of the "K" series of underwater missiles being developed by DRDO, will have to be tested several times, first from pontoons and then finally from submarines, before it can become operational. While India for long has had land-based Agni missiles and fighters jury-rigged to carry nuclear weapons for deterrence, constituting the land and air legs of the triad, the lack of an operational SLBM has been a big operational gap. The 750-km range K-15 SLBM, which has undergone around a dozen tests from pontoons, is yet to be tested from a submarine. That will happen only after the first indigenous nuclear submarine INS Arihant goes for sea trials later this year. Though the miniature 83 MW pressurized light-water reactor on board the 6,000-tonne INS Arihant went "critical" on August 10 last year, it is yet to attain the full power needed for the submarine to head for sea trials. During these 18-month-long extensive "sea-acceptance trials", the 10-tonne K-15 missile -- which can carry a one- tonne nuclear payload - will be fired from the four silos on the submarine's hump. Two more nuclear submarines are being built to follow INS Arihant under the secretive ATV (advanced technology vessel) project at the ship building centre in the naval dockyard at Vizag. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-tests-new-underwater-nuclear-missile/articleshow/32694060.cms Return to Top

The Indian Express – New Delhi, India Nuclear-Capable Prithvi II Missile Test-Fired Successfully "It was a perfect launch and all mission objectives were met," said ITR Director M V KV Prasad. Press Trust of India (PTI) March 28, 2014 Issue No.1108, 28 March 2014 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies | Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 28 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Balasore -- India on Friday successfully test-fired its indigenously developed nuclear-capable surface-to-surface Prithvi II missile, with a range of 350 km, from a test range near Balasore as part of a user trial by the Army. Integrated Test Range (ITR) Director M V K V Prasad said the missile is capable of carrying 500 kg to 1,000 kg of warheads. “It was a perfect launch and all mission objectives were met,” he said, adding the missile was test-fired from a mobile launcher in salvo mode from launch complex-3 at Chandipur at about 9.45 AM. “The missile trajectory was tracked by DRDO radars, electro-optical tracking systems and telemetry stations located along the coast of Odisha,” defence sources said. “The downrange teams onboard the ship deployed near the designated impact point in the Bay of Bengal monitored the terminal events and splashdown,” they said. Defence sources said the training launch of Prithvi II, which was inducted into Strategic Force Command (SFC) in 2003, clearly indicate the country’s operational readiness to meet any eventuality besides establishing the reliability of this deterrent component of India’s strategic arsenal. Prithvi-II is the first missile to be developed by Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) under the country’s prestigious Integrated Guided Missile Development Program and is now a proven technology. The missile is thrust by liquid propulsion twin engines and uses advanced inertial guidance system with manoeuvring trajectory. The missile was randomly chosen from the production stock and the entire launch activities were carried out by the specially formed SFC as part of a regular training exercise. It was monitored by DRDO scientists, the sources said. The last user trial of Prithvi-II was successfully conducted from the same base on January 7, 2014. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/nuclear-capable-prithvi-ii-missile-test-fired-successfully/ Return to Top

The London Guardian – London, U.K. OPINION/Julian Borger Global Security Blog World Leaders Fear Ukraine Crisis Will Harm Nuclear Cooperation Nuclear summit convenes in The Hague as fears grow that west's deteriorating ties with Russia will renew nuclear tensions By Julian Borger in The Hague Sunday, 23 March 2014 More than 50 world leaders will meet in The Hague to discuss the world's nuclear security on Monday amid fears that the west's rapidly worsening relations with Moscow over Ukraine could hobble international efforts to contain the threat of a catastrophe as result of miscalculation, terrorism or accident. Barack Obama will meet the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, at the two-day summit, but Vladimir Putin will stay away. Russia will be represented by foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, who will be meeting US secretary of state, John Kerry, and other western officials for the first time since Russia's annexation of Crimea. So far, nuclear experts said, Washington and Moscow have been successful in insulating their cooperation over nuclear issues from the tension over Ukraine. On the same day that Obama announced sanctions on Putin's allies and advisors, a team of Russian officials arrived in San Francisco on a surprise inspection