Issue 69, 2nd Quarter 2013
Reorganizing National Security T ransnational Crime Threat Sea Power to Cyber Power
Joint Force Quarterly Inside Issue 69, 2nd Quarter 2013
Editor Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D. JFQ Dialogue Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D. Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz 2 From the Chairman Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley Forum Copy Editor/Office Manager John J. Church, D.M.A Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich 4 Executive Summary Executive Assistant Ryan Heggs, J.D. 6 Victory, Peace, and Justice: The Neglected Trinity Design Amy Ellis and Chris Dunham By Beatrice Heuser U.S. Government Printing Office Printed in St. Louis, Missouri 13 Organization Theories: Perspectives on Changing National Security Institutions by By Anthony J. DiBella 20 Goldcorp Crowdsourcing: An Industry Best Practice for the Intelligence Community? By Jesse Roy Wilson NDU Press is the National Defense University’s cross-component, professional military and 25 Fostering Constructive Dialogue on Military Sexual Assault By Lindsay L. Rodman academic publishing house. It publishes books, journals, policy briefs, occasional papers, Commentary monographs, and special reports on national security strategy, defense policy, interagency cooperation, national military strategy, regional 34 Confronting Transnational Organized Crime: Getting It Right to Forestall security affairs, and global strategic problems. a New National Security Threat By Douglas M. Fraser and Renee P. Novakoff This is the official U.S. Department of Defense Democracy Promotion in Oman By Diana M. Holland edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions of this 39 journal may not be reproduced or extracted without permission of the copyright proprietors. Joint 42 Restoring the “Unwritten Alliance”: Brazil-U.S. Relations Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever By Lawrence T. Brown material is quoted from or based on its content. 49 Joint Communications Support Element: The Voice Heard ’Round the World By Kirby E. Watson COMMUNICATIONS Please visit NDU Press and Joint Force 56 Command and Control Vulnerabilities to Communications Jamming Quarterly online at ndupress.ndu.edu for more By Ronald C. Wilgenbusch and Alan Heisig on upcoming issues, an electronic archive of JFQ articles, and access to many other useful NDU Press publications. Constructive com- ments and contributions are important to us. Please direct editorial communications to the link on the NDU Press Web site or write to: Editor, Joint Force Quarterly National Defense University Press 260 Fifth Avenue, S.W. (Building 64, Room 2504) Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, DC 20319
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2nd Quarter, April 2013 ISSN 1070-0692 PUBLISHER Features GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA An Interview with Samuel J. Locklear III President, NDU 64 MG Gregg F. Martin, USA 72 NATO’s Level of Ambition: Beyond Strategic Reach By Dean A. Nowowiejski Advisory Committee Maj Gen Joseph D. Brown IV, USAF Dwight D. Eisenhower From Sea Power to Cyber Power: Learning from the Past to Craft a School for National Security and Resource Strategy 78 RADM John N. Christenson, USN Naval War College Strategy for the Future By Kris E. Barcomb Brig Gen Thomas H. Deale, USAF Air Command and Staff College The Future of U.S. Landpower: Special Operations Versatility, Col Mark Desens, USMC Marine Corps Command 84 and Staff College Marine Corps Utility By Kevin D. Stringer and Katie M. Sizemore LtGen George J. Flynn, USMC The Joint Staff Ambassador James B. Foley National War College Recall Maj Gen Scott M. Hanson, USAF Air War College Col Jay L. Hatton, USMC Marine Corps War College LTG David G. Perkins, USA U.S. Army Command and 92 The German Military Mission to Romania, 1940–1941 By Richard L. DiNardo General Staff College LTG Curtis M. Scaparrotti, USA The Joint Staff Book Reviews ADM James G. Stavridis, USN U.S. European Command Maj Gen Joseph S. Ward, Jr., USAF Joint Forces Staff College The Generals Reviewed by Robert Bracknell 99 Editorial Board The Generals Reviewed by Alan L. Gropman Richard K. Betts Columbia University 100 Stephen D. Chiabotti School of Advanced Air and Space Studies The Next Wave Reviewed by George Michael Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University 101 COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.) National War College Mark J. Conversino Air War College Joint Doctrine Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University Col Thomas C. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.) Office of the Secretary of Lead Turning the Fight: The Joint Operational Access Defense 103 Douglas N. Hime Naval War College Concept and Joint Doctrine By Gregory Kreuder Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College Daniel T. Kuehl Information Resources Management College 109 Redefining Information Operations By Carmine Cicalese Col David Lapan, USMC The Joint Staff Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.) The Joint Staff Kathleen Mahoney-Norris Air Command and Staff College Thomas L. McNaugher Georgetown University Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.) National War College James A. Schear Office of the Secretary of Defense LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.)
About the covers CONTRIBUTIONS Joint Force Quarterly welcomes submission of scholarly, independent Front cover: USS Laboon (DDG 58) arrives in Souda Bay, research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers Greece, to support maritime security operations and theater and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians security cooperation efforts in U.S. th6 Fleet area of respon- from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address on the opposite page or by email to [email protected] sibility (U.S. Navy/Paul Farley). Table of contents shows “Attention A&R Editor” in the subject line. For further information, th (left to right) C-130 Hercules with 107 Airlift Wing shoots see the guidelines on the NDU Press Web site at ndupress.ndu.edu. live flares during night formation training mission (U.S. Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Air Force/Ray Lloyd); Strike Soldier prepares for realistic Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the combat environments during weapon malfunction train- Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal ing session (U.S. Army/Joe Padula); lightning flashes on designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and horizon as USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) operates in other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security th policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; U.S. 5 Fleet area of responsibility (U.S. Navy/Greg Linder- and developments in training and joint professional military man); Marine and wife embrace during return ceremony education to transform America’s military and security apparatus to at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting freedom today. (U.S. Marine Corps/Stephen T. Stewart). The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.
ndupress.ndu.edu From the Chairman Risky Business
here is risk in daring. As asserted by Niccolò Machiavelli, “Never was anything great achieved without danger.”
T DOD (D. Myles Cullen) Every day, the men and women of our Armed Forces dare to be great. Every day, they take risks to achieve something bigger and more important than themselves. It is the risk they willingly take that makes our nation great. We owe our good fortune to more than blind luck. Like no other profession, we pay attention to risk. We study it, forecast it, manage it, and seek to reduce it. We spend endless hours—even years—wargaming risk to our missions and to our forces. We simulate attacks and disasters. We rehearse responses to complex contingencies. We develop strategies and plans for a wide range Chairman and Admiral Samuel Locklear, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, meet at USPACOM of threats to our national security interests. Headquarters, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, May 2012 As much art as science, judging risk is an essential skill for military professionals at every echelon. Right now, a pilot is judging around the world is higher. The conse- a national expectation, while upholding our risk as she climbs into a cockpit. An infantry quences—albeit horrific for those at the point values is part of our national identity. Reliable platoon is doing it while on patrol. A ship’s of attack—are relatively insignificant in terms allies also help to distribute risk. captain is doing it while navigating in the of national survival. Arabian Gulf. In my role as Chairman, I Probability and consequence are What Risks Are Out There? have a statutory responsibility to explain risk not easily measured, and they do not paint The risks to our national security inter- to our senior civilian leaders, the President, the whole picture. It is just as important to ests are real. They are broad and run deep. and Congress. I want to share some thoughts think about how risk changes over time and From a security standpoint, I see risk in the about risk with you as well. what opportunities might be available if we context of a security paradox. To paraphrase accept risk. Cyber attacks, for example, are Charles Dickens, it is the best of times, it is How to Think about Risk becoming more frequent and more disrup- the worst of times. Ancient societies viewed life as subject tive every day. Destructive cyber is a reality. We serve at a time that seems less to arbitrary forces. The discovery of prob- In today’s world, bits and bytes can be as dangerous, but may be more so. By some ability in the 16th century gave mankind a dangerous as bullets and bombs. At the same accounts, we are experiencing an evolution- sense of greater influence over events. Today, time, advanced cyber tools are creating new ary low point in human violence. Dickens we “make our own luck” by better under- options for achieving military objectives. might call this a “season of Light” with low standing risk. Risk only exists in relation to some- risk. But less violence does not necessarily Risk is a relatively straightforward thing we value. At a basic level, we think mean less danger, particularly if both the concept. Simply, it is the probability and con- of the risk to our force—people and equip- probability and consequences of aggression sequence of danger. It is not very likely that ment—and to our mission. At a more stra- are on the rise. We can hope for the light, but we will be invaded soon, or that we will face a tegic level, we think about risk as it relates those of us in the profession of arms have a mass nuclear attack, but the consequences of to our national security interests. Beyond moral obligation to be ready in case we con- either would be catastrophic—even existen- the survival of our nation, the health of the front a “season of Darkness.” tial. On the other hand, the probability that global economic system is essential to our Two trends are casting long shadows. terrorists will attack our interests somewhere way of life. Protecting Americans abroad is First, power in the international system is
2 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu DOD (D. Myles Cullen)
Chairman observes Afghan commandos during demonstration at Camp Moorehead, Afghanistan, April 2012
shifting below and beyond the nation-state, most effective include having a sound strat- and be ready with relevant capabilities and spawning more actors who are more con- egy and a ready force with reliable partners. adequate capacity. nected and more capable of doing harm. A solvent strategy keeps our ends, ways, While hostile regimes such as those in Iran and means in balance. It guards against Leading All the Way and North Korea get the most attention— ambitions that exceed abilities. With our Leadership is our best insurance and deservedly so—the security stage has means reduced, we have no choice but to against risk. By developing leaders today, we become much more crowded with violent carefully and deliberately prioritize our ends prepare for a turbulent tomorrow. The kinds nonstate actors. and seek new ways to achieve them. I have of leaders we need are those able to adapt to At the same time, advanced tech- been hosting a series of strategic seminars a shifting security landscape. They do not nologies are proliferating horizontally and with our senior defense leaders to do just this. just react to change; they lead it. They do not vertically. Highly accurate ballistic missiles The result has been a better sense of where just manage risk; they embrace it to generate wielded by middleweight militaries lurk in to invest our resources and how to integrate opportunity. By taking calculated risks, we every theater. Bombs made of homemade capabilities to meet an uncertain future. illuminate the path to greatness. Whether we explosives can mangle our toughest mine- We also buy down risk through readi- take that path depends on leadership. resistant vehicles. A cyber attack from a ness. A hollow force invites danger. A ready We are and will remain the greatest lone malevolent marauder could disrupt joint force deters threats, assures allies, and fighting force on the planet. Be alert to risk, broad sectors of our economy. In many can respond quickly to defeat aggression. but dare to be great! JFQ ways, the homeland is no longer the sanctu- This is why the Joint Chiefs and I are com- ary it once was. mitted to making sure we sustain the best MARTIN E. DEMPSEY These mutually reinforcing trends led, trained, and equipped military on the General, U.S. Army ensure an uncertain future that will not planet. At the same time, we must make Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff mirror the past. They argue for a more com- some tough tradeoffs to build the joint force petitive security environment that does not we will need by 2020. follow yesterday’s rules. They call for us to We can also share risk. We must think differently and prepare differently for continue to look to others to help us deal the dangers we may face. with threats before they mature. I have made strategy the centerpiece of my dialogues with How to Deal with Risk our pivotal partners. Our allies and partners Our responsibilities do not end with can bring to bear the kind of additional capa- anticipating risk. We are expected to take bility and credibility required to make our actions to reduce and mitigate risk. Among strategies work. Of course, we also need our the many ways to mitigate risk, some of the partners to stand up to their responsibilities ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 3 Executive Summary
enior military leaders, primarily northern Africa, he proclaims, “Rommel, you U.S. Army generals and their magnificent bastard, I read your book!” U.S. Army individual abilities to lead, were The Rommel book in question was S recently examined by the award- actually about infantry tactics in World winning journalist Tom Ricks. Some leaders, War I, and Patton, in his memoirs, refers in Ricks’s view, were highly successful, others to reading it during the Saar Campaign of not so much. I believe that the one critical November 1944—far after the portrayed cin- trait all great military leaders share is that ematic moment. But the point about reading of continuous study and mental develop- and study is made just as well by the fact that ment. Great American captains—ones most Patton continued to think, read, and assess of us would call geniuses—worked hard to his progress, never satisfied with what he strengthen their mental muscles: Washing- knew at the moment—even while engaged in ton, Dewey, Pershing, Marshall, Eisenhower, the ultimate test of his leadership in combat. Nimitz, Arnold, Bradley, Vandegrift, and In the flying business, pilots rightly believe more. My personal favorite of the World that death quickly follows the moment War II generation is George S. Patton, Jr. As one stops learning. Joint Force Quarterly is the man who would literally write military constantly searching for new ideas as well as fighting doctrine and history simultane- reminders of past events that may yield a path ously during the campaigns of World War II, to future successes for our readers. General George S. Patton, Jr., USA General Patton was a voracious reader of a Every platform in the expanding media wide range of works. needs two basic ingredients to succeed: According to one of his biographers, authors and readers. Based on the increasing ments have evolved to encompass a wider between the wars, Patton had read or was amount of submissions I have been receiv- interagency effort, cultures have clashed, acquainted with the concepts “of nearly every ing in recent months, JFQ has a growing and reaching shared solutions has been dif- significant writing on mobile warfare that source of new and interesting ideas to publish ficult for leaders and organizations. Anthony had been produced in English,” regardless each quarter. Also, on the reader side, our DiBella suggests that part of the problem is of the advocating writer’s subject, including last edition, JFQ 68, set another record for a lack of understanding about how organi- works on infantry, cavalry, air, or mechaniza- online viewers. While popular media con- zations operate and that a more thorough tion. By the time he would enter into combat tinue to suggest that platforms such as print understanding of the cultural differences in World War II, Patton was without doubt magazines are failing, the truth is likely less of these groups could lead to more effective “America’s most effective advocate of a daring pessimistic. JFQ continues to thrive in both cooperation. In another avenue of discovery armor doctrine.”1 Given that it took Patton printed and online forms, and while we are for organizational improvement, crowd- three tries to complete a military academy considering ways to update the look of the sourcing has been an increasing focus of how education (once at Virginia Military Institute journal in coming months, the one thing we organizations might seek to better opera- and twice at West Point), due in part to his will continue to do is provide a voice for the tions, especially in industry if not govern- dyslexia, we have to respect Patton’s sheer best ideas to inform, promote, and improve ment. Jesse Roy Wilson presents a corporate force of will and determination to learn all he the joint force. case study that provides an important lesson could about his profession. In line with the theme of study as a that could improve the U.S. Intelligence In 1935, as a lieutenant colonel at the means to improve the mind, this edition’s Community. Next, with the recent headlines age of 50, Patton was found by his wife, Forum presents an intellectually challeng- of sexual misconduct in basic training, Beatrice, weeping one evening as he was ing set of articles that should assist anyone Lindsay Rodman argues that Department reading about past heroic commanders, all seeking to find new insights to consider for of Defense leadership has good intentions to younger than himself. But study on he did. the future of the military. Professor Beatrice deal with these delicate but serious matters. Many can remember George C. Scott’s por- Heuser offers an interesting discussion on She suggests that policy may not always be trayal of Patton in the 1970 film that won an a forgotten set of beliefs regarding what guided by available facts and analysis. impressive seven Academy Awards, including should follow war. She suggests that these Our Commentary brings updates Best Picture. In one memorable scene, one beliefs date from before Napoleon and that on regional and communications issues of Scott’s lines says it all: As Patton surveys Clausewitz overlooked them. But they were from how transnational organized crime the positive results of the battle in progress rediscovered by B.H. Liddell-Hart after should be confronted to whether years of between Allied forces and the Nazi army in World War I: the trinity of victory, peace, permissive environment operations have and justice. As our national security require- dulled our ability to communicate in future
4 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu combat. Former U.S. Southern Command NDU Commander General Douglas Fraser, USAF (Ret.), and Renee Novakoff recommend the development of analysts who can better interpret a mix of traditional intelligence, law enforcement information, and open source data to deal with transnational organized criminal activities. In her essay from the 2012 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strate- gic Article contest, Diana Holland believes that U.S. efforts to promote democracy in the Gulf region of Southwest Asia should start with Oman, as conditions there are right for a peaceful evolution to a more liberal form of government. Lawrence Brown, in his 2012 Secretary of Defense National Security Essay, argues for a rapid reversal of the continuing rift between the United States and Brazil. Next, one of the long-established joint orga- First class of the Army Industrial College, June 1924 nizations, the Joint Communications Support Element (JSCE), has a storied if unheralded service record dating back some 50 years. cautions that the means to meet Alliance at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, With first-hand experience leading this unit, ends may require a lowering of expectations helps us understand the important differ- Kirby Watson outlines the broad range of going forward because of an all-encompassing ences between strategic communications and missions that JCSE is ready to support with austere budget environment. In a truly joint information operations, as well as finding leading-edge joint communications capabil- thinking article, Kris Barcomb channels a path to achieving success in military ity. Even with our best efforts to keep military Mahan and describes a “tailored expansionist decisionmaking supported by these efforts. communications robust and technologically strategy for cyberspace” that leads to better Rounding out this edition are a joint doctrine up to date, however, Ronald Wilgenbusch economic and physical security for the United update and three well-written and engaging and Alan Heisig demonstrate that the U.S. States. Seeing an opportunity to leverage the book reviews. military’s overreliance on commercial com- likely future security environment to meet As an editor and educator along with munications has created severe vulnerabili- an enduring requirement for engagement our NDU Press team, I am “zeroed in” on ties in future combat, especially from an old with land forces, Kevin Stringer and Katie delivering the highest quality content every foe of the Cold War era, jamming. Sizemore recommend a mix of U.S. special way possible, so that my battle buddies, In Features, we present an interview operations forces, primarily from the U.S. shipmates, and wingmen on joint profes- and an interesting mix of articles that include Army and Marine Air-Ground Task Forces sional military education faculties around the a discussion of the U.S. “pivot” to the Asia- (MAGTFs), that would allow mission accom- world have the intellectual ammunition they Pacific, recommendations for the future of the plishment with fewer troops—the expected need to develop critically thinking, adaptive North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), constraint going forward. leaders for the 21st-century joint force. Let us suggestions on how to leverage Alfred Thayer In an impressive primary document– know how we are doing. JFQ Mahan for cyber strategy, insights into how based historical case study from World War to create U.S. joint landpower, and rethinking II, Richard DiNardo takes us to Romania —William T. Eliason, Editor how to properly locate and neutralize indi- as the Germans worked with local forces in vidual strategic enemies. As we consider how preparation for Operation Barbarossa, Hit- best to execute a rebalancing of our military ler’s invasion of Russia. In this Recall article, Note assets into the Pacific, Admiral Samuel J. we see security assistance, of a very different 1 Roger H. Nye, The Patton Mind: The Profes- Locklear, USN, commander of U.S. Pacific kind, playing out with many of the same sional Development of an Extraordinary Leader Command, sits down with JFQ to discuss his issues modern efforts still face. (Garden City Park, NY: Avery, 1993), 129. views on how his command will response. In the Doctrine section, Carmine Cica- Next, looking at NATO’s Strategic Concept, lese, former director of the Joint Command entitled Smart Defense, Dean Nowowiejski and Control Information Operations School ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 5 Patrick Gruban
Norwegian Room, United Nations Security Council Chamber in New York
Victory, Peace, and Justice The Neglected Trinity By Beatrice Heuser
The first aim in war is to win, the second is to prevent defeat, the third is to shorten it, and the fourth and most important, which must never be lost to sight, is to make a just and durable peace. —Sir Maurice Hankey1
ince the U.S. Armed Forces handed out medals to their troops stationed in Germany to celebrate their “victory” in the Cold War, “victories” have eluded the liberal democracies, and their experiences with violent conflicts have been frustrating. We have seen ephemeral, S short-lived, or fruitless victories in the first Gulf War, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Somalia, the Iraq War, and Afghanistan. After George W. Bush famously and rather prematurely proclaimed that the U.S. mission in Iraq was “accomplished” and the press hailed that as a victory, first General David Petraeus and then President Barack Obama have thankfully tended to avoid the term. There has recently Professor Beatrice Heuser is a been a wave of publications seeking to bring greater clarity to the concept of victory.2 It has been defined Historian and Political Scientist. by some of Carl von Clausewitz’s followers as success in imposing one’s will upon the enemy and by She holds a chair of International Relations at the University of others as the restoration of the status quo ante bellum (which, given the losses incurred by all sides in war, 3 Reading, United Kingdom, and is the is never entirely possible). author of The Evolution of Strategy: Unsatisfactory attempts have been made to introduce criteria of success according to a complex 4 Thinking War from Antiquity to cost-gains calculus. William Martel has rightly identified the need to distinguish between victory and the Present (Cambridge University the outcome of the employment of force through strategy.5 Colin Gray has presented persuasive defini- Press, 2010). tions of decisive military victory, while carefully distinguishing the result of a military campaign from
6 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu HEUSER the possible overall achievements on a politi- of action; indeed, it may be the only way. recognize some legitimacy in many of them, cal level: “decisive [military] victory . . . is Nothing of what is argued herein should and the need to address all of them in some hard to translate into desired political effect.”6 suggest that the defeat of enemy forces as nonviolent fashion, through reforms, good We are struggling with the concept of what a means of persuading the enemy to cease governance, education, and investment. victory in general means, as the new status fighting is seen as insignificant. The shock They can hardly be resolved through an quo or state of affairs (or the restored prewar of military defeat is certainly a huge factor in unconditional imposition of one’s will upon state) has so often proved short lived: when decisionmaking on any side, for which there the discontented side. is victory a meaningful concept? In search may well be no substitute, to borrow General of an answer, it is worth enquiring as to how Douglas MacArthur’s claim. But often it T he Trinity of Victory, Peace, and victory was seen in the past, what one might takes more, and sometimes it takes less, Justice retain from past views for the present, and than a military victory. In World War I, for Let us return to Aristotle’s definition of which views have led to dead ends. instance, the German Heeresleitung managed peace as the only legitimate war aim. Accord- to hide the Allies’ military victory from the ing to the professed ethics of European V ictory as Imposition of One’s Will German population because the Allies did societies from Antiquity to the French Revo- on the Enemy not follow up their success in war by occupa- lution, the establishment of a better peace was Ever since Napoleon (and his interpret- tion of the defeated enemy country. self-evidently seen as the purpose of going to ers, among them especially Clausewitz), we The Allies did not repeat their mistake war. We find this argument articulated not have lost sight of a crucial truth that thinkers in World War II. In that second great con- only by Aristotle and pagan Roman thinkers before Napoleon’s wars fully understood: flagration, few took issue with Germany’s but also by one of the fathers of the Roman namely, that victory alone is rarely of much unconditional surrender—the practical Church, by East Roman or Byzantine think- value if it does not bring peace with justice.7 application in its extreme form of the call to ers such as Emperor Leo VI the Wise, and by Military victory for its own sake was and is impose one’s will upon the adversary—as Western Europeans in the Middle Ages and important to the generals and their armed the war aim of the Allies, and few have ques- early modern times, from Christine de Pizan forces, who can think of it as their contribu- tioned the wisdom of this approach since.9 to the many authors of the 16th to 18th centu- tion to fulfilling their side’s strategic aims. There is a weighty argument, however, about ries who wrote about war. Military victory In that respect, as Aristotle commented, whether Japan might have admitted defeat might be the preferred way to peace, but not “The end of the medical art is health, that of earlier had the clause of unconditional sur- the only one. Peace, harmonious order, and shipbuilding a vessel, that of military science render been dropped, and had the Japanese the kosmos were recognized as the overarch- victory, that of economics wealth.” Greek population not been led to believe that this ing aims. How this was to be achieved— and Roman generals were celebrated for their might involve the removal of their emperor.10 through negotiations, through the Byzantine victories, but contemporaries were well aware Either way, crucially, World War II equivalent of check-book diplomacy and that the effects of military victories were was an extreme case of conflict, as it pitted soft power, through deterrence, coercion, or often of short-lived benefit. As such, they civilizations believing in the essential human actual war—depended on circumstances. might not lead lastingly to that essential and right to life against regimes and their follow- But is peace alone a suitable aim? The only legitimate overall purpose of war, which ers who believed mankind could be divided peace of the graveyard—that is, the annihila- Aristotle identified as “peace.”8 into humans and subhumans, of whom the tion of the entire enemy population—was There are cases when the evil that one confronts is so great, and the leadership of the other side is so thoroughly wicked, the peace of the graveyard—the annihilation of the entire that the Clausewitzian definition of war as enemy population—was rarely articulated as an acceptable aim “imposing one’s will upon the enemy” should indeed be applied unconditionally. To con- clude a war, peace must be sought by all the latter could be eliminated or exploited to rarely articulated as an acceptable aim by belligerents, and, at the very least, this means death with impunity. Confrontations with those writing on warfare. A second factor that the mind of a bellicose adversary must such extremely evil adversaries as Nazi had to be present: not only peace, but also be changed through some means—whether Germany and Imperial Japan are the excep- peace with justice. Justice, however, has by violence or persuasion, even if the latter tion, not the norm. Most belligerents today many facets. does not amount to imposing one’s will upon do not aim at the enslavement of an enemy Admittedly, most arguments in Antiq- the enemy fully. To change an enemy’s mind, population, let alone its eradication, as the uity about military victory focused on how one may need to deprive him of the hope that Germans did under Adolf Hitler. Instead, to merit and achieve it (piety and virtus he might achieve his own aims more easily, most wars arise from differences in purpose were seen as the foremost conditions) rather faster, at less cost by using violence. and aim on a less than existential level. They than on its purpose.11 But already the late A military victory of the decisive sort, are conflicts about the distribution of wealth, Roman Republic saw the transformation of as defined again by Colin Gray as depriving resources, and territory, about a variance the notion that pious behavior was neces- the enemy of any hope of reversing his defeat in status of different ethnic or religious sary to gain the support of the gods for one’s in the near future, is certainly a particularly groups, and about the right to determine military enterprise into a distinct notion useful way to make him reconsider his course one’s own way of life. It is difficult not to that a war must fulfil a certain number of ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 7 Forum | Victory, Peace, and Justice conditions to be lawful. This would later be The pursuit of justice according to clas- called just war, bellum iustum, and it had sical and later European authors, then, has to fulfil several criteria with regard to its several facets. The first is the restoration of a causes, purpose, and conduct to be defined just state of affairs, the status quo before the as such. The criteria that later came to con- war, or, if the status quo ante was not just, a stitute just war theory can be traced back to just settlement of the dispute. In the absence pre-Christian, Roman Republican concepts of an international, mutually recognized of a proper or orderly way to conduct a court of justice to settle a dispute between war, most of which can already be found in two or more parties, this has often taken the Cicero’s and Varro’s writings: form of war. Already Christine de Pizan, writing around 1400, tried to introduce an ■■ The war has a just cause (self-defense arbitration authority—composed of other or defense of another). princes and personalities of the highest ■■ It has the only just aim of the pursuit moral authority—to settle disputes between of peace. princes. Many thinkers after her deplored
■■ It is the last resort. the absence of such an authority, or a court of Collection, National Gallery of Art Jacques-Louis David, Samuel H. Kress ■■ It is conducted after a formal declara- justice. Immanuel Kant, in his 1795 Eternal tion of war. Peace, noted that war might serve to decide ■■ It is carried out with moderation a quarrel but would not necessarily decide (which is often referred to as the concept of in favor of justice: “The field of battle is the proportionality). only tribunal before which states plead their ■■ Balancing the consequences of not cause; but victory, by gaining the suit, does going to war or going to war in advance of not decide in favour of the cause. Though The Emperor Napoleon in His Study at the Tuileries, doing so, it must seem reasonable to assume the treaty of peace puts an end to the present 1812 that the destruction and suffering caused will war, it does not abolish a state of war (a state not outweigh the evil that is fought.12 where continually new pretences for war are found).”14 As the Prussian General August able period of calm, in order to continue Pagan Roman just war theory was Rühle von Lilienstern put it in 1813, “War is thereafter the struggle that has been decided adapted to Christianity by Augustine of the means of settling through chance and the upon the more forcefully and completely. Hippo around 400 CE. He added the need use of force the quarrels of the peoples. Or: it There are other contexts . . . in which a State for legitimate authority (God, or his rep- is the pursuit of peace or for a legal agreement derives some substantial, or perhaps only resentative on Earth, the Emperor—later by States with violent means.”15 imaginary, gains from the continuation of taken to mean a legitimate government).13 Contemporary observers have often war. In such cases, war is by no means waged Augustine’s writings on just war, scattered noted, however, that not all parties have for the sake of peace, as this would be a over several parts of his work, were codified always sought such a just settlement of a quite undesired event, but for the sake of the by Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century and quarrel, or indeed peace. Shortly after the hoped-for gains, to be achieved through war. gained general acceptance in international final defeat of Napoleon, Rühle remarked, Such wars include those that are waged for law. Thus, we find that in 1945, the United “Victory . . . is not always the necessary con- passion and personal interests of individual Nations (UN) Charter only allows defensive dition of conquest or of peace, and peace is military men or officials, of the army—in war (chapter VII.51), or action authorized not always the necessary result of victory and short, because of some subordinate interest, by the UN Security Council in protection conquest.” He added, “Victory and conquest but not the general welfare of the State.16 of international peace and security (chapter are often causes of the continuation, the VII). In 2004, the UN High Level Panel on renewal and the multiplication of war.” In Such wars do not, however, qualify as Threats, Challenges and Change, in its docu- full cognizance of the old just war tradition, just wars; the problem arising from a victory ment “A More Secure World: our shared which had been dangerously challenged by of the party pursuing it in such a spirit lies in responsibility,” listed criteria of legitimacy Napoleon, Rühle conceded that it should in the unlikelihood that the defeated party will for authorization of military intervention by theory be the case “that one only wages war accept the outcome of the war. the United Nations: the seriousness of the for [the sake of] peace, and that one should Second, just war theory holds that one threat, the proper purpose, it is the last resort, only wage war, in order afterwards to build it must fight the adversary only until the just it is conducted with proportional means, and the more firmly and intensively on the lawful cause is served. A rare example of a Greek the foreseeable balance of the consequences understanding between States.” Napoleon’s who took an interest in this, Polybius in the favors going to war over living with the initiatives had shown, however, that wars second century BCE, opined, “[G]ood men consequences of inaction. This last criterion were not always like this in reality. At times: should not make war on wrongdoers with the could be termed the choice of the lesser evil, object of destroying and exterminating them, or justice with moderation. Justice cannot be a warring State only concludes peace for the but with that of correcting and reforming divorced from the peace; if it is, the peace will sake of the next war, [contexts] in which it their errors”—or, to use a slightly different be worthless. regards peace as a convenient and irreplace- translation, “undoing their erroneous acts.”17
8 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu HEUSER
In a more practical vein, Machiavelli warned aggressor, but who the aggressor is, and who Tiepolo and Corrado Giaquinto. Even the his Prince that “Victories are never so over- the just defender or liberator is, are often French revolutionaries initially shared these whelming that the conqueror does not have uncertain in longstanding territorial dis- war aims of bringing peace and justice; they to show some scruples, especially regarding putes—think only of the Malvinas/Falklands saw the populations of Europe as oppressed justice.”18 Other writers went further and issue). De facto, the party that calls for pun- by tyrannies and thus as brethren await- advocated justice tempered by clemency. ishment is the victorious one, and punish- ing liberation, and they believed they were Machiavelli’s contemporary Giacomo di ment is meted out to the defeated side once fighting only against their oppressors, not Porcia wrote in 1530, “the duty and office of fighting has come to an end. As General against the populations.27 any political leader, after the battle is won Curtis LeMay, responsible for the firebomb- and victory achieved, [is] to save lives [of ing of Tokyo, remarked, “I suppose if I had T he Trinity Neglected by the Napole- those] who have not been excessively cruel lost the war, I would have been tried as a war onic-Clausewitzian Paradigm and overly resistant. For what would be less criminal.”24 Polybius did not see punishment Military writings between the time gentle, indeed more like to the cruel and as such as a just war aim, postulating that of Napoleon’s wars and World War II, by fiercely brutal beasts, than to handle your good men should “extend to those whom contrast, were dominated by the pursuit of enemy without any mercy and meekness? they think guilty the mercy and deliverance victory for its own sake, victory divorced Undoubtedly a leader acting thus will kindle they offer to the innocent.”25 Others argued from the political settlement of a funda- the minds of men against him.”19 Machia- that the enforcement of justice—punishment mentally political conflict, victory not as a velli’s French admirer, nobleman Raymond for war crimes—can only reasonably take reward for a just cause or for piety but due de Beccarie de Pavie, Baron de Fourquevaux, place in a symbolic form, or at any rate selec- only to strength or at best cunning and appealed to nobler sentiments: “The true tively, against the leading decisionmakers underpinned by the Social Darwinist notion office of the conqueror is to pardon and to responsible for these crimes. As the Spanish that the fitter nation deserved to prevail. have pity upon the conquered.”20 Toward the diplomat and soldier Don Bernardino de Both the admirers and the enemies of Napo- end of the 16th century, Englishman Matthew Mendoza noted in 1595, one cannot “punish leon were blinded by his military victories. Sutcliffe exhorted his readers to remember a multitude”26—or if one does, he either has This was true especially of Clausewitz, who, that “In the execution of wars . . . no cruelty to kill them all, or else the multitude will casting all moral dimensions aside, formu- should be used.” He urged “moderation even persuade themselves that this punishment is lated his famous tenet that “to impose our in the execution of justice, not only in the unjust, and the result, in many historic cases, will on the enemy is” the “object” of war: “To other actions of war.” For to “keep our con- has been the rise of revanchism. secure that object we must render the enemy quest, there are two principal means which Fourth, writing about postwar justice, powerless; and that, in theory, is the true aim are necessary; force and justice.”21 About Sutcliffe, Mendoza, and others after them of warfare.” half a century later, French philosopher and argued that one must prevent injustice at Clausewitz thus reduced the meaning mathematician Blaise Pascal mused that the lowest level, such as attacks on individu- of victory to narrow military conditions: “justice without force is powerless; force als, but also pillaging and other ordinary “1. The enemy’s greater loss of material without justice is tyrannical. Justice without crimes or iniquities that violate local strength; 2. His loss of morale; 3. His open force is opposed, for there will always be villains. Force without justice is decried. One must therefore bring justice and force just war theory holds that one must fight the adversary together, making what is just strong and what only until the just cause is served is strong just.”22 Just before the publication of Pascal’s Thoughts, his countryman Paul Hay du customs. Effectively, they called for “good admission of the above by giving up his Chastelet admonished Louis XIV that the governance,” good administration, and the intentions.”28 Clausewitz knew full well victor “has to preserve a generous humanity maintenance of law and order. The preven- that he was taking warfare out of its greater for the vanquished, to have compassion with tion of arbitrary arrests, assaults, theft, and political context when he stated this, as he them, to comfort them in their disgrace, and arbitrary settlements of local disputes is wrote elsewhere: “In war the result is never through good treatment, sweeten their rude part of the rule of law and justice. It stands final . . . even the ultimate outcome of a war misfortune.”23 If we consider the most suc- to reason that the administration of justice is not always to be regarded as final. The cessful pacification of two defeated enemies is essential to a lasting peace. defeated state often considers the outcome in the 20th century, Germany and Japan, it is Incorporating some or all of these merely as a transitory evil.”29 Beyond this, precisely this recipe that worked: Marshall dimensions of justice, it was a common- Clausewitz deliberately omitted consider- Plan aid for the Germans and reconstruction place to see peace and justice as linked or ation of the trinity of victory, peace, and aid for the Japanese ensured that both nations in need of linking before Napoleon ravaged justice from On War. Only a few writers in had a vested interest in peace and stability Europe. Allegories placing the two next the ensuing age, dominated by the impera- through their new-found prosperity. to each other, depicted as beautiful god- tive of the pursuit of victory at all costs, Third, the administration of justice desses draped in silks and often engaged fully grasped Napoleon’s greatest shortcom- is often identified with the punishment of in conversation or embracing, grace paint- ing as a strategist: his inability to build a the “guilty” party (usually defined as the ings throughout Europe, such as those of lasting peace. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 9 Forum | Victory, Peace, and Justice
without victory, there is no survival.”32 Confronted with Hitler’s genocidal ideol- ogy and his military machinery of willing executioners, the Allies in World War II had no choice but to adhere to the Napoleonic- Clausewitzian paradigm. Santi di Tito, Palazzo Vecchio V ictory vs. Survival The war raised a new question, however: what if military victory and survival became mutually incompatible? A year after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Bernard Brodie asserted, “If the [nuclear] aggressor state must fear retaliation,” that is, if there is a nuclear exchange, “no victory, even if guaranteed in advance—which it never is—would be worth the price.”33 He famously noted, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.”34 Faced with the specter of total nuclear war, strategists to the west, and later also to the east, of the Iron Curtain began to debate whether war continued to be a rational choice—whether it could be the extension of a rational policy to another domain.35 Against this background, Liddell Hart’s rediscovery of earlier thinking about the relative value of victory and his skepti- cism about the Napoleonic-Clausewitzian paradigm were increasingly shared by others. Doubts persist as to whether nuclear war could ever again be a rational choice, and victory is increasingly seen as a nonsensical concept in the context of a nuclear war. Sig- nificantly, in the Cold War, both the North Machiavelli, 16th century Atlantic Treaty Organization and eventually the Warsaw Treaty Organization abandoned victory as a war aim.36 Nevertheless, wars on a lower scale promised to continue; anybody In the subsequent age, which was domi- onic-Clausewitzian paradigm. World War who doubted this was disabused of their nated by the Napoleonic-Clausewitzian para- II, which to the minds of many Britons was optimism by the Korean War, which erupted digm, enemies were expected to surrender due at least in part to the irredentism that the in 1950. And such wars have generally been unconditionally, and summary punishments peace settlement after World War I created fought with the aim of winning them, in were imposed upon the vanquished nation by in Germany, was still an extreme example pursuit of victory. Indeed, the Korean War the victor in 1871 as in 1919. The result was of the adherence to the paradigm, with its experience led to General MacArthur’s rarely a lasting peace, as B.H. Liddell Hart imposition of unconditional surrender, as already mentioned claim that there was “no noted in 1939: “The more intent you appear we have seen. Indeed, a superficial reading substitute for victory” for wars in general. to impose a peace entirely of your own choos- of Winston Churchill’s famous “blood, toil, Yet even in less than total wars, the ing, by conquest . . . the more cause you will tears, and sweat” speech of 1940 to the House concept of victory is now seen as problematic provide for an ultimate attempt to reverse the of Commons—with its emphasis on “victory; in the light of the difficulties of turning settlement achieved by war.”30 victory at all costs, victory in spite of all military victory into lasting success. In “small It dawned on Liddell Hart that “Victory terror, victory, however long and hard the wars,” limited wars, low-intensity conflicts, is not an end in itself,” as he noted in Decem- road may be”—seems quite in keeping with wars of national liberation, or whatever term ber 1936.31 In his own extensive reading, he the paradigm. Nevertheless, even Churchill one chooses, victory was difficult to obtain rediscovered the thinking of sages who wrote conceded that in this total war, the ulterior let alone maintain long before the watershed prior to the age dominated by the Napole- aim was the survival of Great Britain, “for of 1989/1991. Victory, or the translation of a
10 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu HEUSER military success into a lasting and favorable the context of the Napoleonic-Clausewitzian equally wicked regimes) stands to reason, political settlement, had been elusive also in paradigm, from peace and justice. In the but as noted, not all adversaries are so utterly less than total major wars since 1945 includ- words of a particularly eminent and influen- evil. Where at all possible, a war must not ing the Arab-Israeli wars, not to mention the tial British defense civil servant, Sir Maurice be conducted in an unforgivable way: the many small clashes—small from a Western (later Lord) Hankey, “It must always be kept laws of war (ius in bello) must be carefully observed even if it means, as many generals have complained, “fighting with one hand small wars proved particularly difficult for armed forces tied behind one’s back.” While this option is that were good at major campaigns in which overwhelming hardly available to small states, it certainly is firepower promised success to the world’s only superpower. It secures the moral high ground, which is crucial for the perception of justice, an essential prerequisite perspective—in which victory eluded the in mind that after a war we have sooner for a lasting peace. JFQ major powers involved, from the successive or later to live with our enemies in amity.” Indochina wars and Algeria to U.S. involve- Unless one has genocidal aims—which by ment in Somalia. definition no state upholding today’s inter- Ns ote Already during the Cold War, Alexan- national law can espouse—there are few wars 1 Maurice Hankey, Politics: Trials and Errors der Atkinson noted that Chinese Commu- where this consideration need not play a part. (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1950), 26f. nism under Mao Tse-tung was not seeking Hankey’s logical conclusion from this 2 See, for example, Jan Angstrom and Isabelle 37 victory through the classical means of war. statement was cited at the beginning of this Duyvesteyn, eds., Understanding Victory and No wonder that, after the experience of article: the most important aim in any war Defeat in Contemporary War (London: Routledge, Vietnam, American strategists and military must be “to make a just and durable peace.” 2007); Boone Bartholomees, “Theory of Victory,” instructors long shunned the subject of small Victory is nothing if it does not lead to such Parameters 38, no. 2 (Summer 2008), 25–36; wars. They had proved particularly difficult a peace, and such justice must be seen as Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, “Essence for high-tech armed forces that were good reasonable by both sides to make it durable. of Victory: Winning and Losing International at major campaigns in which overwhelming Hankey added: “Emotionalism of all kinds, Crises,” Security Studies 13, no. 2 (2004), 350–381; firepower promised success. hate, revenge, punishment and anything Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in A counterfactual question deserves that handicaps the nation in achieving these International Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard pondering: if nuclear weapons had not been four aims [of the pursuit of justice] are out University Press, 2006). 38 invented, would we have been pushed to of place.” The main obstacle to a just and 3 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence reevaluate the concept of “victory”? Coun- durable peace consists of these all-too-human (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966). terfactual questions in history defy final emotions, in addition to unpardonable collec- 4 Robert Mandel, The Meaning of Military answers, especially if they try to focus on tive selfishness, otherwise known as nation- Victory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 4–6. single variables. What is clear is that, with alism, chauvinism, or the arrogance and con- 5 William C. Martel, Victory in War: Founda- or without nuclear weapons, there continue descension that often underlie religious wars. tions of Modern Military Policy (Cambridge, UK: to be those who doubt that humanity can Hatred, lust for revenge, and chauvinism in Cambridge University Press, 2007), 293. 6 exist without war. Yet critics of war as a turn all too easily become untameable factors Colin S. Gray, Defining and Achieving means of settling disputes go back at least to in democracies, as World War I and the inter- Decisive Victory (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 18. pre-Augustinian Christian authors, and indi- war years illustrated, and as we find in the 7 Brian Bond, The Pursuit of Victory from vidual intellectuals have sought to develop rampant nationalism that characterizes inter- Napoleon to Saddam Hussein (Oxford: Oxford concepts to eliminate war. Nuclear weapons state relations on the Indian subcontinent. University Press, 1996). made the pursuit of this aim more pressing All this has practical implications, 8 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.1 (Chicago: than ever before, even to those who recognize many of which find their echo in current University of Chicago, 2011), X.7. that enduring human passions will continue debates about how to achieve “sustainable 9 Hankey, 25 and following. He was critical of to work against rational, let alone humane, security.” It may well be unhelpful to gloat the imposition of unconditional surrender terms solutions to conflicts. over one’s own success or victory. How differ- for Germany and Italy. 10 ent would relations with the Russian Federa- For the Japanese problem, see Rufus Miles, Conclusions tion be today if the West had not gloated over “Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half a Million As long as war continues to exist, and as its “victory” in the Cold War and distributed American Lives Saved,” International Security 10, no. 2 (Fall 1985); Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to long as states upholding the UN’s restrictive medals for it, but instead celebrated the joint Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an rulings on war encounter situations where escape of East and West from the constant American Myth (New York: Knopf, 1995); Dennis they see the inescapable need to resort to threat of World War III as a nuclear dooms- Wainstock, The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb warfare, there will be the question of how to day? Emphasizing postconflict reconciliation (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996). define war aims in such a context. The works is thus likely to be a better model in many 11 François Helm, La Théologie de la Victoire cited at the beginning of this article fell short instances than continuing to humiliate the de Constantin à Théodose (Paris: Beauchesne, of a helpful definition of war aims by divorc- defeated party. That this model would not 1992), 20–26. ing victory, which they continued to see in extend to defeated National Socialism (or to ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 11 Forum | Victory, Peace, and Justice
