The Pennsylvania State University
The Graduate School
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTORS THAT GOVERN SUCCESS
FOR NEW SAFETY AND HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES IN THE MINING INDUSTRY
AND THE EFFICACY OF THOSE FACTORS TO PREDICT THE LIKELIHOOD
OF SUCCESS FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
A Dissertation in
Energy and Mineral Engineering
by
Jacob L. Carr
© 2019 Jacob L. Carr
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
December 2019
The dissertation of Jacob L. Carr was reviewed and approved* by the following:
Jeffrey L. Kohler Professor of Mining Engineering Undergraduate Program Chair of Mining Engineering Dissertation Adviser Chair of Committee
Shimin Liu Associate Professor of Energy and Mineral Engineering
Sekhar Battacharyya Associate Professor of Mining Engineering
Michael Pate Nationwide Insurance Associate Professor of Agricultural Safety and Health
Mort D. Webster Professor of Energy Engineering Co-Director Initiative for Sustainable Electric Power Systems Associate Department Head for Graduate Education
*Signatures are on file in the Graduate School.
ii
Abstract The mining industry faces many safety and health challenges, and these challenges are often addressed by the introduction of new technologies, many of which are introduced through legislative or regulatory mandates requiring the technology’s use. Many such mandates have been enacted, causing dramatic changes to how work is conducted. Despite these mandates, there are cases in which the intended safety or health benefit of introducing a new technology was not achieved, or worse, cases in which some unintended negative consequence was created by the introduction of a new technology. Given the weighty consequences these mandates can have, both in terms of economic impacts as well as impacts on the safety and health of miners, it is increasingly critical to ensure that the technologies being mandated will achieve their intended benefit without introducing unintended negative consequences. To that end, the goal of the research presented in this dissertation was to identify the factors that govern the success of new safety and health technologies in the mining industry and to develop guidance for the timely and effective introduction of new safety and health technologies through legislative or regulatory mandates. This goal was accomplished through an analysis of several case studies of mining safety and health technology introduction, including mandated as well as voluntarily adopted interventions. For each case study, the development and diffusion of the technology was examined and indications that the technology achieved either a successful or an unsuccessful outcome was identified. Causal tree analysis was then used to identify the root causes for each of these successful and unsuccessful outcomes. The root causes identified for unsuccessful outcomes include, among other factors, the effect of biases on decisions made by researchers, regulators, and legislators. The analysis shows that these root causes lead to consequences including the failure of interventions to deliver their intended safety or health benefit or for new interventions to introduce unintended negative safety consequences. Using these root causes, a bowtie analysis was conducted to identify controls for preventing the enactment of legislative or regulatory mandates requiring the use of immature technologies and to mitigate the negative consequences of the enactment of such a mandate. These controls represent a set of guidelines that can be used to ensure that immature safety and health technologies are not introduced prematurely and that future mining safety and health regulations and legislation are as effective as possible at protecting the safety and health of miners. The implementation of these guidelines will result in more effective regulation, more impactful safety and health research, safer mines, and healthier miners.
iii
Table of Contents List of Figures ...... vii
List of Tables ...... xi
Acronyms and Abbreviations ...... xiv
Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 1
Objectives and Specific Aims ...... 4
Scope of Work ...... 5
Dissertation Format ...... 6
Chapter 2: Background and Survey of Pertinent Literature...... 8
2.1 The Economics of Technological Change ...... 8
2.2 The Effect of Policy on Technological Change ...... 11
2.3 The Assessment of Environmental Control Technologies ...... 12
2.4 The Assessment of Technology Readiness ...... 13
Chapter 3: Methodology ...... 16
3.1 Overall Research Approach ...... 16
3.2 Data Compilation and Consultation with Subject Matter Experts ...... 18
3.3 Identification of Factors that Influence the Success of New Safety and Health Technologies ...... 19
3.4 Development of Strategies to Improve the Likelihood of Success for New Safety and Health Technology Mandates ...... 20
Chapter 4: Case Studies of Safety And Health Technology Introduction to the Mining Industry ...... 24
4.1 Safety Interventions ...... 25
4.1.1: Case 1: Refuge Alternatives for Use in Underground Coal Mines...... 25
4.1.2 Case 2: Self-Contained Self-Rescuers ...... 37
4.1.3 Case 3: Primary Communications and Tracking Systems ...... 48
iv
4.1.4 Case 4: Proximity Detection Systems for Continuous Mining Machines ...... 68
4.1.5 Case 5: LED Cap Lamps...... 72
4.2 Health Interventions ...... 81
4.2.1 Noise Controls and Noise Exposure Regulations ...... 82
4.2.2 Case 6: Noise Controls for Continuous Mining Machines ...... 88
4.2.3 Case 7: Noise Controls for Roof Bolting Machines ...... 96
Chapter 5: Causal Tree Analyses ...... 101
5.1 Causal Tree Analyses for Safety Interventions ...... 103
5.1.1 Causal Tree Analysis for Case 1: Refuge Alternatives ...... 103
5.1.2 Causal Tree Analysis for Case 2: Self-Contained Self-Rescuers ...... 118
5.1.3 Causal Tree Analysis for Case 3: Primary Communications and Tracking Systems ...... 126
5.1.4 Causal Tree Analysis for Case 4: Proximity Detection Systems ...... 141
5.1.5 Causal Tree Analysis for Case 5: LED Cap Lamps ...... 144
5.2 Causal Tree Analyses for Health Interventions ...... 146
5.2.1 Causal Tree Analysis for Noise Controls for Case 6: Continuous Mining Machines ...... 146
5.2.2 Causal Tree Analysis for Noise Controls for Case 7: Roof Bolting Machines ...... 151
5.3 Generalization of Causal Tree Analysis Results ...... 155
Chapter 6: Bowtie Analysis of Mandates for Immature Safety and Health Technologies ...... 164
6.1 Threats and Outcomes Associated with the Enactment of a Mandate for an Immature Safety or Health Technology ...... 165
6.2 Overview of Bowtie Analysis ...... 169
6.3 Discussion of Controls to Prevent the Enactment of a Mandate for an Immature Safety or Health Technology ...... 171
6.3.1: (T1) Biases lead legislators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore indications of technology immaturity ...... 172
v
6.3.2: (T2) Biases lead regulators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore indications of technological immaturity ...... 175
6.3.3: (T3) Biases and political pressures lead researchers to ignore or to understate observed indications of technological immaturity ...... 179
6.3.4: (T4) Despite the best efforts of researchers and developers, effective interventions either cannot be developed or cannot be demonstrated to be effective due to engineering challenges or economic constraints ...... 181
6.3.5: (T5) Biases lead to an acceptance of the status quo with respect to recognized deficiencies in safety and health standards or technologies...... 184
6.3.6: (T6) Cultural forces and cognitive biases among miners lead to a mistrust of new interventions ...... 188
6.3.7: (T7) Biases result in insufficient or poorly designed experiments and (T8) Biases result in insufficient or ineffective review of research ...... 189
6.4 Discussion of Controls to Mitigate the Enactment of a Mandate for an Immature Safety or Health Technology ...... 198
6.4.1: (C1) Intervention does not achieve the intended safety or health benefit ...... 199
6.4.2: (C2) Intervention causes an unintended, negative safety or health consequence ...... 203
6.4.3: (C3) A device that fails to meet the safety and health standard or is otherwise defective is certified and used ...... 204
6.4.4: (C4) Despite effective interventions being available to meet the mandate, there is sustained strong resistance to their use ...... 205
Chapter 7: Guidelines and Recommendations to Improve the Likelihood of Success for New Safety and Health Technology Mandates ...... 208
7.1 Summary of Recommendations ...... 208
7.2 Implementation of Policies to Assess Technology Maturity ...... 210
Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations ...... 229
References ...... 240
vi
List of Figures Figure 1: Generic Causal Tree Analysis Framework ...... 19
Figure 2: Generic bow-tie analysis framework ...... 20
Figure 3: Bow-tie analysis framework as applied in the proposed research ...... 21
Figure 4: Metal-type portable refuge alternative ...... 25
Figure 5: A tent-type portable refuge alternative deployed in the Experimental Mine at the NIOSH facility in Pittsburgh...... 26
Figure 6: Door to a built-in-place refuge alternative constructed in the Experimental Mine at the NIOSH facility in Pittsburgh ...... 26
Figure 7: CSE SR-100 Self-Contained Self-Rescuer ...... 38
Figure 8: Leaky feeder cable...... 49
Figure 9: Conceptual drawing of node-based communications ...... 50
Figure 10: Tag-based tracking concept ...... 52
Figure 11: Tracking tag used in underground coal mines...... 52
Figure 12: Miners' cap lamp assembly from the early 20th century with spring-loaded contacts designed to interupt electric current in the event that the incandescent bulb shattered [174] ...... 73
Figure 13: The Edison Electric Cap Lamp, approved by the Bureau of Mines for use in underground coal mines in 1915 [176] ...... 74
Figure 14: Single sprocket chain conveyor on a continuous mining machine (Source: [228])...... 89
Figure 15: Dual sprocket chain conveyor on a continuous mining machine (Source: [228])...... 89
Figure 16: Dual sprocket conveyor chain with polyurethane-coated flight bars on a continuous mining machine (Source: [228])...... 89
Figure 17: Average noise dose for continuous mining machine operators as reported in the MSHA Noise Samples data set [217] ...... 94
Figure 18: Proportion of noise surveys for continuous mining machine operators for which the PEL dose was above 100% as reported in the MSHA Noise Samples data set [217] ...... 94
vii
Figure 19: Average noise dose for roof bolting machine operators as reported in the MSHA Noise Samples data set [217] ...... 100
Figure 20: Proportion of noise surveys for roof bolting machine operators for which the PEL dose was above 100% as reported in the MSHA Noise Samples data set [217]...... 100
Figure 21: Causal tree analysis for “Judicial intervention and after-rule time extensions occurred in refuge alternatives rulemaking” (See notes in Table 12) ...... 105
Figure 22: Causal tree analysis for “Miners express strong resistance to using refuge alternatives” (portions shown in dashed lines are not shown in their entirety because they would duplicate portions of Figure 21; therefore, only the root causes are shown) ...... 115
Figure 23: Causal tree analysis for "Unacceptably high rate of quality control failures occur for CSE SR-100 self-contained self-rescuers" (See notes in Table 15) ...... 119
Figure 24: Causal tree analysis for "Primary communications and tracking systems are adopted throughout the underground coal mining industry" (See notes in Table 17) ...... 128
Figure 25: Causal tree analysis for "No documented evidence exists showing that tracking systems achieve a material improvement to safety" (See remainders of causal tree in Figure 26 and Figure 27) ...... 134
Figure 26: Causal tree analysis for "Compelling evidence does not exist to indicate that the performance standards, if achieved, will substantially improve the likelihood of successful rescue or escape" (Continues from Figure 25; see notes in Table 19)...... 135
Figure 27: Causal tree analysis for "Compelling evidence does not exist to indicate that the tracking systems in use in the industry meet the performance standards" (Continues from Figure 25) ...... 136
Figure 28: Causal tree analysis for "Electromagnetic interference (EMI) between continuous personal dust monitors and proximity detection systems effectively render the proximity detection system temporarily inoperable" ...... 141
Figure 29: Causal tree analysis for "LED cap lamps are rapidly and voluntarily adopted by mine operators throughout the underground mining industry" ...... 145
Figure 30: Causal tree analysis for "Continuous mining machine noise controls achieve a demonstrated reduction in noise exposure for operators" (See notes in Table 23) ...... 147
viii
Figure 31: Causal tree analysis for "Roof bolting machine noise controls fail to achieve a demonstrated reduction in noise exposure for operators" (See notes in Table 25) ...... 152
Figure 32: Threats contributing to the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature ...... 168
Figure 33: Bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature ...... 170
Figure 34: Left-hand side of bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing threats and preventative controls ...... 171
Figure 35: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Threat 1...... 173
Figure 36: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Threat 2...... 176
Figure 37: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Threat 3...... 181
Figure 38: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Threat 4...... 183
Figure 39: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Threat 5...... 185
Figure 40: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Threat 6...... 189
Figure 41: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Threat 7...... 191
Figure 42: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Threat 8...... 191
Figure 43: Five-stage process of research and reviews associated with each stage ...... 193
ix
Figure 44: Right-hand side of bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing consequences and recovery controls ...... 198
Figure 45: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Consequence 1 ...... 200
Figure 46: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Consequence 2 ...... 204
Figure 47: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Consequence 3 ...... 205
Figure 48: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Consequence 4 ...... 206
Figure 49: Technology Readiness Levels as defined by NASA [257] ...... 212
Figure 50: Sources of uncertainty about technology's readiness at each TRL ...... 223
Figure 51: Risk of unsuccessful outcomes decreases with increasing TRL; relative level of risk for each type of unsuccessful outcome is indicated by the width of the column, which decreases with increasing TRL ...... 225
Figure 52: Recommended TRL definitions for mining safety and health technologies ...... 238
x
List of Tables Table 1: Summary of key guidance provided by MSHA for communications system performance [128] ...... 61
Table 2: Summary of key guidance provided by MSHA for tracking system performance [128] ...... 62
Table 3: NIOSH OMSHR extramural research contracts in the topic area “Emergency Communications and Tracking” (2006 - 2016) [134]...... 64
Table 4: Key dates for proximity detection regulations ...... 70
Table 5: Estimated excess risk of material hearing impairment at age 60 after a 40-year working lifetime exposure to occupational noise for different definitions of material hearing impairment (From [212]) ...... 84
Table 6: Engineering and administrative noise controls considered by MSHA to be technologically and administratively achievable in reducing the noise exposure of miners operating or working around continuous mining machines [229] ...... 91
Table 7: Engineering and administrative noise controls considered by MSHA to offer promise in reducing the noise exposure of miners operating or working around continuous mining machines [24] ...... 92
Table 8: Engineering and administrative noise controls considered by MSHA to be technologically and administratively achievable in reducing the noise exposure of miners operating or working around roof bolters [229] ...... 98
Table 9: Engineering and administrative noise controls considered by MSHA to offer promise in reducing the noise exposure of miners operating or working around roof bolters [24] ...... 98
Table 10: Indicators of a successful safety and health technology introduction ...... 102
Table 11: Indicators of an unsuccessful safety and health technology introduction ...... 102
Table 12: Notes for causal tree analysis for “Judicial intervention and after-rule time extensions occurred in refuge alternatives rulemaking” (See causal tree in Figure 21) ...... 106
Table 13: Identified root causes for “Judicial intervention and after-rule time extensions occurred in refuge alternatives rulemaking” ...... 113
Table 14: Identified root causes for “Miners express strong resistance to using refuge alternatives” ...... 117
xi
Table 15: Notes for causal tree analysis for "Unacceptably high rate of quality control failures occur for CSE SR-100 self-contained self-rescuers" (See causal tree in Figure 23) ...... 120
Table 16: Identified root causes for "Unacceptably high rate of quality control failures occur for CSE SR-100 self-contained self-rescuers" ...... 126
Table 17: Notes for causal tree analysis for "Primary communications and tracking systems are adopted throughout the underground coal mining industry" (See causal tree in Figure 24) ...... 129
Table 18: Identified root causes for "Primary communications and tracking systems are adopted throughout the underground coal mining industry" ...... 133
Table 19: Notes for causal tree analysis for "No documented evidence exists showing that tracking systems achieve a material improvement to safety" (See causal trees in Figure 25, Figure 26, and Figure 27) ...... 137
Table 20: Identified root causes for "No documented evidence exists showing that tracking systems achieve a material improvement to safety" ...... 140
Table 21: Identified root causes for "Electromagnetic interference (EMI) between continuous personal dust monitors and proximity detection systems effectively render the proximity detection system temporarily inoperable" ...... 144
Table 22: Identified root causes for "LED cap lamps are rapidly and voluntarily adopted by mine operators throughout the underground mining industry" ...... 145
Table 23: Notes for causal tree analysis for "Continuous mining machine noise controls achieve a demonstrated reduction in noise exposure for operators" (See causal tree in Figure 30) ...... 148
Table 24: Identified root causes for "Continuous mining machine noise controls achieve a demonstrated reduction in noise exposure for operators" ...... 151
Table 25: Notes for causal tree analysis for "Roof bolting machine noise controls fail to achieve a demonstrated reduction in noise exposure for operators" (See causal tree in Figure 31) ...... 152
Table 26: Identified root causes for "Roof bolting machine noise controls fail to achieve a demonstrated reduction in noise exposure for operators" ...... 154
Table 27: Identified root causes for indications of safety and health technology mandate success...... 155
Table 28: Identified root causes for indications of safety and health technology mandate failure ...... 156
xii
Table 29: Root causes for indications of technology mandate success grouped by groups primarily involved ...... 158
Table 30: Root causes for indications of technology mandate failure grouped by groups primarily involved ...... 159
Table 31: Summary of recommended preventative and recovery controls to prevent and mitigate, respectively, the enactment of a legislative or regulatory mandate for the use of an immature safety or health technology ...... 209
Table 32: TRL definitions used by NASA and DOD as well as a suggested set of definitions for mining safety and health technologies (These scales are identical for TRL 1 through 5 but have minor differences for TRL 6 through 9) ...... 213
Table 33: Guidance for adjusting TRL for a technology that has been developed for and tested in some prior environment and is being adapted to a new environment ...... 215
Table 34: Effects on federal and state legislative bodies of assessing the readiness of safety and health technologies ...... 218
Table 35: Effects on regulatory agencies of assessing the readiness of safety and health technologies ...... 219
Table 36: Effects on research agencies of assessing the readiness of safety and health technologies ...... 220
Table 37: Effects on the mining industry of assessing the readiness of safety and health technologies ...... 221
Table 38: Generalized forms of identified root causes for successful outcomes in case studies of safety and health technology introductions studied...... 232
Table 39: Generalized forms of identified root causes for unsuccessful outcomes in case studies of safety and health technology introductions studied...... 233
xiii
Acronyms and Abbreviations Organizations:
CDC ...... Centers for Disease Control and Prevention CSE ...... Refers to the CSE Corporation DART ...... Division of Applied Research and Technology DHHS ...... Department of Health and Human Services DOD ...... Department of Defense DOE ...... Department of Energy DOL ...... Department of Labor EPA ...... Environmental Protection Agency ESA ...... European Space Agency GAO ...... Government Accountability Office ISO ...... International Organization for Standardization MESA ...... Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration MSA ...... Mine Safety Appliances Company MSHA ...... Mine Safety and Health Administration MSHRAC ...... Mine Safety and Health Research Advisory Committee MSTTC ...... Mine Safety Technology and Training Commission NAS...... National Academy of Sciences NASA ...... National Aeronautics and Space Administration NIOSH ...... National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health NMA ...... National Mining Association NPPTL ...... National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory OMB ...... Office of Management and Budget OMSHR ...... Office of Mine Safety and Health Research OSHA ...... Occupational Safety and Health Administration PMRD ...... Pittsburgh Mining Research Division PRL ...... Pittsburgh Research Laboratory SMRD ...... Spokane Mining Research Division USBM ...... United States Bureau of Mines WVMSTTF ...... West Virginia Mine Safety Technology Task Force
xiv
Other Acronyms and Abbreviations:
ANPRM ...... Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking APA...... Administrative Procedure Act AT ...... Apparent Temperature BACT ...... Best Available Control Technology BIP ...... Built-in-place (referring to a refuge alternative) CDEM ...... Coal Dust Explosibility Meter CFR ...... Code of Federal Regulations CO ...... Carbon Monoxide
CO2 ...... Carbon Dioxide CPDM ...... Continuous Personal Dust Monitor EMC ...... Electromagnetic Compatibility EMI ...... Electromagnetic Interference ERP ...... Emergency Response Plan FACA ...... Federal Advisory Committee Act GNSS ...... Global Navigation Satellite System GPS ...... Global Positioning System HCP ...... Hearing Conservation Plan HTL ...... Hearing Threshold Level IRB ...... Institutional Review Board LAER ...... Lowest Achievable Emissions Rate LAN ...... Local Area Network LED ...... Light-Emitting Diode LIDAR ...... Light Detection and Ranging LiOH ...... Lithium Hydroxide LTFE ...... Long Term Field Evaluation MEMS ...... MicroElectro-Mechanical Systems MF ...... Medium Frequency MINER ...... Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response MSD ...... Musculoskeletal Disorders MWC...... Miner-Wearable Component NFC ...... Near-Field Communication
xv
NLOS ...... Non-Line-Of-Sight NPRM ...... Notice of Proposed Rule Making
O2 ...... Oxygen PAN...... Personal Area Network PDM ...... Personal Dust Monitor PDS ...... Proximity Detection System PEL ...... Permissible Exposure Limit PIB ...... Program Information Bulletin PIL...... Program Instruction Letter PPL ...... Program Policy Letter PRA ...... Paperwork Reduction Act QA ...... Quality Assurance R&D ...... Research and Development RA ...... Refuge Alternative RACT ...... Reasonably Available Control Technology RBLC ...... RACT/BACT/LAER Clearinghouse RADAR...... Radio Detection and Ranging REL ...... Recommended Exposure Limit RFI ...... Request for Information RSSI ...... Received Signal Strength Indicator RFID ...... Radio Frequency Identification SCSR ...... Self-Contained Self-Rescuer SEC ...... Self-Escape Competencies SME ...... Subject Matter Expert TPMM ...... Technology Program Management Model TOF ...... Time of Flight TRA...... Technology Readiness Assessment TRL ...... Technology Readiness Level TRLC ...... Technology Readiness Level Calculator TTE ...... Through-the-Earth TWA ...... Time-Weighted Average UWB ...... Ultra-Wideband
xvi
Chapter 1: Introduction
Mineworkers face some of the most challenging safety and health risks of any industry. Miners work near heavy pieces of machinery and often work in confined spaces. Miners also work in low light conditions and often have high exposures to noise as well as to dust and other respiratory hazards. And miners face the risk of disastrous explosions, fires, or falls of ground that can trap them underground. To address these risks, several technologies have been introduced to the mining industry with the intent of protecting miners’ safety and health.
The Coal Mine Safety Act of 1969 (Coal Act), precipitated by the Farmington Mine disaster in
1968, instituted many new safety and health requirements and led to the introduction of many new technologies to the mining industry. These requirements were later extended to non-coal mines by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act).
December of this year will mark the 50th anniversary of the passage of the Coal Act. In this half- century, conditions at mines have steadily improved, as evidenced by dramatic decreases in the rates of injuries, fatalities, and occupational illness. This improvement has been driven largely by the promulgation of important regulations and the introduction of several new safety and health technologies. However, despite these improvements, significant safety challenges remain for the industry.
In 2006, disasters at the Sago, Darby, and Alma mines led to the passage of the Mine
Improvement and New Emergency Response (MINER) Act of 2006. The MINER Act dramatically expanded the requirements of the Coal and Mine Acts by mandating the implementation of new technologies such as communications and tracking systems, refuge alternatives, and breathing air supply systems. In addition to the new requirements of the MINER
1
Act, mining safety and health requirements have increased over the last decade with new regulations mandating the use of technologies such as proximity detection and personal dust monitors. Still other technologies, such as LED cap lamps, have been voluntarily adopted within the industry without government mandate. In a few instances the improved understanding of health hazards, such as diesel particulate matter, have led to a recognition of the need for technological solutions. New safety and health technologies can either be developed within and specifically for the mining industry, or can be adopted and adapted from other industries.
These technologies are sometimes voluntarily adopted by the industry, but more often, they are widely adopted only after a mandate requiring their use is enacted, either through legislation or regulation. A recent examination of safety and health advances in the mining industry over the last several decades provides some perspective on how new safety and health technologies have been adopted by the industry [1]. For several cases, a new technology was developed and voluntarily adopted by some portion of the industry, but a regulatory or legislative mandate was required to achieve pervasive use. For example, the use of rock dust to prevent deadly mine explosions was adopted by some mines in the 1930s, and rock dust was used in the majority of mines by 1940. However, it was not used in all mines until required by the 1952 Federal Coal
Mine Safety Act.
In other cases, legislative or regulatory mandates completely precede the development and use of the technology. For example, the MINER Act mandated the use of wireless communications and tracking systems for underground coal mines, but, at the time this law was passed, the technology did not exist in a mature form for use by the industry. Such requirements are referred to as “technology-forcing” mandates as they are designed to force the development and diffusion of technologies that do not yet exist. In the case of the MINER Act, the legislation drove
2 research and development of new technologies by their use, by charging federal research agencies with the responsibility of spearheading research and development efforts, and by funding those efforts. As with all safety and health technology mandates, the intent of the
MINER Act was to improve safety and health through the introduction of new technologies.
While the intent of regulatory or legislative mandates is to improve the safety and health of miners, this intent is sometimes not fully achieved because the mandated technology fails to deliver the expected benefit. Worse, the introduction of a new technology can sometimes cause unintended and unexpected consequences that have a negative impact on safety and health. As new technologies continue to be developed and introduced – whether through mandate or through voluntary adoption – it will be increasingly critical to understand why some safety and health technologies achieve success, while others fail to do so. The goal of the research presented in this dissertation is to provide this understanding by identifying the factors that have driven some safety and health technologies to success and prevented others from reaching success.
From these factors, a set of guidelines is presented that can be used to inform the development of future safety and health regulations, to steer the strategic direction of safety and health research, and to ensure that the introduction of new technologies will achieve their intended benefit without introducing some unintended negative consequence.
The guidelines provided in this dissertation build on a deep body of knowledge on the mechanisms by which technology is developed and diffused as well as how those mechanisms can be impacted by laws and regulations. Notably, much has been done by federal agencies such as NASA, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Energy, to assess the readiness of technology for deployment through Technology Readiness Levels. The results of this study demonstrate the applicability of these tools, with some modification, to mining safety and health
3 technology assessment. The results also demonstrate the need for rigorous scientific assessment of safety and health interventions to overcome the effects of biases and maintain objectivity in the regulatory, legislative, and research processes.
By identifying the factors that govern the success of new safety and health technology introduction in the mining industry, this research fills a critical knowledge gap, and by translating these findings into actionable guidelines, this dissertation provides the mining community with a valuable set of tools for ensuring that future safety and health technology introduction efforts achieve success. The implementation of these guidelines will enable the design of effective regulations, which are backed by sound science and which mandate the use of technologies that have been proven to be sufficiently mature. In this way, the use of the information presented in this dissertation will minimize the regulatory burden of new mining safety and health requirements while providing the most effective and proven protections for miners’ safety and health.
Objectives and Specific Aims The research addresses the following objectives:
Objective 1: Test the hypothesis that there exists some set of factors that govern the
success of mandated safety and health technologies in the mining industry
and that these factors can be determined.
Objective 2: Establish a set of guidelines to maximize the likelihood of success for new
safety and health technologies that may be mandated for the mining
industry.
4
These objectives have been accomplished through the achievement of three specific aims:
Specific Aim 1: Identify factors or conditions that have positively contributed to the
success of safety and health technologies in mining.
Specific Aim 2: Identify factors or conditions that have negatively affected the success of
safety and health technologies in mining.
Specific Aim 3: Develop a set of strategies to: (a) reduce the likelihood of a government
mandate being enacted for an immature safety or health technology, and
(b) mitigate the repercussions of the enactment of a mandate for an
immature safety or health technologies.
Scope of Work
The factors identified and the guidelines developed in this research are applicable to all sectors of mining, including both surface and underground mines as well as all mining commodities: coal, metal, non-metal, stone, sand and gravel. However, due to the unique nature and heightened safety concerns of underground coal mining, this sector has seen a disproportionately large number of mandated technologies as compared to the other sectors. Therefore, the data used for this study has necessarily drawn more heavily on case studies from underground coal mining than from surface mining and from non-coal mining. Nonetheless, the findings and conclusions are applicable to all sectors of mining.
5
Dissertation Format
In the following chapters, a study of several cases of safety and health technology introductions to the mining industry will be presented. These cases were used to identify and demonstrate the factors that govern success for new safety and health technologies in mining, and guidelines for the introduction of future safety and health technologies will be presented.
In Chapter 2, background for this study is presented, including an extensive review of the relevant literature on the economics of technological change, the effect of policy on technological change, the assessment of environmental control technologies, and the assessment of technology readiness.
In Chapter 3, a detailed description of study methodology is presented, including an overview of the methods of causal tree analysis and bowtie analysis.
In Chapter 4, several case studies for safety and health technologies are introduced. In this chapter, no analysis or commentary on these cases is provided; rather, this chapter only presents the relevant history of the research, development, diffusion, and regulation of each of the technologies. The chapter is organized into two sections: Safety Technologies (which include case studies for refuge alternatives, self-contained self-rescuers, communications and tracking systems, proximity detection systems, and LED cap lamps) and Health Technologies (which include case studies for noise controls for continuous mining machines and noise controls for roof bolting machines). Each case study is discussed in a sub-section which concludes by identifying indications that the technology introduction achieved either a successful or an unsuccessful outcome.
6
In Chapter 5, causal tree analysis is used to identify the root causes for each of the successful and unsuccessful outcomes identified in Chapter 4. The structure of this chapter mirrors Chapter 4 with the chapter being broken into two main sections – Safety Technologies and Health
Technologies – and each of these main sections being broken into subsections, each of which is dedicated to one case study. Each subsection in Chapter 5 concludes by giving the root causes for the success or failure of the technology introduction. The chapter concludes by combining the results of all of the causal tree analyses to identify a generalized set of root causes for the success or failure of new safety and health technology introductions.
In Chapter 6, the generalized root causes of successful and unsuccessful safety and health technology introductions identified in Chapter 5 are used to conduct a bowtie analysis to develop a set of strategies to prevent the promulgation of legislative or regulatory mandates for technologies that are unlikely to achieve success as well as a set of strategies to mitigate the negative consequences that would be experienced in the event that such a mandate is enacted.
In Chapter 7, a set of guidelines and recommendations for the introduction of new safety and health technologies to the mining industry are presented. These guidelines and recommendations are based on the results of the analysis in Chapters 5 and 6.
Finally, in Chapter 8, conclusions are presented.
7
Chapter 2: Background and Survey of Pertinent Literature
2.1 The Economics of Technological Change To understand the processes through which new technologies are introduced to an industry it is important to understand the economics of technological change. Extensive research has been conducted to understand the economics that drive technological change and how regulatory actions can influence those economics. Foundational work in this field was completed in the first half of the twentieth century when researchers laid out economic theories of technological change [2]. Schumpeter describes three stages in the process through which a new technology is introduced: Invention, Innovation, and Diffusion. Invention refers to the development of a new technology. Through innovation, this new technology is refined into a product that can be commercialized. Finally, the product gradually becomes widely used through diffusion.
Research has been conducted to understand how firms make decisions during each of these stages. A review and summary of some analytical frameworks for developing such an understanding is given in [3]. Models for the invention and innovation stages of technological change can be broadly categorized into two approaches, the first of which is to assume that firms’ decisions regarding funding for research and development (R&D) are governed by an effort to maximize value, and the second of which is to assume that firms base R&D funding decisions not on economic optimization but on some other set of rules, for example a previously established company policy or a set of “rules-of-thumb” [3, 4].
Under the assumption that firms act to maximize value, one can model the output of R&D as
“knowledge capital,” an asset that the firm can use to gain a competitive advantage [5, 6]. In this way, R&D can be viewed as an investment activity; however, there are important peculiarities to this type of investment that differ from investment in tangible assets. These differences include 8 the facts that the uncertainty associated with the outcome of R&D investments is very high, the products of R&D are inherently intangible, and spillover of benefits to competing firms is difficult or impossible to avoid [7]. The impact of uncertainty on R&D investment has been investigated in terms of the implications for funding decisions [8, 9]. When coupled with the inherent intangibility of R&D products, this high level of uncertainty makes it difficult, especially for smaller firms, to secure funding, and may result in underinvestment. The other major difficulty for R&D investment is the fact that spillover of benefits to competing firms is difficult to avoid; in other words, it is difficult to prevent others from somehow making use of the knowledge developed through R&D efforts [10, 5, 11, 7]. This issue of spillover may also have the effect of reducing R&D investments.
If investment in R&D, and thereby in the invention and innovation of new technologies, is viewed as being driven by decisions to maximize the benefits of the generated knowledge capital, it is reasonable to conclude that invention and innovation can be induced by altering the costs through policy and that this induced innovation can be understood from a profit-driven perspective. However, some suggest that industries do not make R&D funding decisions based on optimizing criteria. Rather, the high level of uncertainty and intangibility of R&D outcomes necessitates that firms use a set of established routines or “rules of thumb” to make these funding decisions [12]. If the assumption that R&D funding decisions are based on some economic optimization is removed, then it becomes much more difficult to predict the impact of policy designed to change the costs associated with safety, health or environmental impacts. Some have argued that a new regulation that forces firms to re-evaluate their routine decision-making rules- of-thumb, a “win-win” scenario can arise as the firm both complies with the new regulation and
9 also discovers a more efficient way of doing business [13, 14]. This “win-win” theory has been met with skepticism and contrary findings have been published [15].
Following the invention and innovation of a new product, the gradual process of diffusion begins. Theories to describe the diffusion process can be traced to two influential models. Both models seek to explain the empirically observed S-shaped curve by which the number of adopters grows. Initially only a few users adopt the technology at a slow rate. This is followed by a period of rapid growth and then another slower period as the last few users adopt the technology. This diffusion pattern has been consistently observed and documented for a wide variety of technologies [16].
The first model to explain this pattern is referred to as the probit or rank model and attributes the
S-shaped diffusion curve to differences in the returns received or expected by various potential users [17]. In this model, each user weighs the cost of the new product against the value it is expected to provide. Since new products generally become less expensive as time passes, more potential users will adopt the technology as the price falls below their individual threshold value.
If it is assumed that the value of the product to potential users follows a normal bell-shaped distribution and that the price of the product falls in a smoothly decreasing fashion, this model results in the expected S-shaped curve for diffusion.
An alternate model to explain the S-shaped curve of diffusion is the epidemic model, which ties the diffusion of a product to the dissemination of information about that product [18, 19]. In this model, which considers diffusion to be analogous to the spread of an infectious disease, posits that, as people try the new product, they become a source of information about the product for others in the population. Therefore, as more people adopt the technology, the rate at which
10 information about the product is disseminated increases, and diffusion follows suit. This process is modeled by differential equations that result in the desired S-shaped curve.
2.2 The Effect of Policy on Technological Change A large body of literature exists in the environmental arena dealing with the effect of various regulatory strategies on the invention, innovation, and diffusion of new control technologies.
Some have argued, using industry surveys as evidence, that incentive-oriented policies are more likely to result in technology change through lower compliance costs as compared to prescriptive regulatory approaches [20, 4]. Case studies from the U.S. automotive industry have been used to show that performance-based standards can result in significant induced innovation and diffusion of new technologies [21]. Others have argued, with evidence based on analytical models, that performance-based standards create a disincentive to the adoption of environmentally friendly technologies [22].
Another question is whether technology-forcing regulations are effective. Again, a large body of research exists from the field of environmental regulation. In general, this literature finds that properly designed technology-forcing regulations can be effective at driving technological change and diffusion [23, 21, 24, 25]. However, for these policies to be effective, it is necessary that the government have superior knowledge of the technology, its potential impacts, and the economics of its adoption [4, 26]. This knowledge can be used to strategically push for technologies that are beyond the current capabilities of the industry. If the government is at a knowledge deficit to the industry, it is possible that opponents to regulation can use their superior knowledge to postpone or halt new regulations [27].
11
2.3 The Assessment of Environmental Control Technologies In the regulation of greenhouse gases from stationary sources, standards such as best available control technology (BACT), reasonably available control technology (RACT), and lowest achievable emissions rate (LAER) are used. These standards were promulgated under the Clean
Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7475). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), along with state agencies, use these criteria to determine what air pollution control technology will be used to control specific pollutants. Permits under these requirements are determined on a case-by-case basis by state and local permitting agencies, and the EPA maintains a publicly available database of the decisions [28]. In making the case-by-case decisions about what technologies satisfy the
BACT (or RACT, LAER) requirement, regulatory agencies are required by the Clean Air Act to consider the achievable emission reduction along with cost and to demonstrate that the selected technology is feasible.
The technologies proposed by a firm in air permit applications for a new stationary source of pollution, such as a power plant, for which the BACT standard applies, are evaluated according to a top down methodology [29]. This methodology requires applicants to first identify a list of the available control technologies, often using the online clearinghouse maintained by the EPA.
This list of technologies is then reduced by eliminating technically infeasible options. The remaining technologies are ranked according by control effectiveness, and each technology is evaluated in order of this ranking. The evaluation considers energy impacts, environmental impacts, and cost effectiveness. The technology that is ranked highest in terms of effectiveness that cannot be eliminated based on this evaluation is selected. Guidance for complying with this process are provided by the EPA in the New Source Review Workshop Manual [30]. Attempts at improving the efficiency and ease of this approval process have been made [31, 32].
12
2.4 The Assessment of Technology Readiness In order to evaluate the maturity of a technology for application in the mining industry, it is necessary to have a clearly defined metric that is as objective as possible. Clearly, the desire for such a metric is not unique to mining. In many industries and applications, engineers attempt to evaluate whether a given technology is ready for deployment and use. A commonly used metric is the Technology Readiness Levels (TRL). The TRL constitute a 9-level scale on which technologies and components can be more objectively evaluated.
NASA developed the original Technology Readiness Levels in the 1980s as a means of internally evaluating technologies to be used in space exploration [33, 34]. These TRL definitions were subsequently modified and adopted by several other organizations including the
United States Air Force. A report published by the United States General Accountability Office
(GAO) in 1999 summarized the results of an investigation into the technology development and deployment practices in the Department of Defense (DOD) [35]. This report was critical of the
DOD tendency to take on high levels of risk by promoting emerging technologies with low levels of maturity. To better monitor and control this risk, the GAO recommended that the DOD adopt the use of the TRL system developed by NASA. The DOD’s implementation of TRL is detailed in the guidance provided in the DOD Technology Readiness Assessment Deskbook, first published in 2003 and subsequently updated [36, 37].
Other alternative scales have also been developed by the Department of Energy (DOE) [38], and the European Space Agency (ESA) [39]. More specialized implementations have also been developed, for example to evaluate the readiness of software applications [40]. Note that this is far from a complete list of the numerous implementations of the TRL concept. Many of these
13 implementations are largely the same with the most substantial differences in how they define the environments in which the technologies are to be evaluated.
Aside from the TRL scales themselves, methods of calculating and implementing TRL include the Technology Readiness Level Calculator (TRLC) developed by the United States Air Force
[41], the Technology Program Management Model (TPMM) developed by the United States
Army [42] and the Technology Readiness Assessments used by the DOD and the DOE [43, 37].
The Technology Readiness Assessments and the Technology Readiness Level Calculator are similar in that they give a set of questions that are aimed at addressing different aspects of technological readiness such as feasibility, reliability, maintainability, repeatability, robustness, ruggedness, cost, and existence of a market. For some of the questions, very similar text appears in both the DOD and the DOE guidance documents. However, many of the questions are also highly industry-specific. Given this, it would be problematic to try to directly apply these guidelines to mining safety and health technologies.
Regardless of how the TRL is calculated or exactly which scale is used, there are advantages and limitations to using this method as an assessment tool. The key advantages are that it provides a common language with which the technology status can be clearly communicated, it gives a means of recognizing and managing risks associated with technology transition, and it gives a largely objective measure that can be used to make decisions concerning funding and technology adoption. A NASA study using mission data and pre-mission TRL assessments attempted to quantify the benefits of using TRL in terms of program cost [44]. This study showed that, by reducing uncertainty, the variability of program costs was reduced by 30%. Another study aimed to quantify the economic value of TRAs in the DOD’s funding of technology development
14 projects and in technology acquisition decisions [45]. Although this study did conclude that a positive economic impact is present, insufficient data was available to fully quantify this impact.
Other studies have looked at the limitations and challenges associated with TRL. Through interviews with employees at organizations that use TRL, one study identified challenges and potential pitfalls of the system [46]. These challenges were grouped into three categories: system complexity, planning and review, and assessment validity. Another retrospective study of NASA projects identified challenges with TRL assessment associated with difficulty in setting appropriate cost and performance metrics that can be applied across a broad range of systems and subsystems [47]. All of these challenges underscore the importance of clearly defined guidance on how TRL-based tools can be used. Since no such guidance exists in the mining industry, research is needed to understand the factors that are critical to the success of safety and health technologies in the industry and to develop guidance specifically for mining.
15
Chapter 3: Methodology
3.1 Overall Research Approach Several historical and contemporary examples of new safety and health technologies being introduced to the mining industry have been assembled; this information comes from a variety of sources including research literature, government records, and consultation with subject matter experts. These detailed histories were examined to determine what factors or conditions existed at various points in time and whether these factors positively or negatively impacted the successful introduction of the technology.
Clearly, a definition for success is needed. For the purposes of this study, success of a safety or health technology is understood in terms of performance, diffusion, and expected impact on safety or health. For this study, success is defined by three characteristics:
1. For a safety and health technology to be considered successful, there must be evidence
that the technology, when used in the manner intended and when performing as expected,
will provide a material improvement to the safety or health of workers.
2. There must be evidence that the technology will meet some acceptable level of
performance. This performance level would need to be defined for the technology under
consideration; and defining characteristics of performance are likely to include accuracy,
reliability, robustness, maintainability, interoperability, among others. The performance
level should be selected such that it provides reasonable confidence that the technology
will perform as expected (i.e. that it will provide the intended safety or health benefit and
will not cause deleterious unintended safety or health implications) under a range of
operating conditions.
3. It must be possible to effectively diffuse the technology to a large subset of the industry. 16
Using this definition of success, the historical record of several technologies were examined retrospectively to find evidence of whether the technology has achieved a successful or unsuccessful outcome. Indications that the outcome was successful would include:
• There is documented evidence of an achieved safety or health benefit
• Documented successful trials were performed
• If not mandated, there was wide-spread voluntary adoption
• There is an indication of broad applicability throughout the industry
Indications of an unsuccessful outcome would include:
• There are documented failures of the technology
• The technology’s use introduces a new hazard
• There are low levels of adoption despite demonstrated ability to meet regulatory
standards
• Judicial intervention in rule-making or enforcement occurs
• Miners strongly resist the deployment and use of the technology
• After-rule time extensions occur
In each case, the characteristics of the technology and/or the conditions surrounding the technology that caused or contributed to the successful or unsuccessful outcome was identified.
In determining which factors contribute to or limit success, causal tree analysis was used to determine the root causes of the technology failure or success. Once the root causes for each of the successes and failures were determined, they were categorized into a set of generalized root causes. These generalized root causes were then be used, along with generalized outcomes, to build a bow-tie analysis that provided a means of developing strategies to prevent the enactment
17 of mandates that are likely to be unsuccessful and to mitigate the negative outcomes of such mandates if they are enacted. The development of these strategies draws on the research literature such as previously developed models for technology development and diffusion as well as on evaluation metrics used in other industries such as BACT and TRL.
3.2 Data Compilation and Consultation with Subject Matter Experts For each of the technologies, a thorough review of the research literature was conducted. In addition, government records, such as patents, MSHA product approvals, legislative records, and regulatory records, was reviewed as they relate to the technology. Finally, subject matter experts
(SMEs)1 for each technology were consulted to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the historical account. Based on these reviews, a summary of the history of each technology was written.
For technologies considered successful according to the definitions provided in the previous section, both mandated and voluntarily adopted technologies were included. However, for unsuccessful outcomes, only mandated technologies were considered. This is for two reasons.
The first is that the research aims to capture challenges unique to mandated technologies. The second is to avoid confounding errors due to survivorship bias. In other words, for the case of an unsuccessful safety or health technology that was not mandated, little information is likely to have been recorded. This would lead to an over-weighting of information on technologies for
1 For this research, subject matter experts were selected to be individuals who had both technical expertise in the particular technology being considered as well as direct experience of the development, diffusion, and deployment of that technology. The SMEs selected were employed by federal research and regulatory agencies, academic institutions, and mining companies at the time the events of the case study occurred and were directly involved in these events. The perspectives provided by these individuals was invaluable to understanding the details and nuance of these case studies that are not fully captured in public documents and research literature. 18 which more information just happened to be recorded. By focusing strictly on mandated technologies, the impact of this bias is minimized.
3.3 Identification of Factors that Influence the Success of New Safety and Health Technologies For each of the successful or unsuccessful safety and health outcomes examined, a causal tree analysis was conducted to find the root causes for that outcome. In this method, the outcome is placed at the top of a tree, such as the generic example shown in Figure 1. Direct causes for this outcome are identified and form the second tier of the tree. For each direct cause, intermediate causes are identified, which form the third tier of the tree. This process is continued by adding further tiers until the root causes are found at the bottom of the tree.
Figure 1: Generic Causal Tree Analysis Framework
19
To generalize the findings on the causes of successful outcomes for safety and health technologies in mining, a generalized set of outcomes and a generalized set of root causes for those outcomes were defined. This was accomplished by identifying similarities between the successful outcomes found in each of the root cause analyses. As with the successful outcomes, generalized unsuccessful outcomes for mandated safety and health technologies and generalized root causes for those outcomes were also identified.
3.4 Development of Strategies to Improve the Likelihood of Success for New Safety and Health Technology Mandates For the general case of the failure of a safety or health technology mandate, a bow-tie analysis was performed. Bow-tie analysis is a method typically used to develop mitigation strategies for hazards, such as those found in occupational safety and health. A generic framework for bow-tie analysis is given in Figure 2. This method was adapted for the purposes of this research to develop strategies to minimize the likelihood of unsuccessful outcomes for mandated safety and health technologies in mining. This modified bow-tie analysis framework is given in Figure 3.
Figure 2: Generic bow-tie analysis framework
20
Figure 3: Bow-tie analysis framework as applied in the proposed research At the center of the bow-tie is the hazardous event that occurred. In modified bow-tie analysis framework, the hazardous event is considered to be the promulgation, either through legislation or regulation, of a mandate for a safety or health technology that is not likely to be successful.
The threats that potentially contributed to the event are placed to the left. In the modified framework, these threats are the generalized root causes for the failure of mining safety and health technology mandates. On the right side of the bow-tie are the outcomes. In the modified framework, these are the generalized failures of mining safety and health mandates. With this framework in place, it is possible to identify potential control measures which are intended to prevent the threats from leading to the hazardous event, as well as recovery measures which are intended to prevent the outcomes from occurring if the hazardous event occurs. In the modified framework, the control measures are strategies that are expected to reduce the likelihood that a mandate will be promulgated before the technology is likely to be successful, and the recovery
21 measures are strategies that are expected to mitigate the repercussions in the event that such a mandate is promulgated.
The control measures in the bow-tie analysis (i.e. the strategies to reduce the likelihood that a mandate will be promulgated before the technology is likely to be successful) were developed through a combination of three approaches:
1. Established technology evaluation frameworks, such as BACT and TRL, were
considered, and strategies from these frameworks were applied and adapted as
appropriate.
2. The generalized root causes for successful safety and health outcomes were contrasted
with those for unsuccessful outcomes. Strategies to transform the conditions encountered
in the latter into the conditions encountered in the former were developed.
3. Subject matter experts in mining safety and health were consulted to review strategies
developed by the above two methods and to suggest revisions.