of the US nuclear arsenal – a visit made possible by clauses aimed at increasing mutual transparency and trust in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) the two countries signed in 2010, setting a ceiling of 1,550 for the number of strategic warheads each country can deploy. Issue No.1108, 28 March 2014 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies | Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 29 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama However, advocates of nuclear disarmament say the new freeze in US-Russian relations was likely to torpedo any hopes that they had of persuading Washington and its Nato allies to withdraw the last US nuclear weapons on European soil, an estimated 150-200 B61 gravity bombs deployed in the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Italy and Turkey. Campaigners have long argued that the B61 bombs are obsolete and their removal would represent a confidence- building gesture to Moscow at no strategic cost, putting pressure on Russia to make a reciprocal reduction in its arsenal of about 2,000 operational tactical warheads. But most now concede that the disarmament lobby's chance of winning that argument has gone from slim to nonexistent. "The Ukraine crisis will only amplify voices of those against any move on the B61, from eastern Europe in particular. It will closed down that debate," said Ian Kearns, the director of the European Leadership Network, a group of former ministers pressing the case for disarmament. "The debate over withdrawing nuclear weapons from European Nato air bases is over for the foreseeable future," George Perkovich, the director of the nuclear policy programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, agreed. "This will pose some dilemmas for the Dutch, Belgians, Germans and others who have parties that want them out." Paul Ingram, the executive director of the British-American Security Information Council (BASIC) also predicted that if Nato-Russian relations continued to deteriorate, arguments by arms control advocates in the west against upgrading a new fleet of dual-capable aircraft (DCA), with the capacity to deliver B61 bombs, were also likely to fail. The modernisation of the fleet would give new life to the B61 as a weapon and represent a nuclear escalation in the heart of Europe. "I have little doubt that for the moment at least the political opposition towards spending on updating the DCA aircraft will be weakened by this action. And that could be all it takes to tip the balance," Ingram said. Earlier this month, the Russian deputy defence minister, Anatoly Antonov, reaffirmed Russia's intentions to stick to the agreements in the New START treated and a 2011 accord called the Vienna Document, which allow for mutual inspections of nuclear sites as a way of building confidence and transparency, lessening the chances of misunderstanding leading to catastrophic miscalculations. However, Kearns warned that if Putin wanted to raise the stakes in the stand-off with the west there were several ways he could bring the dispute into the nuclear sphere. He could suspend implementation of the New Start treaty, or even withdraw from it altogether, or he could move some of Moscow's stockpile of nuclear warheads into the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, bordering Poland and Lithuania. In December, Russia said it had deployed short-range Iskander missiles, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead, into its western military districts, bordering Nato states. Putin portrayed it as a reaction to the development of a Europe-based anti-ballistic missile system, which Washington says is intended as a shield against a potential Iranian threat. Moscow argues the missile defence system compromises Russian nuclear deterrent. "One way or another, we will have to react to that," Putin said in December, saying his government had not yet made up its mind to move Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad. The Nuclear Security Summit which begins in The Hague on Monday is the third in a series launched by Obama in 2010, aimed at improving the security around the world's stockpiles of fissile material, to prevent theft by terrorism. The initiative relies heavily on cooperation between the US and Russia as the stewards of the world's two biggest arsenals. There are estimated to be 2,000 metric tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium and highly-enriched uranium (HEU) stored at hundreds of sites in 25 countries, with widely varying security standards. In July 2012, protesters broke into a US site called Y-12, where 400 tonnes of military HEU are stored. The most serious breaches in nuclear