12 William Charles Korfmacher, “Cicero and 33 Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: the bellum iustum,” Classical Bulletin 48, no. 4 Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Har- (February 1972), 49–52; Silvia Clavadetscher-Thür- court, Brace, 1946), 75. lemann, “Polemon Dikaios und Bellum Iustum: 34 Ibid., 76. Versuch einer Ideengeschichte” (M.S. Ph.D. diss., 35 Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz NEW University of Zurich, 1985), 127–130. (London: Pimlico, 2002), 143–160. from NDU Press 13 John Mark Mattox, Saint Augustine and the 36 Beatrice Heuser, “Victory in a Nuclear War? for the Theory of Just War (London: Continuum, 2006). A Comparison of NATO and WTO War Aims and Center for Strategic Research 14 Immanuel Kant, Zum Ewigen Frieden (Koe- Strategies,” Contemporary European History 7, no. Institute for National Strategic Studies nigsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1795). 3 (November 1998), 311–328. 15 August Rühle von Lilienstern, “Vom 37 Alexander Atkinson, Social Order and the Kriege,” in Apologie des Krieges, 2nd ed. (1818; repr. General Theory of Strategy (Sydney: Law Book S trategic Forum 280 Vienna: Age d’homme-Karolinger, 1984). Company of Australasia, 1981). See also Richard 16 August Rühle von Lilienstern, Handbuch Hobbs, The Myth of Victory: What Is Victory in Russia Still Matters: für den Offizier zur Belehrung im Frieden und zum War? (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979). Strategic Challenges and Gebrauch im Felde, vol. I, in The Strategy Makers, 38 Hankey. Opportunities for the trans. and ed. Beatrice Heuser, 171–190 (Santa Obama Administration Barbara, CA: ABC Clio/Praeger, 2010). 17 By John W. Parker and Polybius, The Histories, V.11, trans. W.R. Michael Kofman Paton, F.W. Walbank, and Christian Habicht (Boston: Harvard University, 2011), 35. 18 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. George Bull (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, Russia’s recent 1961), 122. authoritarian turn 19 Giacomo di Porcia, “Clarissimi viri . . . de re and Putin’s pandering to anti-American militaris liber,” in The preceptes of Warre set forth sentiment have highlighted the obstacles by James the Erle of Purlilia, trans. Peter Betham to a genuine partnership with the United (London: E. Whytchurche, 1544), chap. 66. States, assuring that bilateral relations 20 Raimond de Beccarie de Pavie, Seigneur de will be a lower priority for both nations Fourquevaux, Instructions sur le faict de la Guerre in the next 4 years. Nevertheless, as a key extraictes des livres de Polybe, Frontin, Végèce, Cor- United Nations member, a still formida- nazan, Machiavelle, in The Strategy Makers, 47. ble military and nuclear power, and new 21 Matthew Sutcliffe, “The Practice, Proceed- member of World Trade Organization, ings and Lawes of Armes,” in The Strategy Makers, “Russia still matters,” and the authors 69, 80. find and explore a set of mutual interests 22 Blaise Pascal, Pensées sur la Réligion et and concerns that necessitate pragmatic d’autres sujets, published posthumously (Paris: G. engagement between Washington and Desprez, 1669), item 103–298 (author’s translation). Moscow. In the near term, U.S.-Russian The author is grateful to David Yost for having coordination will be required on the drawn his attention to this and for his comments issues of Syria, Afghanistan, and missile on the article. defense in Europe. On a longer fuse, 23 Paul Hay du Chastelet, “Traite de la Guerre, cooperation will be needed on such ou Politique militaire, ” in The Strategy Makers, 111. topics as the rise of China, security and 24 See “People & Events: General Curtis E. development in the Arctic, and bilateral LeMay (1906–1990),” American Experience, trade and development. In all these available at
12 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Senior Airman practices rifle fighting techniques during Security Forces Combat Readiness Training U.S. Air Force (Allen Stokes) U.S. Air Force
Organization Theories Perspectives on Changing National Security Institutions
By Anthony J. Di Bella
Dr. Anthony J. DiBella is a Visiting Associate Professor of Organizational Behavior at the College of William and Mary. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 13 Forum | Perspectives on Changing National Security Institutions
he study of national defense and both internal and external sources. Internal Organizations as Machines. For international security has long pressures are often caused from budgetary thousands of years, the human species made been a core concern of political constraints and shifts in prevailing doctrine its livelihood outside the context of formal scientists. International and as advocated by different political parties. organizations. Pre-agrarian and agrarian T External pressures have come from the effects interstate security issues fall within a political societies were based on self-sufficiency and context of trends, public pressures, and global of globalization and the resultant rise in independence. As civilization evolved, more interests. It is thus not surprising that when terrorism or, as Samuel Huntington would and more people earned their livelihoods it comes to the development and advocacy claim, the “clash of civilizations.”3 From from and through formal organizations that of particular defense or security strategies, the loudest, or at least the greatest number of voices come from political scientists and not there is no one model of organizations, nor is there a universal from physicists, linguists, or cultural anthro- formula for running effective organizations pologists. Yet as has been argued elsewhere, the conduct of national security is more about organization science; it is through the the buzzword of transformation during the were seen as means to some goal or end much institutions of national security that strate- administration of George W. Bush (as articu- like tools or instruments. Individuals were gies are ultimately implemented and either lated most clearly by Secretary of Defense assigned specific roles or tasks, and the orga- succeed or fail.1 Donald Rumsfeld) to the call for reform just nization was looked at in terms of how these It is one thing to conceive and articulate prior to and now during the administration of pieces fit together like a machine. a defense strategy or an approach to home- President Barack Obama, there always seems Many early practices to manage formal land security; it is quite another to implement to be pressure on the defense establishment to organizations originated in the military. strategy through a complex web of national respond to new circumstances. This is prob- Inspired by the legions of the Roman army and international security institutions and ably why General Martin Dempsey explained and the mechanical inventions of his time, organizations. While the Department of the latest push for reallocating defense expen- Frederick the Great of Prussia (1740–1786) Defense (DOD) may not be a business, as ditures as indicating the need for the military is considered to have developed the modern some would suggest, it is an organization; but to act more like “a learning organization.”4 mechanistic army. This army is character- unfortunately, business theory and organiza- To understand that concept requires some ized by a rigid hierarchical structure and the tion theory are too often equated with one minimal notion of how organizations have standardization of personnel and regulations. another.2 Organization theory is about how been conceived. This article endeavors to shed The individual soldier (worker) had no iden- people every day come together to work for light on such perspectives and help formulate tity apart from his particular role and was some mutual purpose that in the process thoughts about how DOD strategies, regard- subservient to the whole. creates private or public good. less of content, can be better implemented As machines require parts to function Much as there is more than one theory through processes of organizational change. and fit together, organizations need jobs to or school of thought to explain economic be done and coordinated. The function of systems, so too with organizations. One per- O rganization Theories and management is to identify all those jobs and tinent aspect of my years of teaching military Perspectives ensure that people carry out their duties officers at a war college and civilian institu- If leading organizations effectively was as assigned. This orientation led to the tions of higher learning is their singular view a matter of mechanics or science, there would notion of “command and control.” Taken of what organizations are. Perhaps this is due never be a weapons-procurement project that to its extreme, supervisors direct or control to the uniformity of thinking that military went over budget, friendly fire accidents, or a workers to behave in specific ways. Con- training tends to foster, but I suspect it also company that went out of business. All of us tributing to this orientation was Frederick derives from a rather dated view of what orga- have ideas about how organizations operate Taylor, considered the father of what came to nizations are and how they are best managed. and how they should function; there is no one be known as scientific management. Taylor The focus of this article, then, is to explain theory or model of organizations, nor is there thought that work should be studied and that that organizations may be conceived of in a a universal formula for running or com- workers should merely follow what science variety of ways and that this diversity consti- manding effective organizations. dictated they do to maximize efficiency.6 In tutes part of the difficulty in managing insti- How mental images guide us was stable environments where organizational tutions of national security. Besides describing elegantly examined by Kenneth Boulding goals and the means to achieve them are various forms or perspectives of organization in The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society unambiguous or remain unchanged over theory, this article also considers the impli- (1956). More recently, Gareth Morgan used time, efficiency derives from the routiniza- cations for successfully implementing new images and metaphors to describe a range of tion of work. However, the advantages of defense strategies, especially in a globally ways in which people think about organiza- this mechanistic approach to production networked world. This capacity is essential tions—as machines, organisms, cultures, dissipate when new environmental demands as defense leaders continue to confront new brains, and political systems.5 Each reflects emerge (as in different stakeholder or adver- global realities and defense challenges. a way to understand organizations and has sarial challenges). The genesis and pressures to alter implications for how we think organizations Viewing organizations as machines and adapt defense institutions come from can be changed or transformed. means focusing on how well all the parts are
14 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu DiBELLA functioning. Are lines of responsibility and are, their (inter)dependence, and degree of over civil-military (civ-mil) relations is based, communications clear and controlled? Are differentiation. Transforming or reforming in part, on the issue of power and politics. rules and procedures followed? Do workers the national security sector would suggest Transformation suggests change in that (soldiers, sailors) know their jobs and are changing the composition of its subsystems relationship, but constitutional concerns con- they trained to do them? While reform may and/or the relationships among them.9 strain that possibility. If the current distribu- suggest changes in how the machine operates, Organizations as Political Systems. All tion of power within the national security transformation may imply shifts in what the citizens in a democratic society have rights system is the cause and consequence of our machine produces. to participate in the decisions that affect failure to reform or evolve that system, then Organizations as Organisms. A them. What happens to those civic rights how can its key stakeholders produce the second metaphor for organizations relates to when individuals enter the portal of their reforms that are being advocated today?10 what most of us know best as a functioning, workplaces? If individuals had the same set Organizations as Cultures. While organic system: the human body. Its focal of needs and wants, answering that question culture was traditionally used to explain point is not goals or a mission but needs would be easy. Unfortunately, the larger the differences between whole societies, it has and metabolism. To maintain a functioning organization, the more it is apt to employ also become a helpful construct to explain body, we need certain inputs (water, food, individuals with different backgrounds, why every organization is different in some affection), and we need to adapt to our envi- educational levels, and financial needs. way. As organizations accrue experience and ronment (if only to avoid getting too hot or The result is conflict between competing resolve problems, they develop distinctive too cold). Organisms are systems comprised needs and wants, from the manner in which ways of doing things. As cultures, organiza- of various parts, each of which may belong compensation is determined to the processes tions offer their members a framework for to subsystems (for example, the heart and whereby work is assigned. shared meaning and the development of spleen are parts of the body’s circulatory In organizations, power and influence common action. Culture provides stability system), and there are interdependencies come from a variety of sources and may be and comfort and can be a pathway or barrier within and between subsystems. A failure vested in groups of individuals more than to change. Strong or rigid cultures are less apt in one subsystem is apt to lead to failure in with individuals per se. In some situations, to respond effectively to internal or external another. Effectiveness is achieved through groups with shared interests form alliances challenges. On the other hand, changes that the proper coordination and balance among or participate in coalitions to expand their are consistent with dominant assumptions or efficient subsystems. influence even further. Labor unions, for organizational values are readily accepted. As the environment changes, organiza- example, are a traditional way for individu- Culture as a system of meaning estab- tions adapt and the rate of change in the als to assert their civic rights through the lishes boundaries between those who share internal organizational environment needs power of numbers. However powerful in the culture and those who do not. In that to match the rate of change in the external groups form, intergroup conflict may sense, culture can be a source of differentia- environment.7 In effect, internal design must promote helpful competition or destructive tion or integration between those inside, match external complexity. For example, adversarial relationships. outside, or within the organization.11 An special operations forces are easier to deploy and more adaptive to theater conditions than larger conventional forces. the larger the organization, the more it is apt to employ Even as the external environment con- individuals with different backgrounds strains the growth of certain organizations, it may similarly generate certain opportuni- ties.8 For example, the development of the Power can be used to gain control of organization needs mechanisms to accultur- Internet has spawned a new generation of vital resources, set policy, determine orga- ate new members and sustain itself when organizations (Amazon, Google, FaceBook, nizational mission, and control technology. members leave. For example, boot camp is a YouTube) based on entirely new business Whether such control is directed toward defining experience for military personnel models. Of course, these developments institutional or personal purposes will since it transforms a raw recruit into a carrier created new threats to our national security depend on the ethical values of those with of a Service’s core culture. and provided new tools for our adversaries, power, the extent to which personal and insti- If we view national security as a con- but they have also given new life to military tutional goals and objectives are aligned, and stellation of distinct cultures represented forces that deal with asymmetric threats and the presence of checks and balances embod- by the differences between (and within) counterinsurgencies. ied in formalized rules and regulations. If military Services and civilian agencies, then If we view national security organiza- power is too diffuse, an organization faces culture may be more of a force for frag- tions as organisms, then we need to acknowl- the risk that no one has enough influence to mentation than integration. Yet if national edge their subsystems and their needs, the make major decisions or get things done. security professionals, military and civilian, relationships among them, and the processes Transforming or reforming the national share some aspects of culture, reform can be that make the whole system work. Consid- security sector as a system of power suggests expedited if it is predicated on those shared eration should be given to how tightly or altering the relative importance of its differ- values. One key is understanding the valence loosely coupled the subsystems (for example, ent constituencies or the processes whereby of values that promote commonality of military Services and combatant commands) decisions are made. The perpetual dialogue interests among stakeholders versus those ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 15 Forum | Perspectives on Changing National Security Institutions that make them different. For example, all O ther Views of What Organizations apt to hear about “learning cultures” than Americans value individual freedom even Are (or Should Be) “learning organizations.” That may make though they differ about how such freedom Much as human experience evolves, so General Dempsey’s statement a bit dated, but can be ensured. too does the nature of organizations and our it is certainly more contemporary than other Organizations as Brains. Cognitive perceptions of them. The following section views of what DOD is or should become. The functioning is an essential element in making outlines some of the latest thinking about need for continuous learning is also a capac- good decisions. In organizations, all sorts of what organizations are or need to become. ity fundamental to counterinsurgency, as decisions need to be made, from the choice of Organizations as Chaords. When often expressed by General David Petraeus, hiring criteria to selecting work assignments VISA International was established in the its key architect.18 to developing strategy. Organizations are 1970s, it searched for a business model that Organizations as Networks. In clas- systems in which vast amounts of informa- would help it operate in a diverse, fast-paced sical theory, organizations are configured tion and knowledge are processed and used environment in over 200 countries. Dee and designed with particular attention to the for a variety of purposes, not just decision- Hock, its founder, coined the term chaordic vertical relationships between operational making. With the advent of computerized (chaos + order) to refer to any complex, self- units (line functions) and administrative information systems, contemporary organi- organizing, self-governing, adaptive, nonlin- units (staff functions). In contrast, today’s zations have an expanded capacity to process ear system.15 Hock believed that VISA needed networked organizations focus on horizontal and store knowledge. Yet choices still have to to be a chaordic organization, a system that relationships and independent action. By be made about what knowledge needs to be balanced the need for both flexibility and emphasizing the latter, organizational archi- acquired or is worth retaining. Another issue stability. Effective organizational perfor- tects enable decisionmaking at the periphery pertains to who will have access to what insti- mance requires mechanisms to build a shared (cells or nodes) of an organization by tutional knowledge and how that knowledge culture while allowing for adaptation to local deemphasizing the power of a central office is made available. circumstances and shifting environmental whose chief focus becomes coordination The metaphor of the brain implies demands. The breadth of U.S. national rather than control.19 one central repository for knowledge and security operations and the mix of functional Transforming our national security information processing. However, holog- (military Services and civilian agencies) and system as a network would require chang- raphy suggests that brain functioning can geographic units (regional combatant com- ing the number or nature of nodes in that occur at multiple nodes or locations.12 In mands) reflects characteristics of chaords. network and the relationships between effect, knowledge and the capacity to process Organizations as Learning Systems. them.20 That sort of transformation has it can be replicated at different locations. In an article published in the Harvard Busi- already been promoted in the private sector.21 Organizations may have a central office or ness Review in 1988, Arie DeGeus, former The term network-centric warfare encapsu- headquarters, but if knowledge and knowl- chairman of Royal Dutch Shell, made the lates this view within military operations.22 edge processing is replicated elsewhere, then claim that a company’s ability to learn may Each of the brief depictions presented decisions can be made closest to where their be its own sustainable competitive advantage. so far offers one way to understand national impact will be felt. Information exchange has This insight was followed soon thereafter by security organizations, and each has implica- been characterized as having the properties Peter Senge’s breakthrough book The Fifth tions for transformation or reform in the of “stickiness” in that barriers to knowledge Discipline, and the search for the learning national security sector and how it can be flow and application can constrain the effec- organization was on.16 However, subsequent expedited. Table 1 lists each of the eight tiveness of any system.13 research has suggested that all organizations, metaphors and their associated goal or focal If we view the national security system including the military, are learning systems.17 point. For example, the key issue or concern as a collective brain, then its capabilities This view suggests that transformation in a machine is efficiency, while for an organ- would be represented by the information, requires changing learning capabilities to ism it is stability. knowledge, and intelligence it acquires, meet current security challenges. Of course, retains, disseminates, and uses. Transforma- time marches on, and now we are much more tion suggests changes in any one of these processes or in the nature of the informa- tion itself. For example, today’s asymmetric Table 1. Organizational Theory Images threats could be responded to more effec- Image Goal/Focus tively if knowledge processing was handled Machine Achieving maximum efficiency on a more localized basis with less depen- Organism Maintaining stability dence on the Pentagon or the Central Intel- Political System Gaining control ligence Agency. An interagency approach would consider how information processing Culture Propagating values could best be coordinated across a diverse set Brain Storing and accessing knowledge of organizational actors.14 Chaord Balancing integration and differentiation Learning Organization Self-realization Network Distributed resources and command
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T he Challenge of Ongoing Change in Table 2. Types of Images with Characteristics Military Affairs Type Image Lever Progress A major dilemma for DOD is that Evolution - Machine Adaptation Cumulative it is faced with managing a continuous process to integrate new technologies, all - Brain the way from the slingshot of Biblical days Lifecycle - Organism Growth over time Linear stages to the drone aircraft of today. That process - Culture often requires fundamental changes in how Dialectic - Political Conflict Synthesis military personnel think about and execute System strategy. Even as the technology of battle Teleology - Chaord Collaboration Movement toward evolves, and with it the organizational structures that support it, so does the role - Learning goal Organization of the military in society. With the recent trend toward democratization, especially in - Network the Middle East, the challenge of reform is not a matter of simply integrating new tech- nologies but adapting the military to the One commonly understood change are cultures, then how do the protocols in current environment of political realities. In process is evolution. Much as it has been used the military reflect fundamental cultural discussing the prerequisites for democracy to describe the development of species, it can assumptions? The role of DOD has been to today, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri be used to classify organizational change. take action to deter our foes or, failing that, acknowledge the historical revolution in The evolutionary cycle of change is precipi- to wage war against them. Nowadays, the military affairs in Multitude.23 In doing tated by the competition for resources and military is being asked to serve as “nation- so, they point out that military reform is the adaptation between internal and external builders,” which can be viewed as trans- guided by historical theories of war and characteristics. Change is cumulative and formational, compared to the image of the battle, but there is a shortage of theory or progressive as organizations become more military as a “warfighting machine.” guiding principles when considering how adapted and less adaptable. The closer a military command is to the to manage the military’s evolving role in A fourth and final type of change field of execution, the greater the concern for today’s democratic societies.24 theory is dialectic based on the Hegelian efficiency and machine-like or mechanistic- This shortcoming is exacerbated by the notion of ongoing conflict between thesis like functioning. However, the greater the capacity to see and understand organizations and antithesis leading to synthesis. As the role of the command in the development of in the multiple ways already described. When relative power of organizational actors shifts strategy, the more organic-like its features it comes to changing organizations, indi- and arguments for one thesis or another must be. Once a war starts, it is impossible to viduals also have different views about what win out, the opportunity for change arises. know what course it will take and what the change is, whether it is classified as transfor- Conflict resolution begets change, but the results will be. That need, to acknowledge mational, incremental, or reform, and how it outcome may lead to worsening rather than how ambiguity will always be an element of can be managed or achieved. Theories on the improved performance. military operations, is what Robert NcNa- processes of organizational change have been mara conveyed with his “fog of war” meta- characterized as four types: lifecycle, evolu- Implications phor.26 Unfortunately, at the highest levels of tion, dialectic, and teleology.25 Table 2 shows Changing or reforming our national strategy formulation, the drive to eliminate how various characteristics of the theories security apparatus is an imposing challenge uncertainty can lead to incorrect inferences. described above match up against these four given this theoretical potpourri. On the one Winning wars may take precision to types of change theory. hand, there are theories about what organiza- put ordnance on a target with fixed GPS Lifecycle theories focus on stage tions are, and on the other there is a typology coordinates, but many demands placed on development based on changes caused about how and why organizations change. our national security apparatus require by organic growth. Whether prompted Yet as shown in table 2, there is some cor- working with and within a shifting envi- by external or environmental change or respondence between the two. For example, ronment. Organic rather than mechanistic internal factors, change is an inevitable for organisms and cultures, change is linear metaphors or images would seem better outcome of time and experience. Change and prompted by developmental growth that suited for these challenges. That perhaps is processes are linear and irreversible. is characteristic of lifecycle theories. one of the key reasons for the introduction of Change may also be framed as teleol- Developing implications from these network-centric warfare into the battlespace. ogy guided by a desirable result, outcome, theoretical orientations for implementing What remains to be seen is how such an or purpose. How an entity moves or change might best proceed via a series of approach can mesh with or within traditional changes and progresses toward that result questions. First, when you think of some command and control structures. is not preordained through some prescrip- branch of the military, what images arise Ensuring national security today tive set of steps. Goals may shift over time in your mind and how do those images requires interagency operations, or what has prompting new periods of change, reform, shape your thinking about one Service been referred to as a whole-of-government or transformation. versus another? If military organizations approach.27 Reform requires not only changing ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 17 Forum | Perspectives on Changing National Security Institutions individual organizations but also changing are decentralized or embedded in a network Lao Tzu), so too are there multiple ways to a network of organizations and the relation- structure?31 As J.M. Kreighbaum suggests, think about organizations. To what extent are ships between them. That requirement is DOD needs to free itself from policies that military and national security leaders aware bound to be difficult when our network of reinforce mechanistic metaphors or images of of the organizational images they carry and national security organizations seems like its organization.32 their implications? What models, paradigms, an organized anarchy.28 As suggested by When civilians enter the military, or theories do they hold with regard to how change theories based on teleology, progress they are trained (some might say socialized) such organizations are changed? When can be made by slow movement toward the to execute orders and not ask questions. senior DOD managers think about and run their operations like a military machine, it should not come as a surprise when they do the change process should not be to reach development stages not operate that way. The bureaucratic nature but to enable incremental steps of a public organization such as the Pentagon provides a sharp contrast with command and control operations in the field of battle. whole-of-government approach currently Execution is expedited when assumptions Both the opacity and multiplicity of advocated. The change process should not are not challenged or tested, and that is a organization theory contribute to the chal- be to reach development stages but to enable good thing when one is facing an adversary lenge of working in an interagency or joint incremental steps. ready to kill him. The training that mili- environment. It is best to recognize that in For example, it is one thing for the U.S. tary personnel receive to standardize their those contexts military leaders and civilian Army to support a battalion or brigade in a responses to combat situations creates a managers will have diverse and potentially specific theater of war, but it is quite another uniformity of mental models and constrains contradictory views about what organizations to manage a joint command or an organiza- seeing the world from multiple perspectives. are and how they can be changed. Many of tion based at the Pentagon or nested in a Uniformity of thinking is more justifiable at us are barely aware of our own theories much coalition. The more diverse the set of organi- the tactical level, but at the strategic or flag less those held by our counterparts who lead zations involved in some coalition, the more officer level, it is counterproductive. If all staff other organizations in an interagency or joint difficult it is to coordinate them. However, officers within a command think alike, their context. JFQ the ease of using common images to compare commander has to work with redundancy. and contrast organizations demonstrates The question remains as to what images that organizations do have a lot in common. will best fit national security organizations in The author thanks Dr. J. Douglas Orton for Perhaps when Arthur Cebrowski explained an age that contains both evolving asymmet- his comments and suggestions on an earlier transformation in terms of changes in beliefs, ric threats and the potential for traditional version of this article. attitudes, and cognition, he referred to the threats. Do we shift from a machine to a ability to work with different types of organi- network or do we alter the properties of the Ns ote zations simultaneously.29 machine? Either way generates change, but In a speech at the U.S. Military one could argue that only the former repre- 1 Steven Kelman, “Organization Studies and Academy at West Point, former Secretary of sents true transformation. The larger ques- Public Administration,” in The Academy of Man- Defense Robert Gates stated that “in order to tion is how we make such a transformation. agement Annals, ed. James P. Walsh and Arthur succeed in the asymmetric battlefields of the Given the political context of our national Brief, 225–267 (New York: Routledge, 2007); James 21st century—the dominant combat environ- security apparatus, a dialectic framing of the D. Orton with Christopher J. Lamb, “Interagency ment in the decades to come, in my view— task ahead seems appropriate. That means National Security Teams: Can Social Science Con- our Army will require leaders of uncommon enlarging our capacity to resolve conflict. tribute?” PRISM 2, no. 2 (March 2011), 47–64. 2 agility, resourcefulness, and imagination; While the Project on National Security Milan Vego, “Is the Conduct of War a Busi- th leaders willing and able to think and act Reform provided a vision of where we need to ness?” Joint Force Quarterly 59 (4 Quarter 2010), 57–65. creatively and decisively in a different kind of go, the challenge remains how to get there.33 3 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civiliza- world, in a different kind of conflict than we In our pluralistic society governed by a politi- tions and the Remaking of World Order (New York: 30 have prepared for the last six decades.” cal system comprised of checks and balances, Simon and Schuster, 2007). Metaphoric thinking is a way to radical and discontinuous change is highly 4 Interview on Face the Nation, January 8, promote creativity and understand national unlikely. Perhaps military transformation 2012. security organizations (and those of our sounds too daunting a task so we no longer 5 Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization adversaries) from multiple perspectives. hear of it. Although reforming national secu- (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1986); Creative Orga- This is not to promote or advocate for any rity seems more palatable and less challeng- nization Theory: A Resourcebook (Newbury Park, one perspective but to incorporate multiple ing, it remains on the periphery. CA: Sage, 1989); and Imaginization: New Mindsets perspectives into our mental models. If The key takeaway from this article for Seeing, Organizing, and Managing (Newbury our generals view (and treat) our military should be a recognition that much as there Park, CA: Sage, 1997). 6 Frederick E. Taylor, Principles of Scientific Services as machines, how can we effectively is more than one mindset about warfare and Management (New York: Harper & Row, 1911). respond to asymmetric threats and adversar- how to beat the enemy (as typified by the ies whose command and control functions classical thinkers Carl von Clausewitz and
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7 Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, 23 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Mul- Organization and Environment (Cambridge, MA: titude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire Harvard Graduate School of Business Administra- (New York: Penguin, 2004). tion, 1967). 24 Ibid., 47. 8 For information on the field of population 25 Andrew H. van de Ven and Marshall Scott NEW ecology, see Michael T. Hannan and John H. Poole, “Explaining Development and Change in from NDU Press Freeman, “The Population Ecology of Organiza- Organizations,” Academy of Management Review for the tions,” American Journal of Sociology 82 (1977), 20 (1995), 510–540. Center for Strategic Research 26 929–964. James G. Blight, The Fog of War: Lessons Institute for National Strategic Studies 9 James R. Locher, “National Security Reform: from the Life of Robert S. McNamara (New York: A Prerequisite for Successful Complex Opera- Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). tions,” PRISM 1, no. 1 (December 2009), 77–86. 27 Locher. S trategic Perspectives, No. 13 10 28 Ibid. Michael D. Cohen and James G. March, The New NATO 11 Donna Winslow, “Military Organization Leadership and Ambiguity, 2nd ed. (Boston: Policy Guidelines on and Culture from Three Perspectives: The Case Harvard Business School, 1986). Counterterrorism: of Army,” in Social Sciences and the Military: An 29 Arthur K. Cebrowski, “Transforming Trans- Analysis, Interdisciplinary Overview, ed. Giuseppe Caforio, formation,” Transformation Trends (Arlington, Assessments, and 67–88 (New York: Routledge, 2007). VA: Office of Force Transformation, April 19, Actions 12 Ken Wilber, ed., The Holographic Paradigm 2004). and Other Paradoxes: Exploring the Leading Edge 30 Robert M. Gates, speech delivered at the U.S. By Stefano of Science (Boulder, CO: Shambhala, 1982). Military Academy, West Point, NY, April 21, 2008. Santamato with 13 Gabriel Szulanski and Rossella Cappetta, 31 Delphine Resteigne and Joseph Soeters, Marie-Theres “Stickiness: Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Pre- “Managing Militarily,” Armed Forces & Society 35 Beumler dicting Difficulties in the Transfer of Knowledge (2009), 307–322. within Organizations,” in The Blackwell Handbook 32 Jay M. Kreighbaum, Busting DoD Bureau- On September 12, 2001, the North Atlantic of Organizational Learning and Knowledge Man- cracy: Creating Fundamental Change by Leveraging Treaty Organization (NATO), for the first time agement, ed. Mark Easterby-Smith and Marjorie Concepts and Practices from the Private Sector in its history, invoked the Article 5 collective A. Lyles, 513–534 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003). (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2002). defense clause after terrorist attacks on the 14 Locher. 33 Project on National Security Reform United States. In the 11 years since, NATO used 15 Dee Hock, Birth of the Chaordic Age (San (PNSR), Forging a New Shield (Washington, DC: a pragmatic approach to fight terrorism, but the Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2000). PNSR, December 2008). impact of this approach was mitigated by the lack 16 See Arie P. DeGeus, “Planning as Learning,” of an agreed policy defining NATO’s rightful Harvard Business Review, March–April, 1988, place among counterterrorism actors. It was not 70–74; and Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The until May 2012 that NATO agreed on a policy to Art and Practice of the Learning Organization define its role and mandate in countering terror- (New York: Doubleday, 1990). ism. In this study, the authors review the evolu- 17 Anthony J. DiBella, “Can the Army Become tion of the terrorist threat, NATO’s response, a Learning Organization? A Question Re-Exam- and the new policy guidelines themselves, which ined,” Joint Force Quarterly 56 (1st Quarter 2010), focus on NATO’s strengths of intelligence- 117–122. sharing, capacity-building, special operations, 18 Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency training, and technology. But the guidelines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). are only a necessary first step. The challenge is 19 Marc S. Gerstein, “From Machine Bureau- to define an Action Plan to implement them. cracies to Networked Organizations: An Archi- Toward this end, the authors recommend six tectural Journey,” in Organizational Architecture, cross-cutting proposals: apply net assessment, ed. David A. Nadler, 11–38 (San Francisco: Jossey- develop counterterrorism strategic communica- Bass, 1992). tions, establish a homeland security constituency 20 Erik J. de Waard and Joseph Soeters, “How in NATO, promote a border security initiative, the Military Can Profit from Management and develop a “functional” counterterrorism partner- Organization Science,” in Social Sciences and ship framework, and contribute to the Global the Military: An Interdisciplinary Overview, ed. Counterterrorism Forum. Giuseppe Caforio, 181–196 (New York: Routledge, 2007). 21 C.K. Prahalad and H. Bhattacharyya, “Twenty Hubs and No HQ,” strategy+business enews, February 26, 2008, 1–6, available at
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 19 Forum | Crowdsourcing for the Intelligence Community
President Obama departs evening campaign rally in Dubuque, Iowa, November 3, 2012
The White House (Pete Souza)
Goldcorp Crowdsourcing An Industry Best Practice for the Intelligence Community?
By Jesse Roy Wilson
Jesse Roy Wilson is a Defense Intelligence Agency Senior Intelligence Officer with U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida. He is currently working on a Master’s degree at the National Intelligence University in Washington, DC.
20 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu WILSON
growing number of businesses McEwen wondered if he could use the same and capability. In doing so he stumbled suc- use crowdsourcing—that is, model with the gold mine. cessfully into the future of innovation, busi- they outsource tasks to people Back at Goldcorp, McEwen pitched his ness, and how wealth and just about every- A outside the organization1—in idea to take “all of our geology, all the data we thing else will be created. Welcome to the new a way that harnesses the capabilities and have that goes back to 1948, and put it into world of wikinomics where collaboration on knowledge of external individuals on a mass a file and share it with the world . . . [and] a mass scale is set to change every institution scale to create innovative solutions. This ask the world to tell us where we’re going to in society.9 article describes how Goldcorp, Incorpo- find the next six million ounces of gold.”4 He rated, an international gold-mining company experienced some resistance. For example, Like Goldcorp, the Intelligence Com- on the brink of collapse, used crowdsourcing the information that McEwen wanted to munity could embrace crowdsourcing via the Internet to turn its business around. The article then explores some challenges and successes behind crowdsourcing initiatives the company posted its entire repository of and offers crowdsourcing as an approach information on its Web site and offered $575,000 to with applicability for the Intelligence Com- participants with the best methods munity (IC).
Goldcorp make public was proprietary. A mining to tap into the knowledge and expertise In Wikinomics, Don Tapscott, a company had never made this information outside of its boundaries when appropri- Canadian business executive and one of public before.5 Second, the geologists were ate. To explore this possibility, we need to Thinkers50’s most influential management concerned how the message would reflect understand how crowdsourcing works and thinkers, works with coauthor Anthony D. on their reputations, which essentially told its benefits and risks. Williams to describe how Goldcorp turned everyone—including their competitors—that its struggling 1950s gold-mining company they were unable to find the gold. Neverthe- Crowdsourcing into a multimillion dollar success.2 Head- less, McEwen prevailed, and in March 2000 Crowdsourcing is a portmanteau that quartered in Vancouver, British Columbia, he launched the “Goldcorp Challenge,” the refers to outsourcing tasks from within an Goldcorp employs 14,000 people who operate world’s first Internet gold rush.6 organization to people outside the organiza- 10 mines in Canada, the United States, The idea was simple. The company tion.10 The term originated in 2006 from a Mexico, and Central and South America. In posted its entire repository of information Wired magazine article in which Jeff Howe the 1990s, the company was struggling with on the 55,000-acre Red Lake property on its modified the term outsourcing to describe a high production costs, debt, and strikes. The Web site and offered $575,000 to participants business model using the Internet workforce new chief executive officer, Rob McEwen, with the best methods and estimates. More without the need for a traditional outsourc- was new to the gold-mining business, serving than 1,000 participants from 50 countries ing company.11 A variety of other terms are previously as a young mutual fund manager registered for the challenge with submissions used to describe similar activity, such as open at Merrill Lynch.3 Goldcorp analysts pro- coming from graduate students, consultants, access, open innovation, open source, and jected the death of a 50-year-old mine in Red mathematicians, physicists, and military collective intelligence. Over the last decade, Lake, Ontario. Without discovery of new gold officers. “There were capabilities I had never a number of successful companies have deposits, the company seemed likely to go seen before in the industry,” stated McEwen. incorporated this approach. Proctor and down with it. Contestants identified 110 potential sites, half Gamble uses crowdsourcing to support up to McEwen held an emergency meeting of which were new to the company, and 80 50 percent of its innovations, helping produce with his geologists and made the decision percent of them yielded substantial quantities such products as Mr. Clean Magic Eraser and to send them with $10 million to find gold of gold, eventually totaling 8 million ounces. Pringles Prints.12 Other examples include on the Red Lake property. Weeks later, the The company estimates that the challenge Affinnova, Amazon, Bell Canada’s I.D.ah!, geologists returned with good news. They saved 3 years of exploration time, and in 2001 Delicious, Dell’s IdeaStorm, Digg, Goldcorp, had discovered gold deposits; however, they revenues increased 170 percent, cash flow Google, IBM, InnoCentive, Kimberly Clark, were unable to estimate the value and deter- grew 1,180 percent, and profits soared from Kraft, LG Electronics, ManyEyes, Marketoc- mine the exact location of the gold. During a $2 million to $52 million.7 racy, Reckitt Benckiser, Salesforce.com’s Idea Massachusetts Institute of Technology con- The company awarded the top four Exchange, Swivel, Threadless, and Unilever.13 ference in 1999, McEwen listened intently to “virtual explorers” a shared prize of $325,000, A key difference, however, between crowd- a presentation on the production of the Linux and 25 semifinalists prizes totaled $250,000.8 sourcing and open innovation in general is computer operating system using volunteer As Wikinomics ends its story about Goldcorp: that crowdsourcing typically uses some kind software developers to “crowdsource” its of incentive or reward for the work.14 development over the Internet. The com- McEwen . . . realized the uniquely qualified The most well-known crowdsourcing pany’s chief architect and software engineer, minds to make new discoveries were probably Web site is Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.15 Linus Torvalds, disclosed the company’s soft- outside the boundaries of his organization, The site gives businesses and developers ware code publically so anonymous develop- and by sharing some intellectual property he access to 250,000 on-demand workers. ers could review it and make improvements. could harness the power of collective genius Requestors post jobs and workers choose ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 21 Forum | Crowdsourcing for the Intelligence Community U.S. Coast Guard (Ayla Kelley) (Ayla U.S. Coast Guard
Admiral Thad Allen provides a briefing to the Unified Area Command in New Orleans in response to BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill
the jobs they want for the money offered. at the University of California Berkeley, Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, public One highly cited example was the attempt used his seminal Expert Political Judgment and private parties launched Web sites and to use Mechanical Turk to find the crash to publish 20 years of research on human wikis to garner ideas from the public about site of American entrepreneur and aviator prediction capabilities, using more than how to stop the oil flowing from the sea Steve Fossett, who went missing in his plane 20,000 forecasts. His research concludes floor. Volunteers submitted approximately between the Sierra Nevada Mountains and that experts have no more forecasting skill 20,000 suggestions on the United States the Nevada desert. Although the effort did than nonexperts. The best forecasters were Deepwater Horizon Unified Command Web not find the crash site, an estimated 50,000 moderate along the ideological spectrum, site.24 However, as Euchner points out, most people looked for Fossett’s plane by review- skeptical of grand schemes, and more likely of the submissions were “notional” and ing two million snapshots of commercial to consider contradictory evidence and lacked real potential. Moreover, it required imagery covering 17,000 square miles.16 hypotheses and hedge on their probabilities vast resources to weed through all the Wikipedia, the world’s largest encyclopedia, when making bets.19 information. is another example of crowdsourcing. It has Although there are challenges to over four million articles (and growing) Challenges crowdsourcing, there are certain conditions produced, edited, and reviewed by volun- The director of innovation and policy that make success more likely. As we saw teers. Their reward is simply the satisfaction at the European branch of RAND, Joanna with Goldcorp and Mechanical Turk, given that their work is instantly available to the Chataway, stated, “We have seen plenty of the right circumstances, companies can world. Tara Behrend, an organizational anecdotal evidence that crowdsourcing can accomplish more by opening their work to sciences professor at The George Washing- work, but there has been little research into the masses than relying only on company ton University, states that one unrealized how and where it works best.”20 Indeed, orga- workers. In The Wisdom of Crowds, James benefit of using crowdsourcing over the nizations must use caution when launching Surowiecki provides four conditions that Internet for research is the potential to crowdsourcing initiatives to ensure that they enable the aggregate decisions of large groups reach a wider and more diverse audience to do not harm the image of the company and to make better judgments than experts: solve a common research challenge.17 that they strike the right balance between There is a growing interest in harness- diversity and expertise, offer the right incen- ■■ diversity of opinion ing crowds to tap the collective intelligence tives, and determine up front who has intel- ■■ independence (avoids groupthink) of the masses, experts and nonexperts alike, lectual rights over the information.21 ■■ decentralization (so individuals can to forecast events. Known as prediction For example, the coach of a Finnish draw on local and tacit knowledge) markets, these initiatives typically pose soccer club crowdsourced the recruitment ■■ aggregation (using a mechanism to time-bound questions or statements (for of players and game tactics to the team’s turn individual information into collective example, Barack Obama’s 2012 reelection) fans via cell phone voting.22 The season judgments).25 to users in a market, allowing individuals to ended in disaster and the owners fired the buy and sell contracts based on what they coach. James Euchner, a vice president at The Finnish soccer fans, for example, likely believe will happen.18 The idea of dilettantes Goodyear, argues that many online crowd- lacked the diversity of opinion and tacit beating experts in certain situations has sourcing initiatives are underdeveloped and knowledge required to determine recruit- some merit. Phillip Tetlock, a professor unsuccessful.23 For instance, during the ment or game tactics.