As with the control measures, the recovery measures in the bow-tie analysis (i.e. the strategies to mitigate the repercussions in the event that an unsuccessful safety or health technology mandate is promulgated) were developed through a combination of three approaches:
1. Established technology evaluation frameworks, such as BACT and TRL, were
considered, and strategies from these frameworks will be applied and adapted as
appropriate.
2. The generalized successful safety and health outcomes were contrasted with the
generalized unsuccessful outcomes. Strategies to transform the conditions encountered in
the latter into the conditions encountered in the former were developed.
22
3. Subject matter experts in mining safety and health were consulted to review strategies
developed by the above two methods and to suggest revisions.
The results of the bowtie analysis constitute a set of guidelines to maximize the likelihood of successful outcomes, and minimize the likelihood of unsuccessful outcomes, for new safety and health technology mandates.
23
Chapter 4: Case Studies of Safety and Health Technology Introduction to the Mining Industry
The seven representative cases of new technologies, which informed the analysis of this study, are introduced in this chapter. The interventions presented here include both technologies that were forced to be developed through government mandate as well as technologies that were voluntarily adopted by the mining industry. First, the following five safety interventions will be presented.
Case 1: Refuge alternatives
Case 2: Self-contained self-rescuers
Case 3: Primary communications and tracking systems
Case 4: Proximity detection systems
Case 5: LED cap lamps
Then the following two health interventions examined are presented.
Case 6: Noise controls for continuous mining machines
Case 7: Noise controls for roof bolting machines
For each of these technologies, a thorough review of the research literature and other records has been conducted and is documented in this chapter. From this review, indications of success or failure for each technology have been identified. In Chapter 5, the causes of these indications of success or failure are presented.
24
4.1 Safety Interventions 4.1.1: Case 1: Refuge Alternatives for Use in Underground Coal Mines
A refuge alternative (RA), also referred to as refuge chamber, rescue chamber, refuge shelter, and similar names, is an enclosed place within a mine where miners can go to take refuge and await rescue in the event that they are not able to escape the mine following a disaster such as a fire, an explosion, a major roof fall, or an inundation. Two well-known types of RA are portable
RAs and built-in-place (BIP) RAs. A portable RA is a manufactured unit which can be a rigid steel structure, an inflatable tent deployed from a steel skid, or some hybrid of the two, and is brought into the mine and can be moved as the mine advances. A BIP RA is a room in the mine that is isolated by either one block stopping for an RA in a dead-end entry or by a block stopping at each end for an RA installed in a crosscut. Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 6 show a metal-type portable RA, a tent-type portable RA and the door to a BIP RA, respectively.
Figure 4: Metal-type portable refuge alternative
25
Figure 5: A tent-type portable refuge alternative deployed in the Experimental Mine at the NIOSH facility in Pittsburgh
Figure 6: Door to a built-in-place refuge alternative constructed in the Experimental Mine at the NIOSH facility in Pittsburgh
26
Background on Refuge Alternatives Prior to the Sago Mine Disaster
The concept of providing a safe space within the mine for miners to go in the event of a disaster is not new. Publications by the US Bureau of Mines suggested the concept as early as 1912 [48,
49]. A 1941 Bureau of Mines report described the construction of a built-in-place chamber which was 75ft long by 8ft high by 11ft wide and connected to the surface by two boreholes to provide air, communications, water, and food [50].
Section 315 of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 granted the federal government the authority to require refuge alternatives in underground coal mines:
The Secretary or an authorized representative of the Secretary may prescribe in
any coal mine that rescue chambers, properly sealed and ventilated, be erected at
suitable locations in the mine to which persons may go in case of an emergency
for protection against hazards. Such chambers shall be properly equipped with
first aid materials, an adequate supply of air and self-contained breathing
equipment, an independent communication system to the surface, and proper
accommodations for the persons while awaiting rescue, and such other equipment
as the Secretary may require. A plan for the erection, maintenance, and revisions
of such chambers and the training of the miners in their proper use shall be
submitted by the operator to the Secretary for his approval.
However, this requirement was never enacted or enforced due to concerns about the feasibility of the technology. Rather, the paradigm was that in the event that they were unable to escape a mine disaster, miners should erect a barricade across a dead-end entry by hanging curtain or stacking block in order to create an isolated space.
27
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Bureau of Mines funded a research contract with Foster-
Miller, Inc. to develop guidelines for the design, construction, stocking, and maintenance of refuge alternatives. The contract resulted in guidelines in the following topic areas: breathable air supply, infiltration of harmful gases, chamber pressurization, chamber construction, chamber location, power and lighting, equipment and supplies, communications, psychological aspects, and training [51, 52]. While the use of refuge alternatives was implemented for non-coal mines following a mandate in the 1977 Mine Act, technical challenges prevented their use in coal mines. Therefore, the common practice in coal remained barricading.
The Call for Refuge Alternatives in Response to the Sago Mine Disaster
On January 2, 2006, the Sago mine disaster underscored a need for refuge alternatives. The Sago disaster was unique in that it was unambiguously clear that if an RA had been available, miners would have had a substantially better chance of survival. The miners at Sago were unable to escape the mine and hung a curtain across a dead-end entry; however, this was not sufficient to prevent them from being exposed to toxic levels of carbon monoxide (CO), and 12 of the 13 trapped miners died from exposure to this harmful atmosphere [53, 54, 55].
The public response to the Sago disaster was intense. One factor that contributed to the strong public reaction was the reporting of false statements during the rescue that 12 of the 13 miners had been found alive, when in fact there was only one survivor [56, 57]. But media attention and criticism following the disaster was not only about this unfortunate miscommunication. In the days and months following the Sago disaster, media coverage scrutinized the mine management’s safety record and the government’s role in mine safety and health enforcement.
For example, the New York Times published a pair of editorials on January 5-6, 2006 which called into question the independence and objectivity of mining regulatory agencies, saying that
28
“workers' risks are balanced against company profits in an industry with pervasive political clout and patronage inroads in government regulatory agencies.” The editorials stated that “the Bush administration's cramming of important posts in the Department of the Interior with biased operatives from the coal, oil and gas industry is not reassuring about general safety in the mines” and asserted that the miners “might have survived if government had lived up to its responsibilities” [58, 59]. In addition, several media outlets scrutinized the safety record at Sago and the history of citations and orders issued against the mine by MSHA [60].
Several investigations of the Sago Mine disaster were launched in the days following the disaster. MSHA announced its investigation on January 4, followed by West Virginia which announced that an independent investigation would be headed by Davitt McAteer, former assistant secretary for MSHA under the Clinton Administration [61].
On January 9, Senator Robert Byrd (Democrat from West Virginia), along with Senators Arlen
Specter (Republican from Pennsylvania) and Tom Harkin (Democrat from Iowa), announced that the Labor-HHS Appropriations Subcommittee would hold hearings beginning January 19
(rescheduled to January 21) on the role of the federal government in the Sago disaster [62], saying:
In Congress, there are tough questions to be asked of the federal Mine Safety and
Health Administration. Is enforcement of coal mining regulations tough enough?
Are the regulations on the books today current enough to handle the challenges
posed by 21st century coal mining? Are mine hazards being minimized? These
and other issues demand scrutiny, and the miners' families deserve the answers.
Leading up to these hearings, several members of Congress were quoted questioning whether the government was fulfilling its responsibility to provide miners with a safe place to work [63].
29
Senator Byrd said, "I don't believe that the federal government is doing enough to protect coal miners from future tragedies,” and Senator Jay Rockefeller said, “We need congressional hearings not only so that we can determine what happened at Sago, but, more broadly, about the state of mine safety across West Virginia and across the country. Coal is on the rise in our country and safety must be too.” A letter from a bipartisan group of 12 senators requesting a series of budget hearings on budget and staffing levels for MSHA said, "We look forward to sending strong, bipartisan mine safety legislation to the president for his signature before the end of the year. The miners who died at Sago deserve no less."
Given the miscommunication of the number of survivors reported to the media, the media scrutiny of the mines safety record and the role of the government in enforcing safety standards, and the attention from Congress, it is understandable that there was a strong public outcry for stronger mine safety regulation. Since the nature of the accident was such that it was clear that the miners would have had a significantly better chance of survival if a refuge alternative had been available, this outcry was, in large part, for legislation or regulation requiring refuge alternatives.
Legislative Actions Following Sago
Days before the Senate hearings on Sago began and in the midst of intense public and media attention, another mine disaster occurred on January 19, 2006 when a belt fire at the Aracoma
Alma Mine killed two miners. In the following week on January 25, MSHA issued a Request for
Information (RFI) to gather public input on “Underground Mine Rescue Equipment and
Technology.” Another week later, on February 1, Senator Byrd introduced the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 2006, which was not enacted but contained several elements eventually incorporated into the MINER Act.
30
At the end of March, the comment period on MSHA’s RFI ended, having gathered information from several companies and organizations who represented refuge chamber technology as feasible with minimal development required.
Shortly thereafter on May 16, Senator Michael Enzi introduced the MINER Act. Four days later on May 20, a disaster at the Darby Mine No. 1 killed 5 miners, and four days after Darby, the
MINER Act passed the Senate. The Act also moved very quickly through the House of
Representatives, passing on June 7. A week later, on June 15, 2006, President George W. Bush signed the MINER Act into law.
The rapid pace with which these actions were completed was undoubtedly fueled by the political and social pressure to respond to the disasters at Sago, Alma, and Darby. The rapid succession of events also makes it clear that it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to properly evaluate claims on feasibility and technology readiness submitted to the RFI and provided at hearings.
The MINER Act that NIOSH conduct “research, including field tests, concerning the utility, practicality, survivability, and cost of various refuge alternatives in an underground coal mine environment, including commercially-available portable refuge chambers,” and to provide a report to Congress on the results of this research within 18 months. (Section 13)
Research on Refuge Alternatives Following the MINER Act
In accordance with the MINER Act mandate, the NIOSH Office of Mine Safety and Health
Research (OMSHR) began conducting research on refuge alternatives and provided a report to
MSHA in December of 2007 [64, 65, 66]. This research included testing on four portable refuge alternatives. Shortcomings were identified with these RAs having to do with heat dissipation, time to deploy, and ability to maintain CO2 concentration at the suggested level. NIOSH
31 considered these deficiencies to be “sufficiently serious in three of the chambers to require correction before deployment.”
All of the RAs tested had been approved by West Virginia based on representations of the manufacturers and certification by professional engineers. The fact that serious deficiencies in these RAs led NIOSH to conclude that “computational models and other engineering analyses alone cannot be relied upon for approval and certification of complex systems such as refuge chambers. The results of the testing indicate the need for independent evaluations and testing beyond the chamber manufacturers.” Yet, at this time, no guidance for such independent testing and certification existed [64].
The NIOSH report to Congress concluded that although “some commercially available portable chambers have operational deficiencies that will delay their deployment in mines” and although
“there are some remaining knowledge or technology gaps for the design and specification of refuge alternatives” that “the benefits of refuge alternatives and the general specification of these alternatives are sufficiently known to merit their commercialization and deployment in underground coal mines.” However, this report also acknowledged the rapidly changing state of the art for refuge alternatives by recommending that “any regulations on the specification, location, and conditions of use for refuge alternatives should accommodate the rapidly changing state of knowledge and technology.” [64]
In addition to intramural research, NIOSH also contracted with Foster-Miller, Inc. to conduct a study that concluded in 2007 to develop guidelines for design, deployment, and use of RAs [67,
68]. This report demonstrated a potential benefit of RAs by estimating the potential number of lives that may have been saved in past mine disasters had an RA been available. While this report provided guidance for technical topics such as heat mitigation, atmosphere management,
32 and explosion survivability, it also highlighted the need for further research to fully understand the safety implications of these design elements.
MSHA Regulation on Refuge Alternatives
On June 16, 2008 MSHA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for a refuge alternatives regulation. Public comments were sought and four public hearings were held on July
29, July 31, August 5, and August 7, 2008 in Salt Lake City, UT, Charleston, WV, Lexington,
KY, and Birmingham, AL, respectively [69]. After the comment period on this proposed rule closed on August 18, MSHA acted very quickly to finalize the rule on December 31, 2008 [70].
As with the passage of the MINER Act, the promulgation of this regulation proceeded unusually rapidly as compared to the timelines typically seen for other safety and health regulations, indicating the political pressure under which decisions were being made.
After the promulgation of this rule, legal actions were taken due to industry objections to the rule’s requirements. Most notably, on October 26, 2010, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in response to objections that MSHA had not provided adequate justification for the requirements of the rule, issued a decision requiring MSHA to re-open the record on the regulation in order to provide interested parties to provide further input [71]. In August of 2013, based on this ruling,
MSHA re-opened the record [72] and issued an RFI [73] requesting “data, comments, and information on issues and options relevant to miners’ escape and refuge that may present more effective solutions than the existing rule during underground coal mine emergencies,” stating that responses to the RFI would “assist MSHA in determining if changes to existing practices and regulations would improve the overall strategy for survivability, escape, and training to protect miners in an emergency.”
33
The comment period for this RFI was originally set to run through October 7, 2013; however, due to lingering questions about the safety of RAs and in anticipation of results from ongoing research, multiple extensions were issued extending the deadline for comment submission to
December 6, 2013 [74], then to June 2, 2014 [75], then to October 2, 2014 [76], and finally to
April 2, 2015 [77]. Among the questions that drove these extensions were the buildup of heat and humidity within the RA, the ingress of CO and other contaminants when miners entered the RA, the explosion survivability of RA doors, valves, and other components, and the emergence of new technologies related to communications, breathable air delivery, heat mitigation, and other factors. Following the RFI closing, the record was again reopened on September 18, 2015 to schedule a public meeting on October 19, 2015 at the MSHA National Mine Health and Safety
Academy in Beaver WV to discuss these and other remaining questions [78], and in November of 2015, the RFI was once again re-opened until January 15, 2016 to allow comments stemming from this public meeting [79].
The legal challenges to the requirements of this regulation and the repeated re-opening and extending of the rulemaking process are indications that the mandate for refuge alternatives had limited success.
Refuge Alternatives Training
In addition to research on the engineering performance of RAs, NIOSH and others also conducted extensive research to provide guidance on training for RAs. This is of particular interest as it pertains to the voiced forceful reluctance of many miners to utilize an RA in the event of an emergency.
34
Investigations by the Mine Safety Technology and Training Commission (MSTTC), the West
Virginia Mine Safety Technology Task Force (WVMSTTF), the Government Accountability
Office (GAO), and others to assess coal miners’ readiness to self-escape, which identified multiple deficiencies in the availability and effectiveness of training [80, 81, 82, 83, 53]. A later report in 2013 from the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) identified similar deficiencies
[84].
NIOSH has conducted research on the self-escape competencies (SEC) that are needed by miners to successfully escape a mine disaster. A reasonably comprehensive list of these competencies was published in [85] and includes items such as “Realistic expectations about using refuge chambers,” “Where to find refuge chambers,” “How to use refuge chambers,” and “when to use refuge chambers,” as well as similar competencies related to SCSRs. A study published by
NIOSH in 2015 provided guidance on ways to improve mine workers’ SEC, recommending that rigorous assessments of SEC are needed, that better evaluation tools are need to aid these assessments, and that debriefing practices following training need to be improved [86]. Both
NAS and NIOSH concluded that SECs for which miners may need better training include competencies related to refuge alternatives and SCSRs [84, 86].
Recommendations for training regarding refuge alternatives, as well as training programs published by NIOSH and MSHA, advise that refuge alternatives should be used as a last resort in the event that self-escape is not possible due to all means of egress being blocked or injury or, if the design and deployment of the refuge alternative permits it, as a way station to rest, communicate with the surface, or switch over SCSRs during self-escape [87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92].
NIOSH has also published similar guidance for RA manufacturers to use in the development of their instructional materials [93].
35
The fact that training advises miners to use RAs as a last resort may help to explain the commonly observed reluctance of miners to utilize this technology; however, the reasons that a miner would or would not enter an RA undoubtedly vary from person to person. As one NIOSH training program put it, “In the end, it boils down to where they place their most faith – in the mine rescue team’s ability to come get them or in their ability to make it out on their own” [87].
Indications of Technology Success or Failure for Refuge Alternatives
Although refuge alternatives are now common within the underground coal mining industry, there are indications that the regulatory mandate for their use has not achieved as much success as it could have. These indications include judicial intervention in rulemaking and after-rule time extensions. In addition, there is strong resistance to the deployment and use of the technology by miners; however, it is possible that this is due at least in part to miners being trained to only use
RAs as a last resort or as a way station during escape.
An analysis of these indications of technology mandate failure is presented in Section 5.1.1.
36
4.1.2 Case 2: Self-Contained Self-Rescuers Background on Self-Contained Self-Rescuers and Regulatory Requirements
Since June 21, 1981, coal mine operators have been required to make a self-contained self- rescuer (SCSR) available to each person who enters an underground coal mine in the United
States (30 CFR 75.1714). After the Sago Mine disaster, an emergency temporary standard increased the requirement to two hours of breathable air per miner, and the MINER Act of 2006 added the requirement for an additional two hours of breathable air to be kept in caches at a distance of no further than an average miner could walk in 30 minutes from the deepest working area of the mine along the escapeway to the surface.
SCSRs provide breathable air by recirculating exhaled air through a chemical bed that produces oxygen (O2) and absorbs exhaled carbon dioxide (CO2). The CSE SR-100, shown in Figure 7, was approved jointly by NIOSH and MSHA as a one-hour SCSR on February 23, 1989 based on
42 CFR Part 84 (approval number TC-13F-0239). The SR-100 provides about 100 liters of usable oxygen and has a rated duration of 60 minutes. Potassium superoxide (KO2), a yellow solid that turns grey as it is reacted, is used as the oxygen-producing chemical bed. It is a yellow solid but turns a dark grey as it is reacted. In addition, Lithium hydroxide (LiOH), a white solid, is also used to absorb carbon dioxide.
A starter oxygen cylinder is used to activate the SR-100 unit and start the reaction. This is done by pulling an actuator tag attached to the cylinder. Miners are advised that, once donned, the
SCSR should not be removed for any reason until safety is reached or until the oxygen supply is completely depleted. Daily visual inspections are required to detect damage to the unit, and more rigorous inspections are required every 90 days.
37
Figure 7: CSE SR-100 Self-Contained Self-Rescuer
The Response to the Sago Mine Disaster with Regard to Self-Contained Self-Rescuers
In the previous section on refuge alternatives, the public and legislative response to the Sago,
Alma, and Darby mine disasters was described. Much of the discussion there also applies to
SCSRs. As with RAs, it was very clear that more effective SCSRs or better knowledge on the part of miners on how to use SCSRs could have significantly improved the miners’ chances for survival at Sago. The apparent deficiencies of the SCSRs at Sago were poignantly described in a letter by the sole survivor of the miners trapped at Sago, Randal McCloy Jr., published in the
Charleston Gazette-Mail on April 26, 2006 [94]:
[T]he mine filled quickly with fumes and thick smoke and … breathing conditions
were nearly unbearable. The first thing we did was activate our rescuers, as we
had been trained. At least four of the rescuers did not function. I shared my
rescuer with Jerry Groves, while Junior Toler, Jesse Jones and Tom Anderson
38
sought help from others. There were not enough rescuers to go around. … The air
was so bad that we had to abandon our escape attempt and return to the coal rib,
where we hung a curtain to try to protect ourselves. … The air behind the curtain
grew worse, so I tried to lie as low as possible and take shallow breaths. While
methane does not have an odor like propane and is considered undetectable, I
could tell that it was gassy… There was just so much gas. We were worried and
afraid, but we began to accept our fate… As time went on, I became very dizzy
and lightheaded. Some drifted off into what appeared to be a deep sleep, and one
person sitting near me collapsed and fell off his bucket, not moving. It was clear
that there was nothing I could do to help him.
The report on the West Virginia investigation of Sago, published on December 11, 2006 confirmed that CO exposure was the cause of death and provided information on the SCSRs recovered from the mine [54]. Seventeen (17) SCSRs used by the miners were recovered from the mine, in addition to several SCSRs carried into the mine by the rescue teams. The investigators, and NIOSH researchers who performed evaluations of the SCSRs, were unable to estimate the oxygen production of the recovered units. Estimates of the remaining oxygen- producing capacity of a deployed SCSR depend on an estimate of how much potassium superoxide is remaining unreacted in the unit. This can be completed by a visual inspection, which is a subjective estimate completed by comparing the approximate quantity of unreacted material (which is yellow in color) to the approximate quantity of reacted material (which appears pale yellow or white in color). An alternative test is to grind the entire recovered chemical into a homogeneous batch, then add portions of that batch to a liquid catalyst which releases the oxygen from the unreacted material. Neither test gives an accurate estimate of the
39 oxygen production of the unit because neither test takes into account decreased air flow that can occur during use due to particles fusing or becoming coated. In addition, after use, the units continued to be exposed to the atmosphere, which would cause slight continued depletion of the chemical bed [54].
The West Virginia investigation also discussed interviews conducted with miners who survived the Sago disaster. A total of 33 persons were underground after the explosion for a period of time sufficient to be exposed to harmful gases. Of these, 15 donned SCSRs that operated adequately,
14 chose not to don their SCSRs, 4 SCSRs were reported as not functioning properly, and 1 miner was injured such that he could not have donned an SCSR [54]. In these interviews, several miners indicated that they chose not to use their SCSRs while others said that they removed
SCSRs to talk or because breathing was difficult.
The MSHA investigation report from Sago, published on May 9, 2007 [55] provided similar and further findings. SCSRs recovered from the mine were visually inspected. However, in most cases, it was impossible to determine whether the units would have passed the normal daily inspections before the disaster due to the fact that the units had been opened and the conditions of seals, the moisture or temperature indicator, and security bands could not be assessed.
Interviews with miners and mine records indicated that several of the miners did not have required training and that inspections either were not performed or were not documented [55].
Also of note in the MSHA investigation was that miners reported difficulties in using the SCSRs.
Miners indicated difficulty opening the units, including one miner who stated that he had to use channel locks to open his unit. Miners indicated that they had to perform the manual start procedure to activate their SCSR, but it was not clear whether this was due to failure of the starter oxygen or some other cause [55].
40
While the public reaction to the disasters of 2006 was intense and called for stronger mining safety and health rules, the changes in rules regarding SCSRs were fairly mild as compared to the changes for RAs, communications systems and tracking systems, which were technology- forcing mandates. The rules for SCSRs, on the other hand, were not changed in the form of a technology forcing mandate. An emergency temporary standard increased the requirement to two hours of breathable air per miner, and the MINER Act added the requirement for an additional two hours of breathable air to be kept in caches.
Identification of Issues Related to Quality Control and Manufacture
On February 26, 2010 the NIOSH National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory (NPPTL) published a public notice stating that NIOSH and MSHA had opened a joint investigation concerning a problem that CSE had identified and reported to NIOSH with the SR-100 [95]. CSE had discovered that one lot of SCSRs delivered less than expected oxygen. Analysis by NIOSH revealed that up to 1% of the units in the lot may have oxygen starter problems, and it was suspected that a total of 4071 units may have been affected. At this time, MSHA and NIOSH advised mine workers that to immediately don another SCSR in the event that the breathing bag in their SCSR did not inflate and to perform the manual start procedure in the event that a second
SCSR was unavailable. Mine operators were advised to make backup SCSRs available to all underground workers.
On May 10 of the same year, a press release from CSE stated that CSE was investigating the starter oxygen issue and that “until the root cause can be identified, we must assume that the potential for start-up oxygen cylinders to fail may extend to any field deployed unit, and not just the serial numbers that were previously identified.” [96]
41
A public notice from NPPTL on June 23 provided an explanation for why NIOSH’s Long Term
Field Evaluation (LTFE) Program had failed to identify the starter oxygen issue because starter oxygen failures in the LTFE had been attributed to environmental factors rather than to manufacturing defects [97]. However, the starter oxygen failures reported by CSE had been observed during an in-process quality control check conducted during production. The NIOSH notice stated that “while there is still information to suggest that environmental factors may increase the likelihood of these failures, the new information from CSE placed the source of the observed failures back to the point of manufacture.” On the same day, NPPTL also published a notice that the failure was expected to extend beyond the initial suspect production lot and that
CSE had stopped production of the SR-100 pending identification of the failure mode and the identification of a resolution [98].
On September 29, 2010 NPPTL announced that beginning in October 2010, NIOSH and MSHA would begin collecting and testing a sample of 500 SR-100 SCSRs using a quality assurance
(QA) approach to quantify the prevalence of failed oxygen starter problems among field- deployed units [99]. The sampling and testing protocol to be used for this test, which was designed to provide an adequate sample size to enable statistically significant conclusions, was published on the same day [100].
NPPTL planned to complete the collection and testing of the 500 SR-100 units by the end of
December 2010 [101]. However, by the end of the year, only 80 of the 500 units had been collected and tested [102]. Among those 80 units, no failures were observed. Difficulty in obtaining more units was attributed to reluctance of mine operators to voluntarily provide units because replacement units were difficult to obtain. Therefore, NIOSH began offering replacement units from other manufacturers to replace the SR-100 units collected for testing.
42
On February 15, 2011 NPPTL published that 109 of the 500 units collected and tested and that one (1) failure had been observed among those units [103]. By May 17, 2011, NPPTL had collected and tested 269 of the 500 units [104]. Of those 269 tests, four (4) failures had been observed, which was sufficient to conclude that the failure rate could not be assured to be less than 1%. On July 29, 2011 NPPTL announced that sample collection and testing of all 500 units was completed and that five (5) failures had been observed [105]. Per the protocol published in
September 2010, this was used to calculate the Limiting Quality level as greater than 1.25% and less than 2% using ANSI/ASQC Standard Q3-1988 [106]. This was judged by NIOSH to be an unacceptable failure rate for long-term deployment [105]. Plans for an orderly phase-out of the
SR-100 began to be developed at this time. Detailed results of tests were published in April,
2012 [107].
Also in April of 2012, NPPTL announced the phase-out of the SR-100 [108]. OSHA required units in use for non-mining applications to be removed from service no later than May 31, 2012
[109], while MSHA required units that were worn or carried by miners or stored on mantrips to be replaced with any other approved one-hour SCSR by April 26, 2013 and all units to be replaced by December 31, 2013 [110, 111].
Prior Failure to Prevent Quality Control Issues
Following the identification and quantification of the starter oxygen quality control issue with the CSE SR-100, questions around why prior evaluations of the SCSR failed to predict this problem.
43
NIOSH had conducted long-term evaluations of field-deployed SCSRs, including the CSE SR-
100 under the Long Term Field Evaluation (LTFE). As far back as 1990, this testing of the SR-
100 revealed performance issues [112], notably including the identification of manufacturing defects with the oxygen starter bottles: “Several units did not have oxygen in the starter bottles requiring cold starts. In one heat-treated unit to be treadmill tested, the human test subject chose not to continue when the oxygen level fell below 16%. It was later determined that the burst disk was defective and that the venting of the oxygen was not a result of the heat treatment.”
However, the significance of the manufacturing defects were minimized by stating that the issues had been resolved: “Laboratory environmental testing of the SR-100 has uncovered a manufacturing defect in the burst disk of the oxygen starter bottle and a design problem with the desiccant bag. Both of these problems have been corrected by the manufacturer.” The researchers concluded that the design and manufacture of the units was satisfactory and that, if properly maintained and inspected, that they could be relied upon, stating, “The major problem is predicted to be not with the apparatus, but with training the user to inspect properly the apparatus.”
A later NIOSH study from 1992 specifically noted quality control problems [113]: “A number of quality control problem were discovered in the long-term field evaluation. These problems were reported to NIOSH, MSHA, and the breathing apparatus manufacturers. In each case, action has been taken to solve the problems.” Despite specifically recognizing quality control problems, the report concludes that the primary issue is with degradation of the units in the field rather than with manufacture, stating that the “results of this study suggest that the large majority of SCSR’s that pass their inspection criteria can be relied upon to provide a safe level of life support capability for mine escape purposes.”
44
Nearly identical wording appears in reports from 1994 [114] (“The results of this study suggest that the large majority of SCSR’s that pass their inspection criteria can be relied upon to provide a safe level of life support capability for mine escape purposes.”), 1996 [115] (“The results of this fifth-phase SCSR test study at PRC suggest that the large majority of SCSR's that pass their inspection criteria can be relied upon to provide a safe level of life support capability to allow miners to escape safely during a mine emergency. However, the mining environment appears to have caused some performance degradation in the CSE SR-100.”), 2000 [116] (“The results of this sixth-phase SCSR test study at PRL suggest that the large majority of SCSRs that pass their inspection criteria can be relied upon to provide a safe level of life support capability to allow miners to escape safely during a mine emergency. However, the mining environment seems to have caused some performance degradation in the CSE SR-100 and the MSA Portal-Pack.”), and
2002 [117] (“The results of this study suggest that the large majority of SCSRs that pass their inspection criteria can be relied upon to provide a safe level of life support capability for mine escape purposes. However, the mining environment seems to have caused some performance degradation in the CSE SR-100, Draeger OXY K-Plus, and Ocenco M-20.”).
In 2006, the eighth and ninth phase results of the LTFE were published [118]. This was published after the Sago Mine disaster and after the passage of the MINER Act and included a more direct description of the failures observed with the CSE SR-100:
The results of this study suggest that some performance degradation was
observed. The CSE SR-100s exhibit problems with CO2 levels exceeding 4%
(65% of all units tested, with 29% of these occurring before 60 minutes); stuck-
together breathing hoses (19%) which were prone to tear; starter-O2 failure
(16%); breathing hose punctures and tears (9%); breathing pressures exceeding
45
+200 mm H2O or -300 mm H2O (36%); and loose particles in the breathing hose
(31%). The loose particles caused coughing in all human-subject tests.
Similar results and wording was also included in the publication of the tenth phase results of the
LTFE in 2008 [119]:
The results of this study suggest that the large majority of SCSRs that pass their
inspection criteria can be relied upon to provide a safe level of life support for
mine escape purposes. However, the mining environment seems to have caused
some performance degradation in all the apparatus to some degree. The CSE SR-
100 is exhibiting problems of CO2 exceeding 4% (66%), stuck-together breathing
hoses (11%), starter-O2 failure (16%), breathing hose punctures and tears (4%),
breathing pressures exceeding +200 mm H2O or -300 mm H2O (31%), and loose
particulates in the breathing hose (23%). The loose particulates caused coughing
in human-subject tests.
Despite the repeated identification of performance and quality control issues with the SR-
100 over the course of nearly two decades, the quality control issues with the oxygen starter bottles that was reported by CSE in 2010 and eventually led to the discontinuation of the SR-100 were apparently not recognized. This appears to be due to the propagation of the alternative explanation that performance issues with the units were solely due to degradation of the units in the field. In addition, the importance of previous observations of manufacturing defects were discounted by considering the issued solved by the manufacturer. Finally, the LTFE testing did not utilize statistically driven experimental design and sampled an insufficient number of units to identify the issues of the sort identified in the 2010-2011 test of 500 SR-100 units.
46
Indications of Technology Success or Failure for Self-Contained Self-Rescuers
The unacceptably high level of quality control problems with the CSE SR-100 SCSR represents a documented failure of the technology, which is an indication of a failure of the mandate for the use of SCSRs. In this case, the failure appears to lie in the testing and certification of the technology rather than in the mandate itself.
An analysis of this indications of technology mandate failure is presented in Section 5.1.2.
47
4.1.3 Case 3: Primary Communications and Tracking Systems Primary Communications Technologies
There are four main types of communications systems used in underground coal mines [120,
121, 122]:
1. Leaky feeder
2. Wired node-based
3. Wireless node-based
4. Medium frequency (MF)
5. Through-the-earth (TTE)
Leaky feeder systems have a long history in mining and tunneling applications [123]. Leaky feeder cable, as shown in Figure 8, is a coaxial-type cable designed to radiate a portion of the signal through a holes in its shielding, acts as a distributed antenna as well as a transmission line.
In this way, two-way communication signals are allowed to enter and exit the cable and to propagate along the cable as needed. Coverage of a leaky feeder system depends is limited to the areas of the mine where the leaky feeder system is run; however, it is possible to extend coverage using antennas branching off from the leaky feeder line [122].
48
Figure 8: Leaky feeder cable
Node-based systems, also referred to as wireless-mesh systems, are formed from a number of network nodes distributed throughout the mine. These nodes communicate with each other either wirelessly (wireless node-based system) or through wires (wired node-based system). Regardless of whether the communication between nodes is wired or wireless, the communication from a node to the handheld radios is wireless. This is shown conceptually in Figure 9.
49
Figure 9: Conceptual drawing of node-based communications
Leaky feeder and node-based communications systems are the sometimes referred to as
“primary” communications systems. This indicates that these systems are used on a day-to-day basis as the primary means of communication within the mine. In contrast, “secondary” communication systems, including medium frequency and through-the-earth systems, are not intended for routine day-to-day communications. Rather, these secondary systems are intended to provide an alternative means of communication in the event of an emergency. For this chapter, only primary communications system will be discussed.
Tracking Technologies
Tracking systems that are either commercially available or under development for underground coal mines today operate using the following technologies [124]:
• Active Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
50
• Local area network (LAN)
• Personal area network (PAN)
• Passive RFID
• Inertial MicroElectro-mechanical systems (MEMS)
• Ultra-wideband (UWB)
• Near-field communication (NFC)
RFID tracking systems utilize RFID tags, most commonly battery-powered active tags, and
RFID readers which measure the strength of the signals received from each uniquely identified tag. Received signal strength indicator (RSSI) methods are used to determine the position of the reader relative to nearby tags. Alternatively, rather than using RSSI, a zone-based RFID system can be implemented in which the system does not determine a precise location of the reader and only reports the position of the nearest tag. Since leaky feeder communications systems do not typically have the capability of providing tracking information, RFID systems are often used with leaky feeder installations. Tag-based tracking is shown conceptually in Figure 10, and an example of the tags used in mines is shown in Figure 11.
51
Figure 10: Tag-based tracking concept
Figure 11: Tracking tag used in underground coal mines
52
In contrast, a node-based communications system can be designed to also provide tracking information. These systems can be configured as either local area networks (LAN) or personal area networks (PAN) and either RSSI or time of flight (TOF) methods are used to determine positions based on the signal strength received by the handheld radio, eliminating the need for separate tracking hardware.
The two technologies described above represent the vast majority of installed tracking systems in underground coal mines. However, other technologies have been trialed or are under development, including passive RFID (in which passive RFID tags are used and a reader is carried by the miner), inertial MEMS (which uses miniaturized inertial sensors – gyroscopes and accelerometers – in a wearable device to continuously track and integrate the movement of the miner), ultra-wide band, and near-field communication.
Public and Political Response to Mine Disasters of 2006
Following the Sago, Alma, and Darby mine disasters in 2006, the public response and political response was to call for increased mine safety and health regulation. This was discussed in the preceding sections as it relates to refuge alternatives and SCSRs, and much of the discussion for these technologies also applies to communications and tracking systems. As with RAs and
SCSRs, it was clear, especially after the Sago disaster, that if the mine had a wireless communications and tracking system, it likely would have greatly increased the miners’ chance of rescue. In the months following Sago and as Alma and Darby occurred, the push from the public and from lawmakers was that communications and tracking systems should be required, with the rationale being that, if is possible in other industries, it should be possible in mining.
53
Following the Sago and Alma mine disasters, and before the passage of the MINER Act MSHA issued an RFI requesting information on technologies that could improve mine escape and rescue, which included technologies to track the location of miners before or after an accident
[125]. The views of several key stakeholders are well documented in congressional hearings as well as in the responses to this RFI. The responses to this RFI can be found on MSHA’s website
[126].
In response to the RFI, NIOSH noted that additional research would be needed to provide survivable communications systems [126]: “Research will be needed to harden this type of equipment, develop reliable redundant transmission paths, and provide intrinsically safe backup power solutions.” NIOSH also commented that “miner tracking is an additional communications research need; existing systems do not pinpoint miner location or function if mine power is lost.
Research is needed to develop systems that rescuers can use to quickly locate miners, especially those that are not able to communicate.”
Several coal operators commented that the technology is not mature enough to be put into use without further research and development. For example, San Juan Coal Company stated [126] that “improving the capability of knowing where miners are located during the shift would be desirable. Some primitive systems are available now that would provide limited information about when people passed a certain point and if they had passed another beacon somewhere else in the mine. Their ability to pinpoint miner’s locations is extremely limited at this time.”
Similarly, CONSOL Energy said [126], “The coal mining industry has been presented recently with a plethora of communications technologies purported to provide improved in-mine communications and tracking capabilities. Many proposals are merely conceptual and most others are unproven in this nation’s prevalent and diverse underground coal mining conditions.”
54
In contrast, communications and tracking equipment manufacturers and vendors purported to have systems that were proven in the mine environment and that would provide highly reliable communications and accurate tracking. For example, one vendor described their system as having accuracy of a yard or better: “The miners wear tags that transmit a low frequency signal which is detected by locator receivers. The receivers are spaced approximately a hundred yards apart in the drifts of the mine. Using near field physics, the receivers can measure the distance to the transmitter. These measurements provide a basis to determine the real-time location of a miner to an accuracy of a yard or better as the miner travels down a draft.” Several other companies, including Varis Mine Technology, Q-Track Corporation, InSet, Savi Technology,
Mine Site Technologies, and Siemens, also reported that their systems were ready for industry- wide deployment [126].
Similar positions were expressed at the public hearings held by MSHA as well as hearings held by the US Senate. In general, suppliers of communications and tracking systems characterized their technologies as mature and ready for deployment, while research organizations and mine operators felt that further research and development was needed for these technologies. As was described in the sections for RAs and SCSRs, political pressures caused Congress to act rapidly to respond to the disasters by mandating new technologies, making independent verification of the technology’s readiness impossible.
MSHA Communications and Tracking System Evaluations in Response to Sago and Alma
Based on their preliminary investigation of Sago, MSHA had concluded that functioning communication and tracking systems would have benefited search and rescue efforts and therefore formed a committee to evaluate the technologies that could be adapted to underground mines. In the months immediately following Sago and Alma, MSHA formed a committee to
55 evaluate the performance of commercially available communications and tracking technologies.
This committee published a report on June 13, 2006 describing results of tests that had been conducted in the months immediately following the disasters in January of that year [127]. The timing of this report is notable because it occurred after the MINER Act had already passed the
Senate on May 24 and the House of Representatives on June 7 but before the Act was signed into law by the President on June 15.
In response to their RFI, MSHA had received information from vendors on numerous communications and tracking systems. They selected six (6) of these systems to evaluate in underground field tests. These systems included multiple different technologies such as wireless mesh networks, ultra-wide band radio (UWB), and through-the-earth (TTE) communications.
Tests of these systems were conducted with the cooperation of CONSOL Energy at their
McElroy Mine in West Virginia. These tests had four objectives: (1) to evaluate how well signals propagate in the underground environment, (2) to measure the overburden a TTE communications system could penetrate, (3) to determine how interference affects system performance, and (4) to quantify the accuracy of tracking systems [127].
The tests of the communications systems evaluations consisted of miners moving through the mine along pre-planned routes away from a stationary base station transmitter and recording where signals were lost. The routes through the mine included traveling through a track entry, through a belt entry, through a dip, through an “S” turn, into a crosscut, and along a parallel entry. In addition, tests were performed to evaluate the ability of the signals to penetrate a stopping. The tests showed that, in general, the communications systems had ranges comparable to their purported specifications along straight entries; however, signals were lost quickly when the receiver was located in a non-line-of-sight (NLOS) location such as in a crosscut, past a dip,
56 or in a parallel entry. Given the limited timeframe for these tests (each system was only tested over a period of one to two days, and all tests were completed over a period of approximately two months), rigorous quantification of the performance was not possible [127].
Although the stated purpose of these tests included determining “the accuracy of tracking systems,” the tests performed did not measure this accuracy in any quantifiable way. Rather, the test consisted of a demonstration in which the system vendor set up the tracking system in a straight entry of the mine and showed via a graphical interface that the position of a tracking tag appeared to be in the correct position (i.e. the tag was shown to be midway between two stationary nodes or close to a single node in an apparently accurate way). These tests were very limited in that quantitative data were not taken and the tests were completely only once and only along a single straight entry of the mine [127]. This represented the most rigorous independent evaluation of the performance claims made by the tracking system vendors between the time of the Sago and Alma disasters in January and the passage of the MINER Act in June of 2006.
Communications and Tracking Mandate in the MINER Act
The MINER Act requires mines to install wireless communications between the surface and underground and to install tracking systems which can “provide for above ground personnel to determine the current, or immediately pre-accident, location of all underground personnel.” The
“post-accident” communications system is required to be “redundant,” and the tracking system is required to “be functional, reliable, and calculated to remain serviceable in a post-accident setting.” Section 2, Part (1)(b)(ii) of the MINER Act reads:
Not later than 3 years after the date of enactment of the Mine Improvement and
New Emergency Response Act of 2006, a plan shall, to be approved, provide for
57
post accident communication between underground and surface personnel via a
wireless two-way medium, and provide for an electronic tracking system
permitting surface personnel to determine the location of any persons trapped
underground or set forth within the plan the reasons such provisions can not be
adopted. Where such plan sets forth the reasons such provisions can not be
adopted, the plan shall also set forth the operator's alternative means of
compliance. Such alternative shall approximate, as closely as possible, the degree
of functional utility and safety protection provided by the wireless two-way
medium and tracking system referred to in this subpart.
Specific performance metrics are not provided in the Act with regard to tracking accuracy, communications system coverage, component hardening, backup power supplies, or other considerations to ensure that the systems are functional after a disaster and that they will provide sufficient levels of performance to materially affect the outcome of escape and rescue attempts.
Notably, the provision that mine operators can “set forth the operator's alternative means of compliance” that “shall approximate, as closely as possible, the degree of functional utility and safety protection provided by the wireless two-way medium and tracking system” will be of significance in the interpretation and enforcement of this mandate.
It should be noted that the nature of this mandate, like that for RAs, is a technology-forcing mandate. Although system vendors represented the technologies as mature, commercial products were not approved and available to the mining industry that would provide wireless communications and tracking of miners.
58
MSHA Enforcement of the MINER Act Mandate for Communications and Tracking
The compliance date for the communications and tracking mandate set by the MINER Act was three years from the passage of the Act, or June 15, 2009. As that date approached, MSHA issued a Program Policy Letter (PPL) on January 16, 2009 providing mine operators with guidance on complying with the law [128]. Since the MINER Act had not provided specific performance or design requirements for the communications and tracking systems and since
MSHA had not (and has not) enacted any regulation providing more specific requirements, guidance was needed on the interpretation of the mandate. The PPL explained that “because fully wireless communications technology is not sufficiently developed at this time, nor is it likely to be technologically feasible by June 15, 2009, this guidance addresses acceptable alternatives to fully wireless communication systems.”
The performance metrics provided in the PPL were also not presented as enforcement policy, but rather as guidance: “This guidance represents MSHA’s current thinking with respect to two-way communication and electronic tracking for use in mine emergencies. It does not create or confer any rights for any person nor does it operate to bind mine operators or any other members of the public.” Since no specific regulatory or legislative language exists to establish requirements for system performance or design standards, the MINER Act mandate is accomplished through the approval of the Emergency Response Plan (ERP) by the district offices through “the Agency’s existing consultative process for approving mine plans, as opposed to the process for enforcement decisions related to citations.” As allowed by the provisions of the MINER Act, the
PPL provides “the features MSHA believes would best approximate the functional utility and safety protections of a fully wireless system,” but also allows operators the option to “propose
59 other approaches or systems, and the District Manager will exercise his discretion in evaluating them.” [128]
The January 2009 PPL gives specific performance specifications for communications system related to coverage area, permissibility, standby power, surface considerations, survivability, maintenance, and other considerations; a summary of the key recommendations for communications systems are provided in Table 1. The PPL also gives performance specifications for tracking systems related to performance, permissibility, standby power, capacity, scanning rate, surface considerations, survivability, and maintenance; a summary of the key recommendations for tracking systems are provided in Table 2.
This guidance was reissued and revised in subsequent PPLs in 2011 [129] and again in 2014
[130]. Among the revisions in these subsequent PPLs was that it should be possible to monitor the communications system from a remote site and that the system should determine the location of miners in belt entries to within 4000 feet. These PPLs also provided more guidance on the survivability of components by applying the requirement for redundancy to tracking systems and by specifying how protection should be provided for components installed in vulnerable areas.
MSHA issued related PPLs in 2011 [131] and 2013 [132], respectively, to provide guidance on the approval of communications and tracking devices for permissibility under 30 CFR Part 23 and to provide guidance on the prevention of electromagnetic interference with blasting circuits.
MSHA also issued a Program Instruction Letter (PIL) in 2011 to provide federal inspectors with guidance on how to complete inspections of communications and tracking systems [133].
It is important to note that MSHA has not entered rule-making for communications and tracking systems, but is instead relying on policy guidance in the fulfillment of the MINER Act mandate.
60
Table 1: Summary of key guidance provided by MSHA for communications system performance [128]
GUIDANCE GENERAL • Each group of miners traveling together should have an CONSIDERATIONS untethered device for two-way communication with the surface through voice and/or text • Able to send an emergency message to each untethered device • System should be installed to prevent interference with other electrical systems, including blasting caps COVERAGE AREA • Coverage throughout each working section of the mine • Continuous coverage along escapeways • Coverage within 200 feet of strategic areas such as belt drives, transfer points, power centers, loading points, SCSR caches, and other areas identified by the District Manager • Communications must be provided at refuge alternatives per 30 CFR §75.1600-3 PERMISSIBILITY • System must be approved by MSHA for permissibility STANDBY POWER • Stationary components should have 24 hours of standby power • Untethered devices should have 4 hours of operation beyond a normal working shift (12 hours minimum total duration) SURFACE • Standby power to surface components should ensure continuous CONSIDERATIONS operation • A person trained in the operation of the system and knowledgeable of the ERP must be always on duty per 30 CFR §75.1600-1 SURVIVABILITY • A redundant signal path to the surface should be installed either by installing two or more systems in two or more entries or by a single system with two or more pathways to surface • Major events or component failure in one signal path should not disrupt system availability • Components that are installed in vulnerable areas should be protected MAINTENANCE • Procedures should be established to provide communication during system or component failure or maintenance • Infrastructure should be inspected weekly • Untethered devices should be inspected daily • Manufacturer’s maintenance recommendations should be followed
61
Table 2: Summary of key guidance provided by MSHA for tracking system performance [128]
GUIDANCE PERFORMANCE • Determine location of miners… o on a working section to within 200 feet o in escapeways at intervals not exceeding 2000 feet o within 200 feet of strategic areas such as belt drives, transfer points, power centers, loading points, SCSR caches, and other areas identified by the District Manager • Determine direction of travel at key junctions in escapeways • Determine the identity miners within 200 feet of refuge alternatives • System should be installed to prevent interference with other electrical systems, including blasting caps PERMISSIBILITY • System must be approved by MSHA for permissibility STANDBY POWER • Stationary components should have 24 hours of standby power • Individually worn or carried devices (i.e. tags) should have 4 hours of operation beyond a normal working shift (12 hours minimum total duration) CAPACITY • System should be capable of tracking the maximum number of persons expected to be in the coverage area SCANNING RATE • Update rate of no more than 60 seconds SURFACE • Standby power to surface components should ensure continuous CONSIDERATIONS operation • A person trained in the operation of the system and knowledgeable of the ERP must be always on duty per 30 CFR §75.1600-1 • System should display the last known position of miners when the tracking device is not reporting • Each miner should be uniquely identified • Each reported position should be time-stamped • Data should be stored for two weeks SURVIVABILITY • Components that are installed in vulnerable areas should be protected • Data storage should not be impacted by communications interruptions MAINTENANCE • Procedures should be established to provide tracking during system or component failure or maintenance • Infrastructure should be inspected weekly • Miner worn or carried should be inspected daily • Manufacturer’s maintenance recommendations should be followed
62
Research to Develop and Adapt Communications and Tracking Systems
The MINER Act directed the newly formed Office of Mine Safety and Health Research
(OMSHR) within NIOSH “to enhance the development of new mine safety technology and technological applications and to expedite the commercial availability and implementation of such technology in mining environments.” OMSHR fulfills this directive by conducting intramural research and by funding extramural research through contracts. Between 2006 and
2016, OMSHR awarded more than 120 such contracts in 25 topic areas as a result of the MINER
Act [134]. Of these contracts, the topic area which has had the greatest number of contracts awarded is “Emergency Communications and Tracking,” with 40 contracts awarded between
2006 and 2016. These contracts are listed in Table 3, and include contracts to develop novel technologies such as inertial navigation and through-the-earth communications, as well as to adapt more mature technologies from other industries or to improve technologies already available in mining, such as node-based communications, leaky feeder, and RFID-based tracking.