The Diplomat – Tokyo, Japan OPINION/Article A Global Zero World Would Be MAD Abolishing nuclear weapons would make the world more violent and, paradoxically, more prone to nuclear warfare. By Zachary Keck for The Diplomat March 24, 2014 This week world leaders are gathering in the Netherlands for the 3rd Nuclear Security Summit. Although the purpose of the Nuclear Security Summits is to secure nuclear materials around the world, it is also part of President Barack Obama’s larger goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons. This goal was announced in President Obama’s infamous Prague speech in 2009 during which he committed the U.S. to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. Since that speech, leaders from around the world have joined President Obama in endorsing global nuclear disarmament, including the UN Security Council, whose permanent members are the same five states the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) recognizes as nuclear weapon states. There are many reasons to support the global nuclear disarmament movement, but all are ultimately geared towards creating a more peaceful world free from the menace of nuclear war. As President Obama explained in his famous Prague speech in 2009, eliminating nuclear weapons would “leave this world more prosperous and more peaceful than we found it.” In fact, global nuclear disarmament, if achieved, is likely to lead to a less peaceful world and one where the threat of nuclear war is, paradoxically, much greater. One of the biggest dangers of nuclear disarmament is not that a rogue nation would cheat, but that there would be no nuclear deterrence to prevent conventional conflicts between great powers. Nearly seven decades removed from the end of the last great power conflict, it’s easy to understate just how destructive these wars can be. For that reason, it’s imperative that we periodically revisit history. The number of deaths in the last great power conflict, WWII, is generally calculated to be anywhere from 50 to 70 million people, which includes civilian and military deaths. However, the global population was only about 2.25 billion at the start of WWII, or less than a third of the current global population of 7.152 billion. Thus, assuming the same level of lethality, a great power conflict today would result in between 150 and 210 million deaths, many times greater than an accidental nuclear launch or nuclear terrorist attack, however devastating both would be. Issue No.1108, 28 March 2014 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies | Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 31 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama There’s little reason to believe that a global war today— even if fought conventionally— would not be many times more lethal than WWII, however. Although strategic bombings were certainly a factor in WWII, for much of the war technology and rival air forces limited their effectiveness. Offensive operations against civilian populations in a modern conflict would be much more effective. To begin with, most nations would turn to launching ballistic and cruise missiles in unprecedented quantities. Like Korea and Vietnam, but unlike most of WWII, there would essentially be no methods for defending civilian population centers against these missiles. Moreover, because of urbanization, populations are far more concentrated than they were in WWII. According to the UN, the number of people living in urban areas more than quadrupled between 1950 and 2005, increasing from 732 million (29 percent of total population) to 3.2 billion (49 percent of population). In 2010 more than half the world population was living in cities and this number is expected to rise to 60 percent by 2030. By mid-century, a full 70 percent of the world’s population, or 6.4 billion people, will be urban dwellers. Thus, the combination of missile attacks for which there are few defenses, combined with much greater population density, would alone make WWIII much more lethal than either of its predecessors. But as deadly as a modern conventional war would be in a nuclear free world, the real danger is that it wouldn’t remain conventional. Along with making great power conflict far more likely, global nuclear disarmament offers no conceivable mechanism to ensure that such a war would remain non-nuclear. In fact, common sense would suggest that immediately following the outbreak of hostilities — if not in the run-up to the war itself — every previous nuclear power would make a rapid dash to reconstruct their nuclear forces in the shortest amount of time. The result would not merely be a return to the nuclear world we currently inhabit. Rather, some countries would reconstruct their nuclear weapons more quickly than others, and no power could be sure of the progress their rivals had made. The “winners” in this nuclear arms race would then have every incentive to immediately use their new nuclear capabilities against their adversaries in an effort to quickly end the conflict, eliminate others’ nuclear weapons-making capabilities, or merely out of fear that others will launch a debilitating strike on its small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal. There would be no mutually assured destruction in such an environment; a “use-it-or- lose-it” mentality would prevail. President Obama is right to call for further reductions in existing arsenals and greater safety standards for nuclear explosives and fissile material. As countless studies have shown, however, the world is currently more peaceful than it’s ever been. Eliminating nuclear weapons would irresponsibly put that all at risk. Zachary Keck is Associate Editor of The Diplomat where he authors The Pacific Realist blog. He also writes a monthly column for The National Interest. http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/a-global-zero-world-would-be-mad/ Return to Top