22 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu WILSON
Applicability to the Intelligence 2008 NIC report Global Trends 2025 included for decisionmakers to have more questions Community American and non-American contributions on more issues and to direct those questions Like Goldcorp, the Intelligence Com- through conferences, commissioned studies, to the IC. Given the right circumstances munity (IC) deals with sensitive information and for the first time through a special Web and intelligence issues, the IC can adopt this and challenging problems. IC assessments site to allow comments on drafts.32 industry best practice to take advantage of establish what is known, unknown, and Embracing expertise wherever it resides the talent, expertise, and knowledge available where developments might be heading. The is an increasing requirement. Just in the across the globe to solve some of the most IC continues to monitor traditional issues last year, the Defense Advanced Research perplexing problems related to U.S. national such as the capabilities and intentions of Projects Agency launched a crowdsourc- security, generating additional capacity to nation-states, but it is now responsible for ing challenge to build an amphibious tank, deliver decision advantage to the Nation’s assessing a growing number of nontradi- offering $1 million.33 However, the IC has not policymakers. JFQ tional topics, such as health threats, resource attempted a crowdsourcing effort of its own. scarcity, and even global climate change.26 Building on the DNI directive on analytic Former Deputy Director of National Intelli- outreach and the work of Global Trends Ns ote gence (DNI) for Analysis and National Intel- 2025, the IC could conduct a pilot program 1 Adapted from Clare Sansom, “The Power of ligence Council (NIC) Chairman Thomas and crowdsource an intelligence problem to Many,” Nature Biotechnology 29, no. 3 (2011), 201. Fingar points to the expanding issues in IC the world over the Internet. It could identify A portmanteau is a combination of two or more threat assessments as evidence of the expand- existing outreach initiatives and establish a words into one new word. 27 ing agenda. For example, the IC’s 1996 framework to clear certain intelligence topics 2 Unless referenced otherwise, this section Annual Threat Assessment covered China, for public crowdsourcing initiatives. Like relies on Don Tapscott and Anthony D. Williams, North Korea, Russia, Iran, a few unstable Goldcorp, the DNI or NIC would review Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes states, terrorism, proliferation, narcotics, agency proposals and host the Internet site to Everything (New York: Penguin Group, 2010), crime, and economics.28 In 2012, however, the pose intelligence challenges with some type 7–10. 3 threat assessment included all of the above of incentive or reward. Contestants would Linda Tischler, “He Struck Gold on the intelligence topics plus an extended list of register so the IC could establish contacts and Net (Really),” Fast Company, May 31, 2002, available at In 2007, the DNI published a directive Wikimedia Commons (Chuhern Hwang) on analytic outreach, defined as the “open, overt, and deliberate act of an IC analyst engaging with an individual outside the IC to explore ideas and alternative perspectives, gain new insights, generate new knowledge, or obtain new information.”31 Acknowledg- ing the need for the IC to expand its knowl- edge base and share burdens, the new policy directs analysts to tap outside expertise, IC elements to establish an analytic outreach coordinator, and the IC to use outside experts whenever possible. The preparation of the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 23 Forum | Crowdsourcing for the Intelligence Community Goldcorp_%28GG%29/Data/Gross_Profit/1999/ mittee on Intelligence,” February 2, 2012, available Q4>; and Goldcorp, Inc. at 24 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu U.S. Marine Corps (Tyler J. Bolken) U.S. Marine Corps (Tyler Marine Corps Drill Instructors train enlistees currently part of delayed entry program in Arrowhead Meadows Park, Chandler, Arizona Fostering Constructive Dialogue on Military Sexual Assault By Lindsay L. Rodman t a press conference in January the number, but it does state the number is of a survey of 10,029 Active-duty female 2012, Secretary of Defense based on data from the Defense Manpower Servicemembers and 14,000 Active-duty Leon Panetta stated that he Data Center 2010 Workplace and Gender male Servicemembers. The survey itself is estimates there were 19,000 Relations Survey.3 Perhaps more importantly, forthright and explicit about the numbers it A 1 sexual assaults in the military in 2011. That the report does not refer to 19,000 sexual produces and its methodology. The sample number is derived from a statement in the assaults, but rather 19,000 reports by indi- size and sample composition necessarily Department of Defense (DOD) Annual viduals of unwanted sexual contact. make extrapolation military-wide prob- Report on Sexual Assault in the Military, The Defense Manpower Data Center lematic. The sample was clearly weighted Fiscal Year 2010.2 The report does not actu- 2010 survey never uses the number 19,000. toward female responses, and the definition ally explain its methodology for arriving at Rather, the document relays the results of unwanted sexual contact did not align at all with the colloquial understanding or any statutory or legal definition of sexual assault. Captain Lindsay L. Rodman, USMC, is a Judge Advocate currently stationed at Judge Advocate Division, Nevertheless, the number 19,000 arose as Headquarters Marine Corps. an extrapolation from the numbers in this ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 25 Forum | Fostering Dialogue on Military Sexual Assault sampling, and this number has pervaded the victions are simply not achievable in many and setting realistic expectations, as well as media discussion ever since.4 Most practi- of these cases. providing counseling and resources to accus- tioners of justice and criminal investigators Clear-cut accusations against perpetra- ers. We should not be revictimizing victims throughout the military should agree that tors that can be proven in court because an by convincing them that the criminal justice the figure cited by Secretary Panetta is unre- investigation yielded admissible and persua- system is an appropriate forum for adjudica- alistically high. sive evidence will almost always result in a tion, requiring them to undergo scrutiny and Inconsistent definitions and an inabil- guilty plea. Savvy defense attorneys under- multiple rounds of interviews, testimony, and ity to delve into problem definition and stand when the cards are stacked against the cross examination only to result in acquittals problem framing have plagued discussions of accused,8 and they will likely advise their that appear to be referenda on the victim’s sexual misconduct in the military since the clients to accept a plea negotiation. The dif- credibility, integrity, and character. days of the Tailhook scandal.5 Now, renewed ficult cases that cause consternation are the For better or worse, commanders have pressure on military commanders has been closer calls. attempted to accommodate public pressure to sparked by an uptick in media attention resulting from Secretary Panetta’s statement as well as a new documentary6 and a lawsuit sound bites and platitudes have detracted filed against DOD and Navy leadership.7 from the ability to engage in thoughtful conversation Civilian and uniformed military leader- about the actual problem ship has tended to react to inflammatory stories and inflated numbers without taking a thoughtful, deliberate, and measured There are many meritorious and pros- prosecute in these cases. The accusation that approach to the problem. Attention to these ecutable accusations of sexual assault in the commanders do not take these cases seriously matters comes from a genuine desire to make military. However, this issue has not been is completely unfounded. The truth is quite change for the better, but it is not always treated carefully or with precision. Sound the opposite; commanders feel hamstrung guided by rational and well-founded infor- bites and platitudes have detracted from the to prosecute sexual assaults to the fullest, mation. In more recent months, Members of ability to engage in thoughtful conversation regardless of the possibility of success at trial. Congress have petitioned DOD to acquiesce about the actual problem and have therefore Political pressure from victims’ rights groups to a human rights inquiry, provide relevant prevented thoughtful proposals for solutions. have created an environment in which Ser- testimony, and most recently to establish a This article aims to illuminate where the vicemembers are no longer presumed inno- commission to review this problem. While conversation has faltered. cent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable further study is often warranted, there has The problem plaguing the military is doubt, which is a constitutional travesty. frequently been a rush to find a solution the desire—from commentators, the media, Public complaints that the military does not without properly defining the problem. Congress, and even military leadership—for take sexual assault seriously have prompted Over time, due in part to political this situation to be a zero-sum game. Either overprosecution in cases that would likely not pressure, DOD has attacked this sophisti- the victim is telling the truth, in which case a go to trial in the civilian world. This creates cated problem, framed in the wrong way, conviction should be obtained, or the victim a vicious cycle of acquittals in the court- by simplistically overprosecuting. Current is lying. If a conviction is not obtained, the martial system, continuing to compound an leadership struggles under public pressure victim will often complain that he or she was optics problem in the military. to address sexual assault numbers by imple- not heard, was not taken seriously, or was Empirically, we have more victims menting increasingly draconian policies made out to be a liar. than we have criminally convicted offend- and sending more military Servicemembers Military justice practitioners often see ers. This result is actually an appropriate accused of sexual assault through the court- victims who experience real trauma as the outcome. There are sexual encounters that martial process. Secretary Panetta stated result of a sexual encounter, but who would result in trauma and produce victims, yet during his January 18 press conference that never be able to achieve a conviction in any at the same time do not rise to the level the reason prosecutions are not successful criminal justice system against the person of criminality or provability that a rape is due in part to insufficient evidence and with whom they had sex. A traumatic sexual or sexual assault charge in a felony court “aggressiveness” from prosecutors. As a encounter may not necessarily be a crimi- would require for conviction. result, DOD leadership has become increas- nal sexual assault. The inability to obtain This article proposes a new lens ingly frustrated by the lack of results. By a conviction in many of these cases is not through which to view sexual misconduct seeking to prosecute anyone accused of the fault of the commander, prosecutor, or allegations. Civilian colleges and universities sexual assault without understanding the military justice system. Rather, it is a problem have dealt with sexual misconduct allegations source of the underlying problem, leaders of expectation and misunderstanding about for as long as the military has, and there are are actually contributing to the same cycle the capabilities of a criminal justice system. lessons to be learned from their experiences of acquittals they seek to avoid. Criminal Instead of blaming the military for not taking and practices. After explaining the problem prosecution is not the answer to resolving these allegations seriously,9 we should be with a prosecution-focused approach, this many of these reports. Overprosecution fostering a more constructive conversation article proposes a new approach to under- only perpetuates the problem because con- about prosecutorial discretion, alternative standing how we can have victims in cases accountability measures where appropriate, where convictions are inappropriate. 26 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu RODMAN U.S. Marines with Lima Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, conduct census patrol in Sangin, Afghanistan, January 2011 U.S. Marine Corps (Dexter S. Saulisbury) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 27 Forum | Fostering Dialogue on Military Sexual Assault N onprosecutable Sexual Assault she could only have blacked out—her point women are sexually assaulted during their Allegations of intoxication would not have been enough tenure in school.16 Consider the following hypothetical: for her to pass out.13 PFC Lamb and Pvt The Duke Lacrosse scandal of 2006 two Marines, one male and one female, drink Peterson acknowledged that they had sex is instructive on this point. It was an to the point of intoxication at a party. They but stated that it was consensual. Given the attempted civilian prosecution of college retire to a barracks room and proceed to victim’s memory lapse, there is no way to students for rape in a he-said-she-said sce- have sex. The next day, the female Marine know whether the sex was consensual. Both nario. Part of the reason the case achieved reports a sexual assault. There are no helpful cases resulted in convictions at the trial so much notoriety was its uniqueness. Aside witnesses. The male Marine explains that he level, but the Navy–Marine Corps Court of from the Duke case, prosecutors rarely believed the sex was consensual. Criminal Appeals reversed the convictions attempt to achieve a conviction in a civilian The criminal justice system—both the based on the toxicology evidence. court in cases arising from this context. civilian and military systems—would most Many attorneys interpret Lamb and Moreover, in the Duke case, prosecutor likely not produce a criminal conviction, nor Peterson to create a black out/pass out dis- Michael Nifong eventually lost his bar should we want it to. Constitutionally, the tinction in courts-martial. The previous license for prosecutorial misconduct due to his overreaching as the case fell apart.17 Most civilian prosecutors are ethical finders of fact will often find reasonable doubt if and understand the limitations of the crimi- they can only consider an incomplete story nal justice system and thus routinely decline to prosecute these cases. Instead, colleges and universities have developed a variety accused may only be convicted of a crime if version of Article 120 of the Uniform Code of of administrative forums and procedures it has been proven, beyond any reasonable Military Justice (UCMJ)14 defined aggravated for addressing these matters. Alternative doubt, that he or she committed a crime. sexual assault as a sexual act committed dispute resolution, disciplinary boards, and There is often (but certainly not always) against the victim by placing the victim in honor boards are just a few of the standard inherent reasonable doubt in a “he-said-she- fear, causing bodily harm, or committing the answers to this problem. Higher education said” scenario. Alcohol contributes to reason- act while the victim was “substantially inca- institutions have learned over time that the able doubt by making stories less plausible. If pacitated.” Anecdotally, substantial incapaci- criminal justice system cannot provide a we encourage conviction in that case without tation is the most frequently charged type of solution for the standard he-said-she-said more facts, we are infringing on the constitu- aggravated sexual assault. (Rape, by contrast, sexual assault allegation. tional rights of the accused. is defined in most cases as a sexual act by In a typical college setting, the 18- to This hypothetical is not far from the force. But it can also be charged for rendering 24-year-old cohort lives together in dor- prototypical sexual assault allegation in the the victim unconscious, personally adminis- mitories in a culture that includes a high military. Many cases also involve memory tering a drug or intoxicant causing substan- incidence of alcohol-facilitated sexual loss. In most instances, the victim is female tial incapacitation, causing grievous bodily encounters. Similarly, enlisted Servicemem- and the accused is male. The female victim harm, or placing the victim in fear of death, bers live in barracks with access to alcohol, will often report that she does not remember grievous bodily harm, or kidnapping.15) If the and I posit that they tend to drink and have what happened, or that she only remembers victim can remember bits of the night, as the sex with a frequency comparable to their snippets of the sexual encounter. In those victim could in Lamb and Peterson, biologi- civilian counterparts. cases, convictions are even more difficult to cally she was likely not completely passed out. There are no solid statistics for the obtain because the finders of fact (a panel of Where a victim has blacked out rather than military or civilian sectors regarding the Servicemembers or a military judge10) will passed out, a reasonable possibility exists that prevalence of sexual encounters on the often find reasonable doubt if they can only she had enough capacity to consent at the whole (consensual or nonconsensual) or consider an incomplete story. time of the sexual act. That possibility would sexual assaults among this age cohort.18 Recent case law out of the military preclude conviction beyond a reasonable Because there is no way to obtain accurate appellate courts suggests that even if a doubt, and that leads to acquittals, or in these data on how much sex there is or how conviction is obtained where the victim two cases, reversal by the appellate court. many sexual assaults there are in either suffers a memory lapse, the case could be the college/university setting or military overturned on appeal. In United States v. Analogy to the College and University setting, we cannot know whether the mili- Lamb11 and United States v. Peterson,12 two Setting tary number is greater or lesser than the companion cases, a female Marine private Colleges and universities face a similar civilian number. Anecdotally, it seems clear first class (PFC) was invited to drink with problem of difficult-to-prosecute sexual that there are high numbers of victims in two male Marines, PFC Lamb and Private assault allegations. Rarely, if ever, are college both communities who are traumatized by (Pvt) Peterson. Both male Marines had sex students held criminally accountable for sexual encounters that they do not believe with her. The next morning, the victim sexual assault. The most cited sexual assault were consensual. A fair argument could be stated that she passed out and was then statistics from colleges and universities are 15 made that we should hold Servicemembers sexually assaulted by both PFC Lamb and to 20 years old, but they typically state that to a higher standard than we do college Pvt Peterson. Her blood draw showed that between one in four and one in six college students; however, it would be unwise to 28 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu RODMAN ignore the experience of these institu- assault that are unparalleled in civilian Quick Primer on the Military Justice tions, their similar demographics, and the society. Sexual Assault Prevention and System similar problems they face. Therefore, best Response Offices exist in DOD and at each The military justice system differs from practices should be shared between the two Service and department. These offices coor- the civilian criminal justice system in a few communities to provide a more holistic dinate the provision of education and train- significant ways. A court-martial trial itself approach to fighting this problem. ing. They also ensure that every command looks remarkably like a civilian trial, with has a Uniformed Victim Advocate and access the exception that the jury is replaced by a T raining, Education, and Resources to civilian victim advocates who are available panel of Servicemembers. The major pro- The military has drastically increased as resources for any Servicemember who cedural differences between courts-martial its education and training about sexual claims to be the victim of a sexual assault, and civilian trials reside in pretrial and post- assault. Servicemembers are taught to report regardless of whether that allegation can be trial processes. any sexual encounter in which they feel substantiated. Counselors are provided to Unlike in the civilian world, the they were taken advantage of. Specifically, victims, and victims can avail themselves of prosecutor does not own the criminal case; the military teaches women to consider additional mental health resources if they the commanding officer of the accused any sexual encounter or contact to which so choose. In addition, Secretary Panetta Servicemember owns the case. It is up to they believed that they did not consent as universalized a policy in his January 2012 the commander to determine what forum is “rape.”19 That is not necessarily a bad thing: press conference that was already in place in appropriate for addressing the misconduct; no woman should be subjected to any sexual some Services including the Marine Corps: that is, whether to choose administrative contact to which she does not feel she con- all reporting victims will be allowed expe- punishment of some kind, a misdemeanor- sented. However, the training can be mis- dited transfer away from their units. The type “special court-martial,” or a felony-type leading because the term rape is a legal term existence of these resources is immensely “general court-martial.”23 that implies that a conviction for rape could important and helps foster a community that Rape or sexual assault prosecutions are or should result from that encounter. encourages healing and provides resources appropriately tried at a general court-martial. Training and education are for anyone who is victimized by a sexual To refer a case to a general court-martial, the immensely valuable. However, they have to encounter. Provision of these services does charges must be vetted by an impartial officer be nuanced enough to distinguish between not and should not hinge on whether the who is either a judge advocate or field-grade “rape” or “sexual assault” and “sexual military justice system will produce a con- officer.24 In practice, these investigations, misconduct.” Sexual misconduct, as used viction in a certain case. codified in Article 32 of the UCMJ, are in this article, includes any sexual conduct The military also has “restricted almost always conducted by a judge advo- in which the victim does not believe she reporting,” an opportunity for a victim cate so legal expertise can be applied to the consented, regardless of what can be to avail himself or herself of resources analysis.25 These investigations are intended proven in court. Sexual assault, on the without prompting an investigation or to provide a hedge against prosecutorial other hand, is often colloquially discussed as the conduct captured in sections (a) and (c) of the 2008 version of Article 120 of to refer a case to a general court-martial, the charges the UCMJ: “Rape and Aggravated Sexual must be vetted by an impartial officer Assault.”20 As a legal term, sexual assault is not clearly defined in the 2008 version of Article 120, but it did become a specific, prosecution. However, it is difficult for misconduct and overreaching, much like the technical term under the newest 2012 revi- a Servicemember to submit a restricted grand jury system in Federal criminal courts. sion.21 There may be offensive conduct (for report without making a mistake that After thoroughly investigating the example, unwanted touching) that does would convert the submission to an “unre- misconduct, the Article 32 investigating not rise to the colloquial understanding of stricted report,” that is, one that prompts officer will write a report providing recom- “sexual assault” that might otherwise be investigation. Restricted reporting can mendations to the commander about how properly discussed as sexual misconduct or only be communicated to a chaplain, to dispose of the case. Typically, the first possibly sexual harassment. Statistics can medical professional, or victim advocate or commanding general in the accused’s chain be misunderstood or inflated by misusing counselor.22 Consequently, when a Marine of command has the authority to convene the terminology. Even within DOD, differ- confides in his or her best friend about a a general court-martial. The commanding ent offices use other definitions of sexual sexual encounter, that friend is obligated general will only decide on how to proceed assault that do not align with the statutory under military order to disclose the after receiving advice from his or her staff landscape. Training within the military— communication to the command. Many judge advocate (SJA), a judge advocate for both leaders and subordinates—about investigations begin when a roommate assigned to the commanding general’s staff rape, sexual assault, and sexual miscon- reports on behalf of another Servicemem- as a legal advisor.26 duct is misguided if it does not capture ber. While that is beneficial in some cases, Despite this robust vetting process, these nuances. in other cases it forces the victim into a commanding officers and commanding gen- The military has also created institu- role he or she has not chosen and does not erals often neglect to heed the advice of their tions and resources for victims of sexual want, that of an accuser. legal advisors—the prosecutor, the Article 32 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 29 Forum | Fostering Dialogue on Military Sexual Assault officer, and/or the SJA—and push forward “taken into account” during the process. In tal must result. Again, this is appropriate; on sexual assault cases that lack merit at trial. 2012, Article 120 was revised again, but it the Constitution demands it, and the penal- They do so because they fear they will be per- does not appear that the revision will renew ties for a guilty finding are severe. ceived as taking the accusations lightly. focus on the victim or address these con- In reports of sexual assault, we often cerns. Rather, some commentators believe see victims who were harmed through Facts Drive Outcomes that the focus on the offender is even stronger negligence or recklessness. In an aggravated The problem in these cases is the facts. in the new version.28 sexual assault case that hinges on substantial They often cannot be developed fully enough incapacitation, even if the victim cannot to achieve proof beyond a reasonable doubt, Using Tort Law “Negligence” to show that she was passed out beyond a as illustrated above by the alcohol-induced Understand the Problem reasonable doubt, it may be that she was he-said-she-said hypothetical. When a The disconnect between a victim’s intoxicated enough that the accused was prosecutor does not have good facts, convic- trauma resulting from a sexual experience reckless or negligent in pursuing sex with tion cannot be the expectation. Nor should and the inability to obtain a conviction is her. The accused may have acted in a way that we want there to be a conviction in many of a large contributor to the perception of a does not meet the level of care that we want Servicemembers to have for one another, but perhaps the accused was not malicious. if the finder of fact believes it is possible A tort outlook may be a more appropriate that the accused reasonably believed the victim consented, framework with which to approach analysis an acquittal must result of sexual misconduct. By using the negligence framework, we can capture the category of cases that those cases. That would require a standard “sexual assault problem” in the military. involve a victim who believes he or she was below the “beyond a reasonable doubt” stan- The problem is actually in large part a tort taken advantage of, but where a prosecutor dard, creating an exception in criminal law problem. However, the tort paradigm is cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt for sexual assault cases in direct contraven- inherently problematic for addressing sexual at trial that there was force (rape) or sub- tion of the Constitution. assault. Therefore, despite being analytically stantial incapacitation (aggravated sexual Some victims have expressed frustra- more appropriate, both the military and assault) under the 2008 statutory frame- tion at the inability of commands to obtain civilian worlds have been reluctant to discuss work. If the accused caused harm to the convictions, or even to pursue investiga- sexual assault with tort terminology. victim, the harm is still real. The accused tions in their cases. Some of this criticism A tort is a harm inflicted by one party may even have done something morally unfairly targets processes that are necessar- against another. Torts are the subject of wrong under the circumstances. But it may ily not victim-focused. Criminal investiga- civil lawsuits. When one party believes that not have been a crime. tions are focused on the accused. If the another has behaved negligently or reck- investigating law enforcement agency can lessly with regard for another, and harm A Negligence Discussion Only Begins identify the accused, its job is to investigate is inflicted, the harmed party can sue and to Frame the Problem impartially to provide whatever evidence collect in court for the value of the harm. In The problem with using the tort para- it can to the commander so he or she can cases where a sexual assault allegation might digm is that it drives seemingly unacceptable decide whether to prosecute. By law, victims not result in a conviction, the complaint may solution sets. The necessary consequence are kept informed of the progress of the have resulted from a harm inflicted by a Ser- of using tort language is that it suggests investigation, and their preference is con- vicemember, perhaps due to lack of due care lawsuits are the answer. Neither military sidered, but it will never be dispositive, nor (negligence) or even recklessness regarding leaders nor victim advocates are likely to should it be. the victim’s desire to participate or level of accept an argument that we should encour- Similarly, prosecutions themselves intoxication. Nevertheless, it may not achieve age Servicemembers to sue each other over should not be victim-focused. The military the level of criminality or intent required for harms that result from sexual encounters.31 sexual assault statute, Article 120 of the a rape or sexual assault conviction. The hope in introducing this paradigm is not UCMJ, underwent substantial revision in If consent is an issue at trial (that is, to encourage lawsuits but merely to reframe 2008. The revision was intended in part to where the accused argues that the victim the analysis. take the focus away from the victim in order consented, not that sex did not occur), a The criminal law framework used to to protect him or her.27 The question before sexual assault conviction can be achieved address sexual assault allegations in the the trier of fact is based on whether she was only where the government has proven military continues to be ill-equipped to forced by the accused, and not whether she beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim handle many cases. Colleges and universi- consented. The ironic consequence of that did not consent or that the accused was not ties appear to have abandoned criminal law revision is that what was going through the reasonably mistaken that he or she con- as a tool for this reason, except in the most victim’s head at the time, or her subsequent sented.29 In other words, if the finder of fact clear-cut circumstances. Instead, these trauma, is irrelevant to the question of guilt. at court-martial believes it is possible that institutions pursue a host of alternative Perhaps in part for that reason, victims can the accused reasonably believed the victim adjudicative tools to address the problem. often believe that they were not “heard” or consented (even if she did not),30 an acquit- No one argues that these solutions in col- 30 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu RODMAN leges and universities have eliminated the sarily complicated legal landscape. The term commanders, hopefully this will result in a problem. However, the solution imposed on substantially incapacitated has also been culture where the decision not to prosecute in the military—encouragement to prosecute replaced with “asleep, unconscious, or other- certain cases comes with credibility and faces questionable cases and be more “aggres- wise unaware that the sexual act is occurring,” less criticism. sive”—has our leadership going in the or situations in which a drug or intoxicant General Martin Dempsey published his wrong direction entirely. For those who renders the victim incapable of consenting. Strategic Direction to the Joint Force on Sexual believe that the military does not prosecute Although these changes will move the inquiry Assault Prevention and Response on April to the fullest, going farther down the path further away from a victim-focused question 30, 2012. Although the document highlights of pursuing more prosecutions in more of consent, questions of force or incapacita- the importance of this matter to the highest cases will not achieve the desired outcome tion and consent will always be inextricably ranking leaders within the military, it does of more convictions. It may end up doing intertwined. Finally, the definition of sexual not present new or novel approaches to the more harm than good by failing to manage assault will include a broader definition of issue. It merely recommits the joint force to the expectations of victims and forcing sexual conduct and sexual acts, thus poten- existing programs and policies. them through a frustrating process. tially enabling more prosecutions in cases that Within the Marine Corps specifically, do not involve sexual intercourse (and poten- the commandant spent the spring and early Recent Developments tially making it a target for constitutional summer of 2012 on a “Heritage” tour, asking Aside from encouraging more prosecu- overbreadth challenges). Marines to honor their traditions, behave tion, recent developments in law and policy These changes help tidy up the lan- morally, and hold each other accountable for may change the landscape somewhat in guage of an unwieldy and complicated their missteps. In his brief, the commandant sexual assault cases. First, Congress passed statute, but they will likely not affect many described the distrust that Members of Con- a revision to Article 120 of the UCMJ that of the problematic scenarios discussed gress and the public have in commanders, became effective on June 28, 2012. One major above. The issue boils down to proving, manifested to him directly, and their skepti- change in the new statute is that the accused beyond all reasonable doubt, that the victim cism that Marine Corps leadership takes will face a “knew or should have known” did not consent or did not have the capacity these issues seriously. This lack of faith in the standard about whether the victim was inca- to consent, especially in cases where alcohol genuine efforts of leadership has the potential pacitated. Results from cases arising under and memory lapses are involved. The new to drive bad policy outcomes. these statutes should just be starting to come revision may allow more convictions at the The commandant also cited a “sexual in as this article is published. Nevertheless, margins (though it may result in fewer as assault” statistic of 343 reports in 2011, legal analysts have begun to consider the 2012 well), but it is not likely to be a panacea. though he defined “sexual assault” to include revision, and some point out that the should- have-known standard applied in incapacita- tion sexual assault cases actually appears to the issue boils down to proving, beyond all create a negligence (or possibly recklessness) reasonable doubt, that the victim did not consent or standard, leading to the belief that the land- did not have the capacity to consent scape will change with application of the new law. However, the new law merely requires the government to prove that the accused Another major policy development everything from unwanted touching to forc- knew or should have known that the victim was the release by Panetta of a Secretary of ible sexual intercourse, as well as allegations was incapacitated, whereas the old law did Defense Memorandum on April 20, 2012, that were later unsubstantiated. This figure, not have a knowledge requirement. Under the that withholds disposition authority of despite being derived from an overly broad old statute, the finders of fact were charged sexual assault cases to the O-6 level. This definition of “sexual assault,” also serves to with determining whether they believed memorandum requires some command- contextualize how problematic the 19,000 the victim was substantially incapacitated ing officers, who would otherwise have the extrapolation is. Any sexual assault is one regardless of what the accused understood. authority to decide whether to prosecute sexual assault too many, but if the goal is to Therefore, although the change looks like certain cases, to obtain the decision from have a targeted and productive discussion it embraces “negligence,” the new approach their higher headquarters. Most sexual about the actual problem in order to derive actually may make conviction even harder assault case disposition decisions are made at corresponding solutions, the discourse has by requiring the government to prove more the flag-officer level, so this memorandum certainly not gotten there yet. than before; moreover, it does not address the may not affect that decisionmaking process The commandant has decided to reor- overarching problems with the old statute. greatly. However, it indicates that the senior ganize the Marine Corps legal community The new Article 120 will not capture those levels of DOD leadership continue not to to facilitate better oversight, supervision, and cases in which the accused’s general decision- trust the commanders making disposition mentorship. With the creation of Regional making lacks due care for the perspective of decisions. The hope is that by elevating the Trial Counsel Offices, the Marine Corps will the victim. rank of those empowered to decide, the deci- have a vastly improved means of surging Another significant change to Article sions will carry more weight with outside capability and expertise to strategic and 120 is the revocation of the affirmative observers. Therefore, despite the lack of faith complex cases, especially sexual assault cases, defense of consent, which created an unneces- that this policy change exhibits in lower-level wherever they arise. The new construct gives ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 31 Forum | Fostering Dialogue on Military Sexual Assault RODMAN the Marine Corps flexibility and a better court-martial process and is made out to be 5 In 1991, at an event at the Las Vegas Hilton ability to pair the appropriate experience a pariah when he or she may not have done attended by the naval aviation community, 83 and ability level with the appropriate case. anything criminal. female and 7 male military Servicemembers were groped, sexually harassed, and sexually assaulted However, what these initiatives cannot do is We do not need to deny the victimiza- by as many as 100 other Sailors and Marines. change the facts or the law: prosecution of tion or trauma of the accuser in order to When reported, the event turned into a scandal many sexual assault cases will continue to be acknowledge that prosecution is inappropri- and forced the military to confront questions an uphill battle. ate in many instances. Using a negligence about a culture of hostility toward women in the paradigm, perhaps both military and civilian military in the media and in multiple congressio- Conclusion leadership can come to appreciate that there nal hearings. The next step in addressing this are many instances in which a sexual assault 6 The Invisible War, produced by Kirby Dick problem is to embrace the existence of a gray allegation is made but no conviction would and Amy Ziering, has screened at various film area. To approach the problem constructively, result: the gray area. In those cases, much festivals. The Web site for the film is 32 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu RODMAN Bonnie S. Fisher, Francis T. Cullen, and Michael G. Turner describe the problem of achieving reliable numbers. The study attempts to measure the problem and arrives at roughly 35 instances of sexual assault per 1,000 college women. Study NEW available at V isit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 33 U.S. Coast Guardsmen unload $36 million worth of confiscated cocaine and marijuana, St. Petersburg, Florida DOD (Matthew Bash) Confronting Transnational Organized Crime Getting It Right to Forestall a New National Security Threat By Douglas M. Fraser and Renee P. Novakoff General Douglas M. Fraser, USAF (Ret.), was the Commander of U.S. Southern Command from 2009 to 2012. Renee P. Novakoff is a Senior Defense Intelligence Analyst in the Directorate of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance at U.S. Southern Command. 34 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu FRASER and NOVAKOFF ecurity threats to the United affect security at the local level, but also dwarfs defense budgets in the subregion States are evolving. For most have the ability to compromise national and allows significant criminal penetration of the 20th century and before, security. According to Moisés Naím, “Today into governmental organizations, includ- threats were state-on-state. Since more than ever, these structures have the ing security forces and judicial systems, as S well as legitimate financial networks. The 9/11, however, threats to the homeland have capacity to operate on a global scale, con- grown to include terrorism and transnational necting remote places of the planet and the overall value to these criminal networks organized crime (TOC) groups and net- most cosmopolitan cities, above all, with from the cocaine trade alone is more than works. These networks represent a different accumulated political power. Never have the gross domestic product (GDP) of every danger than we experienced during the Cold criminals been so global, so rich, or had so country in Latin America except Brazil. The War. This is not a force-on-force threat but much political influence.”3 White House estimates in its 2011 Strategy rather something more insidious. These All indicators show that TOC networks to Combat Transnational Organized Crime borderless groups infiltrate levers of power to will continue to grow, and, in the worst cases, that money-laundering accounts for $1.3 create spaces from which to carry out their they will work with or will corrupt govern- trillion to $3.3 trillion—or between 2 and activities unimpeded. Currently, these groups ment institutions to form alliances to gain 5 percent of the world’s GDP. Bribery from are destabilizing friendly governments not by space to do business. Virtually all criminal TOC adds close to $1 trillion to that amount, direct means but through behind-the-scenes cartels and gangs organize in networks while drug-trafficking generates an estimated attempts to gain political space to develop connected by violent crime of all types. To $750 billion to $1 trillion, counterfeited and their illegal businesses. These groups also survive and prosper, these thugs have become pirated goods add another $500 billion, have ties in the United States, endangering highly intelligent and ruthless. This is affect- and illicit firearms sales generate from $170 our citizens and our economic infrastructure. ing societies throughout the Western Hemi- billion to $320 billion.4 These total to some The scale of their enterprises, the impact they sphere. In nearly every country in the region, $6.2 trillion—10 percent of the world’s GDP, have on legal economies, and their prospec- populations state that personal security is placing it behind only the United States tive continued growth argue for sustained their number one concern. Across the region, and the European Union, but well ahead national and international attention and murder rates are generally higher than 10 of China, in terms of global GDP ranking. resources as a tier-one security threat.1 To understand and counter these threats, the U.S. Government must work TOC networks will corrupt government institutions to form across bureaucratic lines, which will take new alliances to gain space to do business organizational constructs and relationships that are not wedded to parochial border norms. In addition, the Intelligence Commu- years ago. In addition, drug use is up—a sign Other estimates of global criminal proceeds nity will be the first line of defense. To fully that regional drug-trafficking is increasing. range from a low of 4 percent to a high of 15 understand the motivations and vulnerabili- Moreover, the traffickers often pay middle- percent of global GDP.5 ties of these TOC networks, the Intelligence men in product as a way to increase their Analysts have described the situation in Community will need to develop analysts customer base. several countries in Latin America as a crimi- who can assess a sophisticated mix of open- As the primary transshipment zone nal insurgency. Its effects on Central America source, law enforcement, and traditional for illicit trafficking to the United States, are clear. The murder rate is the highest in intelligence. The United States will need to Central America is an epicenter of TOC the world. MS-13 and M18 gang members deploy a new type of intelligence professional activities. The problem is particularly acute routinely torture and intimidate citizens. The who is able to work across organizational in the “Northern Tier” countries of Gua- homicide rates in El Salvador and Honduras and geographic boundaries and is willing to temala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Belize, alone, where MS-13 operates extensively, are share information. This analyst must be an where criminal networks exploit weak rule 82 and 66 per 100,000 inhabitants, respec- integrator who can work in the collection of law, corrupt officials, and porous borders tively—over 13 times the rate in the United and analytical worlds and communicate with to traffic in drugs, precursor chemicals, States.6 Gang leaders in Central American counterparts in all parts of government, aca- weapons, people, and bulk cash. In all four prisons direct member activities inside the demia, and partner nations. countries, gangs and other violent criminal United States. MS-13 operates throughout groups are contributing to escalating murder Central America and in at least 40 U.S. states Background rates and deteriorating citizen security. This according to a 2008 report from the Federal Over the past 10 years, TOC networks has overwhelmed civilian law enforcement Bureau of Investigation.7 In October, the have grown in importance and influence departments and court systems, many of Obama administration designated MS-13 as a throughout Latin America and the Carib- which were nascent to start with and are drug kingpin organization. The sanctioning bean. In Brazil, for example, the Red Com- characterized by pervasive corruption and of MS-13 is the latest step in a 21st-century mandos have woven a complex network chronic underresourcing. arms race between sovereign governments in which different illegal factions have the Challenges faced by these countries and violent nonstate networks empowered by power to intimidate, interact, and control are further exacerbated by the economic technology and globalization.8 entire sectors of cities such as Rio de Janeiro power wielded by criminal groups. The TOC access to regional governments is and São Paulo.2 These groups not only value of cocaine destined for North America gaining momentum and leading to co-option ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 35 COMMENTARY | Confronting Transnational Organized Crime in some states and weakening of governance that ultimately cross U.S. borders undetected institutions—ranging from law enforcement in others. The nexus in some states among thousands of times each day. The actors and judicial sectors to education and health— TOC networks and elements of govern- along the pipeline form and dissolve alli- that improve opportunities for young people. ment—including intelligence services and ances quickly, occupy both physical and Understanding the varied political landscape personnel—and big business figures threatens cyber spaces, and use highly developed insti- (the human terrain) of the hemisphere is also rule of law.9 New communications technolo- tutions including the global financial system, important as geopolitical fragility opens the gies have led to new criminal business models as well as ancient smuggling routes and way for gangs and cartels to further destabi- of widely distributed, constantly shifting methods.13 They are middlemen who have lize civil life. networks of personal contacts and fleeting little loyalty to one group and often have no More than any other problem the alliances to produce, market, transport, and illusion of developing their organization into United States faces, this particular challenge distribute illegal goods—sometimes drugs, a major trafficking network. They make a blurs the line among U.S. institutions. The sometimes human beings. These activities living by moving goods and ensure that they size, scope, and reach of TOC networks are abetted by extortion, kidnapping, coun- and their families are safe from the TOC far surpass the ability of any one agency terfeiting, and whatever else turns a profit.10 group, who may threaten to kill those who or nation to confront this threat alone. In TOC networks insinuate themselves into do not assist them. Central America, increasing military involve- the political process through bribery and in ment in domestic security is a reality, at least some cases have become alternate providers of Effect on the United States until the TOC threat is degraded and the governance, security, and livelihoods to win For the United States, these networks capabilities of civilian police institutions are popular support. As an example, members challenge national welfare, not necessarily expanded. This will not happen overnight, of Mexican cartels reside in Central America national security. Strong U.S. law enforce- and it will not happen in isolation. This effort and, according to former Guatemalan Presi- ment efforts and effective policing have requires the commitment of Latin American dent Alvaro Colom, have influence over entire kept gangs and cartels from having the governments and their societies. It requires departments there. Polls in Guatemala show same effect they do in other countries in the their commitment to build the capacity of that a majority of citizens would exchange hemisphere, but their influence is growing. their law enforcement, judicial, and penal less democracy for more security.11 Guatemala Latin American gangs with connections organizations. It requires their commitment City is experiencing record levels of violent to the United States are primarily MS-13 to the use of their militaries only as a security crime and at the same time a high-rise build- (estimated at 6,000 to 10,000 U.S. members) bridge as they develop other institutional ing construction boom, though with only a and the 18th Street Gang (estimated at 30,000 capacities. It requires their commitment to 25 percent occupancy rate, which is usually a U.S. members), with up to 70,000 for both address endemic corruption throughout sign of large-scale money-laundering that can in Central America (primarily El Salvador, their societies. And it requires their commit- only be successful with the support of govern- Honduras, and Guatemala), where they chal- ment to engage regional and international ment agents.12 lenge local authorities for control of streets institutions to enhance coordination and A key to countering TOC groups is and towns. cooperation—supporting the development of understanding the smaller networks that national and regional security plans, enhanc- make up these larger groups. Transnational Pushing Back on TOC ing regional defense and security institutions, criminal organizations can move anything, The 2010 National Security Strategy and improving human rights training. and will for a price. Major crime groups acknowledges the challenge these organiza- Furthermore, it takes concerted col- such as Mexican cartels or the Revolution- tions pose and that combating transnational laboration and sustained commitment by ary Armed Forces of Colombia contract criminal and trafficking networks requires a the United States and the international with smaller, local criminal organizations “multidimensional strategy that safeguards community—both governmental and non- or “transportisters” that will move goods citizens, breaks the financial strength of governmental organizations—to address this from one country to the next. These are criminal and terrorist networks, disrupts complex problem and help support regional governments in building strong, capable, and accountable institutions. Innovative the actors along the pipeline form and dissolve approaches, creative public-private col- alliances quicky, occupy both physical and cyber spaces, laborations, and synchronization of efforts and use highly developed institutions among numerous U.S. Federal agencies—the Department of State, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Agency for Interna- important elements of the TOC network but illicit trafficking