Several of these contracts have resulted in commercial products that are now widely used in the mining industry. In particular, node-based and leaky feeder communications systems have been widely adopted [121, 135], as have RFID tracking systems and tracking systems integrated into node-based communications systems [120].
Extensive intramural research at OMSHR, closely tied to this extramural research, has also enhanced the success of these technology development efforts. In particular, intramural research on communications systems has enabled the development of guidelines for the design, installation, and use of these systems [136, 137].
63
Table 3: NIOSH OMSHR extramural research contracts in the topic area “Emergency Communications and Tracking” (2006 - 2016) [134]
Contract No. Title Contractor Start End Date Date 07FED717801 Subterranean Wireless Electronic U.S. Army CERDEC 10/1/2006 5/19/2009 Communication System 08FED898353 Mine Communications Engineering and DISA Joint Spectrum 5/22/2007 9/30/2009 Compatibility Guidelines Center 200-2007-20388 Wireless Mesh Mine Communication L-3 Global Security & 5/25/2007 2/27/2009 System Engineering Solutions (now Engility Corporation) 200-2007-21249 Design and Demonstration of a Location Extreme Endeavors and 7/25/2007 3/25/2008 Tracking System for Underground Coal Consulting Mines (Award 1) 200-2007-21250 Design and Demonstration of a Location L-3 Global Security & 7/25/2007 11/30/2009 Tracking System for Underground Coal Engineering Solutions Mines (Award 2) (now Engility Corporation) 200-2007-22843 A Magnetic Communication System for Lockheed Martin 9/11/2007 7/31/2009 Use in Mine Environments Corporation 08FEB898345 Develop a Means to Model Network U.S. Department of 2/15/2008 8/15/2009 Performance Using Network Simulation Commerce, NIST Tools 200-2008-24502 Passive Fiber Optic System for Locating, US Sensor Systems Inc. 3/18/2008 2/28/2009 Tracking, and Communicating with Personnel in Coal Mines 200-2008-24620C Development of a Wireless Test and Helium Networks 5/14/2008 5/14/2009 Measurement Tool for Use in Mines 200-2008-25720 Through-The-Earth Wireless Real-Time Alertek, LLC 8/1/2008 8/31/2010 Two-Way Voice Communications 200-2008-26293 Sprinkler Head Emergency Commonwealth 8/5/2008 8/5/2009 Communications Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation 200-2008-26818 Ultra-Low Frequency Through-the-Earth E-Spectrum 8/13/2008 11/30/2009 Communication Technology Technologies 200-2008-26815 Leaky Feeder to Wireless Media Converter Rajant Corporation 8/14/2008 7/30/2009 Device Technology Development 200-2008-24628 Supplementary Technologies for Foundation 8/19/2008 12/31/2009 Advanced Mine Communication Networks Telecommunications Inc. 200-2008-27444 Mobile Adaptable RF/IT Infrastructure - St. Francis University 9/1/2008 8/14/2009 Experimental (MATRIX) Center of Excellence for Remote and Medically Under-Served Areas 200-2008-26864 System Reliability and Environmental Foster-Miller, Inc. (now 9/1/2008 10/31/2009 Survivability QinetiQ North America) 200-2009-29066 Emergency Seismic Communication Teledyne Brown 3/23/2009 5/22/2010 System for the Mining Industry Engineering 200-2009-31292 Magneto-Inductive TTE Communications Ultra Electronics Canada 8/25/2009 10/31/2010 Defence, Inc. 200-2009-31502 Post-Accident AMS System CONSPEC Controls Inc. 9/1/2009 9/29/2013 200-2009-32117 Two-Way, Through-the-Earth Emergency Stolar Research, Inc. 9/4/2009 12/4/2010 Communication System for Trapped Miners and the Surface 200-2009-32021 Magnetic Communication System (MCS) Lockheed Martin 9/10/2009 4/1/2011 Corporation 200-2010-35295 Radio System Modifications for Improved Kutta Technologies, Inc. 8/25/2010 8/25/2011 Mine Safety (Medium Frequency) 64
Contract No. Title Contractor Start End Date Date 200-2010-34687 Demonstration of Inertial Sensor Tracking InSeT Systems, LLC 8/30/2010 3/2/2011 and Communication System 200-2010-35935 Feasibility Study: Vision-Aided Personal Carnegie Mellon 9/8/2010 7/8/2011 Inertial Tracking System for Mining University 200-2010-36005 Application of Extreme Power Line Northern Microdesign, 9/13/2010 6/13/2012 Communication Methods to Mine Inc. Environments 200-2010-36317 Full-Wave Modeling of MF Propagation Pennsylvania State 9/30/2010 9/29/2013 University 200-2010-36140 Development of a Uniform Methodology Virginia Polytechnic 9/30/2010 1/4/2014 for Evaluating Coal Mine Tracking Institute Systems 200-2011-39884 Through-the-Earth Communication E-Spectrum 9/1/2011 11/30/2012 Systems for Underground Coal Mines: Technologies, Inc. Product Final Development and Standardized Interface Definition 200-2011-39862 Wireless Through-The-Earth Modeling Lockheed Martin 9/9/2011 6/30/2012 and Support Corporation 11FED1113303 Low-Frequency Electromagnetic Noise Los Alamos National 9/30/2011 12/15/2015 Cancelling Antenna System Laboratory 200-2012-53624 Communication and Hazard Monitoring in Kutta Technologies 9/20/2012 9/30/2013 Bleeders and Remote Workings 200-2012-53504 Medium Frequency Radio System Kutta Technologies 9/20/2012 9/30/2013 Modifications for Refuge Chamber Situational Awareness NA Resource Identification for Improvement URS Corporation 3/25/2013 5/31/2013 of Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) in Underground Coal Mines 200-2013-56128 Through-the-Earth (TTE) Lockheed Martin 7/16/2013 4/15/2015 Communications: Range Reliability Improvements 200-2013-56050 Kutta OutCall Micropower Messaging Kutta Technologies 8/12/2013 8/11/2014 System (KOMMS) 200-2013-56809 Advanced Software Radio Techniques for Vital Alert 9/9/2013 7/17/2015 Improved Range and Reliability of Digital Communications, Inc. Through-the-Earth Communication Systems 200-2014-58688 Through-the-Earth Communication Raytheon-UTD 9/1/2014 8/31/2015 Antenna Feasibility Demonstration 200-2014-59253 Integration of Sensing Technologies for SenSevere 9/1/2014 4/30/2016 Post-Event Monitoring of Hazardous Conditions in the Mining Environment 200-2015-63501 Wireless Sensor Network with Methane Innovative Wireless 9/1/2015 6/30/2016 Gas Cloud Detector and Absolute Pressure Technologies Sensor
65
The OMSHR intramural research program on communications and tracking focused primarily on communications systems. In particular, the research on primary communications systems
(secondary communications systems will be discussed in Chapter 7) focused on measuring and modeling the propagation of RF signals in underground environments [138, 139, 140, 141, 142,
143, 144]. Since this research provided an empirically verified basis for the design of communications systems to ensure proper coverage in the mining environment, in which RF signals behave much differently than they do in open air, it provided system designers with the tools needed to ensure that their systems would perform as expected.
On the other hand, intramural research on tracking technologies at OMSHR was fairly limited
[124]. A rigorous evaluation of the accuracy of various tracking technologies in the mining environment was not performed as the facilities to conduct such an evaluation were not developed and the intramural research focus was on communications. While a number of tracking technologies were commercialized for the underground mining market, the performance of these technologies in terms of their ability to improve the success of escape and rescue efforts has never been independently evaluated.
Research conducted by academic researchers and by international research organizations has resulted in the development of several novel tracking technologies, which have been evaluated in mining and non-mining environments [145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151], but these have not provided a systematic comparison of the performance of commercially available systems.
66
Indications of Technology Success or Failure for Primary Communications Systems
While there is wide-spread adoption of primary communications and tracking systems in response to the MINER Act mandate, there is not documented evidence that these technologies achieve a material improvement to safety or health. This is especially true for tracking systems, where the requirements to locate miners to within 200 feet at working section and to within 2000 feet along escapeways has been the topic of considerable debate with regard to whether this level of accuracy would provide mine rescue teams with sufficient information to effect successful rescue. This indicates both success of the technology mandate, in that the technology is widely adopted, but also failure of the technology mandate, in that there is not documented evidence of an achieved safety or health benefit. The actual safety benefit of these technologies likely will not be seen unless and until a mining disaster necessitates their use.
An analysis of this indications of technology mandate success and failure is presented in Section
5.1.3 for communications systems and in Section 5.1.4 for tracking systems.
67
4.1.4 Case 4: Proximity Detection Systems for Continuous Mining Machines Background on Proximity Detection Systems and Regulatory Requirements
Since the mid 1980’s when remote-controlled continuous mining machines were introduced to the industry, there have been 43 fatalities in which a miner was pinned by a CMM. The Mine
Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) estimates that, in the majority of these fatalities, the use of proximity detection technology may have been a preventative factor [152]. There are currently five proximity detection systems that have been approved by MSHA for use in underground coal mines [153]. It is important to note that this approval does not pertain to the performance of the system, but is rather only an indication that the systems meet the permissibility requirements in 30 CFR Part 18 meant to prevent mine fires and explosions.
All of the five MSHA-approved systems are based on similar technical concept; the system includes a transmitting component that generates either a magnetic field or an RF signal, and the strength of this signal is measured by another component of the system. One of these components (either the transmitter or the receiver) is mounted on the mining machine, and the other is worn by the miner. The measured signal strength is used to estimate the distance between the miner and the machine or the position of the miner relative to the machine. Based on this position, machine motion can be automatically inhibited. This type of technology was first considered for use in underground mining in research conducted about 20 years ago [154].
Researchers at the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) developed the first working prototypes of such a system for continuous mining machines and demonstrated the feasibility of this technology through laboratory and field trials [155] [156]. NIOSH researchers also published research on human factors related to these systems including the types of warnings to be used and the interface between the miners and the system [157].
68
This original invention was patented by the government [158, 159]. From about 2004 onward, these two patents were licensed to a number of manufacturers that further developed and refined the initial invention. A number of other important patents were also filed that continued to introduce new innovations. Despite the advances evidenced by the filing of these patents during the time, from the year 2004 through 2009, there was little published research on proximity detection.
In 2010, NIOSH resumed research focused directly on proximity detection. Prior research had indicated that miners were inclined to stand in positions close to the mining machine in order to see the visual cues necessary to stay safe and to efficiently mine [160, 161]. Based on this research, NIOSH focused its efforts on the development of a next-generation proximity detection system that would allow miners to stand close to the machine and remain safe. To accomplish this, they developed a system that would determine the position of a miner and selectively disable only the machine functions that would cause an injury [162] [163] [164]. While the main focus of this research was on the development of this next-generation system, NIOSH research at this time also quantified the effect of coal on proximity detection systems, and showed this effect to be minimal [165]. In addition, NIOSH researchers conducted a series of interviews with continuous mining machine operators to understand the effect this new technology would have on the risk perception and risk behavior of miners [166] [167].
At this time research was also conducted to measure the performance of proximity detection systems already in use in underground coal mines on continuous mining machines [168]. This work was conducted primarily through a cooperative effort involving the West Virginia Mine
Safety Technology Task Force, mine operators, proximity detection vendors, and NIOSH. At the time these field tests were conducted, a limited number of mines had installed proximity
69 detection systems. As such, the number of tests completed early on was small, and with small sample sizes, it was not possible to generalize conclusions or to set performance standards.
MSHA has mandated the use of proximity detection systems for continuous mining machines and has also proposed regulations to require the technology on mobile haulage equipment. Key dates for these regulations are shown in Table 4. Leading up to and following the promulgation of the continuous mining machine regulation in 2015, adoption of the technology has accelerated dramatically. Per the regulation, the majority of continuous mining machines in the country are now equipped with a proximity detection system.
Table 4: Key dates for proximity detection regulations Request for Information (RFI) published February 1, 2010 for continuous mining machine rule Request for Information (RFI) published for February 1, 2010 mobile machine rule Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) August 31, 2011 for continuous mining machine rule Final Rule published for continuous mining January 15, 2015 machines Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) September 2, 2015 for mobile machine rule
Identification of Electromagnetic Interference
In the months following the implementation of the regulatory mandate, some miners observed adverse performance changes in the proximity detection system when used in conjunction with another required piece of safety technology, the personal dust monitor (PDM). MSHA determined that this problem was caused by electromagnetic interference (EMI) between the two devices, and issued notice of the potential for this problem to mine operators [169]. Researchers
70 at NIOSH have confirmed that such EMI does occur and that it effectively renders the proximity detection system temporarily inoperable [170].
Indications of Technology Success or Failure for Proximity Detection Systems
The failure to anticipate the potential for EMI between the PDM and proximity detection systems represents a documented failure of the technology. This could be considered an indication of a failure of the mandate for the use of proximity detection systems or an indication of a failure of the mandate for the use of the PDM.
An analysis of this indications of technology mandate failure is presented in Section 5.1.5.
71
4.1.5 Case 5: LED Cap Lamps Historical Background on Mining Cap Lamps
Lighting has always been of critical importance in underground mining safety, and the technology of mine illumination has continuously evolved. Given the long history of cap lamps – a history that continues to influence the industry’s adoption new types of cap lamps and informs the conclusions of this study with regard to safety technology adoption in the mining industry – it is worthwhile taking a longer-term historical look at cap lamp technology.
As early as the 1st century AD, miners used candles for illumination underground. In the 16th century, oil wick lamps were introduced and continued to be used up to as recently as 1920.
Carbide lamps were introduced in the 19th century along with the flame safety lamp. At the beginning of the 19th century, the first electric light was invented (coincidentally, the first electric light was invented by Humphry Davy, the inventor of the flame safety lamp). Throughout the
19th century, the technology of electric lights was improved, and in 1879, Thomas Edison developed the first practical incandescent lightbulb. In 1915, incandescent lightbulbs were used in the first electric cap lamp. Electric cap lamps were rapidly and widely adopted by the mining industry, and incandescent cap lamps remained the dominant technology for cap lamps for approximately a century [171].
The US Bureau of Mines (USBM) was formed in 1910, largely in response to several disastrous mine fires and explosions. At this time, the concept of electric cap lamps appeared to be feasible, but also by this time, flame safety lamps were a proven technology for controlling methane ignition. Therefore, much of the early USBM research was focused on testing the potential for electric cap lamps to ignite methane-air mixtures. In particular, testing was conducted to determine what would happen if the bulb was broken, suddenly exposing the filaments to a
72 methane-air atmosphere [172, 173]. This early research led to innovative means of preventing ignition from electric cap lamps such as using spring-loaded contacts that would interrupt current in the event the bulb shattered [174] as shown in Figure 12.
Figure 12: Miners' cap lamp assembly from the early 20th century with spring-loaded contacts designed to interupt electric current in the event that the incandescent bulb shattered [174]
In 1914, two engineers from the USBM, John Ryan and George Deike (for whom the Deike
Building on Penn State’s University Park campus is named), formed the Mine Safety Appliances
Company (MSA) and sought out Thomas Edison to develop and commercialize electric cap lamps. Edison, Ryan, and Deike designed a lamp with a small, rechargeable battery and a miniature incandescent bulb with a tungsten filament [171]. The Edison electric cap lamp (Figure
13) was approved by the USBM in 1915, and by 1917, seven models of electric cap personal mining lamps had been approved [175]. The technology was adopted rapidly; by August of 1916,
73 approximately 70,000 lamps were in use and about 2,000 lamps per week were being purchased according to USBM reports [175].
Figure 13: The Edison Electric Cap Lamp, approved by the Bureau of Mines for use in underground coal mines in 1915 [176]
In the first half of the 20th century, the USBM took an active role in developing electric cap lamp technology as well as in promoting and tracking the adoption the technology [177, 178, 179], and this undoubtedly was critical to the rapid adoption and success of the new technology. In addition, the USBM set rules for the construction, installation, maintenance, and use of electrical
74 equipment, including cap lamps beginning in 1916 [180] and revised several times thereafter, and in 1935, the USBM published guidelines specific to cap lamps focusing on proper maintenance practices to not compromise permissibility or efficiency [181, 182]. These early regulation and guidelines laid the groundwork for the regulation of cap lamp technology as it still is today.
The Federal Coal Mine Safety Act of 1952 established requirements for permissibility, including the requirement that only permissible electric lamps are permitted in gassy mines, and the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 charged the Department of the Interior with establishing “the standards under which all working places in a mine shall be illuminated,” and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977 extended these standards to non- coal mines. Permissibility, inspection, and maintenance standards for cap lamps were based on the requirements set forth by the USBM (Schedule 6D, 4 FR 4003, Sept. 21, 1939), but requirements did not exist for the performance of cap lamps or other mine lighting. In 1970, in fulfillment of the 1969 Coal Act mandate, the USBM proposed a regulation to require minimum illumination in working places of at least 5 foot-candles and no more than 110 foot-candles. In public hearings for this proposed regulation, mine operators and mining equipment manufacturers objected to the performance requirements, saying that existing technology had not been demonstrated to be capable of meeting the standard [176, 183].
In response to these objections, the newly formed Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration
(MESA), the precursor to MSHA, was charged with determining if the requirement for 5 foot- candles was attainable. To accomplish this, a number of equipment operation tasks were analyzed in terms of the visual cues that would need to be seen and the lighting that would be needed to allow these visual cues to be seen. This analysis concluded that a minimum luminance
75 of 0.06 foot-lamberts was needed [184]. Foot-lambert is a unit of luminance, whereas foot-candle is a unit of illuminance. The two are related by the following equation:
퐿푣 = 퐸푣 × 푅
where 퐿푣 is the luminance in foot-lamberts, 퐸푣 is the illuminance in foot-candles, and 푅 is the reflectivity, which is the fraction of the light that is reflected by the surface being illuminated.
Since the relationship between luminance and illuminance depends on the reflectivity of the surface being illuminated, there is no direct comparison between this 0.06 foot-lambert recommendation and the 5 foot-candle standard proposed by the USBM; however, for any reasonable assumption about reflectivity, the 0.06 foot-lambert is much less stringent. In 1976, regulations were promulgated with this less stringent 0.06 foot-lambert standard, with a compliance date of 1978 [176].
At the time these regulations were being finalized and beginning to be enforced, the USBM and
MESA published a number of instructional guides and conducted a number of seminars on the standards and on the proper design and implementation of cap lamps as well as machine- mounted lighting, with 44 such one-day seminars being conducted over the three-year period from 1976 to 1978 [185, 186, 187, 188, 189]. The active role of the government in educating the industry about these standards and about the technology of mine illumination have shaped the culture of the industry as it relates to this critical technology.
Driven by research on lighting technology and visual requirements for safety, the standards for mine illumination have evolved over the half century since Congress first mandated illumination standards with the 1969 Coal Act. But the standards have consistently been notably less stringent than the lighting requirements for other industries, and the expectation for lighting has been less
76 in underground mining than what is considered reasonable for safety in industrial environments
[176]. As such, the regulations around mine illumination have not represented a technology- forcing mandate, and the primary driving force behind new illumination technologies has been voluntary adoption.
Introduction and Diffusion of LED Cap Lamps
The first practical light-emitting diode (LED) was introduced in 1962 [190]; however, early
LEDs were limited to infrared light (which were used in electronics such as television remote controls) or low-intensity colored light (which were used in electronics for indicators or seven- segment digital displays). Key development in LED technology were the ability to produce white light, the exponential increase in light output, and the simultaneous exponential decrease in cost.
By the mid-2000s, LEDs were capable of producing bright enough white light at a low enough cost to be a feasible means of providing illumination [191].
When LED technology began to be widely adopted for illumination in the 2000s, cap lamp manufacturers were quick to recognize the potential for this technology and began developing
LED cap lamps, which were first introduced to non-coal mines and were then submitted for permissibility approval by MSHA, and MSHA approved the first LED cap lamp in 2008 [192].
A major advantage of LED cap lamps is that the lower power consumption allows for a much smaller and lighter battery pack. As a result, cordless cap lamps are possible, in which the entire cap lamp and battery can be contained within an all-in-one assembly that is worn on the miner’s hard hat. This eliminates the need for the miner to carry a battery pack on their belt. The first cordless LED cap lamp was approved by MSHA in 2010 [192].
77
LED cap lamps were shown to consume less energy to produce more light than incandescent lamps [193]. In addition to the advantages of energy efficiency and light output, LED cap lamps also offer advantages in terms of more accurate color rendering, decreased heat production, and more consistent light output over as the battery is discharged and as the lamp ages. After an 8- hour shift, the light output from an incandescent cap lamp powered by a lead-acid can decrease by as much as 31% as compared to the start of the shift; in comparison, the light output of an
LED cap lamp powered by a nickel-hydride battery only decreases by 4% over the same period
[194]. LED cap lamps also offer advantages related to convenience and ergonomics: LED cap lamps are lightweight, have a longer rated life, and generally have a faster charging time than incandescent lamps [195].
All of these advantages have resulted in the rapid and pervasive adoption of LED cap lamps, especially cordless LED cap lamps, and the majority of underground miners in the United States now use such lamps.
Safety Benefits and Concerns of LED Cap Lamps
Although the factors that drove the adoption of LED cap lamps were largely around usability, convenience, energy efficiency, and cost, the use of LED cap lamps has been shown to also have safety benefits. NIOSH and others have done extensive research to demonstrate these safety benefits.
Detection of tripping hazards was shown to be improved with LED cap lamps, enabling detection times that were an average of 0.96 seconds faster compared to the incandescent lamps; this improvement was attributed to the spectral content of the LED lamp making the hazards more visible [196]. Other studies indicated that the detection time for slip and fall hazards could
78 be improved by as much as 55% with LED cap lamps [197]. The use of LED cap lamps were also shown to improve the ability of human subjects to detect hazards in their peripheral vision, with improvements of up to 11% - 15% in detection time for the hazards [198].
Some negative results were also obtained in these studies on the potential safety improvements of using LED cap lamps. The postural stability of human subjects was measured while they were wearing LED and incandescent cap lamps. Postural stability can have a significant impact on the occurrence of slip, trip, and fall accidents. No significant difference in postural stability was detected for the two types of cap lamps [199].
The performance of cap lamps in a smoke-filled mine entry, such as would be encountered by miners attempting self-escape following a disaster, was also tested. Specifically, the distance at which human subjects could detect reflective tags hanging from the roof and mine rail on the floor was measured for incandescent cap lamps as well as for LED cap lamps. The results showed that the incandescent lamps allowed for a greater detection distance [200]. This can be attributed to several factors including the possibility that more light was reflected off of the smoke particles back toward the subjects for the brighter LED lamps.
A potential unintended consequence of introducing brighter lights into the underground environment is glare. Glare can be bothersome and distracting, but it can also be hazardous as it can leave a miner temporarily unable to see hazards in the area. Studies at NIOSH indicated that, although the LED cap lamps are generally brighter than the incandescent lamps, they do not produce significantly more discomfort glare [201].
79
Indications of Technology Success or Failure for LED Cap Lamps
The rapid and wide-spread voluntary adoption of LED cap lamps is a strong indication of success for this technology, and although the technology was not adopted solely for its safety benefits, it does offer demonstrable safety benefits.
An analysis of the indications of technology success for LED cap lamps is presented in Section
5.1.6.
80
4.2 Health Interventions
Health-related interventions in the mining industry have focused on controlling hazardous exposures of noise, dust, and toxic substances, as well as musculoskeletal disorders (MSD). The cases used for this study, focus on interventions to control exposure to noise and specifically, on noise controls for two pieces of underground coal mining equipment: continuous mining machines and roof bolting machines.
The problem of hearing loss in the mining industry is of significant concern; the industry once had the highest rate of hazardous noise exposure [202] and one of the highest rates of hearing loss, along with manufacturing and construction [203]. In addition to hearing loss, high noise exposure can also lead to workers experiencing excess stress, tinnitus, sleep disorders, and decreased work performance [204]. Moderate noise exposure can also be of concern because it can interfere with hearing, potentially causing workers to miss audible warnings or audible indications of a hazard, and it can lower a worker’s ability to maintain concentration on their job, potentially making them more likely to become distracted or make mistakes [205].
In this section, an overview of noise control technology research, development, and diffusion will first be provided. Following this, noise controls for continuous mining machines and roof bolters will be discussed in particular.
81
4.2.1 Noise Controls and Noise Exposure Regulations
Background on Noise Controls
The USBM had a long history of researching hearing loss prevention and noise controls for the mining industry. The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 granted the authority to set and enforce maximum noise exposure levels for coal mines, and the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977 extended this authority to non-coal mines. In response to this mandate, the
USBM started conducting research on hearing loss prevention and noise controls. In 1971, a
USBM study found that 73% of underground coal miners were exposed to noise levels that would be considered hazardous [206], and in 1976, NIOSH concluded that miners have a measurably worse hearing than the average American [207]. The USBM conducted a series of projects in the years following the 1969 Coal Act, which resulted in the characterization of noise sources in the mining industry and in the development of noise control solutions [208]. These mining machinery noise controls were published by the USBM in a handbook in 1983 [209], but these solutions were never widely adopted by the mining industry [210].
Noise Control Research Following the Transfer of S&H Research from USBM to NIOSH
In 1996, the USBM was closed and its safety and health functions were transferred to NIOSH.
The hearing loss prevention research program remained in Pittsburgh under what is now the
Pittsburgh Mining Research Division (PMRD). At this time, NIOSH already had a hearing loss prevention research program housed in the Division of Applied Research and Technology
(DART) in Cincinnati, Ohio. Also in 1996, DART published a “Preventing Occupational
Hearing Loss – A Practical Guide” [211], which set the strategic direction for future hearing loss prevention research, including that to be conducted in Pittsburgh for mining. This strategy gave primacy to engineering noise controls. Research was structured to prioritize the development of
82 controls in order of effectiveness: (1) engineering controls to reduce noise at the source, (2) administrative controls to reduce exposure through changes in procedures or behavior, and (3) hearing protection devices such as ear plugs or muffs [211].
Another key action from DART at this time was the publication of a recommended noise exposure standard [212], which included a Recommended Exposure Limit (REL) of an 8-hour time-weighted-average (TWA) sound level of 85dBA, which remains NIOSH’s recommendation. The 1998 recommendation from NIOSH updated a 1972 recommendation from NIOSH [213]. Both the 1972 recommendation and the 1998 recommendations gave an
REL of 85dBA. However, the recommendations differed in how the TWA was to be calculated; specifically, the 1972 criteria recommended an exchange rate of 5dB, whereas the 1998 criteria recommended an exchange rate of 3dB. The exchange rate is the increase in decibels corresponding to a halving of the allowable exposure time (or, equivalently, the decrease in decibels corresponding to a doubling of the allowable exposure time). So, for example, with an
REL of 85dBA and an exchange rate of 5dB, exposure to 90dBA for four (4) hours would be equivalent to eight (8) hours at the REL; however, with the same REL and an exchange rate of
3dB, exposure to only 88dBA for four (4) hours would be equivalent to eight (8) hours at the
REL.
The 1972 and 1998 NIOSH recommendations were based on risk assessments which evaluated the excess risk of material hearing impairment as a function of noise level and exposure duration for a 40-year working lifetime [212]. Excess risk is defined as the percentage of the population exposed to occupational noise that would have material hearing impairment minus the percentage of a population not exposed to occupational noise that would have material hearing impairment. Material hearing impairment is defined as having an audiogram showing an average
83 hearing threshold level (HTL) exceeding 25dB for both ears. The frequencies at which the audiogram is to be conducted affects this definition, and a number of different standards have been used for this frequency selection. In addition to the NIOSH risk assessments, other agencies have conducted risk assessments for material hearing impairment. A comparison of the estimates of excess risk for a 60-year-old worker with 40 years of working experience from NIOSH, ISO, and EPA are shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Estimated excess risk of material hearing impairment at age 60 after a 40-year working lifetime exposure to occupational noise for different definitions of material hearing impairment (From [212])
Material hearing impairment defined as an average HTL for Material hearing impairment both ears Material hearing impairment defined as an defined as an average HTL exceeding 25dB at average HTL for both ears exceeding 25dB at for both ears exceeding 25dB 1000, 2000, 3000, 500, 1000, and 2000 Hz at 1000, 2000, and 3000 Hz and 4000 Hz Average exposure level 1971 1972 1973 1990 1998 1972 1990 1998 1990 1998 (dBA) ISO NIOSH EPA ISO NIOSH NIOSH ISO NIOSH ISO NIOSH 90 21% 29% 22% 3% 23% 29% 14% 32% 17% 25% 85 10% 15% 12% 1% 10% 16% 4% 14% 6% 8% 80 0% 3% 5% 0% 4% 3% 0% 5% 1% 1%
This, and other information on the prevalence of noise-induced hearing loss in the mining industry, would become the basis for a new regulation on noise exposure promulgated by MSHA in 1999.
Introduction of New Regulatory Requirements for Noise Exposure
After the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, regulatory requirements for noise exposure were established for coal mines, and after the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of
1977, similar standards were established for metal/non-metal mines. The standards for both coal and for non-coal set the permissible exposure limit (PEL) at 90dBA based on an 8-hour TWA
84 with an exchange rate of 5dB. Both standards also required feasible engineering or administrative controls to be implemented in order to reduce exposure below the PEL.
Beyond these similarities, there were significant differences between the requirements for coal mines and the requirements for metal/non-metal mines. For coal mines, the attenuation provided by hearing protection devices (ear plugs or ear muffs) were considered in the determination of whether the PEL had been exceeded, but no credit for hearing protection was given in metal/non- metal mines. In coal mines, when the PEL was exceeded, the operator was required to implement a hearing conservation plan (HCP) for over-exposed miners, but the requirement for an HCP was not in place for metal/non-metal mines.
The MSHA requirements prior to 1999 also significantly differed from the corresponding OSHA standards which had been updated in 1983 (29 CFR 1910.95). The OSHA requirements also used a 90dBA PEL with a 5dB exchange rate but also included an “action level” at 85dBA which triggered the implementation of an HCP. These provisions for the HCP under OSHA had also been updated to reflect recent advances in hearing conservation research.
In 1989, MSHA published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) [214], proposing to revise the standards for noise exposure. In this ANPRM, MSHA cited calls from members of the mining community to reconcile the differences between the standards for coal and metal/non-metal, to reconcile the differences between the MSHA and OSHA requirements, and to consider the more conservative 85dBA PEL recommended by NIOSH in 1972. Public comments were received in response to this ANPRM, and MSHA did extensive work to assess the economic and technical feasibility of a change in the regulations.
85
In December 1996, MSHA proceeded with the rulemaking process, publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) [215]. The proposed rule would maintain the 90dBA PEL with an exchange rate of 5dB, but would also implement an 85dBA action level similar to the OSHA requirement. At the action level, mine operators would be required to enroll the miner in an HCP and to provide the miner with hearing protection upon their request or in the event a significant shift in hearing acuity was detected through the HCP. When the 90dBA PEL was exceeded, the mine operator would be required to implement feasible engineering and administrative controls to reduce exposure to the PEL. The feasibility of the controls would be determined by MSHA as the feasibility for the particular mine in question to implement the control, and it would be up to the mine operator to select whether engineering controls, administrative controls, or some combination of the two would be used. To aid operators in the selection of controls, MSHA would publish what it considered feasible controls in a Program Information Bulletin (PIB). In the event that it was deemed infeasible for the mine to reduce the exposure to the PEL, the proposed rule required that the operator must reduce the exposure to as close to the PEL as feasible and to provide miners with hearing protection. The proposed rule also included a dual hearing protection level of 105dBA, above which miners must wear both ear plugs and ear muffs, and a ceiling level of 115dBA that could at no time be exceeded. Finally, the proposed rule would no longer give credit for the attenuation provided by hearing protection when determining whether the action level or PEL had been exceeded.
With the publication of the proposed rule in December 1996, MSHA sought written public comment with a due date in February of 1997 [215]. After reviewing the written comments received, MSHA decided to extend the comment period and to schedule a series of six public hearings in Beckley, St. Louis, Denver, Las Vegas, Atlanta, and Washington DC [216, 217].
86
Later that year, NIOSH published a report entitled “Prevalence of Hearing Loss for Noise-
Exposed Metal/Nonmetal Miners,” and MSHA re-opened the rulemaking record to allow public comment on this report [218, 219]. The commenting period for this rule, including this and subsequent extensions, closed in June of 1998, and in September of 1999, MSHA published the final rule [220], which primarily amended 30 CFR Part 62. Minor changes were made in the final rule as compared to the proposed rule, but the main provisions described above remained unchanged. The decision to keep the PEL at 90dBA and the exchange rate at 5dB, as opposed to
NIOSH’s recommendation of 85dBA and an exchange rate of 3dB [212], was based on MSHA’s conclusion that it would be infeasible for the mining industry to meet the NIOSH recommendation [215, 220].
Expansion of the NIOSH Hearing Loss Prevention Research Program
Following the implementation of the 1999 MSHA noise rule, NIOSH significantly expanded its mining hearing loss prevention research efforts in Pittsburgh. The research team increased from about 3-5 researchers to about 16-24 researchers [210]. The facilities for this research were also improved with the construction and accreditation of a reverberation chamber and hemi-anechoic chamber large enough to accommodate underground mining equipment [221, 210]. In addition to these large laboratory facilities, NIOSH constructed and obtained accreditation for a laboratory for the testing of attenuation of hearing protectors and commissioned a mobile hearing loss prevention unit, a 32-foot trailer containing a four-person booth for conducting hearing tests and for evaluating hearing protectors [210].
Based on MSHA noise exposure data, NIOSH decided to focus its research first on continuous mining machines and roof bolting machines. This research and the diffusion of noise controls for those two pieces of equipment is discussed in the following sections.
87
4.2.2 Case 6: Noise Controls for Continuous Mining Machines Continuous Mining Machine Noise Control Research
Following the enactment of the new MSHA regulations on noise exposure, NIOSH began conducting field measurements of noise exposure for workers around a variety of different mining machines. It was found that 86% of continuous mining machine operators are exposed to noise levels exceeding the PEL in the MSHA regulation [222]. Therefore, developing and demonstrating the effectiveness of noise controls for continuous mining machines became a priority for the NIOSH mining research program, with the goal of having feasible noise controls published in an MSHA PIB [210].
Using the newly constructed and accredited hemi-anechoic chamber at the NIOSH Pittsburgh facility and beam-forming microphone array technology, researchers identified the dominant noise source from a continuous mining machine to be the conveying system [223]. Several controls were developed and tested, the most successful of which was coated flight bars [224].
Testing both in the lab and in the field demonstrated that the coated flight bars reduced operators’ noise exposure by 7dB [225].
Other notable engineering controls developed through NIOSH research for continuous mining machines include a dual-sprocket conveyor chain, which was shown to provide a 3dB reduction in exposure [226], a urethane jacketed tail roller, which was shown to provide a 2dB reduction
[227], and a vibration-isolated chain conveyor take-up [210]. Figure 14 shows a single-sprocket conveyor on a continuous mining machine, which is was the standard configuration. Figure 15 shows a dual-sprocket conveyor, and Figure 16 shows a dual-sprocket conveyor with urethane- coated flight bars.
88
Figure 14: Single sprocket chain conveyor on a continuous mining machine (Source: [228])
Figure 15: Dual sprocket chain conveyor on a continuous mining machine (Source: [228])
Figure 16: Dual sprocket conveyor chain with polyurethane-coated flight bars on a continuous mining machine (Source: [228]) 89
Diffusion of Continuous Mining Machine Noise Control Technologies
The effectiveness of noise controls developed for continuous mining machines by NIOSH was demonstrated through both laboratory and field evaluations. The research program worked closely with mining machinery manufacturers and material suppliers during the research process.
A major milestone was when Joy Mining Machinery, now owned by Komatsu, modified their facilities to produce dual-sprocket chains and coated flight bars for their continuous mining machines. The dual-sprocket chain technology provides benefits other than noise reduction; it also reduces wear on the chain and sprockets and lengthens the life of the components [228,
226].
As a result of the demonstrated effectiveness of these noise controls and the fact that a major manufacturer was supplying the noise controls on their equipment, MSHA determined that the controls were “technically and administratively achievable” and listed them in a Program
Information Bulletin (PIB) [229]. Since the noise regulation requires operators to use any feasible noise controls to reduce exposure below the PEL, this effectively requires the use of these controls in cases where miners are overexposed. Dual-sprocket conveyor chains and polyurethane-coated conveyor flight bars are among very few engineering noise controls listed in the MSHA PIB, with the majority of the controls listed being administrative controls. The controls listed by MSHA as “technically and administratively achievable” are shown in Table 6, and the controls listed as offering promise are shown in Table 7.
It is difficult to assess how many continuous mining machines now have these controls installed, but roughly a decade after they were developed, both the dual-sprocket conveyor chain and coated conveyor flights are still offered as options on continuous mining machines [228]. The
90 best way of assessing the effectiveness of these controls is to look at the reduction in miner noise exposure, which is discussed in the following section.
Table 6: Engineering and administrative noise controls considered by MSHA to be technologically and administratively achievable in reducing the noise exposure of miners operating or working around continuous mining machines [229]
Engineering and administrative controls considered feasible for continuous mining machines as published in MSHA PIB [229] Remote control with proper positioning of the operator; Treated cutting heads on auger miners (e.g., the application of stiffening gussets to the helix and filling of voids with sand) Proper maintenance, such as replacing bent or misaligned conveyor flights or sides and use of a chain with proper tension or one having an automatic chain tension device Polyurethane coated conveyor flights Dual sprocket conveyor chain Locate the shuttle car change-out point away from major noise sources (e.g., auxiliary fan) Avoid idle parking in high noise areas Keep miners away from auxiliary fans Have mechanics and electricians avoid working near high-noise sources during maintenance Reduce utility personnel working time near face and auxiliary fan Limit operation of empty chain conveyors on all equipment (i.e., shuttle car, loading machine, continuous miner, miner-bolter, and feeder-breaker) Eliminate a high-pitched screech by instructing roof bolters to drill straight holes and to avoid metal strap contact with the drill steel Follow a cutting cycle (e.g., reduce cutting into roof and floor rock, cutting directly into in- seam rock, and over sumping) to minimize noise generation from both the continuous mining machine and the cutting process Regulate engine RPM on diesel-powered shuttle cars during loading and dumping Follow shuttle car loading and tramming procedures that minimize noise (e.g., time that the conveyor chain is turning, increase distance from continuous miner and its boom, etc.) Follow loading and tramming procedures for loading machines that minimize noise Turn off any mobile equipment when not in operation Maintain proper fan blade clearance on dust scrubbers associated with continuous-mining machines Constrained layer damping on the conveyor pan on an auger miner (e.g., the application of visco-elastic materials covered with wear steel to isolate the chain and flights from the conveyor pan line)
91
Table 7: Engineering and administrative noise controls considered by MSHA to offer promise in reducing the noise exposure of miners operating or working around continuous mining machines [24]
Engineering and administrative controls considered to offer promise for continuous mining machines as published in MSHA PIB [229] Transparent barrier between the operator and conveyor pan line Constrained layer damping on the conveyor pan on a continuous ripper miner (e.g., the application of visco-elastic materials covered with wear steel to isolate the chain and flights from the conveyor pan line) Sand-filled conveyor decks Enclosure and isolation of motors and pump housings where they have been demonstrated to be a significant noise source Vibration isolation mounts on motors/pumps where they have been demonstrated to be a significant noise source Isolated cutting bits (e.g., the application of vibration isolation materials between the bits/block and the drum) Sand-filled cutting heads Rotate center bolter operator with center bolter helper, roof bolter operators with utility personnel or shuttle car operators, miner-bolter operator with loading machine operator, or continuous miner operator with shuttle car operator. Noise controls for continuous mining machine scrubbers
Impact of Noise Controls on Continuous Mining Machine Operator Exposure
In 2007, researchers published an analysis of noise exposures before and after the enactment of the 1999 noise regulation and concluded that noise exposure significantly declined after the new regulation became effective [230]. Another analysis, published in 2017, went beyond this analysis by considering a much larger data set and by examining exposure by mining sectors.
Overall, the mining industry saw an average 4.5dB decrease in exposure comparing measurements before the rule change to measurements after the rule change. However, the greatest reductions were seen at surface mines and at metal/non-metal mines. Whereas the average reduction for all mines was 4.5dB, the average reduction was only 0.8dB for underground coal mine [231].
92
An analysis of MSHA citations related to the noise rule from 2000 through 2014 showed a decreasing trend in violations since 2000 [232]. Since these violations are directly tied to measurements of noise exposure and to the implementation of noise controls, it is reasonable to interpret this decrease in violations as a decrease in hearing loss risk. The majority of the violations were for insufficient corrective actions when noise exposure exceeded the 85dBA action level or the 90dBA PEL, which represents an ongoing challenge despite the downward trend in exposure, violations, and hearing loss risk.
To look specifically at the effectiveness of noise control efforts for continuous mining machines, data from MSHA’s database of noise samples has been analyzed, which provides measurements taken during mine inspection noise surveys [217]. The dataset provides noise dose measurements as a percentage of the 90dBA PEL, so any dose over 100% would be considered an overexposure by the regulation. The data was filtered to remove noise doses above 3200% of the PEL, which corresponds to an average exposure for an 8-hour working shift of 115dBA, which is the ceiling limit in the regulation. These outliers were judged to be anomalous sensor readings. The average and standard deviation for the 90dBA PEL noise dose for continuous mining machine operators was calculated on a year-by-year basis and is shown in Figure 17. In addition, the proportion of the noise surveys for continuous mining machine operators for which the dose was over 100% was also calculated on a year-by-year basis and is shown in Figure 18.
These figures clearly show that, since the enforcement of the 1999 noise regulation began in
2000, the average noise dose for these miners have steadily decreased and that the number of miners who are overexposed has also steadily decreased. This represents a demonstrated improvement in miner health risk exposure.
93
Figure 17: Average noise dose for continuous mining machine operators as reported in the MSHA Noise Samples data set [217]
Figure 18: Proportion of noise surveys for continuous mining machine operators for which the PEL dose was above 100% as reported in the MSHA Noise Samples data set [217]
94
Indications of Technology Success or Failure for CMM Noise Controls
The demonstrated reduction in excessive noise exposure for continuous mining machine operators since the enactment of new noise regulations in 1999 is a clear indication of the success of this mandate, which drove the development and deployment of improved noise control technologies.
An analysis of this indication of technology success is presented in Section 5.2.1.
95
4.2.3 Case 7: Noise Controls for Roof Bolting Machines Roof Bolting Machine Noise Control Research
NIOSH identified roof bolting machine operators as the second most over-exposed occupations in underground coal mining, with 81% of operators having exposures that exceeded the MSHA
PEL [222]. Most of the noise exposure was found to occur during the drilling of the holes prior to the insertion of the bolt [210]; therefore, the research focused on the drilling process. Noise source identification using a beam-forming microphone array in NIOSH’s hemi-anechoic chamber in Pittsburgh showed that the radiated noise during drilling primarily came from two sources: the bit-roof interface and the drill-chuck interface [233].
Research for bolters therefore focused on the development and testing of noise controls to reduce the noise from these sources. Controls were developed in collaboration between NIOSH and companies including Corry Rubber Corporation and Kennametal, Inc. These controls included a collapsible drill steel enclosure [234] and isolators for the drill bit and chuck [235]. In laboratory testing, the use of the drill bit and chuck isolators together was shown to provide a 3-7dBA in operator noise exposure [236, 237], the use of the collapsible drill steel enclosure was shown to provide a 7dBA reduction [238], and the concurrent use of all three of these controls was shown to provide a 13dBA reduction [239]. Field evaluations of the drill bit isolator showed a reduction of 3-5dBA in operator exposure [240]. Conclusive field evaluations of the other controls were not published.
96
Diffusion of Roof Bolting Machine Noise Control Technologies
The effectiveness of noise controls developed for roof bolting machines by NIOSH was demonstrated through both laboratory and field evaluations. The research program worked closely with manufacturers and material suppliers, including Corry Rubber Corporation and
Kennametal, Inc., during the research process. This partnership resulted in drill bit isolators becoming commercially available. On the other hand, chuck isolators and drill steel enclosures were not commercialized.
As a result of the demonstrated effectiveness for the drill bit isolator, and the fact that a major manufacturer was supplying the noise control, MSHA determined that the drill bit isolator was
“technically and administratively achievable” and listed it in a PIB [229]. Since the noise regulation requires operators to use any feasible noise controls to reduce exposure below the
PEL, this effectively requires the use of this control in cases where miners are overexposed.
MSHA lists the chuck isolator and the collapsible drill steel enclosure as offering promise. The controls listed by MSHA as “technically and administratively achievable” for roof bolting machines are shown in Table 8, and the controls listed as offering promise are shown in Table 9.
It is difficult to assess how many roof bolting machines now have these controls installed. The best way of assessing the effectiveness of these controls is to look at the reduction in miner noise exposure, which is discussed in the following section.