People’s Daily Online – Beijing, China OPINION/Editor’s Pick Be Wary of Japan's Nuclear Ambitions (People’s Daily Online) March 24, 2014 It is indisputable that Japan holds a large amount of weapons-grade nuclear materials; this should be a matter of concern to the international community. Yun Byung-se, Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Korea, emphasized that if a county holds or produces more nuclear materials than it actually needs there is always a risk that it will become a threat to itself and to other countries. Meanwhile John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of State, also said that preventing Japan from developing nuclear weapons is one of the key points of American diplomacy. Issue No.1108, 28 March 2014 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies | Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 32 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Facing such pressure from the international community, Japan has participated in international nuclear affairs in apparent good faith. But according to a report from Kyodo News Agency, the draft of the statement which will be released after the non-proliferation and disarmament initiative meeting in Hiroshima next month may demand that China and some other countries join in the arms control negotiations between the US and Russia. China strictly abides by its commitment to no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances, and commits not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nuclear weapon-free countries and in nuclear weapon-free zones. China's nuclear policy is open, transparent and responsible, a fact that has been widely recognized by the international community. The negotiations on strategic arms reduction between the US and Russia date from the cold war period, and developed against a background of the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers of that time. It is absurd that some Japanese want China to join in these negotiations. Even some Japanese media have pointed out that dragging China into the arms control negotiations between the US and Russia is a "public relations gimmick" that aims to confuse the public. Japan has always assumed an ambiguous attitude towards nuclear weapons issues. As early as 1957, the then Japanese premier Nobusuke Kishi asserted that Japan would not exclude the possibility of owning nuclear weapons for self-defense purposes. And when Kishi's brother Satō Eisaku was elected Japanese premier, though he announced the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, in private he claimed that these principles were simply "window- dressing". For decades, Japan has purposely maintained itself "a screwdriver's distance" from making nuclear warheads. What is the purpose of Japan's large stocks of weapon-grade nuclear materials? Japan must come clean, and remove any doubts of the part of the international community by practical actions. The article is edited and translated from《日本，别有用心的“核热心”》, source: People's Daily, author: Zhong Sheng. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/98649/8576368.html Return to Top

Roll Call.com OPINION/Commentary Getting Missile Defense Right By Thomas Karako March 24, 2014 Not long ago, missile defense was a contentious issue about Cold War strategic stability. Today, it has widespread bipartisan support on Capitol Hill. We no longer debate whether to have defenses, but which programs, at what cost, and how well they will work. Atop the list of programs requiring improvement is Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), which remains the only system dedicated to defending the homeland against long-range threats. President Obama’s FY2015 budget further reduces missile defense funding, exacerbating a troubling, five-year pattern. It also does something quite praiseworthy, to the tune of investing nearly $200 million over five years in a new “kill vehicle” (KV) to replace the current Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) deployed in Alaska and California. Addressing these KVs (the part that collides with a target), Frank Kendall, the Department of Defense’s Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, recently declared that “we’ve got to get to more reliable systems.” That Congress’ policy recommendations are finally being pursued reflects the leadership of Vice Admiral James Syring, director of the DOD’s Missile Defense Agency. If implemented well, this long-awaited move could be among the more promising developments for GMD in years.