networks, defeats trans- tional Development, and Department of little is known about them. These franchises national criminal organizations, fights Homeland Security—will be necessary to operate in, and control, specific geographic government corruption, strengthens the create a cooperative national and interna- territories that allow them to function in a rule of law, bolsters judicial systems, and tional network that is stronger and more relatively safe environment. These pipelines, improves transparency.”14 The solution to resilient than any criminal network. Key to or chains of networks, are adaptive and able transnational crime in this hemisphere lies success will be information-sharing within to move a multiplicity of illicit products in helping improve Latin America’s domestic the U.S. interagency community, partner (cocaine, weapons, humans, and bulk cash) institutions and coordination across these 36 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu FRASER and NOVAKOFF DOD (Michael De Nyse) Servicemembers secure crew of drug-smuggling vessel in Gulf of Aden nations, and finally among other countries (DOD), and they require extensive invest- With the exception of the first mission set in question. ments of time and effort. (detection and monitoring), helping partner In an effective strategy to combat illicit nations build and sustain their security A Way Ahead trafficking, all approaches have relevance. capacity is a key component of all DOD Interagency focus and organization The disruption line of effort should be bal- counter-TOC efforts: are needed for the United States to have anced against partner nation capacity. If the greatest chance at pushing back TOC the social services and effective local law ■■ detection and monitoring network gains in the hemisphere. To succeed, enforcement can only fill a small vacuum, ■■ counternarcotics training partner nation capacity must match or at then we should only target a small area. ■■ counternarcotics support least keep pace with national and regional Operations that create a vacuum in TOC ■■ defense equipment (Foreign Military campaigns to arrest TOC leaders and dis- operations and businesses should be paired Financing/Foreign Military Sales) mantle their networks. Building capacity with aggressive non–law enforcement ■■ defense training (International Mili- has a military dimension, but is far more engagement and social services in a coor- tary Education and Training) dependent on other branches of the U.S. dinated fashion. This type of coordination ■■ defense institution-building Government—the Departments of State and requires agencies beyond law enforcement ■■ human rights training Justice, for example. Capacity of police forces and DOD, from both the country itself and ■■ multinational training exercises must be supported by investigative and judi- from international contributors. ■■ defense engagement cial capacity and competency. The judicial ■■ TOC network analysis and branches must be led by uncorrupted and DOD Role in Countering TOC information-sharing. effective legislative and executive branches. DOD plays a small but important sup- Democratic partner nation capacity devel- porting role in countering TOC networks; it The role of helping partner nations opment is dependent on the support of the brings unique capabilities in support of U.S. build capacity cannot be overstated. But this partner nation population. These reforms are and partner nation law enforcement. Its role role will only succeed when it supports each not the domain of the Department of Defense in countering TOC networks generally falls regional partner’s commitment and invest- into the following supporting lines of effort. ment to build its institutional capacity. The ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 37 COMMENTARY | Confronting Transnational Organized Crime main effort for the U.S. interagency com- organized criminal networks in the Western U.S. Deputy Attorney General David W. Ogden munity should be to help build and sustain Hemisphere, the United States will face an cited 15 percent of world gross domestic product partner nation capacity across law enforce- asymmetric security threat in the homeland as the total annual turnover of transnational organized crime networks. See Josh Meyer, “U.S. ment, military support to law enforce- in the next several years. Left unchecked, attorney general calls for global effort to fight ment in the counternarcotics mission, the TOC networks will continue to infiltrate organized crime,” Los Angeles Times, October judiciary, and social organizations. There governments, businesses, and financial 13, 2009, available at 38 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Democracy Promotion in Oman By Diana M. Holland ooperation with and support from the strategically positioned Persian Gulf states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are critical to America’s stated national interests: security, prosperity, human rights C values, and international order.1 In the Gulf region, Iranian hegemonic ambitions, piracy, and violent extremism pose threats to those interests. The United States has spent bil- lions on military assistance and foreign aid programs in the past decade to ensure the stability and cooperation of Gulf governments. Nonetheless, as the “Arab Awakening” demonstrated in 2011, some of these governments face significant internal opposition and could be at risk. If these states devolve into chaos, or if anti-American regimes come to power, the United States could face greater challenges in the region. Colonel Diana M. Holland, USA, is Commander of the 130th Engineer Brigade at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. Al-Shamikh, one of three Kahreef-class Corvettes under construction for Royal Navy of Oman at Portsmouth, England Wikipedia ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 39 COMMENTARY | Democracy Promotion in Oman One way to sustain stable and friendly of the 1980 hostage rescue attempt in Iran, Ibadism encourages leaders to make deci- governments in the Gulf is to increase as well as more recent combat operations in sions through consultation and consensus. democracy promotion programs designed the region. The two countries signed a Free It stresses moderation and toleration to encourage timely and peaceful transitions Trade Agreement in 2006, which assists with toward fellow members of Omani society, to more representative forms of govern- economic diversification in preparation for as well as foreigners and those of different ment.2 In fact, the 2010 National Security the depletion of Oman’s oil reserves in the belief systems. Finally, Ibadism dictates Strategy contends that the United States must next 15 years. In 2010, the United States that communities choose leaders through promote democracy because governments provided Oman $1.5 million and $8.9 million elections. These tenets are deeply rooted in that respect democratic values “are more under the International Military Education the Omani conscience and over time have just, peaceful and legitimate” and ultimately and Training and Foreign Military Financ- established conditions conducive to demo- protect America’s national interests.3 The ing programs, respectively. Oman aligns cratic principles.8 United States does not currently have many with American positions on the Arab-Israeli Despite Oman’s potential receptive- democracy promotion programs in the Gulf, conflict more frequently than other Arab ness to liberalization, U.S. policies toward but if a threat to stability is internal dissat- states do.6 The United States and Oman are the Sultanate, like those toward the rest of isfaction with autocratic governments, then strong friends, and through this relationship the Gulf, normally focus on security and stronger efforts toward reform supported by America can encourage substantive reforms defense capabilities rather than governance. the United States could foster a more peaceful in that Gulf state. Yet the dearth of democracy programs in political transformation. This process should To appreciate the potential for change this region is also due to the extraordinary begin with the Sultanate of Oman because in Oman, it is important to understand its wealth of the oil monarchies. They are not many of its citizens desire reform and are recent history. Discussions about modern dependent on American aid and, therefore, willing to work with the existing government Oman focus on Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al the United States cannot use financial incentives to leverage them to accept democracy promotion programs.9 However, Oman has unique potential for democratic Oman is not as wealthy as the other Gulf development and could serve as a model of reform states and faces economic uncertainty for the other Gulf states because of its dwindling oil reserves.10 Thus, economic incentives might be more effec- tive in achieving political change in Oman to that end.4 Furthermore, Oman has unique Said and the remarkable transformation of than in the other member states of the Gulf potential for democratic development and the country during his rule. Sultan Qaboos Cooperation Council. could serve as a model of reform for the other replaced his father in 1970 following a The major entities that employ such Gulf states. palace coup. The new sultan immediately programs in the Middle East are the U.S. Foreign policy discourse about the confronted and ultimately defeated a 14-year Agency for International Development Middle East and American national security insurgency. He then turned his attention to (USAID), the National Endowment for interests there often neglects Oman. The economic and social development, as well Democracy (NED) and its affiliates,11 and omission is surprising considering the state’s as national unification. He enacted policies the Department of State’s Middle East geographical position vis-à-vis Iran, the Strait that improved infrastructure, education, Partnership Initiative (MEPI). A survey of of Hormuz, and the Arabian Peninsula. One and health care for all Omanis. In the 1990s, these U.S.-sponsored democracy programs reason for the neglect is that the Gulf region, Qaboos instituted significant political confirms that Oman is largely overlooked; aside from its role in exporting oil, is over- reforms. He created a bicameral legislature the United States provides negligible support shadowed by the dysfunction of the rest of under the Basic Law in 1996. Omanis elect and incentives to Oman through these the Middle East. Regional policymakers and the members of the Majlis al-Shura (Con- organizations. USAID does not allocate any commentators devote much of their atten- sultative Assembly), and the sultan appoints funding toward governance.12 NED and its tion to palpable tension or outright conflict members of the Majlis al-Dawla (State affiliates have little engagement in Oman, between Israel and its neighbors, the Palestin- Assembly). Women also gained additional especially when compared to their efforts in ian refugee problem, and Iranian nuclear rights under Qaboos including the right to other parts of the region. One of the affili- ambitions. Moreover, the other Gulf countries vote in 2003.7 Compared to their neighbors, ates, the International Republican Institute, eclipse Oman because the former have large Omanis enjoy considerable religious tol- sponsors a single program that provides oil reserves, host major U.S. military head- eration and economic interaction with the training in legislative procedures. The other quarters, and control substantial financial outside world. The country is relatively safe NED affiliate with the mission to train and assets. Finally, the Omanis themselves down- even without the trappings of a police state. educate citizens on democratic principles is play their ties with the United States in order It also attracts tourists, who can freely and the National Democratic Institute; however, to maintain a close relationship with Iran.5 independently traverse most of the country. it has no ongoing programs in Oman.13 Though the U.S.-Omani relationship is Ibadism is the dominant form of Finally, MEPI sponsors 17 programs in inconspicuous, the two countries cooperate Islam in Oman, and its effect on develop- Oman, but they generally focus on economic in many areas. Oman authorized the use of ment is important in any assessment of the development and opportunities made pos- its military facilities by U.S. forces in support country’s potential for political reform. sible by the 2006 Free Trade Agreement.14 40 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu HOLLAND World Factbook (Washington, DC: CIA, 2012), Even if U.S. policymakers decide to Notes increase democracy programs, it is impor- available at ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 41 Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus learns about Brazilian riverine operations at Estacao Naval Riverine Base, Manaus U.S. Navy (Kevin S. O’Brien) Restoring the “Unwritten Alliance” Brazil-U.S. Relations By Lawrence T. Brown he primary challenge the economic growth as a challenge to U.S. while Canada will be eleventh and Mexico United States faces in the 21st hegemony, U.S. leaders should commend it as fifteenth.2 Moreover, “By the end of 2009, century, according to historian a regional achievement. Additionally, some Brazil’s economy represented forty percent T and diplomat Joseph Nye, “is current perceptions of the two countries’ of the total gross domestic product (GDP) of not one of decline but what to do in light of strategic interests as continuing to diverge are Latin America and the Caribbean, and fifty- the realization that even the largest country historically shortsighted. Such a view affirms five percent of the GDP of South America cannot achieve the outcomes it wants without a U.S. failure to adapt long-range diplomatic alone.”3 Brazil will host both the 2014 World the help of others.”1 Acknowledging Brazil strategies to match the global rise of many Cup and the 2016 Olympics; accordingly, it is as a genuine partner is problematic for countries. Undeniably, the United States investing billions of dollars in infrastructure American leaders since the United States needs Brazil—now and in the future. and security improvements throughout the exercised tremendous unilateral influence in Economically, Brazil is becoming the country. Additionally, a new oil field has South American affairs throughout the 19th most important country to the United States been discovered off the coast near Rio de and 20th centuries. Today, U.S. hubris lingers in the Western Hemisphere. It will become Janeiro. The find has drawn great interest in relations with Brazil. This residual atti- the fifth largest world economy by 2015, from the United States, which is seeking oil tude prompts some U.S. leaders to consider any Brazilian disregard for U.S. interests Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence T. Brown, USA, is the Director of Operations for the Office of the Defense as an affront. Instead of regarding Brazil’s Representative–Pakistan. 42 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BROWN autonomy from the Middle East. This off- redefine the U.S.-Brazil strategic relationship leadership through the Monroe Doctrine shore oil field and others will double Brazil’s and restore the “Unwritten Alliance”10 that and Rio Treaty—and receiving much dissent output of petroleum by 2020.4 was initially established by Secretary of State along the way. Now it is Brazil that is criti- Former Secretary of State Hillary Elihu Root, whose work toward greater pan- cized for both taking action and not taking Clinton proclaimed a “new 21st Century American understanding contributed to his enough action. But Brazil has the where- reality—that GDP matters more than receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 1912. withal to successfully manage this transition. military might.”5 Her pronouncement reprioritized economics to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy. She cited Brazil and Brazil’s rise represents the reemergence of a global economic India as examples of 21st-century economic and diplomatic player from the early to mid-20th century success.6 As U.S. foreign policy focuses more on economics, the U.S. relationship with Brazil assumes greater importance. If Consistent Player History is on its side. Brazil has remained at economics has become the primary interest Today, Brazil sees itself as a regional peace with its neighbors for nearly 150 years. in U.S. foreign policy, then failure to build leader. Its strategy is not to disrupt or disturb No other emerging power in the world enjoys a stronger strategic partnership with Brazil any multilateral organizations, despite its this kind of accomplishment. will be a huge opportunity lost for substantial growing power, “but to adapt them and Brazil’s Defense Minister Celso economic trade and growth. Already Brazil employ [its strengths] as platforms to advance Amorim has recently stated that his govern- has concluded Common Market of the South Brazilian interests.”11 This strategy nests ment’s goal is to transform South America (MERCOSUR) free trade agreements with nicely with two of President Dilma Rous- into a true “Peace Zone.”14 Brazil has largely Israel, along with a separate trade arrange- seff’s areas for action: “diversifying relations accomplished this goal. The United States ment with Egypt.7 Additionally, Brazil has by forging stronger economic and political should actively support Brazil’s ongoing entered into special trading agreements ties with other nations of the developing objective of a continental Peace Zone. Such with South Africa and India, which are also world; and supporting multilateralism by U.S. support would help convince the major- rapidly growing global economies.8 The pushing for the democratization of global ity of Brazilians and Latin Americans that European Union and various other countries governance.”12 Brazil has recently proved its the primary U.S. interest is not to pursue have recognized Brazil’s rise and future eco- unfaltering pursuit of these goals, and this imperial power and resource domination, but nomic potential. They, too, plan to make the commitment has not been lost on the other to promote international trade, investment, most of what Brazil’s economy has to offer. 11 South American countries. In view of Bra- and security. Indeed, greater leadership roles zil’s significant economic progress, its neigh- for responsible countries in the global system Tides of History bors acknowledge that Brazil is now a serious actually strengthen U.S. worldwide interests The United States so far has not global player and economic powerhouse. and U.S. domestic security.15 viewed its bilateral relationship with Brazil Proximity to Brazil will not only benefit these through the lens of history. Brazil’s recent South American countries, but also position Understanding Motivation economic growth should not be regarded regional relations to eliminate the need to The United States, however, must as a miracle of a Third World country. look elsewhere for economic support. do a better job understanding how Brazil Rather, its rise represents the reemergence Historically, Brazil has already exercised approaches diplomacy and difficult prob- of a global economic and diplomatic player leadership in conflict disputes between other lems. In terms of interests versus values, from the early to mid-20th century. At that countries in the region. In 1942, it played a Brazil emphasizes its constitutional values time, the United States supported Brazil’s key role in resolving the Ecuador-Peru war. more than at any other time in its history. preeminence in South America. President Brazil arbitrated a peace settlement between Self-determination, nonintervention, Theodore Roosevelt even hoped that Brazil them again in 1995.13 Likewise, it has shared defense of peace, peaceful settlement of would be the responsible party for support- hydroelectric power with its neighbors and conflicts, repudiation of terrorism and ing the Monroe Doctrine within the region.9 entered into cooperative security agreements, racism, cooperation among peoples for Approximately 20 years later, Brazil became brokered distribution of fresh water, and the progress of mankind, and granting of one of the original members of the League managed regional environmental programs. political asylum are among the salient con- of Nations and committed the only Latin However, Brazil’s government has had dif- stitutional values that Brazil uses to shape American ground forces to the Allied cause ficulty with indigenous minority groups. For its international relations today.16 Out of in World War II, deploying an entire division example, it is constantly challenged to per- these, the peaceful settlement of disputes is to Europe. Unfortunately, Brazil’s rise to suade the Amazon aboriginals that they will highlighted in the preamble of its constitu- preeminence in South America was inter- benefit from certain regional infrastructure tion. Indeed, it is the singular driving force rupted by authoritarian military rule that projects. Still, through protracted negotia- behind Brazil’s foreign policy. sapped its international credibility for over tions, it has generally compensated displaced For example, Brazil has been exhibiting two decades. Only now has Brazil regained and dispossessed peoples. Essentially, Brazil is its constitutional values of nonintervention its capability and potential for regional growing into its role as the regional leader. and peaceful settlement of conflicts when and global leadership. As before, there is a The United States once held this dif- dealing with truculent Iran. As a nonperma- window of opportunity for Washington to ficult position in South America, exercising nent member of the United Nations Security ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 43 COMMENTARY | Brazil-U.S. Relations U.S. Army (Kaye Richey) USSOUTHCOM director, at Conference of Directors of Peacekeeping Operations, discusses opportunities for cooperation Council (UNSC), Brazil voted against Ribeiro Viotti argued that “No military violations on their citizens’ human rights. implementing sanctions on Iran in 2010. In action alone would succeed in ending the It also supported an Arab League plan for its minority vote with Turkey, Brazil claimed conflict. Protecting civilians, ensuring a political transition in Syria.20 Brazil’s that “sanctions will most probably lead to the lasting settlement and addressing the legiti- support, which moved from an earlier suffering of the people of Iran and will play mate demands of Libyan citizens demanded abstention in December 2011 on a similar in the hands of those, on all sides, that do not a political process.”18 The ambassador was resolution, still focuses on a peaceful politi- want dialogue to prevail. Past experiences in somewhat prophetic: the militias that over- cal transition, not a violent one. Whether the U.N., notably the case of Iraq, show that threw Muammar Qadhafi with assistance it is resolving a border conflict in South the spiral of sanctions, threats and isolation from the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- America, dealing with the erratic Hugo can result in tragic consequences.”17 In this tion over a year ago are now the overlords Chavez in Venezuela, or negotiating with case, Brazil acted according to its core prin- of cities and towns across Libya, while the the radical Islamic regime in Iran, Brazil has ciple of the peaceful settlement of disputes. fledgling police and military are too weak shown itself consistent in word and deed to In addition, along with Turkey, Brazilians did to control them. Libya watchers and inter- its core constitutional values. It is a respon- not believe they were allowed enough time national media note that the recent surge of sible and rational actor in its foreign policy to culminate their tentative agreement with militant violence against foreign diplomats, and regional relations. Iran. Brasília’s principal complaint was the military, and police officers demonstrates perceived rush to sanctions. a largely lawless Libya with little stability Diplomatic Recommendations Likewise, Brazil’s abstention the or security.19 Again, Brazil’s vote affirmed Several proposals would set the U.S.- following year on UNSCR 1973, which its value of nonintervention and peaceful Brazil relationship on a positive path for the authorized UN member states to take settlement of conflicts. next 20 years. They would also allay Brazil’s all necessary measures to protect civil- This common thread of values is historic concerns for sovereignty and reci- ians under threat of attack in Libya, also woven throughout Brazilian diplomacy. procity. Implementation of these recommen- demonstrated Brazil’s consistent pursuit Along with 137 other countries, Brazil dations would garner immediate reciprocal of peaceful diplomacy. Explaining Brazil’s recently supported a UN General Assembly benefits from the Brazilian government and abstention, Ambassador Maria Luiza vote condemning Syrian leaders’ ongoing lay the groundwork for future bilateral coop- 44 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BROWN eration both regionally and globally. Stronger improve bilateral relations and cooperation implies Brazil’s leadership: “We welcome U.S.-Brazil relations would bolster homeland, across a wide range of security and economic efforts by Brazil and our other regional regional, and international security. issues throughout the world, particularly in partners to establish economic and security First, Washington needs to formally South America. This reprioritization would mechanisms, such as the South American endorse Brasilia’s bid for a permanent seat also lend legitimacy to President Obama’s Defense Council (SADC).” The SADC is on the UNSC. The United States extended pledge to treat Brazil as an equal partner, a suborganization of the Union of South this support to India. Brazil’s nominal GDP not a junior one. The NSS declares: “We are American Nations (UNASUR).31 It was is projected to grow to the fifth largest in the working to build deeper and more effective modeled after the European Union, whose world by 2015 while India’s will grow only to partnerships with other key centers of influ- long-term goals of continental integration are ninth largest, immediately behind Russia.21 ence—including China, India, and Russia, as similar. Another regional South American India’s GDP may surpass Brazil’s in the well as increasingly influential nations such organization not mentioned in the NMS is future based on the purchasing power parity as Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia.”28 This MERCOSUR, in which Brazil has become the (PPP) methodology, but once PPP GDP is statement clearly delineates two groupings natural leader due to its expansive economy. adjusted per capita, Brazil will remain ahead of nations. First, it lists China, India, and Through these organizations, Brazil has of India in 2015.22 Furthermore, “Unlike Russia as key centers of influence. Next, it exercised regional leadership by addressing India, [Brazil] has no insurgents, no ethnic lists Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia as regional problems “without having to turn and religious conflicts nor hostile neigh- increasingly influential nations. Both China to extra-regional powers, such as the United bors.”23 It is problematic that India, which and Russia already occupy permanent seats States.”32 In the NSS, President Obama has yet to resolve its conflict in Kashmir on the UNSC affirming that they are key specifically cited Brazil’s exceptional role and Jammu with Pakistan, should receive a centers of influence. in Latin America: “We welcome Brazil’s permanent UNSC seat before Brazil.24 Any Listing Brazil in the NSS as only an leadership and seek to move beyond dated future UN political agreement regarding “increasingly influential nation” after con- North-South divisions to pursue progress on Kashmir would be severely limited by an sidering the evidence of its economic power bilateral, hemispheric, and global issues.”33 Indian veto on the UNSC if this proposed is unsound. Regardless, designating India a These policy statements clearly indicate that agreement is not in New Delhi’s best inter- “key center of influence” is consistent with the United States prefers to work with any est. Other permanent members of the U.S. support for India’s bid for a perma- organization, sovereign or multilateral, that UNSC—France, the United Kingdom, nent seat on the UNSC. Furthermore, the is proactively working to solve problems. and Russia—all affirmed their support for United States and India are already strategic UNASUR, MERCOSUR, and even the Brazil’s bid for a permanent UNSC seat.25 partners because of shared concerns over a Community of Latin American and Carib- China, however, remains uncommitted to potentially hostile China. However, there are bean States are potential U.S. partners for both Brazil and India. Vociferous against enormous differences in security, diplomatic, hemispheric and regional progress. President Japan’s candidacy for a permanent UNSC economic, and democratic contributions to Obama has welcomed Brazil’s leadership seat, China has remained silent with regard to international order between South Africa in these organizations in executive policy India. It is unlikely that China would support and Indonesia, on one hand, and Brazil on documents, but his statements have not been India’s bid for a permanent UNSC seat due the other. The strategic designation of Brazil matched by specific actions. to its growing strategic partnership with the as an increasingly influential nation and not Appointing a U.S. Ambassador to United States to counter China’s military rise. a “key center of influence” supports former UNASUR, as Washington already does for the Also, China does not want to jeopardize its U.S. Ambassador Luigi Einaudi’s view that European Union and Organization of Ameri- growing friendship with Pakistan. If Beijing “Washington’s identification of Brazil with can States, is one measure that would imme- does eventually support Brasilia’s bid to the Latin America and the Third World hampers diately demonstrate practical U.S. support Security Council, Washington would remain its appreciation of Brazil’s importance to the for regional “economic and security mecha- the last holdout. In March 2011, President United States.”29 nisms,” as stated in the NSS. There are several Barack Obama endorsed the concept of an Consider this: South Africa’s and Indo- benefits for the United States. Latin American equal partnership.26 But to be equal partners, nesia’s economies are respectively the 28th and multilateral institutions such as UNASUR Brazil and the United States should be seated 18th in the world. Significantly larger, Brazil provide an alternative to Hugo Chavez’s side by side on the UNSC as permanent hosts the world’s seventh largest economy.30 version of Bolivarianism within the region, members. Failure to endorse Brazil’s bid to Acknowledging Brazil’s global status in the which is a definite concern of the United occupy a permanent seat would confirm NSS would foster a stronger relationship. States. Instead of criticizing the policies of Brazil’s lingering suspicions that “the United It would place Brazil on equal ground with the Venezuelan regime directly, Brazil has States commitment to a mature relationship other major global players such as China and decided to use its own example of establishing between equals is largely rhetorical.”27 Russia. And it would require Congress, the generally good relations throughout the world Second, at the earliest opportunity, the Department of State, and the Department of to encourage Chavez to act more rationally U.S. President should advance Brazil’s posi- Defense to give greater attention to our new than he would if confronted directly about his tion in the National Security Strategy (NSS) equal partner to the south. radical tendencies. This approach has appar- from secondary to one of primary interest. Interestingly, the 2011 U.S. National ently worked.34 By participating as an active Informed by this higher priority, Brazil’s Military Strategy (NMS) actually supports observer in regional organizations, and by leaders would be assured of U.S. intentions to South American regional structures and establishing formal diplomatic relations with ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 45 COMMENTARY | Brazil-U.S. Relations UNASUR, the United States would do much tance has provided Underwater Explosive, a lack of effective law enforcement from the to extinguish any lingering doubts about the Critical Incident, and Special Events Manage- three border nations.39 Concerns increased “Colossus of the North.”35 ment, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, after 9/11 that al Qaeda could transit porous Brasilia’s regional activism enables Nuclear, and related equipment training.”36 borders, perhaps through Mexico, to attack Washington to focus its diminishing foreign Both the 2006 World Cup in Germany and U.S. interests in North America.40 Today, as aid budget on the unstable parts of the the South African event transpired success- the specter of war with Iran rises because of developing world. These proposed diplomatic fully with low-key U.S. security assistance. its purported pursuit of nuclear weapons, initiatives are good faith measures crafted to There were no terrorist attacks despite the concern has moved from attacks by lay the groundwork for greater friendship. ongoing large-scale operations against ter- al Qaeda to attacks by Hizballah and its They should allay Brazilian concerns regard- rorists in Iraq and Afghanistan at the time. patron Iran. As recently as October 2011, ing sovereignty and reciprocity. Addition- When President Obama visited Brazil in Iran was accused of authorizing and financ- ally, more positive U.S.-Brazil relations will 2011, one of the agreements resulting was ing an assassination attempt against the facilitate future bilateral cooperation on a memorandum of understanding (MOU) Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United economic and defense measures regionally between the United States and Brazil con- States and contemplating further attacks and throughout the world. cerning world sporting events cooperation. in Argentina.41 Successful terrorist attacks Security was one of the MOU’s six focus areas against Argentina were carried out in 1992 Military Recommendations of cooperation. This MOU is foundational for and 1994 by a Hizballah militant organiza- Strengthened military relations natu- the U.S. Departments of State and Defense tion supported by Iran. Terrorists exploited rally flow from improved diplomatic rela- to provide any future support desired by the the TBA during each operation.42 The most tions. As regional leaders, the United States Brazilian government.37 telling evidence of potential terrorist attacks and Brazil can focus their combined security One of the great strengths of the United out of the TBA surfaced during a Hizbal- efforts and resources against common States resides in its intelligence databases, lah militiaman’s interview by Spanish threats to both nations—and to the entire whose holdings and effectiveness have grown television station Telemundo. The militant Western Hemisphere. Intelligence-sharing substantially since 9/11. For the 2014 World stated emphatically that if the United States during the upcoming World Cup and Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics in Brazil, an attacked Iran, Hizballah would conduct Olympic games, coordinated counterterror- intelligence-sharing mechanism would help retaliatory attacks inside the United ism measures in the Tri-Border Area (TBA, deter terrorism threats. Successful physical or States.43 Counterterrorism expert Edward the name given to the area surrounding the virtual sharing could continue afterward to Luttwak described the TBA as Hizballah’s border shared among Brazil, Argentina, and address other regional security threats, such most important base outside Lebanon, from Paraguay), and disrupting narco-trafficking as drug-trafficking and organized crime. Of which they have already supported terrorist between South America and Africa are course, extending temporary intelligence- attacks: “The northern region of Argentina, among the more pressing cooperation sharing after the events may be problematic the eastern region of Paraguay and even initiatives that can bring greater security due to Brazilian memory of its authoritarian Brazil are large terrains, and they have an to both countries and to the hemisphere. past, when the military regime collected organized training and recruitment camp Close security and defense cooperation in intelligence to deter internal dissent.38 U.S. for terrorists.”44 the future, absent the historic shadow of U.S. officials have the next 4 years to convince The historical evidence of terrorist activity emanating from the TBA is chill- ing. If the current crisis with Iran is not close security and defense cooperation would help in resolved by the time of the World Cup and reestablishing the Unwritten Alliance dynamic Olympics, the Brazilian government will need substantial help in preventing terror- ist attacks aimed at disrupting the games imperialism, would help in reestablishing the Brazilian government of its benign and attracting a global audience. Even now, the Unwritten Alliance dynamic between the intentions. With less than 2 years before the Hizballah terrorists may be inclined to United States and Brazil that flourished in opening kick of 2014 World Cup, beta testing strike at Israeli or American targets in the the first half of the 20th century. of this provisional intelligence-sharing Western Hemisphere in retaliation for a When Brazil hosts the World Cup and arrangement should begin immediately to recent UNSC resolution that placed addi- Olympics, it will be in the U.S. national inter- track terrorist threats likely to originate in tional sanctions on Iran. Hizballah attacked est to assist its efforts in countering terrorism, the Tri-Border Area. its targets in Argentina for lesser reasons curbing drug-trafficking, and reducing inter- in 1992 and 1994. This is why intelligence- national crime. The United States provided Exposed Southern Flank sharing with Brazil must start now. The last similar support to South Africa during the The United States has long worried time the United States held a 3+1 Group World Cup in 2010, assisting in preventing about the Tri-Border Area. In these border Meeting (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and devastating terrorist attacks on that world towns, laws are minimally enforced, money the United States) on TBA security was stage. South African security services ben- is laundered, and weapons, drugs, and in 2004.45 This group should reconvene efited from security grants and extensive people are trafficked. Organized crime and at the earliest opportunity to assess the training: “Specifically, Anti-Terrorism Assis- Islamic extremism have thrived there due to current terrorist threat within the TBA and 46 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BROWN determine the probabilities of Hizballah Brazil’s Initiative for Cooperation Conclusion becoming operational if Iran is attacked. The last area of convergence and With the war in Iraq over and the war Nevertheless, collaborative intelligence cooperation is not American, but Brazilian. in Afghanistan winding down, the United initiatives must extend to the World Cup Brasília is as interested as Washington in a States has the opportunity to reassess its and Olympic timeframes if Iran continues stronger relationship. Former foreign min- global strategic interests. U.S. leaders must to violate UNSC resolutions concerning its ister Celso Amorin, who is now the defense carefully scrutinize Brazil’s potential as a nuclear program. It is in both countries’ minister, recognized that there is enormous long-term strategic partner. A new era of national interests to prevent attacks against potential for structured cooperation between security cooperation with Brazil supports their homelands. Certainly, Brazil does not Brazil and the United States in areas of the the interests of both nations and strengthens want its territory used as a springboard for world such as Africa, where there is great the Western Hemisphere. Collaboration on attacks within the region. Full cooperation need for development and stability.48 Min- World Cup and Olympic security is vital to in this security arena would assist in pre- ister Amorin has cited the trilateral coop- the whole world. Many hemispheric home- venting the unthinkable until the Iran crisis eration agreement among Brazil, Guinea- lands are at risk if war breaks out with Iran over dual-use nuclear material is resolved. Bissau, and the United States as an example for whatever reason. Also, drug lords moving of productive cooperation. This was a first of narcotics from South America to Europe Narco-terrorist Connection its kind agreement for the United States and through Africa represent new relationships Cooperation in breaking the Brazil– Brazil in Africa. of convenience that provide funds for AQIM West Africa narcotics connection is another These trilateral agreements make and other terrorists that further converge area where national interests converge. In strategic sense because bilateral agree- U.S.-Brazil interests. As Brazil grows, so will 2009, Brazil became the primary embarka- ments between the United States and its security concerns. It has become a respon- tion point for South American cocaine relatively poor countries usually elicit sible international player that is seeking headed for West Africa, where “there is criticism that the world’s only superpower greater diplomatic and security cooperation evidence by the U.S. Drug Enforcement is engaging in exploitive neocolonialism. with the United States. It is willing to help [Administration] . . . that Latin American Having itself been a Portuguese colony, secure the hemispheric and global commons traffickers are collaborating with [al Qaeda] Brazil is viewed as a moderating influ- to ensure freedom, stability, and prosperity.51 in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Hezbol- ence on perceived expansive U.S. foreign However, the United States, acknowledging lah to smuggle cocaine to Europe.”46 The policy. It is also considered a friendly its domineering past in this region, must executive director of the UN Office on Drugs observer to the Non-Aligned Movement give a little to gain a lot. Only then can the and Crime also confirmed that terrorists of 120 countries that are distrustful of Unwritten Alliance be restored. JFQ from Africa used money from drug-traffick- superpower diplomacy.49 Plainly spoken, if ing to resource operations, purchase equip- Brazil is part of a U.S. agreement with an ment, and provide salaries for their ranks.47 It impoverished country, that country feels Notes is common knowledge that the United States more comfortable making an agreement 1 conducts counterterrorist operations against with the United States because Brazil, a Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective,” AQIM and seeks to stop any funding derived guarantor of U.S. intentions, is part of Foreign Affairs 89, no. 6 (November–December from the transshipment of cocaine from it. Brazil welcomes this role because it 2010), 2–12. Latin America. Although Brazil itself does enhances its position as a regional and 2 International Monetary Fund (IMF), “IMF not produce significant amounts of cocaine, world leader, establishes a singularly Data Mapper,” September 2011, available at it does have 10,500 miles of mostly unsecured special diplomatic relationship with Economic Times, October 19, 2011, available 2013, available at 48 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu JCSE JCSE members ensure rapid connectivity to multiple users accessing network and deploying assets during operational exercise Joint Communications Support Element The Voice Heard ’Round the World By Kirby E. Watson n early January 2010, a catastrophic 7.0-magnitude earthquake rippled through Port-au-Prince, Haiti, affecting more than 3 million people and resulting in one of the worst natural disasters in history. More than 250,000 homes and buildings were destroyed including the Presidential Palace, National Assembly I building, and headquarters of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. Additionally, the earth- quake knocked out communications systems and electrical networks that were essential to respond to the various needs of Haitian citizens during this time of extreme devastation. Enter the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), which arrived in Haiti within 24 hours of the earthquake and provided the first joint and secure communication capabilities in the country. JCSE communica- tions equipment enabled the Haitian government to communicate with the U.S. President, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Department of State to identify the way ahead for relief operations. In Colonel Kirby E. Watson, USA, is Commander of the Joint Communications Support Element at MacDill Air Force Base. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 49 COMMENTARY | The Voice Heard ‘Round the World addition, JCSE provided the initial secure in 2011, both the JECC and its subordinate ernment in June of 1979. Within 14 hours, voice, network, and video-teleconference commands were reassigned to U.S. Trans- JCSE had provided secure communications to capabilities for Joint Task Force (JTF)–Haiti portation Command. USS Wainwright and USS Saipan in the vicin- commander, Lieutenant General Ken Keen, Despite JCSE’s continuous evolution ity of the Panama Canal. USA, and his staff. Without JCSE’s ability over the last 50 years, the essence of the to provide these essential communications original CSE mission has remained at the As word of the element’s capabili- ties spread throughout the Department of Defense (DOD), the demand for JCSE JCSE’s persistent focus on expeditionary, increased exponentially. Additionally, in joint communications support has taken it all over the mid-1980s, JCSE adjusted its mission to the world to assist in some of the most highly publicized provide concurrent joint communications support to more than one commander. Spe- U.S. military operations of the last half century cifically, this included direct JCSE support to two JTFs and two joint special operations task forces simultaneously. For JCSE to capabilities in the time period immediately forefront. JCSE’s persistent focus on expedi- provide communications to multiple, simul- following the earthquake, it is possible that tionary, joint communications support has taneous missions, two Air National Guard U.S. humanitarian assistance efforts may not taken it all over the world to assist in some units—the 224th and 290th Joint Communica- have been as successful. of the most highly publicized U.S. military tions Support Squadrons—were aligned to This article demonstrates that commu- operations of the last half century. the JCSE mission. nications during a disaster relief operation is Over the next few years, JCSE solidified only one of the many mission sets that JCSE Ever-changing Mission its position and value within DOD during is prepared to support. With over 50 years of When JCSE was initially stood up various noteworthy operations such as: joint communications experience across the in 1961, each branch of the Armed Forces full spectrum of military operations, JCSE already maintained its own signal/communi- ■■ Operations Desert Shield/Desert has earned the designation of the “Voice cations units. However, those resources were Storm: JCSE provided the communications Heard ’Round the World.” typically predesignated for specific mission between the in-theater forces and the com- sets and therefore could not meet the demand mander of USCENTCOM. The Establishment of JCSE for joint or multi-Service crisis operations. ■■ Operation Restore Hope: JCSE pro- JCSE, a subordinate command of JCSE was established to fill this gap as a dedi- vided a package capable of supporting a JTF the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command cated communications resource for short- with satellite communications, secure voice, (JECC), was originally established at notice contingency operations. Additionally, facsimile, and telephone.2 MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, in 1961 as as a multi-Service and eventually a fully joint ■■ Operation Support Hope: JCSE pro- the Communications Support Element (CSE) unit, JCSE had the unique ability to enable vided essential communications support to under the now disestablished U.S. Strike commanders to communicate across multi- the JTF headquartered in Entebbe, Uganda.3 Command (USSTRICOM). With just over Service platforms and leverage the most effi- 400 Air Force and Army personnel assigned, cient means of communication to accomplish Within the past 10 years, JCSE’s the CSE was established to serve as a quick the mission. primary focus has been on operations in the response communications unit during crisis Within the first two decades of its USCENTCOM area of responsibility follow- and contingency operations. In 1972, the existence, JCSE’s two original Active-duty ing the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent Navy and Marine Corps joined the CSE, and squadrons—the 1st and 2nd Joint Communi- war on terror. JCSE members were deployed it was appropriately redesignated as JCSE. cations Squadrons (JCS)—employed their within weeks of 9/11 and were actively Operational control was transferred to the expertise to a variety of military opera- involved in operations in Afghanistan barely Joint Chiefs of Staff while U.S. Readiness tions including: 2 months later. JCSE troopers were some of Command (USREDCOM) gained respon- the first military responders to arrive in Iraq sibility for administrative and logistical ■■ Support to the commander of JTF-Leo to support Operation Iraqi Freedom in March support. At the deactivation of USREDCOM in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in of 2003 and have since maintained a con- in 1987, administrative control of JCSE 1964. JCSE established the initial communica- tinuous presence in the country throughout was reassigned to U.S. Central Command tions connectivity from JTF-Leo to the com- that operation (March 2003—August 2010) (USCENTCOM) where it remained until mander of USSTRICOM. and the duration of the follow-on mission, 1998 when it transferred to U.S. Atlantic ■■ The international peacekeeping force Operation New Dawn (September 2010– Command (which transitioned to U.S. Joint organized to counter the rebel invasion of December 2011). Over 2,000 JCSE members Forces Command [USJFCOM] in 1999) southern Zaire in 1978. JCSE provided a have rotated through Iraq in support of these along with operational control. In 2008, the communications link for the former Military operations, and as U.S. troops withdrew from JECC was established and JCSE became one Airlift Command between Zaire and Corsica.1 Iraq following the completion of New Dawn of its three subordinate commands. Fol- ■■ The evacuation of U.S. citizens from on December 15, 2011, the final three JCSE lowing the disestablishment of USJFCOM Nicaragua under the fall of the Somoza gov- members in Iraq deployed to home station, 50 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu WATSON JCSE JCSE team sets up Deployable Joint Command and Control system thus ending JCSE’s uninterrupted support to Global Response Force execution, and bridge system can be broken down into reduced a mission that spanned almost 9 years. Addi- joint operational requirements. Currently portions to provide communications to tionally, since March of 2002, JCSE has pro- commanded by Rear Admiral Scott Stearney, small mobile missions or midsize JTFs. vided continuous communications to joint USN, the JECC offers a highly skilled team These condensed packages have the same and special operations forces units in various that rapidly increases joint force command functionality as the full DJC2, only on a locations throughout Pakistan, Afghanistan, and control capability at the operational level smaller scale. To support the aforementioned and elsewhere for multiple missions stem- of a newly formed joint force headquarters. In geographic combatant commands, JCSE ming from Operation Enduring Freedom. addition to JCSE, the JECC also gained two maintains direct support detachments of 16 In March 2005, JCSE was tasked as a other subordinate commands upon its estab- members, each responsible for the mainte- global joint force command, control, com- lishment: the Joint Public Affairs Support nance and employment of the DJC2 at their munications, and computer (C4) enabler. Element and Joint Planning Support Element. respective command headquarters. When Reorganizing existing resources to add Additionally, in 2008, the Secretary of additional support is needed, JCSE can another Active-duty squadron (3rd JCS), JCSE Defense tasked JCSE with the maintenance deploy a surge team of 10 members, who are was postured to support this new role. The 4th and operation of the Deployable Joint also trained on the DJC2 system and can fall JCS, an Army Reserve squadron, was added Command and Control (DJC2) systems for in on the detachments for extra assistance. in 2006 to bring additional strategic depth U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), U.S. Since being tasked with the DJC2 mission and flexibility supporting the successful Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), set, each of the combatant commands’ DJC2 execution of the JCSE mission. U.S. European Command, and U.S. Africa system has been used during both Chairman In 2008, the JECC was established to Command. The DJC2, an integrated of the Joint Chief of Staff’s exercises and real- provide rapidly deployable, mission-tailored command and control headquarters system, world operations. joint capability packages to combatant com- can provide unclassified/classified network Most recently, USPACOM deployed its manders in order to facilitate the rapid estab- access to a full JTF of up to 1,500 users. If DJC2 system and detachment to Yokota Air lishment of joint force headquarters, fulfill a full JTF is not needed, the versatile DJC2 Base in support of Operation Tomodachi, the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 51 COMMENTARY | The Voice Heard ‘Round the World humanitarian assistance operation following One of the major contributing factors Honoré, USA (Ret.), the JTF-Katrina com- the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and in this significant reduction of both man- mander. A small executive communications subsequent nuclear disaster in Japan. Once power and equipment was JCSE’s initiation kit was designed specifically for the mission notified, it took the JCSE team approximately of the “Everything over Internet Protocol” to provide 24/7 access to secure/nonsecure 72 hours to forward deploy and have the (EoIP) communications architecture. Legacy voice, data, and Internet via the EoIP archi- DJC2 system set up and fully operational. communications systems used circuit-based tecture. The kit, which Honoré took with him The communications provided to the joint networks that required serial cabling and wherever he traveled, allowed him to sustain force commander, which included unclassi- consumed large amounts of valuable band- command and control of the numerous agen- fied and classified network access and video- width dedicated to specific communication cies supporting the relief efforts. teleconferencing, was critical to ensuring the services. The EoIP architecture sends com- JCSE uses a bottom-up approach in military units could communicate quickly munication services over IP satellite modems designing, testing, fielding, and sustaining and effectively during relief efforts. that allocate bandwidth as required, resulting its capabilities. This approach is focused on in a pool of available bandwidth and increas- small unit deployments at the tactical edge Revolutionizing Military ing user flexibility to change between com- for proof of concept while planning for scal- Communications munications services on demand. ability to larger size deployments and opera- Early in its history, JCSE began JCSE’s transition to EoIP technology, tions up to a JTF headquarters. This approach working with industry to develop joint led by the operational and technical vision also emphasizes the on-scene commander as solutions. This practice—along with JCSE’s of Colonel Thomas Hopkins, USA, the JCSE primary mission support. ability to rapidly test, integrate, and field commander from 2004 to 2007, enabled JCSE uses its unique strengths to rapidly the latest communication technologies—led the element to radically condense its com- field sustainable, certified solutions meeting the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate a JCSE munications packages into smaller and more joint force requirements. It does this by: modernization program equitably funded by deployable entities that were increasingly cost each Service. JCSE’s modernization program efficient and resulted in a more effective and ■■ building on the vast amount of knowl- integrates emerging technology into certi- flexible network for joint forces. edge and experience in planning, executing, fied systems to fill gaps in joint force C4. An additional advantage of the EoIP and supporting joint force missions JCSE partners with commercial industry technology is the ability for JCSE to tailor ■■ collaborating within the joint C4 com- to integrate, test, and certify C4 systems its communications packages to a fluid, munity to identify requirements unique to the based on commercial off-the-shelf technol- developing mission. During the initial for- dynamic tactical environment ogy and equipment. After obtaining formal mation of a JTF, JCSE normally deploys a ■■ leveraging JCSE ability to field solu- tions through the acquisition process. from small, mobile team missions to full-sized JTFs, As JCSE’s mission expanded over the JCSE can deploy assets rapidly and scale support past few years, DOD has entrusted the man- agement and employment of various com- to provide the necessary capabilities munications assets to the element. As the leader in global C4 capabilities, it was only fitting that JCSE have a major role in these Joint Staff interoperability and information small package that supports just five users. evolving technologies. assurance certification, JCSE’s lightweight However, as the JTF increases operational In partnership with the Defense and highly mobile systems are completely capability and additional forces begin arriv- Information Systems Agency (DISA), JCSE interoperable with Service communications ing, JCSE can scale that same basic package maintains the Defense Information Systems equipment and capabilities. to support up to 1,500 users without any Network–Tactical Edge (DISN-TE), a global Over time, this modernization program interruption to service. enterprise network capable of supporting all has enabled JCSE to create communication JCSE’s rapid integration of this technol- combatant commands. This network was packages that are consistently smaller, lighter, ogy was particularly important during the established to integrate, manage, and control and faster than previous iterations. The goal disaster relief operations following the dev- a wide variety of communications interfaces is not only to make the equipment more reli- astating effects of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. between the network and deployed tacti- able and efficient, but also to reduce the size The destruction of the storm left the Gulf cal satellite C4 assets. DISN-TE is an EoIP and footprint of the equipment, as well as the coast without much of its communications enhancement of the existing Standard Tacti- personnel needed to move and operate com- infrastructure, and it was imperative that cal Entry Point (STEP)/Teleport reachback munications packages. For instance, 40 years senior military leaders, who were challenged service consistent with the overall structure ago, a communications package servicing by the intermittent operations of land/cellular of the Global Information Grid (GIG) archi- 20 users weighed more than 30,000 pounds phone lines and commercial Internet, had the tecture and GIG master plan as formulated and required a C-130 aircraft to transport. ability to communicate quickly and reliably. by DISA. DISN-TE encompasses telecommu- Today, a comparable package can fit into four JCSE took this opportunity to employ nications collection and distribution points airline checkable cases and weighs less than an innovative EoIP communications package that provide deployed warfighters with mul- 300 pounds. to support Lieutenant General Russel L. tiband, multimedia, and worldwide access. 