97
Table 8: Engineering and administrative noise controls considered by MSHA to be technologically and administratively achievable in reducing the noise exposure of miners operating or working around roof bolters [229]
Engineering and administrative controls considered feasible for roof bolters as published in MSHA PIB [229] Wet drilling (where it can be implemented due to the roof bolter design and when compatible with the geology and mining method) Sharp drill bits Starter drill steel to begin the hole Straight drill steel (one piece and with thick wall, if conditions and dust collection allow) Replacement of worn or defective drilling components (e.g., drill pot bushings or bearings, worn steel, bent steel) Maintenance of manufacturer-recommended drilling parameters for thrust, torque, and rotational speed Drill bit isolator
Table 9: Engineering and administrative noise controls considered by MSHA to offer promise in reducing the noise exposure of miners operating or working around roof bolters [24]
Engineering and administrative controls considered to offer promise for roof bolters as published in MSHA PIB [229] Automated dust collection system or actuation of the dust collection system motors only during drilling, or use of administrative controls to accomplish the same task Exhaust conditioner (water box) and/or manufacturer-recommended exhaust muffler Chuck isolator Acoustic drill steel enclosure Controls for optimizing the drilling parameters (drill feedback system) Water misting system (i.e., injection of a small volume of water in a mist form into the drill hole clearance system) Grommet to isolate the drill steel and chuck Acoustical liner in the tool tray Damped drill steels
Impact of Noise Controls on Roof Bolter Operator Exposure
As was discussed in the preceding section for continuous mining machine noise controls, noise exposures have been shown to have significantly declined since the enactment of the 1999 noise regulation and [230], but whereas the average reduction for all mines was 4.5dB, the average reduction was only 0.8dB for underground coal mine [231]. An analysis of MSHA citations also
98 showed a decreasing trend in violations since 2000, indicating a reduction in hearing loss risk
[232].
And, as was done with the continuous mining machines, MSHA’s database of noise samples
[217] was used to assess noise dose changes for roof bolting machines since 2000. Again, the data was filtered to remove noise doses above 3200% of the PEL, considering these outliers to be anomalous sensor readings. The average and standard deviation for the 90dBA PEL noise dose for roof bolting machine operators was calculated on a year-by-year basis and is shown in Figure
19. In addition, the proportion of the noise surveys for roof bolting machine operators for which the dose was over 100% was also calculated on a year-by-year basis and is shown in Figure 20.
These figures clearly show that, since the enforcement of the 1999 noise regulation began in
2000, unlike the noise dose for continuous mining machine operators, which has steadily declined, the average noise dose for roof bolting machine operators has remained relatively flat as has the proportion of miners who are overexposed. This indicates that a demonstrable improvement in miner health risk has not been achieved.
Indications of Technology Success or Failure for RBM Noise Controls
Unlike the case with continuous mining machines, the development of noise controls for roof bolting machines has not resulted in a clearly demonstrable reduction in excessive noise exposure for roof bolting machine operators since the enactment of new noise regulations in
1999. This is an indication that these controls have not achieved success.
An analysis of this indication of technology failure is presented in Section 5.2.2.
99
Figure 19: Average noise dose for roof bolting machine operators as reported in the MSHA Noise Samples data set [217]
Figure 20: Proportion of noise surveys for roof bolting machine operators for which the PEL dose was above 100% as reported in the MSHA Noise Samples data set [217].
100
Chapter 5: Causal Tree Analyses
In Chapter 4, the selected cases for several mining safety and health technologies for the mining industry were described: including portable refuge alternatives, self-contained self-rescuers, primary communications and tracking systems, proximity detection systems, LED cap lamps, and noise controls for continuous mining machines and roof bolting machines. In particular, the research, development, and diffusion of these technologies were studied to find indications that the introduction of the technology had been successful or unsuccessful. As was discussed in
Chapter 3, indications of a successful outcome include:
• There is documented evidence of an achieved safety or health benefit
• Documented successful trials were performed
• If not mandated, there was wide-spread voluntary adoption
• There is an indication of broad applicability throughout the industry
Indications of an unsuccessful outcome would include:
• There are documented failures of the technology
• The technology’s use introduces a new hazard
• There are low levels of adoption despite demonstrated ability to meet regulatory
standards
• Judicial intervention in rule-making or enforcement occurs
• Miners strongly resist the deployment and use of the technology
• After-rule time extensions occur
101
With these definitions in mind, indications of successful and unsuccessful outcomes were identified for each of the technologies. The indications of successful outcomes that were found are shown in Table 10, and the indications of unsuccessful outcomes that were found are shown in Table 11. In this chapter, each of these is examined individually, and causal tree analysis is applied to find the root causes of each successful or unsuccessful outcome. From these root causes, commonalities are identified, and potential ways of improving the likelihood of successful outcome are proposed.
Table 10: Indicators of a successful safety and health technology introduction
Primary communications and tracking systems are adopted throughout the underground coal mining industry
LED cap lamps are rapidly and voluntarily adopted by mine operators throughout the underground mining industry
Continuous mining machine noise controls achieve a demonstrated reduction in noise exposure for operators
Table 11: Indicators of an unsuccessful safety and health technology introduction
Judicial intervention and after-rule time extensions occurred in refuge alternatives rulemaking
Miners express strong resistance to using refuge alternatives
Unacceptably high rate of quality control failures occur for CSE SR-100 self-contained self-rescuers
No documented evidence exists showing that tracking systems achieve a material improvement to safety
Electromagnetic interference (EMI) between continuous personal dust monitors and proximity detection systems effectively render the proximity detection system temporarily inoperable
Roof bolting machine noise controls fail to achieve a demonstrated reduction in noise exposure for operators
102
In the following sections, the causal tree analysis for each of the technologies examined are presented along with a discussion of the results. First, the causal tree analyses for the safety technologies are presented: refuge alternatives, SCSRs, communications and tracking, proximity detection, and LED cap lamps. Following this, the causal tree analyses for the health technologies are presented: noise controls for continuous mining machines, and noise controls for roof bolting machines. Finally, this chapter will conclude by presenting a summary of the commonalities between the results of these analyses and a discussion of what this indicates for potential means of increasing the likelihood of success for new safety and health technology mandates, which will feed into the next chapter in which recommendations are presented.
5.1 Causal Tree Analyses for Safety Interventions
5.1.1 Causal Tree Analysis for Case 1: Refuge Alternatives
In Section 4.1.1, a summary of the research, development, and diffusion of portable refuge alternatives was presented. Although this technology has been a topic of interest for several decades most of the development for the underground coal mining industry has occurred since the occurrence of the Sago, Darby, and Alma mine disasters in 2006 and the subsequent passage of the MINER Act of 2006, which mandated research into refuge alternatives, and the promulgation of a 2008 MSHA regulation that mandated the use of refuge alternative. Two indications that this safety technology mandate has been unsuccessful were identified:
1. Judicial intervention and after-rule time extensions occurred in refuge alternatives
rulemaking.
2. Miners express strong resistance to using refuge alternatives.
In this section, causal tree analyses of these two outcomes are presented.
103
Causal Tree Analysis of “judicial intervention and after-rule time extensions occurred in refuge alternatives rulemaking”
Figure 21 shows the causal tree for the outcome “judicial intervention and after-rule time extensions occurred in refuge alternatives rulemaking.” Notes related to this analysis are shown in Table 12. This outcome is evidenced by the filing of successful legal challenges to the regulation [71] and the repeated re-opening and extension of the rulemaking process after the passage of the final rule [73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 72].
The first step to performing the causal tree analysis is to identify the proximal cause for these legal challenges and after-rule time extensions. It seems reasonable to conclude that the reason these occurred was that after the enactment of regulations, lingering questions about the safety of portable RAs remained in the minds of members of the mining community. These questions lingered because, at the time of rulemaking, the risks associated with the use of RAs were not well understood. Specifically, the risk of heat-related illness while in an RA, the risk of RA components not surviving either primary or secondary explosions, and the risk of toxic gas ingress into the RAs were not well understood. The fact that these risks were not well understood is reflected in NIOSH research that has occurred since the passage of the regulation on the topics of heat and humidity buildup inside RAs [241, 242, 243], cooling systems for RAs [244], the explosion survivability of RA doors [245] and pressure relief valves [246], the ingress of harmful gases into RAs during miner ingress [247], and the purging of harmful gases following miner ingress [248]. The fact that concentrated, ongoing research in these topic areas has yet to provide clear guidance for the design and use of RAs is clear evidence that these risks were not well understood at the time the regulation was written. The above discussion is reflected in the top three levels of the causal tree analysis in Figure 21.
104
Judicial intervention1 and after-rule time extensions2 occurred in refuge alternatives rulemaking
Questions about risks associated with refuge alternatives remain after rulemaking
Risks associated with the use of RAs were not well understood at the time of rulemaking: - Risk of heat-related illness3 - Risk of components not surviving explosions4 - Risk of toxic gas ingress5
Rulemaking proceeded despite the identification of Rulemaking proceeded despite identification of need for further research on heat mitigation, operational deficiencies in portable RAs11 atmosphere management, and explosion survivability6 Despite identifying Regulators fail to fully serious deficiencies with recognize the Political and cultural pressures exist for immediate available RAs, NIOSH seriousness of identified action following 2006 mine diasters7 report to Congress stated deficiencies that the technology merits commercialization and The timeframe The MINER Act calls deployment12 Biases lead regulators to established by the for the use of RAs judge that immediate MINER Act allows for despite a lack of action is needed and to limited research and research indicating that ignore indications of development8 the technology is Biases and political technological mature10 pressures lead immaturity researchers to understate the seriousness of issues Biases lead legislators to identified through Biases lead legislators to judge that immediate research action is needed9 fail to recognize indications of technological immaturity
Figure 21: Causal tree analysis for “Judicial intervention and after-rule time extensions occurred in refuge alternatives rulemaking” (See notes in Table 12)
105
Table 12: Notes for causal tree analysis for “Judicial intervention and after-rule time extensions occurred in refuge alternatives rulemaking” (See causal tree in Figure 21)
1 United Mine Workers v. MSHA, October 26, 2010 [71]
2 Multiple re-openings and extensions of public comment periods issued [73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 72]
3 Ongoing research on heat and humidity buildup [241, 242, 243] and cooling systems [244] for refuge alternatives indicates significant knowledge gaps at the time the rule was enacted.
4 Ongoing research on survivability of RA doors [245] and pressure relief valves [246] for refuge alternatives indicates significant knowledge gaps at the time the rule was enacted.
5 Ongoing research on contamination ingress [247] and harmful gas purging [248] for refuge alternatives indicates significant knowledge gaps at the time the rule was enacted.
6 The Foster-Miller report commissioned by NIOSH in 2007 highlighted the need for further research on heat mitigation, atmosphere management, and explosion survivability [67, 68].
7 See discussion on the call for refuge alternatives in response to the Sago mine disaster in Section 4.1.1
8 The MINER Act required that NIOSH conduct “research, including field tests, concerning the utility, practicality, survivability, and cost of various refuge alternatives in an underground coal mine environment, including commercially-available portable refuge chambers,” and to provide a report to Congress on the results of this research within 18 months. This timeframe set an expectation for rapid enactment of regulations.
9 Explain and cite relevant biases
10 A 1983 report developed by Foster-Miller through a USBM contract highlighted the importance of considering the following in the development of refuge alternatives: breathable air supplies, infiltration of harmful gases, chamber pressurization, chamber construction, communications, psychological aspects, and training [51, 52]
11 NIOSH testing of refuge alternatives in 2007 identified shortcomings with RAs having to do with heat dissipation, time to deploy, and ability to maintain CO2 concentration at the suggested level. NIOSH considered these deficiencies to be “sufficiently serious in three of the chambers to require correction before deployment.” [64]
12 The NIOSH report to Congress concluded that although “some commercially available portable chambers have operational deficiencies that will delay their deployment in mines” and although “there are some remaining knowledge or technology gaps for the design and specification of refuge alternatives” that “the benefits of refuge alternatives and the general specification of these alternatives are sufficiently known to merit their commercialization and deployment in underground coal mines.” [64]
106
Between the third and fourth levels of the causal tree analysis in Figure 21, the question that must be answered is why the risks associated with the use of RAs was not well understood at the time of rulemaking. Two causes were identified among those that contributed to this situation:
1. Rulemaking proceeded despite the identification of need for further research on heat
mitigation, atmosphere management, and explosion survivability
2. Rulemaking proceeded despite identification of operational deficiencies in portable RAs
It should be noted that a third cause could have also contributed. Manufacturers and vendors of refuge alternatives technologies may have either intentionally or unintentionally misrepresented the maturity level of their products. This cause was not explicitly included in this analysis because it was judged that any recommendations designed to objectively detect the need for further research or to appropriately act on identified deficiencies would necessarily also detect misrepresentations of technology maturity.
The first identified cause (“Rulemaking proceeded despite the identification of need for further research on heat mitigation, atmosphere management, and explosion survivability”) is evidenced by the fact that following the passage of the MINER Act, and in partial fulfillment of Act’s mandate that NIOSH lead research and development efforts on refuge alternatives, NIOSH commissioned a contract with Foster-Miller to quantify the potential benefits of using RAs and to identify areas in which further research and development is needed. The report from this contract was published in 2007, after the passage of the MINER Act but before the finalization of the RA regulation from MSHA. This report highlighted the need for further research on heat mitigation, atmosphere management, and explosion survivability [67, 68].
107
The second (“Rulemaking proceeded despite identification of operational deficiencies in portable RAs”) refers to information reported by NIOSH to Congress in 2007 that testing of refuge alternatives had identified shortcomings with RAs having to do with heat dissipation, time to deploy, and ability to maintain CO2 concentration at the suggested level. NIOSH considered these deficiencies to be “sufficiently serious in three of the chambers to require correction before deployment” [64]. Asking why rulemaking proceeded despite these indications that further research and development was needed and that the existing RA technologies exhibited deficiencies is the next step in the causal tree analysis, which takes us to the fifth level of the causal tree in Figure 21.
The most apparent reason that rulemaking proceeded despite the apparent need for research and development is that political and cultural pressures were pushing for an immediate response to the mine disasters of 2006. This was discussed in detail in Section 4.1.1: following the Sago disaster and other disasters, media coverage, Congressional hearings, and political discourse created an environment in which there were serious doubts about the nation’s ability to protect miners’ safety and health and there was a call for immediate and decisive action to ensure that disasters of this type did not occur again. The urgency of the political and cultural environment under which the RA regulations were passed can be traced back to the passage of the MINER
Act, as shown on the left side of the sixth level of the causal tree in Figure 21, with the following two causes:
1. The timeframe established by the MINER Act allowed for limited research and
development.
2. The MINER Act calls for the use of RAs despite a lack of research indicating that the
technology is mature.
108
The first of these can be traced to the root cause that biases lead legislators to judge that immediate action is needed. Specifically, cognitive biases such as the availability heuristic [249], availability cascade [250], bandwagon effect [251], the law of the hammer [252], and the identifiable victim effect [253] may have led legislators to conclude that immediate action was needed to respond to the disasters. A brief discussion of each of these biases and the role the played in the decision to rapidly enact the MINER Act is presented below.
The availability heuristic [249] is the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of events which one remembers happening recently or which are more unusual or emotionally charged. In this case, the disasters at Sago, Darby, and Alma were recent, unusual, and emotionally charged at the time the MINER Act was being passed; it is likely that legislators, as well as others in society overestimated the likelihood of similar disasters occurring in the future, which contributed to the sense of urgency for legislation. Availability cascade [250] is the cycle by which propositions which are emotionally charged are frequently repeated in public discourse, which, by the availability heuristic, increases the emotional charge of these propositions. This self-reinforcing cycle undoubtedly played a role in creating the mindset that immediate legislative and regulatory action was needed. This appears to also have been reinforced by the bandwagon effect [251], which is the tendency to hold beliefs that many other people also hold. The law of the hammer
[252] is the tendency to over-rely on familiar tools and methods, as captured by the idiom “If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.” This cognitive bias surely played a role in legislators judging that legislation was the best means of addressing the apparent need for improvements to mine safety and health. Finally, the identifiable victim effect [253] is the tendency to respond more strongly to risk when the potential victim of an event is personally identified rather than a group of unidentified people. The personal stories of the victims of the
109
Sago, Darby, and Alma disasters were covered extensively in the media in the months following the disasters, notably including the poignant letters left by the victims at Sago. This personalization of mining disaster victims was likely a factor in the thinking of legislators and others.
The other root cause on the left side at the bottom of Figure 21 is that biases led legislators to fail to recognize indications of technological immaturity. In particular, confirmation bias appears to have played a role in leading legislators to the conclusion that refuge alternative technologies either were already mature or could easily be developed to maturity. Confirmation bias [254] is the tendency to seek out and remember information that confirms one’s beliefs or preconceptions while ignoring information that disconfirms one’s beliefs or preconceptions. As was discussed in
Section 4.1.1, the discourse around mine safety in the media and from members of Congress following the disasters of 2006 was largely motivated by the notion that the mining industry was not making use of modern technologies to protect miners. This notion that available technologies simply weren’t being used surely led legislators to think that new safety and health technology mandates would be relatively easy to meet. Confirmation bias would have caused legislators to more heavily weight evidence that reinforced this notion (e.g., testimony from vendors claiming that they could provide effective solutions) and to discount evidence that contradicted this notion
(e.g., testimony stating that further research and development is needed).
Returning now to examine the right side of Figure 21 from the intermediate cause “Rulemaking proceeded despite identification of operational deficiencies in portable RAs,” the question is why the identification of deficiencies did not cause rulemaking to stall following the passage of the
MINER Act. Two causes for this have been identified:
110
1. Despite identifying serious deficiencies with available RAs, NIOSH report to Congress
stated that the technology merits commercialization and deployment.
2. Regulators fail to fully recognize the seriousness of identified deficiencies.
The first refers to the fact that the 2007 NIOSH report to Congress on their preliminary research on RAs concluded that although “some commercially available portable chambers have operational deficiencies that will delay their deployment in mines” and although “there are some remaining knowledge or technology gaps for the design and specification of refuge alternatives” that “the benefits of refuge alternatives and the general specification of these alternatives are sufficiently known to merit their commercialization and deployment in underground coal mines”
[64]. In this way, although researchers had identified serious deficiencies, the implications of these deficiencies were understated. Similarly, despite having seen these documented deficiencies, regulators apparently failed to fully appreciate the seriousness of these deficiencies.
These are traced back to the root causes shown at the bottom right of Figure 21: “Biases and political pressures lead researchers to understate the seriousness of issues identified through research,” and “Biases lead regulators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore indications of technological immaturity.” Both of these can be explained by similar cognitive biases in the thinking of the researchers and the regulators, namely: confirmation bias [254], availability heuristic [249], availability cascade [250], the identifiable victim effect [253], the law of the hammer [252], optimism bias [255, 256], and the ostrich effect [256].
The availability heuristic, availability cascade, and the identifiable victim effect, played a role similar to what was discussed for legislators above; the frequently repeated, emotionally charged discussion of the recent events of Sago and other disasters created a greater sense of urgency.
111
This likely led regulators to feel that immediate action was needed and led researchers to feel that a positive interpretation of the research was needed in order to accommodate this immediate action. As with the legislators, the law of the hammer may also have led regulators to their most familiar tool: regulation. Regulators and researchers appear to also have suffered confirmation bias that caused them to discount evidence that contradicted the proposition that RA technology was mature and effective. Finally, optimism bias and the ostrich effect may have led both regulators and researchers to discount the evidence that there were deficiencies with RAs.
Optimism bias [255, 256] is the tendency to be overly optimistic when considering a decision involving risk. In other words, although the risk that RAs might not be as safe as expected was apparent in the identified deficiencies of the chambers, optimism bias caused regulators and researchers to conclude that these deficiencies could be corrected. Similarly, the ostrich effect
[256] is the tendency to ignore an obvious risk (i.e., to stick one’s head in the proverbial sand). It is possible that, although researchers and regulators recognized the import of the identified deficiencies, they ignored this in decision making due to the ostrich effect.
In addition, these biases can be compounded by political pressures and interactions within or between agencies whereby positions that do not align with the agendas of an agency can be stifled either overtly through the silencing of those positions or more subtly through the intentional or unintentional fostering of a culture in which those positions are not expressed.
The discussion above traces the causes for judicial and after-rule time extensions in the refuge alternatives rulemaking process to four root causes which can all be attributed to cognitive biases on the part of legislators, regulators, and researchers who were responsible for making key decisions leading to the enactment of the regulation. These root causes are shown in Table 13.
112
Table 13: Identified root causes for “Judicial intervention and after-rule time extensions occurred in refuge alternatives rulemaking”
Biases lead legislators to judge that immediate action is needed
Biases lead legislators to fail to recognize indications of technological immaturity
Biases and political pressures lead researchers to understate the seriousness of issues identified through research
Biases lead regulators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore indications of technological immaturity
Causal Tree Analysis of “Miners express strong resistance to using refuge alternatives”
In Section 4.1.1, the other indication of an unsuccessful outcome for the mandate for refuge alternatives was that miners express strong resistance to the use of the chambers. It is common to hear from miners that they will not ever use an RA, or at least that they won’t use them except as a last resort. While these statements may not reflect what miners will actually do in a disaster, it is a significant concern that miners may not use an RA in a situation where one could save their life. The causal tree analysis for this is shown in Figure 22. Note that a significant portion of this tree is shown in dashed lines. This is because at two parts of the tree, one of the intermediate causes is that “risks associated with the use of RAs were not well understood at the time of rulemaking,” which was also an intermediate cause in the causal tree shown in Figure 21.
Therefore, only the root causes are shown with dashed lines.
There are two apparent reasons why miners would be strongly opposed to using RAs; these represent the second level of the causal tree analysis in Figure 22:
1. Training instructs miners to use RAs only as a last resort or as a way station.
113
2. Miners perceive that attempting escape is less risky than taking refuge and awaiting
rescue.
Appropriate and effective training is obviously an important component of any successful safety or health technology introduction. When training for technologies is designed, the creators of the training content make decisions about what content to include and how the appropriate use of the technology should be presented. In the case of RAs, the decision was made that miners should be instructed to use RAs only as a last resort or as a way station to rest, communicate with the surface, or to switch over SCSRs during escape; this is reflected in multiple training programs created and distributed by NIOSH [87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92]. There are two reasons for this decision. The first is that there are justifiable reasons why escape should be preferred over refuge and rescue. At the Sago Mine disaster, it was unambiguous that miners would have had a better chance of survival if an RA had been available; the miners were unable to escape the mine, and the atmosphere was filled with carbon monoxide. However, scenarios like this are rare among mine disasters. In most cases, miners would be able to escape, even if they had to do so through smoke and toxic gases. Clearly, if escape is possible, miners are better off getting out of the mine than staying in the mine. Although there are these justifiable reasons why escape should be preferred, there are also scenarios, such as the scenario at Sago, where taking refuge would be necessary and would be safer than attempting escape. This leads to the first root cause for this analysis, which is that this engineering control is only able to improve safety under a specific type of scenario. In other words, since the use of RAs is not universally the safer option in every mine disaster, the judgement of the miners is needed to select when to use an RA and when not to.
114
Miners express strong resistance to using refuge alternatives
Training instructs miners to use RAs only Miners perceive that attempting escape is less as a last resort or as a way station risky than taking refuge and awaiting rescue
Justifiable reasons Among regulators, Justifiable reasons Fears exist among Miners are able to exist for preferring mine operators, exist for preferring miners about maintain greater escape over and researchers, escape over entering refuge autonomy by refuge/rescue confidence in RA refuge/rescue alternatives attempting escape safety is not than by taking absolute refuge
Engineering Engineering Risks associated control improves Risks associated control improves with the use of safety or health with the use of safety or health RAs were not well Biases lead miners only when used in RAs were not well only when used in understood at the to mistrust a specific scenario understood at the a specific scenario time of rulemaking interventions time of rulemaking
See corresponding portion of causal tree for See corresponding portion of causal tree for "Judicial intervention and after-rule time "Judicial intervention and after-rule time extensions occurred in refuge alternatives extensions occurred in refuge alternatives rulemaking" rulemaking"
Biases lead Biases lead Biases lead Biases lead legislators to judge legislators to fail to legislators to judge legislators to fail to that immediate action recognize indications that immediate recognize indications is needed of technological action is needed of technological immaturity immaturity
Biases and political Biases lead Biases and political pressures lead regulators to judge Biases lead researchers to pressures lead regulators to judge that immediate action researchers to understate the is needed and to that immediate seriousness of issues understate the action is needed and ignore indications of seriousness of issues identified through technological to ignore indications research identified through of technological immaturity research immaturity
Figure 22: Causal tree analysis for “Miners express strong resistance to using refuge alternatives” (portions shown in dashed lines are not shown in their entirety because they would duplicate portions of Figure 21; therefore, only the root causes are shown)
115
Another reason that training programs may have advised using RAs only as a last resort is that those creating or advising the development of those training programs may have had less than complete confidence in the ability of RAs to provide a safe environment to await rescue. Again, this is justifiable since at the time of rulemaking and after, the risks associated with the use of
RAs were not well understood, as has already been discussed. This traces back to the four root causes shown in Table 13, which were identified through the analysis shown in Figure 21. These root causes have to do with cognitive biases, such as confirmation bias, the law of the hammer, availability heuristic, and others as discussed for the previous analysis. The same discussion for that analysis would apply here.
Aside from the fact that training advises miners to only use RAs as a last resort, the other reason that miners would be hesitant to use an RA is that they perceive that attempting escape is less risky than taking refuge and awaiting rescue, which is the right half of Figure 22. There are three reasons miners might have this perception:
1. Justifiable reasons exist for preferring escape over refuge/rescue.
2. Fears exist about entering refuge alternatives.
3. Miners are able to maintain greater autonomy by attempting escape than by taking refuge.
The first of these has already been discussed and traces to the same root cause discussed above.
The second represents a justifiable fear since the risks associated with entering an RA (for example, the risk of heat-related illness or the risk of secondary explosion) are significant and are not well understood. Again, this traces back to root causes already discussed associated with biases during the legislative and rulemaking procedures. The third, that miners are able to maintain greater autonomy by attempting escape, represents (at least in part) biases on the part of
116 the miners themselves. These biases may cause a miner to choose to attempt escape even when taking refuge is the safer course of action. Since this is out of the control of any legislative, regulatory, or research activities, it is beyond the scope of this study, but should be considered by those developing training materials or performing research on the human factors of mining safety and health interventions.
The discussion above traces the causes for the fact that miners express strong resistance to using
RAs to six root causes, four of which can all be attributed to cognitive biases on the part of legislators, regulators, and researchers who were responsible for making key decisions leading to the enactment of the regulation, and two of which can be considered inherent limitations or engineering and administrative controls. These root causes are shown in Table 14.
Table 14: Identified root causes for “Miners express strong resistance to using refuge alternatives”
Biases lead legislators to judge that immediate action is needed
Biases lead legislators to fail to recognize indications of technological immaturity
Biases and political pressures lead researchers to understate the seriousness of issues identified through research
Biases lead regulators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore indications of technological immaturity
Engineering control improves safety or health only when used in a specific scenario
Biases lead miners to mistrust interventions
117
5.1.2 Causal Tree Analysis for Case 2: Self-Contained Self-Rescuers
In Section 4.1.2, the recent history on SCSRs was presented, with a particular focus on the CSE
SR-100 SCSR, which was found to experience unacceptably high rates of quality control failure, as was reported in public notices from NIOSH between 2010 and 2013 [97, 95, 99, 101, 108,
104, 102, 105, 98]. Figure 23 shows a causal tree analysis to find the root causes for this unacceptably high rate of failures and for why this problem was not identified earlier. Notes and citations for this analysis are shown in Table 15.
118
Unacceptably high rate of quality control failures occur for CSE SR-100 self-contained self-rescuers1
SCSRs are certified despite deficiencies being 2 Identified Improvements to identified concerns with SCSR technology certified SCSRs have not occurred are understated in despite 6 Observed failures are incorrectly Observed failures public reports deficiencies that are identified observed in mine attributed to degradation in field- 7 deployed units rather than to as problems with disasters problems with manufacture3 manufacture are discounted as Biases and insignificant or as political pressures easily corrected5 lead researchers Technologies Testing is Biases lead to understate the other than SCSRs inadequately researchers to seriousness of were seen as a designed to faulty issues identified more effective positively conclusions Explanations through research solution to identify problems despite provided by problems seen at with SCSR 4 contradictory data Sago and other manufacture manufacturers are disasters8 accepted without Biases lead critical review regulators, researchers, and Biases result in legislators to insufficient or Biases lead maintain regulators, poorly designed confidence in experiments Biases result in researchers, and insufficient or existing safety legislators to ineffective review and health maintain of research technologies confidence in Biases lead to findings despite existing safety insufficient or indications of and health ineffective review poor performance technologies of research despite findings indications of poor performance
Limited research and development resources necessitate prioritization of some technology development and testing efforts over others
Figure 23: Causal tree analysis for "Unacceptably high rate of quality control failures occur for CSE SR-100 self- contained self-rescuers" (See notes in Table 15)
119
Table 15: Notes for causal tree analysis for "Unacceptably high rate of quality control failures occur for CSE SR- 100 self-contained self-rescuers" (See causal tree in Figure 23)
1 See discussion of quality control failures with starter oxygen in Section 4.1.2 and see public notices concerning failures and investigation in [97, 95, 99, 101, 108, 104, 102, 105, 98]
2 See discussion to prior failure to detect quality control issues in Section 4.1.2. The LTFE program had identified issues with the performance of CSE SR-100 units in reports published as far back as 1990 [112] and again in subsequent reports published over nearly two decades [113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119].
3 The conclusions of LTFE reports consistently attribute issues identified with tested units to degradation in the mining environment or to inadequate inspection of the units. The following quote is from the conclusions of the 2002 LTFE report [117], but very similar wording appears in all of the other LTFE reports published from 1990 through 2008: “The results of this study suggest that the large majority of SCSRs that pass their inspection criteria can be relied upon to provide a safe level of life support capability for mine escape purposes. However, the mining environment seems to have caused some performance degradation in the CSE SR-100.”
4 The inadequacy of the LTFE test program for detecting quality control issues is clearly evident by comparing the sampling procedures for the LTFE testing to the sampling performed in response to the identification of the quality control problem in 2010. In each phase of the LTFE, dozens of SCSR units were tested; in contrast, in the 2010-2011 testing using the quality assurance experimental design, 500 units were tested [100].
5 As early as 1990, manufacturing defects with the starter oxygen in CSE SR-100 SCSRs were identified. However, these problems were said to have been corrected by the manufacturer and were thereby discounted. The following quote appears in the conclusions of the 1990 report of the LTFE, but similar language appears in other LTFE reports: “Laboratory environmental testing of the SR-100 has uncovered a manufacturing defect in the burst disk of the oxygen starter bottle and a design problem with the desiccant bag. Both of these problems have been corrected by the manufacturer.”
6 Although performance problems with SCSR performance were identified through the LTFE, the conclusions of the public reports from these tests consistently presented the results in a positive light, including language such as: “The results of this study suggest that the large majority of SCSRs that pass their inspection criteria can be relied upon to provide a safe level of life support for mine escape purposes”
7 Investigations of the Sago disaster uncovered apparent deficiencies with SCSRs, including miners having difficulty breathing while using the units, and miners having difficulty starting the units, miners removing the units to talk (MSHA and WV Sago investigation reports). Although these issues might be partially attributable to insufficient expectations training or insufficient inspections, it is reasonable to conclude that improvements to the design of the SCSRs might help to address these problems. Despite these indications that
120
improvements to the technology may be needed, changes in mining safety and health legislation and regulation following the Sago disaster did not force any changes in the technology.
8 In contrast to changes in SCSR requirements, which were to increase the number of SCSRs required to be available in the mine and to require caches, changes to the requirements for communications and tracking systems and refuge alternatives in the MINER Act were technology-forcing in nature. This is an indication that legislators deemed the development of these technologies to be a more effective strategy than improvement of SCSRs. In large part, acceptance of the status quo with respect to SCSRs underlies this decision.
The fact that the potential for widespread quality control failures for these units is especially troubling when one considers that these units were certified for use in mines jointly by MSHA and NIOSH despite deficiencies being repeatedly identified through the Long Term Field
Evaluation (LTFE) program that was conducted to evaluate the capabilities of these and other
SCSRs deployed in the field over decades beginning in the 1980s. As was discussed in Chapter
4, the LTFE program had identified issues with the performance of CSE SR-100 units in reports published as far back as 1990 [112] and again in subsequent reports published over nearly two decades since then [113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119]. These performance issues included insufficient starter oxygen, breathing difficulty, less than rated capacity, and other issues affecting the safety value of these units.
Despite these limitations being identified, the conclusions of LTFE reports consistently attributed them to degradation of the units due to the harsh mining environment or to inadequate inspection. Language such as the following from the conclusions of the 2002 LTFE report [117] appears in several of the LTFE reports published from 1990 through 2008: “The results of this study suggest that the large majority of SCSRs that pass their inspection criteria can be relied upon to provide a safe level of life support capability for mine escape purposes.” So, even when
121 deficiencies with the SCSRs were identified, the potential seriousness of these deficiencies were understated, which undoubtedly contributed to the continued certification and use of these units.
The discussion above describes the first two proximal causes for the unacceptably high quality control failure rates in the SCSRs, as shown on the second level of the causal tree in Figure 23:
1. SCSRs are certified despite deficiencies being identified.
2. Identified concerns with certified SCSRs are understated in public reports.
The third proximal cause shown on the figure is that “improvements to SCSR technology have not occurred despite deficiencies observed in mine disasters.” Since this is unrelated to the first two causes listed above, it will be discussed separately later.
The reasons that SCSRs are certified despite deficiencies being identified are:
1. Observed failures are incorrectly attributed to degradation in field-deployed units rather
than to problems with manufacture.
2. Observed failures that are identified as problems with manufacture are discounted as
insignificant or as easily corrected.
The first can be traced to root causes on the part of those performing the LTFE program and preparing the reports from these evaluations. In particular, confirmation bias [254] will have led the researchers to reinforce any pre-conception they already had that the deficiencies in performance were due to degradation in the field. Since the same conclusion was published repeatedly in several subsequent LTFE reports, the bandwagon effect [251] may have led researchers to go along with this conclusion despite evidence that it might not be correct. In addition, biases such as the optimism bias [255, 256], and the ostrich effect [256] may have
122 caused researchers to underestimate or ignore the potential negative outcomes of certifying
SCSRs with observed deficiencies.
In these ways, cognitive biases would have played a major role in the false attribution of observed deficiencies to degradation of units rather than to defects in manufacture. Another way that biases played a role in this was that they led to inadequate testing of the SCSR units. The inadequacy of the methods used in the LTFE for detecting quality control issues is clearly evident by comparing the sampling procedures for the LTFE testing to the sampling performed in response to the identification of the quality control problem in 2010. In each phase of the
LTFE, dozens of SCSR units were tested; in contrast, in the 2010-2011 testing using the quality assurance experimental design, 500 units were tested [100]. The sample size and the testing procedures used in the LTFE were simply not able to conclusively implicate manufacturing defects in observed poor SCSR performance. The reasons for the insufficiency of the test methods in this regard can be traced back once again to cognitive biases on the part of the researchers. Many of the biases already discussed would have caused those designing the study and those reviewing the research to decide that the methods were sufficient despite the fact that they could not conclusively test for manufacturing issues. In particular, confirmation bias and the bandwagon effect were likely involved since, as discussed above, the same conclusions were repeatedly drawn in several of the LTFE reports over several years.
In some cases, manufacturing defects were implicated in the LTFE reports. However, in these cases the observed defects were discounted as being easily solved by the manufacturer. As early as 1990, manufacturing defects with the starter oxygen bottles in CSE SR-100 SCSRs were identified. However, these problems were said to have been corrected by the manufacturer and were thereby discounted. The following quote appears in the conclusions of the 1990 report of
123 the LTFE [112], but similar language appears in other LTFE reports: “Laboratory environmental testing of the SR-100 has uncovered a manufacturing defect in the burst disk of the oxygen starter bottle and a design problem with the desiccant bag. Both of these problems have been corrected by the manufacturer.” In this way, the LTFE authors took the word of the SCSR manufacturers that the issues had been corrected without performing rigorous review of these claims. This can again be traced to cognitive biases such as confirmation bias, optimism bias, and the ostrich effect.
So, despite observing and reporting several deficiencies with the SCSR performance, the seriousness of these issues was understated in public reports. The above discussion shows how cognitive biases led to this understatement of the deficiencies, which led to the continued certification and use of these SCSR units.
The third proximal cause shown on the second level of the causal tree in Figure 23 is that
“improvements to SCSR technology have not occurred despite deficiencies observed in mine disasters.” This refers to the fact that during disasters where SCSRs have been used, the use of the technology was problematic. In particular, at Sago, miners had difficulty breathing while using the units, had difficulty starting the units, and removed the units to talk [53, 55]. Although these issues might be partially attributable to insufficient expectations training or insufficient inspections, it is reasonable to conclude that improvements to the design of the SCSRs might help to address these problems. Despite these indications that improvements to the technology may be needed, changes in mining safety and health legislation and regulation following the
Sago disaster did not force any changes in the technology. Rather, the MINER Act and an emergency temporary standard only required that an increased number of SCSRs be made available and that extra units be kept in caches at strategic locations in the mine. Thus,
124 improvements to the functionality of the technology were not forced through the legislation and regulation.
In contrast, changes to the requirements for communications and tracking systems and refuge alternatives in the MINER Act were technology-forcing in nature. This is an indication that legislators deemed the development of these technologies to be a more effective strategy than improvement of SCSRs. This is due, in part, simply because limited resources necessitate the prioritization of some R&D efforts over others. However, the decision to prioritize refuge alternatives and communications and tracking development over improvements to SCSR technology may also be due to an implicit acceptance of the status quo with respect to SCSRs. In other words, SCSRs were accepted as a mature and well established technology due to their long-standing use in mines and the positive conclusions regarding their capabilities as presented in the LTFE reports. This may have caused legislators and regulators to fail to see the need for improvement to the technology that was apparent in the difficulties experienced by the Sago miners. This can be traced to biases such as the optimism bias, which would lead individuals to believe that the technology would be likely to help miners in a disaster and the ostrich effect, which would lead individuals to ignore indications that this might not be the case.
The above discussion traces the causes for the fact that unacceptably high rates of quality control failures occur for CSE SR-100 self-contained self-rescuers to seven root causes, six of which have to do with cognitive biases at play in decisions made during the testing and certification of
SCSRs as well as in the crafting of legislative and regulatory requirements for this technology.
These root causes are shown in Table 16.
125
Table 16: Identified root causes for "Unacceptably high rate of quality control failures occur for CSE SR-100 self- contained self-rescuers"
Biases result in insufficient or poorly designed experiments
Biases lead to insufficient or ineffective review of research findings
Biases lead researchers to faulty conclusions despite contradictory data
Biases result in insufficient or ineffective review of research findings
Biases and political pressures lead researchers to understate the seriousness of issues identified through research
Biases lead regulators, researchers, and legislators to maintain confidence in existing safety and health technologies despite indications of poor performance
Limited research and development resources necessitate prioritization of some technology development and testing efforts over others
5.1.3 Causal Tree Analysis for Case 3: Primary Communications and Tracking Systems
In Section 4.1.3, the history of the research, development, and diffusion of primary communications and tracking systems was presented. These technologies were introduced to the mining industry through a technology-forcing mandate in the MINER Act in response to the mining disasters of 2006. An examination of this history showed indications that the introduction of the technology was successful as well as indications that it was not as successful as it may have been. The fact that primary communications and tracking systems were adopted throughout the underground coal mining industry without significant time delays or strong resistance is a good indication that the introduction was successful. On the other hand, the fact that there is no documented evidence showing that tracking systems achieve a material improvement to safety is
126 an indication that the technology introduction has not been fully successful. Causal analyses for these two outcomes are presented below.
Causal Tree Analysis of “primary communications and tracking systems are adopted throughout the underground coal mining industry”
As was discussed in Section 4.1.3, primary communications and tracking systems, which are node-based wireless systems and leaky feeder systems as opposed to secondary systems such as through-the-earth and medium frequency, have been adopted by every operating underground coal mine in the country. This is evidenced in by a review of the emergency response plans
(ERP), which the mines are required to submit to MSHA as mandated by the MINER Act [121].
A causal tree analysis of why this wide-spread adoption has occurred is shown in Figure 24, and the notes and citations for this analysis are shown in Table 17. As is shown in the second level of the figure, there are three proximal causes for this success:
1. Systems offer benefits beside safety.
2. Systems developed to an acceptable level of maturity relatively quickly.
3. Enforcement of MINER Act requirements accounted for technological maturity.
The first is relatively self-explanatory – having effective wireless communications and tracking is useful to mine operators because they can more easily and efficiently coordinate mine operations. The convenience of having wireless communication quickly and the convenience of always knowing where miners and equipment are located is an important component of the rapid adoption. The other two proximal causes require somewhat more discussion. First the relatively rapid development of the technology will be discussed.
127
Primary communications and tracking systems are adopted throughout the underground coal mining industry1
Systems developed to an acceptable level of maturity relatively Enforcement of MINER Systems offer quickly Act requirements benefits accounted for beside safety technological maturity8 Existing Intramural research by Federal technologies federal agencies provided research from other sound understanding of dollars used MINER Act MSHA Technology industries underlying physics and recognized provides to direct contained could be other parameters affecting large-scale provisions to that feasible benefits adapted to system operation4 technology besides effort to allow for less mining2 develop and than fully does not exist safety and to provide health adapt wireless technologies truly wireless protections Research communi- MINER Act through communi- agencies cations mandated extramural 9 cations as MINER Act were systems federal research required by mandate was research on equipped designed to contracts7 the MINER technology with Act leverage development5 appropriate Legislators existing expertise, correctly technologies facilities, and identified Regulators to expedite resources to uncertainty in MINER Act correctly technology Legislators conduct mandated the ability of 3 identified difusion correctly research6 industry to federal indications of identified the research on meet the need for provisions of technological technology immaturity research to development5 a technology- Legislators achieve Research forcing correctly successful agencies mandate identified an results for correctly opportunity technology- identified Legislators for a forcing need for correctly technology- mandate specialized identified the forcing capabilities need for mandate to and acted to technology result in the fulfill the research and development need provided of new or adequate adaptation of funding to existing support this technologies effort
Figure 24: Causal tree analysis for "Primary communications and tracking systems are adopted throughout the underground coal mining industry" (See notes in Table 17)
128
Table 17: Notes for causal tree analysis for "Primary communications and tracking systems are adopted throughout the underground coal mining industry" (See causal tree in Figure 24)
1 A review of emergency response plans (ERP) shows that node-based and leaky feeder wireless communications and tracking systems are implemented at underground mines throughout the industry [121]. 2 Several of the communications and tracking technologies investigated through the MINER- Act-mandated NIOSH extramural research program were established technologies that were already in use in other industries, including node-based communications and RFID tracking systems. 3 The technology-forcing mandate for communication and tracking systems in the MINER Act was, in large part, motivated by the observation that wireless communication and positioning technology was available on the surface but not underground. See the discussion of this mandate in Section 4.1.3 for more detail. 4 In addition to funding research and development contracts for communication and tracking systems, as part of the MINER Act mandate, NIOSH conducted extensive intramural research on communication systems. The bulk of this research focused on understanding and modeling the propagation of RF signals of various frequencies in underground mines [138, 140, 139, 141, 142, 143]. This research provided system developers with the fundamental understanding of the operating phenomena to design effective systems as well as with clear guidelines for system implementation [136, 137]. 5 The MINER Act directed the newly formed Office of Mine Safety and Health Research (OMSHR) within NIOSH “to enhance the development of new mine safety technology and technological applications and to expedite the commercial availability and implementation of such technology in mining environments.” 6 In response to the MINER Act mandate for NIOSH to perform and fund communication and tracking research and development, the program hired several researchers with expertise in electromagnetic theory and practical experience with the design and implementation of communication systems. In addition, laboratory facilities were improved and developed to enable this research. 7 Between 2006 and 2016, OMSHR awarded 40 extramural research and development contracts in the topic area of “Emergency Communications and Tracking” [134]. 8 The MINER Act required mines to implement wireless communications systems by June 15, 2009. In the months before this enforcement deadline, MSHA published a program policy letter (PPL) in which it was stated that “because fully wireless communications technology is not sufficiently developed at this time, nor is it likely to be technologically feasible by June 15, 2009, this guidance addresses acceptable alternatives to fully wireless communication systems.” [128]. This PPL established the acceptance of wired node-based and leaky feeder systems as acceptable alternatives to fully wireless systems. 9 MINER Act contains the provision: “Where such plan sets forth the reasons such provisions can not be adopted, the plan shall also set forth the operator's alternative means of compliance. Such alternative shall approximate, as closely as possible, the degree of functional utility and safety protection provided by the wireless two-way medium and tracking system referred to in this subpart.”
129
The relatively rapid development of communications and tracking technologies to a level of maturity that is acceptable and useful to mine operators was important to the adoption of the technology. While this development didn’t occur immediately, within a few years of the passage of the MINER Act, there were systems that were usable and a marked improvement over the technologies they replaced such as page phones. There are three reasons why the technology was able to be developed to an acceptable level of maturity so quickly:
First, existing technologies from other industries could be adapted to mining. Technologies such as node-based communications systems and RFID tracking were already extensively used in other industries, and more sophisticated leaky feeder technology was already in use in metal/non- metal mines at the time the MINER Act was passed. Although the underground coal mining environment presents unique challenges for the implementation of these technologies, it was not the case that the research and development was starting from the ground up (or rather, down).
This was possible because the MINER Act was written in such a way that it specifically called for the adaptation of existing technologies, leveraging this opportunity to implement already mature technologies in a new setting. Because these opportunities did exist, i.e., since it was, in fact, true that existing wireless communications technologies could be effectively adapted to the underground mine environment, it can be concluded that legislators correctly identified an opportunity where a technology-forcing mandate would be effective.
The second reason why communications and tracking technologies were able to be rapidly developed for underground mining was that there was extensive intramural research by federal agencies to provide a sound understanding of the underlying physics and other parameters affecting system operation. Much of the NIOSH intramural research that was conducted in response the MINER Act was to measure and model the propagation of RF signals in
130 underground mines [138, 140, 139, 141, 142, 143]. Through this research, NIOSH developed and published guidelines for the design, installation, and use of communications and tracking systems [136, 137]. This provided the industry with the understanding needed to develop effective systems and to quickly diffuse this technology throughout the industry. The reasons for this success can be traced to the root causes that legislators recognized the need for research and development in order to make the technology-forcing mandate successful and that research agencies recognized and filled the need for specialized expertise and facilities to conduct this research and significantly expanded capabilities following the passage of the MINER Act by hiring several RF experts and improving facilities.
The final, and perhaps most significant, reason that communications and tracking technologies were developed to maturity rapidly is that extensive extramural research and development efforts were funded by NIOSH as part of the MINER Act mandate to conduct research on the technology. Between 2006 and 2016, NIOSH awarded 40 extramural research and development contracts in the topic area of “Emergency Communications and Tracking” [134]. Although not all of these resulted in successful products, the overall effect of this massive investment into
R&D was clearly positive. As with the intramural research, this can be traced to the root cause that legislators correctly recognized that significant research and development would be needed in order to successfully implement this new technology, and a mandate for this research to be funded was written into the legislation.
Besides the rapid development of the technology, another proximal cause for the successful wide-spread adoption of the technology was that enforcement of MINER Act requirements accounted for the fact that the technology simply was not at a level of maturity to meet the letter of the requirements of the law – there were not effective communications systems that could
131 provide completely wireless communication between surface and underground. The MINER Act required mines to implement wireless communications systems by June 15, 2009. In the months before this enforcement deadline, MSHA published a program policy letter (PPL) in which it was stated that “because fully wireless communications technology is not sufficiently developed at this time, nor is it likely to be technologically feasible by June 15, 2009, this guidance addresses acceptable alternatives to fully wireless communication systems.” [128]. This PPL established the acceptance of wired node-based and leaky feeder systems as acceptable alternatives to fully wireless systems.