Issue No.1108, 28 March 2014 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies | Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 33 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Americans always do the right thing, Churchill quipped, but only after trying everything else. In 2009, President Obama cancelled deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic to which Russia had objected, reduced the number of interceptors planned for deployment in Alaska from 44 to 30, slashed spending for homeland defense, and cancelled a next-generation KV. Instead of GMD deployments in Poland, the administration conjured up the idea of an SM-3IIB program, which then Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, I-Conn., panned as a “paper missile,” and which after significant criticism was cancelled in March 2013. While abandoning the third site in Europe and simultaneously opposing relocation to the East Coast, the Obama administration has fallen back to one part of the Bush-era architecture: restoring by 2018 the full 44 interceptors for Alaska. Although now more expensive and behind schedule, the administration is now doubling down on the same systems it cut just five years ago. Today’s KVs, CE-1 and CE-2, have suffered important setbacks. Despite several successful intercepts with CE-1, the 2013 intercept attempt failed due to a faulty battery. In 2010, a CE-2 test failed due to a separation problem — the kind of thing engineers solved in the 1960s. Although these failures were addressed and although GMD is certified to meet today’s threat mission, no one — in the Pentagon or Congress — believes band-aids are sufficient. This mixed record is partly due to GMD’s relatively quick deployment and lack of subsequent funding. When first emplaced ten years ago to remedy the absence of any defenses, EKVs were little more than prototypes with roots in the Homing Overlay Experiment in the 1980s, and the ABM Treaty-compliant testing in the 1990s. While continually improved, they were never expected to be final — thus the blow from post-2009 cuts to development and testing. Whereas ICBMs are tested several times annually to ensure reliability, GMD has had only two intercept tests since 2008. The path forward requires short, medium, and long-term action. Immediately, we must continue to maintain and improve EKVs, and begin testing at an operational pace. For the longer term, GMD needs an entirely new interceptor, tested and purchased in a more customary way, with each of the major industry players developing and competing proposals on the merits. This route holds great potential, perhaps with “volume-kill” force multipliers, but everyone knows it will take a decade or more. The bad news: homeland defense can’t wait that long. The good news: it doesn’t have to. Drawing on current programs and technologies, a medium-term GMD fix can shorten painfully long acquisition cycles and defend the homeland against increasing missile threats. A host of recent reports point the way. In 2012, the National Academy of Sciences recommended that GMD harvest improvements present on existing or past programs, including the now-cancelled KEI and the sensors and seeker used in the today’s highly successful SM-3 family. This means upgrading EKV’s more sophisticated “front end” brains, while keeping the “back end” that maneuvers. Last June, a DOD report specifically suggested a new “common” KV using components from SM-3s, which likewise builds upon the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review urging greater reliance on “proven capabilities.” Using components from other platforms is further consistent with the Defense Science Board’s 2011 recommendation of more flexible acquisition processes, modular “building blocks,” and open architectures — and with Under Secretary Kendall’s acquisition tenets on better buying power. Recently-released budget documents state MDA’s intention to contract redesigned KVs by 2015 using a “modular, open architecture” (also recommended by the committee report for the House-passed defense bill last year). In this manner, a better KV would become available for the additional 14 interceptors planned for 2018. Something must be done within these next few years to carry us through the coming decade of missile threats from Iran and North Korea. Omitting a medium-term solution in the hope of immediate savings risks greater long-term cost and guarantees greater vulnerability. To be sure, the administration has not restored adequate funding for missile defense, but it is turning a programmatic corner by embracing Congress’s past recommendations. Congress should welcome this pivot, while taking care to provide necessary funding and exercise oversight so that next-generation programs do not preclude

The Heritage Foundation – Washington, D.C. OPINION/ Issue Brief #4183 on Arms Control and Nonproliferation U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: After Ukraine, Time to Reassess Strategic Posture By Michaela Dodge March 27, 2014 Russia recently invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea in blatant disregard of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty. Russia’s willingness to challenge the status quo and its disregard for its arms control obligations have important implications for U.S. nuclear weapons policy. The U.S. can take many steps to improve and strengthen its overall nuclear posture regardless of Russian actions in Ukraine. Russia Is Violating Its Arms Control Obligations The Administration has made many concessions to improve relations with Russia.