Historical Review

THE ENGLISH HISTORICAL REVIEW NO. LI I.—OCTOBER 1898 The Campaign of the Metaurus TV. DATA OF TOE BATTLE SITE. "pEFORE coming finally to the actual sites proposed for the battle, JD it is necessary to recall to mind the data to help us in the judg- ment of them all. We have seen that the camps were five hundred paces distant with a river (unnamed) in the immediate neighbour- hood, probably flowing between, and that the camps were ' by Sena,' whatever that may mean. Hasdrubal departs silently from his camp, and endeavours vainly to cross the Metaurus river. He follows up this river, but finds it winds in and out very considerably ; and the higher up from the s^a he proceeds, ths steapar grow its banks. When the Koman cavalry and light-armed troops overtook him, continues Livy, he abandoned the idea of further flight and began to fortify a camp on a hill above the bank of the river. Quum . castra metan Poenus in tumulo superfluminis ripam veilet, adccnit Lxviut (xxvii. 48. 2). The Eoman mainguard, however, came up, and the Romans drew up their battle array, Claudius on the right wing, Livius on the left, the praetor in the centre. Giving up therefore the idea of completing the camp, Hasdrubal drew up his forces. On the left wing he placed the Gauls; he himself took command of the Spaniards who formed his right wing; the Ligurians formed his centre; and in front of his line were stationed the elephants (xrvii. 48. 5-7). Other data are added by our other authorities. Hasdrubal drew up his forces on the hill in question. The ground was rough and broken, and his line was also protected by. vineyards. Cum TOL. xm.—NO. m. s s 626 THE CAMPAIGN OF THE METAURUS Oct. Hasdrubal hello Puntco teamdo deeernendi necessitatem evitans in colie confragoso pott vineat aciem direxisseU . .l Hifl men, as Livy and Appian tell us, were weary from their flight, and perhaps the Carthaginian general was anxious to avoid a decisive engagement. True, as Livy says, he saw some battle that day was inevitable (pottquam pugncmdum vidit, 48. 5); but he clearly trusted to the natural strength of his position to render the engagement indecisive, or at least to protect his left wing, on which he relied little, from attack. And livy and Poly bios agree in stating that the Roman efforts remained fruitless until Nero's manoeuvre, unexpected alike by friends and foes, turned the fortunes of the day.1 Hasdrubal began the battle by attacking tbe Roman left wing, and here the struggle was stubborn, neither side having the advantage.3 While the battle was raging here, Nero vainly endeavoured to storm the hill on which the Gauls were stationed. Here he could make no progress. 6 it KXaiSios isl.rov ie^tov tiparoc Ttrayfiit os xpoaynr fiiv ii( rovfixpovdiv rai reptctpdf rove vxtr.aiTiovt ovi: iSvyaro ita rac vpoicti/jlrac ivff^ttpiat, ale TtTrirrtvKuc 'AaZpouftac ciroo/o'aro TI)V ixl ra Xaia riv vo\tfiiuv lipoZor.4 So also Livy: Gallos prominena collis tegebat; ea frons quam TTiapani tenebant, cum sinistro Romanoram coma concurrit; deitra (?). omnis acies extra proeliam pTni"«"" cessabat; collis oppoaitua arcebat. ne aut a fronte ant ab l&tere aggrederentor (48. 8). Then Nero vrr' airrov TOV <rvft/3alvovros ifiaOev ft Biov fp> rparrtaf? Taking some of the cohorts from his own wing, the right, he marched with these round behind the rest of the Roman army and suddenly and unexpectedly made his appearance on its extreme left wing. By so doing he outflanked the Carthaginian right wing. His troops overlapped, and closing in they fell upon the foe both flank and rear. The Iberians found themselves assailed now no longer only in front. There thronged on every 6 side save one a press of foemen. This decided the day: &VHTO* r\v T) ftdxV' Hasdrubal, seeing all was lost, charged into the midst of the Romans and met his death bravely. The Spanish and Irigurians were cut down, and, from the ground these had occupied, the hill on which the Gauls were posted was scaled with ease, and its drunken garrison put mercilessly to the sword.7 This is the account of the battle given us in Polybius and Livy. 1 Erontinnj, Strat. ii. 3. 8. 1 Poljbius, xi. 1. 8-40. Livy, ixvii. 48. 9 ijj. • Polybiui, xi. 1. 8, 4, 8. Liry, c. 48. 9-11. * Poljbius, xL 1. 5. • Ibid. 0. • 1W<L7-11. Iivy, xxrii. 48.12-15. ' Polybius, xi. 2. 3. Livy, xxrii. 48.15-49. 4. 