It was possible for MSHA to be flexible with enforcement of the law in this way because the
MINER Act contains a provision stating that when the provision for a completely wireless system could not be met, that alternative means of compliance, which “shall approximate, as closely as possible, the degree of functional utility and safety protection provided by the wireless two-way medium and tracking system referred to in this subpart.” The inclusion of this language in the Act shows that legislators correctly identified uncertainty in the ability of the industry to meet the provisions of their technology-forcing mandate, and therefore provided a level of flexibility in the enforcement of the law.
With this provision allowing more flexible enforcement, it was up to MSHA to recognize that it was necessary to take advantage of this flexibility, which they did through the issuance of PPLs allowing for less than fully wireless systems. This shows that regulators correctly identified the indications of technological immaturity in fully wireless communications systems and did not require mines to meet this more rigid requirement.
132
The above discussion has examined the causes for the wide-spread successful adoption of primary communications and tracking systems and has traced these causes to seven root causes, six of which are related to legislators, regulators, and researchers correctly assessing the maturity of the technologies. These root causes are shown in Table 18.
Table 18: Identified root causes for "Primary communications and tracking systems are adopted throughout the underground coal mining industry"
Legislators correctly identified an opportunity for a technology-forcing mandate to result in the development of new or adaptation of existing technologies
Legislators correctly identified the need for research to achieve successful results for technology-forcing mandate
Legislators correctly identified the need for technology research and development and provided adequate funding to support this effort
Legislators correctly identified uncertainty in the ability of industry to meet the provisions of a technology-forcing mandate
Regulators correctly identified indications of technological immaturity
Research agencies correctly identified need for specialized capabilities and acted to fulfill the need
Technology provides benefits besides safety and health protections
Causal Tree Analysis of “no documented evidence exists showing that tracking systems achieve a material improvement to safety”
Although the mining industry has adopted communications and tracking technologies in response to the mandate of the MINER Act, there are, nonetheless, indications that the technology has not achieved the levels of success that it may have. In particular, there is not documented evidence that tracking systems achieve a material improvement to safety, meaning that there is not compelling evidence in the research literature that the performance standards, if
133 achieved, will substantially improve the likelihood of successful escape or rescue and there is not compelling evidence in the research literature that the tracking systems in use in the industry meet the performance standards. It is difficult to provide evidence for the lack of research in the literature; however, the review presented in Section 4.1.3 did not find any evidence that studies of this type have been performed to show that tracking systems materially improve the chances of successful escape or rescue. A causal tree analysis of this apparent unsuccessful outcome is shown in Figure 25, Figure 26, and Figure 27. Notes and citations for this analysis are given in
Table 19.
Below, the causes of the fact that “compelling evidence does not exist to indicate that the performance standards, if achieved, will substantially improve the likelihood of successful rescue or escape” is discussed as shown in Figure 26. Following this, the causes for the fact that
“compelling evidence does not exist to indicate that the tracking systems in use in the industry meet the performance standards” is discussed shown in Figure 27.
No documented evidence exists showing that tracking systems achieve a material improvement to safety
Compelling evidence does not exist to indicate that the Compelling evidence does not exist to indicate that the performance standards, if achieved, will substantially tracking systems in use in the industry meet the improve the likelihood of successful rescue or escape performance standards
See remainder of causal tree in subsequent figures See remainder of causal tree in subsequent figures
Figure 25: Causal tree analysis for "No documented evidence exists showing that tracking systems achieve a material improvement to safety" (See remainders of causal tree in Figure 26 and Figure 27)
134
Compelling evidence does not exist to indicate that the performance standards, if achieved, will substantially improve the likelihood of successful rescue or escape
Performance standards are not based on a publicly documented an analysis of expected safety gains
Enforcement standards were Research on the effect of Regulators judged tracking enacted through mechanisms tracking system accuracy on the systems to be a mature that did not require public 2 outcome of escape and rescue technology review as in the rulemaking attempts has not been conducted process1
Biases lead regulators to judge Biases lead to insufficient or Test facilities for performing that immediate action is required ineffective review of appropriate experiments and to ignore indications of research findings were not available technology immaturity
Biases lead regulators to judge that immediate action Research on communication system performance is prioritized is required and to ignore over research on tracking system performance indications of technology immaturity
Limited research and development resources necessitate prioritization of some technology development and testing efforts over others
The timeframe for compliance in the MINER Act limits the amount of research that can be completed
Biases lead regulators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore indications of technology immaturity
Figure 26: Causal tree analysis for "Compelling evidence does not exist to indicate that the performance standards, if achieved, will substantially improve the likelihood of successful rescue or escape" (Continues from Figure 25; see notes in Table 19)
135
Compelling evidence does not exist to indicate that the tracking systems in use in the industry meet the performance standards
Enforcement policy does not provide effective means Research has not been performed to provide by which inspectors can check compliance independent verification of tracking system performance
Enforcement policy was formulated without the support of research on methodological approaches to Limited federal research funding is used for quantifying performance quantitative testing of tracking system performance
Biases lead regulators to judge that Test facilities for performing immediate action is needed and to appropriate experiments were not ignore indications of technology available immaturity
Research on communication system The timeframe for compliance in the performance is prioritized over research MINER Act limits the amount of on tracking system performance research that can be completed
Limited research and development Biases lead legislators to judge that resources necessitate prioritization of immediate action is needed and to some technology development and ignore indications of technology testing efforts over others immaturity
The timeframe for compliance in the MINER Act limits the amount of research that can be completed
Biases lead legislators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore indications of technology immaturity
Figure 27: Causal tree analysis for "Compelling evidence does not exist to indicate that the tracking systems in use in the industry meet the performance standards" (Continues from Figure 25)
136
Table 19: Notes for causal tree analysis for "No documented evidence exists showing that tracking systems achieve a material improvement to safety" (See causal trees in Figure 25, Figure 26, and Figure 27)
1 The MINER Act provides a mandate that communications and tracking systems be used in underground mines, but it does not give details on the required capabilities of these systems. The performance standards for these systems were enacted through a series of program policy letters and policy information bulletins [128, 131, 133, 129, 132, 130] rather than through the normal rulemaking process. 2 In contrast to fully wireless communication systems, tracking systems were judged to be mature in MSHA’s enforcement of the MINER Act mandate [128].
The reason that there is not compelling evidence that the performance standards, if achieved, will materially improve the likelihood of successful escape or rescue appears to be that the performance standards are not based on a publicly documented an analysis of expected safety gains. While evaluations and demonstrations of tracking systems have been conducted by
NIOSH, MSHA, and others, there is not any study showing what system capabilities would be needed to enable a miner to successfully escape or to enable a rescue team to successfully find trapped miners. Clearly, having greater accuracy, faster refresh rates, greater reliability, etc. would be beneficial to aiding escape and rescue, but it is not clear what all of the performance metrics should be to evaluate tracking systems and what minimum specifications should be required for these metrics.
Three factors appear to contribute to this outcome. First, the enforcement of the MINER Act mandate for tracking systems was accomplished through means other than the normal rulemaking process. Rather, MSHA issued a series of program policy letters and policy information bulletins [128, 131, 133, 129, 132, 130] which established the requirements for accuracy on working sections, in escapeways, and at strategic locations in the mine as well as establishing other performance metrics such as battery life and component ruggedness. The use of policy documents rather than rulemaking appears to have been motivated by a sense of
137 urgency to enforce the mandate of the MINER Act. This can be traced to biases which caused regulators to judge that immediate action was needed and to ignore the fact that compelling studies of the benefits of tracking systems had not been presented. Biases at play in this decision were likely the same biases that created the sense of urgency driving refuge alternatives regulation as discussed in Section 5.1.1, which are presented again in the following.
Cognitive biases such as the availability heuristic [249], availability cascade [250], bandwagon effect [251], the law of the hammer [252], and the identifiable victim effect [253] may have led the regulators to conclude that immediate action was needed to respond to the mine disasters that occurred in 2006.
The availability heuristic [249] is the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of events which one remembers happening recently or which are more unusual or emotionally charged. In this case, the disasters at Sago, Darby, and Alma were recent, unusual, and emotionally charged at the time the tracking requirements was being developed, which contributed to the sense of urgency for the implementation of the technology. Availability cascade [250] is the cycle by which propositions which are emotionally charged are frequently repeated in public discourse, which, by the availability heuristic, increases the emotional charge of these propositions. Before and following the passage of the MINER Act, the media coverage and public discourse of mining disasters was intense as has been discussed, which would have reinforced the sense of urgency to implement tracking technologies. As with the RA regulations, the bandwagon effect
[251] may have also played into this discourse. Finally, the identifiable victim effect [253], the tendency to respond more strongly to risk when the potential victim of an event is personally identified rather than a group of unidentified people was at play in these decisions as the personal stories of mining disaster victims were surely on the minds of regulators.
138
The sense of urgency and the rapid deployment of communications and tracking systems also limited the amount of research that could be conducted on the needed capabilities of tracking systems to enable successful escape or rescue. This is shown as the second cause on the second level of Figure 26. This is traced to three root causes. First, the facilities to conduct the tests were not available to federal researchers. Second, limited resources caused researchers to prioritize communications research over tracking research. And finally, the same biases that caused regulators to judge that immediate action was needed also caused legislators to judge that immediate action was needed when they passed the MINER Act.
Figure 27 shows the analysis for the causes of why compelling evidence does not exist to indicate that the tracking systems in use in the industry meet the performance standards. As with the previous analysis, one reason is the fact that research had not been conducted, which traces to the same root causes discussed above: the facilities to conduct the testing were not available, limited resources led to prioritization of communications research over tracking research, and biases caused legislators to judge that immediate action was needed while ignoring indications of technological immaturity.
The other causal chain shown on the left side of Figure 27 has to do with the enforcement policy for tracking systems not including clearly defined, quantitative methods by which inspectors can evaluate the performance of tracking systems. While policy guidance has been issued to aid inspectors in evaluating these systems [133], the guidance does not provide a detailed method by which inspectors can systematically and quantitatively check the accuracy, reliability, or other performance metrics. This can reasonably be expected to lead to inconsistencies in how these evaluations are performed from inspector to inspector, which decreases the confidence that can be placed in the ability of tracking systems to meet the established performance criteria. The lack
139 of detailed guidance is likely due again to the sense of urgency that existed around the creation of these policies and around the passage of the MINER Act. The root causes for this are once again the same biases that have caused legislators and regulators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore indications that technologies are not mature.
The above discussion and analysis has identified the root causes for the unsuccessful outcome
“no documented evidence exists showing that tracking systems achieve a material improvement to safety.” Six root causes have been identified, four of which have to do with cognitive biases in decision making by legislators, regulators, and researchers. These root causes are shown in Table
20.
Table 20: Identified root causes for "No documented evidence exists showing that tracking systems achieve a material improvement to safety"
Biases lead to insufficient or ineffective review of research findings
Biases lead regulators to judge that immediate action is required and to ignore indications of technology immaturity
Biases lead regulators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore indications of technology immaturity
Biases lead legislators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore indications of technology immaturity
Test facilities for performing appropriate experiments were not available
Limited research and development resources necessitate prioritization of some technology development and testing efforts over others
140
5.1.4 Causal Tree Analysis for Case 4: Proximity Detection Systems
In Section 4.1.4, a summary of the recent history of proximity detection systems for underground coal mining equipment was presented. In this history, one indication that the technology has achieved an unsuccessful outcome is the occurrence of electromagnetic interference (EMI) between the continuous personal dust monitor and proximity detection systems, the result of which is to render the proximity detection system inoperable. A root cause analysis for why this outcome was not predicted and prevented is shown in Figure 28.
Electromagnetic interference (EMI) between continuous personal dust monitors and proximity detection systems effectively render the proximity detection system temporarily inoperable
Research failed to Proximity detection identify the potential Reports from mine operators that systems are not systems and personal for EMI operating properly are not attributed to EMI dust monitors are not designed for electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) A high level of Laboratory and field confidence was Reports of system testing of proximity placed in malfunction are detection systems manufacturers' incorrectly attributed Standards for EMC was not conducted engineering of to innocuous causes do not exist for the under conditions that systems such as operator underground mining would show EMI misunderstanding/ industry misinterpretation of system functionality Biases lead to or poor system insufficient review of calibration/ Biases result in research findings configuration Biases lead to an poorly designed or acceptance of the insufficient status quo with experiments respect to recognized Biases lead to a lack deficiencies in safety of independent Biases lead regulators and health standards assessment of to ignore indications technologies' of technology capabilities immaturity
Biases lead researchers to ignore indications of technology immaturity
Figure 28: Causal tree analysis for "Electromagnetic interference (EMI) between continuous personal dust monitors and proximity detection systems effectively render the proximity detection system temporarily inoperable"
141
Three reasons that the potential for EMI between the personal dust monitor and the proximity detection system was not predicted and prevented are:
1. Proximity detection systems and personal dust monitors are not designed for
electromagnetic compatibility (EMC).
2. Research failed to identify the potential for EMI.
3. Reports from mine operators that systems are not operating properly are not attributed to
EMI.
Standards for EMC design of electronic systems do not apply to devices used underground.
Since these standards do not exist, they obviously weren’t applied in the design of the personal dust monitor and the proximity detection systems. The use of such standards would have placed upper limits on the electromagnetic emission of each device and lower limits on the susceptibility of each device to interference, which would have prevented this occurrence of
EMI. It is reasonable to assume that through the years, several people in research and regulatory agencies recognized the need for such standards, but action was never taken to implement such standards. It is also reasonable to conclude that cognitive biases played a role in this inaction by contributing to an acceptance of the status quo with respect to recognized deficiencies in safety and health standards. Biases that may be at play here likely include confirmation bias [254], which would have led people to reinforce their notions that standards were not needed, optimism bias [255, 256], which would have led people discount the possibility that EMI could occur, and the ostrich effect [256], which would have led people to ignore indications that the lack of standards created the potential for EMI.
142
The failure of agencies performing research on proximity detection and personal dust monitors to identify the potential for EMI was due to the fact that studies on the potential for EMI involving these devices simply was not conducted. Although experts in electromagnetics were involved in the research at NIOSH, experiments on the potential for EMI did not occur. This shows that biases, such as those described above led resulted in poorly designed or insufficient experiments.
The final proximal cause for the failure to prevent EMI was that reports from mine operators that systems were not operating properly were not attributed to EMI. During the development and diffusion of proximity detection systems, mine operators reported to NIOSH as well as to MSHA that the systems were not operating properly or consistently. It now seems that many of these instances may have been due to EMI; however, this was not identified at the time because alternative explanations such as operator misunderstanding/misinterpretation of system functionality or poor system calibration/configuration were believed to have been the true cause of the reports of malfunction. Although there was no evidence to support these explanations, they are relatively innocuous and were simply assumed to be true. A high level of trust had also been placed in the engineering of the systems, with the underlying assumption that the manufacturers would have properly designed their systems to prevent EMI. This was clearly a faulty assumption given the lack of EMC standards. In all of these judgements, the same biases discussed above (confirmation bias [254], optimism bias [255, 256], and the ostrich effect [256]) may have been involved.
The analysis and discussion above has traced the causes for the fact that electromagnetic interference (EMI) between continuous personal dust monitors and proximity detection systems effectively render the proximity detection system temporarily inoperable” to six root causes, all
143 of which have to do with biases during key decisions by researchers and regulators. These root causes are shown in Table 21.
Table 21: Identified root causes for "Electromagnetic interference (EMI) between continuous personal dust monitors and proximity detection systems effectively render the proximity detection system temporarily inoperable"
Biases lead to an acceptance of the status quo with respect to recognized deficiencies in safety and health standards
Biases lead to insufficient review of research findings
Biases lead to a lack of critical assessment of technologies' capabilities
Biases lead regulators to ignore indications of technology immaturity
Biases lead researchers to ignore indications of technology immaturity
Biases result in poorly designed or insufficient experiments
5.1.5 Causal Tree Analysis for Case 5: LED Cap Lamps
Section 4.1.5 provided a history of the development and diffusion of mine cap lamp technology and a more focused history of the recent development and diffusion of LED cap lamp technology. LED cap lamps have been rapidly and voluntarily adopted throughout the underground mining industry. A causal tree analysis for why this adoption was so successful is shown in Figure 29. This rapid adoption can be attributed to the fact that LED cap lamps offer several benefits related to energy efficiency, operating cost, compact size, and the convenience of not having a corded light with a belt-worn battery. These benefits were discussed in more detail in Section 4.1.5. The safety benefits of the technology have also been demonstrated, but this was not a driving factor in the adoption of the cap lamps. The adoption of the new technology of LED cap lamps was also enabled by the fact that regulatory and legislative standards for cap lamps do not prescribe a specific technology to be used, but rather provide
144 performance-based specifications that must be met. Since these standards did not preclude the use of new technologies, they did not hinder the adoption of LED cap lamps. The root causes identified for the successful adoption of LED cap lamps are shown in Table 22. Two of the three root causes have to do with regulators and legislators enabling new technologies to be introduced by including flexibility in the safety mandate for mine lighting.
LED cap lamps are rapidly and voluntarily adopted by mine operators throughout the underground mining industry
LED cap lamps offer benefits Regulatory standards for cap Legislative standards for cap besides than safety and health lamps allow for alternative cap lamps allow for alternative cap improvements lamp technology to be used lamp technology to be used
Regulators correctly identified Legislators correctly identified Technology provides benefits the need for flexibility in the need for flexibility in besides safety and health regulations to allow for regulations to allow for protections technology development technology development
Figure 29: Causal tree analysis for "LED cap lamps are rapidly and voluntarily adopted by mine operators throughout the underground mining industry"
Table 22: Identified root causes for "LED cap lamps are rapidly and voluntarily adopted by mine operators throughout the underground mining industry"
Legislators correctly identified the need for flexibility in regulations to allow for technology development
Regulators correctly identified the need for flexibility in regulations to allow for technology development
Technology provides benefits besides safety and health protections
145
5.2 Causal Tree Analyses for Health Interventions
In Section 4.2, historical summaries of the research, development, and diffusion of new noise control technologies for mining equipment was provided with a particular focus on underground coal mining equipment including continuous mining machines and roof bolting machines, which had been identified as the pieces of equipment with the greatest occurrence of noise overexposure. The development of this technology was driven, in large part, by the promulgation of new hearing loss prevention regulations by MSHA in 1999. An analysis of the MSHA data on noise exposure surveys, it was noted that the average noise dose experienced by continuous mining machine operators has steadily decreased since the promulgation of the regulation, while the dose for roof bolting machine operators has remained relatively flat. This is an indication that, somehow, the technology-forcing mandate for new noise controls has apparently been more successful for the continuous mining machines than it has for the roof bolting machines.
In the following sections, causal tree analyses for the successful outcome with continuous mining machine noise controls and for the unsuccessful outcome with roof bolting machines will be presented.
5.2.1 Causal Tree Analysis for Noise Controls for Case 6: Continuous Mining Machines
Noise exposures for continuous mining machine operators have steadily dropped since 1999 when MSHA passed a technology-forcing regulation, which in part, required all feasible noise controls to be used. A causal tree analysis for why these exposures have decreased is shown in
Figure 30, and notes and citations for this analysis are given in Table 23.
146
Continuous mining machine noise controls achieve a demonstrated reduction in noise exposure for operators1
Mines utilize engineering noise controls to Mines utilize reduce noise exposure administrative noise controls to reduce noise exposure
Effective noise Mine operators Noise controls are controls are available purchase equipment deemed technically Effective means of as standard equipment with noise controls and administratively isolating workers or as options from achievable by from hazards through mining machinery 5 regulators administrative OEM2 controls exist Technology provides benefits besides safety and health Effectiveness of Implementation of protections3 intervention was Administrative noise noise controls offer successfully controls are deemed benefits besides safety demonstrated in field administratively and health3 trials under operating achievable by Technology increases conditions regulators5 capital cost, but does not increase operating Technology provides cost benefits besides safety Regulators correctly and health protections recognized the need for a combination of Noise controls have engineering and minimal impact on administrative controls Noise controls are equipment operation developed and demonstrated through collaboration between researchers and OEM4 During research and Noise regulation development, the allows mine operators impact on mining to use a combination operations was of engineering and considered administrative Researchers develop controls at their effective partnerships discretion6 with industry in order to facilitate the best solutions and to better diffuse research Regulatory findings into practice requirement is a written as a performance-based standard
Figure 30: Causal tree analysis for "Continuous mining machine noise controls achieve a demonstrated reduction in noise exposure for operators" (See notes in Table 23)
147
Table 23: Notes for causal tree analysis for "Continuous mining machine noise controls achieve a demonstrated reduction in noise exposure for operators" (See causal tree in Figure 30)
1 See discussion on continuous mining machine operator noise dose surveillance data in Section 4.2.1.
2 Joy Mining Machinery, now owned by Komatsu, modified their facilities to produce dual- sprocket chains and coated flight bars for their continuous mining machines [228, 226, 225].
3 The dual-sprocket chain technology was shown to reduce wear on the chain and sprockets and to lengthen the life of the components [228, 226, 225].
4 Throughout the development of the noise controls, collaborative research and development efforts were performed between NIOSH and Joy Mining Machinery [225].
5 See MSHA Program Information Bulletin No. P14-02 (Reissue of P08-12), “Technologically Achievable, Administratively Achievable, and Promising Noise Controls” [229].
6 Per the noise regulation, when the 90dBA PEL is exceeded, the mine operator is required to implement feasible engineering and administrative controls to reduce exposure to the PEL. While the feasibility of the controls is determined by MSHA as the feasibility for the particular mine in question to implement the control, it is up to the mine operator to select whether engineering controls, administrative controls, or some combination of the two is used [220].
This reduction in exposures can be attributed to two primary causes: the use of administrative noise controls and the use of engineering noise controls. It is important to note that since the regulations do not give credit for hearing protectors and since the noise exposure surveys conducted by inspectors do not take the attenuation provided by hearing protectors into consideration; therefore, these exposures are independent of any additional benefit that may have been achieved over the same period by increased use of ear plugs or ear muffs. It is also important to note that mining operations have changed significantly over the last two decades. In particular, the number and size of underground coal mining operations have decreased as market and regulatory conditions have changed. This is a confounding factor to this analysis since it is possible that the changing nature of mine operations also played a role in the changing noise
148 exposure. This effect would be difficult to isolate and quantify, and no attempt has been made to do so here.
The reasons why mine operators have utilized engineering noise controls can be linked to three causes:
1. Effective noise controls are available as standard equipment or as options from mining
machinery OEM.
2. Mine operators purchase equipment with noise controls.
3. Noise controls are deemed technically and administratively achievable by regulators.
The noise controls for continuous mining machines that have been listed as feasible in the
MSHA PIB [229] include the dual-sprocket conveyor chain and polyurethane-coated conveyor flights, both of which were successfully demonstrated to be effective in field tests and both of which are now offered either as standard equipment or as options on all new continuous mining machines from Joy Mining Machinery, now owned by Komatsu [228, 226, 225]. The fact that the manufacturer modified their facilities to offer these products as well as the fact that mine operators purchased these products is in part due to the fact that they provide benefits besides just reducing noise exposure; the dual-sprocket chain technology was shown to reduce wear on the chain and sprockets and to lengthen the life of the components [228, 226, 225]. The adoption of the technologies is also due, in part, to the effective collaboration that occurred between federal researchers at NIOSH and the equipment manufacturers to develop and test these systems. The nature of the noise controls also play a part in the adoption by mine operators; the controls are installed on the conveyor chain and do not affect the normal operation of the
149 machine or change the way the equipment operator does their job, which can be attributed to the fact that the impact on mine operations was considered during the development of these controls.
The adoption of administrative controls for continuous mining machines is also influenced by the design of the machine and the nature in which it is operated. Continuous mining machines are remote-controlled pieces of equipment, which grants greater flexibility in when the machine operator can be positioned in order to avoid especially noisy locations. The use of these administrative controls was enabled by the listing of the controls in the MSHA PIB [229] and by the flexibility allowed in the regulation to use a combination of administrative and engineering controls. Per the noise regulation, when the 90dBA PEL is exceeded, the mine operator is required to implement feasible engineering and administrative controls to reduce exposure to the
PEL. While the feasibility of the controls is determined by MSHA as the feasibility for the particular mine in question to implement the control, it is up to the mine operator to select whether engineering controls, administrative controls, or some combination of the two is used
[220]. This flexibility reflects the regulators correct assessment that a combination of engineering controls and administrative controls would be needed to address noise overexposures and that the use of a performance-based standard was most appropriate.
The analysis and discussion above traced the causes of the demonstrated reduction in noise exposure for continuous mining machine operators since the promulgation of a technology- forcing mandate for noise controls by MSHA in 1999. Eight root causes were identified, five of which have to do with regulators and researchers engaging effectively in the development and diffusion of the technologies. These root causes are shown in Table 24.
150
Table 24: Identified root causes for "Continuous mining machine noise controls achieve a demonstrated reduction in noise exposure for operators"
Regulators correctly recognized the need for a combination of engineering and administrative controls
Researchers develop effective partnerships with industry in order to facilitate the best solutions and to better diffuse research findings into practice
During research and development, the impact on mining operations was considered
Effectiveness of intervention was successfully demonstrated in field trials under operating conditions
Regulatory requirement is a written as a performance-based standard
Effective means of isolating workers from hazards through administrative controls exist
Technology provides benefits besides safety and health protections
Technology increases capital cost, but does not increase operating cost
5.2.2 Causal Tree Analysis for Noise Controls for Case 7: Roof Bolting Machines
In contrast to continuous mining machine operators, the average noise dose for roof bolting machine operators has remained relatively flat since the promulgation of the new MSHA noise regulation in 1999, and through the resulting efforts to introduce engineering and administrative noise controls for this equipment. A causal tree analysis of why exposures with this machine have not decreased as they did with the continuous mining machine is shown in Figure 31. Notes and citations for this analysis are given in Table 25.
151
Roof bolting machine noise controls fail to achieve a demonstrated reduction in noise exposure for operators1
There is limited There is limited utilization of utilization of engineering noise administrative controls noise controls
Mine operators do not Effective means of Noise controls are Noise controls are supplied by a purchase and implement noise isolating workers controls not deemed from hazards third-party technically manufacturer through achievable by administrative rather than being regulators3 offered by mining Noise controls Noise controls controls do not 2 machinery OEM have significant increase operating exist negative impacts cost on equipment Effectiveness of Nature of noise operation intervention was control does not Technology not successfully allow it to be increases capital demonstrated in offered by the Nature of and operating field trials under OEM equipment costs operating operation and conditions design limits Nature of design of Noise control is equipment engineering implemented as a operation and controls consumable design limits design of engineering Nature of controls equipment operation and design limits design of engineering controls
Figure 31: Causal tree analysis for "Roof bolting machine noise controls fail to achieve a demonstrated reduction in noise exposure for operators" (See notes in Table 25)
Table 25: Notes for causal tree analysis for "Roof bolting machine noise controls fail to achieve a demonstrated reduction in noise exposure for operators" (See causal tree in Figure 31)
1 See discussion on roof bolting machine operator noise dose surveillance data in Section 4.2.2. 2 Controls were developed in collaboration between NIOSH and companies including Corry Rubber Corporation and Kennametal, Inc. These controls included a collapsible drill steel enclosure [234] and isolators for the drill bit and chuck [236]. 3 See MSHA Program Information Bulletin No. P14-02 (Reissue of P08-12), “Technologically Achievable, Administratively Achievable, and Promising Noise Controls” [229].
152
Whereas the continuous mining machine apparently experienced decreases in exposure due to the adoption of engineering and administrative controls, there was limited adoption of such controls for roof bolting machines. The limited adoption of administrative controls can be attributed primarily to a fundamental difference in the design of these two machines and the means by which the machines are operated. Continuous mining machines are remote-controlled, which allows miners to position themselves more flexibly. On the other hand, roof bolting machines are operated by a miner standing directly adjacent to where the holes are being drilled, which is the greatest noise source for the machine. Miners must stand in this location in order to operate the machine properly, which greatly limits the use of administrative controls.
The reasons that the engineering controls for the roof bolting machines have not been adopted are also in direct contrast with the reasons that controls were adopted for continuous mining machines. Whereas continuous mining machine noise controls were included as standard or optional equipment by equipment manufacturers, the noise controls for roof bolting machines were offered as consumable components (drill bit and drill steel components) by third-party suppliers. This placed a greater burden on mine operators to utilize the controls since it was not simply a matter of purchasing a new piece of equipment with the controls installed; the mine operator had to continuously stock the controls and ensure that they were being used. This can be traced to the root cause that the nature of the equipment design limited the type of noise controls that could be used – since the noise sources is the drill steel and the drill bit, the possible set of controls that could be designed is limited. Another factor that apparently limited the adoption of these controls was that the controls increase operating cost and have a significant impact on the operation of the machine. Again, this can be traced to the fact that the noise controls that could be designed for a roof bolting machine was limited by the nature of the noise sources for this
153 machine and the manner in which the machine is operated. In other words, the development of effective noise controls for a roof bolting machine is simply a more difficult engineering challenge than the development of effective noise controls for a continuous mining machine.
The challenges associated with developing controls for this machine also led to the failure of researchers to successfully demonstrate the effectiveness of the controls through field trials and to have the controls listed as technically achievable in the MSHA PIB (with the exception of the drill bit isolator, which was demonstrated and listed).
In summary, the causes for the lack of exposure reduction for roof bolting machine operators was traced to four root causes, which are shown in Table 26. All of these root causes reflect the difficulty of the engineering challenges involved with developing controls for this machine, which is not an indication of any shortcoming in the regulatory or research processes involved.
Table 26: Identified root causes for "Roof bolting machine noise controls fail to achieve a demonstrated reduction in noise exposure for operators"
Effectiveness of intervention was not successfully demonstrated in field trials under operating conditions
Effective means of isolating workers from hazards through administrative controls do not exist
Technology increases capital and operating costs
Nature of equipment operation and design limits design of engineering controls
154
5.3 Generalization of Causal Tree Analysis Results
The preceding sections have presented causal tree analyses for three indications of successful outcomes for new safety and health technologies in mining and for six indications of unsuccessful outcomes for new safety and health technologies in mining. The identified root causes associated with the successful outcomes are summarized in Table 27, and the identified root causes for the unsuccessful outcomes are summarized in Table 28. In this section, commonalities between these identified root causes will be identified and the implications for future efforts to introduce new safety and health technologies will be discussed.
Table 27: Identified root causes for indications of safety and health technology mandate success
Identified Root Causes Legislators correctly identified an opportunity for a technology-forcing mandate to result in the development of new or adaptation of existing technologies Legislators correctly identified the need for research to achieve successful results for technology-forcing mandate Primary communications and Legislators correctly identified the need for technology research and tracking systems are adopted development and provided adequate funding to support this effort throughout the underground Legislators correctly identified uncertainty in the ability of industry to meet the coal mining industry provisions of a technology-forcing mandate Regulators correctly identified indications of technological immaturity Research agencies correctly identified need for specialized capabilities and acted to fulfill the need Technology provides benefits besides safety and health protections LED cap lamps are rapidly Legislators correctly identified the need for flexibility in regulations to allow and voluntarily adopted by for technology development mine operators throughout Regulators correctly identified the need for flexibility in regulations to allow the underground mining for technology development industry Technology provides benefits besides safety and health protections Regulators correctly recognized the need for a combination of engineering and administrative controls Researchers develop effective partnerships with industry in order to facilitate the best solutions and to better diffuse research findings into practice During research and development, the impact on mining operations was Continuous mining machine considered noise controls achieve a Effectiveness of intervention was successfully demonstrated in field trials demonstrated reduction in under operating conditions noise exposure for operators Regulatory requirement is a written as a performance-based standard Effective means of isolating workers from hazards through administrative controls exist Technology provides benefits besides safety and health protections Technology increases capital cost, but does not increase operating cost
155
Table 28: Identified root causes for indications of safety and health technology mandate failure
Identified Root Causes Biases lead legislators to judge that immediate action is needed Biases lead legislators to fail to recognize indications of technological Judicial intervention and immaturity after-rule time extensions Biases and political pressures lead researchers to understate the seriousness of occurred in refuge issues identified through research alternatives rulemaking Biases lead regulators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore indications of technological immaturity Biases lead legislators to judge that immediate action is needed Biases lead legislators to fail to recognize indications of technological immaturity Biases and political pressures lead researchers to understate the seriousness of Miners express strong issues identified through research resistance to using refuge Biases lead regulators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore alternatives indications of technological immaturity Engineering control improves safety or health only when used in a specific scenario Biases lead miners to mistrust interventions Biases result in insufficient or poorly designed experiments Biases lead to insufficient or ineffective review of research findings Biases lead researchers to faulty conclusions despite contradictory data Unacceptably high rate of Biases result in insufficient or ineffective review of research findings quality control failures occur Biases and political pressures lead researchers to understate the seriousness of for CSE SR-100 self- issues identified through research contained self-rescuers Biases lead to acceptance of status quo despite observed deficiencies Limited research and development resources necessitate prioritization of some technology development and testing efforts over others Biases lead to insufficient or ineffective review of research findings Biases lead regulators to judge that immediate action is required and to ignore indications of technology immaturity No documented evidence Biases lead regulators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore exists showing that tracking indications of technology immaturity systems achieve a material Biases lead legislators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore improvement to safety indications of technology immaturity Test facilities for performing appropriate experiments were not available Limited research and development resources necessitate prioritization of some technology development and testing efforts over others Electromagnetic interference Biases lead to an acceptance of the status quo with respect to recognized (EMI) between continuous deficiencies in safety and health standards personal dust monitors and Biases lead to insufficient review of research findings proximity detection systems Biases lead to a lack of critical assessment of technologies' capabilities effectively render the Biases lead regulators to ignore indications of technology immaturity proximity detection system Biases lead researchers to ignore indications of technology immaturity temporarily inoperable Biases result in poorly designed or insufficient experiments Effectiveness of intervention was not successfully demonstrated in field trials Roof bolting machine noise under operating conditions controls fail to achieve a Effective means of isolating workers from hazards through administrative demonstrated reduction in controls do not exist noise exposure for operators Technology increases capital and operating costs Nature of equipment operation and design limits design of engineering controls
156
Several of the root causes pertain to actions or decisions made by legislators, regulators, and researchers. Re-organizing the lists of root causes by the relevant group is useful. This is done in
Tables 29 and 30 for the successful and unsuccessful outcomes, respectively. Examining the tables above, a number of similarities begin to become apparent. Several of the root causes that contributed to successful outcomes for new safety and health technologies (Tables 27 and 29) relate to the assessment of technological maturity. It seems to be the case that, in order for the introduction of a new safety and health technology mandate to be successful, legislators and regulators need to have an accurate assessment of the capabilities of the technology and an accurate assessment of the effort that would be required to develop and implement the technology, as well as a recognition of any uncertainty involved in either of those assessments.
In contrast, several of the root causes that contributed to unsuccessful outcomes (Tables 28 and
30) relate to cognitive biases causing regulators, legislators, and researchers to draw flawed conclusions about the maturity of a technology or to ignore indications of technological immaturity.
Other root causes for successful outcomes relate to the success of research to definitively demonstrate the efficacy of the interventions and to the effective partnership between researchers and industry to design and deploy interventions in a way that minimizes the impact on mine operations and/or offers some benefit besides safety and health. Again, by way of contrast, some of the root causes for unsuccessful outcomes relate to an increased burden on mine operators, either in the form of increased costs or some hindering of mine operations.
157
Table 29: Root causes for indications of technology mandate success grouped by groups primarily involved
Legislators correctly identified an opportunity for a technology-forcing mandate to result in the development of new or adaptation of existing technologies Legislators correctly identified the need for research to achieve successful Root causes of results for technology-forcing mandate technology success that pertain Legislators correctly identified the need for technology research and primarily to development and provided adequate funding to support this effort legislators Legislators correctly identified uncertainty in the ability of industry to meet the provisions of a technology-forcing mandate Legislators correctly identified the need for flexibility in regulations to allow for technology development Regulators correctly identified indications of technological immaturity Root causes of Regulators correctly identified the need for flexibility in regulations to allow technology success for technology development that pertain primarily to Regulators correctly recognized the need for a combination of engineering and regulators administrative controls Regulatory requirement is a written as a performance-based standard Researchers develop effective partnerships with industry in order to facilitate the best solutions and to better diffuse research findings into practice Root causes of Research agencies correctly identified need for specialized capabilities and technology success acted to fulfill the need that pertain primarily to Effectiveness of intervention was successfully demonstrated in field trials researchers under operating conditions During research and development, the impact on mining operations was considered Technology provides benefits besides safety and health protections Other root causes of Effective means of isolating workers from hazards through administrative technology success controls exist Technology increases capital cost, but does not increase operating cost
158
Table 30: Root causes for indications of technology mandate failure grouped by groups primarily involved
Biases lead legislators to judge that immediate action is needed Root causes of technology failure Biases lead legislators to fail to recognize indications of technological that pertain immaturity primarily to Biases lead legislators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore legislators indications of technology immaturity Root causes of Biases lead regulators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore technology failure indications of technological immaturity that pertain primarily to Biases lead regulators to ignore indications of technology immaturity regulators Biases and political pressures lead researchers to understate the seriousness of issues identified through research Biases result in insufficient or poorly designed experiments Biases lead researchers to faulty conclusions despite contradictory data Root causes of technology failure Biases lead to insufficient or ineffective review of research findings that pertain Limited research and development resources necessitate prioritization of some primarily to technology development and testing efforts over others researchers Test facilities for performing appropriate experiments were not available Biases lead researchers to ignore indications of technology immaturity Effectiveness of intervention was not successfully demonstrated in field trials under operating conditions Engineering control improves safety or health only when used in a specific scenario Biases lead miners to mistrust interventions Biases lead to acceptance of status quo despite observed deficiencies Biases lead to an acceptance of the status quo with respect to recognized Other root causes of deficiencies in safety and health standards technology failure Biases lead to a lack of critical assessment of technologies' capabilities Effective means of isolating workers from hazards through administrative controls do not exist Technology increases capital and operating costs Nature of equipment operation and design limits design of engineering controls
159
The list of root causes for successful outcomes were simplified by combining similar items into the following ten items:
1. Legislators correctly identified an opportunity for a technology-forcing mandate to result
in the development of new or adaptation of existing technologies
2. Legislators correctly identified the need for research and development to achieve
successful results for a technology-forcing mandate
3. Legislators correctly identified uncertainty in the ability of industry to meet the
provisions of a technology-forcing mandate and permitted flexibility in compliance to
allow for technology development
4. Regulators correctly identified indications of technological immaturity
5. Regulators correctly identified the need for flexibility in regulations to allow for
technology development
6. Regulatory requirements are written as performance-based standards
7. Researchers develop effective partnerships with industry in order to facilitate the best
solutions and to better develop research findings into practical interventions that can be
effectively diffused
8. Research agencies correctly identified need for specialized capabilities and acted to fulfill
the need
9. Effectiveness of intervention was successfully demonstrated in field trials under
operating conditions
10. Interventions can be designed that have minimal impact on mine operations and/or offer
some benefit aside from safety and health protections
160
It is not necessary that all of these be present, but the analysis shows that at least some of these factors contributed in each of the successful outcomes analyzed. Although not all of these are applicable to every technology introduction, this analysis shows these factors to contribute to successful outcomes.
The root causes for unsuccessful outcomes can similarly be simplified to the following eight items:
1. Biases lead legislators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore indications
of technology immaturity
2. Biases lead regulators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore indications
of technological immaturity
3. Biases and political pressures lead researchers to ignore or to understate observed
indications of technological immaturity identified through research
4. Despite the best efforts of researchers and developers, effective interventions either
cannot be developed or cannot be demonstrated to be effective due to engineering
challenges or economic constraints
5. Biases lead to an acceptance of the status quo with respect to recognized deficiencies in
safety and health standards or technologies
6. Cultural forces and cognitive biases among miners lead to a mistrust of new interventions
7. Biases result in insufficient or poorly designed experiments
8. Biases result in insufficient or ineffective review of research
161
The presence of one, or even several, or these factors would not guarantee an unsuccessful outcome for a new safety or health technology mandate, but at least a few of these factors were present in each of the unsuccessful outcomes analyzed.
These root causes demonstrate the need to find ways of overcoming biases that affect the decisions made by regulators, researchers, and legislators and to ensure the objectivity of these groups. These biases can lead to several intermediate outcomes that further contribute to unsuccessful outcomes, such as:
• Regulators or legislators may fail to confirm that, if successfully implemented, new
standards would achieve a material improvement to safety and health
• Regulators or legislators may fail to implement effective means of checking and
quantifying compliance with a new standard
• Regulators or legislators may act with an unfounded degree of urgency to implement new
mandates without first confirming the readiness of the technology needed to meet the
mandate
• Researchers may overstate the maturity of technologies despite evidence of deficiencies
• Researchers may fail to identify the potential for unintended consequences that can occur
in the operating conditions at the mine
These outcomes can lead to the enactment of rules which mandate the use of technologies that have not been demonstrated to be effective or that have observed deficiencies; an example of this is the mandate for refuge alternatives despite observed deficiencies in the chambers. They can also lead to the certification and use of technologies that are defective and do not meet the intent or letter of safety and health regulations; an example of this is the continued certification and use
162 of SR-100 SCSRs despite observed deficiencies through the LTFE. Finally, these causes can lead to the implementation of technologies that, although they perform well and deliver the desired safety or health benefit, introduce some unintended consequence that diminishes safety in some other way; an example of this is electromagnetic interference between the personal dust monitor and proximity detection systems, whereby the introduction of an effective health intervention caused the unintended consequence of disabling an effective safety intervention.
There is a need to maintain objectivity throughout the process of writing, reviewing, passing, and enforcing new safety and health mandates as well as throughout the process of researching, developing, deploying, and using new safety and health technologies. In particular, it is necessary to actively identify indications of technological immaturity in an objective manner.
When indications of technological immaturity are identified, efforts should be made to improve the technology, but efforts should also be made to appropriately modify existing or proposed safety and health regulations or legislation. A means of assessing when a new safety or health technology has matured to the point that it can proceed in development, diffusion, or regulation is needed.
In the next chapter, recommendations for how objectivity can be better assured during the crafting of new safety and health regulations or legislation and during the research and development of new safety and health interventions will be presented.
163
Chapter 6: Bowtie Analysis of Mandates for Immature Safety and Health Technologies
The previous chapter presented a series of root cause analyses for several successful and unsuccessful outcomes for safety and health technology mandates in the mining industry. The result of each of these analyses was the identification of root causes for the outcome. These root causes were then compiled and compared to find a set of ten generalized root causes for successful outcomes and a generalized set of eight root causes for unsuccessful outcomes. The root causes for the successful outcomes represent desirable conditions to enable and foster the development and diffusion of effective safety and health technologies whereas the root causes for the unsuccessful outcomes represent threats to the successful development and diffusion of effective technologies.
Left unchecked, these threats can lead to the enactment of legislation or regulation that mandates the use of safety and health technologies that are immature, meaning that these technologies have not been adequately developed or demonstrated and may lead to undesirable consequences. In this chapter, bowtie analysis is used to develop recommendations for how mining safety and health regulatory agencies and research agencies can attempt to avoid the enactment of a mandate for an immature safety or health technology and, in the event that such a mandate is enacted, to mitigate the undesirable consequences of the mandate. This bowtie analysis will be presented in the next section along with general recommendations for mining safety and health regulatory agencies and research agencies. In Chapter 7, a more detailed discussion of how these recommendations could be implemented is presented.
164
As was described in Chapter 3, bowtie analysis is a method typically used to systematically consider the causes and outcomes of some hazardous event and to develop controls to prevent the causes from leading to the release of the hazard as well as recovery measures to mitigate and to decrease the severity of the consequences it that hazard is realized. In this study, bowtie analysis is adapted to develop strategies to prevent the enactment of a safety or health technology mandate for an immature technology and to mitigate the undesirable consequences of such a mandate. Rather than performing this analysis for each of the safety and health technologies considered in Chapters 4 and 5, a generalized case was studied. This simplified the analysis and also enabled the development of more generalizable conclusions and recommendations. This bowtie analysis for the generalized case of an immature safety or health technology mandate is presented here.
6.1 Threats and Outcomes Associated with the Enactment of a Mandate for an Immature Safety or Health Technology
The threats in this bowtie analysis are the generalized root causes for unsuccessful outcomes for safety or health technologies in the mining industry, which were identified in Chapter 5 and are listed below :
Threat 1: Biases lead legislators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore
indications of technology immaturity
Threat 2: Biases lead regulators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore
indications of technological immaturity
Threat 3: Biases and political pressures lead researchers to ignore or to understate observed
indications of technological immaturity
165
Threat 4: Despite the best efforts of researchers and developers, effective interventions
either cannot be developed or cannot be demonstrated to be effective due to
engineering challenges or economic constraints
Threat 5: Biases lead to an acceptance of the status quo with respect to recognized
deficiencies in safety and health standards or technologies
Threat 6: Cultural forces and cognitive biases among miners lead to a mistrust of new
interventions
Threat 7: Biases result in insufficient or poorly designed experiments
Threat 8: Biases result in insufficient or ineffective review of research
It is important to note that the presence of these root causes is, for the most part, out of the control of agencies involved in mining safety and health regulation or research. This is clearly the case for some of the threats (for example, Threat 6). For most of the others, it is less clear that the regulatory agencies, research agencies, and legislators cannot directly control these threats. Most of the threats deal with cognitive biases on the part of individuals or groups within these organizations, so a naïve view might be that these biases can be avoided through objective thinking. However, biases are an unavoidable part of any human being’s thinking – it is a myth to say that we can eliminate bias from our thinking. Moreover, these biases can be further compounded by political forces and interactions within or between agencies. Rather, the key to avoiding biases is to be vigilant for them in our own thinking as well as in the thinking of others and to work to correct them when they occur. In organizations, this can be accomplished through policies such as those for scientific peer-review and proper design of experiments. Since the threats cannot be directly controlled or eliminated, it is necessary to implement policies which
166 are designed to prevent the presence of these threats from leading to the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature.
In the event that a mandate is enacted for an immature technology, a number of undesirable outcomes are possible. Examples of these were seen in Chapters 4 and 5 and fall into four generalized categories:
Consequence 1: Intervention does not achieve the intended safety or health benefit
(An example is the lack of evidence that tracking systems provide a
material safety benefit)
Consequence 2: Intervention causes an unintended, negative safety or health consequence
(An example is the occurrence of electromagnetic interference between
the personal dust monitor and proximity detection systems)
Consequence 3: A device that fails to meet the safety and health standard or is otherwise
defective is certified and used
(An example is the continued certification and use of self-contained self-
rescuers with observed deficiencies)
Consequence 4: Despite effective interventions being available to meet the mandate, there
is sustained strong resistance to their use
(An example is the low adoption rate of noise controls for roof bolting
machines)
Figure 32 shows the threats and consequences for this bowtie analysis.