[1] Some of the most significant concessions are in the New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (New START). Among these concessions are the absence of a strong verification regime, limits on U.S. missile defense options, and mandates that the U.S. shoulder a majority of the nuclear weapons reductions. These conditions have resulted in a treaty that is grossly lopsided in Russia’s favor. In addition, Russian violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty have been widely reported.[2] Russian violations and circumventions of the INF Treaty pose a threat to U.S. allies in Europe due to the undeniable fact that they fall within the range of Russian weapons. It would be unwise to ignore the danger these missiles pose to NATO allies. Improve U.S. Strategic Posture Given Russia’s blatant aggression and open disdain for its arms control obligations and U.S. national interests, Washington should take steps to improve its nuclear posture. The U.S. should:  Withdraw from New START. New START does not provide predictability in U.S.–Russia strategic relations, especially since Russia has launched the most extensive nuclear weapons modernization program since the end of the Cold War while the U.S. allows its nuclear weapons to atrophy.  Withdraw from the INF Treaty. Due to Russian violations, the treaty has lost its relevance and has created a false sense of security in the U.S. Washington should not implement any arms control agreements that Russia has repeatedly violated.  Stop unilateral nuclear weapons reductions. The U.S. is projecting weakness by reducing its own arsenal while Russia builds up its forces. There is a fundamental disparity between U.S. and Russian obligations to international security. The U.S. provides nuclear security guarantees to over 30 countries around the world, while Russia, rather than safeguarding other nations, threatens them instead. It is imperative that the Administration recommit to NATO’s function as a nuclear alliance and sustain and modernize U.S. and NATO forward-deployed systems, including dual-capable aircraft, B-61 tactical nuclear weapons, and dual-capable long-range stand-off missiles.

Issue No.1108, 28 March 2014 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies | Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 35 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama  Modernize U.S. nuclear weapons. U.S. nuclear weapons and delivery systems are aging. The Obama Administration failed to provide the funding it promised prior to New START ratification. In addition, the Budget Control Act is increasing pressure on funding for U.S. weapons systems. Both of these constraints will delay nuclear infrastructure improvements, including further delay of nuclear certifications for the next- generation bomber and the development of the follow-on strategic submarine. These delays increase the overall costs of the programs and leave the U.S. less capable of responding to unexpected developments in the nuclear programs of other nations.  Consider the benefits of yield-producing experiments for the U.S. nuclear weapons program. Conducting very small-scale yield-producing experiments would benefit the science that underpins the program; indeed, China and Russia are already conducting such experiments.[3]  Advance a “protect and defend” strategic posture. At the core of today’s more dangerous world is a fundamental asymmetry between the vaues of the U.S. and the values of its adversaries. While the U.S. values its citizens, economic prosperity, and institutions, U.S. adversaries value leadership survival above all. The U.S. should develop precise means to credibly threaten what its adversaries value and deploy both passive and active defenses to remove the benefits adversaries might gain in attacking the U.S. or its allies.  Re-evaluate its strategic nuclear posture. The Pentagon currently bases its nuclear posture on the notion that “Russia and the United States are no longer adversaries, and prospects for military confrontation have declined dramatically.”[4] In light of Russia’s demonstrated recklessness, this is no longer valid. Toward a Safer World Russia has invaded two countries in the past six years and just this month has illegitimately changed Ukraine’s borders. It is violating its arms control obligations, increasing the role of nuclear weapons in its national security, and extensively modernizing its nuclear forces, including building new nuclear weapons. The U.S. remains the only nuclear weapons state that is not modernizing its nuclear forces. The U.S. should reassess its nuclear weapons posture to better deal with realities of the 21st century. Michaela Dodge is Policy Analyst for Defense and Strategic Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. The author would like to thank Rebecca Robison, a member of the Heritage Young Leaders Program, for her help in writing this Issue Brief. References [1] The Heritage Foundation, “Reset Regret: Heritage Foundation Recommendations,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 3334, August 5, 2011, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/08/reset-regret-heritage- foundation-recommendations. [2] See Michaela Dodge and Ariel Cohen, “Russia’s Arms Control Violations: What the U.S. Should Do,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4150, December 11, 2013, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/12/russia-s- arms-control-violations-what-the-us-should-do. [3] See Michaela Dodge, “Keeping Nuclear Testing on the Table: A National Security Imperative,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2770, February 27, 2013, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/keeping-nuclear-testing-on-the-table-a-national-security- imperative. [4] U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf (accessed March 21, 2014). http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/03/us-nuclear-weapons-policy-after-ukraine-time-to-reassess- strategic-posture