52 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu WATSON JCSE Soldiers establish connectivity after airborne jump during combined tactical warfighting training The system provides extended connectivity has succeeded in this arena by developing a daily basis, JCSE executes three essential via multiple military and commercial satellite versatile concept of operations that can be “no fail” tasks: communications frequencies and increases applied across the full spectrum of military overall capability. Along with DISA, JCSE operations. From small, mobile team mis- ■■ operate, secure, and manage a global operates eight DISN-TE sites around the sions to full-sized JTFs, JCSE can deploy network supporting distributed operations world and therefore can provide the deployed assets rapidly and scale support to provide (conventional forces) and global pursuit warfighter with a level of support that is the necessary capabilities. (special operations forces) unmatched elsewhere in DOD. Additionally, as part of the Global ■■ understand operational and technical Response Force, JCSE is the premier source requirements across geographic combat- Responsibility for Unique Missions for a joint force commander’s immediate ant commands and U.S. Special Operations The current national security and early entry C4 capability. In compliance Command to deliver near-ubiquitous com- environment has increased the number with the guidelines outlined in the Global munications and services in all combatant of “no-notice” JTFs that are needed to Response Force Execute Order, JCSE main- command theaters support a wide range of operational and tains an alert-postured force that can deploy ■■ prepare technically and tactically task- humanitarian missions. Although these and have its communications packages fully organized teams across the full spectrum of operations feature a wide variety of forces, operational within hours of notification for operations in ground, maritime, air, and cyber organizations, and mission sets, they share an emerging requirement.4 warfighting domains. a common need for rapid deployment of communications capabilities to establish Delivering Capabilities to the Joint Within the framework of these three effective command and control in the Force persistent tasks, JCSE has pursued several ini- shortest time possible. All JCSE operations are performed tiatives aimed at setting conditions for success Since the JCSE mission set spans theater within the context of ensuring reliable in the future joint operational environment. strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and secure delivery of both capability and JCSE’s primary focus areas for future opera- it needs to be flexible enough to respond readiness across the full spectrum of mili- tions are enabling joint force mobility and to whatever mission it is tasked with. JCSE tary operations in multiple domains. On a conducting joint cyber operations. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 53 COMMENTARY | The Voice Heard ‘Round the World Enabling Joint Force Mobility. A is designed to minimize the time required JCSE applies operational art to the current focus of JSCE is to develop, test, and to transfer the equipment between different cyber domain by following four principles: field capabilities to enhance joint force mobil- UAV platforms. JACS V3 also provides reach- ity. Mobility applies to both the physical and back capability to a tactical operations center ■■ define the cyber battlespace to identify electronic components of the ground, mari- through an embedded Ku-band radio. JACC/ the joint area of influence and area of interest time, and air domains. CP provides the joint force with in-flight/ ■■ comprehend friendly networks to With regards to physical components, enroute secure voice and data communica- baseline network performance and behavior JCSE enables mobility through its reliable, tions on board C-130 and C-17 aircraft. to support anomaly detection secure, and lightweight communications JACC/CP supports a command and control ■■ train the force through an integrated equipment packages. These commercial element of up to 14 people. training curriculum, including both industry- and military-focused education, knowledge, and experience JCSE’s stellar reputation allows it to seek out only the best ■■ link cyberspace to intelligence and network and system administrators, satellite and field radio operational activities by integrating cyber operators, and data network specialists from each Service intelligence support into mission planning and operational processes. off-the-shelf systems are easily transported In the maritime domain, mobility is Value Beyond the Battlefield and activated at the deployed location. The enabled by a maritime variant of JCSE’s light- Part of what makes JCSE stand out systems, designed to be displaced with little weight communications kit. The maritime from other communications units is the 24/7 effort and minimal service disruption, have variant provides connectivity and services to reachback support it provides. In addition a sufficiently small footprint allowing for an embarked JTF headquarters. As a platform to its world-class communications equip- the use of commercial transportation as agnostic system, the maritime variant is a ment, JCSE ensures reliable communications much as possible. critical component of JCSE’s integrated archi- through its Joint Network Operations Center Ensuring mobility for electronic com- tecture for supporting distributed operations (JNOC), maintained from its headquarters at ponents includes having the ability to support in the maritime domain and helps meet joint MacDill Air Force Base. The JNOC employs, distributed and maneuver element operations force requirements for: operates, and defends the DISN-TE enterprise while maintaining access to required infor- 24/7, while providing assured network avail- mation. JCSE can provide mobility for both ■■ aerial layer networking to an extended ability, information protection, and delivery physical and electronic components through- range of maritime communications across the full spectrum of operations. More- out the ground, maritime, and air domains. ■■ increased intelligence, surveillance, over, it provides the only military-specific In the ground domain, JCSE enables and reconnaissance receipt and dissemination communication network using EoIP technol- joint force mobility through its small, throughout the operating area ogy. Essentially, the JNOC is JCSE’s heartbeat lightweight, and scalable communications ■■ connectivity to the supported geo- for real-time situational awareness. packages. The Initial Entry Package (IEP), graphic combatant command headquarters In addition to the JCSE communica- Early Entry Package (EEP), and Joint Mobil- ■■ information exchange with special tions packages that were deployed to support ity Package provide secure and nonsecure operations forces JTF-Haiti, the value of the JNOC was voice, video, and data to small mobile teams ■■ information exchange with coalition validated during this operation. The JNOC operating worldwide. The IEP and EEP can partners worked diligently with USSOUTHCOM, be rapidly scaled to meet force surge require- ■■ reachback to national-level intelli- DISA, and JTF–Global Network Operations ments from small dismounted teams up to gence assets in the continental United States to establish a common operation picture as an advance echelon joint headquarters of ■■ network operations covering all com- well as a network operations management 40 users. GIG services are extended to the bined JTF operations and network nodes capability for JTF-Haiti. This capability, deployed location through connection to ■■ enroute planning and communica- known as the Joint Network Operations JCSE’s DISN-TE gateways located at selected tions capability. Control Center (JNCC), essentially pro- STEP locations. vided full network situational awareness by In the airborne domain, JCSE enables Conducting Joint Cyber Operations. monitoring networks from all the Services mobility through its Joint Airborne Com- JCSE’s joint cyber operations take place in supporting JTF-Haiti with a specific focus munications System (JACS) and Joint Air- an operating environment where threats on maintaining information assurance and borne Communications Center/Command to mission accomplishment are growing network defense. The use of the JNCC was Post (JACC/CP). JACS provides an airborne in both complexity and frequency. Threats the first time that this level of coordination radio relay connection for VHF and UHF to cyber assets can be internal or external and visibility had been available during a communications range extension and relay. and caused by natural or manmade events. large-scale operation and was critical to the JACS Version 2 operates from either a C-12 Adversaries have demonstrated an ability mission’s success. or C-130 airframe. JACS Version 3 (V3) and willingness to use cyberspace to deny, increases operational flexibility by operating degrade, or disrupt friendly force communi- from an unmanned aerial vehicle. JACS V3 cations and information flows. 54 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu WATSON Key to Continued Success The element’s unique position allows JCSE’s success is a direct result of it to leverage all Service schools. Troops the combined efforts of its highly trained, assigned to JCSE can expect to have oppor- dedicated, and professional members. For- tunities to attend the airborne and air assault tunately, JCSE’s stellar reputation allows it to schools, along with pathfinder, survival, NEW seek out only the best network and system evasion, resistance, escape training, moun- from NDU Press administrators, satellite and field radio tain warfare training, and various Service for the operators, and data network specialists from technical schools. JCSE members train exten- Center for Strategic Research each Service. For those personnel in a com- sively on commercial telecommunications Institute for National Strategic Studies munications specialty, a position at JCSE is systems and obtain civilian certifications on a desirable stepping stone that often leads to operation and protection measures for hard- key assignments when they return to their ware and software. Strategic Forum 278 respective Services. Former JCSE members have taken Offshore Control: A With an ever-increasing operational such pride in their time and experiences that Proposed Strategy for tempo, JCSE’s Servicemembers, especially they founded the JCSE Veterans Association an Unlikely Conflict noncommissioned officers (NCOs), have in 2001. With over 300 members currently, taken on more responsibility and an the association connects members of JCSE By T.X. Hammes enhanced leadership role. JCSE NCOs par- and its squadrons, both past and present. In ticipate in planning and operational support addition to maintaining a detailed account This paper is the start at a level that previously would have been of JCSE’s history, the organization supports of what the author reserved for more senior personnel. NCOs current Servicemembers and their families hopes will be a deep, and junior enlisted personnel at JCSE pass through scholarship programs and fundrais- wide-ranging discus- through a screening process to ensure they ing events. sion of potential strategies for a are up to the task. They receive technical and The Joint Communications Support conflict with China. While such a conflict is leadership training from Service schools, as Element is regarded as the center of excel- undesirable and highly unlikely, it is driving well as additional training from industry. lence in joint military communications. Its many of the Pentagon’s investment decisions Continual emphasis is placed on planning, communication/equipment packages are today. Under a proposed strategy of “Offshore training, and execution at the team level. cutting edge, its services are extremely reli- Control,” the United States would work with JCSE NCOs have exceptional flexibility in able, its members are the most highly skilled, Asia-Pacific nations to interdict China’s energy identifying those areas in which their teams and its performance is flawless. JCSE’s and raw material imports and industrial need additional training and then designing exceptional communication technology and exports, while protecting our partners. This those training programs. service already has or soon will impact every strategy would have several advantages: it would Additionally, JCSE offers an oppor- single member of the Armed Forces. As tech- slow a crisis down, reducing escalatory pressure tunity for enlisted personnel to earn joint nology advances at an increasingly rapid pace on decisionmakers; align U.S. strategic require- ments with the resources available; take advan- experience. A troop may work with or for in the next few years, JCSE will be sure to tage of Pacific geography to provide strategic, NCOs from each branch of the Armed remain at the forefront to lead the charge as operational, and tactical advantages for U.S. JFQ Forces, contributing to a well-rounded and the Voice Heard 'Round the World. forces; provide a way for the conflict to end that comprehensive understanding of the various is consistent with previous Communist Chinese communication capabilities of each Service. behavior; and finally, provide for conflict reso- This thorough joint expertise is not only a Notes lution that does not require an unobtainable fundamental benefit during JCSE deploy- “decisive” victory. 1 ments, but it is also a knowledge base that Military Airlift Command was inactivated in June of 1992, and its remaining personnel and troops can employ during future assignments resources were reassigned to the Air Mobility with their own Services. Command. A position within JCSE is rewarding 2 Operation Restore Hope was the 1992 U.S.- because of the opportunity for members led intervention into Somalia to establish a secure to excel and hone their skills. JCSE affords environment for humanitarian relief operations. members the freedom to identify areas in 3 Operation Support Hope was the 1994 U.S. which they may want to gain additional military effort to provide humanitarian assistance knowledge and then fully supports them in to refugees of the Rwandan genocide. their endeavors. Regardless of the member’s 4 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Service branch or position in the element, Global Response Force Executive Order Mod 2 JCSE leadership encourages cross-training, DTG:272126Z September 2012 (SECRET). initiative, ambition, and invention and vows never to hinder or deter a member who Visit the NDU Press Web site shows passion for furthering his knowledge for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu and training. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 55 Command and Control Vulnerabilities to Communications Jamming By Ronald C. Wilgenbusch and Alan Heisig f the United States ever has to face a peer adversary in a no-holds-barred fight, we will encounter a serious operational obstacle. The way we command and control our forces is highly vulnerable to disastrous disruption. Modern operations have become dependent I on high-capacity communications, and this vulnerability could cause our forces to sustain a serious mauling or, perhaps, not to prevail. Why is this? The ability to provide the information required for successful high-impact/ low-committed asset warfare has developed an overwhelming reliance on unprotected com- munications satellites. There is an increasing public awareness of these vulnerabilities and the relative ease by which jamming can foil our methods of highly effective warfare. In this article, jamming is defined as electronically rendering a circuit or network unusable by disrupting it so it cannot be effectively used as a means of communication for purposes of command and control. Such an attack could be directed against any portion of the communications system and be of extended duration or else just long enough to lose crypto synchronization. Jamming is at the discretion of the enemy. It does not have to be constant or dependent on large fixed sites. It is often difficult to immediately distinguish jamming from other information flow disruptions caused by systemic disturbances such as cryptographic resets, system management changes, and natural phenomena. U.S. Air Force maintenance technicians conduct pre-flight checks on RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle DOD (Andy M. Kim) 56 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu WILGENBUSCH and HEISIG While we have placed an appropri- Defense. The guidance states, “we will con- dependencies on protected communications. ate emphasis on cyber warfare, we have tinue to invest in the capabilities critical to The protection of information and ability to neglected the less sophisticated threat of future success, including intelligence, sur- maintain freedom of maneuver in space is jamming. At some point prior to or during veillance, and reconnaissance [ISR]; coun- essential to Army success;6 the highly mobile combat, an adversary might decide spoofing, terterrorism; countering weapons of mass Army of the future requires communications intrusion, and exploitation of our networks destruction; operating in anti-access [and on the move with networked operations. are insufficient. The adversary could try to area-denial (A2/AD)2] environments; and It depends on the availability of high- shut our networks down. prevailing in all domains, including cyber.”3 bandwidth, reliable, protected satellite com- By Ronald C. Wilgenbusch and Alan Heisig Then what? If our networks are We have taken great strides along these lines, munications to achieve this goal.7 The Air jammed, commanders in the field, at sea, but are we fully prepared? Force is hotly debating the methodologies to and in the air would not be able to employ The space-enabled communications ensure space capabilities, including protected their forces adequately. Our warfighters are systems used by the U.S. military are the communications, at a balanced cost and risk.8 dependent on these links to coordinate joint most omnipresent information infrastructure The Navy has reorganized its entire infor- information, make reports, request supplies, to deployed forces. The military depends mation apparatus to focus on information coordinate land, sea, and air operations, and largely on commercial broadcast satellite dominance as a key element of its future. The evacuate wounded. Clever application of systems architectures. In some cases, it leases Joint Staff has reestablished its J6 Command, jamming might go undiagnosed for a long capacity from the same operators of satellite Control, Communications, and Comput- period. Most likely, initial attribution would systems that commercial organizations use. ers/Cyber Directorate due to the increased be to equipment malfunction, crypto prob- These systems are virtually unprotected importance of and dependence on assured lems, or operator error. This dependency is a against jamming, which is probably the information technology and networks. significant vulnerability—one that can only cheapest, most readily available, and most The dependence on information flows get worse unless action is taken soon to direct likely form of denying or degrading the reli- (communications) of all kinds has produced our communication paths toward more pro- ability of information flow. superior combat efficiencies and effective- tected communications systems. Communications networks are deci- ness. Today’s Army uses significantly smaller In 2010, Loren Thompson of the sive in all aspects of U.S. global military and dispersed units to operationally control Lexington Institute published an article responsibilities. Commander of U.S. Pacific battlespace areas than in prior warfight- pointing out this gap in future warfighting Command, Admiral Samuel Locklear, high- ing constructs. The shift to strategic small capability.1 He stated that 80 to 90 percent of lighted this issue: “we still have to be able to units is possible, in part, because of the all military transmission travels on vulner- operate the networks that allow us to produce significantly increased lethality of smaller able commercial satellite communications combat power . . . so one of my priority jobs units enabled by the use of ISR and precision channels and that only 1 percent of defense is to ensure those [command] networks will weapons. This precision, however, depends communications is protected against even survive when they have to survive.”4 largely on reliable communications. This modest jamming. He asserts that the “only overall change in operational concepts has satellite constellation the military is currently Why So Critical? become a fundamental shift in military building that can provide protection against Since the 1980s, the U.S. military’s thinking. The Army is starting to build the full array of potential communications approach to conventional operations has around the platoon level and the Marine threats is the Advanced Extremely High become more dependent on access to space- Corps around the squad. Special operations Frequency (AEHF) system. . . . The feasible, based systems—particularly long-haul forces build around the team. This shift affordable answer is not to begin a new satellite communications and the precision exponentially expands the need for high program, but to start incrementally evolving navigation and timing information provided bandwidth information, particularly ISR. AEHF towards a more robust capability.” His by the Global Positioning System (GPS) The ability to provide the required assessment recognizes the persistent historic constellation. For this reason, the military voluminous information has so far devel- demand for greater capacity through satellite has invested heavily in developing battle oped a strong reliance on unprotected satel- communications links. networks to detect, identify, and track targets lites including the ability to use unmanned In January 2012, the Department with sufficient timely precision to enable aerial vehicles (UAVs) and beyond-line- of Defense (DOD) released its Strategic them to be struck. Intelligence, surveillance, of-sight capabilities for over-the-horizon Defense Guidance entitled Sustaining U.S. and reconnaissance systems reflect how control and real-time communication. This Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century dependent U.S. forces have become on access has led to an increasingly widespread public to the orbital and cyber dimensions of the discussion of the vulnerabilities of using global commons.5 unprotected satellite communications.9 The Rear Admiral Ronald C. Wilgenbusch, USN (Ret.), is a Consultant in Command, Control, In concert with the move toward preci- ubiquitous use of unprotected commercial Communications, Computers, and Intelligence sion munitions, U.S. warfighting doctrine wideband satellite communications leads (C4I). During his career, he served as an Electronic has become inseparably joint at all levels of to a false sense of comfort and assurance of Technician, Surface Warfare Officer, and Acquisition the Services. Joint coordination between availability, which is deceptively dangerous. Professional. Captain Alan Heisig, USN (Ret.), is widely dispersed forces is only possible by Jamming is the enemy’s side of asymmetric also a Consultant in C4I. He commanded several assured information flows. Moreover, all Ser- information warfare. surface ships and amphibious squadrons. vices have an increasing realization of their ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 57 COMMENTARY | Vulnerabilities to Communications Jamming reality. The omnipresent capability by widely divergent players almost guarantees that jamming source attribution will be a problem even after detection is accomplished. In February 2012, the United Nations International Telecommunications Union hosted the World Radiocommunications U.S. Air Force (Raymond McKoy) U.S. Air Force Conference in Geneva. In recognition of the upswing of satellite jamming in 2011, the union issued a change to its regulations and a call to all nations to stop international inter- ference with satellite telecommunications.14 Moreover, recent incidents illustrating the need for action were the jamming of satel- lite operators EUTELSAT, NILESAT, and ARABSAT.15 Jamming has occurred from a variety of locations recently across the globe. Interference with satellite television broad- casting has come from Indonesia,16 Cuba,17 18 19 20 Air Force cadets defend their network during National Security Agency’s Cyber Defense Exercise at U.S. Ethiopia, Libya, and Syria. Addition- Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs ally, in the case of Libya, the use of tactical jamming of satellite telephones was reported during the course of combat operations.21 Potential adversaries have a variety of ties would play a significant part in any A2/ The proliferation of jamming does not options to accomplish disruption including AD campaign. have to depend on land-based fixed or mobile physical destruction of satellites and ground The ability to counter area-denial facilities. China is not tied to castoff Soviet stations, cyber, and jamming. Jamming is an activities depends in many ways on reliable naval designs. The People’s Liberation Army important element of any communications- satellite communications capabilities. Such Navy (PLAN) has small, fast, and capable denial plan. It is cheap to obtain and simple capabilities exist today in China11 and, by craft with good seakeeping capabilities such to operate. It can effectively be used surgi- extension, any surrogate or client regimes as the Houbei missile attack craft. Even a cally or in broadly based attacks. The absence with area-denial agendas. U.S. forces must be cursory look at the craft’s superstructure of planning and programmatic actions to able to operate in this challenging environ- shows that attention is paid to shipboard protect against a jamming threat is worri- ment. The obvious counter to jamming is electronics. The superstructure could be some given the likelihood of its use. to protect communications for operational equipped with powerful jammers and oper- forces. The necessity for protected communi- ated collaboratively far from U.S. forces. This Jamming and Antiaccess/Area Denial cations is not limited to A2/AD scenarios. A could seriously complicate U.S. naval or air A principal priority of the Strategic striking example is the strong reliance by the power projection. The PLAN continues to Defense Guidance is to project power Intelligence Community on UAVs for tacti- field these state-of-the-art, ocean-capable, despite A2/AD challenges.10 The recent cally relevant information supporting ground wave-piercing aluminum hull SWATH craft. conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan do not troops. These vehicles require wideband sat- According to in-country open sources, by provide experience against an adversary ellite communications systems for over-the- February of 2011, the PLAN had fielded over employing significant communications- horizon control and real-time information 80 type 22 Houbei-class fast attack craft, and denial methods. Information access dissemination. Future tactical forces will rely the number is growing.22 The question is no was assured in those conflicts. Potential on robust and reliable information systems. longer who has jamming capabilities but, adversaries in other areas of the world have They are at huge risk to jammers. rather, have we prepared to operate effectively studied U.S. force enablers for two decades. China and Russia have well-docu- when it happens. At present, the answer is a They realize how dependent we are on mented satellite jamming capabilities. Some resounding no. assured communications. They understand versions of militarily effective jammers are that the best way to confront U.S. military even commercially available.12 The prolifera- Causes and Actions power is to prevent it from deploying. tion of jamming technology has led to an Historically, protected communications China, for example, has sent clear signals increasing utilization of strategic and tactical were viewed as the realm of strategic exis- of its intent through a variety of activi- jamming.13 Satellite jamming, in particular, tential threats to the Nation. The underlying ties including a naval buildup, submarine is proliferating. Military jamming equipment principle of U.S. protected communications deployments, ballistic missiles capable of can be purchased on the Internet by anyone, continued to have its raison d’être linked to targeting aircraft carriers, cyber activities, including nonstate actors. The attraction of nuclear communications survivability and and an antisatellite demonstration. There this economical, highly effective capability to essential, highest-level command and control. can be no question that jamming capabili- disrupt vastly superior forces is an ominous The approach was heavily focused on getting 58 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu WILGENBUSCH and HEISIG DOD Arleigh Burke–class guided missile destroyer USS Hopper (DDG 70), equipped with Aegis integrated weapons system, launches RIM-161 Standard Missile through a small number of human-to-human Desert Storm also highlighted the much more expensive alternative. Moreover, messages on which dispersed forces could inadequacy of the existing satellite commu- commercial communications satellites retain execute preplanned objectives. This focused nications architecture. The starkest reality their inherent jamming vulnerabilities. view kept protected communications capabil- was the inability to transmit large data files ity development geared toward the “Arma- to tactical forces. The air tasking order (a Realization and Acceptance of the geddon” context and did not significantly daily compilation of all joint and coalition Requirement influence tactical requirements. aircraft planning and execution) was unable The paucity of protected communica- During Operation Desert Storm in to reach the significant airpower resident tions below the highest levels of requirements 1991, laser-guided bombs, Tomahawk land- on Navy carriers. The reprogramming of of nuclear command and control is starting attack missiles (TLAMs), and the GPS-aided TLAMs, laser-guided bombs, joint direct to wend its way into the thinking of military conventional air-launched cruise missiles attack munition, and other precision muni- leadership. A 2010 Defense Intelligence demonstrated that U.S. forces had the capa- tions took exceedingly long times to transmit Agency (DIA)–sponsored wargame, with bility to hit almost any target whose location and overwhelmed the beyond-line-of-sight over 60 Active-duty troops and civilian rep- could be pinpointed. For this reason, the U.S. systems of the day. resentatives from each of the Services, tried military has invested heavily in developing The vulnerability of unprotected broad- to grapple specifically with the loss of assured battle networks to detect, identify, and track band communications went unchallenged in satellite communications. The players made targets with sufficient timely precision to the last two decades. Recent conflicts have several key comments as they became aware enable target strikes. ISR systems such as the not been fought against major adversaries of the impact of threats to existing warfight- RQ-4 Global Hawk, GPS constellation, and with comparable capabilities.24 The U.S. mili- ing doctrine. The consensus among partici- photoreconnaissance satellites reflect how tary was able to accomplish its ends cheaply pants was that “significant risk” to mission dependent U.S. forces have become on access by taking advantage of a commercial over- success occurred when protected beyond- to the orbital and cyber dimensions of the building of satellite communications capacity line-of-sight communications were limited to global commons.23 The preplanned targeting in the late part of the last century and the existing capabilities. In the presence of even initially envisioned for these types of preci- early years of this one. That convenient modest jamming capability, participant reac- sion weapons incrementally has given way to resource is no longer available. Market devel- tion was to revert to Cold War–era doctrine a need for real-time responsiveness. opments have made commercial leasing a and tactics. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 59 COMMENTARY | Vulnerabilities to Communications Jamming U.S. Soldiers set up tactical satellite communication system in Shekhabad Valley, Wardak Province, Afghanistan U.S. Army (Russell Gilchrest) 60 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu WILGENBUSCH and HEISIG Those reactions were immediately frus- of the past when our military was left ill- enemy-controlled territory, it would still trated by a lack of available older systems; prepared for the future.” be a tough target. The jammer could stand the infrastructure to accomplish those out in the open just long enough to disrupt doctrines and tactics no longer exists. The Are There Options? the crypto set on the link/network. Then it combat functions of planning, command Optimists would say that the picture is could go silent, move to another location, or and control, movement and maneuver, not so grim—that there are options. So what focus on another satellite link. As mentioned, intelligence, fires, force protection, logistics/ might these options be if or when we encoun- operators frequently confuse jamming personnel support, and special operations ter an enemy who wishes to shut down our with equipment problems or a self-imposed were all significantly or critically degraded. communications? How quickly can we turn mistake. At best, locating and shooting the Additionally, there were issues with force options into operational capabilities? Are jammer is a difficult targeting problem that structure, organization, training, and equip- these really viable options that will keep our would certainly tax the intelligence and strike ment. Essentially, the entire spectrum of forces fighting as they have trained? assets assigned to other high-value targets. warfighting capability beyond preplanned The most frequently discussed option A third option is that we would attempt initial insertion and organic logistics was is that we would “go old school.” Participants to reconstitute the satellite constellations by significantly adversely affected. These risks in the previously mentioned DIA-sponsored rapidly replacing capability on orbit. This translated into longer engagement timelines, wargame suggested that they could still usually implies a set of smaller satellites increased casualties, and the need for a larger accomplish their warfighting missions already in storage. It also means the avail- force structure for each mission and reduced by using old-school techniques such as ability of a nearly immediate launch period multimission capability.25 high-frequency (HF) radio links. But, on acceptable for military operations. However, The wargame specifically focused on examination, they came to realize that this replacing one disrupted satellite with another satellite jamming as the most mature and is not viable. The worldwide system of fixed equally vulnerable to jamming hardly seems economically available means to deny satel- HF transmitters and antennas that was once to solve the problem. Furthermore, none of lite capability. The issue of physical destruc- the mainstay of our HF communications the smaller satellites that have been proposed tion of orbital assets was not addressed as it systems is gone. Even if it was still in place, has the capability to replace the types of satel- had several military/political elements that the skilled HF operators needed aboard ships lites used today. At present, there are simply were deemed too expensive or carried a sig- and ashore have been cashing retirement not enough launch vehicles or launch sites nificantly disproportionate geopolitical risk. checks for years. available to support such an alternative. The same denial effect is achieved by spot There is a more basic issue. Our satel- A fourth option might be to design an jamming without the protagonist having to lite links have enabled completely different entirely new satellite system with new fea- develop physical methods of interfering with types of operational communications and tures. This is theoretically feasible. However, space-related infrastructure. tactics and procedures that cannot be sup- it is hard to envision what this solution Pinpointing the source of jamming is ported on HF. This includes high bandwidth additionally offers in the sense of timeliness, not easy. Jammers can appear innocuous and machine-to-machine data exchanges, video cost reduction, and operational improvement can be quite mobile. They can be intermittent teleconference, Web sites, chat, email, and over expanding the constellation of existing in operation. A jammer can physically appear other mechanisms that in a large context protected communications satellites such as as some sort of commercial system, such allow decisionmaking to be viable at low advanced extremely high frequency (AEHF) as a news uplink vehicle or normal receive levels in the chain of command. That is the ones. The current and evolving technology antenna on a fixed site. fundamental capability that enables quick, is understood and carries known program- We have many lessons to draw on that adaptive, and effective warfighting that matic risk. We can certainly improve and point to a future where a large component of exponentially multiplies smaller force capa- expand the AEHF constellation much faster beyond-the-horizon communications must bilities. Yet going old school, reverting to than engage in multiple new technology be protected. Given the huge advantages that HF, was exactly the alternative a senior Navy program starts. space communications provide, it makes officer suggested as the course of action in A fifth option is centered on redun- sense to protect the capability against the trying to overcome a potential jamming dancy. In this alternative, even though most inexpensive and ubiquitous development of threat at the 2012 Navy Information Tech- communications links are not protected, disruptive capability by potential adversaries. nology Day briefing. there are many of them. It is hard to imagine The risk of not protecting it is an exponential A second knee-jerk option is that we an adversary who could take the entire infra- rise in force structure and cost coupled with would “shoot the jammer.” This is a non- structure down simultaneously. High-level the plummeting warfighting effectiveness starter. Almost everyone has seen the massed DOD officials have suggested that an enemy of existing forces. Accordingly, DOD will army of television trucks/vans wherever might be able to mount a jamming attack continue to work with domestic partners and and whenever some sensational news event that would leave operational forces with only international allies and invest in advanced occurs. Imagine downtown Baghdad or about 60 percent of our present capability. capabilities to defend its networks, opera- Kabul with the same number of trucks. Any But when was the last time we were using tional capability, and resiliency in cyberspace one of them could be a jammer. Which one only 60 percent of our satellite communica- and space.26 In the President’s words, “Going should be shot, and how long would it take tions capacity? forward, we will also remember the lessons to sort them out? Even if the jammer was We must further assume that an intel- of history and avoid repeating the mistakes working in the middle of an open desert in ligent enemy would have at least determined ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 61 COMMENTARY | Vulnerabilities to Communications Jamming Likelihood of Occurrence for Types of Communications Attack Unsophisticated and Cheap Orbital Kinetic Cyber Jamming Sophisticated User Requirement and Costly Harder and Time Easier and Quickly Ease of Tactical Employment Consuming Adaptable our most critical links to operations in would offer the same capability at a reduced the jamming capability or we do not. So we progress. Those are likely to be the first to deployed cost. In order to make a disag- have to be prepared to defeat the most likely go. More concerning is the fact that a swept gregated satellite constellation acceptable jamming threats. tone jammer could take out all our links, or from a cost standpoint, it would have to be One alternative put forth that seems to certainly more than DOD officials estimate. supported by math to show that it is less offer potential is to supplement the existing The 60 percent figure appears unsupported expensive than the evolving current highly satellite system through the development of by analysis. effective and efficient systems. Second, the Aerial Layer Network (ALN). However, In any event, forces experiencing it is suggested that disaggregation would like an entirely new satellite system, it is not jamming without prior training and a reduce vulnerability, but in fact no amount fully defined and has yet to be built. ALN is management plan would create operational of disaggregation could offer protection a solution that might be able to take existing chaos. Managing heavy jamming attacks in against effective jamming or ASAT attack. satellite technology, scaled down in size but this environment becomes an effort to plan Furthermore, simple logic would tell us that, not in capability, and have it ready for rapid for gradual degradation of communications. if it is known that an attack on our strategic deployment to enable our forces to operate in Operational concepts must be modified on antijam main asset, AEHF, is tantamount to some scenarios in the face of jamming. This the fly as individual circuits are lost. Training an act of war, extending the use of that same involves engineering developments that carry must also be conducted both to recognize asset to provide secure coverage for both all the risks of any new start. By its nature, it and counter jamming as it occurs. These tactical and strategic forces would make the is best used in a permissive environment or actions should be pursued. It appears at tactical support more secure simply by being one with airspace dominance. This concept present that little progress has been made on the same strategic asset. On the other seems ripe for use as a pseudosatellite aug- in this direction. The reality is that many hand, disaggregating the two missions on mentation to support a land area of opera- important circuits have no backup. For different satellites would seem, from a logic tions or a battlegroup maneuvering at sea. example, many UAVs have only one form of standpoint, to make the disaggregated tacti- Dr. Thompson’s thesis of incrementally over-the-horizon communication available. cal asset more vulnerable to attack. After all, expanding the capability of AEHF is not It would not be difficult for an adversary to would jamming one of many tactical assets sufficient; it should be matched with a real- learn where to target his jamming efforts for be considered an act of war? Additionally, ization that the EHF spectrum also contains the greatest effect against UAVs. a disaggregated architecture presents ques- the capability to accommodate a wide variety It has been suggested that the present tions of technical risk and complexities not of high bandwidth requirements. This could military satellite communications system yet answered. provide ground, maritime, and atmospheric is composed of too many and too large Of course, there are other alternatives, forces with the protected wideband capabili- satellites that are overly vulnerable, overly such as adding antijam capability to unpro- ties that complement the mobile, highly inte- complex, and unnecessarily costly. The tected wideband systems. The properties of grated forces the U.S. military fields today proposed solution is to develop and deploy transmission physics dictate that an increase and will field tomorrow. disaggregated system architecture to replace in antijam capability implies modifications present architectures. to the waveform that would, of necessity, Conclusion There are two obvious problems with cause a reduction of the data rate. There are Jamming is a highly effective technique this suggestion. First, it presupposes that no halfway measures. There is no point in that could cripple U.S. military operations, there is a disaggregated architecture that adding just a “little antijam.” We either defeat and our potential adversaries know it and 62 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu WILGENBUSCH and HEISIG have the capability to employ it. We should 4 Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, USN, U.S. Project Ploughshares, August 2007), available at not underestimate what they might do. Real- Pacific Command change of command address, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 63 FEATURES | Interview KC-135 Stratotanker maintenance crew prepares aircraft for departure to support RIMPAC exercises U.S. Air Force/Jacob N. Bailey An Interview with Samuel J. Locklear III Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, USN, is the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii. He was interviewed by Joint Force Quarterly’s William T. Eliason. 