167
Threats Event Consequences
T1: Biases lead legislators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore indications of technology immaturity
T2: Biases lead regulators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore indications of technological immaturity
T3: Biases lead researchers to ignore or to understate observed indications of technological immaturity C1: Intervention does not achieve the intended health or safety T4: Despite the best efforts of benefit researchers and developers, effective interventions either C2: Intervention causes an cannot be developed or cannot be Enactment of a unintended, negative health or demonstrated to be effective due to law or regulation safety consequence engineering challenges or that mandates the economic constraints use of a health or C3: A device that fails to meet the safety technology health and safety standard or is T5: Biases lead to an acceptance of that is immature otherwise defective is certified and the status quo with respect to used recognized deficiencies in safety and health standards or C4: Despite effective interventions technologies being available to meet the mandate, there is sustained strong T6: Cultural forces and cognitive resistance to their use biases among miners lead to a mistrust of new interventions
T7: Biases result in insufficient or poorly designed experiments T8: Biases result in insufficient or ineffective review of research
Figure 32: Threats contributing to the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature
168
6.2 Overview of Bowtie Analysis
With these threats and consequences in place, preventative controls can be developed to prevent the enactment of immature technology mandates and recovery controls can be developed to mitigate the enactment of such a mandate. A set of recommended controls is shown in Figure 33.
These controls were developed using the knowledge gained through the study of both successful and unsuccessful safety and health technology outcomes in Chapters 4 and 5 and through discussion with subject matter experts in the areas of safety and health technology development and diffusion. Detailed discussion on how the controls shown in the figure is provided in this chapter. These controls draw on tools such as Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) as discussed in Chapter 2.
In the following sections, the controls associated with each threat and with each consequence will be discussed, including a discussion of the rationale for the recommended controls and a brief description of how these controls could be implemented at mining safety and health regulatory and research agencies. In Chapter 7, a more detailed discussion of the recommendations for these organizations is given.
169
Threats Preventative Controls Event Recovery Controls Consequences T1: Biases lead legislators to judge that immediate action is PC1: During legislative needed and to ignore process, assemble indications of technology congressional committees to immaturity examine scientific evidence and technological maturity T2: Biases lead regulators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore PC2: Research and regulatory indications of technological agencies should implement immaturity policies for the effective communication of science- T3: Biases lead researchers to based recommendations to ignore or to understate Congress and state legislatures observed indications of C1: Intervention does not technological immaturity PC3: During the rulemaking RC1: Regulations should be process, regulatory agencies designed to allow for discretion achieve the intended health or T4: Despite the best efforts of should conduct assessments of in enforcement safety benefit researchers and developers, technology readiness as part of effective interventions either the normal technical and RC2: Research and regulatory C2: Intervention causes an cannot be developed or cannot economic feasibility agencies should implement be demonstrated to be effective assessment unintended, negative health or Enactment of a law policies to track technology due to engineering challenges safety consequence PC4: Research and regulatory or regulation that maturity development or economic constraints agencies should implement mandates the use of policies to perform technology T5: Biases lead to an a health or safety C3: A device that fails to meet readiness assessments and to RC3: Agencies responsible for acceptance of the status quo technology that is safety and health product the health and safety standard with respect to recognized publicly report these immature assessments in a transparent certification should implement or is otherwise defective is deficiencies in safety and policies to link product certified and used health standards or manner certification to assessments of technologies PC5: Research and regulatory technology maturity C4: Despite effective T6: Cultural forces and agencies should implement interventions being available to cognitive biases among miners policies to seek engagement RC4: Research and regulatory meet the mandate, there is lead to a mistrust of new with industry stakeholders agencies should implement sustained strong resistance to interventions policies to seek engagement their use T7: Biases result in insufficient with industry stakeholders PC6: Research agencies or poorly designed experiments should implement rigorous T8: Biases result in insufficient policies for meaningful peer- or ineffective review of review of project proposals, research protocols, and publications
Figure 33: Bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature
170
6.3 Discussion of Controls to Prevent the Enactment of a Mandate for an Immature Safety or Health Technology
In this section, the left side (the threats and the associated preventative controls) of the bowtie analysis given in Figure 33 will be discussed. This portion of the bowtie is shown in Figure 34.
In this section, each of the threats and associated preventative controls will be discussed in turn.
Threats Preventative Controls Event T1: Biases lead legislators to judge PC1: During legislative process, that immediate action is needed assemble congressional committees to and to ignore indications of examine scientific evidence and technology immaturity technological maturity
T2: Biases lead regulators to judge PC2: Research and regulatory agencies that immediate action is needed should implement policies for the and to ignore indications of effective communication of science-based technological immaturity recommendations to Congress and state legislatures T3: Biases lead researchers to PC3: During the rulemaking process, ignore or to understate observed conduct assessments of technology indications of technological readiness as part of the normal technical immaturity and economic feasibility assessment T4: Despite the best efforts of researchers and developers, PC4: Research and regulatory agencies effective interventions either should implement policies to perform Enactment of a cannot be developed or cannot be technology readiness assessments and to law or regulation demonstrated to be effective due to publicly report these assessments in a that mandates the engineering challenges or transparent manner use of a health or economic constraints safety technology that is immature T5: Biases lead to an acceptance of the status quo with respect to PC5: Research and regulatory agencies recognized deficiencies in safety should implement policies to seek and health standards or engagement with industry stakeholders technologies
T6: Cultural forces and cognitive biases among miners lead to a mistrust of new interventions PC6: Research agencies should T7: Biases result in insufficient or implement rigorous policies for poorly designed experiments meaningful peer-review of project proposals, protocols, and publications T8: Biases result in insufficient or ineffective review of research
Figure 34: Left-hand side of bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing threats and preventative controls
171
6.3.1: (T1) Biases lead legislators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore indications of technology immaturity
The first threat (T1) is that biases may lead legislators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore indications of technology immaturity. This was observed as one of the root causes in the analyses of the unsuccessful outcomes associated with refuge alternatives and miner tracking systems. The use of tracking technology was directly mandated by the MINER Act of
2006. The use of refuge alternatives was mandated by MSHA regulation, as directed by the
MINER Act. As was discussed in Section 4.1.1, the MINER Act was passed unusually rapidly following the Sago Mine disaster and other disasters in 2006; the Sago disaster occurred in
January and by June, the Act had been signed into law. The public discourse following these disasters, along with the unavoidable biases held by legislators as discussed in Sections 5.1.1 and
5.1.3, led legislators to judge that immediate action was needed to prevent similar disasters from occurring in the future. With both technologies, there was a lack of evidence to show that the technologies were mature and ready to be implemented through government mandate.
Nonetheless, these indications of immaturity were ignored.
It is impossible to eliminate the cognitive biases that contribute to legislative actions, such as the passage of the MINER Act. Rather, the goal should be to prevent these biases from leading to future mandates for immature safety and health technologies. Figure 35 shows the portion of the bowtie analysis that is relevant to this threat and gives two possible preventative controls.
172
Threat Preventative Controls Event
PC1: During legislative process, assemble congressional committees to Enactment of a T1: Biases lead legislators to judge examine scientific evidence and technological maturity law or regulation that immediate action is needed that mandates the and to ignore indications of PC2: Research and regulatory agencies use of a health or technology immaturity should implement policies for the safety technology effective communication of science-based that is immature recommendations to Congress and state legislatures
Figure 35: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Threat 1
The first of these (PC1) is a recommendation to Congress to, during the legislative process, to assemble congressional committees to examine the scientific evidence relevant to the proposed legislation and to critically assess the maturity of technologies that are proposed to be mandated.
This is perhaps the most open-ended and imprecise recommendation provided in this dissertation
– it will be up to the individual Senators and Representatives to decide how best to assess the evidence for any proposed legislation, but a healthy degree of skepticism about new interventions is advisable.
The second preventative control for this threat (PC2) has to do with how research and regulatory agencies communicate with Congress about proposed or potential legislation. Specifically, these agencies should provide science-based recommendations concerning existing as well as potential new safety and health interventions. These recommendations should not be limited to positive findings, but should also indicate when there is a lack of evidence and, therefore, a need for further investigation. In other words, there should be an expectation that the maturity, efficacy,
173 and suitability of a new intervention should be demonstrated before any mandate to use the technology can be issued, and this expectation should be reflected in recommendations provided by regulatory and research agencies to Congress.
In order for such recommendations to carry weight, it will be necessary for the agencies issuing them to have an established track record of performing sound scientific research and also of being authorities on the state of the art for emerging safety and health technologies. When one of these organizations says that there is not sufficient evidence to support a proposed mandate, it must be clear that, if such evidence existed, the organization would be aware of it. To make a conclusive recommendation based on a lack of evidence, it must be possible to convincingly dismiss the accusation “you just didn’t look hard enough.” The degree to which this accusation can be convincingly dismissed is a function of how strongly the organization is perceived to be an authority on emerging safety and health technologies.
To strengthen this perception, regulatory and research agencies should establish policies for the continual (re)assessment of safety and health technologies in terms of their maturity and their ability to address safety and health concerns. The use of tools such as technology readiness assessments or product development lifecycle approaches could be used to do this. These recommendations are discussed below for the second threat (T2).
174
6.3.2: (T2) Biases lead regulators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore indications of technological immaturity
The second threat (T2) is that biases lead regulators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore indications of technological immaturity. This is very similar to T1 in that those in regulatory agencies are subject to the same unavoidable cognitive biases that cause flawed thinking for legislators. These biases can lead to the enactment of regulations that mandate the use of technologies that are immature, potentially leading to unsuccessful outcomes for these technology mandates. This was seen in the root causes for the unsuccessful outcomes associated with refuge alternatives and proximity detection systems, as discussed in Sections 5.1.1 and
5.1.4, respectively. In the case of refuge alternatives, the regulation was driven primarily by the expectations established by the MINER Act, as was discussed above. For proximity detection systems, the mandate for the use of this technology (as well as for the personal dust monitors that were involved in the electromagnetic interference with proximity detection systems) was driven by MSHA. However, in both cases, there was a lack of compelling evidence to conclude that the technology was sufficiently mature and appropriate to be mandated.
As was discussed in the relevant sections of Chapter 5, the decision to proceed with regulations mandating the use of refuge alternatives and proximity detection systems despite a lack compelling evidence for their maturity can be traced back, in part, to biases on the part of regulators. These biases are an unavoidable aspect of human thinking, so the focus should not be on eliminating the biases, but rather on detecting them and preventing them from leading to the enactment of mandates for immature technologies. The portion of the bowtie analysis which are relevant to this threat is shown in Figure 36.
175
Threat Preventative Controls Event
PC3: During the rulemaking process, conduct assessments of technology Enactment of a readiness as part of the normal technical T2: Biases lead regulators to judge law or regulation and economic feasibility assessment that immediate action is needed that mandates the and to ignore indications of PC4: Research and regulatory agencies use of a health or technological immaturity should implement policies to perform safety technology technology readiness assessments and to that is immature publicly report these assessments in a transparent manner
Figure 36: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Threat 2
Two potential controls have been identified to prevent biases within regulatory agencies from leading to the enactment of mandates for safety and health technologies that haven’t been demonstrated to be mature. In contrast to T1, which had to do with biases among legislators and is largely out of the control of mining safety and health organizations, this threat can be more directly controlled through the implementation of policy changes within these organizations. The two preventative controls identified (PC3 and PC4) are recommendations for such policy changes.
The first (PC3) is the recommendation that during the rulemaking process, regulatory agencies should conduct assessments of the technology’s readiness as part of the regular technical and economic feasibility assessment, and the second (PC4) is that both research and regulatory agencies should regularly perform technology readiness assessments. For any new regulation, a determination of technical and economic feasibility must be made and must be supported by documented evidence. As part of the research conducted to make this feasibility determination, information on the readiness of any technology proposed to be mandated should be collected and
176 analyzed. The question of feasibility is fundamentally different from the question of technology maturity, but much of the same information can be used to answer both questions. Since a significant effort is already expended on the determination of feasibility, it is wise to put in somewhat more effort to concurrently investigate the readiness of the technology and to make a complimentary determination of technology readiness. This technology readiness assessment would be different from the normal feasibility investigation in that the processes and standards of evidence would be clearly defined for the assignment of a given maturity level. In addition, the use of a standardized evaluation framework would allow for clearer and more consistent communication about the how the maturity determination was done and what evidence supports the determination. Transparency in this process is critically important.
For this recommendation to be effective at mitigating the effects of biases in the regulatory process, it is clearly necessary to conduct the analysis of technology readiness in a manner that minimizes the influence of biases. This is accomplished by implementing processes for detecting biases through objective reviews and established expectations for supporting evidence before decisions are made. As was discussed in Section 2.4, the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) scale provides a useful means of performing consistent evaluations of the maturity of technologies with explicitly stated expectations for supporting evidence. The TRL scale was developed by NASA [33, 34], and was adopted by the DOD in order to prevent the funding of high-risk development efforts for emerging technologies with low levels of maturity [35]. The
DOD provides guidance in their Technology Readiness Assessment Deskbook on how the TRL scale can be used in a structured way to manage the progression of technology research and development efforts [36, 37].
177
Other tools, such as the Technology Readiness Level Calculator (TRLC) [41], the Technology
Program Management Model (TPMM) [42], and Technology Readiness Assessment guides [43,
37] have been developed by the DOD, DOE, and other organizations as ways of managing the development of technologies through the TRL stages. In the private sector, many companies employ similar methods to assess the maturity of their products and to manage the progression of
R&D efforts. The Product Development Lifecycle (PDLC) is a framework for managing all aspects of product development and evaluation through all phases of technology maturity, from conceptual stages through diffusion and marketing.
The PDLC framework is most applicable to situations where the entire product development is under the direct control of the company or organization developing the technology. As such, it has more limited applicability in situations where technologies are being developed through more distributed means as would be the case for most safety and health technologies that would be mandated for use in the mining industry. In other words, since the agencies mandating the use of these technologies isn’t solely responsible for the decisions made during the technologies development, the PDLC framework may not be entirely appropriate. However, lessons from this approach can be useful nonetheless.
Namely, it is advisable to utilize a systematic approach to assessing and managing the development of a technology even in the case that the development is not entirely under the control of the organization conducting the assessment or driving the development. Under a
PDLC framework or under any of the frameworks for managing the funding of technology development based on TRLs (e.g. the TPMM), decisions are managed in a structured way with defined responsibilities for those involved in making the decisions and clear expectations for the type of supporting evidence that is needed at each decision point. Suggestions on how such a
178 system might be implemented for mining safety and health research and regulatory agencies are provided in Chapter 7.
Regardless of the details of how these tools might be used to manage key decisions in the research and regulation of safety and health interventions, the use of tools based on TRL has important advantages as were discussed in Chapter 2. The key advantages are that these tools provide a common language with which the technology status can be clearly communicated, they give a means of recognizing and managing risks associated with technology transition, and they give a largely objective measure that can be used to make decisions concerning research funding, acquisition, and most significantly here, regulation. NASA and DOD studies have quantified the economic benefits of these tools [44, 45], and the analysis presented in Chapter 5 on the root causes of unsuccessful outcomes for safety and health technology mandates shows the less quantifiable risks associated with not using these tools.
6.3.3: (T3) Biases and political pressures lead researchers to ignore or to understate observed indications of technological immaturity
The third threat (T3) is that biases amongst safety and health researchers in the mining community may lead these researchers to ignore or understate observed indications of technological immaturity. This was identified in the causal tree analyses for the unsuccessful outcomes associated with refuge alternatives, SCSRs, and proximity detection, although it likely plays a role in other cases as well. In the case of refuge alternatives, researchers saw in testing that the chambers exhibited significant deficiencies, and, although these deficiencies were publicly reported to Congress, the conclusions of this report stated that “the benefits of refuge alternatives and the general specification of these alternatives are sufficiently known to merit
179 their commercialization and deployment in underground coal mines.” With SCSRs, researchers repeatedly identified deficiencies with CSE SR100 SCSR units during LTFE testing that spanned nearly two decades. Again, these deficiencies were publicly reported; however, the seriousness of these deficiencies was either not recognized or was understated in the conclusions of these reports, and the units continued to be certified and used. In the case of proximity detection, researchers were told by mine operators that there were performance problems with proximity detection systems that could potentially be attributed to electromagnetic interference, but these claims were dismissed by the researchers and a rigorous study of EMI between personal dust monitors and proximity detection systems was not conducted until after both technologies had been mandated. Again, it is likely that the biases that contributed to these outcomes also played a role in similar cases and these cases simply were not captured in this analysis due to a lack of documented evidence.
The portion of the bowtie analysis associated with this threat is shown in Figure 37 and provides one suggested preventative control (PC4), which is the same control as was discussed above for
T2, namely to implement policies within research agencies to perform technology readiness assessments. In each of the three examples discussed for this threat, researchers made a determination that the technologies were mature and ready for widespread use in the industry.
For refuge alternatives and SCSRs, this determination was explicit in recommendations to
Congress or in the continued certification of products for use. For proximity detection systems, the determination was implicit in the lack of action to investigate reported performance issues.
180
Threat Preventative Control Event
Enactment of a PC4: Research and regulatory agencies T3: Biases lead researchers to law or regulation should implement policies to perform ignore or to understate observed that mandates the technology readiness assessments and to indications of technological use of a health or publicly report these assessments in a immaturity safety technology transparent manner that is immature
Figure 37: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Threat 3
In all three cases, if a policy had been in place that established a structured framework for determining the maturity of safety and health interventions with clearly defined expectations for supporting evidence, it is unlikely that the research that had been conducted would have supported a determination that the technologies were mature enough to merit a mandate for their use. In Chapter 7, suggestions on how such a policy might be implemented are provided.
6.3.4: (T4) Despite the best efforts of researchers and developers, effective interventions either cannot be developed or cannot be demonstrated to be effective due to engineering challenges or economic constraints
The fourth threat (T4) is that despite their best efforts, it is sometimes not possible for researchers and technology developers to develop and demonstrate an effective engineering solution to a safety or health problem. This can be due to significant engineering challenges, as was seen in the case of noise controls for roof bolters, or due to economic constraints, including the constraint of limited resources to conduct research, as was seen in the case of tracking systems.
181
As was discussed in Section 5.2.2, despite cooperative research and development efforts between
NIOSH researchers and equipment manufacturers, the drill chuck isolator, the drill bit enclosure, and other noise controls for roof bolters were never successfully demonstrated to be effective under operating conditions. As a result, these interventions were never listed as feasible in the
MSHA PIB and were never widely adopted by the industry. In a sense, this can be considered a success of the mechanisms that were in place through the expectations established by MSHA enforcement policies that a successful demonstration under operating conditions must first be completed before an intervention could be considered to be feasible. It also showcases the harsh reality that, despite well designed research and despite strong partnership between researchers and product developers, it is still sometimes the case that an effective engineering solution will simply not be found.
In contrast, the failure of researchers to produce compelling evidence that miner tracking systems provide a material improvement to post-disaster safety can largely be attributed to a lack of concerted research in this area. As was discussed in Section 5.1.3, although NIOSH had been mandated by the MINER Act to conduct research on communications and tracking systems, the bulk of that research was on communications and little was done on tracking. This was a decision made under the economic and practical constraints of limited resources, facilities, and personnel as well as in the presence of competing research focuses such as refuge alternatives and proximity detection, for which regulatory mandates were concurrently being enacted. Again, this highlights a harsh reality that, even when a safety or health problem is well appreciated, it may be difficult to properly address the problem through research due to economic constraints.
In Figure 38, the portion of the bowtie analysis that is relevant to this threat is given and includes one suggested preventative control, which again is PC4 as was discussed for the previous two
182 threats: Research and regulatory agencies should implement policies to perform technology readiness assessments and to publicly report these assessments in a transparent manner. In this case, it may be less clear how the use of these tools could prevent the enactment of a law or regulation mandating the use of a technology that is immature. By assessing maturity in the early stages of technology development as well as throughout the later stages, it will be possible to better detect cases where there are indications that a technology is unlikely to be successful or cases where there is a lack of sufficient evidence to conclude that the technology will be successful. In addition, the information provided by these tools will help to make prioritization decisions regarding the allocation of resources and the development of infrastructure or expertise. By identifying which technologies represent lower risk development efforts, research funding decisions can be based on an analysis of expected impact on safety and health issues. In order to make this possible, it is necessary to continually assess the maturity of technologies that are either being researched or that are being considered for research. Specific suggestions on how a policy to use tools based on TRA or PDLC are given in Chapter 7.
Threat Preventative Control Event
T4: Despite the best efforts of Enactment of a researchers and developers, PC4: Research and regulatory agencies law or regulation effective interventions either should implement policies to perform that mandates the cannot be developed or cannot be technology readiness assessments and to use of a health or demonstrated to be effective due to publicly report these assessments in a safety technology engineering challenges or transparent manner that is immature economic constraints
Figure 38: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Threat 4
183
6.3.5: (T5) Biases lead to an acceptance of the status quo with respect to recognized deficiencies in safety and health standards or technologies
The next threat (T5) is that biases can lead to an acceptance of the status quo with respect to recognized deficiencies in safety and health technologies or standards. Examples of this are discussed in the causal tree analyses for the unsuccessful outcomes associated with SCSRs and proximity detection systems as discussed in Chapter 5.
With SCSRs, there were indications that the existing SCSR technologies were insufficient. In particular, at disasters like Sago, miners had difficulty starting the units, had difficulty breathing once the units were started, and had to remove the units in order to talk. Despite this, no action has been taken to institute new standards for the design or functionality of SCSRs, due, at least in part, to an acceptance of the status quo with respect to these apparent deficiencies.
The unsuccessful outcome analyzed for proximity detection systems, namely the occurrence of
EMI between the personal dust monitor and proximity detection systems, also shows a scenario where the status quo was accepted with respect to existing safety and health standards or technology. Standards designed to prevent EMI, including the allocation of the RF spectrum and design standards for electromagnetic compatibility, do not apply to the underground mining industry. This is certainly not because there has never been anyone in the mining community that recognized the potential for EMI. This potential has long been understood, but this has not resulted in action to implement changes to standards through regulation. Again, it is reasonable to conclude that this is due, in part, to an acceptance of the status quo regarding the safety of electronic devices in underground mines.
The portion of the bowtie analysis that is relevant to this threat is shown in Figure 39, and two suggestions for preventative controls are given.
184
Threat Preventative Controls Event PC4: Research and regulatory agencies should implement policies to perform Enactment of a technology readiness assessments and to law or regulation T5: Biases lead to an acceptance of publicly report these assessments in a that mandates the the status quo with respect to transparent manner recognized deficiencies in safety use of a health or and health standards or PC5: Research and regulatory agencies safety technology technologies should implement policies to seek that is immature engagement with industry stakeholders
Figure 39: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Threat 5
The first (PC4) has already been discussed for the previous three threats and is to implement policies to conduct assessments of technology readiness. By prompting the continual assessment of the maturity of technologies in use in the mining industry, such policies would help to identify deficiencies with existing standards or technologies earlier, and by explicitly stating clear expectations for supporting evidence in order to justify a determination that a technology is mature, these policies would force the discussion of the appropriateness and sufficiency of existing standards. In addition, by assessing the readiness of technologies not yet in use in the mining industry, opportunities might be identified for improvements to the status quo using technologies or applicable standards from other industries. And a structured approach to the decisions made using these assessments would again force the discussion of whether existing changes are needed.
The second preventative control (P5) is that policies should be implemented within research and regulatory agencies to seek engagement with industry stakeholders. Arguably, this is something that the mining regulatory and research organizations already do well – seeking input from and
185 engaging with the mining community. The small size of the industry makes it somewhat easier to maintain this engagement. In addition, the high level of industry oversight (frequent and rigorous government inspections and strict requirements for reportable incidents) give a strong incentive for mine operators and other stakeholders to engage with the regulatory process. This incentive is also strengthened by the unique nature of mining safety and health regulations, which are focused on the limited jurisdiction of mining. Finally, the historical and ongoing influence of labor organizations and lobbying groups in the mining industry create opportunities and incentives for engagement and cooperation.
On the other hand, it could be argued that there are gaps in the level of engagement between government agencies and the mining community, as demonstrated in cases that were analyzed in this research. Regardless of whether current relationships between government agencies and members of the mining community are strong or not, it is always worth further strengthening those relationships. To do so, policies can be implemented that encourage, empower, and incentivize employees of the agencies to more effectively engage with the stakeholders.
At a minimum, this would include making collaboration and partnering a priority in agency strategic documents and communicating the importance of these values to employees. To enable employees to fulfill this directive, competencies related to collaboration and partnering should be developed. This can be done through training and other professional development activities.
Cascading personnel performance plan elements should be used to reinforce the importance of these competencies and to put concrete plans in place for them. In addition to conventional classroom training, other tools for developing these competencies can include mentoring, coaching, and job shadowing.
186
Beyond training, policies to enable effective engagement with the industry can include the organization of workshops, partnership meetings, webinars, and other opportunities for meetings with as broad a cross-section of the mining community as possible. Meetings which bring together researchers, regulatory representatives, mine operators, equipment manufacturers, labor organizations, professional organizations, and other groups are critically important to the success of efforts to foster engagement between the government and industry. There are several requirements with which the organization of these meetings must comply, including those of the
Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), which limits the administrative burden that the government can place on the public, the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), which governs the formation and operation of advisory committees to direct the strategic planning of government activities, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which governs the process of rulemaking. Within the constraints of these legal requirements, agencies should seek out and create opportunities to bring the mining community together through meetings.
Finally, means of incentivizing industry engagement should be used. This can be accomplished by writing goals related to engagement into employees’ performance plans and by rewarding effective collaboration through performance awards and other means of formal recognition. In addition to these formal means of formal recognition and incentives, creative ways of incentivizing employees and to create a culture in which partnering is valued should be found.
Investment in fostering these relationships will pay dividends in that the safety and health needs and opportunities in the industry will be better understood.
187
6.3.6: (T6) Cultural forces and cognitive biases among miners lead to a mistrust of new interventions
The next threat (T6) is related to T5 in that it could be addressed through better engagement with the mining community. This is the threat that cultural forces and cognitive biases within the community lead to a mistrust of new interventions. It should be no surprise that people are, to varying degrees, resistant to change. There are significant barriers to the adoption of new technology in the mining industry that contribute to this resistance to change, including barriers to entry imposed by the small size of the industry and by regulatory standards such as permissibility requirements. But it can also be attributed to an apparent culture of resistance to and mistrust of new safety and health interventions. It should also be noted that this resistance can be justified in many situations. Past situations, such as the cases studied in this research, in which a new technology failed to achieve its intended safety or health benefit or created some new hazard have occurred. These situation clearly give miners sufficient justification to be skeptical of future interventions.
The portion of the bowtie analysis related to this threat is shown in Figure 40, and one preventative control is given. This preventative control (PC5) has already been discussed above and is to implement policies to improve engagement with the mining community. By doing so by the methods described above, it will be possible to influence the mistrust many have in new
188 interventions by earning trust and by ensuring that their needs are addressed.
Threat Preventative Control Event
Enactment of a law or regulation T6: Cultural forces and cognitive PC5: Research and regulatory agencies that mandates the biases among miners lead to a should implement policies to seek use of a health or mistrust of new interventions engagement with industry stakeholders safety technology that is immature
Figure 40: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Threat 6
6.3.7: (T7) Biases result in insufficient or poorly designed experiments and (T8) Biases result in insufficient or ineffective review of research
The final two threats (T7 and T8) are closely related, are addressed by the same preventative controls, and will be discussed here together. T7 is the threat that biases amongst researchers lead to insufficient or poorly designed experiments, and T8 is the threat that biases amongst those responsible for reviewing research will lead to insufficient or ineffective review. It should be noted that sometimes it may be prohibitively difficult or even impossible to conduct properly designed experiments due to a lack of needed cooperation. For example, if researchers do not have access to a mine in which to conduct experiments, those experiments will not be conducted.
Similarly, it is possible that the vendor of a safety or health technology may seek to impede research on their product by preventing researchers from obtaining the product to test.
These barriers aside, there are also cases in which researchers have access to the resources and cooperation they need to conduct a proper experiment, but fail to do so. This was observed most notably in the analyses of unsuccessful outcomes for SCSRs (Section 5.1.2) and for proximity detection systems (Section 5.1.4). In the case of SCSRs, the testing conducted through the LTFE
189 was insufficient to conclusively implicate quality control issues in the observed failures. As a result, the results of the studies were left up to interpretation, and the conclusions were thus more susceptible to being influenced by the cognitive biases of the researchers. Similarly, experiments evaluating the performance of proximity detection systems failed to identify the possibility for electromagnetic interference affecting the performance of the system. In this case, experiments simply were not conducted to test for this possibility, which shows the biases of researchers who decided that such experiments were not necessary.
The fault for these unsuccessful outcomes cannot be laid entirely at the feet of the researchers directly responsible for conducting the experiments. Good science depends on proper peer- review to overcome and counteract biases among researchers. At research organizations, policies must be in place to ensure that research is being properly reviewed by appropriately qualified and objective experts. Without well-defined policies for scientific review, these reviews are left up to the judgement and discretion of the researchers and their management. Biases can influence the decisions of either of these groups, leading to insufficient reviews. Thus, well- defined and consistently-applied policies and procedures for review are needed. The implementation of such policies is the last preventative control (PC6) recommended in this dissertation and is shown in the relevant portions of the bowtie analysis in Figure 41 and Figure
42.
190
Threat Preventative Control Event
Enactment of a PC6: Research agencies should law or regulation T7: Biases result in insufficient or implement rigorous policies for that mandates the poorly designed experiments meaningful peer-review of project use of a health or proposals, protocols, and publications safety technology that is immature
Figure 41: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Threat 7
Threat Preventative Control Event
Enactment of a PC6: Research agencies should law or regulation T8: Biases result in insufficient or implement rigorous policies for that mandates the ineffective review of research meaningful peer-review of project use of a health or proposals, protocols, and publications safety technology that is immature
Figure 42: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Threat 8
While peer-review is an integral part of any research process and policies for peer-review are already in place at federal research agencies, there are opportunities to improve these policies. Of critical importance to the effectiveness of peer-review is the independence of the review.
Whenever practical, blind reviews should be performed such that the researchers do not know who is reviewing their work and the reviewers do not know whose work they are reviewing. This helps to prevent conflicts of interest and subconscious biases from affecting the outcome of the
191 reviews. In addition, it is important to have oversight of the peer-review process incorporated into the policy. It is necessary to assign responsibility to someone within the research agency to check that reviewer comments have been appropriately addressed. Ideally, the person responsible for this oversight task would be independent from the researchers’ normal chain of command, but would be given the authority to halt research or dissemination activities that did not meet the standards of scientific excellence and integrity.
There are several stages in the research process where oversight and review is important, and there are several ways in which these stages can be delineated. For the purpose of this discussion, a five-stage process for research is used, consisting of: (1) Project concept development, (2)
Project proposal and planning, (3) Design of experimental protocols, (4) Conduct of experiments and analysis of results, and (5) Dissemination of results. This process is not necessarily a linear progression through the stages. It is possible that the stages overlap and that the stages are re- visited in an iterative process throughout the life of a research effort. At each stage, appropriate and effect oversight and review is needed. This five-stage process, along with a brief statement of the objective of review at each stage, is shown in Figure 43. This process is described for intramural research (research conducted directly by the organization, as opposed to extramural research, which is funded and overseen by the organization), but the expectations for effective review in both intramural and extramural research should be consistent.
192
Project concept development Project proposal and planning Reviews should confirm that Design of experimental protocols Reviews should research Conduct of experiments and confirm that concept is Reviews should analysis of results the project plan Dissemination justified by a confirm that is sound and of results clear health or experiments Reviews should safety need, that needed confirm that expertise, are designed in Reviews should burden, and a scientifically established impact resources, and protocols are confirm that facilities are valid and publications, ethical way being followed available and that presentations, adjustments to and other these protocols products are valid present sound results and conclusions
Figure 43: Five-stage process of research and reviews associated with each stage
Project concept development – At the earliest stage of a research effort, researchers will develop a concept for a research project. The development of this concept should be informed by a review of the research literature to identify research gaps as well as to identify opportunities from innovation, an analysis of available injury and illness surveillance data to identify safety and health needs, and engagement with mining stakeholders to understand the safety and health challenges they face as well as the burden and impact that might result from the implementation of a new intervention. At this stage, reviews should probe whether the project concept is justified based on documented evidence of the need for the research, and the burden and impact that is expected to be achieved through the successful completion of the research. These reviews can be effectively conducted internally to the research organization – appropriate experts within the
193 organization should scrutinize the justification for the research project, and senior management should make a decision on whether the concept should advance to the next stage.
Project proposal and planning – Once a determination has been made that a project concept is justified, a project proposal must be written. This proposal should comprehensively document the burden, need, and impact identified in the previous stage through literature review, surveillance data analysis, and stakeholder engagement and should detail a plan of how the research will be conducted, including descriptions of methods, analysis, and plans for dissemination of results. The proposal should also state the availability of the expertise, resources, equipment, and facilities needed to successfully complete the research.
For reviews, this is likely the most critical stage of the research process. The decision of whether to commence a research project should be based on an objective assessment that the project is likely to be successful, and that, if successful, the project is likely to address a safety or health need. Reviews at this stage should include both internal and external peer-reviews. Experts from outside the research organization should be sought out for their expertise for these reviews. To the extent possible, the reviews should be conducted as blind reviews, with neither the reviewer nor the researcher knowing who the other is. The number of reviews needed and the type of expertise needed to conduct the reviews will vary, but procedures for these reviews should be well documented and consistently applied to all project proposals.
Design of experimental protocols – Protocols for the conduct of experiments should, ideally, be designed during the project proposal stage. However, due to the exploratory and adaptive nature of research, it is often not possible at the outset of a research project to completely plan every experiment that will be completed during the course of the project. Hence, protocols are often
194 written throughout the course of a research project. These protocols can be for tests to be conducted in laboratory settings or for tests to be conducted in the field at a cooperating mine site. In either case, the protocol should thoroughly explain the motivation and justification for the experiment as well as explaining methods to be used for data collection, data processing, data analysis, data storage and sharing, and dissemination of results. In addition, protocols should also discuss ethical considerations, including how the safety of researchers and, if applicable, human subject will be protected. Protocols should also provide a review of relevant literature regarding research methods and should utilize appropriate statistical and analytical methods to ensure that supportable conclusions are reached.
The review of research protocols should be focused on ensuring the quality of the science and the adherence to standards of scientific integrity. In the case of experiments involving human or animal subjects, review by an Institutional Review Board (IRB) should be conducted to ensure the protection of these subjects. Government research must also comply with laws limiting the burden that can be placed on the public; for research involving surveys or interviews with members of the public, this includes complying with the requirements of the PRA. Under the
PRA, government researchers must obtain approval from the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) for any such study that collects information from ten (10) or more members of the public. The processes for obtaining IRB and OMB approvals already represent effective mechanisms for providing review of scientific research protocols.
Regardless of whether IRB or OMB approval is needed, research organizations should ensure that appropriate peer-review of all research protocols is conducted. This can include both internal and external review and should include reviews from individuals with all applicable areas of expertise, including statistics and design of experiments, research ethics, and whatever technical
195 area the protocol concerns. Procedures for obtaining protocol reviews should be consistently applied to all research activities, and policies should be in place to prohibit the conduct of any research activities not approved through the designated processes.
Conduct of experiments and analysis of results – If the review of the project concept has confirmed the justification for the research, if the review of the project proposal has confirmed the soundness of the research plan and the likelihood of successful, impactful results, and if the review of research protocols has confirmed that experiments are being conducted using scientifically and ethically appropriate methods, then minimal review of the actual conduct of the research should be needed. However, oversight should be in place to ensure that projects proceed according to the approved project proposal and that experiments are conducted according to approved research protocols. Policies should be in place to monitor the progress of projects through regular quarterly, semi-annual, or annual project reviews. The focus of these project reviews should be to confirm that research is proceeding only according to approved plans.
Minor adjustments to the approved plans (for example, changes in personnel or timelines) are to be expected, but if substantial adjustments to the approved plans are needed (for example, fundamental changes to research methods or the addition of new major research tasks), the appropriate stages of review should be re-visited – either a re-review of the project protocol or a re-review of relevant research protocols.
Dissemination of results – Following the completion of an experiment or of a research project, results and conclusions are typically disseminated through government-issued technical papers, peer-reviewed journal articles, conference papers, and presentations. Research can also be disseminated through less conventional means such as workshops, webinars, or software applications. However research is disseminated, it is important that the products be sufficiently
196 reviewed to ensure that they contain valid scientific methods, appropriate analysis, and conclusions that are supported by the evidence.
For official government statements or documents, rigorous reviews are required, and in the case of peer-reviewed journal articles, the journal will administer its own review process. However, research organizations should not rely on these mechanisms to guarantee the quality of research dissemination products. Consistently applied review practices should be used for all products.
Even for non-peer-reviewed products, such as conference papers or presentations, organizations should, at a minimum, internally review the products prior to publication and should consider whether a more rigorous external review is appropriate.
A final thought on the review of research is that, while established and consistently applied processes for review are important, the culture of the organization with regard to review is also important. Valuing peer-review should be part of the culture at a research organization, and researchers should be encouraged to seek out review for their own research as well as to provide review of others’ research. It is human nature to be uncomfortable with having our work criticized or our objectivity questioned, but for science to have value, it must be backed by rigorous and critical peer-review. It is challenging to overcome people’s resistance to criticism and to get them to value critical review, but if a culture that values review can be created, the validity and impact of the research will be strengthened. Efforts to instill this culture should be a priority for any organization where research is conducted.
197
6.4 Discussion of Controls to Mitigate the Enactment of a Mandate for an Immature Safety or Health Technology
In the previous section, a number of preventative controls were suggested that could help to prevent the enactment of a regulation or legislation mandating the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, which represents the left half of the bowtie analysis given in Figure
33. In this section, the right half of the bowtie analysis will be discussed and a number of recovery controls will be presented that could help to mitigate negative consequences associated with the enactment of a law or regulation mandating the use of an immature safety or health technology. The relevant portion of the bowtie analysis is shown in Figure 44.
Event Recovery Controls Consequences RC1: Regulations should be C1: Intervention does not achieve designed to allow for discretion in the intended health or safety enforcement benefit
RC2: Research and regulatory C2: Intervention causes an agencies should implement policies Enactment of a unintended, negative health or to track technology maturity safety consequence law or regulation development that mandates the use of a health or C3: A device that fails to meet the RC3: Agencies responsible for health and safety standard or is safety technology safety and health product that is immature otherwise defective is certified and certification should implement used policies to link product RC4: Research and regulatory C4: Despite effective interventions agencies should implement policies being available to meet the to seek engagement with industry mandate, there is sustained strong stakeholders resistance to their use
Figure 44: Right-hand side of bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing consequences and recovery controls
On the left side of this figure is the event which corresponds with the middle of the bowtie: the enactment of a law or regulation mandating an immature technology. On the right side of the
198 figure, are the negative consequences that can occur as a result of the enactment of such a mandate. Whereas the threats used in the previous section were derived from the root causes for unsuccessful outcomes of safety and health technology mandates obtained through the causal tree analyses presented in Chapter 5, the consequences used in this section are generalizations of the unsuccessful outcomes themselves. Between the event and the consequences on the bowtie analysis are the recovery controls – strategies that can be used to help mitigate the impact of the event and to decrease the likelihood that it will lead to the negative consequences.
In the following, each of the consequences will be discussed in turn, along with the associated recovery controls.
6.4.1: (C1) Intervention does not achieve the intended safety or health benefit
The first negative consequence (C1) that could occur is that the mandated intervention might not achieve the safety or health benefit that it is intended to achieve. Two examples in which this might be the case are with refuge alternatives and tracking systems.
As was discussed in Section 5.1.1, at the time the RA regulation was passed and continuing to today, there are many unanswered questions about the safety of RAs with regard to heat and humidity buildup, the explosion resistance of components, the ingress of harmful gases, and post-accident communications with the surface. Until a disaster occurs that necessitates their use, it will be impossible to conclusively say whether the design of RAs is sufficient to protect the lives of miners. However, the lingering questions with this technology merit concern.
199
Similarly, questions remain around whether tracking systems provide a material improvement to safety during a post-disaster escape or rescue. While it is known that tracking systems provide a level of functionality, there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the use of these systems will provide the information needed to substantially increase the likelihood of successful escape or rescue following a disaster. As with RAs, the true safety value of these systems will not be known until a disaster necessitates their use, but the questions are cause for concern.
The portion of the bowtie analysis that is relevant to this consequence is shown in Figure 45, which suggests two recovery controls.
Event Recovery Controls Consequence
RC1: Regulations should be Enactment of a designed to allow for discretion in law or regulation enforcement C1: Intervention does not achieve that mandates the the intended health or safety use of a health or RC2: Research and regulatory benefit safety technology agencies should implement policies that is immature to track technology maturity development
Figure 45: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Consequence 1
The first recovery control (RC1) is that, where appropriate, regulations should be designed to allow for discretion in enforcement. This recommendation is drawn from a lesson learned in the causal tree analysis of the successful outcome for communications systems given in Section
5.1.3. With communications systems, MSHA recognized that the available systems could not meet the letter of the MINER Act mandate for fully wireless communications between underground and surface. The MINER Act contained a clause allowing for discretion in the
200 enforcement of this mandate by allowing for alternatives to a fully wireless system that
“approximate, as closely as possible, the degree of functional utility and safety protection provided by the wireless two-way medium.” With communications systems, MSHA utilized this discretion by issuing guidance on the use and enforcement of partially wireless communications system. If appropriate, similar flexibility should be written into future regulations to permit the enforcement of the regulation to be adaptable to the state of the technology.
As technology advances and as the nature of mining evolves, the enforcement of regulations should adapt. To do this, it is necessary for regulatory requirements to allow for discretion and flexibility on the part of the enforcement agency. It should be noted that this does not mean that the discretion should be in the hands of individual investigators or individual district offices.
Rather, if a change in enforcement is needed and is permitted by the language of the regulation or law, a policy change should be published and consistently enforced. With this flexibility, if a situation occurs in which a mandated safety or health technology is suspected to be immature, the enforcement of the mandate can be adjusted.
The second recovery control suggested (RC2) is that research and regulatory agencies should implement policies to track technology maturity development for mandated, as well as emerging, safety and health technologies. Presumably, by the time a technology is mandated, a determination will have been made, either justifiably or not, that the technology is mature or that it can be developed to maturity to satisfy the mandate. Once a rule is issued this question should not be considered settled. Rather, the question of maturity should be revisited and tracked throughout the development and diffusion of the technology.
201
For voluntarily-adopted technologies, adoption will follow an S-shaped curve as was discussed in Chapter 2, with few early adopters, followed by a more rapid increase in adoption as others see the benefits, and finally a slowdown in adoption as some of those who were resistant to the new innovation gradually become late adopters. In the case of mandated technologies, adoption rates are not organically determined in this manner; rather, adoption is driven by compliance deadlines and enforcement, with even those who are resistant to the change being forced to adopt the technology. This will result in more rapid adoption by a non-self-selecting user group, which will provide a trial by fire for the technology under a wide variety of operating environments and use conditions. As a result, the clearest picture of the technology’s readiness can often come after the mandate for its use has been implemented.
For this reason, the period following the enactment and initial enforcement of a technology mandate is a critical time to assess the success of the technology. As mine operators begin to use the technology, they should be approached and encouraged to share their experiences and views.
Tests of the intervention’s performance under a wide variety of real operating conditions should be conducted in as objective and quantifiable a manner possible, using appropriately designed research protocols. The actual burden of the intervention’s use, both economically and practically, on the mining industry should be assessed, both through the gathering of stakeholder feedback and through objectively quantifiable means. All of this information should be utilized in evaluating the maturity of the technology and in identifying areas where improvements are needed. Tools based on TRL can be used for this, and a more detailed discussion on the use of these tools is given in Chapter 7.
202
6.4.2: (C2) Intervention causes an unintended, negative safety or health consequence
The second potential negative consequence (C2) of the enactment of a mandate for an immature safety or health technology is that the deployment of the intervention may result in some unintended negative impact on safety or health. An example of this was observed with the EMI occurrence between personal dust monitors and proximity detection systems. Both devices function correctly in that, under most circumstances, they achieve the intended safety or health impact (i.e., reducing dust exposure and reducing the risk of striking/pinning accidents).
However, when the two devices are used together and are worn close to each other on a miner’s belt, the unintended consequences of EMI occurs, effectively rendering the proximity detection system inoperable. It is conceivable that, if a miner had come to expect the proximity detection system to stop the motion of the machine when they got too close, that this could create a scenario that is more hazardous than the situation without a proximity detection system installed at all. This is one example of an unintended consequence of the introduction of a safety intervention, but many other scenarios where the introduction of an intervention designed to increase safety could, in fact, decrease safety in unexpected ways.
The relevant portion of the bowtie analysis related to this consequence, and the associated recovery controls, is shown in Figure 46. The two recovery controls (RC1 and RC2) suggested here for C2 are identical to those suggested for C1 in Figure 45. As with an intervention that fails to deliver the intended safety or health benefit, the fallout from an intervention that delivers the intended benefit but also creates some other unintended negative consequence could be mitigated by allowing for discretion and adaptability in the enforcement of the mandate as well as by continually tracking the maturity of the technology to identify and correct shortcomings.
203
Event Recovery Controls Consequence RC1: Regulations should be Enactment of a designed to allow for discretion in law or regulation enforcement C2: Intervention causes an that mandates the unintended, negative health or use of a health or RC2: Research and regulatory safety consequence safety technology agencies should implement policies that is immature to track technology maturity development
Figure 46: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Consequence 2
6.4.3: (C3) A device that fails to meet the safety and health standard or is otherwise defective is certified and used
The third type of negative consequence (C3) that could occur is that a device that fails to meet the standards or intent of a safety or health mandate could be certified and used. This was observed with the unsuccessful outcome associated with SCSRs, namely that an unacceptably high rate of quality control failures occurred with a certified and widely used SCSR model.
Despite testing showing deficiencies with these units over nearly two decades, the model continued to be certified and used. One could argue that this is not the result of a flawed regulatory mandate, but rather the result of flawed certification procedures. Regardless, there are lessons that can be learned to prevent similar situations from occurring in the future.
The relevant portion of the bowtie analysis is given in Figure 47. One recovery control (RC3) is suggested: organizations responsible for certifying safety and health products for use in mining should link the certification of these products to prior assessments of the maturity of the underlying technologies. By doing so, it will more confidence will be able to be placed in the correct functioning of the component technologies, and abnormal function, due to manufacturing
204 defect or other deficiencies will be more easily detected. In addition, the use of technology maturity assessments will provide a framework under which rigorous scientific studies of the capabilities of the technology will need to be evaluated as well as clear expectations for the type and degree of supporting evidence needed to make a determination that a system is effective. A discussion of how a policy requiring such assessments could be designed is given in Chapter 7.