ArmsControlWonk.com OPINION/Commentary A Wobbly Nuclear Order By Michael Krepon 27 March 2014 Five years ago, President Barack Obama was preparing to deliver a speech in Prague calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Nongovernmental organizations, including the Stimson Center, helped with blueprints for getting to zero, and distinguished “formers” were lending their names to the cause. Now these initiatives seem like headlines from a bygone era. The pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons remains an essential complement to nuclear non-proliferation, but this quest cannot be divorced from international relations. President Obama continues to try to reduce nuclear dangers at Nuclear Security Summits and in negotiations with Iran, but progress comes grudgingly. The need of the hour is to prevent further backsliding, not to promote sweeping plans. Aspirations matter, but nuclear arms reduction will occur only as quickly as conditions permit. The numerical top line of force deployments set in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty are in excess of the Pentagon’s needs. They are also in excess of Russian needs, but Vladimir Putin is building up to treaty limits and remains wedded to weapons that have symbolic significance instead of military utility. In all likelihood, US-Russian relations have yet to hit bottom, and it will take time before stabilization occurs and another treaty might be pursued. The second tier of nuclear-armed states isn’t facilitating a global process of arms reductions. What remains of the nuclear forces of Great Britain and France seem divorced from contemporary international relations and immune from the deep cuts that have decimated their conventional power projection capabilities. China and India have been extraordinarily relaxed about strategic modernization programs. (Think of the ramifications if they acted otherwise.) But Beijing and New Delhi are standoffish toward multilateral accords to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons and in no hurry to improve bilateral relations. Their relatively lethargic pace of strategic modernization could be shaken by events in Pakistan, the East China Sea, or elsewhere. The nuclear enclave within Pakistan has competed successfully with India and shows no evidence of reconsidering this pursuit. Its growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile material provide no help against extremist groups that reject the writ of the state. If Pakistan’s “foolproof” nuclear security breaks down in a crisis or limited war with India, or during a long-promised but frequently delayed counter-terrorism campaign, religious zealots could hold the state up for ransom. Then, with the benefit of hindsight, Pakistanis will view their nation’s embrace of easily portable, tactical nuclear warheads and their seven year-long opposition to a treaty cutting off fissile material production as the height of folly. There are bottom-up impediments to nuclear arms reductions, as well. States are hedging their bets against outliers like North Korea and Iran, a Russian Federation that flexes its muscles and a rising China. The usual precincts on Capitol Hill will call for hurrying up strategic modernization programs, inviting repeat performances like the B-1 and the Ground-Based Interceptor. Instead, Washington is now obliged to counter concerns about retrenchment by sloughing off its obsession with deficit reduction and spending more money for defense programs that have actual military and diplomatic utility. Retarding onward proliferation also means reaffirming the nuclear umbrella held above friends and allies, as well as proceeding with sensibly configured, forward-based missile defense programs. After the first US war against Saddam Hussein, the architect of India’s nuclear deterrent, General K. Sundarji, famously remarked that nuclear weapons offered the best defense against the designs of a major power. This observation gained credence in the air campaign against Muammar Qaddafi and now with Moscow’s annexation of Crimea after repossessing the nuclear weapons it left behind when the Soviet Union dissolved. Moscow’s pledge to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity lasted all of two decades.

ABOUT THE USAF CUWS The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University, while extending its reach far beyond - and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON), now AF/A5XP) and Air War College Commandant established the initial manpower and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation . The Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management released a report in 2008 that recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." As a result, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide continuing education through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the Counterproliferation Center in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research to not just countering WMD but also nuclear deterrence. In February 2014, the Center’s name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term “unconventional weapons,” currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. The CUWS's military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation - counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management.