64 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Locklear JFQ: President Barack Obama and other a partner relationship with China that some Muslim countries. It also has the smallest officials have called for an increased focus on people find surprising, but I believe it is in country in the world. It has 7 of the 10 largest your command’s area of responsibility [AOR] our best interest to do so, especially from a armies in the world. It has the largest navies in recent years. Can you describe what you USPACOM perspective, in order to achieve in the world. It also has the highest propen- have called a “rebalance” of security strategy our desired endstate. Through the rebalance sity for natural disaster. and policy in terms of how this change in stra- tegic focus will affect U.S. Pacific Command [USPACOM]? the United States has significant interests in this Indo-Asia-Pacific environment now and for the foreseeable Admiral Locklear: The strategy that the years and decades to come President put out last year could not have been better timed. The strategy was a byproduct of discussions we were all having we’ll be able to strengthen the security archi- The United States, as a Pacific nation, about what happens to the U.S. military—the tecture and frameworks in this vast and com- has significant interests in this Indo-Asia- joint force—as we go forward into the future plicated region, ultimately ensuring a security Pacific environment now and for the foresee- after what we believe will be the conclusion environment that protects U.S. citizens and able years and decades to come, so the strat- of more than 10 years of war in the Middle U.S. interests, provides necessary support to egy is designed to ensure that we can help East. Our forces have to be very much appre- our allies and our partners, and withstands create a security environment that protects ciated for the magnificent work they have any challenges we might face. For instance, these interests. done there under some difficult challenges the USPACOM AOR is full of large natural and environments. To some degree it has disasters; this year alone I think we are on JFQ: Assuming there will be continuing pres- shaped our joint force in a way that might super typhoon number 26 or 27. The average sures on the global economy and more reduc- not be the best for what we see as our emerg- is about 16. We are seeing more of this type tions in the Federal budget, can you discuss ing interests in the 21st century. So what this of event, which will put large population what measures you are considering in terms rebalance represents is a hard look at where centers at risk. If those population centers are of force structure and operations within your the interests of the United States are and what at risk and cannot be managed by the secu- command area of responsibility? will concern our children and grandchildren rity environment, they have a tendency to most in the future. Every vector pointed to make the environment unstable. As we move Admiral Locklear: I think we will have the the Asia-Pacific and, in fact, the Indo-Asia- forward on the scale of events that can occur, joint force, and our civilian leadership will Pacific in significant ways where not only the security environment must be able to have a discussion in earnest over the next our security interests will be at stake but our endure such shocks to the system, including year or so about what the future force struc- economic interests, too. That’s kind of where territorial disputes, nationalistic perspectives ture should look like in the military. We are this started. So I was lucky to come into this from nations as they pursue their interests already being affected by that to some degree job with that kind of guidance. at the expense of others (security interests), by continuing resolutions and sequestration, It is also fortuitous because of big deci- or the security environment. Therefore, the but I don’t want to spend a lot of time on that sions being made in our government about endstate is to create a future in this vast part because I think they are near-term issues that the size of discretionary spending and the of the world that has the ability to ensure that we will get through; on the other side, it will future of defense spending. I have to leave American interests are secure. be just another factor in determining what those decisions to the political leaders, who Interestingly, the USPACOM area—if our joint force will look like. But there are are working on them as we speak. This you consider only the Pacific Ocean—is the several underlying aspects of the USPACOM rebalance perspective will hopefully provide largest object on the face of the Earth. If you AOR that I think have to be recognized. the guideposts for decisions we make about look at a map, you would not see it that way Because of its size, there remains a how we reshape the military into probably because maps distort the true appearance of tyranny of distance. In the cyber domain, a smaller but more lethal, more agile, more the world. You could take every land mass in the space domain, and in some cases the technologically capable one best positioned to the world, including Greenland and Antarc- air domain, distance is not as significant support U.S. global interests, many of which tica, and put them in the Pacific Ocean and because the ability to move and transport will be in the USPACOM area. still have room for another African continent things globally has greatly increased during There are several aspects to this. One and another North American continent. I my time in the military. But the tyranny of is about employing new concepts regarding don’t know if most people recognize that distance still affects certain aspects of what improving our capabilities across a broad fact. There are 3.6 billion people in the we do in this region, particularly concerning spectrum of traditional and nontraditional USPACOM AOR. The area stretches from maritime security. Because it entails the dif- mission sets. It points out the need to the coast of California to the border between ficulties of moving and providing logistics strengthen our alliances; we have only seven India and Pakistan and running basically support of forces as they try to remain treaty allies in the world, and five of those are north to south. In addition to a population forward, maritime security represents a huge in the USPACOM AOR. We are also working of 3.6 billion, the area has the world’s largest feature in our AOR, and it puts a premium on building partnerships with key nations economies. It has the world’s most populated on forward presence. Moreover, I think it such as India and Singapore. We are building countries. It has the world’s most populous will for some time to come. So whatever our ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 65 FEATURES | Interview U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Locklear visits People’s Republic of China force structure will look like when we get region and probably proliferated to other relevant to the current security challenges we through this period—and I hope our next regions of the world. Therefore, it is impor- face in the region and those we expect to face Quadrennial Defense Review will address tant that the assets we do put forward are the in the future. some of these issues—there has to be an best and that they keep pace with potential understanding of the importance and signif- threats. We must make sure that these forces JFQ: What steps have you taken in your icance in having a number of assets forward are capable when faced with a human disas- first year to orient your staff to account for in the Asia-Pacific: 1) to demonstrate U.S. ter threat, a terrorist threat, a threat to the this rebalance proposition? Why were these commitment to the region, 2) to create the maritime environment, or perhaps a destabi- changes, if any, necessary, and what do you ability to partner day-to-day with those allies lizing event in the region that would lead us hope to gain from the effort? who mean the most to the United States, and to conflict. They cover a lot of areas. It’s not 3) to provide a deterrent or calming perspec- about ships and airplanes and submarines Admiral Locklear: Any time you receive tive. Ask any nation in the USPACOM AOR and ground forces. It’s about cyber capabili- guidance from the Commander in Chief that if it can imagine the Pacific without U.S. ties. It’s about space capabilities. It’s about you should put a finer point on or refocus military presence; I have yet to find one that information operations. your effort, it requires staffs to take a hard claims it would want to imagine such a sce- If you take a realistic look at the rebal- look at what they do. To begin, we had to nario. So the value of that forward presence ance, USPACOM military forces are only educate ourselves on what we thought were and the type of assets that we put forward one component of the effort. The rebalance the compelling aspects of the rebalance to will be important. uses a whole-of-government approach. It ensure that USPACOM strategy was consis- We are advocating in that forward has to do with economic, diplomatic, and tent with the President’s strategy. presence that these forces be the most law enforcement efforts, and drug and We did a full review. We looked at the capable and the most highly trained. Because counternarcotics trafficking and the flow of emerging threats we would have to deal with of the growth of militaries and the invest- human capital, among other issues. We want in the security environment in the region. ments we are seeing in military capabilities to make sure that USPACOM forces, once we We looked at how we were structurally in our AOR, some of the most highly techni- come to the end of our decision cycles about organized to work more closely with our cal capabilities will be developed in this what our force is going to look like, will be partners from the interagency [community]. 66 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Locklear And we made some moves to beef up our staff’s capability and capacity to achieve that by bringing in more interagency folks. I also took a look at this staff, which has been his- torically made up of U.S. personnel only, and U.S. Pacific Command we’re making some changes to bring a more international perspective to the group. In the coming months, I expect to see more general and flag officers and staff officers from our partners arriving who wish to participate. I believe this broadens our perspective and improves the quality of the way we think through our role here in the Asia-Pacific. I’ve taken a look at the internal workings of the staff and, without getting into a lot of detail, we need to make sure that it is manned and equipped to be able to look across the AOR and manage what we can from a [military- to-military] perspective including the day- to-day shaping and security operations that ensure we remain in a peaceful environment Admiral Locklear visits Republic of the Philippines rather than one of conflict. From my perspective, peace in the Asia-Pacific for decades to come will allow the same things that happened in the last Indo-Asia-Pacific has an opportunity to We have invited the Chinese to 60 years to happen for the nations in the do what we can to help ensure that the rise RIMPAC. I hope they come. I hope they come region to enjoy peace and prosperity. So of China happens in a productive way in ready to participate fully and be integrated we’re going to make sure that we spend as which China emerges as a positive member into the great work that we do there. And I much time thinking and working on the of a security environment or a positive con- expect that all the other partners who partici- success piece as we do on the failure piece. tributor to the security environment rather pate in RIMPAC will welcome the Chinese The failure piece would be if you have to than a potential adversary. just as we welcomed the Russians this past get into a conflict. But rest assured that if Every country in the AOR recognizes year, which worked well. We hope that the somewhere down the road we find ourselves that it is not in their best interest for an Chinese bring great ships to Pearl Harbor in conflict, we will be properly organized adversarial relationship to exist between and join in the festivities that are associated and equipped to be predominant. them and China or between the United States with RIMPAC. It’s hard to build relationships and China. Therefore, we are looking not with people you don’t know. Having China JFQ: Given your recent efforts to engage with only at RIMPAC but also across the spectrum participate in what is easily the largest naval the People’s Republic of China through activi- to determine how we encourage engagement exercise in the world—42 nations partici- ties such as the RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific] between our allies, partners, and ourselves pated last year—instead of remaining outside exercise, in what ways do you plan to reassure with China. RIMPAC is just another step in RIMPAC looking in can only be good. allies and partners who might be concerned this process. about what they see China becoming? We’ve had fits and starts over the years JFQ: What are your thoughts about develop- regarding our relationship with China. Its ments in the last year on the Korean Penin- Admiral Locklear: Personally, I think that leadership, for instance, would not agree to sula? Do you see an opportunity to return U.S. the invitation to RIMPAC for the Chinese use the [military-to-military] relationship forces in the Republic of Korea to levels seen was overdue. In and of itself, the invitation as a first move toward security cooperation. before 2001? is a reassuring activity. When I consider From my perspective, that decision was coun- the USPACOM AOR and I speak to our terproductive for the security environment, Admiral Locklear: Let me talk about partners, they understand that the rise of and from what I have observed over the last the developments first. I believe they will China will have an impact on the AOR. We year, we are making a lot of progress in not continue to be quite disturbing, at least in understand that, too. A nation can go from allowing that to happen again. By working North Korea. North Korea continues to being a prospective Third World country with our allies and partners in building pursue—even under the new leadership of to an economic superpower in just a few a partnership with China, managing the Supreme Commander Kim Jung-un—poli- decades without it having an impact on competition between two potential economic cies and activities that run counter to the the economic environment, social envi- superpowers—certainly powers that have a United Nations Security Council [UNSC] ronment, or security environment. The global security impact—in a way that assures resolutions, which, I think, most find reason- USPACOM community of nations in the success is important to all of us. able. [North] Korea continues to prioritize ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 67 FEATURES | Interview USS George Washington (CVN 73) steams through South China Sea, July 2012 DOD/Paul Kelly 68 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Locklear military spending—spending on nuclear [producing] tremendous weapons systems combatant commands, is working quickly to programs and ballistic missile systems to be and linking architectures and interoper- establish the right supporting-supported rela- able to deliver them prior to the needs of its ability between Services. We would ask if we tionships in this very dynamic environment. underprivileged population. This continues can look at the emerging threat environment We are patterning our exercises to make the to be disturbing, and the road ahead of where using our long experience in USPACOM and training realistic so we can put pressure on we are going with North Korea as it continues to proliferate and continues to violate UNSC resolutions will be important not only for the I would say that the cyber enterprise in general is under- United States and its allies and partners in resourced based on the size and complexity of the problem the region—as well as China and Russia—but also the rest of the global community, espe- cially now that it appears North Korea will be how we best can leverage the technologies ourselves to ensure that 1) we can maintain continuing its path of nuclearization. and capabilities we have specifically pur- access to our own networks should they ever To address your question of what chased to address these issues, which I refer be attacked, and then we can defend those the U.S.-ROK [Republic of Korea] alliance to as antiaccess/area-denial [A2/AD] threats. networks, and 2) we start to look at other will look like, let me first say that this alli- And where you can, does it point you in the networks and other architectures outside of ance remains a cornerstone of U.S. security direction of investments? You might need our own—how would we understand those perspectives in Asia and certainly on the to close those seams. Or does it point you and leverage those if necessary during a con- peninsula. We continue to grow that relation- toward asymmetric advantages that you want flict to our benefit? So we’ve got some work ship, and the capabilities of the ROK military to improve to increase your overall asymmet- to do. I would say that the cyber enterprise in continue to improve. Our connectivity ric advantage? general is under-resourced based on the size and ability to share information and work This is important to USPACOM and all and complexity of the problem. I believe the together continue to improve, but it is not of our components; we are briefed routinely joint force will move to correct some of that. without challenges. We will go through a on the work being done in Washington, DC, I believe we are already moving in that direc- process here in probably the next year where on A2/AD and ASB. We make suggestions to tion. And I believe we now understand the we will take a look again at how we feel about them because, in the end, USPACOM forces problem and we have a way ahead. We just the positioning of forces and agreements and will be called on to be successful in a high- have to be fast enough to stay ahead of how where we have them and how we are support- end environment, should that day ever come. fast the cyber world is changing. ing the people on the peninsula. Do I antici- Therefore, it is critical that we do all we can to pate a large change in U.S. force numbers on solve these problems and shortfalls with the JFQ: You are a graduate of one of our joint the Korean Peninsula? No. If what we see in capabilities that we have already bought. No professional military education colleges, then North Korea today is what we see in the next matter how we might feel about the future, known as the Industrial College of the Armed year or so, our number there will remain the reality is that for the next several decades, Forces [ICAF], now the Eisenhower School at consistent. Unfortunately, the North Korean the force you see today will be about 80 National Defense University. How well did leadership gets a vote in all of this. If it votes percent of the force USPACOM will have. We your joint education and experience prepare poorly, then it could certainly rapidly change have got to make it work during an increas- you for joint assignments? our view on how we would support the secu- ingly challenging environment. rity situation on the peninsula. Admiral Locklear: I have been through a JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly has featured a fair amount of joint education over time, JFQ: How do concepts in development such series of articles on cyber operations and the and I can tell you that the experience I had at as Air-Sea Battle affect your command’s need to better integrate these operations into ICAF was probably one of the most valuable approach to planning and operations? Are you the joint force commander’s command and as it related to any ability I have as a strategic able to assist in their development in a way to control. What is your assessment of the way thinker beyond the realm of joint warfare. leverage your unique environment? ahead for cyber operations for the joint force? The ability as a graduate to contemplate the intricacies and importance of understanding Admiral Locklear: First, I would applaud Admiral Locklear: Cyber operations have economics, logistics, and all the other aspects the Navy’s and Air Force’s efforts on Air-Sea become a serious focus for us in the region. of national and international power that go Battle [ASB]. A lot of good work and think- This particular theater is important because into how I make strategic decisions has paid ing went into it. I believe we had an AirLand the tyranny of distance is heavily reliant on off multiple times. To answer your question, Battle process several decades ago that cyber, space, and an assurance of access to my joint education was exactly what I needed produced similar thinking. Unfortunately, cyber and space. Not to consider these facts to aspire to be a combatant commander, par- ASB has been misinterpreted, particularly by in our planning would be remiss. Right now ticularly in the USPACOM AOR. some of our allies and partners, as a strategy I think we are a little behind, and we are rather than a concept. I try to explain that making steps as a joint force to catch up. I JFQ: How has jointness changed USPACOM ASB is not a secret weapon. ASB is where was supportive of the creation of U.S. Cyber over the years, and do you see the possibility smart people in smart Services come together Command and remain supportive of it. U.S. that some day the commander might be from where U.S. investments have been made in Cyber Command, in conjunction with the another Service? ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 69 FEATURES | Interview DOD/Keith Deviney Ships and submarines participating in RIMPAC 2012 sail in formation around Hawaiian Islands, July 2012 Admiral Locklear: I won’t speculate on the would be in the calculus of the decision that has to look at it from a different perspective, decisions of our civilian leaders because I our civilian leadership would have to make if and certainly, there is another view from the believe that the President and Secretary of they should decide to change the uniform of larger global perspective. But from where Defense are in a good position to evaluate the USPACOM commander. I sit, there is benefit in having Russia par- potential combatant commanders. My guess ticipate in whatever way it can because its is that any decisions will be made on the JFQ: As USPACOM commander, can you force levels in the Pacific are not significant personality and capability of the officers characterize your perspective of the Russian compared to other places it might be, at who are available and not so much on the Federation regarding the security environment least today. Having Russia as a productive uniform they wear. That said, when you look in the Asia-Pacific? partner in the overall security environment, at the history of this region, it represents a particularly as we look at maritime activity significant maritime theater. A huge part of Admiral Locklear: From the USPACOM that might be moving north into the Arctic, is what I do here includes a large component perspective, we view Russia as a potential important. In fact, the relationships we have of the maritime domain. I don’t think that security partner. I just had a chief of defense in the region with allies and partners contrib- is going to change or that it is going to get conference that was held in Australia, and ute to an overall understanding that allows us more complex. Furthermore, the allies and Russia’s deputy minister of defense—who at to operate with and around each other. JFQ partners in this region have a long historical one time happened to be the Eastern Flank perspective that we, as Americans, sometimes Commander—attended and spent 4 or 5 days don’t possess. They have been comfortable, with us and we had good discussions and I think, over time with USPACOM having a good dialogue. As I mentioned earlier, we just maritime face—the face of an admiral—so it had Russian ships participate in RIMPAC, could change and they would probably accept and that was quite successful. So I look at it, but I would just say that they are comfort- Russia only from the USPACOM perspec- able with the current situation. This issue tive. I know that U.S. European Command 70 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Locklear DOD/Michael Holzworth Sailor fast-ropes out of MH-60S Knighthawk helicopter during RIMPAC 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 71 NATO’s Level of Ambition Beyond Strategic Reach By Dean A. Nowowiejski he North Atlantic Treaty crisis. Challenges to the euro and potential Modern Defence. This concept not only Organization (NATO) faces default of nations threaten Europe’s eco- reaffirmed the collective defense of the many strategic challenges based nomic unity. The United States borrows 40 Alliance, but also established an ambitious T on the international security cents on the dollar to finance its entitlements level of effort, particularly given the current environment. As an alliance at war, not only and wars, with no political solution in sight. low level of national investment in NATO does NATO have to confront an uncertain Confronting challenges to security with via defense budgets, and the significant future in Afghanistan, but also shadowy sparse resources forms the context of NATO’s economic challenges that most member threats of proliferation of weapons of mass strategic situation. states face. Some details of this strategy are destruction, cyberwar, and terrorism. The In light of that test, the heads of state outlined in this article. 21st century promises to become an even and government, the political leaders of This strategic statement offered a more complex environment over time, while NATO, met in Lisbon in November 2010 new concept for a new century, and was national resources for defense are dwindling. and agreed on a new strategic concept for immediately put to the test with the NATO Both sides of the Atlantic face budgetary the Alliance, entitled Active Engagement, operation in Libya, Active Endeavor. NATO NATO Secretary General speaking at 2012 NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation seminar in Washington 72 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu NOWOWIEJSKI demonstrated a core tenet of the new strategic implement ballistic missile defense over the ance is postured for success in the near term concept by executing aggressive crisis man- populations of Europe and, in the same vein, against evolving international threats and a agement. Active Endeavor provided air cover wrestled with their ongoing partnership with threatened international economy. over Libya to protect citizens and enforced Russia. All of these missions were affirmed at Closer review of the strategy seems to an arms embargo on the high seas to prevent the same time that operations in Afghanistan confirm such lack of fidelity regarding strate- resupply of weapons to the regime. Libya demanded great effort. All in all, this was a gic means. The Alliance confirmed its desire established a new realm of the possible with path-breaking summit with a strategic docu- to reform, modernize, and transform to meet the new strategic concept in place and reaf- ment to match: Alliance ambition toward the the operational needs of worldwide commit- firmed the Alliance’s stated purpose of reach- circumstances of a new century. ments. NATO required resources for this new ing beyond its own territory proper to ensure The affirmation of three “essential” set of missions, and the Allies affirmed their the lasting security of the member states. But core tasks formed the heart of the strategic desire to reduce unnecessary duplication, the operation simultaneously revealed sig- concept. The increased level of ambition develop and operate jointly, and preserve and nificant flaws in capability that have forced for the Alliance lies between the lines that strengthen common capabilities. Beyond reconsideration of the way the Alliance will announce these tasks. these broadly stated goals of transformation, develop resources in the future. Collective Defense. This task affirms not much detail is offered in the strategic Since Libya, the growing pressure of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty—the concept about what specific means are avail- the Eurozone crisis leads to questions about charter document of the Alliance—with able to execute the strategy. the viability of the strategic concept itself the addition of a goal to deter and defend This inattention may stem from the given the limited focus it gave to resource against emerging challenges. This goal of economic distractions of the heads of state use. How will the level of ambition in the combating emerging challenges is what takes when the document was written, or it may concept be met by members who are giving the Alliance out of sector and into where be intentional. At the time, the European less, not more, to the needs of the Alliance? How will the Alliance restore balance among the contributions of its members, when the stating that nuclear weapons should ideally be abolished, U.S. share is openly acknowledged to be the Alliance reaffirmed its commitment to nuclear around three-quarters of the whole? This weapons as an instrument article argues that the constraints of Alli- ance resources should force a reconsidera- tion of the strategic concept itself, both to they emerge, whether in Libya, the Horn of economy was struggling with the effects of incorporate as a stated purpose the concept Africa, or Afghanistan. The task emphasizes the international downturn from 2008, the of “smart” defense, and to consider a more expeditionary operations by modernized and threatened default of Greece and perhaps limited level of ambition, focusing on less deployable conventional forces. more European countries, and the growing security through crisis management. Crisis Management. This task need for rescue measures. Declining defense addresses international crises affecting the budgets and reduced contributions to Extended Reach and Limited Alliance before and after they erupt, stops Alliance operations and modernization Resources ongoing conflicts before they affect security, were already a contemporary trend. So the Active Engagement, Modern Defence and consolidates stability. It commits the Allies faced a significant challenge—and was released from the NATO Lisbon Summit Alliance to a wide range of tasks in opera- how to deal with it makes no appearance (November 19–20, 2010). At the time, its con- tional environments that extend beyond ter- in the strategic concept. This could mean cepts reflected an achievement in consensus ritorial boundaries. that the omission of detail regarding Alli- and forethought, as the heads of state and Cooperative Security. This task encom- ance resources was necessarily intentional. government reaffirmed their commitment passes security cooperation, arms control, Consensus concerning Alliance resources to the bedrock principle of collective defense, nonproliferation and disarmament, and may have been just too difficult. Whatever while expanding their strategic ambition expansion. the cause, the concept was short on details to include out-of-sector missions, missile At the end of the list of core tasks and of how to deal with a burgeoning resource defense, cyber defense, access to the global principles, there is this statement: “In order crisis, and nothing has rectified the imbal- commons, counterproliferation, counter- to carry out the full range of NATO mis- ance since. This became clearer as NATO piracy, countertrafficking, and moderniza- sions as effectively and efficiently as possible, engaged Libya. tion. Stating that nuclear weapons should Allies will engage in a continuous process of ideally be abolished, the Alliance reaffirmed reform, modernization and transformation.”1 NATO and Libya its commitment to nuclear weapons as an This is the only reference to resources in the Within months of the promulgation instrument. The heads of state agreed to core principles. This short statement, buried of the new strategic concept, NATO entered at the end, seemingly implies a limited focus an unexpected phase of execution, Opera- in the strategic concept on the potential tion Unified Protector. This operation both Dr. Dean A. Nowowiejski is the Ike Skelton means needed to execute such an advanced offered a glimpse of the future potential of the Distinguished Chair for the Art of War at the U.S. strategy. From this simple statement, our Alliance to react quickly to emerging threats, Army Command and General Staff College. analysis must determine whether the Alli- and a reminder of how the previous lack of ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 73 FEATURES | NATO’s Level of Ambition resource commitment left the air campaign next round of national austerity measures, The Secretary General’s timely article short of precision munitions; intelligence, better allocating (and coordinating) the in Foreign Affairs addressed the lessons of surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); intel- resources the Alliance does have, and follow- Libya and the relative decline in defense ligence fusion; electronic warfare capability; ing through on commitments to the Alliance spending of Europeans in a widely read and air component logistic support. Fol- and to each other.4 forum.5 Rasmussen cited statistics of a 20 lowing a successful and fairly rapid conclu- Given the NATO standard of consensus, percent decline in defense expenditure at a sion on October 31, 2011, the pundits and bringing these issues into the open marks Sec- time of simultaneous 55 percent growth in academics began to debate the relevance of retary Gates’s departure as a brave episode of gross domestic product (GDP) for European the Alliance.2 truth-telling. The idea that the Alliance really NATO members. Rasmussen emphasized Alliance proponents, such as the NATO needed a more robust commitment from its both the potential loss of the chance to Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmus- European members in order to survive the be relevant in a changing world, and the sen, Supreme Allied Commander Europe challenges of the 21st century struck home, potential of turning the United States away Admiral James Stavridis, USN, and U.S. at least in academe and the media. Secretary from Europe in the same way as outlined by Permanent Representative to NATO Ambas- Gates’s remarks also serve as a call to reexam- Secretary Gates. sador Ivo Daalder trumpeted the success and ine the relevance of the strategic concept. He In outlining solutions to this general sought means to address shortcomings in the brought into stark contrast the problems of an problem, Rasmussen offered the idea of Smart future. Their reviews echoed the themes that alliance with grand ambitions yet an anemic Defence and began to list its key characteris- tics, without offering a precise definition. This softness of concept probably allowed Alliance the idea that the Alliance needed a more robust commitment partners to interpret Smart Defence for them- from its European members struck home selves, within national constraints, as they moved toward consensus acceptance. Smart Defence, according to Rasmussen, “is about NATO responded quickly and was ultimately resource reality. In his view, the Alliance building security for less money by working successful in reaching the goal of protecting still suffers from strategic shortcomings in together and being more flexible.” It charges the Libyan people, but the success revealed procurement, training, logistics, and sustain- member nations to set spending priorities stress fractures in the Alliance. These short- ment. He openly linked the decreasing level on the basis of threats, cost-effectiveness, comings were those of resources as outlined of investment on the part of the European and performance, since they cannot afford above, limited member participation (only community, the lack of strategic and opera- everything. Smart Defence includes the key 14 of 28 members participated), and reliance tional enablers as called for by the strategic idea of NATO nations working in “small on the United States for precision munitions concept, and the potential that U.S. leaders in clusters to combine their resources and build and ISR. Unified Protector provided the first the future would not be willing to continue to capabilities” with the Alliance serving as a evidence of a mixed record with the new stra- invest as strongly in the Alliance when they matchmaker for the partners. Rasmussen tegic concept in practice.3 have domestic budget problems of a crisis then concluded that he had been trying to nature. Would the Alliance change its ways, engage the transatlantic partners in this The Gates Challenge and pay for what it wanted to do? strategic dialogue of smarter use of resources These various assessments crystallized ever since the Lisbon Summit, since what in a confrontational moment in Brussels at Secretary General Shapes a Response NATO requires is an agreement that results in the NATO Defense Ministerial in June 2011. Fortunately, the Alliance seems to have deployable and sustainable capabilities. Departing U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert a leader who addresses problems strategically Gates offered his colleagues a candid assess- and openly. Secretary General Rasmussen Secretary General’s 2011 Annual ment of the potential future of the Alliance. repeatedly addresses the problem of low Report He echoed the assessment that prospects in investment in the face of expanded strategic In his first Secretary General’s annual Afghanistan were improving and that Libya ambition, seeing it as a threat to the future report, Rasmussen returned to many of the was a qualified success for NATO, but he viability of the Alliance. He uses a variety of ideas in his Foreign Affairs article. He again also offered a warning. Highlighting the forums, some outlined below. The solution to cited statistics about the low level of member increasing imbalance of member contribu- the problem of limited resources most often investment in defense, stating that, for 2011, tions in support to NATO, to the extent that repeated by Secretary General Rasmussen is annual defense expenditures for 18 of the 28 the U.S. accounted for more than 75 percent the concept of “Smart Defence.” The concept Allies were lower than they had been before of NATO defense spending, Secretary Gates of Smart Defence was officially promulgated the global economic crisis began in 2008. warned of a potential retrenchment by by the heads of state and government at Furthermore, he outlined that only 3 of the the United States. This would come from the Chicago Summit in May 2012 in their 28 member nations were at the required increased budget pressure to the Congress. “Summit Declaration on Defence Capabili- level of defense expenditure required by the He called for three positive things to happen ties: Toward NATO Forces 2020.” How Sec- Alliance (2 percent of GDP). Levels of invest- to ensure a solvent future for the Alliance: retary General Rasmussen led them toward ment in modernization were similarly low. making a serious effort to protect defense the concept, and how they thus validated the The U.S. share of NATO expenditures grew budgets from being further gutted in the strategic concept reached in Lisbon, follows. to 75 percent.6 74 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu NOWOWIEJSKI By the time of Rasmussen’s annual The Secretary General’s 2012 Annual specifics in these historical statements, the report, Smart Defence had grown important Report real work of fleshing out the idea and putting enough to merit its own section in the docu- Secretary General Rasmussen is it into practice will be confirmed as the Allies ment, and a refined explanation of what the still emphasizing Smart Defence, and as collectively announce and execute collabora- concept means. This includes “greater col- time passes, his calls for adequate defense tive Smart Defence projects. Key to successful laboration and coherence of effort . . . priori- resources seem to grow more strident. His implementation will be whether the heads of tizing the capabilities needed the most, spe- second annual report, released January 31, state and government will be willing to make cializing in what Allies do best, and seeking 2013, has a major section calling for secur- the bold political decisions that keep the multinational solutions.” The Secretary ing capabilities for the future. NATO Forces organization funded to its level of ambition General highlighted an agreement made in 2020 and Smart Defence are principal to this in the face of declining resources. They may Lisbon to invest in 11 critical needs, demon- effort. The principles announced in Chicago have to demonstrate this resolve in a deepen- strating that concern for strategic resources remain the same, but the number of Smart ing economic crisis. Expect Smart Defence dates at least to the same time as the new strategic concept itself. He also pointed ahead Twelve nations contribute to NATO strategic airlift capabilities to the Chicago Summit where defense minis- ters agreed to “deliver a range of substantive multinational projects” to be made available to the Alliance by that time. This effort for resource harmonization extends to NATO staffs working with the European Union (EU) to avoid unnecessary duplication with EU pooling and sharing. The annual report thus outlined some specific areas where the idea of more efficiency is already in progress. Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities, May 2012 The Chicago Summit declaration connected the idea of Smart Defence to the concept of NATO Forces 2020: modern, tightly connected forces equipped, trained, exercised, and commanded so that they can operate together and with partners in any environment. It outlined the need to cooper- ate more closely in acquiring capabilities, prioritize what is needed most, and consult on changes to defense plans. It spoke of the need for a strong defense industry in NATO Europe. The declaration recognized that “as technology grows more expensive, and Defence projects has now increased to 25. to continue to evolve within the constraints defence budgets are under pressure, there are The Secretary General proudly announces of international threat and the relative eco- key capabilities which many Allies can only that European Allies lead around two-thirds nomic health of its members. obtain if they work together to develop and of these projects, with one-third of the 25 acquire them.” Allies would take forward projects purely European. Yet the Secretary What’s Missing: Coherence and specific multinational projects to this end General warns that continued decreasing Realism designed to deliver improved operational levels of defense investment by Alliance What do we make of the overall NATO effectiveness, economies of scale, and closer partners will lead to potential capability gaps resource problem? A common conclusion connections between forces. The words of between European Allies, across the Atlantic, for many years is that NATO spends too the declaration carry forward ideas originally and with respect to emerging powers.8 much money on personnel costs, and not offered by the Secretary General. Smart Beginning at least with the post-Libya enough on modernization or development. Defence “represents a changed outlook, the NATO assessments, Secretary General Ras- This criticism extends to the type of forces opportunity for a renewed culture of coop- mussen called for better resourcing within in which European members customarily eration in which multinational collaboration the Alliance in order to meet the ambition invest: conventional land forces with limited is given new prominence.” In these charter outlined in the strategic concept. Smart deployment readiness and not enough stra- words, the heads of state offered the broad Defence is the key response to the current tegic lift. These conditions lie behind the principles under which Smart Defence will be Alliance resource shortfall, and appears to conception of the NATO Response Force executed.7 be an evolving concept. Though vague on (NRF) a decade ago. Not much has changed. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 75 FEATURES | NATO’s Level of Ambition The NRF, once proved in principle and deterrence and defense, crisis management, substance to the ambition for missile defense declared fully operational in 2006, has had and security cooperation, and what the and ISR in the midterm, then the concept limited activity. One wonders if called upon, Alliance will have over time to accomplish appears to be more viable. The proof will would it be ready, given the commitment of those ambitions. This comes to the question be contained not in strategic tasks, but in the Alliance to the International Security of whether Smart Defence will work to solve member investment in defense and modern- Assistance Force in Afghanistan? This may the problem. European partners are not ization over the next decade. be behind the recent U.S. declaration that, going to increase expenditures, and as they while shifting focus to the Asia-Pacific, it decrease them, Smart Defence becomes how An Alternative: Update the Strategic would dedicate an Army brigade to the NRF to do less with less. Smart Defence requires Concept in order to bring to life a concept that may Alliance members to act with great foresight The questions remain, given suc- have gone dormant. and trust in a time of economic crisis. It cessful execution of Smart Defence, is the The basic problem for NATO’s strategic requires member states to forego individual 2010 strategic concept viable? Even smarter execution is one of resources. NATO has purchase of key operational capabilities in spending cannot overcome insufficient high ambition for capable operational forces order to enter a collective arrangement that spending, and the NATO strategy requires but struggles to afford them. In reality, the requires other members to deliver those sufficient resources in the areas of collective Alliance has a limited expeditionary, con- capabilities. The risk of this approach is defense, crisis management, and security ventionally modernized capability. There is that in crisis, the partner nation will with- cooperation. Collective defense remains the certain incoherence to the member nations’ hold needed capability. To a degree, Smart cornerstone of the Alliance, and will likely investments. They buy the wrong things, or Defence requires members to surrender consume whatever limited resources are not enough of the right things. Consider the sovereignty over resource decisions to the available, given real world contingencies acknowledged shortage of lift, ISR, precision Alliance. In many ways, the decisions over requiring multinational defense. How many munitions, cyber capability, and supply. defense resources for European members more prevention situations will NATO enter Deployable forces are required, but not yet parallel the difficulty EU members face into? How many more Kosovos, Afghani- built. For years in Afghanistan, command- with salvage operations of the Eurozone. stans, and Libyas are there? ers have struggled with national caveats on They require collective action in a time of Given increasingly scarce resources, it is operational use of forces. Because of these economic crisis and dwindling resources. It the crisis management pillar that is likely to shortages and caveats, the United States is a steep order. suffer, particularly the ability to stop conflicts increased its member investment in Alliance Much of the potential success of Smart before escalation or to stabilize them long capabilities to the point of unsustainability. Defence will be signaled in implementing after they have concluded. There is a pending Insufficient investment and out-of- the Chicago Summit Declaration on Defence struggle over the ability of the Alliance to sta- balance investment imply lack of realism in Capabilities. If the principles outlined by the bilize Afghanistan over the long term. NATO what the Alliance can really do. There is a Secretary General are put into action, if the is still committed to stability in Kosovo simple mismatch between global ambition in priority programs are resourced, if there is after a dozen years, thus demonstrating the resource drain of commitments to long-term crisis management. Perhaps the pending U.S. NATO step back from long-term stability operations, as announced in the January 2012 defense strategy guidance, will work its way through the national counsels of the Alliance, and curtail appetites for long-term crisis manage- ment, counterinsurgency, stabilization, and reconstruction. If European defense budgets continue to dwindle, the appetite for these types of operations may be suppressed. Of course, if members have not yet invested in crisis capability in the first place, then the simple status quo remains. There is the perception in some circles that the new strategic concept is really U.S. ambitions pitted against European means, that the pressure for continued stability operations stemmed from the U.S. commit- ments to Iraq and Afghanistan at the time of the Lisbon Summit. If this is true, then the January 2012 U.S. defense strategic guidance may be the first glimmer that the protagonist of such missions is beginning to realize they 76 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu NOWOWIEJSKI are beyond capability, and the NATO strate- Notes gic concept should follow suit.9 1 Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Stra- Conclusion tegic Concept for the Defence and Security of the NEW This article concludes with two small Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from NDU Press proposals. One is that the Alliance-wide (Brussels: NATO, 2010), 9, available at Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 77 From Sea Power to Cyber Power Learning from the Past to Craft a Strategy for the Future By Kris E. Barcomb U.S. Navy cryptologic technicians preview Integrated System for Language Education and Training program at Center for Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture, Pensacola, Florida U.S. Navy (Gary Nichols) 78 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BARCOMB Naval strength involves, unquestionably, the possession of strategic points. —Alfred Thayer Mahan lfred Thayer Mahan saw the both economic growth and security akin to and overcome resource constraints: “The ocean for what it is. While it Mahan’s approach to sea power a century ago. search for and establishment of leading prin- spans the globe and covers a ciples—always few—around which consider- A predominant portion of the A Mahanian Approach to Cyberspace ations of detail group themselves, will tend to Earth, not all parts of it are equally impor- Mahan did not view the Navy as an reduce confusion of impression to simplicity tant. Mahan offered a focused naval strategy end unto itself, but as a key component of and directness of thought, with consequent in an era when America was struggling to the larger economic welfare of the Nation. facility of comprehension.”3 In accordance define itself as either isolated from, or an He tied the very existence of the Navy to with these two principles, this article identi- integral part of, the larger international com- commerce when he wrote, “The necessity of fies seven strategic points of concentration munity. The force structure of the U.S. Navy a navy, in the restricted sense of the word, in cyberspace: operating systems (OSs), hinged upon leaders deciding between pro- springs, therefore, from the existence of search engines, physical communications tectionism and expansionism. Rather than a peaceful shipping, and disappears with infrastructure, cloud computing, governance simply a mechanism to defend the coasts, it.”1 Similarly, while cyberspace originated forums, cryptography, and Internet Protocol Mahan envisioned the Navy as a powerful through U.S. Government investment, version 6 (IPv6). means for promoting American economic the domain owes its rapid expansion and Each of these categories has unique prosperity. In one sense, his strategy allowed modern character to commerce. In this challenges, and some are more established the Nation to achieve both objectives simul- sense, sea power and cyber power share a than others. Fortunately, the United States taneously. By projecting naval power at key common objective. They both primarily exist holds dominant roles in many of these points around the globe, Mahan’s approach to protect economic interests within their categories, such as operating systems and allowed for economic expansion and had the respective domains. search engines, and it must define strategies second-order effect of pushing conflict away from U.S. shores. Cyberspace represents a similar chal- sea power and cyber power both primarily exist to protect lenge. The United States now faces a contem- economic interests within their respective domains porary struggle between expansionism and protectionism in this domain. We can learn a great deal from Mahan’s methodology for Two principles guided Mahan’s analy- to maintain those positions. In others, such delineating and prioritizing the sea domain sis. First, Mahan looked for strategic points as physical communications infrastructure into actionable terms. Thus, this article of convergence and concentration. He stated, and cloud computing, the United States has identifies strategic categories in cyberspace “In general . . . it will be found that by sea, as played a leading role in their early develop- by adopting Mahan’s approach. In doing so, by land, useful strategic points will be where ment, but the future share of influence is still it seeks to identify similarities and differ- highways pass, and especially where they uncertain. Here, more proactive measures ences between sea power and cyber power. cross and converge.”2 As a result of his fore- must be taken to help assert U.S. influence. The aim is to provide senior leaders with a sight and the willingness of key U.S. leaders better understanding of the salient aspects of to act on it, such as President Theodore Roos- Key Differences cyberspace, offer insights for securing those evelt, American influence secured the Hawai- Before continuing with a detailed points, and suggest a new paradigm for the ian Islands, the Philippines, Guantanamo review of each category, it is important to proper role of the military in this domain. Bay, Puerto Rico, and the Panama Canal, to evaluate the salient differences between the This tailored expansionist strategy for cyber- name a few. Despite both the realities and nature of the sea and the essence of cyber- space should provide the United States with perceptions of the decentralized nature of space. First, while the government played a cyberspace, careful inspection reveals several key role in helping establish the technological points of concentration. foundations of the Internet, commercial Major Kris E. Barcomb, USAF, is a Cyberspace Second, Mahan emphasized the need interest quickly surpassed the government in Strategist for 24th Air Force at Lackland Air Force to minimize the total number of points con- terms of influence over the domain. Martin Base, Texas. sidered important to communicate priorities Libicki, a senior policy analyst at the RAND ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 79 FEATURES | From Sea Power to Cyber Power Corporation, succinctly described the current William McNeill wrote about how European for centuries.9 Europeans recognized that state of government influence: “As it is, the sea power in the 16th century was quasi- they could not control the outcome of the days when governments were leading-edge private in character. Neither the British Royal economy as a whole. Instead, they established consumers and manipulators of information Navy nor Spanish Armada significantly dif- policies to facilitate economic growth. In con- technology are long past. . . . Man for man, it ferentiated themselves from their respective trast, China’s attempt to control its economy cannot compete with Microsoft.”4 merchant shipping enterprises until after too tightly led to its decline. Given that The second important difference is the 1600.7 The utility of a government-led navy commercial interests dominate cyberspace, relationship between hard and soft power was not realized until the barriers to self- and influence is based largely on merit, the in each domain. Mahan emphasized hard protection increased beyond practical limits United States must act more like the Europe- power, and he viewed the threat or use of of individual commercial entities. As barriers ans than the Chinese of the middle ages. force as foundational to protecting maritime to entry increased, the security paradigm So far, we have established conver- interests. He also tied sea power to command shifted from a distributed model to a central- gence and simplicity as key components of a when he asserted, “These national and ized one. This belief in a centralized security Mahanian-style analysis for cyberspace. We international functions can be discharged, model persists today, even though it may not have also established how the proper employ- certainly, only by command of the sea.”5 Yet be relevant in cyberspace. Instead, the much ment of both sea power and cyber power is his view of command and the role of force lower barriers to entry into cyberspace may intimately linked to promoting economic do not translate well into cyberspace, where require the reversion to a distributed security growth. Yet the two also have important soft power plays a predominant role. In model dominated by private interests. differences. Commercial entities wield more influence over cyberspace technology than governments, power and influence in cyber- USS George H.W. Bush in Naples, Italy, in support of maritime security operations and space are based on attraction and coopera- theater security cooperation tion rather than command, and low barriers to entry into cyberspace likely require a decentralized security model. Seven Strategic Points in Cyberspace The first strategic point is operating systems. While cyberspace is distributed and lacks a centralized authority, a single company has tremendous influence over nearly every desktop computer on the planet. Microsoft Windows commands 92 percent of the global market share, followed by Apple’s Mac OS at a distant 6 percent, and Linux trailing at only slightly more than 1 percent.10 In real numbers, this equates to over 1.25 billion computers running versions of the Windows OS.11 Despite the complaints about security flaws and functionality restrictions in Microsoft product offerings, the United States can be thankful that Microsoft is a U.S.