Event Recovery Control Consequence
Enactment of a law or regulation RC3: Agencies responsible for C3: A device that fails to meet the that mandates the safety and health product health and safety standard or is use of a health or certification should implement otherwise defective is certified and safety technology policies to link product used that is immature certification to assessments of
Figure 47: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Consequence 3
6.4.4: (C4) Despite effective interventions being available to meet the mandate, there is sustained strong resistance to their use
The last type of negative consequence (C4) that can result from the enactment of a mandate to use a safety or health technology that is not mature is that the mining community may have strong and sustained resistance the use of the mandated technology. This has been seen with refuge alternatives, which many miners say they would not enter in the event of a disaster, and noise controls for roof bolting machines, which have failed to achieve widespread adoption due, in part, to the impact the use of these interventions has the normal operation of the machines. In both cases, it can legitimately be argued that the underlying failure is that the interventions do not provide the intended safety or health benefit (i.e., a consequence of type C1) and that
205 improving the performance of the technologies would alleviate the resistance to their use, but the continued resistance to the use of the technologies is nonetheless a consequence worth considering.
The relevant portion for this consequence is given in Figure 48, and one recovery control (RC4) is suggested: research and regulatory agencies should implement policies to seek stronger engagement with industry stakeholders.
Event Recovery Control Consequence
Enactment of a law or regulation RC4: Research and regulatory C4: Despite effective interventions that mandates the agencies should implement policies being available to meet the use of a health or to seek engagement with industry mandate, there is sustained strong safety technology stakeholders resistance to their use that is immature
Figure 48: Partial bowtie analysis of the enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety or health technology that is immature, showing portion associated with Consequence 4
This identically echoes a preventative control, PC5 (“Research and regulatory agencies should implement policies to seek engagement with industry stakeholders”), which was suggested as a way to address threat T6 (“Cultural forces and cognitive biases among miners lead to a mistrust of new interventions”). The similarities between T6 and C4 should be apparent, but it is worth noting that resistance to a new intervention will not go away simply because a regulatory or legislative mandate has been issued for its use. This resistance is likely to continue, or even to intensify, following the promulgation and enforcement of such a mandate. To overcome this resistance, it is important to promote the value of collaboration and partnering, to develop employees’ competencies for collaboration and partnering, to organize meetings with broad
206 cross-sections of the mining community, and to incentivize employees to engage with industry stakeholders using performance plans and awards.
It may be difficult or even impossible to foster a cooperative relationship between government and industry with respect to the enforcement of regulations. It would also be inappropriate to build such a relationship to the point that the independence and objectivity of the regulatory oversight could be called into question. Nevertheless, partnering and collaboration is critical to success both before and after the passage of new rules.
207
Chapter 7: Guidelines and Recommendations to Improve the Likelihood of Success for New Safety and Health Technology Mandates
In the previous chapter, a bowtie analysis was presented in which the event at the center of the bowtie was the enactment of a legislative or regulatory mandate to use a safety or health technology that is not mature; the consequences at the right side of the bowtie were generalized forms of observed unsuccessful outcomes resulting from immature safety and health technologies that have been mandated; and the threats at the left side of the bowtie were generalized forms of the root causes for those unsuccessful outcomes, which were informed by the causal tree analyses presented in Chapter 5. Six preventative controls were formulated, which will help to prevent the threats from leading to the event (the enactment of a mandate for an immature intervention). In addition, four recovery controls, which will help to mitigate the outcome of such an event and prevent or lessen the negative consequences were formulated.
In this section, a brief summary of these recommended preventative and recovery controls, most of which call for policy changes at regulatory and research organizations, will be presented in
Section 7.1. Following this summary, since several of the recommendations deal with the use of tools to assess and track the maturity of technologies, a discussion is provided in Section 7.2 on how procedures to conduct such assessments might be designed.
7.1 Summary of Recommendations
The preventative and recovery controls identified through the bowtie analysis presented in
Chapter 6 are listed in Table 31.
208
Table 31: Summary of recommended preventative and recovery controls to prevent and mitigate, respectively, the enactment of a legislative or regulatory mandate for the use of an immature safety or health technology
Preventative Controls Recovery Controls PC1: During legislative process, responsible RC1: Regulations should be designed to Congressional committees should constitute allow for discretion in enforcement scientific panels to investigate technical issues including the scientific evidence for technological maturity
PC2: Research and regulatory agencies RC2: Research and regulatory agencies should implement policies for the effective should implement policies to track technology communication of science-based maturity development recommendations to Congress and state legislatures
PC3: During the rulemaking process, RC3: Agencies responsible for safety and regulatory agencies should conduct health product certification should implement assessments of technology readiness as part of policies to link product certification to the normal technical and economic feasibility assessments of technology maturity assessment
PC4: Research and regulatory agencies RC4: Research and regulatory agencies should implement policies to perform should implement policies to seek technology readiness assessments and to engagement with industry stakeholders publicly report these assessments in a transparent manner
PC5: Research and regulatory agencies should implement policies to seek engagement with industry stakeholders
PC6: Research agencies should implement rigorous policies for meaningful peer-review of project proposals, protocols, and publications
These controls would require policy changes in government agencies, with the exception of PC1, which would require action by Congressional committees. The examples in this research were at the federal level, but the conclusions apply at the state level as well. Recommendations PC2,
PC5, and RC4 deal with effective communication, including communication between government agencies and Congress as well as communication between the same agencies and the
209 mining community. This communication is important for ensuring that regulations and legislative recommendations from the agencies are based both on scientific evidence as well as on the needs and opportunities in the industry.
Recommendation PC6 addresses scientific peer review, which is critical to the success of any research program. Rigorous review of findings by qualified experts is necessary to ensure that conclusions and policy are based on sound analysis of the data. Review is needed at all stages of the research process, from the generation of a research concept through the dissemination of results.
Most of the recommendations listed in Table 31 were discussed in Chapter 6, but four recommendations that were not discussed in detail are PC3, PC4, RC2, and RC3, which address the implementation of policies to assess and track technological maturity. Implementation of such policies is examined in the next section.
7.2 Implementation of Policies to Assess Technology Maturity
Several threats identified as root causes for the unsuccessful outcomes analyzed in Chapter 5 could be, at least partially, controlled by having a consistently applied policy for the assessment of technology maturity. Tools for assessing technology maturity and managing the advancement of technologies through the levels of maturity would be valuable for enhancing the success of safety and health technology development efforts for mining. One approach to assessing the maturity of a technology was discussed in Chapter 2: Technology Readiness Levels (TRL).
TRL is a 9-level scale on which technologies and components can be more objectively evaluated, as shown in Figure 49. TRL was developed by NASA in the 1980s [33, 34], and the system was
210 subsequently modified and adopted by several other organizations including the Department of
Defense [36, 37], the Department of Energy (DOE) [38], the European Space Agency [39], and many others. It is recommended that some form of TRL should be used in mining to provide a more consistent framework under which safety and health technologies can be evaluated and to establish well-defined guidelines for the supporting evidence that should be expected in order to make a determination that a technology is mature.
The wording of each of the nine technology readiness levels varies somewhat among agencies utilizing the system, but the general idea behind each of the levels is consistent. The definitions used by NASA and by DOD are shown in Table 32 along with a suggested set of definitions for the mining industry. The first 5 levels are identical across these three scales, but there are minor wording differences for TRL 6 through 9. For example, where the NASA scale refers to testing in “a space environment,” the DOD scales refers to testing in “an operational environment,” and the recommended mining scale refers to testing in “an operating mine.”
211
Figure 49: Technology Readiness Levels as defined by NASA [257]
212
Table 32: TRL definitions used by NASA and DOD as well as a suggested set of definitions for mining safety and health technologies (These scales are identical for TRL 1 through 5 but have minor differences for TRL 6 through 9)
NASA Definition DOD Definition Suggested Mining Definition Actual system proven through Actual system 'flight proven' successful use in active mining Actual system proven through through successful mission operations under the range of TRL 9 successful mission operations operations conditions expected to be encountered in use Actual system completed and Actual system completed and 'flight qualified' through test Actual system completed and qualified through test and TRL 8 and demonstration (ground or demonstrated through field tests demonstration space)
System prototype demonstration System prototype demonstration System prototype demonstration in a representative operating TRL 7 in a space environment in an operational environment mine
System/subsystem model or System/subsystem model or System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a prototype demonstration in a prototype demonstrated in a TRL 6 relevant environment (ground relevant environment relevant environment or space)
Component and/or breadboard Component and/or breadboard Component and/or breadboard TRL 5 validation in relevant validation in relevant validation in relevant environment environment environment
Component and/or breadboard Component and/or breadboard Component and/or breadboard TRL 4 validation in laboratory validation in laboratory validation in laboratory environment environment environment
Analytical and experimental Analytical and experimental Proof of concept established TRL 3 critical function and/or critical function and/or through analytical or characteristic proof of concept characteristic proof of concept experimental means
Technology concept and/or Technology concept and/or Technology concept and/or TRL 2 application formulated application formulated application formulated
Basic principles observed and Basic principles observed and Basic principles observed and TRL 1 reported reported reported
213
One important aspect of a TRL determination is the environment under which the technology has been tested (e.g. laboratory environment, relevant environment, or operating environment) and the actual environment under which the technology is expected to be used. For the mining industry, the operating environment is clearly an operating mine, but this statement alone falls far short of defining the environment. To best evaluate the readiness of the technology, the following considerations should be taken into account:
• Mine characteristics, e.g. surface/underground, commodity, mining method, equipment type • Range of expected conditions under normal and abnormal operation, e.g. environmental parameters • Differences in operating conditions or practices at different mines • Dependence on infrastructure (electrical power, water, GPS, data communication, etc.) • Presence of other technologies in the environment (including the potential for EMI) • Intended and unintended usage by miners
In many cases, a technology might have been successfully demonstrated or evaluated in a non- mining environment and adapted to the mining environment. For example, node-based wireless communications systems were successfully used in other industries before being adapted to use in underground mines. Or a technology used in one mining environment might be adapted to another mining environment.
Frequently, legislative or regulatory mandates are motivated by the notion that an existing technology can be adapted to a mining application. A TRL determination for one operating environment is not valid in another operating environment. However, having information on the
TRL in the prior environment can still be useful. Guidance on how a TRL for one operating environment can be adjusted for another operating environment is shown in Table 33.
214
Table 33: Guidance for adjusting TRL for a technology that has been developed for and tested in some prior environment and is being adapted to a new environment Difference between new environment and prior environment Prior It is unknown Use in new New Differences environment whether the environment environment is environment considered a same basic represents a practically the justify “relevant principles hold fundamentally same as the laboratory environment” in new different prior evaluation for new environment application environment environment TRL 9 Actual system proven ↘TRL 8 through successful use Adjust TRL in active mining in new operations under the environment range of conditions to 8 expected to be encountered in use ↘TRL 6 Adjust TRL TRL 8 in new Actual system environment completed and to 6 demonstrated through ↘TRL 4 field tests Adjust TRL TRL 7 in new System prototype environment demonstration in a to 4 ↘TRL 2
representative operating mine Adjust TRL in new TRL 6 environment System/subsystem ↘TRL 0 to 2 model or prototype Adjust TRL Environment demonstrated in a in new relevant environment environment TRL 5 to 0 Component and/or
breadboard validation in
TRL in TRL Prior relevant environment TRL 4 No Change Component and/or TRL in new environment is the breadboard validation in same as in the prior environment laboratory environment TRL 3 Proof of concept established through analytical or experimental means TRL 2 Technology concept
and/or application formulated TRL 1 Basic principles observed and reported
215
Assessments of the technology readiness of safety and health interventions can be performed at any point during the intervention’s research, development, and diffusion. At each of these points, the information provided by such an assessment would be beneficial for various reasons. Six distinct scenarios in which having an assessment of the maturity of a health or a safety technology would be useful have been considered:
1. The technology is under consideration by Congress to be mandated through legislation
2. The technology is under consideration by a regulatory agency to be mandated through
regulation
3. The technology is already mandated either through legislation or regulation
4. The technology is suspected to provide substantial safety or health benefits, but is not
widely adopted and is not under consideration to be mandated
5. The technology is widely and voluntarily adopted
6. The technology has been mandated and implementation has begun, but problems are
surfacing
This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather illustrative of the benefits provided by using tools based on TRL. The effects of using such tools have been analyzed for four groups that might conduct an assessment of technology readiness, use the results of an assessment of technology readiness, or benefit from the use of such assessments:
1. Federal or state legislative bodies
2. Federal or state regulatory agencies, such as MSHA
3. Research agencies, such as NIOSH
4. The mining industry, including mine operators, equipment manufacturers, and others
216
Again, this is far from an exhaustive list, and might include, for example, universities, labor organizations, and trade associations, among others. For each of the scenarios and aforementioned groups, the effects on each the groups of using tools for assessing the readiness of safety and health technologies has been considered. Tables 34 - 37 list some of the potential benefits that could be received by Congress, regulatory agencies, research agencies, and the mining industry, respectively.
For each of these tables, the effects of conducting an assessment of a technology’s readiness are listed in three columns: (1) the effects that would be achieved if the assessment produces definitive evidence that the technology is acceptably mature, (2) the effects that would be achieved if the assessment produces definitive evidence that the technology is not acceptably mature, and (3) the effects that would be achieved if the assessment is inconclusive.
There is no table to present the effects that would occur in terms of benefits to mineworkers, to whom safety and health regulations and interventions are directed. Effectively, they will be the primary beneficiaries of this process to ensure that mandated safety and health technologies are able to accomplish their intended purpose and that ineffective technologies are not allowed to consume resources, instill false confidence, or create unintended new hazards.
217
Table 34: Effects on federal and state legislative bodies of assessing the readiness of safety and health technologies
EFFECTS ON CONGRESS OR STATE LEGISLATURES OF ASSESSING TECHNOLOGY READINESS… …if the assessment shows …if assessment shows that that the technology is the technology is not …if assessment is not SCENARIO acceptably mature acceptably mature conclusive Legislation can be postponed TECHNOLOGY IS until sufficient evidence can be UNDER found to make a conclusive Legislation can proceed with CONSIDERATION Legislation mandating an determination of maturity; greater confidence that it will BY CONGRESS TO immature technology can be gaps in the evidence will be achieve a positive safety or BE MANDATED avoided identified, and specific health outcome THROUGH additional evidence can be LEGISLATION requested from government or from industry TECHNOLOGY IS UNDER Congressional oversight CONSIDERATION Congressional oversight committees can direct Congressional oversight BY A committees will have greater regulatory agencies to provide committees can identify REGULATORY confidence that regulatory further justification for inappropriate actions by AGENCY TO BE agencies are developing regulatory actions or research regulatory agencies MANDATED appropriate regulations agencies to address knowledge THROUGH gaps REGULATION Research agencies can be TECHNOLOGY IS directed and funded to address ALREADY the knowledge gaps needed to The success of prior legislation Prior legislation mandating an MANDATED make a conclusive mandating the technology will immature technology can be EITHER THROUGH determination of maturity; be validated repealed or amended LEGISLATION OR since the technology is already REGULATION mandated, this should be a top priority TECHNOLOGY SHOWS THE POTENTIAL TO PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL If a legislative mandate seems SAFETY OR Potential legislation mandating Legislation mandating an like a potential future HEALTH the use of the technology could immature technology can be possibility, research agencies BENEFITS, BUT IS be considered avoided can be directed and funded to NOT WIDELY address knowledge gaps ADOPTED AND IS NOT UNDER CONSIDERATION TO BE MANDATED TECHNOLOGY IS Unintended consequences of If unintended consequences WIDELY AND Will have greater confidence using an immature technology are suspected possible, VOLUNTARILY that industry is working safely can be identified; legislation agencies can be directed to ADOPTED can be considered address knowledge gaps THE Research agencies can be TECHNOLOGY directed and funded to address HAS BEEN the knowledge gaps needed to Results of the assessment can Prior legislation mandating an MANDATED AND make a conclusive be used to address problems as immature technology can be IMPLEMENTATION determination of maturity; they surface repealed or amended HAS BEGUN, BUT since the technology is already PROBLEMS ARE mandated, this should be a top SURFACING priority
218
Table 35: Effects on regulatory agencies of assessing the readiness of safety and health technologies
EFFECTS ON FEDERAL OR STATE REGULATORY AGENCIES OF ASSESSING TECHNOLOGY READINESS… …if the assessment shows …if assessment shows that that the technology is the technology is not …if assessment is not SCENARIO acceptably mature acceptably mature conclusive A recommendation can be provided to Congress that further research is needed, TECHNOLOGY IS A cogent recommendation that including specific knowledge UNDER Evidence supporting the the legislation should be gaps to address; the weight of CONSIDERATION BY legislation can be provided to delayed or revised can be this recommendation will CONGRESS TO BE Congress with confidence that provided to Congress and depend on the agency’s track MANDATED THROUGH the mandate will be successful supported by evidence record of effective technology LEGISLATION readiness evaluations and their reputation as a technical authority Regulation can be postponed TECHNOLOGY IS until sufficient evidence is UNDER Regulation can proceed with found to make a conclusive CONSIDERATION BY A Regulation mandating an greater confidence that it will determination of maturity; REGULATORY immature technology can be achieve a positive safety or gaps in the evidence will be AGENCY TO BE avoided health outcome identified, which can be shared MANDATED THROUGH with research agencies to guide REGULATION strategy Research can be conducted, and assistance from research Prior regulations mandating an TECHNOLOGY IS agencies can be requested, to immature technology can be ALREADY MANDATED The success of prior address knowledge gaps repealed or amended; EITHER THROUGH regulations mandating the needed to make a conclusive enforcement policy can be LEGISLATION OR technology will be validated determination of maturity; adjusted to account for the REGULATION since the technology is already technology’s insufficiencies mandated, this should be a top priority TECHNOLOGY IS SUSPECTED TO If a regulatory mandate seems PROVIDE like a potential future SUBSTANTIAL SAFETY Potential regulation mandating Regulations mandating an possibility, research can be OR HEALTH BENEFITS, the use of the technology immature technology can be conducted to address BUT IS NOT WIDELY could be considered avoided knowledge gaps and efforts ADOPTED AND IS NOT can be coordinated with UNDER research agencies CONSIDERATION TO BE MANDATED If unintended consequences TECHNOLOGY IS Unintended consequences of are suspected possible, WIDELY AND Will have greater confidence using an immature technology research can be conducted to VOLUNTARILY that industry is working safely can be identified; regulation address knowledge gaps and ADOPTED can be considered efforts can be coordinated with research agencies Research can be conducted, and assistance from research TECHNOLOGY HAS Prior regulations mandating an agencies can be requested, to BEEN MANDATED AND immature technology can be Results of the assessment can address knowledge gaps IMPLEMENTATION repealed or amended; be used to address problems as needed to make a conclusive HAS BEGUN, BUT enforcement policy can be they surface determination of maturity; PROBLEMS ARE adjusted to account for the since the technology is already SURFACING technology’s insufficiencies mandated, this should be a top priority
219
Table 36: Effects on research agencies of assessing the readiness of safety and health technologies
Effects on RESEARCH AGENCIES OF ASSESSING TECHNOLOGY READINESS… …if the assessment shows …if assessment shows that that the technology is the technology is not …if assessment is not SCENARIO acceptably mature acceptably mature conclusive A recommendation can be provided to Congress that TECHNOLOGY IS further research is needed, UNDER A forceful recommendation including specific knowledge CONSIDERATION Evidence supporting the that the legislation should be gaps to address; the weight of BY CONGRESS legislation can be provided to halted can be provided to this recommendation will TO BE Congress with confidence that Congress and supported by depend on the agency’s track MANDATED the mandate will be successful evidence record of effective technology THROUGH readiness evaluations and their LEGISLATION reputation as a technical authority A recommendation can be TECHNOLOGY IS provided to the regulatory UNDER agency that further research is A cogent recommendation that CONSIDERATION Evidence supporting the needed, including specific the regulation should be BY A regulation can be provided to knowledge gaps to address; the delayed or revised can be REGULATORY the regulatory agency with weight of this recommendation provided to the regulatory AGENCY TO BE confidence that the mandate will depend on the agency’s agency and supported by MANDATED will be successful track record of effective evidence THROUGH technology readiness REGULATION evaluations and their reputation as a technical authority TECHNOLOGY IS ALREADY Cogent recommendations for Identifying knowledge gaps MANDATED The effectiveness of safety and needed changes to regulations will provide a clear strategic EITHER health protections for miners or legislation can be provided direction; since the technology THROUGH will be validated to Congress and regulatory is already mandated, this LEGISLATION OR agencies should be a top priority REGULATION TECHNOLOGY IS SUSPECTED TO PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL Demonstrated maturity of the SAFETY OR Identifying knowledge gaps technology will provide Resources spent on research HEALTH will provide a clear strategic evidence needed to promote the into technologies with low BENEFITS, BUT IS direction and can be used to use of the technology through probability of success can be NOT WIDELY strategically coordinate with voluntary adoption or to minimized ADOPTED AND IS regulatory agencies recommend regulatory action NOT UNDER CONSIDERATION TO BE MANDATED If unintended consequences are TECHNOLOGY IS Unintended consequences of suspected possible, research WIDELY AND Will have greater confidence using an immature technology can be conducted to address VOLUNTARILY that industry is working safely can be identified and mitigation knowledge gaps and efforts can ADOPTED strategies developed be coordinated with regulatory agencies The technology has Cogent recommendations for Identifying knowledge gaps been mandated and Results of the assessment can needed changes to regulations will provide a clear strategic implementation has be used to address problems as or legislation can be provided direction; since the technology begun, but they surface to Congress and regulatory is already mandated, this problems are agencies should be a top priority surfacing
220
Table 37: Effects on the mining industry of assessing the readiness of safety and health technologies
EFFECTS ON THE MINING INDUSTRY OF ASSESSING TECHNOLOGY READINESS… …if the assessment shows …if assessment shows that that the technology is the technology is not …if assessment is not SCENARIO acceptably mature acceptably mature conclusive TECHNOLOGY IS UNDER Clearly defined performance CONSIDERATION Government agencies can be requirements for the Objections to mandate for an BY CONGRESS pressed to provide evidence of technology will be known, immature technology can be TO BE technology’s maturity before a enabling more effective supported by evidence MANDATED mandate can be enacted implementation THROUGH LEGISLATION TECHNOLOGY IS UNDER CONSIDERATION Clearly defined performance Government agencies can be BY A requirements for the Objections to mandate for an pressed to provide evidence of REGULATORY technology will be known, immature technology can be technology’s maturity before a AGENCY TO BE enabling more effective supported by evidence mandate can be enacted MANDATED implementation THROUGH REGULATION TECHNOLOGY IS ALREADY Clearly defined performance Objections to mandate or Government agencies can be MANDATED requirements for the requests for changes to pressed to provide evidence of EITHER technology will be known, enforcement policy can be technology’s maturity or to THROUGH enabling more effective supported by evidence change enforcement policy LEGISLATION OR implementation REGULATION TECHNOLOGY IS SUSPECTED TO PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL Proactive industry players can Investment in R&D efforts SAFETY OR Knowledge gaps will be known lead the development and unlikely to be successful can be HEALTH and can be used to guide R&D implementation of promising avoided; better BENEFITS, BUT IS efforts or to provide technologies in advance of any recommendations can be NOT WIDELY recommendations to legislative or regulatory provided to government ADOPTED AND IS government agencies mandate agencies NOT UNDER CONSIDERATION TO BE MANDATED Knowledge gaps will be known TECHNOLOGY IS Unintended consequences of The technology can be used and can be used to guide R&D WIDELY AND using an immature, even if with greater confidence that it efforts or to provide VOLUNTARILY popular, technology can be will be effective recommendations to ADOPTED avoided government agencies The technology has Clearly defined performance been mandated and Objections to mandate or Government agencies can be requirements for the implementation has requests for changes to pressed to provide evidence of technology will be known, begun, but enforcement policy can be technology’s maturity or to enabling more effective problems are supported by evidence change enforcement policy implementation surfacing
221
The question of what level of maturity qualifies as “acceptably” mature is not trivial. In these scenarios in which a mandate requiring the use of the technology is being considered, the acceptable level of maturity may be higher than in the acceptable level of maturity in other scenarios. The question boils down to what an acceptable level of uncertainty is regarding the ability of the technology to provide the desired safety or health benefit. This uncertainty can be thought of as a function of the TRL; at lower TRLs, there is a high degree of uncertainty, and this uncertainty decreases as the technology is proven and advanced through the TRLs. For example, at TRL 2, the concept for the technology has been formulated, but there is no proof that the concept is achievable. Obviously, this is substantial uncertainty.
By the time the technology reaches TRL 9, it will have been proven through successful use in active mining operations, as well as having passed the prior TRL milestones, i.e. laboratory evaluation, testing in a relevant environment. The uncertainty surrounding the performance capabilities of the technology are not reduced to zero at this point, but they are significantly reduced. It is still possible that, despite successful use in mines, changes in operating conditions or practices, introduction of other technologies into the environment, system degradation, and other factors may impact performance. If these changes are outside the range of conditions for which testing has been conducted, it is unknown whether they will decrease efficacy.
Figure 50 shows some of the sources of uncertainty that are present at each TRL. To read the figure for a given TRL, the horizontal band containing that TRL is extended to the right and all vertical bands that it intersects are a remaining source of uncertainty at that TRL. So TRL 9 only intersects one of the eight vertical bands, indicating the fewest sources of uncertainty, whereas
TRLs 1 and 2 intersect all eight vertical bands, indicating the most sources of uncertainty.
222
TRL 9 Actual system proven through successful use in active mining operations under the range of
conditions expected to be encountered in use otherd
TRL 8 Actual system completed and demonstrated through field tests
TRL 7 System prototype demonstration in a representative operating mine
TRL 6
System/subsystem model or prototype demonstrated in a sted, this decrease will effective readiness
relevant environment
capabilities of capabilities prototypes
TRL 5 Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment
TRL 4
Component and/or breadboard validation demonstrated to work
in laboratory environment
underoperating conditions
producedmay differthe from - TRL 3 Proof of concept established
through analytical or
experimental means
environment other environment than a s betweens minesmay lead performance to differences; Unexpected use cases may occur
TRL 2
laboratory relevantenvironment under which testing hasbeen conducted Technology concept
and/or application accurately emulates conditions at an operating mine
formulated factors may impactperformance; if outside the range conditions te of
TRL 1 laboratory environment
Basic principles
Capabilitiesof actual system mass as
The conceptof the Key components of technology the have been not notbeen demonstrated to work in a
observed and Itunknown is if the
demonstrated work to an in
mine disparateor condition
Performancemayunder differ conditions included not inanddemonstration; testing Changing conditions within one
Changesin operating conditions or practices, introduction otherof technologies theinto environment, system degradation, an
technology not is proven
Key components of technology the have Key components of technology the have been not
reported undermining conditions, orcomplete a prototypehasnot been assembled
Figure 50: Sources of uncertainty about technology's readiness at each TRL
223
So, as the technology is proven through laboratory testing, field testing, and finally successful use in an operating environment, the uncertainty that the technology will provide the desired benefit decreases, which means that the technology mandate under consideration is likely to be successful. In Chapter 6, four general types of unsuccessful outcomes for safety and health technology mandates were identified and are listed below:
Unsuccessful Outcome Type 1: Intervention does not achieve the intended safety or health benefit Unsuccessful Outcome Type 2: Intervention causes an unintended, negative safety or health consequence Unsuccessful Outcome Type 3: A device that fails to meet the safety and health standard or is otherwise defective is certified and used Unsuccessful Outcome Type 4: Despite effective interventions being available to meet the mandate, there is sustained strong resistance to their use
As TRL increases, the risk that each of these unsuccessful outcomes will occur decreases.
However, these four risks do not all decrease at the same rate. Confidence that a Type 1 outcome will not occur (i.e. confidence that the intervention will achieve its intended benefit) can reasonably be said to begin increasing after successful proof-of-concept testing (TRL 3) and to further decrease with laboratory and field testing (TRLs 4+). In contrast, confidence that a Type
2 outcome will not occur (i.e. confidence that unintended consequences such as EMI will not occur) would not begin to increase until testing in a mine-like environment was conducted (TRLs
5+). Similarly, the risk of a Type 3 outcome cannot be said to be significantly reduce until the capabilities of the technology’s components are proven and design specifications are established
(TRL 5+). Finally, a Type 4 outcome should be considered likely until the technology has been demonstrated in a mine environment and successfully used by miners, i.e., that the technology has achieved a TRL of 7 or greater. A visual representation of these decreasing risks for each of the unsuccessful outcome types with increasing TRL is shown in Figure 51.
224
TRL 9 Actual system proven through successful use in active mining operations under the range of conditions expected to be encountered in use
TRL 8 Actual system completed and demonstrated
TRL 7 System prototype demonstration in a representative operating mine TRL 6 System/subsystem model or prototype demonstrated in a relevant environment
TRL 5 Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment
TRL 4 Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment
TRL 3 Risk of Proof of concept unsuccessful established through Risk of outcome type 4: analytical or experimental unsuccessful Despite means Risk of outcome type 3: effective
TRL 2 Risk of unsuccessful A device that interventions Technology concept unsuccessful outcome type 2: fails to meet the being available and/or application outcome type 1: Intervention health and to meet the formulated Intervention causes an safety standard mandate, there does not unintended, or is otherwise is sustained TRL 1 achieve the negative health defective is strong Basic principles observed intended health or safety certified and resistance to and reported or safety benefit consequence used their use
Figure 51: Risk of unsuccessful outcomes decreases with increasing TRL; relative level of risk for each type of unsuccessful outcome is indicated by the width of the column, which decreases with increasing TRL
225
Based on the uncertainty presented in Figure 50 and the risks of an unsuccessful technology mandate outcome presented in Figure 51, an informed decision can be made regarding what might be an appropriate TRL to require before a technology mandate can be considered. For a
TRL of 6 or below, there is still significant uncertainty since a complete prototype has not yet been demonstrated at an operating mine. As a result, the risk of all four types of unsuccessful outcomes would be substantial. To reach a TRL of 8, a manufactured product (as opposed to a prototype) must be demonstrated in an operating mine. For a technology-forcing mandate, i.e., a mandate specifically designed to be promulgated before a product is on the market, it would not make sense to require TRL 8 to be achieved.
Therefore, TRL 7 is a reasonable threshold level to set as what must be achieved before a technology can be considered mature enough for a mandate to be appropriate. At this TRL, a prototype of the technology has been tested and demonstrated in an operating mine. Even at this stage of maturity, there is a degree of uncertainty concerning the capabilities of the technology.
As is shown in Figure 50, the sources of this uncertainty include the following:
• Capabilities of actual system as mass-produced may differ from the capabilities of
prototypes.
• Changing conditions within one mine or disparate conditions between mines may lead to
performance differences.
• Unexpected use cases may occur under operating conditions.
• Evolving operating conditions or practices, introduction of other technologies into the
environment, system degradation, and other factors may impact performance.
226
With these uncertainties, it is possible that the mandate may result in an unsuccessful outcome of the types shown in Figure 51. In order to minimize these risks, it is necessary to minimize the uncertainties of the types listed above. Consideration of these uncertainties should be built into the determination of TRL. In particular, an assignment of TRL 7 to a prototype technology should account for the following considerations:
• There should be evidence that the capabilities of the prototype are representative of what
would be achievable with the manufactured product. To do this, the manufacturing
capabilities in the industry should be well understood and channels for technology
diffusion should be established through engagement and partnering. Recommendations in
this area were previously discussed as PC5 (“Research and regulatory agencies should
implement policies to seek engagement with industry stakeholders”).
• The certification of products as meeting the requirements of the mandate should be tied to
clearly-defined technical capabilities, which will be produced through the assessment of
the maturity of the technology. This was previously discussed as RC3 (“Agencies
responsible for safety and health product certification should implement policies to link
product certification to assessments of technology maturity”).
• Testing in the field and in the lab should be designed to capture, to the extent feasible, the
full range of operating conditions under which the technology could be used. For
example, for underground mining interventions, testing should be conducted in mines of
various seam heights and geologies. This should also include testing for the potential for
electromagnetic interference and other environmental factors that could impact
performance. This is closely tied to PC6 (“Research agencies should implement rigorous
policies for meaningful peer-review of project proposals, protocols, and publications”).
227
• As the technology is introduced, the manner in which the industry is actually using the
technology and the issues that are occurring should be tracked by active engagement with
stakeholders. This was discussed as RC4 (“Research and regulatory agencies should
implement policies to seek engagement with industry stakeholders”).
• Finally, the presence of uncertainty in the capabilities of the technology should be
recognized and accounted for by designing regulations to allow for discretion and
flexibility to adjust to evolving industry conditions and advances in technology. This was
discussed as RC1 (“Regulations should be designed to allow for discretion in
enforcement”).
If the above considerations and recommendations are built into the determination of technology readiness for a new intervention and if the technology can, subject to those considerations, be successfully demonstrated to meet a TRL of 7, a much higher degree of confidence can be placed on the expected success of the technology’s introduction. These guidelines should be used in the processes for proposing new regulations as well as for formulating recommendations by research agencies to regulatory agencies as well as recommendations from both types of agencies to
Congress and state legislatures.
228
Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations
This dissertation set out to identify the factors that govern the success of mandated safety and health technologies in the mining industry and to develop a set of guidelines that can be used to maximize the likelihood of success for future mining safety and health technology mandates.
This goal was accomplished by analyzing several cases of safety and health technology introduction to the industry. These case studies included technologies that were mandated through legislation or regulation as well as technologies that were voluntarily adopted by the mining industry. The root causes for the success or failure in each of these case studies were determined and these root causes were analyzed to identify factors that were key to the success or failure of the introduced technologies
For each case, the factual basis for the analysis came from the research literature and government records, as well as through discussions with subject matter experts. Successful outcomes clustered into four categories: (1) Wide-spread voluntary adoption; (2) Documented successful trials; (3) Documented evidence of an achieved safety and health benefit; and (4) Indication of broad applicability throughout the industry. Unsuccessful outcomes clustered into six categories:
(1) Documented failures of the technology; (2) Introduction of a new hazard due to the technology’s use; (3) Low levels of adoption despite demonstrated ability to meet regulatory standards; (4) Judicial intervention in rule-making or enforcement; (5) Strong resistance to the deployment and use of the technology by miners; and (6) After-rule time extensions.
Within the cases analyzed, three successful and six unsuccessful outcomes were identified falling into these categories. A causal tree analysis was performed for each of these successful and unsuccessful outcomes to find the root causes that resulted in either success or failure. The root
229 causes from these analyses were compared and formulated into a set of generalized root causes for successful outcomes and another set for unsuccessful outcomes.
Ten generalized root causes for successful outcomes, shown in Table 38, and eight generalized root causes for unsuccessful outcomes, shown in Table 39, were identified. An examination of these root causes revealed four interesting themes.
• The accurate assessment of technology readiness contributes to success. Three of the
generalized root causes for unsuccessful outcomes (items 1 through 3 in Table 39)
involve biases among researchers, regulators, or legislators leading to a failure to
accurately assess the readiness of a safety or health technology. In contrast, five of the
generalized root causes for successful outcomes (items 1 through 5 in Table 38)
involve researchers, regulators, or legislators correctly assessing technology
readiness.
• Research based on sound scientific methods and study design contributes to success.
Two of the generalized root causes for unsuccessful outcomes (items 4 and 5 in Table
39) involve poorly designed experiments or ineffective review of research. In
contrast, two of the generalized root causes for successful outcomes (items 8 and 9 in
Table 38) involve the successful completion of well-designed scientific research.
• Effective engineering solutions can be developed through partnerships between
stakeholders. Three of the root causes for unsuccessful outcomes (items 6 through 8
in Table 39) describe failures to develop effective interventions that address the needs
of the industry and that are accepted by miners. In contrast, two of the root causes for
successful outcomes (items 7 and 10 in Table 38) describe partnerships between
230
researchers and stakeholders to develop effective engineering solutions that address
the needs of the industry.
• The practice of incorporating provisions into regulations that will allow for
technology development is beneficial, and this is reflected in two of the successful
outcome root causes (items 5 and 6 in Table 38).
The identification of the root causes for successful and unsuccessful safety and health technology introduction outcomes represents the first major contribution of this research. The identification of the root causes fills a critical knowledge gap in the understanding of the challenges and opportunities faced during the introduction of new safety and health technologies to the mining industry. This research has shown how the factors identified resulted in the successful and unsuccessful outcomes observed in the case studies. A high degree of consistency was observed in the root causes identified across the analyses for all of the unsuccessful outcomes. This consistency indicates that these findings are generalizable to other technology introductions and that the findings can be used to inform future efforts to introduce new safety and health technologies.
231
Table 38: Generalized forms of identified root causes for successful outcomes in case studies of safety and health technology introductions studied
Generalized Root Causes for Successful Safety and Health Technology Introduction Outcomes 11. Legislators correctly identified an opportunity for a technology-forcing mandate to
result in the development of new, or adaptation of, existing technologies.
12. Legislators correctly identified the need for research and development to achieve
successful results for a technology-forcing mandate.
13. Legislators correctly identified uncertainty in the ability of industry to meet the
provisions of a technology-forcing mandate and permitted flexibility in compliance to
allow for technology development.
14. Regulators correctly identified indications of technological immaturity.
15. Regulators correctly identified the need for flexibility in regulations to allow for
technology development.
16. Regulatory requirements were written as performance-based standards
17. Researchers established effective partnerships with industry in order to develop
research findings into practical interventions that can be effectively diffused.
18. Research agencies correctly identified need for specific research and acted to fulfill the
need.
19. The effectiveness of intervention was successfully demonstrated in field trials under
operating conditions.
20. The interventions were designed such that they had minimal impact on mine operations
and/or offered an additional benefit beyond the intended safety or health benefit.
232
Table 39: Generalized forms of identified root causes for unsuccessful outcomes in case studies of safety and health technology introductions studied
Generalized Root Causes for Unsuccessful Safety and Health Technology Introduction Outcomes 9. Biases led legislators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore indications
of technology immaturity
10. Biases led regulators to judge that immediate action is needed and to ignore indications
of technological immaturity
11. Biases led researchers to ignore or to understate observed indications of technological
immaturity identified through research
12. Biases resulted in insufficient or poorly designed experiments
13. Biases resulted in insufficient or ineffective review of research
14. Biases led to an acceptance of the status quo with respect to recognized deficiencies in
safety and health standards or technologies
15. Despite the best efforts of researchers and developers, effective interventions either
could not be developed or could not be demonstrated to be effective due to engineering
challenges or economic constraints
16. Cultural forces and cognitive biases among miners led to a mistrust of new
interventions
In addition, a high degree of consistency was observed across the root causes for the successful outcomes, and these root causes showed a logical contrast to the root causes for the unsuccessful outcomes. The contrast between the root causes for the unsuccessful and successful outcomes are observed across four major themes: (1) the accurate assessment of technology readiness contributes to success, (2) the completion of research based on sound scientific methods and
233 study design contributes to success, (3) effective engineering solutions can be developed through partnerships between stakeholders, and (4) having regulations that allow for technology development is beneficial. The contrast between the identified causes for successful and unsuccessful outcomes with respect to these four themes is to be expected if these causes have predictive value for the success of new safety and health technology introductions. The fact that the expected contrast is observed validates that the factors identified do have predictive value and that they can be used to inform guidance for the introduction of future safety and health technologies.
To develop such guidance, a bowtie analysis for unsuccessful mining safety and health technology mandates was constructed using the results of the causal tree analyses. At the center of the bowtie analysis was placed the event, “Enactment of a law or regulation that mandates the use of a safety and health technology that is immature.” On the left side of the bowtie analysis were the threats, which are the eight generalized root causes for unsuccessful outcomes, and on the right side of the bowtie are the consequences, which are generalized forms of the unsuccessful outcomes themselves. This bowtie was used to identify preventative controls, which are designed to prevent the threats from leading to the event, and recovery controls, which are designed to mitigate the effects of the event. Six preventative and four recovery controls were identified, which are listed below.
Preventative Control 1: During legislative process, responsible Congressional committees
should constitute scientific panels to investigate technical issues
including the scientific evidence for technological maturity
234
Preventative Control 2: Research and regulatory agencies should implement policies for
the effective communication of science-based recommendations to
Congress and state legislatures
Preventative Control 3: During the rulemaking process, regulatory agencies should conduct
assessments of technology readiness as part of the normal technical
and economic feasibility assessment
Preventative Control 4: Research and regulatory agencies should implement policies to
perform technology readiness assessments and to publicly report
these assessments in a transparent manner
Preventative Control 5: Research and regulatory agencies should implement policies to
seek engagement with industry stakeholders
Preventative Control 6: Research agencies should implement rigorous policies for
meaningful peer-review of project proposals, protocols, and
publications
Recovery Control 1: Regulations should be designed to allow for discretion in
enforcement
Recovery Control 2: Research and regulatory agencies should implement policies to
track technology maturity development
Recovery Control 3: Agencies responsible for safety and health product certification
should implement policies to link product certification to
assessments of technology maturity
Recovery Control 4: Research and regulatory agencies should implement policies to
seek engagement with industry stakeholders
235
The development of these controls represents the second major contribution of this research. A detailed discussion on recommendations for how these controls could be implemented for the mining industry was presented in the previous two chapters. While the bowtie analysis was not designed explicitly to do so, it is worth noting that the controls developed through this analysis address the four themes previously discussed with the causal tree analysis results. These themes again are: (1) the accurate assessment of technology readiness contributes to success, (2) the completion of research based on sound scientific methods and study design contributes to success, (3) effective engineering solutions can be developed through partnerships between stakeholders, and (4) having regulations that allow for technology development is beneficial. The first theme is addressed by Preventative Controls 1, 3, and 4 as well as by Recovery Controls 2 and 3. The second theme is addressed by Preventative Controls 2 and 6. The third theme is addressed by Preventative Control 4 and Recovery Control 4. And the fourth theme is addressed by Recovery Control 1.
The primary purpose of several of these controls is to maintain objectivity in the decisions that are made in the planning of research, the design of new safety and health legislation or regulation, and the enforcement of existing legislation and regulations. The importance of maintaining objectivity in these processes cannot be understated. As has been discussed extensively, biases affecting the thinking of those involved in making these decisions can lead to many undesirable outcomes. Means of maintaining objectivity represented in the recommended controls include performing technology readiness assessments and conducting research according to rigorous, peer-reviewed scientific processes. The flawed thinking and biases that affect the decisions made by researchers, regulators, and legislators should be considered an unavoidable fact of life. Therefore, it is necessary to have strictly defined standards for evidence
236 to support decisions regarding regulation, legislation, or research. These standards should be implemented in as consistent and transparent a manner possible.
Recommendations for such standards have been provided in the preceding chapters, most notably including the recommendation to conduct systematic assessments of technology maturity using Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs). When coupled with other controls recommended, including the use of proper scientific experimental design, development of strong engagement between government agencies and industry stakeholders, and policies for effective science-based communication, the use of TRL assessments will ensure the objectivity of decisions concerning whether a technology is mature enough to be mandated as well as to guide research and development strategy. A mining-specific TRL scale definition was developed, and is shown in
Error! Reference source not found..
The expected effects of utilizing a scale of this sort for performing consistent technology readiness assessments were described in the previous chapter and include providing for more cogent recommendations concerning proposed regulations or legislation, offering a means of identifying research gaps and guiding research strategy, and establishing clearly communicated and consistently applied expectations for the maturity of technologies to be mandated or used in the industry.
237
Figure 52: Recommended TRL definitions for mining safety and health technologies
238
The findings of this research fill a critical knowledge gap on the understanding of the factors that influence the success of new safety and health technology introduction in the mining industry.
This new knowledge has been used to develop recommendations for future safety and health technology introductions. By using the findings of this research and by applying the recommendations provided in this dissertation, more impactful safety and health research can be planned and performed and more effective safety and health regulations can be designed for the mining industry.
239
References
[1] J. L. Kohler, "Looking ahead to significant improvements in mining safety and health
through innovative research and effective diffusion into the industry," International
Journal of Mining Science and Technology, pp. 325-332, 2014.
[2] J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper, 1942.
[3] A. B. Jaffe, R. G. Newell and R. N. Stavins, "Environmental Policy and Environmental
Change," Environmental and Resource Economics, pp. 41-69, 2002.
[4] A. B. Jaffe, R. G. Newell and R. N. Stavins, "A Tale of Two Market Failures:
Technology and Environmental Policy," Ecological Economics, pp. 164-174, 2005.
[5] Z. Griliches, "Issues in Assessing the Contribution of Research and Develoment to
Productivity Growth," Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 10, pp. 92-116, 1979.
[6] B. Hall, A. Jaffe and M. Traitenberg, "Market Value and Patent Citations: A First Look,"
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 7741, 2000.
[7] A. B. Jaffe, "The Importance of Spillovers in the Policy Mission of the Advanced
Technology Program," Journal of Technological Transfer, vol. Summer, pp. 11-19, 1998.
[8] F. M. Scherer and D. Harhoff, "Technology Policy for a World of Skew-Distributed
Outcomes," Research Policy, vol. 29, pp. 559-566, 2000.
240
[9] F. M. Scherer, D. Harhoff and J. Kukies, "Uncertainty and the Sice Distribution of
Rewards from Technological Innovation," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, vol. 10,
pp. 175-200, 2000.
[10] K. J. Arrow, "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," in The
Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, R. Nelson, Ed., Princeton, NJ, Princeton
University Press, 1962.
[11] Z. Griliches, "The Search for R&D Spillovers," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol.
94, pp. S29-S47, 1992.
[12] S. G. Winter, Y. M. Kaniovski and G. Dosi, "Modeling Industrial Dynamics with
Innovative Entrants," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, vol. 11, pp. 255-293,
2000.
[13] M. E. Porter and C. van der Linde, "Toward a New Conception of the Environment-
Competitiveness Relationship," Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 9, pp. 97-118,
1995.
[14] M. Greaker, "Spillovers in the Development of New Pollution Abatement Technology: A
New Look at the Porter-Hypothesis," Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, pp. 411-420, 2006.
241
[15] K. Palmer, W. E. Oates and P. R. Portney, "Tightening Environmental Standards: The
Benefits-Cost or the No-Cost Paradigm?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 9, pp.
119-132, 1995.
[16] P. A. Geroski, "Models of Technology Diffusion," Research Policy, vol. 46, pp. 1-3,
2000.
[17] P. David, "A Contribution to the Theory of Diffusion," 1969.
[18] Z. Griliches, "Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of Technical Change,"
Econometrica, vol. 48, pp. 501-522, 1957.
[19] P. Stoneman, The Economic Analysis of Technological Change, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1983.
[20] A. B. Jaffe, R. G. Newell and R. N. Stavins, "Technological Change and the
Environment," in Handbook of Environmental Economics, K. Maler and J. R. Vincent,
Eds., Amsterdam, Elsevier Science, 2003, pp. 461-516.
[21] J. Lee, F. M. Veloso, D. A. Hounshell and E. S. Rubin, "Forcing Technological Change:
A Case of Automobile Emissions Control Technology Development in the US,"
Technovation, pp. 249-264, 2010.
[22] R. D. Mohr, "Environmental Performance Standards and the Adoption of Technology,"
Ecological Economics, pp. 238-248, 2006.
242
[23] J. Lee, F. M. Veloso and D. A. Hounshell, "Linking Induced Technological Change, and
Environmental Regulation: Evidence from Patenting in the U.S. Auto Industry," Research
Policy, pp. 1240-1252, 2011.