1898 THE CAMPAIGN OF THE METAURVS 627 Of our other authorities only Frontinus gives us any precise information concerning the details of the fighting: Livius Salinator et Claudius Nero, cam Hasdrubal bello Funico secundo deoernendi necessitatem evitans in colle confragoso post vineas aciem direxisset, ipsi diductis in latera viribus vacua fronte ex utraque parte circumvenerunt earn aique ita adgressi superarunt.8 This account is not very clear. Frontinus realises that there was (1) a hill, (2) a flanking movement. But he seems to have conceived all the Carthaginians as posted on this hill, which in front was impregnable; wherefore the Romans, by diverging to left and right, stormed it on both sides, and so won the day. It is perfectly true that the hill in question was stormed from one side, but not true that this was of any importance in deciding the battle. The battle was decided by the flanking movement, and this was directed not against the troops on the hill, but against those who had moved to the attack in the open, and therefore more level, ground on the Carthaginian right wing. These, then, are all the data we have given us for the actual battle site: a rough hill on one bank of the Metaurus river, at some distance from its mouth, between which hill and the sea the river exhibits considerable windings. The banks of the river hard by must be steep. As the left wing of the Carthaginians was posted on the hill and the Romans came up in pursuit from the sea, if the battle took place on the left bank some considerable space must separate the hill and the river channel (unless the Romans fought with their rear ranks hard on the river, which is unlikely, and leaves no room for the flanking movement); for between hill and river must be left space for the Carthaginian centre and right wing, and also for the outflanking movements of Nero and his troops. If, on the other hand, the battle was fought on the right bank of the river, the hill may be sought in the immediate vicinity of the river channel, and some more level, though not necessarily lower, ground be found on its southern side. Again, if we take ad Senam of the city, as is more natural, and accept the tale of Nero's march, which I feel bound to do, any site further up the river than (say) Fossombrone, fifteen miles from the mouth, becomes an impossibility. Hasdrubal cannot have retreated from (say) the Cesano to beyond Fossombrone, some twenty-three miles in all, in the one night and part of a day before he was over- taken. And even were the camps on the Metaurus, the difficulty of the site increases every step we go beyond that city. There are yet two other possible data to aid the search: (1) the present nature of the river bed and banks, and (2) tradition and finds. Neither, however, is conclusive. 1. To-day the Metaurus valley, as far as Fossombrone, is wide, • Strattg. ii. 8. & ssS 628 THE CAMPAIGN OF THE METAURUS Ocfe. fertile, and well cultivated. The river winds considerably, and its bed is Droad. The volume of water in it, however, when I saw it at the end of March, was not so great as to preclude an apparently easy possibility of fording it by day in more places than one. The banks, however, were high and steep for the most part, and Dr. Arnold urged with force that in the course of some two thousand years the river bed may very possibly have been considerably raised.9 Certainly to-day above Fossombrone, where the character of the valley changes, the bare red water-scarred Lanark-like mountain sides, and the impetuous torrent beds falling into the main river, are proof evident how great must be in winter the torrent of water, earth, debris, stones &c. poured into the Metaurus. Now Hasdrubal appeared in north Italy in early spring, while his brother in the south lay still in his winter quarters. He wasted time, however, in the siege of Placentia, and the battle can hardly have been fought before April. In this Oehler concurs. The traditional date is as late as 24 Jane, and Fittaluga places it in the summer. In any case, April seems the earliest date possible, and Matzat's 16 Feb. can hardly be accepted. If this be the case, it was probably rather the steepness of the then banks than the then volume of water (though doubtless this too was greater then than now) which made the passage of the river a matter of such difficulty. This, indeed, seems implied in Livy, 47. 11. Thus the hill by the river is a just object of search. The windings of the river bed must also be duly found—for hollowed out as this is in the otherwise very level surface of the valley, we cannot easily suppose that the river has taken to itself one or more new courses since 207 B.C.

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