-based company subject to its own laws U.S. Navy (Betsy Lynn Knapper) U.S. Navy (Betsy Lynn and cultural norms. Similarly, U.S. companies currently cyberspace, strategies centered on relation- While Western navies were expanding dominate the global market share of mobile ship-building, performance, and legitimacy the sphere of European influence, events in operating systems, although not to the degree will be more effective than those based on the East were unfolding differently. In 1433, of concentration seen in the desktop market. force. In contrast to Mahan, Joseph Nye in an attempt to inhibit the link between The breakdown of the top four companies stated, “To succeed in a networked world military and commercial enterprises, the is Google Android at 43 percent, Nokia requires leaders to think in terms of attrac- Chinese imperial court halted naval expedi- Symbian 22 percent, Apple iOS at 18 percent, tion and co-option rather than command.”6 tions. Then, in 1436, the Chinese government and Research in Motion at 12 percent (Micro- The final differentiator is ease of access. banned the construction of new seagoing soft carries less than a 2-percent share).12 Cyberspace has much lower barriers to entry ships.8 Because the Chinese economy was The U.S. position in the mobile OS space is a than the sea. Perhaps this key difference will only allowed to function within the narrow relatively recent development. Nokia ceded lead to a devolution of norms with respect to limits defined by the government, commerce the top spot in 2010 as a result of the transfor- the proper role of government and military failed to expand, thereby allowing European mation of cellular phones from simple voice in protecting private interests in cyberspace. interests to dominate the global economy communication devices to “smart phones.”13 80 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BARCOMB From a national security standpoint, To maintain its dominant position in of driving that traffic to infrastructure even if the government or military cannot both operating systems and search engines, outside of U.S. control.21 directly control the software powering the the United States must continue to adhere Additionally, some U.S. companies bulk of the world’s desktop and mobile to economic principles that promote growth have been shortsighted with regard to devices, it is far better to at least have the and innovation. It must also be extremely expanding their services. After the dot-com preponderance of software come from a cautious in exerting hard power in either of bubble of 2000 burst, these companies were U.S.-based company. Imagine if we woke up these categories. For example, antitrust regu- either not in a financial position to invest tomorrow and 92 percent of the world’s per- lation that fostered U.S. competition in the in physical communications infrastructure sonal computers ran on an operating system industrial era may now open a door for global or were unwilling to take another chance designed by a strategic competitor to the competitors to rise to the top. The United on risky technology. This myopic stance United States. We would quickly wish for the States should also guard against mandating allowed non-U.S. interests to attain those good old days of Microsoft. controls or censorship within either of these resources and open independently owned Search engines are the second strategic areas. Too much government interference and operated communications paths.22 A point in cyberspace. While operating systems could delegitimize companies such as Micro- more farsighted investment strategy com- define the technical performance character- soft, Apple, and Google and subsequently bined with targeted financial incentives istics of systems, search engines exert tre- facilitate the ability of non-U.S. companies to could have helped the United States retain mendous influence over ideas. In many ways, take their place. the preponderance of ownership. they embody Nye’s concept of soft power; they must attract users through superior performance, and the results they return are antitrust regulation that fostered U.S. competition a powerful form of agenda-setting and pref- in the industrial era may now open a door for global erence-shaping. Most users can easily switch competitors to rise to the top from one search engine to another, yet they often choose only one: Google. The company commands 91 percent of the global market A third strategic point in cyberspace The fourth strategic point is cloud share for search.14 Google’s search algorithm is physical communications infrastructure. computing. While physical communications returns what it believes are the most relevant In particular, this category relates to those infrastructure established the need to main- matches to a user’s request from its index of physical systems supporting the backbone tain influence over the global communica- over 1 trillion unique URLs.15 Since people of the Internet. Only a handful of com- tions paths, this category deals with main- generally only review the top three to five panies, known as Tier 1 Internet Service taining similar influence over the current results, the company wields historically Providers, control the bulk of the com- trend to centralize processing and storage on unprecedented ability to shape preferences. munications passing through cyberspace. the Web. Cloud computing providers such as Over 1 billion times every day, Google The United States has historically held the Amazon, Microsoft, and Google allow users decides what is and is not important across majority stake in this category, and until to rent storage and processing capacity on the Internet.16 That is power. recently, nearly all Internet traffic has been hosted infrastructures. While the current The struggle for control of this strategic routed through U.S.-owned infrastructure. market for this category is relatively small, point in cyberspace has already begun. For In an address to Congress in 2006, former it is an emerging aspect of cyberspace that example, China and Google have had a public Central Intelligence Agency Director will be important in the near future. As the dispute over the Chinese government’s efforts Michael Hayden acknowledged this point: market for cloud services grows, more and to censor Google’s search results within “Because of the nature of global telecom- more data will flow across the infrastructures its borders and the government’s attempts munications, we are playing with a tremen- of a handful of providers, making it a strate- to hack into Google’s infrastructure.17 In dous home-field advantage, and we need to gic concentration point in cyberspace. a demonstration of corporate soft power, exploit that edge.”20 For now, U.S. companies are the cloud Google withdrew its search services from Unfortunately, from a national security computing market leaders, but that could mainland China in 2010 and rehosted them standpoint, this situation is rapidly changing change. If it does, it could mean that an in Hong Kong. Google’s absence in mainland as information technology costs decrease increasing share of cyberspace data, includ- China opened the door for the government and the legal environment governing the ing that of U.S. citizens, could be hosted on to increase its own authority over Internet protection of electronic communications machines operating outside the boundar- searching. The state-run search engine Baidu grows more uncertain. In this environment, ies of U.S. law. The United States should became a de facto monopoly over the coun- lawmakers must be mindful of unintended encourage the development of these services try’s 400 million Internet users.18 Prior to effects as nations become increasingly within regions covered by U.S. jurisdiction. pulling its search engine out of the mainland, willing to recreate their own communica- It should incentivize U.S. cloud service Google had over 35 percent of the Chinese tions backbones to reduce the need to pass providers through both appropriate fiscal market share. As of June 2011, Google’s through U.S. infrastructure. For example, policy and continue to participate in the dispute caused them to slip to an 11 percent Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act in governance bodies defining standards for share, while Baidu rose to over 83 percent of part to help monitor nefarious cyber activity, this emerging capability. U.S. Government the Chinese search engine market.19 but the law had the unintended consequence organizations such as the National Institute ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 81 FEATURES | From Sea Power to Cyber Power of Standards and Technology (NIST) have strategic point, cryptography. The mathemat- II, provides an excellent historical case study performed well in building a foundation of ical underpinnings of cryptography provide to support this point. R.A. Ratcliff describes legitimacy and credibility in the cloud com- the foundation of security in cyberspace. If the negative consequences of decentralizing puting arena. These kinds of activities need the modern methods for securing data were the management of cryptography and how encouragement. broken, the entire economic engine of the it undermined the German war effort.24 A The fifth strategic point is governance Internet would crumble almost overnight. similar problem would arise if individual forums. Governance in cyberspace is more Fortunately, the odds of that happening are companies were left to define their own cryp- like a cultural phenomenon than a means of extremely low because of the NIST’s trans- tography standards. Cryptography also rep- control. There are many consortiums made parent process for defining cryptographic resents the elements of soft power in cyber- up of various interested parties that work standards. Since 1972, NIST, in coordination space since the government cannot dictate its together to decide the standards for com- with the National Security Agency, has been implementation outside its own networks. Yet municating in cyberspace. The Institute of instrumental in testing and certifying cryp- NIST’s open, competitive process for defin- Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inter- tographic standards and making them avail- ing standards helps attract security conscious national Telecommunications Union, World able to the general public. A 2001 economic private entities that recognize the value of Wide Web Consortium, Internet Assigned assessment determined their efforts had such a process. Numbers Authority, and many others play improved the U.S. economy by $1.2 billion as The United States must also continue integral roles in shaping the characteristics of 2000. 23 While more recent data were not to support research and development efforts of the cyber domain. A detailed description available, given the exponential growth of into quantum computing as a subset of the of each forum and its relevance to the cyber- e-commerce, it seems clear that this number cryptography category. Quantum computers space is beyond the scope of this article, but it has grown tremendously since then. have the potential to undermine the fun- is enough to emphasize that the United States The U.S. Government has an important damental security assumptions of modern must make a concerted effort to support, role to play in this field because of the fragil- encryption. Fortunately, quantum computers participate with, and help set the direction for ity of cryptography when poor practices are currently too immature to achieve this these governing bodies. or design implementations undercut its feat, but when and if they do reach that level Another area where NIST has been theoretical foundations. Enigma, the cypher of complexity, it is in the best interest of the instrumental in exercising U.S. Government machine used by the German military to United States to be at the forefront of this soft power in cyberspace has been in the sixth encrypt communications during World War next generation of computing technology. Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn briefed on cloud computing by Google representatives U.S. Air Force (Jerry Morrison) U.S. Air Force 82 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BARCOMB The final strategic point, IPv6 (the next Hard power will be secondary to soft 14 “Browser, OS, Search Engine including generation standard), is associated with the power in cyberspace for the foreseeable Mobile Market Share,” Statcounter.com, available fundamental routing protocol of the Internet. future. Strategies aimed at attracting and at ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 83 The Future of (Mike Buytas) U.S. Air Force U.S. Landpower Special Operations Versatility, Marine Corps Utility By Kevin D. Stringer and Katie M. Sizemore Army Special Forces on patrol in Iraq 84 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu STRINGER and SIZEMORE merican military landpower, Iraq and Afghanistan, national demographic billion more.7 In all, sequestration constraints represented by the U.S. Army trends, and continuing controversy over roles could trim anywhere from $500 billion to and Marine Corps, finds itself and missions. The Army consists of 45 Active over $1 trillion from projected long-term A in a period of transition. This and 28 Reserve Brigade Combat Teams, while defense spending.8 phase is characterized by troop drawdowns the Marine Corps is broken down into 29 The results could be devastating, with from the decade-long, manpower-intensive Active and 9 Reserve Infantry Battalions.1 grave implications for the land components. counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and As of June 2011, there were 571,108 Active As Defense Secretary Leon Panetta stated, Afghanistan; an uncertain budgetary per- Army personnel and 200,827 Active Marine “It’s a brigade without bullets. . . . It’s a paper spective given impending defense cutbacks; personnel stationed worldwide.2 When tiger, an Army of barracks, buildings and and a divisive debate on the appropriate former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates bombs without enough trained Soldiers able roles and missions for ground forces in itemized the fiscal year 2012 Department to accomplish the mission. . . . It’s a force that the future. This article aims to provide a of Defense (DOD) budget, he stated that by suffers low morale, poor readiness and is forward-looking view of U.S. landpower for the beginning of 2012, there would be fewer unable to keep up with potential adversaries. the next decade. While the sheer difficulty of than 100,000 troops deployed in both Iraq In effect, it invites aggression.”9 Chairman predicting the future is known, the demands and Afghanistan. He also added that by 2015, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin of policy and force planning require some Army Active force levels would be reduced Dempsey echoed this view by stating that attempt to delineate at least the rough con- by at least 27,000 and the Marine Corps by the U.S. military’s capacity to deploy ground tours of this upcoming period. 15,000 to 20,000 troops, assuming that the forces for future operations would be reduced To achieve this tour de horizon, the majority of troops in Afghanistan exit by by around 15 percent as a result of defense article first provides an overview of the 2014. This level would still be 40,000 troops spending cuts over the next decade. Con- current state of American land forces. It larger than in 2008.3 cretely, American land forces would retain then highlights the fiscal, demographic, and doctrinal challenges that impact American landpower. The authors then propose a more demography, finance, and threats dictate a more nuanced and subtle application paradigm for landpower sophisticated use of landpower that is both indirect and preventive. The lead instruments for this approach are U.S. special operations forces (SOF) and Marine But given a new Presidential strat- capability across the spectrum of conflict, but Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs). Their egy that envisions a regional focus on the the frequency and capacity for use would be missions involve interceding in priority geo- Asia-Pacific, the Army may be reduced greatly limited.10 graphic combatant command regions to stabi- to 490,000 troops from 570,000 and the In the face of these unprecedented lize, prevent, or preclude conflict situations in Marines to 175,000 from 200,000 over the budgetary limits, defense planners face some order to avoid manpower-intensive and costly next few years.4 To place these figures in nightmarish dilemmas about how best to conventional or counterinsurgency interven- historical perspective, the Army today has maintain real flexibility and cost effective- tions, which will be unsustainable given 200,000 fewer Active-duty troops than in ness.11 For instance, the Middle East remains future fiscal and demographic constraints. 1991.5 While the projected numbers may the highest priority in terms of a continued Examples from the most relevant or seem sufficient for national defense, these military commitment, while Africa and Latin representative combatant commands for the troop strengths depend upon a wider and America receive the lowest priority for a large future—U.S. Central Command (USCENT- highly volatile fiscal context that could bring American military presence.12 The Asian COM), U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), further reductions. theater increases in importance, but it does and U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM)— In this period of economic uncertainty, not require a large number of ground forces. demonstrate the developing nature of this Congress is targeting DOD for cost reduc- Hence, policymakers must choose how to “light touch” approach. The conclusion tion measures. The Congressional Budget allocate declining resources and determine supports the premise that demography, Control Act passed in August 2011 seeks which areas require a strong U.S. military finance, and threats dictate a more nuanced to reduce defense spending by $882 billion land commitment. and sophisticated use of landpower than in over the next 10 years.6 Furthermore, lack of the past. congressional decisionmaking could result in Demographics lowered “sequestration” ceilings on spending In addition to budget cuts, demographic Current State and Fiscal Challenges that would effectively cut more than $500 trends have the potential to strain recruiting U.S. landpower consists of its Army and billion from what the Pentagon has projected, as well as retention for the land components. Marine Corps elements, both of which bear plus sequestration cuts that would further Of the military Services, the Army deployed consequences from the troop drawdowns in indiscriminately slash as much as $500 the largest number of personnel to opera- tions in Iraq and Afghanistan but struggled to maintain and increase its end strength in Dr. Kevin D. Stringer (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve) is an Associate Professor at Webster University accordance with congressional authorization. Geneva. Katie M. Sizemore is a Master’s degree candidate in International Peace and Conflict Resolution in With recruiting and retention a stated priority the School of International Service at American University. for the Army, 2009 witnessed a decrease in ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 85 FEATURES | The Future of U.S. Landpower recruiting by 14.2 percent, or some 24,120 longer life expectancies further affects these future holds a high potential for instability Soldiers. Retention measurements, referring numbers.17 This development leaves the due to demographic, energy, and climate to the number of Soldiers who reenlist within American population with a lower number of trends.22 Hostile great powers, once the pre- a given fiscal year, also saw a decrease in 2009 young people of recruiting age as a propor- dominant threats to American security, have of 3.2 percent, or 3,830 Soldiers.13 Conversely, tion of the total population. This phenom- been supplanted by rogue states, failed states, the Marine Corps has met or exceeded all enon partially explains the slight decrease and nonstate actors—all of them pursuing of its recruiting goals in terms of quantity seen in 2009 retention. Also, since military asymmetrical strategies to offset U.S. mili- and quality every year since 2000, but these personnel tend to retire earlier due to the tary strengths.23 In Latin America, Africa, goals were lowered by 10 percent over the nature of the system, the overall ground force and Southeast Asia, an intertwined wave of period 2000–2006.14 Several studies seem to faces declining numbers at both ends of the violent extremism and criminality confronts confirm the challenges of future recruitment military career spectrum.18 Finally, from a governments and populations.24 China and in a modern society. One Armed Forces & purely supply-side perspective, only 3 out of other emerging regional powers, often with Society article looked at propensity to serve every 10 young Americans (17–24 years old) opaque intentions, represent potential risks in the military, which is shown to be a strong meet the medical, educational, and moral too. This future implies the commensurate predictor of actual enlistment. Propensity to standards of the U.S. military.19 These facts need for adequate ground forces to address serve is declining among American youth, equate to a smaller pool of personnel from the contingency operations produced by such and there are not sufficient “high propensity” which to recruit and retain.20 These com- a volatile world.25 youth to meet manpower needs, so harder- bined fiscal and demographic limits imply a American society needs landpower for to-reach segments must be targeted and much smaller land component, which must a diverse set of national security objectives: recruited.15 Another study from the same still maintain adequate flexibility and combat to fight and win major wars, secure a U.S. journal explored underlying themes affecting power for future contingencies, yet be used presence overseas, confront counterinsur- enlistment while illustrating that the U.S. mili- sparingly for only the most crucial national gencies, execute stability operations, and tary faces substantial recruiting challenges. security interests. assist in domestic disturbances and national These hurdles stem from the high percentage disasters at home and abroad. Yet while the of youth pursuing education beyond high Doctrinal Roles general public can create such task lists, poli- school, cyclical fluctuations in civilian job At the same time that American cymakers struggle to organize or prioritize opportunities, and the occurrence of inter- military landpower navigates a period of these missions since there is no objective national events that can lead to periods of fiscal and demographic transition, threats standard to determine what constitutes heightened concern.16 to national security continue to multiply. A “enough” security, or what particular mix The demographic trend of a “graying” 2010 U.S. Joint Forces Command21 study on of goals and resources is best. 26 To address population due to lower birth rates and warfare lends credence to the view that the this broad societal mandate, U.S. Army doctrine clearly describes future expecta- tions for an expeditionary, campaign-quality Army that is proficient at full-spectrum operations—conventional warfare, hybrid warfare, irregular warfare, humanitarian assistance, stabilization operations, and any other mission the Nation gives it. The com- plexity of these missions defies the concept of a “one-size-fits-all” force structure. There are too many variables and uncertainties to expect a homogeneous army to be equally proficient and optimally organized for any mission in any scenario. This combination will most certainly require tradeoffs in force structure, training proficiency, and future acquisition programs.27 Similarly, the Marine Corps, con- sidered a general purpose force in DOD, operates on the land, sea, and air, but is not optimized to dominate any of them. Rather, the Marine Corps is designed to be expedi- tionary. Organized in MAGTFs ranging in size from a 2,000-man Marine expedition- ary unit (MEU) to a 45,000-man Marine U.S. Marine Corps (Daniel A. Negrete) expeditionary force, the Marine Corps can U.S. Marine with Air-Ground Task Force posts security during jungle patrol exercise in Poptun, Guatemala provide rapid response to humanitarian 86 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu STRINGER and SIZEMORE crises, traditional power projection, forcible- respectful of human rights.34 Sufficient U.S. tional conflicts.”42 This article subscribes to entry capabilities, and sustained, large-scale troop numbers for counterinsurgency would this view and proposes an indirect and pre- combat operations.28 most likely not be available in the future ventive land force paradigm where worldwide Yet ongoing military operations in two given budgetary and demographic limits. ground engagement is led by SOF and the wars have exposed the difficulties of accom- Additionally, institutional resistance stays Marine Corps. This approach finds support plishing critical policy aims while maintain- strong inside the Army, despite recent growth from several sources. As Secretary Gates ing flexibility within manpower restrictions. in its special operations components. Though noted in a February 25, 2011, speech at West In these conflicts, the Nation relied heavily the Marine Corps remains comfortable Point, the United States will not send large on the Army to carry a significant portion with counterinsurgency because of its long land armies into the Middle East again, and of the national effort on land.29 Equally, history of small wars and policing operations, the most plausible, high-end scenarios for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan required the Army, notwithstanding considerable the U.S. military are primarily naval and air the Marine Corps to fight as a second land experience in small wars, has never viewed engagements—whether in Asia, the Persian army.30 These campaigns strained the full- counterinsurgency as anything other than a Gulf, or elsewhere. The strategic rationale for spectrum flexibility of both organizations. diversion from its main mission of conven- swift-moving expeditionary forces, whether This recent history raises an important ques- tional combat against like enemies.35 Army or Marine, airborne infantry or special tion for landpower usage in the future: What Contemporary supporters of the con- operations, is self-evident given the likeli- concept should determine land force employ- ventional view, notably Colonel Gian Gentile, hood of counterterrorism, rapid reaction, ment, training, and structure in a limited contend that counterinsurgency has become disaster response, or stability or security personnel and fiscal context? To date, the the new American way of war prematurely force assistance missions.43 The new DOD debate centers around whether conventional and without proper examination.36 He calls strategic guidance confirms that U.S. forces means or counterinsurgency concepts should for a reassessment of the doctrine in order to will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, predominate.31 The next section summarizes reach a more complete and operational role.37 prolonged stability operations.44 this controversy and then offers a relevant Gentile rejects a doctrinal approach that With versatility and flexibility third way for consideration. places Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, vital characteristics for future landpower Mission Dissonance Landpower experts typically divide the Army has never viewed counterinsurgency as anything into two camps. Proponents of counterin- other than a diversion from its main mission of conventional surgency such as Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, combat against like enemies John Nagl, and David Kilcullen advocate U.S. ground forces addressing asymmetric conflicts for the future. They believe the U.S. above conventional capacities. He writes that operations, coupled with the need to husband military is more likely to be called upon to “the future of war is not only the counter- scarcer ground force personnel, SOF and the counter insurgencies, intervene in civil strife insurgencies of Iraq and Afghanistan” and Marine Corps both possess capabilities and humanitarian crises, rebuild nations, and that “the choice should be to build an army and cultures for early and successful initial wage unconventional types of warfare than it on the organizing principle of fighting.”38 He ground engagement in the exceedingly is to fight mirror-image armed forces. In this demands a military more heavily weighted complex, unpredictable, and unstructured school, U.S. forces should focus on winning to the requirements of conventional war.39 world that confronts the U.S. military. the “hearts and minds” of the population This latter perspective follows the intel- Their characteristics also complement through compromise, negotiation, and above lectual tradition of Colonel Harry Summers those of the more conventional Army. all the defeat of the insurgent’s strategy. The in his 1982 On Strategy: A Critical Analysis While the regular Army remains expert at essential role of military forces is to create of the Vietnam War, which repudiated the large-scale land combat and the integra- the preconditions necessary for nonmilitary counterinsurgency lessons of Vietnam.40 Pro- tion of huge formations against similarly measures to succeed.32 ponents of this group find succor in the 2008 sized foes, SOF concentrate on irregular Yet such circumstances require large Russo-Georgian war and the 2006 Lebanon warfare—that is, counterterrorism, coun- numbers of properly trained ground troops war, both of which demonstrated the need for terinsurgency, psychological operations, for securing population centers and infra- adequate levels of conventional capabilities.41 and foreign internal defense.45 The present structure, maintaining order, providing Given this impasse, it seems a third and future environment is so complex humanitarian relief, and facilitating revived way is needed for the future. In a prescient that SOF can use their high levels of warf- delivery of such fundamental services as article, Michael Cohen summarized thinking ighting expertise, coupled with cultural electric power, potable water, and refuse on the counterinsurgency and conventional knowledge and diplomacy skills, to lay the collection.33 As one researcher noted, coun- approaches and concluded that both camps groundwork for interagency development, terinsurgency campaigns are winnable if they have it wrong. He asserted the argument of defense, and diplomatic activities that con- attain a sufficient force density, are defending Steven Metz that, “in the end, perhaps the tribute to overall U.S. national interests.46 a generally popular and capable government, focus of the U.S. military and American Similarly, the Marine Corps offers and rest largely on the shoulders of indig- foreign policy, writ large, should be to avoid real cross-functional utility. The Service enous forces who are skilled, flexible, and counterinsurgencies—and to avoid conven- can bridge the critical seam between Army ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 87 FEATURES | The Future of U.S. Landpower and Navy operations, is culturally and the lead military organization for managing United States. Yet as troop withdrawals operationally adept and comfortable with our two primary military challenges.50 continue, the future role of landpower in irregular warfare, and can transition to fight USCENTCOM is unclear. As Secretary Gates as a second conventional army if needed. Conversely, Ambassador Mary Yates noted, a large land army will not be a part of While SOF and Marine Corps land activities views an interagency combatant command the U.S. role in the Middle East in the future, would be undertaken to preclude larger and like that found in USAFRICOM as more rel- but rather a lighter, more diverse force will more costly interventions, if these “steering” evant to the post-9/11 environment through a shape the strategic architecture of U.S. engage- engagements, often interagency in character, close integration of both military and civilian ment in the region. The reduction of conven- are not successful, adequate numbers of efforts.51 While acknowledging this debate and tional troops will likely place a larger burden heavy Army conventional forces should the imperfections of dividing the world into on SOF formations as well as increase their remain for reinforcement. David E. Johnson regional commands, a prioritized combatant roles in the region. As a case in point, the eloquently makes this case in a recent RAND command lens provides useful examples to majority of Army Special Forces are operating study on the future of the heavy army. Army show the utility of SOF and the Marine Corps in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility.56 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams provide a to shape, influence, manage, or deter specific In addition to carrying out direct combat crucial hedge against the full range of poten- risks found in key regions in the future. and counterterrorism operations, in-theater tial enemies that the United States could In terms of priorities for future land- SOF conduct a wide variety of indirect mis- face in the future: nonstate irregular, state- power employment, four of the current com- sions including psychological, training, and sponsored hybrid, and state adversaries.47 batant commands stand out and illustrate the support operations for paramilitary forces.57 But these assets, most likely limited by fiscal relevancy of leading with SOF and Marine Besides SOF, the Marine Corps is active. The constraints, should be kept in reserve. Rather, Corps capabilities. USCENTCOM remains 15th MEU demonstrated a perfect example of the future of landpower employment, based a priority for strategic landpower since it the future of land warfare in USCENTCOM upon regional priorities, already tends toward oversees operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, when it simultaneously provided close-air giving SOF primacy of engagement, while and Pakistan, and conducts a theater-wide support in Afghanistan, conducted evacua- simultaneously utilizing the versatility of the campaign against al Qaeda.52 USPACOM’s tion and disaster-relief operations in Pakistan, MAGTFs. This trend should be reinforced. importance grows as American foreign policy and secured and removed suspected pirates pivots away from the greater Middle East to from the container ship Magellan Star in the Landpower by Geographic Combat- the Asia-Pacific. President Barack Obama’s Gulf of Aden.58 ant Commands U.S. Northern Command (USNORTH- COM), U.S. Southern Command in-theater SOF conduct a wide variety of indirect missions (USSOUTHCOM), USCENTCOM, U.S. including psychological, training, and support operations for European Command (USEUCOM), paramilitary forces USPACOM, and USAFRICOM form part of the unified combatant command community and are charged with the command and new “Hedge” strategy confirms this shift.53 USPACOM. Similarly, the security control of the U.S. military on a geographical Finally, USAFRICOM is uniquely focused on environment in the Pacific demands versatil- basis.48 This arrangement is controversial. building security capacities rather than war- ity and flexibility from the military’s land Some experts question whether these com- fighting and serves as a surrogate example in forces. Currently composed of 250,000 per- mands should be modified or rendered obso- this section for the equally vital USSOUTH- sonnel, U.S. Pacific Command’s major effort lete altogether given the limitations posed by COM given their similarities in mission.54 has been enhancing the stability of the Asia- a rigid regional organization that no longer These two latter commands, USAFRICOM Pacific region. Its main focus areas include fits comfortably in today’s global security and USSOUTHCOM, will merit more atten- strengthening and advancing alliances and environment.49 Ambassador Edward Marks, tion in the future since instability in these partnerships, remaining prepared to respond noting that one of our foremost security chal- regions is multigenerational and represents to a Korean Peninsula contingency, and lenges is international terrorism, makes the a long-term threat to security in an increas- countering transnational threats.59 following observation: ingly globalized world.55 USNORTHCOM As in USCENTCOM, SOF are uniquely and USEUCOM, while important as logistics organized and prepared to counter the The lead for planning (and often conducting) bases and power projection platforms, are less present threats. U.S. Special Operations military counterterrorism campaigns falls relevant for the landpower discussion given Command Pacific (SOCPAC) has increas- on the shoulder of [U.S.] Special Operations the lower threat profiles found there. ingly used an indirect approach to combat Command—a global, functional command. USCENTCOM. While overseeing the terrorism in the region and the threats posed Another major security challenge is monitor- wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. Central by al Qaeda. SOCPAC’s efforts consist mostly ing and securing weapons of mass destruc- Command has been the focal point of the of foreign internal defense and unconven- tion . . . a task that falls to another global, combatant command community for most tional warfare. It works closely with host functional command—[U.S.] Strategic of this decade. Its region includes Pakistan, nation militaries and political leadership to Command. In other words, the [geographic which together with Afghanistan constitutes foster ties and coordinate efforts so that they combatant commands] are not designated as the epicenter of the terrorist threat to the can develop the capability to provide security 88 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu STRINGER and SIZEMORE over the long term. SOCPAC land forces have three principles of collaborating with African in USAFRICOM places stability operations learned to do more with less via an indirect partners, approaching the continent within a on par with major combat missions through approach of institution- and capacity- regional framework, and cooperating as part its SOF elements within Special Operations building for addressing asymmetric threats of an interagency team. While a conventional Command Africa.69 in USPACOM. 60 military conflict in Africa is unlikely, the Meanwhile, U.S. Marine Corps Forces In addition to SOCPAC’s unique challenges created by crime, poverty, corrup- Africa (MARFORAF) focuses on engage- efforts in the region, the self-contained and tion, illicit trafficking of materials, terrorism, ment through military-to-military training sea-based MAGTFs are the best kind of fire and institutional weakness call for a more with partner nations. In anticipation of this extinguishers—because of their flexibility, varied and preventive security cooperation broader future, the Marine Corps created a reliability, logistical simplicity, and relative approach.65 A traditional military culture Security Cooperation Marine Air-Ground economy.61 The Marines were scheduled in focused primarily on major land conflict has Task Force concept tailored for security coop- 2012 to begin reorienting from Afghanistan difficulty using this capacity-building meth- eration and civil-military operations. This to the Pacific because of the increasing odology in foreign nations, yet since it is the force provides another expeditionary option emphasis on a ground force presence in the heart of USAFRICOM’s mission, SOF forma- to augment joint and interagency capabilities region.62 For example, the Marine Corps tions, with their versatility, play an important that are already available to geographic com- showcased its expeditionary force readiness role in its execution.66 batant commands. This formation will help by deploying within 20 hours to Japan and In September 2011, General Carter partner nations in not only Africa but also beginning humanitarian assistance following Ham, commander of USAFRICOM, asked Southwest Asia and South America in order the devastating tsunami in March 2011.63 for more special operations forces. His state- to foster stability and prevent conflict in their Forward-positioned MAGTFs, supported ment referenced the growing counterterror- respective regions.70 when necessary by immediately deployable ism effort in Africa due to signs of increased In Africa, Special Purpose Marine reinforcements, enable swift power projec- collaboration between al-Shabaab in East Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) 12 tion and rapid crisis resolution throughout Africa, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, exemplifies this concept by sending small the USPACOM area of operations.64 and Nigeria-based Boko Harem.67 To avoid training groups to partner with local militar- USAFRICOM. Created in 2007 as the future high-profile wars, subordinate ies in an effort to indirectly blunt the spread newest addition to the geographic combat- commanders were told to focus on “smart of extremist groups across the continent. ant commands, U.S. Africa Command power”—that is, training national armies to The task force has dispatched teams across covers all 53 countries on that continent. keep the peace and neutralize threats before a wide swath of Africa over the course of its The USAFRICOM mission operates on the they reach the headlines.68 The Army’s role 6-month deployment in support of MAR- U.S. Marines with Echo Company, 4th Reconnaissance Battalion, demonstrate amphibious assault during Marine Week Saint Louis, June 2011 U.S. Marine Corps ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 89 FEATURES | The Future of U.S. Landpower FORAF, sending from 5 to 50 Marines into nations’ reluctance to host large numbers of President Obama’s decision announced partner nations from days to months at a U.S. troops was one reason for USAFRICOM in November 2011 to redeploy 2,500 Marines time. The 180-troop-strong unit was formed headquarters to remain in Europe despite to Australia in order to expand and solidify over the summer of 2011 from Marine Forces growing threats in Africa. SPMAGTF 12 military alliances with Asia, and subsequent Reserve units and equipped with two KC-130 missions on the continent could represent policy documents, provide a glimpse into Hercules aircraft to ferry teams to and from an early example of a long-heralded Marine this evolving future of American landpower. African countries. The unit is among the first Corps return to quick reaction operations.71 Small, versatile forces judiciously placed in of its kind. key locations to symbolize long-term Ameri- In Uganda, the Marine team of force Conclusion can military commitment could provide reconnaissance, infantry, and combat- While many uncertainties cloud the expandable platforms for capabilities across engineering troops taught common soldier- future, the United States must possess a flexi- a range of missions—humanitarian crises, ing skills that Ugandan soldiers need for use ble land force—one that can engage, respond, power projection, and disaster relief. This against the brutal Lord’s Resistance Army. and project—to operate across the domains blueprint mirrors the new strategic guid- More specialized follow-on training was that challenge its ability to execute global ance that states, “Whenever possible, we designed to help Ugandan field engineers responsibilities.72 Yet demographic, financial, will develop innovative, low-cost, and small counter al-Shabaab insurgency tactics in and future threat parameters dictate that footprint approaches to achieve our national Somalia, where urban obstacles and impro- the use of landpower must become more security objectives.”74 This foretaste demon- vised explosive devices reminiscent of the nuanced and sophisticated than in the past. strates that even in times of stringent budget- Iraq War are common. This small task force Rather than argue the merits of coun- ary cuts and adverse demographic trends, the represents one of the first significant security terinsurgency or conventional approaches measured use of landpower remains a strate- cooperation missions undertaken by DOD in for the future, the U.S. military should gic tool for projecting American interests and Uganda, a nation more accustomed to State concentrate on a subtler application para- influence abroad.75 JFQ Department interaction. digm for landpower that is both indirect Under Secretary of the Navy Robert and preventive. In this setting, SOF and Work singled out the task force as a prime MAGTFs lead the ground force effort Notes example of the type of “low footprint, high to prevent, deter, and contain threats in 1 Frank A. DiStasio, Jr., The Army Budget payoff operations” the White House is USCENTCOM, USPACOM, USAFRICOM, Fiscal Year 2012: An Analysis (Arlington, VA: seeking as a means of maintaining global and USSOUTHCOM in order to avoid Association of the United States Army, 2011). defense postures as the Pentagon pledges manpower-intensive engagements. Con- 2 “Active Duty Military Personnel by Regional to cut at least $450 billion in spending over ventional and heavy land forces remain on Area and by Country,” Department of Defense, the next decade. Using a small group such hand, but they are husbanded as the strate- Defense Manpower Data Center, 2011. as the one in Uganda could simplify the gic reserve to be used only if the SOF and 3 DiStasio. complex politics associated with deploy- MAGTF efforts fail. This model still allows 4 Mackubin Thomas Owens, “The President’s ing and hosting troops in a foreign nation. “strategic pluralism,” an approach that calls Risky Defense Strategy,” The Wall Street Journal, During testimony to Congress on February for a wide variety of military forces and January 6, 2012. 5 29, 2012, General Ham noted that African weapons to meet a diversity of threats.73 Max Boot, “Slashing America’s Defense: A Suicidal Trajectory,” Com- mentary, January 2012, available at 90 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu STRINGER and SIZEMORE shire, UK: Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power 33 Record, 7; and Max Boot, “The Struggle to 56 Kate Brannen, “U.S. Army Special Opera- Studies, 2010). Transform the Military,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 tions Force Not Expected to Grow Beyond 2017,” 12 Barno, Bensahel, and Sharp. (2005). Defense News, 2010. 13 U.S. Army Sustainability Report 2010 (Wash- 34 Carl Conetta, “No Good Reason to Boost 57 John J. Kruzel, “Special Forces to Remain in ington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Marine Corps End Strength,” Project on Iraq through Drawdown,” American Forces Press Army for Installations, Energy, and Environment, Defense Alternatives, Briefing Report No. 20, Service, 2010. 2011). Washington, DC, 2007. 58 George J. Flynn, “Versatility in the Age of 14 Recruiting, Retention, and Future Levels of 35 Record, 10. Uncertainty,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 136, Military Personnel (Washington, DC: Congressional 36 Gian P. Gentile, “Is Counterinsurgency the no. 11 (2010). Budget Office, 2006). Right Path in Afghanistan? No,” U.S. News Digital 59 Robert F. Willard, “United States Pacific 15 Todd Woodruff, Ryan Kelty, and David Weekly 1, no. 40 (2009). Command Strategic Guidance,” available at R. Segal, “Propensity to Serve and Motivation to 37 Gian P. Gentile, “Time for the Deconstruc- ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 91 The German Military Mission to Romania, 1940–1941 By Richard L. Di Nardo hen one thinks of security assistance and the train- ing of foreign troops, W Adolf Hitler’s Germany is not a country that typically comes to mind. Yet there were two instances in World War II when Germany did indeed deploy troops to other countries that were in noncombat cir- cumstances. The countries in question were Finland and Romania, and the German mili- tary mission to Romania is the subject of this article. The activities of the German mission to Romania are discussed and analyzed, and some conclusions and hopefully a few take- aways are offered that could be relevant for military professionals today. Creation of the Mission The matter of how the German military mission to Romania came into being can be covered relatively quickly. In late June 1940, the Soviet Union demanded from Romania the cession of both Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. The only advice Germany could give to the Romanian government was to agree to surrender the territory.1 Fearful of further Soviet encroachments, the Roma- nian government made a series of pleas to Germany including a personal appeal from Wikimedia Commons King Carol II to Hitler for German military assistance in the summer of 1940. Hitler, Finnish Volunteer Battalion of German Waffen-SS return home from front in 1943 however, was not yet willing to undertake such a step. Thus, all Romanian requests were rebuffed with Hitler telling Carol that Romania brought its own problems upon itself by its prior pro-Allied policy. Hitler also 92 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu DiNARDO urged the Romanian government to settle its The next major element was the German air German Me 109E, German Hs 112B, and problems with Hungary peaceably.2 force mission (Deutsches Luftwaffe Mission Romanian IAR 80A fighters. The bomber Having been urged by Hitler to attain in Rümanien, or DLM), commanded by Luft- fleet included German He 111s, French Bloch a peaceful solution, Romania and Hungary waffe Lieutenant General Wilhelm Speidel. 