[24] D. Gerard and L. B. Lave, "Implementing Technology-Forcing Policies: The 1970 Clean
Air Act Amendments and the Introduction of Advanced Automotive Emissions Controls
in the United States," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, pp. 761-778, 2005.
[25] A. Nentjes, F. P. de Vries and D. Wiersma, "Technology-Forcing through Environmental
Regulation," Europoean Journal of Political Economy, pp. 903-916, 2007.
[26] S. T. Anderson and R. G. Newell, "Information Programs for Technology Adoption: the
Case of Energy-Efficiency Audits," Resource and Energy Economics, pp. 27-50, 2004.
[27] S. L. Puller, "The Strategic Use of Innovation to Influence Regulatory Standards,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, pp. 690-706, 2006.
[28] Environmental Protection Agency, "RACT/BACT/LAER Clearinghouse (RBLC)," 2016.
[Online]. Available:
https://cfpub.epa.gov/RBLC/index.cfm?action=Home.Home&lang=en. [Accessed July
2016].
[29] K. B. J. Schnelle, R. F. Dunn and M. E. Ternes, Air Pollution Control Technology
Handbook, Second Edition, CRC Press, 2016.
243
[30] U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, New Source Review Workshop Manual, Draft,
1990.
[31] B. Evans and K. Weiss, Sumary of progress on EPA's NSR reform initiative, 2000.
[32] B. Hawkins and M. E. Ternes, Clean Air Act Handbook, 3rd Ed., American Bar
Association, Section of Environment, Energy and Resources, Chapter 6, 2011.
[33] J. C. Mankins, "Technology Readiness Levels: A White Paper," NASA, Office of Space
Access and Technology, 1995.
[34] S. R. Sadin, F. P. Povinelli and R. Rosen, "The NASA Technology Push Towards Future
Space Mission Systems," 1988.
[35] United States Government Accountability Office, "NSIAD-99-162: Better Management
of Technology Development Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes," 1999.
[36] United States Department of Defense, "Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA)
Deskbook," 2005.
[37] United States Department of Defense, "Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA)
Guidance," 2011.
[38] R. Sanchez, "Technology Readiness Assessment Guide," United States Department of
Energy, 2011.
244
[39] European Space Agency, "Technology Readiness Level," 2016. [Online]. Available:
http://sci.esa.int/sre-ft/50124-technology-readiness-level/.
[40] C. P. Graettinger, S. Garcia-Miller, J. Siviy, P. J. V. Syckle and R. J. Schenk, "Using the
Technology Readiness Levels Scale to Support Technology Management in the DoD's
ATD/STO Environments (A Findings and Recommendations Report Conducted for
Army CECOM)," Software Engineering Institute, 2002.
[41] United States Department of Defense, "Technology Assessment Calculator," 2 October
2009. [Online]. Available: https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=320594.
[42] United States Department of Defense, "TPMM - Technology Program Management
Model," 9 May 2007. [Online]. Available:
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=148163.
[43] R. Sanchez, DOE G 413.3-4A, Technology Readiness Assessment Guide, Department of
Energy, 2011.
[44] R. J. Terrile, F. G. Doumani, G. Y. Ho and B. L. Jackson, "Calibrating the Technology
Readiness Level (TRL) scale using NASA mission data," in 2015 IEEE Aerospace
Conference, 2015.
[45] R. U. Bailey, T. A. Mazzuchi, S. Sarkani and D. F. Rico, "A Comparative Analysis of the
Value of Technology Readiness Assessments," Defense Acquisition Research Journal: A
Publication of the Defense Acquisition University, vol. 21, no. 4, 2014.
245
[46] J. C. Mankins, "Technology readiness assessments: A retrospective," Acta Astronautica,
vol. 65, no. 9, pp. 1216-1223, 2009.
[47] A. Olechowski, S. D. Eppinger and N. Joglekar, "Technology readiness levels at 40: A
study of state-of-the-art use, challenges, and opportunities," in 2015 Portland
International Conference on Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET),
2015.
[48] G. S. Rice, "Mine Fires, A Preliminary Study," Department of the Interior, Bureau of
Mines, 1912.
[49] J. W. Paul, B. O. Pickard and M. W. VonBernewitz, "Erection of Barricades During Mine
Fires or After Explosions," Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1923.
[50] D. Harrington and W. J. Fene, "Barricading as a Life-Saving Measure in Connection
With Mine Fires and Explosions," Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1941.
[51] J. F. McCoy, D. R. Berry and D. W. Mitchell, "Development of Guidelines for Rescue
Chambers, Volume I," Foster-Miller, Inc, 1983.
[52] J. F. McCoy, D. R. Berry and D. W. Mitchell, "Development of Guidelines for Rescue
Chambers, Volume II," Foster-Miller, Inc, 1983.
[53] J. D. McAteer, T. N. Bethell, C. Monforton, J. W. Pavlovich, D. Roberts and B. Spence,
"The Sago Mine Disaster: A preliminary report to Governor Joe Manchin III," 2006.
246
[54] West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety, and Training, "Report of Investigation
into the Sago Mine Explosion which occured January 2, 2006," 2006.
[55] R. A. Gates, R. L. Phillips, J. E. Urosek, C. R. Stephan, R. T. Stoltz, D. J. Swentosky, G.
W. Harris, J. R. J. O'Donnell and R. A. Dresch, "Report of Investigation: Fatal
Underground Coal Mine Explosion; January 2, 2006; Sago Mine, Wolf Run Mining
Company; Tallmansville, Upshur County, West Virginia; ID No. 46-08791," Mine Safety
and Health Adminstration, United States Department of Labor, Arlington, Virginia, 2007.
[56] M. Davis, "US Mining Safety Under Scrutiny," BBC News, 5 January 2006.
[57] J. Dao, "12 Miners Found Alive 41 Hours After Explosion," The New York Times, 4
January 2006.
[58] NYT, "The Sago Mine Disaster," The New York Times, 5 January 2006.
[59] NYT, "Coal's Power Over Politicians," The New York Times, 6 January 2006.
[60] M. Clayton and A. Paulson, "Sago raises red flags for mine oversight," The Christian
Science Monitor, 6 January 2006.
[61] K. J. Ward, "Mine Safety Probe: Ex-MSHA Chief to Oversee Investigation," West
Virginia Gazette, 10 January 2006.
[62] D. Goode, "Panel to hold hearings on federal role in mine disaster," Government
Executive, 9 January 2006.
247
[63] Fox News, "Congress to Examine Mine Safety," Fox News, 21 January 2006.
[64] Office of Mine Safety and Health, "Research Report on Refuge Alternatives for
Underground Coal Mines," National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2007.
[65] NIOSH, "Refuge Alternative Research," National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health Research, 2007. [Online]. Available:
https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docket/archive/docket125.html.
[66] E. R. Bauer and J. L. Kohler, "Update on refuge alternatives: research, recommendations
and underground deployment," Mining Engineering, vol. 61, no. 12, p. 51, December
2009.
[67] D. Ounanian, "Refuge Alternatives in Underground Coal Mines: Phase I Final Report,"
Foster-Miller, Inc, 2007.
[68] D. Ounanian, "Refuge Alternatives in Underground Coal Mines: Phase II Final Report,"
Foster-Miller, Inc, 2007.
[69] Department of Labor, "Refuge Alternatives for Underground Coal Mines (RIN 1219-
AB58)," Federal Register, vol. 73, no. 116, pp. 34140 - 34173, 16 June 2008.
[70] Department of Labor, "Refuge Alternatives for Underground Coal Mines (RIN 1219-
AB58)," Federal Register, vol. 73, no. 251, pp. 80656 - 80700, 31 December 2008.
[71] United Mine Workers v. MSHA, 2010.
248
[72] Department of Labor, "Refuge Alternatives for Underground Coal Mines (RIN 1219-
AB84)," Federal Register, vol. 78, no. 153, pp. 48592 - 48593, 8 August 2013.
[73] Department of Labor, "Refuge Alternatives for Underground Coal Mines (RIN 1219-
AB79)," Federal Register, vol. 78, no. 153, pp. 48593 - 48597, 8 August 2013.
[74] Department of Labor, "Refuge Alternatives for Underground Coal Mines (RIN 1219-
AB79)," Federal Register, vol. 78, no. 184, p. 58264, 23 September 2013.
[75] Department of Labor, "Refuge Alternatives for Underground Coal Mines (RIN 1219-
AB79)," Federal Register, vol. 78, no. 235, pp. 73471 - 73472, 6 December 2013.
[76] Department of Labor, "Refuge Alternatives for Underground Coal Mines (RIN 1219-
AB79)," Federal Register, vol. 79, no. 106, p. 31895, 3 June 2014.
[77] Department of Labor, "Refuge Alternatives for Underground Coal Mines (RIN 1219-
AB79)," Federal Register, vol. 79, no. 190, pp. 59167 - 59168, 1 October 2014.
[78] Department of Labor, "Refuge Alternatives for Underground Coal Mines (RIN 1219-
AB79)," Federal Register, vol. 80, no. 181, pp. 56416 - 56418, 18 September 2015.
[79] Department of Labor, "Refuge Alternatives for Underground Coal Mines (RIN 1219-
AB79)," Federal Register, vol. 80, no. 222, p. 72028, 18 November 2015.
249
[80] Mine Safety Technology and Training Commission (MSTTC), Improving mine safety
technology and training: establishing U.S. global leadership, National Mining
Association, 2006, p. 193.
[81] West Virginia Mine Safety Technology Task Force, "Mine Safety Recommendations,
Report to the Director of the Office of Miners’ Health, Safety and Training by the West
Virginia Mine Safety Technology Task Force," West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health,
Safety and Training, Charleston, WV, 2006.
[82] GAO, "Better oversight and coordination by MSHA and other federal agencies could
improve safety for underground coal miners. GAO-07-622," U.S. Government
Accountability Office, Washington, DC, 2007.
[83] J. D. McAteer, T. N. Bethell, C. Monforton, J. W. Pavlovich, D. Roberts and B. Spence,
"The Fire at Aracoma Alma Mine #1: A preliminary report to Governor Joe Manchin III,"
2006.
[84] National Acadamy of Sciencies, "Improving self-escape from underground coal mines,"
National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2013.
[85] R. Peters and C. Kosmoski, "Are your coal miners prepared to self-escape?," Coal Age,
vol. 118, no. 1, pp. 26 - 28, 2013.
[86] E. J. Haas, R. H. Peters and C. L. Kosmoski, "Report of Investigations 9699: Enhancing
Mine Workers' Self-escape by Integrating Competency Assessment into Training,"
250
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH), 2015.
[87] C. Vaught, E. E. Hall and K. A. Klein, "Information Circular 9511: Harry's Hard Choices:
Mine Refuge Chamber Training Instructor's Guide," Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), 2009.
[88] K. A. Margolis, K. M. Kowalski-Trakofler and C. Y. Kingsley Westerman, "Information
Circular 9516: Refuge Chamber Expectations Training," Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), 2009.
[89] E. E. Hall and K. A. Margolis, "Information Circular 9525: Emergency Escape & Refuge
Alternatives Instructor Guide and Lesson Plan," Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), 2010.
[90] M. J. Brnich, C. Vaught and K. M. Kowalski-Trakofler, "Information Circular 9685: Man
Mountain's Refuge: Refuge Chamber Training Instructor's Guide and Trainee's Problem
Book," Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), 2011.
[91] C. L. Kosmoski, K. A. Margolis, K. L. McNelis, M. J. Brnich, L. Mallet and P. Lenart,
"Report of Investigations 9682: When Do You Take Refuge? Decisionmaking During
Mine Emergency Escape Instructor's Guide and Lesson Plans," Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH), 2011.
251
[92] C. Y. Kingsley Westerman, K. L. McNelis and K. A. Margolis, "Report of Investigations
9683: Recommendations for Refuge Chamber Operations Training," Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH), 2011.
[93] K. A. Klein and E. E. Hall, "Information Circular 9514: Guidelines for Instructional
Materials on Refuge Chamber Setup, Use, and Maintenance," Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH), 2009.
[94] R. J. McCloy, "Text of Randal McCloy Jr.'s Letter," Charleston Gazette-Mail, 28 April
2006.
[95] H. W. Ahlers, "CSE SR-100 SCSR - notice of information. Joint Investigation - CSE
Corp SR-100 Self-Contained Self-Rescuerer (SCSR)," Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH),
National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory (NPPTL), Pittsburgh, PA, 2010.
[96] CSE Corporation, "SR-100 User Notice," CSE Corporation, Monroeville, PA, 2010.
[97] H. W. Ahlers, "Background and SUmmary of CSE SR-100 Investigations," Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH), National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory (NPPTL),
Pittsburgh, PA, 2010.
252
[98] H. W. Ahlers, "Updated Users Notice Concerning SR-100 Self-Contained Self-Rescuer
(SCSR)," Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), National Personal Protective Technology
Laboratory (NPPTL), Pittsburgh, PA, 2010.
[99] H. W. Ahlers, "CSE SR-100 SCSR Sampling Plan," Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH),
National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory (NPPTL), Pittsburgh, PA, 2010.
[100] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH), National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory
(NPPTL), "Protocol for Sampling, Testing and Analyzing Oxygen-Starter Performance of
the CSE SR-100 Self-Contained Self-Rescuer," 2010.
[101] H. W. Ahlers, "CSE SR-100 Self-Contained Self-Rescuer Respirator User Notice,"
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH), National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory
(NPPTL), Pittsburgh, PA, 2010.
[102] H. W. Ahlers, "Update of the NIOSH and MSHA Collection and Testing of the CSE SR-
100; December 30, 2010," Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), National Personal Protective
Technology Laboratory (NPPTL), Pittsburgh, PA, 2010.
253
[103] H. W. Ahlers, "Update of the NIOSH and MSHA Collection and Testing of the CSE SR-
100; February 15, 2011," Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), National Personal Protective
Technology Laboratory (NPPTL), Pittsburgh, PA, 2011.
[104] H. W. Ahlers, "Update of the NIOSH and MSHA Collection and Testing of the CSE SR-
100," Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), National Personal Protective Technology
Laboratory (NPPTL), Pittsburgh, PA, 2011.
[105] H. W. Ahlers, "Update of the NIOSH and MSHA Collection and Testing of the CSE SR-
100; July 29, 2011," Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), National Personal Protective
Technology Laboratory (NPPTL), Pittsburgh, PA, 2011.
[106] American Society for Quality (ASQ), "ANSI/ASQC Q3-1988: Sampling Procedures and
Tables for Inspection of Isolated Lots by Attributes," American Society for Quality
(ASQ), Milwaukee, WI, 2000.
[107] R. Stein, H. Ahlers and R. Berry Ann, "Loss of Start-Up Oxygen in CSE SR-100 Self-
Contained Self-Rescuers," Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), National Personal Protective
Laboratory (NPPTL), 2012.
254
[108] H. W. Ahlers, "Loss of Start-Up Oxygen in CSE SR-100 Self-Contained Self-Rescuers,"
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH), National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory
(NPPTL), Pittsburgh, PA, 2012.
[109] Occupational Safety and Health Administration, "OSHA ALERT OA-3541: Loss of
Start-Up Oxygen in CSE SR-100 Self-Contained Self-Rescuers," US Department of
Labor, 2012.
[110] Mine Safety and Health Administration, "Program Information Bulletin (PIB) No. 12-
09," US Department of Labor, 2012.
[111] Mine Safety and Health Administration, "News Release: Labor Department's MSHA
issues user notice regarding SCSR units; Phase-out of CSE SR-100 breathing devices in
underground mines to begin immediately," US Department of Labor, Arlington, Virginia,
2012.
[112] N. Kyriazi, J. Kovac, W. Duerr and J. Shubilla, "Report of Investigations 9328:
Laboratory Testing of the CSE SR-100 Self-Contained Self-Rescuer for Ruggedness and
Reliability," US Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1990.
[113] N. Kyriazi and J. Shubilla, "Report of Investigations 9401: Self-Contained Self-Rescuer
Field Evaluation: Results from 1982-90," US Department of the Interior, Bureau of
Mines, 1992.
255
[114] N. Kyriazi and J. Shubilla, "Report of Investigations 9499: Self-Contained Self-Rescuer
Field Evaluation: Fourth-Phase Results," US Department of the Interior, Bureau of
Mines, 1994.
[115] N. Kyriazi and J. Shubilla, "Report of Investigations 9635: Self-Contained Self-Rescuer
Field Evaluation: Fifth-Phase Results," US Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines,
1996.
[116] N. Kyriazi and J. Shubilla, "Information Circular 9451: Self-Contained Self-Rescuer
Field Evaluation: Sixth-Phase Results," US Department of Health and Human Services,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2000.
[117] N. Kyriazi and J. Shubilla, "Report of Investigations 9656: Self-Contained Self-Rescuer
Field Evaluation: Seventh-Phase Results," Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), 2002.
[118] National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, "Report of Investigations 9671:
Self-Contained Self-Rescuer Long Term Field Evaluation Combined Eighth and Ninth
Phase Results," Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), 2006.
[119] National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, "Report of Investigations 9675:
Self-Contained Self-Rescuer Long Term Field Evaluation Tenth Phase Results," Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH), 2008.
256
[120] S. J. Schafrik, C. Dietrich and C. Harwood, "Geolocation for underground coal mining
applications: Classification of systems," Mining Engineering, vol. 66, no. 4, pp. 22-48,
April 2014.
[121] N. Damiano, G. Homce and R. Jacksha, "A Review of Underground Coal Mine
Emergency Communications and Tracking System Installations," Coal Age, pp. 34-35,
November 2014.
[122] T. Novak, D. P. Snyder and J. L. Kohler, "Postaccident Mine Communications and
Tracking Systems," IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 712-
719, 2010.
[123] D. J. R. Martin, "Leaky-feeder radio communications: A historical review," Proceedings
of the 34th IEEE Vehicle Technology Conference, vol. 34, pp. 25-30, 1984.
[124] C. Sunderman and J. Waynert, "An Overview of Underground Coal Miner Electronic
Tracking System Technologies," in 2012 IEEE Industry Applications Society Annual
Meeting, Las Vegas, NV, 2012.
[125] Department of Labor, "Underground Mine Rescue Equipment and Technology (RIN
1219-AB44)," Federal Register, pp. 4224 - 4226, 25 January 2006.
[126] MSHA, "List of Commenters: 30 CFR Part 49: Underground Mine Rescue Equipment
and Technology - Request for Information: RIN 1219-AB44," 27 March 2006. [Online].
Available: https://arlweb.msha.gov/regs/comments/06-722/minerescueequipment.asp.
257
[127] D. Chirdon, T. Barkand, N. Damiano, K. Dolinar, G. Dransite, J. Hill, P. Retzer and W.
Shumaker, Emergency Communication and Tracking Committee Underground
Communication and Tracking Systems Tests at CONSOL Energy Inc., McElroy Mine,
Mine Safety and Health Administration, 2006.
[128] K. Stricklin and M. Skiles, "Guidance for Compliance with Post-Accident Two-Way
Communications and Electronic Tracking Requirements of the Mine Improvement and
New Emergency Response Act (MINER Act)," Program Policy Letter No. P09-V-01, 16
January 2009.
[129] K. G. Stricklin and L. F. Zeiler, "Guidance for Compliance with Post-Accident Two-Way
Communications and Electronic Tracking Requirements of the Mine Improvement and
New Emergency Response Act (MINER Act)," Program Policy Letter No. P11-V-13, 28
April 2011.
[130] K. G. Stricklin and G. Fesak, "Revised Guidance for Compliance with Post-Accident
Two-Way Communication and Electronic Tracking Requirements of the Mine
Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act)," Program
Policy Letter No. P14-V-01, 27 March 2014.
[131] K. G. Stricklin, N. H. Merrifield and L. F. Zeiler, "Approval of Communication and
Tracking Devices Required by the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response
Act of 2006 (MINER Act)," Program Policy Letter No. P11-V-11, 14 April 2011.
258
[132] K. G. Stricklin and G. M. Fesak, "Re-Issue of P11-V-07 - Two-Way Communication and
Electronic Tracking System: Potential Interference of RF Electromagnetic Fields with
Electric Blasting Circuits," Program Policy Letter No. P13-V-09, 12 July 2013.
[133] K. G. Stricklin and L. F. Zeiler, "Inspection of Post-Accident Communication and
Electronic Tracking Systems," Procedure Instruction Letter No. I11-V-06, 7 June 2011.
[134] NIOSH, "Mining Contracts," 31 August 2017. [Online]. Available:
https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/researchprogram/contracts/index.html.
[135] A. D. Douglas, Status of Communication and Tracking Technologies in Underground
Coal Mines, University of Kentucky, 2014.
[136] NIOSH, "Basic Tutorial on Wireless Communication and Electronic Tracking:
Technology Overview," 6 February 2013. [Online]. Available:
https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/content/emergencymanagementandresponse/commtra
cking/commtrackingtutorial1.html.
[137] NIOSH, "Advanced Tutorial on Wireless Communication and Electronic Tracking," 25
October 2013. [Online]. Available:
https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/content/emergencymanagementandresponse/commtra
cking/advcommtrackingtutorial1.html.
259
[138] C. Zhou, J. Waynert, T. Plass and R. Jacksha, "Attenuation Constants of Radio Waves in
Lossy-Walled Rectangular Waveguides," Progress In Electromagnetics Research, vol.
142, pp. 75-105, 2013.
[139] C. Zhou and J. Waynert, "The Equivalence of the Ray Tracing and Modal Methods for
Modeling Radio Propagation in Lossy Rectangular Tunnels," IEEE Antenas and WIreless
Propagation Letters, vol. 13, pp. 615-618, 2014.
[140] C. Zhou, T. Plass, R. Jacksha and J. Waynert, "RF Propagation in Mines and Tunnels,"
IEEE Antennas & Propagation Magazine, pp. 88-102, August 2015.
[141] C. Zhou and R. Jacksha, "Modeling and Measurement of Radio Propagation in Tunnel
Environments," IEEE Antennas and Wireless Propagation Letters, 2016.
[142] C. Zhou, "Ray Tracing and Modal Methods for Modeling Radio Propagation in Tunnels
With Rough Walls," IEEE Transactions on Antennas and Propagation, vol. 65, no. 5, pp.
2624-2634, 2017.
[143] R. Jacksha and C. Zhou, "Measurement of RF propagation around corners in underground
mines and tunnels," Transactions of the society for mining, metallurgy & exploration,
vol. 340, pp. 30-37, 2016.
[144] A. C. Yucel, W. Sheng, C. Zhou, Y. Liu, H. Bagci and E. Michielssen, "An FMM-FFT
Accelerated SIE Simulator for Analyzing EM Wave Propagation in Mine Environments
260
Loaded With Conductors," IEEE Journal On Multiscale and Multiphysics Computational
Techniques, vol. 3, pp. 3-15, 2018.
[145] M. Hedley and I. Gipps, "Accurate Wireless Tracking for Underground Mining," in IEEE
International Conference on Communications 2013: IEEE ICC'13 - Workshop on
Advances in Network Localization and Navigation (ANLN), 2013.
[146] S. Dayekh, S. Affes and C. Nerguizian, "Cooperative Geo-location in Underground
Mines: A Novel Fingerprint Positioning Technique Exploiting Spatio-Temporal
Diversity," in 2011 IEEE 22nd International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile
Radio Communications, Piscataway, NJ, 2011.
[147] A. Fink and H. Beikirch, "MineLoc - Personnel Tracking SYstem for Longwall Coal
Mining Sites," IFAC-PapersOnLine, vol. 48, no. 10, pp. 215-221, 2015.
[148] Y.-X. Chen, "Underground Coal Mine Positioning System Based on RSSI Positioning
Algorithm Improved Through the BP Learning Training," The Open Fuels & Energy
Science Journal, vol. 8, pp. 281-286, 2015.
[149] V. Savic, J. Ferrer-Coll, P. Angskog, J. Chilo, P. Stenumgaard and E. G. Larsson,
"Measurement Analysis and Channel Modeling for TOA-Based Ranging in Tunnels,"
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 456-467, 2015.
[150] X. Zhang, Smart Sensor and Tracking System for Underground Mining, Saskatoon,
Saskatchewan, Canada: University of Saskatchewan, 2016.
261
[151] F. J. L. Pereira, Positioning Systems for Underground Tunnel Environments,
Universidade do Porto, 2016.
[152] C. Huntley and D. Chirdon, Remote Controlled Continuous Mining Machine Fatal
Accident Analysis Report of Victim’s Physical Location with Respect to the Machine, US
Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration, 2014.
[153] MSHA, "Proximity Detection / Collision Warning Single Source Page," 2016. [Online].
Available:
http://www.msha.gov/Accident_Prevention/NewTechnologies/ProximityDetection/Proxi
mitydetectionSingleSource.asp.
[154] T. M. Ruff and D. Hession-Kunz, "Application of radio frequency identification systems
to collision avoidance in metal/nonmetal mines," in IEEE Industry Applications
Conference, 1998.
[155] W. H. Schiffbauer and G. L. Mowrey, "An environmentally robust proximity warning
system for hazardous areas," in Proceedings of the ISA Emerging Technologies
Conference , 2001.
[156] W. H. Schiffbauer, "Active proximity warning system for surface and underground
mining applications," Mining Engineering, vol. 54, no. 12, pp. 40-48, 2002.
262
[157] L. J. Steinter and W. H. Schiffbauer, "Human factors design and evaluation of a close
proximity warning device," in Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics
Society Annual Meeting , 2000.
[158] W. H. Schiffbauer, "Mobile machine hazardous working zone warning system". United
States Patent US 5939986 A, 1999.
[159] W. H. Schiffbauer, "Non-directional magnet field based proximity receiver with multiple
warning and machine shutdown capability". United States Patent US 6810353 B2, 2004.
[160] J. R. Bartels, S. Gallagher and D. H. Ambrose, "Continuous mining: a pilot study of the
role of visual attention locations and work position in underground coal mines,"
Professional Safety, vol. 54, no. 8, 2009.
[161] J. R. Bartels, C. C. Jobes, D. J. P. and T. J. Lutz, "Evaluation of work positions used by
continuous miner operators in underground coal mines," in Proceedings of the Human
Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, 2009.
[162] J. L. Carr, C. C. Jobes and J. Li, "Development of a method to determine operator
location using electromagnetic proximity detection," in IEEE International Workshop on
Robotic and Sensors Environments (ROSE), 2010.
[163] C. Jobes, J. Carr and J. DuCarme, "Evaluation of an Advanced Proximity Detection
System for Continuous Mining Machines," International Journal of Applied Engineering
Research, vol. 7, no. 6, 2012.
263
[164] J. L. Carr and J. P. DuCarme, "Performance of an Intelligent Proximity Detection System
for Continuous Mining Machines," in SME Annual Meeting and Exhibit, Denver, CO,
2013.
[165] J. Li, J. Carr, J. Waynert and P. Kovalchik, "Environmental impact on the magnetic field
distribution of a magnetic proximity detection system in an underground coal mine,"
Journal of Electromagnetic Waves and Applications, vol. 27, no. 18, pp. 2416-2429,
2013.
[166] E. J. Haas and K. A. Rost, "Integrating technology: Learning from mine worker
perceptions of proximity detection systems," in Proceedings of the 144th Annual Society
for Mining, Metallurgy, & Exploration Conference , Denver, 2015.
[167] E. J. Haas and J. P. DuCarme, "A Different Perspective: NIOSH researchers learn from
CM operator responses to proximity detection systems," Coal Age, October 2015.
[168] J. L. Carr, T. J. Lutz and M. A. Reyes, "Field Evaluations of Proximity Detection
Technology on Continuous Mining Machines," in SME Annual Meeting and Exhibit, Salt
Lake City, UT, 2014.
[169] MSHA, "Notice to Underground Coal Mine Operators: Proximity Detection System
(PDS) Interference," 2 May 2016. [Online]. Available: https://www.msha.gov/notice-
underground-coal-mine-operators-proximity-detection-system-pds-interference.
264
[170] J. Noll, R. Matetic, J. Li and C. Zhou, "Electromagnetic interference from personal dust
monitors and other electronic devices with proximity detection systems," Mining
Engineering, vol. 70, no. 5, pp. 61 - 68, May 2018.
[171] D. A. Trotter, The Lighting of Underground Mines, Trans Tech Publications, 1982.
[172] H. H. Clark and L. C. Ilsley, "Ignition of Mine Gases by the Filaments of Incandescent
Electric Lamps," US Bureau of Mines Bulletin 52, 1913.
[173] H. H. Clark, "Permissible Electric Lamps for Miners," US Bureau of Mines Technical
Paper 75, 1914.
[174] L. C. Ilsley and A. B. Hooker, "Permissible Electric Mine Lamps," US Bureau of Mines
Bulletin 332, 1930.
[175] H. H. Clark and L. C. Ilsley, "Approved Electric Lamps for Miners," U.S. Bureau of
Mines Bulletin 131, 1917.
[176] J. J. Sammarco and J. L. Carr, "Mine Illumination: A Historical and Technological
Perspective," in 2010 SME Annual Meeting and Exhibit, Phoenix, Arizona, 2010.
[177] S. P. Howell, A. C. Fieldner and L. C. Ilsley, "Permissible Explosives, Mining
Equipment, and apparatus, Approved Prior to March 15, 1922," US Bureau of Mines
Technical Paper 307, 1922.
265
[178] L. C. Ilsley, A. B. Hooker and W. H. Roadstrum, "Investigations of Permissible Electric
Mine Lamps 1930-40," US Bureau of Mines Bulletin 441, 1942.
[179] F. E. Cash, "Electric Cap Lamps in Alabama Mines," US Bureau of Mines Information
Circular 6865, 1935.
[180] H. H. Clark and C. M. Means, "Suggested Safety Rules for Installing and Using Electrical
Equipment in Bituminous Coal Mines," US Bureau of Mines Technical Paper 138, 1916.
[181] A. B. Hooker and D. H. Zellers, "Factors that Decrease the Light of Electric Cap Lamps,"
US Bureau of Mines Report of Investigations 3292, 1935.
[182] D. H. Zellers and A. B. Hooker, "Maintaining the Permissibility of Electric Cap Lamps,"
US Bureau of Mines Informaiton Circular 6832, 1935.
[183] R. Vines, K. Klouse, G. R. Bockosh, R. E. Slone, G. Evans and G. Becket, "Panel
Discussion - Illumination," in Proceedings of the 8th Annual Institute on Coal Mining
Health, Safety and Research, Blacksburg, Virginia, 1977.
[184] L. C. Hitchcock, "Development of Minimum Luminance Requirements for Underground
Coal Mining Tasks," Research and Development Department, Naval Ammunition Depot,
1973.
[185] J. W. Blakely, "Problems Remain i n U nderground Lighting; New Regulations
Forthcoming," Coal Mining & Processing, vol. 58, 1976.
266
[186] N. P. Chironis, "Underground M ine Lighting . .. A look at What's New in Concepts and
E quipment," Coal Age, pp. 66-76, 1974.
[187] K. Klouse, "Measurement Procedures Proceedings: Bureau of Mines Technology
Transfer Seminars: Coal Mine Illumination," US Bureau of Mines Information Circular
8709, 1976.
[188] C. E. Lester, "Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration Review of New
Rulemaking in Mine Illumination," in Proceedings: Bureau o f Mines Technology
Transfer Seminars: Coal Mine Illumination. US Bureau of Mines Information Circular
8709, 1976.
[189] J. W. Crawford, "Impact of US Legislation on Equipment Manufacturers," Colliery
Guardian International, 1978.
[190] T. M. Okon and J. R. Biard, "The First Practical LED," Edison Tech Center, 9 November
2015. [Online]. Available:
http://edisontechcenter.org/lighting/LED/TheFirstPracticalLED.pdf.
[191] M. P. Mills, "The LED Illumination Revolution," Forbes, 27 February 2008.
[192] MSHA, "Approval And Certification Center: Electric Cap Lamps Approved Under Part
19," Mine Safety and Health Administration, 12 October 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://arlweb.msha.gov/TECHSUPP/ACC/lists/19lamps.pdf.
267
[193] N. Pal, P. K. Sadhu, R. P. Gupta and U. Prasad, "Review of LED Based Cap Lamps for
Underground Coalmines to Improve Energy Efficiency as Compared to Other Light
Sources," in The 2nd International Conference on Computer and Automation
Engineering (ICCAE), 2010.
[194] J. J. Sammarco, J. P. Freyssinier, J. D. Bullough, X. Zhang and M. A. Reyes,
"Technological Aspects of Solid-State and Incandescent Sources for Miner Cap Lamps,"
IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, vol. 45, no. 5, pp. 1583-1588, 2009.
[195] H. Mishra, Study of Application of LED Lighting System in Mines, National Institute of
Technology Rourkela, 2012.
[196] J. J. Sammarco, S. Gallagher and M. A. Reyes, "Visual performance for trip hazard
detection when using incandescent and led miner cap lamps," Journal of Safety Research,
vol. 41, pp. 85-91, 2010.
[197] J. J. Sammarco and T. J. Lutz, "Visual Performance for Incandescent and Solid-State Cap
Lamps in an Underground Mining Environment," IEEE Transactions on Industry
Applications, vol. 47, no. 5, pp. 2301-2306, 2011.
[198] J. J. Sammarco, M. A. Reyes, J. R. Bartels and S. Gallagher, "Evaluation of Peripheral
Visual Performance When Using Incandescent and LED Miner Cap Lamps," IEEE
Transactions on Industry Applications, vol. 45, no. 6, pp. 1923-1929, 2009.
268
[199] J. J. Sammarco, J. P. Pollard, W. L. Porter, P. G. Dempsey and C. T. Moore, "The effect
of cap lamp lighting on postural control and stability," International Journal of Industrial
Ergonomics, vol. 42, pp. 377-383, 2012.
[200] T. J. Lutz, J. J. Sammarco, J. R. Srednicki and S. Gallagher, "Comparison of cap lamp
and laser illumination for detecting visual escape cues in smoke," Transactions of the
Society of Mining, Metallurgy, and Exploration, vol. 334, no. 1, pp. 401-409, 2013.
[201] J. J. Sammarco, A. G. Mayton, T. J. Lutz and S. Gallagher, "Discomfort Glare
Comparison for Various LED Cap Lamps," IEEE Transactions on Industry APplications,
vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 1168-1174, 2011.
[202] S. Tak, R. D. Davis and G. M. Calvert, "Exposure to hazardous workplace noise and use
of hearing protection devices among US workers," American Journal of Industrial
Medicine, vol. 52, pp. 358-371, 2009.
[203] E. A. Masterson, S. Tak, C. L. Themann, D. K. Wall, M. R. Groenewold, J. A. Deddens
and G. M. Calvert, "Prevalence of Hearing Loss in the United States by Industry,"
American Journal of Industrial Medicine, vol. 56, pp. 670-681, 2013.
[204] K. D. Kryter, The Handbook of Hearing and the Effects of Noise, San Diego, California:
Academic Press, 1994.
269
[205] T. J. Horberry, R. Burgess-Limerick and L. J. Steiner, Human Factors for the Design,
Operation, and Maintenance of Mining Equipment, Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press,
2011.
[206] J. A. Lamonica, R. L. Mundell and T. L. Muldoon, Noise in Underground Coal Mines,
US Bureau of Mines, 1971.
[207] NIOSH, Survey of Hearing Loss in the Coal Mining Industry, Cincinnati, OH: National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 1976.
[208] W. W. Aljoe, T. G. Bobick, G. W. Redmond and R. C. Bartholomae, The Bureau of
Mines Noise-Control Research Program: A 10-Year Review, US Bureau of Mines, 1985.
[209] R. C. Bartholomae and R. P. Parker, Mining Machinery Noise Control Guidelines,
Pittsburgh, PA: US Bureau of Mines, 1983.
[210] R. Matetic, R. F. Randolph and P. G. Kovalchik, "Hearing Loss in the Mining Industry:
The Evolution of NIOSH and Bureau of Mines Hearing Loss Research," in Extracting the
Science: A Century of Mining Research, J. Brune, Ed., Littleton, Colorado, Society for
Mining, Metallurgy, and Exploration, Inc, 2010, pp. 23-29.
[211] NIOSH, Preventing Occupational Hearing Loss--A Practical Guide, Cincinnati, OH:
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 1996.
[212] NIOSH, Criteria for a Recommended Standard: Occupational Noise Exposure,
Cincinnati, Ohio: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 1998.
270
[213] NIOSH, NIOSH criteria for a recommended standard: occupational exposure to noise,
Cincinnati, Ohio: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 1972.
[214] MSHA, "Noise: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking (RIN 1219-AA53)," Federal
Register, vol. 54, no. 231, pp. 50209-50213, 4 December 1989.
[215] MSHA, "Health Standards for Occupational Noise Exposure: Proposed rule (RIN 12-19-
AA53)," Federal Register, vol. 61, no. 243, pp. 66348-66469, 17 December 1996.
[216] MSHA, "Health Standards for Occupational Noise Exposure: Proposed Rule: Extension
of comment period and notice of hearings (RIN 1219-AA53)," Federal Register, vol. 62,
no. 25, pp. 5554-5555, 6 February 1997.
[217] MSHA, "Noise Samples Data Set," [Online]. Available:
https://arlweb.msha.gov/OpenGovernmentData/DataSets/NoiseSamples.zip.
[218] MSHA, "Health Standards for Occupational Noise Exposure in Coal, Metal and
Nonmetal Mines: Proposed Rule: availability: request for comments (RIN 1219-AA53),"
Federal Register, vol. 62, no. 246, pp. 67013-67014, 23 December 1997.
[219] NIOSH, Prealence of Hearing Loss for Noise Exposed Metal/Nonmetal Miners,
Cincinatti, Ohio: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 1997.
[220] MSHA, "Health Standards for Occupational Noise Exposure: Final Rule (RIN 1219-
AA53)," Federal Register, vol. 64, no. 176, pp. 49548-49634, 13 September 1999.
271
[221] J. S. Peterson and R. C. Bartholomae, "Design and instrumentation of a large
reverberation chamber," in NOISE-CON 2003, Ames, IA, 2003.
[222] E. R. Bauer, D. R. Babich and J. S. Vipperman, Equipment Noise and Worker Exposure
in the Coal Mining Industry (IC 9492), Pittsburgh, PA: National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health, 2006.
[223] P. G. Kovalchik, M. Johnson, R. Burdisso, F. Duda and M. Durr, "Noise Control for
Continuous Miners," in Proceedings from the 10th International Meeting on Low
Frequency Noise and Vibration and its Control, York, England, 2002.
[224] E. R. Spencer, A. K. Smith, L. A. Alcorn and P. G. Kovalchik, "Underground Evaluation
of Coated Flight Bars for a Continuous Mining Machine," in Inter-Noise 2006.,
Honolulu, Hawaii, 2006.
[225] A. K. Smith, Engineering Controls for Reducing Continuous Mining Machine Noise
(Technology News 531), Pittsburgh, PA: National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health, 2008.
[226] A. K. Smith, P. G. Kovalchik, L. A. Alcorn and R. J. Matetic, "A dual sprocket chain as a
noise control for a continuous mining machine," Noise Control Engineering Journal, vol.
57, no. 5, pp. 413-419, 2009.
[227] A. K. Smith, D. S. Yantek and J. S. Peterson, "Development And Evaluation Of A
Urethane Jacketed Tail Roller For Continuous Mining Machines," in Proceedings of the
272
ASME 2007 International Mechanical Engineering Congress and Exposition
(IMECE2007), 2007.
[228] Komatsu, "Continuous Miner Conveyor Chains," Komatsu Mining Corp. Group, 2017.
[Online]. Available: https://mining.komatsu/docs/default-source/product-
documents/underground/underground-service-products-and-consumables/en-gjspcmcc01-
0616-v1.pdf?sfvrsn=8c68f06b_22.
[229] MSHA, "Program Information Bulletin No. P14-02: Reissue of P08-12 - Technologically
Achievable, Administratively Achievable, and Promising Noise Controls (30 CFR Part
62)," Mine Safety and Health Administration, 2014.
[230] G. J. Joy and P. J. Middendorf, "Noise exposure and hearing conservation in US coal
mines: A surveillance report," Journal of Occupational and Environmental Hygeine, vol.
4, pp. 26-35, 2007.
[231] B. Roberts, K. Sun and R. L. Neitzel, "What can 35 years and over 700,000
measurements tell us about noise exposure in the mining industry?," International
Journal of Audiology, vol. 56, pp. S4-S12, 2017.
[232] K. Sun and A. S. Azman, "Evaluating hearing loss risks in the minign industry through
MSHA citations," Journal of Occupational and Environmental Hygiene, vol. 15, no. 3,
pp. 246-262, 2018.
273
[233] D. S. Yantek, J. S. Peterson and A. K. Smith, "Application of a Microphone Phased Array
to Identify Noise Sources on a Roof Bolting Machine," in NOISE-CON 2007, Reno, NV,
2007.
[234] J. S. Peterson, Collapsible Drill Steel Enclosure for Reducing Roof Bolting Machine
Drilling Noise (Technology News 532), Pittsburgh, PA: National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health, 2008.
[235] P. G. Kovalchik, A. K. Smith, R. J. Matetic and J. S. Peterson, "Noise Controls for Roof
Bolting Machines," Mining Engineering, vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 74-78, 2009.
[236] J. S. Peterson, P. G. Kovalchik and D. Yantek, "Development of roof-bolting machine bit
and chuck isolators for drilling noise reductions," in Proceedings of the ASME 2009
International Mechanical Engineering Congress & Exposition, IMECE2009, Lake Buena
Vista, Florida, 2009.
[237] D. S. Yantek, J. S. Peterson, R. Michael and E. Ferro, "The Evolution of Drill Bit and
Chuck Isolators to Reduce Roof Bolting Machine Drilling Noise," Transactions of the
Society of Mining, Metallurgy, and Exploration, vol. 330, pp. 429-437, 2012.
[238] R. J. Matetic, P. G. Kovalchik, J. S. Peterson and L. A. Alcorn, "A Noise Control for a
Roof Bolting Machine: Collapsible Drill Steel Enclosure," in NOISE-CON 2008:
Proceedings of the 2008 National Conference on Noise Control Engineering, 2008.
[239] M. J. Lowe, J. S. Peterson, D. S. Yantek, L. A. Alcorn and R. Michael, "A control suite to
reduce roof bolting machine drilling noise," in NOISE-CON 2010: Proceedings of the
274
2010 National Conference on Noise Control Engineering and 159th Meeting of the
Acoustical Society of America, 2010.
[240] A. S. Azman, D. S. Yantek and L. A. Alcorn, "Evaluations of a noise control for roof
bolting machines," Mining Engineering, vol. 64, no. 12, pp. 64-70, 2012.
[241] D. S. Yantek, Investigation of Temperature Rise in Mobile Refuge Alternatives (RI
9695), National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2014.
[242] L. Yan, D. S. Yantek, P. Bissert and M. Klein, "In-mine experimental investigation of
temperature rise and development of a validated thermal simulation model of a mobile
refuge alternative," in ASME 2015 International Mechanical Engineering Congress and
Exposition, 2015.
[243] L. Yan, D. S. Yantek, M. Klein, P. Bissert and R. J. Matetic, "Validation of temperature
and humidity thermal model of 23-person tent-type refuge alternative," Mining
Engineering, vol. 68, no. 9, 2016.
[244] L. Yan, D. S. Yantek, M. A. Reyes, N. Damiano, J. Srednicki, J. Bickson, B. Whisner and
E. Bauer, "Cooling Systems for Refuge Alternatives in Hot Mine Conditions," in ASME
2018 International Mechanical Engineering Congress and Exposition, 2018.
[245] D. S. Yantek, "Update on Blast Resistance of BIP RA Doors," in NIOSH Refuge
Alternative Workshop, Bruceton, PA, 2018.
275
[246] J. Homer, "Relief Valve Research for Refuge Alternatives," in NIOSH Refuge Alternative
Workshop, Bruceton, PA, 2018.
[247] T. J. Lutz, J. D. Noll and L. Yan, "Evaluation of Contamination Ingress for Built-in-place
Refuge Alternatives," in SME Annual Meeting, Minneapolis, MN, 2018.
[248] J. Bickson, D. S. Yantek, J. R. Srednicki and M. A. Reyes, "Effect of Ventilation System
Layout on Purging of Harmful Gases In a Built-in-place Refuge Alternative with a
Borehole Air Supply," in SME Annual Meeting, Denver, CO, 2019.
[249] N. Schwarz, H. Bless, F. Strack, G. Klumpp, H. Rittenauer-Schatka and A. Simons, "Ease
of Retrieval as Information: Another Look at the Availability Heuristic," Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 1991.
[250] T. Kuran and C. R. Sunstein, "Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation," Stanford Law
Review, 1998.
[251] A. Colman, Oxford Dictionary of Psychology, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
[252] R. W. Brislin, "Cross-Cultural Research Methods: Strategies, Problems, Applications," in
Environment and Culture, Springer, 1980, p. 73.
[253] T. Kogut and I. Ritov, "The 'Identified Victim' Effect: An Identified Group, or Just a
Single Individual?," Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, pp. 157-167, 2005.
276
[254] M. E. Oswald and S. Grosjean, "Confirmation Bias," in Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook
on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgement and Memory, Hove, UK, Psychology
Press, 2004, pp. 79-96.
[255] J. Baron, Thinking and Deciding (Second Edition), Cambridge University Press, 1994.
[256] D. Hardman, Judgment and decision making: psychological perspectives, Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009.
[257] NASA, "Technology Readiness Levels: Introduction," 21 October 2004. [Online].
Available: https://web.archive.org/web/20051206035043/http://as.nasa.gov/aboutus/trl-
introduction.html.
277
Vita Jacob L. Carr Education PhD in Energy and Mineral Engineering: The Pennsylvania State University Dissertation Title: “An Investigation into the Factors That Govern Success for New Safety and Health Technologies in the Mining Industry and the Efficacy of those Factors to Predict the Likelihood of Success for Emerging Technologies” M.S. in Mining Engineering: University of Nevada, Reno December, 2008; Thesis Title: “Application of Computer-Assisted Control Architecture to the Operation of Large Surface Mining Shovels and Excavators” B.S. in Mining Engineering: University of Nevada, Reno December, 2006
Research Experience Team Leader for the Machine Safety Team at NIOSH’s Pittsburgh Mining Research Division 2015 – Present Safety Engineer at NIOSH’s Pittsburgh Mining Research Division 2009 – 2014 Graduate Research Assistant at the University of Nevada, Reno 2007 – 2008 Undergraduate Research Assistant at the University of Nevada, Reno 2004 – 2006
Professional Membership Member of Society of Mining, Metallurgy, and Exploration (SME) since 2002
Honors and Awards JW Woomer Young Engineer Award, 2018 University of Nevada, Reno, College of Science: Young Alumnus of the Year, 2017 Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and Engineers (PECASE), 2016 Stefanko Best Paper Award, 2013 CDC & ATSDR Honor Award – Excellence in Leadership, 2013 Pittsburgh FEB Outstanding Professional Employee in a Medical/Scientific Field, 2012 University of Nevada, Reno: Outstanding B.S. Student, Mining Engineering, 2006
Publications Author or co-author on more than 30 research publications, including conference papers, journal articles, and book chapters on mining equipment automation, proximity detection systems, mine illumination, RF and magnetic field propagation and modeling, and electromagnetic interference mitigation.