210s and Potez 63s, Italian SM 84s, Polish then asked Hitler and Italy’s Benito Mussolini The final part of the military mission was the PZL 37Bs, and Romanian IAR 37s. The to act as arbitrators in their dispute over the German navy mission, headed by Admiral Romanians used several of their own aircraft contested area of Transylvania.3 Much to W. Tillesen.7 This article looks at the activi- models for reconnaissance as well as British Romania’s chagrin, however, Hitler and Mus- ties of the DLM to a small degree, but the Blenheims. Under these circumstances, the solini tried to split the difference but in Hun- major focus will be on the DHM. best the Germans were able to do was to gary’s favor. On August 30, 1940, Germany, Hitler laid out the chains of command train ground troops extensively in aircraft Italy, Hungary, and Romania signed the for the elements of the German military identification and make sure the Romanians Second Vienna Award. By the terms of that mission in his directive of October 10, 1940. received British aircraft and parts captured in agreement, Romania had to cede about half Each service mission traced its administra- Yugoslavia in 1941.10 of Transylvania to Hungary.4 tive chain of command to its respective The territorial losses incurred during headquarters in Germany. Hansen, as head The DHM and Romanian Army the summer of 1940 caused considerable of the military mission, would decide matters The major effort in Romania was made political instability in Romania. The Second of common concern. Political matters would by the German army mission, the DHM, Vienna Award, coming after Romania’s be turned over to the German minister in first commanded by Hansen and later by agreeing to conduct a pro-Axis foreign Romania, who looked after German foreign General Eugen Ritter von Schobert. Aside policy, completed the discrediting of Carol’s policy interests there.8 from Schobert’s own staff, the presence of government. Carol appointed Romania’s the DHM would be manifested initially in top military leader, General Ion Antonescu, as prime minister on September 4, 1940. Antonescu promptly forced Carol’s abdica- with Antonescu’s ascension to power, the relationship between tion on September 6, with exile following Germany and Romania warmed considerably soon thereafter. The now vacant Romanian throne was then occupied by King Michael, a callow youth of 19, while Antonescu assumed The DLM and the Aerial Defense of the form of a division-size unit. At first, this dictatorial powers and the title of “Leader,” Romania was to be Friedrich Wilhelm von Rothkirch’s much in keeping with his Nazi and Fascist The DLM had two principal missions. und Panthen’s 13th Motorized Infantry Divi- colleagues.5 The first was to create air defenses around the sion, but was later expanded to include Hans With Antonescu’s ascension to power, vital oil region of Romania in the vicinity of Valentin Hube’s 16th Panzer Division as well. the relationship between Germany and Ploesti and the Black Sea port of Constanta. Several infantry divisions were added in the Romania warmed considerably. Antonescu Also involved was the regulation of air space course of 1941 as German plans first for the began by promising closer collaboration with over the defended areas. The second mission invasion of Greece and later the Soviet Union Germany. He also renewed the request for was to modernize the Romanian air force. took shape.11 German military assistance, with the idea The DLM was more successful in completing Like the DLM, the DHM had two mis- of having Germans train and reorganize the the first mission. Speidel and his staff were sions. Aside from the training mission, the Romanian army. This time, Hitler agreed able to use both Romanian and German German units were to assist the Romanian and on September 19, 1940, he decided to materiel and procedures to make Ploesti one force in erecting defenses against a possible send a military mission to Romania. The of the most heavily defended targets against Soviet invasion, although the mere presence improvement in relations would culminate air attacks. This was to prove invaluable in of German units in Romania did act as a on November 23, 1940, with Romania’s the initial Romanian participation in Opera- guarantee against further Soviet encroach- adherence to the Tripartite Pact.6 tion Barbarossa. Between late June and mid- ments. The second mission was to train the To be precise, Germany actually sent October 1941, Ploesti and Constanta were Romanian army up to a level that was as close four missions to Romania. The umbrella attacked 91 times by Soviet aircraft. Led by to German standards as possible. These units organization was the German military the efforts of the Luftwaffe’s Jagd Geschwader would play a part in the invasion of the Soviet mission, commanded by Army General Erik 52, the combined Romanian-German defense Union. Hitler had distinctly mentioned Hansen, who was also the military attaché brought down some 81 Soviet aircraft.9 this in his December 5, 1940, speech to the to Bucharest. Hansen also commanded the Modernizing the Romanian air force heads of the Wehrmacht. Both Finland and German army mission (Deutsches Heeres proved a bridge too far for the DLM to travel. Romania are mentioned as possible allies in Mission in Rümanien, or DHM) to Romania. Bringing the air force up to date assumed the execution of Operation Barbarossa in growing importance for Germany as Roma- Hitler’s first official directive on the subject nian participation in Barbarossa became a issued December 18, 1940.12 Richard L. DiNardo is Professor of National Security certainty. The most notable problem was The DHM’s ability to carry out its Affairs at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff the veritable plethora of aircraft used by the training mission was hampered by several College in Quantico, Virginia. Romanian air force. This mélange included factors outside of its control. The first was an ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 93 RECALL | The German Military Mission to Romania earthquake that struck Romania on the night Aside from these problems, lowed by Himmler’s recall of all SS officials of November 9–10, 1940. German soldiers in members of the German military mission from Romania.18 the 13th Motorized Infantry Division found in Romania, especially in the DHM, had As these problems were dealt with by themselves in the unaccustomed position of to avoid stepping into the minefield of Germans or Romanians or both, the DHM rendering humanitarian assistance to Roma- ethnic minority politics. For the DHM, got on with the business of training the nian civil authorities, which did yield some this centered around the Volksdeutsche Romanian army. Training was conducted at dividends in terms of goodwill.13 (ethnic German) community in Romania. the tactical and operational levels, at least in a The second factor that disrupted Like all ethnic German communities in theoretical sense. There was also an ideologi- DHM activity was the tension between the that part of Europe, the Volksdeutsche in cal aspect to the training. Antonescu government and Romania’s contri- Romania had major connections to the Tactically, the Germans set up training bution to fascism, the Iron Guard. By January Nazi Party, and the Nazis had newspapers centers for the Romanian 5th, 6th, 13th, 18th, and 1941, Antonescu decided that cooperation and political organizations in Romania. 20th infantry divisions as well as for the Roma- between his government and the leader of the Not surprisingly, German language nian Panzer Division. These centers aimed at Iron Guard, Horia Sima, was no longer pos- newspapers ran articles welcoming the training Romanian soldiers in both German sible and that the Iron Guard would have to be German military presence.17 weapons and tactics. Later on in the spring of dealt with decisively. For his part, although he A sticky issue for the DHM was the 1941, the Germans extended the training in a had more affinity ideologically with the Iron fact that the Volksdeutsche in Romania limited way to artillery.19 They also sought to Guard, Hitler decided that Antonescu was a were subject to conscription and service improve the quality of Romanian general offi- much more reliable ally with whom to deal. in the Romanian army, which they were cers through education. The DHM set up the The result was the suppression of the Iron resistant to for a variety of reasons. Matters equivalent of the German Kriegsakademie in Guard by the Romanian army, in some cases were made more complex by the pres- Romania. All aspirants for general officer rank with German support. Horia Sima and some ence of the Schutzstaffel (SS) recruiters in were to take a 2-year course of instruction. of his principal followers fled to Germany, Romania who were eagerly seeking ever Like its German counterpart, the Romanian where they were offered safe haven.14 more members for Heinrich Himmler’s war college was tactically oriented and focused Third, DHM efforts were interrupted expanding SS empire. The Romanians on division-sized operations. The course was by the German invasion of Yugoslavia and naturally objected because they sought also aimed at producing officers who could Greece, an operation that had to be mounted this manpower for their own army, and undertake all staff and administrative func- from Romania. The German High Command avoiding military service in Romania was tions associated with division and brigade had already indicated to Antonescu that some in fact a crime. Both issues were eventu- operations. A course was also set up for 500,000 German troops slated for the inva- ally solved. When a local Volksdeutsche general officers and older staff officers as well, sion of Greece would pass through Romania. leader, Gauleiter Fromm, came to Hans lasting from 1 to 3 months.20 While the troops would be under the tactical command of Field Marshal Wilhelm List, the Twelfth Army commander, List would be sub- like its German counterpart, the Romanian war college was ordinate to the head of the DHM for the pur- tactically oriented and focused on division-sized operations poses of the preparation and conduct of the Twelfth Army’s passage. As head of the DHM, Hansen would keep Romanian headquarters Valentin Hube on January 28, 1941, he As might be expected of such an effort informed of the army’s progress.15 complained about Romanian conscription mounted by a country such as Nazi Germany, Since there were large numbers of and recounted all manner of mistreatment there was the previously mentioned ideo- German troops passing through Romanian of Volksdeutsche by Romanian authorities. logical component to DHM activities. In a territory, the DHM also had to negoti- Hube sidestepped Fromm’s complaints situation report, Hube noted that, in addition ate a status-of-forces agreement with the first by expressing skepticism of his tales to the need for measures to be taken against Romanian government. German troops of Romanian mistreatment, and then got corruption in the officer corps, friendly were instructed not to buy too many goods around the conscription issue by telling attitudes toward Great Britain and the Jews from the Romanians, especially items from Fromm that service in the Romanian army had to be eliminated. To aid this, German the countryside, since it would weaken the was also service to the Führer. The activities propaganda was disseminated that found a Romanian economy. Romania was already of Himmler’s SS recruiters were also curbed degree of receptivity in Romania, although paying for the two initial instruction units after the SS was able to recruit about 1,000 not as much as the Germans hoped.21 that would conduct the training of its army men from the Romanian Volksdeutsche. The various endeavors of the DHM for the DHM. German soldiers were told to The German minister to Romania, Manfred brought about a record of mixed success. The present as friendly a face to the Romanians Killinger, wrote to Himmler that if so many biggest problem the DHM had was a lack of as possible and to help the Romanian people young German men were removed from time. Given all of the issues discussed above when circumstances required. Finally, train- Romania, the remaining female Volks- and the ever-looming onset of Operation ing of the Romanian army by the DHM was deutsche in Romania would have no choice Barbarossa, the DHM had at best 4 months set back by the hard winter of 1940–1941, but to marry Romanians, thus polluting to train with the Romanians before they especially in Moldavia.16 good German blood lines. This was fol- would be committed to combat against the 94 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu DiNARDO Soviets.22 This was particularly important The final problem faced by the DHM Italian, Russian, Czech, Romanian, and Aus- regarding the issue of mindset. During the in conducting its activities was lack of trian artillery pieces, all of varying calibers. interwar period, Romania’s closest ally had standardization in the Romanian army. Although the Romanian army tried to miti- been France. Naturally, such a relationship Like many of the armies in that part of the gate this situation by minimizing the number had a military component. Romanian officers world, Romania did not have an armaments of different weapons allocated to specific attended French schools, and, institutionally, industry sufficient to equip the army by itself. divisions, the lack of standardization made the Romanian army was greatly influenced To make up the difference, the army made training difficult.27 by French doctrine and thinking. If it proved all manner of weapons purchases. The result difficult to get more senior Romanian offi- was that by the time the German military The Test of Combat cers to abandon what the Germans saw as the mission arrived in Romania, the Romanian The ultimate outcome of DHM activi- overly “schematic” and methodical French army was using a bewildering variety of ties was the record of the Romanian army in approach to combat operations, the younger weapons including Czech, Russian, French, combat. In this regard, the Romanian record officers, in contrast, proved more receptive to and Austrian rifles; French, Russian, and was mixed. Broadly put, Romanian participa- German concepts and doctrine.23 Czech machineguns; and German, French, tion in Barbarossa could be divided into two A major problem faced by the DHM involved the lack of interpreters. To be sure, the mastery of a foreign language was a requirement for graduation from the Krieg- sakademie. The vast majority of German officers who studied a foreign language gen- erally gravitated toward French or English. German Federal Archive In 1932, for example, a language examination was administered by Wehrkreis (Military District) III in Berlin. Some 178 officers took examinations, the great majority of which were in French or English. Only 34 took the examination in Russian, and no one took it in Romanian. Examinations administered by the Luftwaffe showed a somewhat wider variation, but again Romanian was well down on the list.24 Consequently, the German divisions with the DHM had relatively few inter- preters available to provide instruction and training to the Romanians. The 16th Panzer Division, for example, had only two interpreters on its staff, a wholly inadequate number given the tasks set for the unit. The Romanians did not have the resources to make up the shortfall. They were able to provide only one interpreter to the German 170th Infantry Division.25 Another major problem the Germans saw in trying to train the Romanian army was the lack of a professional noncommis- sioned officer (NCO) corps able to carry out its responsibilities. In the German army, the day-to-day conduct of training and, indeed, the daily running of the army at the lowest levels were often left to its NCOs and junior officers. In the Romanian army, however, such positions were not held in the same degree of esteem. In the eyes of DHM liaison officers, too many Romanian NCOs looked upon their positions as chances for personal monetary gain.26 Ion Antonescu with Adolf Hitler in Munich, June 10, 1941 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 95 RECALL | The German Military Mission to Romania phases. The first phase extended from the start which was also operating on that part of the by the fact that liaison staffs were small. An of the invasion on June 22, 1941, up through front, thanks to the efforts of German liaison army-level liaison staff, headed by a general the first week of July. During this time, the officers with both formations.32 officer, usually did not exceed 18 members, Romanian army was tasked by Hitler to The siege of Odessa proved long and while a corps-liaison staff, normally led by a defend the Pruth River and then gain some costly to the Romanians. The Soviet High colonel, would be no more than 10. Division bridgeheads across it. The army would also Command was able to keep the Independent and brigade staffs were tiny, consisting of no defend the Romanian oil-producing areas Coastal Army, garrisoning Odessa, supplied by more than an officer, a major or even a captain, and the Black Sea port of Constanta.28 The sea. That allowed the garrison to conduct an plus an interpreter and a driver. This made it second phase of the Romanian army’s part in active and energetic defense. Several successful difficult for liaison officers to be absent from the invasion would begin with the crossing Soviet sorties forced the Fourth Army to fight their units for any length of time, whether for of the Dniestr River once Army Group South repeatedly over the same ground in bloody official or personal business.34 In addition, it penetrated the Soviet defenses to the north. assaults. It was only after the Romanians did not take into account the fact that liaison Ultimately, the army would advance across officers, like other human beings, were subject the Dniestr and Bug Rivers into what would to problems such as sickness or sheer exhaus- become Transnistria, and the Romanians tion. The difficulties associated with the small would eventually besiege and finally occupy size of German liaison staffs mirror the com- the port of Odessa on October 16, 1941.29 plaints of many involved with Mobile Training Radu Mihai Crisan Since the main Romanian effort was Team efforts in Iraq during the 2005–2008 to be made by General Petre Dumitrescu’s timeframe and more recently in Afghanistan.35 Romanian Third Army, Romanian head- The structure of liaison teams is also quarters concentrated the majority of an issue. Some current critics, such as T.X. divisions that had German training under Hammes, suggest that the Army replace Dumitrescu’s command. In addition, field-grade officers on staffs with skilled the German-trained divisions enjoyed a and professional NCOs. This would allow greater degree of standardization in terms company-grade officers to spend more time of weapons and equipment. For the basic at the company level, and reduce the number small arm, for example, these divisions used of field-grade officers. At the same time, he the Czech 7.92mm rifle, which could take calls for the creation of larger advisory teams German ammunition. Reserve units would to work with allies against fourth-generation have to make do with the previously noted warfare opponents.36 plethora of Russian-, Austrian-, and French- While Hammes’s call for larger advisory made weapons.30 teams is correct, the German experience In the first phase of the campaign, detailed above suggests that more officers, not Romanian performance might be regarded as fewer, are needed, especially when it comes to satisfactory. The army was able to accomplish working with foreign partners. Hammes, like its task even though, in a number of places, his German counterparts in the DHM, comes the Romanians’ Soviet opponents were often from a military culture that values the NCO. better armed and equipped. Even Colonel Such was not the case in Romania. German General Franz Halder, the chief of the reports consistently noted that capable Roma- German Army General Staff and no particu- Ion Antonescu nian NCOs were rare. Too often, Romanian lar admirer of Romanian military prowess, NCOs were corrupt and abusive. On the other confessed pleasant surprise at the initial hand, it does seem clear that Romanian offi- performance of the Romanians. The liaison secured key points in the fortress’s defense cers regarded NCOs as not much more than staff with the Romanian 1st Border Division system, combined with the threat of interven- privates who had a bit more rank.37 Getting a thought well enough of the division’s conduct tion by German airpower on a massive scale, military culture to create a professional NCO to submit the names of some 37 members for that the Soviets evacuated the city on October corps where one has not existed previously German military awards.31 15, 1941. Odessa’s occupation marked a clear involves a profound change in mindset, a Things were much tougher in the end of the campaign for what was by that time process that would require great invest- second phase of the 1941 campaign. The an exhausted Romanian army.33 ments of time and patience. This was true in Romanian Third and Fourth Armies were Romania in 1940 and it is just as true today. now required to undertake missions well Takeaways for Today Rank also becomes an issue here. As beyond their normal operational radius. That So what can be drawn from the experi- noted previously, both the German military often left them requiring logistical support ences of the German army mission to Romania culture of World War II and contemporary from the Germans, who were not always in a that would be of use to today’s military profes- American military culture value the judgment position to deliver it when needed. Dumitres- sional? The first takeaway concerns the size as well as the independence of NCOs and cu’s Third Army narrowly avoided a deadly and composition of liaison staffs. The German relatively junior officers. In other cultures, clash with the Hungarian Mobile Corps, effort in this regard was consistently hindered this is not the case. In Germany, sending rela- 96 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu DiNARDO tively lower-ranking officers to units as liaison continue to impact our efforts in a negative 9 Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), officers was at times regarded as an insult by sense, and it will not yield to the type of quick “Defense of Constanza and Oil Area,” February the commanders of those units, who believed fix so desired by both American military 20, 1941, Bundesarchiv-Militäarchiv File 2 II/271, Freiburg, Germany (hereafter cited as BA-MA); that their status demanded that they deal with culture and the broader society it represents. Deutsches Luftwaffe Mission in Rümanien (DLM), a liaison officer of higher rank.38 This is still The experience of the German “Report on the Defense of the Romanian Oil true today, and using short-term expedients military mission to Romania holds a good Area,” December 14, 1941, BA-MA RL 9/62; such as frocking NCOs with field-grade ranks many lessons useful for today’s military DLM, “Defended Air Space in Romania,” July 16, and sending them out as liaison officers, as we professional. Like so many other events 1941, National Archives Records Administra- did in the Gulf War, will simply not do. from history, when placed in the context tion, Microfilm Series T-405, Roll 49, Frame 4888173, College Park, MD (hereafter cited as NARA T-405/49/4888173); and Alexander Statiev, the German effort was consistently hindered by the “Antonescu’s Eagles Against Stalin’s Falcons: The fact that liaison staffs were small Romanian Air Force, 1920–1941,” The Journal of Military History 66, no. 4 (October 2002), 1102. 10 Statiev, 1094; and DLM to Luftwaffe High A third takeaway concerns language. of contemporary events, the story of the Command, “Yugoslavian Booty for Romania,” July As noted previously, German officers who German mission once again shows the 5, 1941, NARA T-405/49/4888254. were attendees of the Kriegsakademie were wisdom of William Shakespeare’s words 11 DGFP, vol. XI, no. 80, 136; Deutsches Heeres required to study a foreign language. The carved outside of the National Archives in Mission in Rümanien (DHM), “Build-Up and vast majority of them, however, took French Washington, DC, “What Is Past Is Prologue.” Action of the Romanian Army Since the Start of or English, the foreign languages they were JFQ the German Army Mission,” January 18, 1942, most familiar with and had probably already NARA T-501/269/000069; and Förster, 337. had some knowledge of from their days as 12 DGFP, vol. XI, no. 532, 900; and Förster, 338. students in the German educational system. Nos te 13 DHM, “Build-Up and Action of the Roma- French and English were also, as the biog- nian Army”; DGFP, vol. XI, no. 84, 145; DHM, 1 Documents on German Foreign Policy rapher of one of Germany’s most successful “Order of the Day No. 4,” November 12, 1940, 1918–1945 (Washington, DC: Government Print- field commanders noted, the languages of NARA T-501/272/000418; and DiNardo, 98. ing Office, 1949–1956), Series D, vol. X, document 14 DGFP, vol. XI, nos. 9, 652 and 691, 11, Germany’s two most likely enemies. This had no. 28, 27–28. Hereafter cited as DGFP, vol. X, no. 1090–1091 and 1169, respectively; and Förster, 339. also been the case for an extended time.39 27, 27–28. Unless otherwise noted, all references to 15 DGFP, vol. XI, no. 664, 1114; and Oberkom- Not much thought, however, had DGFP are from Series D. mondo des Heeres (OKH), “Instructions on 2 apparently been given to training people in DGFP, vol. X, nos. 51, 56, 80, and 171, 52–53, Command Relationships in Romania,” December the languages of those countries that might 58, 91, and 218–219, respectively. 28, 1940, BA-MA RL 2 II/271. 3 be allies. Thus, while cultural and historical Romania was awarded Transylvania as part 16 OKW, “Instructions for the Behavior of factors alleviated a need for the Germans to of the Treaty of Trianon in 1919. Prior to that, German Soldiers in Romania,” January 11, 1941, have interpreters when dealing with the Finns Transylvania was part of the dual monarchy of NARA T-501/281/000230; Förster, 338; and DHM, Austria-Hungary. “Build-Up and Action of the Romanian Army.” and Hungarians, the Romanians and Italians 4 DGFP, vol. X, no. 413, 583. The First Vienna 17 were another story.40 Consequently, Germany, See, for example, the Banater Deutsche Award was allocated on November 2, 1938, when Zeitung, December 14, 1940, NARA especially the army, found itself consistently Hungary was given a piece of the rump Slovak T-315/680/000045. short of Romanian and Italian interpreters. state that had survived the Munich agreement. See 18 German 16th Panzer Division, “Partial Complaining that the allies were not doing Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Record of Conversation Between Gauleiter Fromm their parts, as the Germans did in regard to Germany, vol. 2 (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humani- and General Hube,” January 28, 1941, NARA the Romanians, although gratifying emotion- ties Press, 1994), 472. T-315/680/000088; DGFP, vol. XII, no. 258, 444; 5 ally, was not a solution to the problem.41 DGFP, vol. X, no. 57, 60; Mark Axworthy, and “Killinger to Himmler,” February 26, 1941, Solving the problem of language, especially Cornel Scafes, and Cristian Craciunoiu, Third Axis/ NARA T-175/128/2653688. the more difficult ones, again requires Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the Euro- 19 DHM, “Build-Up and Action of the a long-term attempt at a solution, while pean War, 1941–1945 (London: Arms and Armor Romanian Army”; DHM, “Course of Instruction Press, 1995), 23; and Richard L. DiNardo, Germany understanding that the problem may remain for Romanian Artillery Officers,” May 12, 1941, and the Axis Powers: From Coalition to Collapse insoluble. Providing language instruction NARA T-315/1516/000402; and Artillery Com- (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 96. mander 20, “Report on the Establishing of Liaison to field-grade officers at intermediate-level 6 Franz Halder, The Halder Diaries, vol. 4 with the Romanian II Corps and the Romanian professional military education institutions, (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal, 1950), 201; 10th Division on 21/22 May 1941,” May 24, 1941, as the U.S. military has been doing over the DGFP, vol. XI, nos. 19 and 80, 25 and 136–137, NARA T-501/275/000329. past few years, frankly yields too little return respectively; Jürgen Förster, “Die Gewinnung von 20 DHM, “Build-Up and Action of the Roma- for the size of the investment made. A longer Verbündeten in Südosteuropa,” Das Deutsche nian Army”; DHM, “Handbook for German term solution would be to improve the type Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, vol. 4, Der Angriff Trainers in Romania,” September 23, 1942, NARA of education in language afforded students in auf die Sowjetunion (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags T-501/286/000522; and Chief of the General Staff the education system generally, but this is too Anstalt, 1983), 338. of the DHM, “Training of General Officers,” Feb- 7 problematic to ensure the desired outcome. Axworthy, Scafes, and Craciunoiu, 26. ruary 1, 1941, NARA T-581/281/000216. 8 DGFP, vol. XI, no. 171, 281–282. In short, the issue of language will most likely ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 97 RECALL | The German Military Mission to Romania 21 Commander of Training Staff II to DHM, Headquarters, “Final Report of the German 13th “Situation Report,” February 7, 1941, NARA Liaison Headquarters,” October 29, 1941, NARA T-315/680/000134; and Radu Ioanid, The Sword T-501/275/000706; Halder, 214; and German of the Archangel: Fascist Ideology in Romania 37th Liaison Command to German 2nd Liaison (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1990), Command, “German Awards for Romanian NEW 193–194. 1st Border Division,” August 2, 1941, NARA from NDU Press 22 Adolph Hitler’s initial military directive T-501/280/000854. for the made it quite clear that the invasion of the Soviet 32 “Inspection Report of Major (General Center for Strategic Research Union would involve Romanian participation. Staff) Stephanus of 25 and 26 July 1941 to German Institute for National Strategic Studies DGFP, vol. XI, no. 532, 900. XXX and XI Corps, Romanian Third Army,” July 23 DHM, “Build-Up and Action of the 26, 1941, NARA T-312/359/7933496; Romanian Romanian Army”; German 13th Liaison Third Army to German Eleventh Army Quar- Command, “Final Report of the German 13th termaster, “Memo on Supply of Romanian Third Liaison Command,” October 29, 1941, NARA Army East of the Bug River,” August 21, 1941, Strategic Perspectives, No. 12 T-501/275/000706; and DHM, “Report and Map NARA T-312/354/7927680; and “Dumitrescu to Annexes of the German 2nd Liaison Command German Eleventh Army,” August 15, 1941, NARA James J. Przystup’s on the Campaign of the Romanian Fourth Army,” T-312/360/7934785. 33 Japan-China Rela- Strategic PerSPectiveS October 25, 1941, NARA T-501/275/000605. Hitler’s Table Talk 1941–1944, trans. 12 Japan-China Relations 2005–2010: 24 tions 2005–2010: Managing Between a Rock and a Hard Place Wehrkreis III Foreign Language Examina- Norman Cameron and R.H. Stevens (New York: An Interpretative Essay Managing Between by James J. Przystup tion (Oral), Berlin, October 7, 1932, Nachlass Enigma Books, 2000), 66; and DHM, “Build-Up a Rock and a Hard Freytag von Loringhoven, BA-MA N 362/1; James and Action of the Romanian Army.” Place, An Interpreta- S. Corum, The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational 34 DiNardo, 105; and “Second German Liaison tive Essay, examines Air War, 1918–1940 (Lawrence: University Press of Command to Subordinate Liaison Commands, the metafactors Kansas, 1997), 253; and DiNardo, 21. Official Operation of German Liaison Com- 25 th Center for Strategic Research German 16 Panzer Division, “List of Offi- mands,” July 30, 1941, NARA T-501/280/000971. shaping the China- Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Japan relationship: cers for the Staff of the 16th Panzer Division from 1 35 This is an observation made to the author by the rise of China, November–11 December 1940,” December 11, 1940, one of his students, an Army major with consider- a competition for regional leadership within NARA T-315/680/000013; and DHM, “Course of able experience in this duty. a shifting balance of power, and history. At the Instruction for Romanian Artillery Officers,” May 36 Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the strategic level, there is intense, but quiet politi- 12, 1941, NARA T-315/1516/000402. Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: cal competition for the mantle of leadership in 26 Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: Zenith Press, 2004), 244, 264–265. the Asia-Pacific region. The author discusses German and US Army Performance, 1939–1945 37 German 13th Liaison Headquarters, “Final the increasing integration of the two econo- (Westport: CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 121–123; Report of the German 13th Liaison Headquarters,” mies—for example, within Japan’s business DHM, “Build-Up and Action of the Romanian October 29, 1941, NARA T-501/275/000706; community, the China boom is widely recog- Army”; and Commander of Training Staff II of the DHM, Build-Up and Action of the Romanian nized as the driving force behind Japan’s recov- DHM in Romania, “Situation Report,” February 7, Army”; and DHM, “Handbook for German Train- ery from its “lost decade” in the 1990s. Nev- 1941, NARA T-315/680/000134. ers in Romania,” September 23, 1942, NARA ertheless, the Japan-China relationship is also 27 OKH, Foreign Armies East, Taschenbuch T-501/286/000522. marked by a number of combustible political Rümanisches Heer, February 1940, NARA 38 An excellent example of this comes from issues including conflicting territorial claims, a T-501/281/000004; and German Liaison Staff the German experience working with the Italians disputed maritime boundary in the East China with the Romanian I Mountain Corps and the in North Africa. See German Liaison Officer to Sea, and security anxieties in both countries. Romanian 4th Mountain Brigade to the Chief of the Italian Fifth Air Fleet, “Report of Liaison Officer Moreover, highly nationalistic, zero-sum issues General Staff of the DHM, April 23, 1941, NARA to Italian Fifth Air Fleet in North Africa to Com- relating to sovereignty, such as the September T-501/275/000284. manding General of German X Air Corps,” May 2010 Senkaku incident, have the potential to 28 DGFP, vol. XII, nos. 614 and 644, 1004–1005 19, 1941, BA-MA RL 2 II/38; and DiNardo, 62. derail the relationship at significant cost to both and 1048, respectively. 39 Wehrkreis III Foreign Language Examina- nations. These issues must be managed with 29 DGFP, vol. XI, no. 532, 901; Friedrich tions; and Charles Messenger, The Last Prussian: care if Sino-Japanese relations are to reach their Forstmeier, Odessa 1941: Der Kampf um Stadt und A Biography of Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt full potential. Hafen und der Räumung der Seefestung 15 August 1875–1953 (London: Brassey’s, 1991), 13. bis 16 Oktober 1941 (Freiburg: Verlag Rombach, 40 German was taught as a second language in 1967), 18; and DiNardo, 112. the Finnish school system from early on, while all 30 DHM, “Build-Up and Action of the officers who graduated from the Hungarian General Romanian Army”; OKH, Foreign Armies East, Staff College had to know German since about Taschenbuch Rümanisches Heer, February 1940, half of the school library books were in German. NARA T-501/281/000004; and German Liaison DiNardo, 108; and telephone interview with Bela Staff with the Romanian I Mountain Corps and Kiraly, December 20, 1993. Kiraly was a Hungarian the Romanian 4th Mountain Brigade to the Chief officer who served on the eastern front in World War of the General Staff of the DHM, April 23, 1941, II and one of my professors in graduate school. NARA T-501/275/000284. 41 DiNardo, 100; and German 107th Liaison Visit the NDU Press Web site 31 German XXX Corps to German Elev- Command, “Annex to War Diary of German 107th for more information on publications enth Army, “Evening Report,” June 22, 1941, Liaison Command, Experiences,” September 17, at ndupress.ndu.edu NARA T-314/823/000258; German 13th Liaison 1942, NARA T-501/282/000184. 98 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BOOK REVIEWS end simply is wearing stars, not leading of the institution and concerns over the the military properly into the next century senior leader’s career compete for consider- and candidly rendering their best military ation in the decision space. In an effort to advice to our nation’s civilian leaders. demonstrate an example of “doing it right” Ricks convincingly traces modern in the modern era, Ricks reaches deep failures of generalship to their origins below the senior-leader level to examine in the interwar period, through World the relief of Colonel Joe Dowdy, USMC, War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Operations the commander of First Marine Regiment Desert Storm, Iraqi Freedom, and Enduring in the march to Baghdad. Dowdy’s (not Freedom. He juxtaposes successful Army uncontroversial) relief demonstrates that and Marine generals through their histories there is no indispensable man, and if a com- with the characteristics of history’s failed mander loses confidence in a subordinate, generals. Ricks draws specific, substanti- the subordinate must go. In Ricks’s view, if The Generals: American Military ated conclusions about generalship, Army it is a close call, senior leaders should err on Command from World War II to Today culture, civil-military relations, and the the side of relief: the human and strategic By Thomas E. Ricks way the Army has elected to organize, train, costs of getting that call wrong are virtually Penguin Press, 2012 and equip itself in ways that ultimately unconscionable. Ricks rightly concludes 576 pp. $32.95 suboptimized Service performance. Specifi- that too much emphasis has been placed ISBN: 978-1-59420-404-3 cally identifying the Army’s modern-era on the “career consequence” of relief for reluctance to effect senior leader reliefs as individual officers. For leaders who ascend a departure from the pattern of history, to flag rank, the Armed Forces must rewrite Ricks paints an image of the ultimate the “promotion contract” with an unspo- Reviewed by country club, self-righteously convinced of ken clause: if you accept this position, and ROBERT BRACKNELL its own infallibility—an Army for the sake things go wrong on your watch, you will of The Army, rather than for the sake of the be sacrificed on the altar of generalship, om Ricks is no stranger to Nation. The result is an outline of what ails regardless of whether it was your “fault.” criticizing the modern crop the modern Army, with lessons to be con- This clause is not unfamiliar; our senior of generals. A fellow at the sidered not only for that Service to correct leaders talk about it a lot, but enforce it very Center for New American itself, but also for all the Armed Forces little. Wanat springs to mind.1 T and their civilian leaders. Convincingly, Security, Ricks decisively established his If Ricks comes up short anywhere in national reputation with Making the Corps, Ricks identifies history’s A-list of gener- this tome, it could be that he attempted to followed by two successful analyses of the als—George C. Marshall, George S. Patton, write a neutral and unbiased analysis on Iraq War, Fiasco: The American Military Dwight D. Eisenhower, Matthew Ridgway, a topic that he feels so strongly about. It is Adventure in Iraq and The Gamble: General O.P. Smith, Creighton Abrams, William no secret that Ricks has taken his disdain David Petraeus and the American Military E. DuPuy, and David Petraeus, among for the professional failures of Franks, Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008. Along the others. Not surprisingly, on his B-list of Sanchez, and their cohorts and elevated way, Ricks became a cynic, relentlessly general officer failures, Ricks singles out them to a level of malice that approaches a critiquing the decision to go to war in Iraq, Douglas MacArthur, William Westmore- personal grudge. Ricks’s writing on Franks the conduct of the conflict, particularly the land, Norman Schwarzkopf, Franks, and and Sanchez is a bit like trying to take seri- generalships of Tommy Franks and Ricardo Sanchez, suggesting strongly that their ously a critique of Red Sox pitching written Sanchez, the utter dysfunction of the stra- failures in generalship have amounted not by Don Zimmer. Moreover, while Ricks’s tegic decisionmaking and interagency pro- only to massive strategic failures, but also book was complete and published prior cesses required to make America’s modern to unnecessary loss of American lives, from to Petraeus’s spectacular fall from grace, conflicts successful, and, most saliently, the Korea through Afghanistan. Ricks’s loving treatment of Petraeus sug- failures of the conflict’s most senior mili- Ricks works to identify tangible, quan- gests that he views generalship more like tary leadership. Ricks weaves critiques of tifiable historical trends and specific stra- being an accountant—a brilliant technical Army leadership, in particular, into a fluid, tegic, operational, personnel, and program specialist—than being a priest, whose prin- meticulously researched tapestry, but leaves decisions that yielded undesirable short- cipal currency of authority is moral. Ricks room for debate about his ultimate conclu- and long-term effects. He bemoans the underestimates the moral component nec- sions. Ricks’s focus on the technical and Army’s gravitation away from the concept essary to maintain the respect of privates, strategic prowess of generals causes him to of meaningful relief (performance-based sergeants, captains, and colonels, a shortfall gloss over the moral and ethical compo- firing, as opposed to mere conduct-based) roundly and regularly on display on the nents of leadership that have eviscerated as a leadership-shaping mechanism. Once front pages of the Washington Post. True the legacies of a number of senior generals. upon a time, senior leaders fired generals generalship is an ability to borrow elements Even so, failing to consider and evaluate the because they believed line Soldiers deserved of Patton’s technical military competence themes that Ricks identifies risks maturing to be well led and not to have their lives and the moral pureness of Ghandi, mixed a crop of generals for whom the professional squandered. Now, suggests Ricks, the needs with Bill Clinton’s artful communication, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 d quarter 2013 / JFQ 99 BOOK REVIEWS Ryan Crocker’s diplomatic savvy, and runaway inflation, and, most importantly, George Kennan’s strategic acumen—in wasting 58,000 American lives. other words, to approximate a fraction of Ricks’s generalized portraits of the the soul of George Marshall. World War II generals will meet with broad The Generals is a serious study of acceptance. His model officer is Marshall, senior-level leadership that rivals H.R. an Army chief of staff who was in the right, McMasters’s Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, place at the right time. The main attribute McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Ricks cites is Marshall’s inclination to the Lies That Led to Vietnam, and Lewis relieve officers he thought were inadequate Sorley’s A Better War: The Unexamined to the task. He let hundreds go in his 6 years Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s as chief, which became a lost art (except for Last Years in Vietnam. Ricks’s tone toward Ridgway) after he left. certain of his subjects eclipses censure His number one antihero is Taylor. and borders on vituperation, while others The Generals: American Military Ricks, unfortunately, gets carried away here: bask in the gentle glow of his prose. This Command from World War II to Today “Maxwell Taylor arguably was the most may bother some readers, but not this By Thomas E. Ricks destructive general in American history. reviewer—in fact, it is refreshing to read Penguin Press, 2012 As Army Chief of Staff in the 1950s, he a commentator calling a spade a spade in 576 pp. $32.95 steered the U.S. military toward engaging terms of his unvarnished criticism of the ISBN: 978-1-59420-404-3 in ‘brushfire wars.’” Also, “[H]e encour- shortfalls of certain generals (and their aged President John F. Kennedy to deepen civilian counterparts and seniors) whose American involvement in Vietnam. As decisions unnecessarily cost American Reviewed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he poisoned lives and strategic currency in Vietnam ALAN L. GROPMAN relations between the military and the civil- and Iraq. His warranted criticisms of the ian leadership. He was also key in picking leadership failures of certain senior gener- om Ricks has done it again, Gen. William Westmoreland to command als, insidious careerism, moral cowardice, producing an interesting the war there.” and self-interest (Maxwell Taylor, MacAr- and useful book. He has To begin with, Taylor steered neither thur, the Vietnam Joint Chiefs of Staff, the two major themes in The the Army nor the military in any direc- T tion while he was chief of staff. Dwight Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Generals. The first is with Army generals Freedom Joint Chiefs of Staff), the policies today: senior leaders are unable to remove Eisenhower was the President, and his that led to those failures, and the dysfunc- inadequate generals. His second is more grand strategy did not focus on “brushfire tional civil-military relationships (Harry important: the costly incapability of the wars,” and certainly neither did the Air Truman–MacArthur, Lyndon Johnson–the generals to think and act strategically. In Force strategy. This was the era of strategic Joint Chiefs of Staff, Donald Rumsfeld–the every case of disaster Ricks cites, strategic bombers, massive retaliation, and bomber- U.S. military writ large) are underwrit- thinking was absent. pilot generals put in command of Air Force ten by scholarly research and meticulous The book contains 30 chapters (and fighter commands by bomber-pilot chiefs documentation. If the military truly is an epilogue) covering World War II, the of staff. Secondly, Eisenhower was never the as reflective and self-critical as it likes to Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the two ultimate decisionmaker (certainly not in the advertise, The Generals should land on the Iraq wars. The author sketches portraits 1950s), and in the next decade, he worked Chairman’s and Service chiefs’ reading lists of U.S. Army (and one Marine Corps) under a strong-willed Secretary of Defense soon. JFQ general officers from World War II forward. and determined Presidents who were much There are heroes including George C. Mar- more culpable for the Vietnam tragedy. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Bracknell, USMC, is a shall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, O.P. Smith, There is, therefore, a balanced short- Staff Attorney with the Trial Judiciary, Office of Matthew Ridgway, and David Petraeus coming in this book. Ricks has abundant Military Commissions. (the book was published before Petraeus examples of senior officers failing in their resigned from the Central Intelligence missions because they were strategically Agency). There are also villains including inept, but all of them had civilian supervi- Note Maxwell Taylor, William Westmoreland, sors who, while not getting a complete pass 1 See Thomas Shanker, “Three Officers Face Tommy Franks, and Ricardo Sanchez. from Ricks, are not nearly as appropriately Reprimands Over 2008 Battle,” The New York The strategic debacle in Vietnam is condemned by the author. I realize the Times, March 13, 2010, A8. exceptionally well treated. Ricks’s cogent title is The Generals, but there are levels of analysis is a searing critique of errors that authority above combat general officers. we must never make again, and it tells Presidents Kennedy and Johnson did readers how to lose a war—and in doing so not have to follow Taylor into oblivion in damaging America’s reputation, severely Vietnam. Johnson was not required to let weakening the home country, provoking Westmoreland fight with a totally backward ground strategy while dropping more tons 100 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BOOK REVIEWS of bombs on South Vietnam than were According to Herridge’s sources, al-Awlaki dropped on Germany and Japan combined had coached the Nigerian on security and in World War II. President George H.W. surveillance in Western countries and was Bush and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney the middleman between Abdulmutuallab did not have to let Norman Schwarzkopf and the bombmaker. Al-Awlaki’s sermons stop Operation Desert Storm after 4 days of also inspired Faisal Shahzad, a seemingly ground warfare, leaving Iraq’s Republican upright and assimilated middle-class com- Guard nearly intact and prolonging Saddam puter technician and U.S. citizen who lived Hussein’s murderous reign for more than a in Connecticut but was born in Pakistan. dozen years. Shahzad attempted to detonate three bombs Regarding Operation Iraqi Freedom, in an SUV parked in the heart of Times Generals Tommy Franks and Ricardo Square in New York City in May 2010. Sanchez were tacticians when strate- Once characterized as the “bin Laden of gists were needed. The former rushed to The Next Wave: On the Hunt for Al the Internet,” Al-Awlaki’s pronouncements Baghdad leaving his support forces to be Qaeda’s American Recruits have been broadcast on jihadist Web sites mauled by bypassed mujahideen, and the By Catherine Herridge and YouTube. Fluent in both Arabic and latter permitted the inhumane treatment Crown Forum, 2011 English, he had an encyclopedic knowl- of Iraqi insurgents and rounded-up civil- 272 pp. $25.00 edge of Islam and was regarded as a gifted ians as well as the atrocities at Abu Ghraib ISBN: 978-0-30788-525-8 speaker who was capable of moving his prison. These actions made enemies of the listeners to action. Iraqi population, and Ricks completely mis- Reviewed by Al-Awlaki was born in 1971 in New appropriates the blame. GEORGE MICHAEL Mexico, where his father pursued his Finally, Ricks appears to believe higher education. Sometime in 1977 or counterinsurgency combat is a valid combat n the final years of his life, Osama 1978, the family returned to Yemen, where mission for the U.S. military. It is not. I do bin Laden served mainly as an the senior al-Awlaki went on to become a not understand why any political decision- inspirational figure rather than an well-respected and well-connected govern- maker, after costly failures in Vietnam, actual commander. He counseled his ment minister. In 1991, Anwar al-Awlaki I returned to America to pursue a degree in Iraq, and Afghanistan, would advocate faithful that jihad was an individual duty counterinsurgency. We go to war in places for every Muslim capable of going to war. engineering at Colorado State University. we do not understand—in order to save Ominously, a small but notable number of He misrepresented himself as foreign born, nondemocratic and often corrupt states that Americans have answered his call. In fact, presumably to receive a $20,000 scholar- are open to attacks by insurgents—against American recruits are highly valued by ship from the U.S. State Department in a adversaries who have greater knowledge al Qaeda for their passports and abilities program intended for foreign students. On than we do of the countries we fight. to blend in with American society. In her his Social Security application, he claimed We need to continue to study coun- book The Next Wave, Catherine Herridge that he was born in Yemen and was issued terinsurgency art to advise states seeking explores the travails of prominent Ameri- a new Social Security number. When he our help, and who are worthy of our help, can jihadists. She draws on her 10-year renewed his passport in 1993, however, ever careful to avoid mission creep, but experience reporting on the war on terror he presented his birth certificate, which not sacrificing our people—58,000 in a and cites numerous military and intelli- indicated that he was actually born in losing effort in Vietnam, thousands more gence officials and analysts. New Mexico, but he used his fraudulently in Iraq—and our wealth, estimated to be $1 The chief focus of her book is Anwar obtained Social Security number. trillion in Iraq. Tell me what we got for our al-Awlaki, who played an important After graduation, al-Awlaki moved money and our lost men and women. operational role for al Qaeda in the Arabian to San Diego where he became the imam That said, read Tom Rick’s The Gener- Peninsula and reached out to several of the al-Rabat Mosque. While there in the als to appreciate better the awful costs to American jihadists. For instance, al-Awlaki late 1990s, he met regularly with Nawaf the United States of failures in strategic exerted a strong influence over Major Nidal al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar, two of the thinking. JFQ Malik Hasan, with whom he exchanged 9/11 hijackers. Herridge avers that al-Awlaki several emails. On November 5, 2009, the was part of a support cell sent to the United Dr. Alan L. Gropman is Professor Emeritus in Virginia-born Muslim and U.S. Army States prior to 9/11. Sometime in 2001, he the Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National psychiatrist went on a shooting rampage at moved to Falls Church, Virginia, where Security and Resources Strategy at the National Fort Hood, Texas, that killed 13 people and he became the imam of the Dar al-Hijra Defense University. left 38 wounded. On Christmas day of that Islamic Center and crossed paths with Hani same year, a young Nigerian, Umar Farouk Hanjour who, along with Hazmi and al- Abdulmutuallab, attempted to ignite an Midhar, hijacked American Airlines Flight explosive device that was sewn into his 77, which slammed into the Pentagon. underwear while he traveled on Northwest Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit. took an immediate interest in al-Awlaki ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 101 BOOK REVIEWS and interviewed him at least four times in to launch lone wolf attacks on their own the first 8 days after the 9/11 attacks. Nev- initiatives. In addition to his propaganda, NEW ertheless, the unflappable and mediagenic U.S. officials believed that al-Awlaki was from NDU Press al-Awlaki was often the go-to guy for sound involved in the operational planning of ter- bites on local and national broadcasts for rorist attacks. After his return to Yemen, he for the the Muslim-American perspective on 9/11. skillfully used his connections to expand Center for Technology and National In fact, Herridge discovered that al-Awlaki his influence in the jihadist movement. Security Policy had participated in a Pentagon outreach Despite his U.S. citizenship, in the spring Institute for National Strategic Studies program to moderate Muslims in the of 2010 he was placed on the Central Intel- immediate aftermath of the attacks. ligence Agency kill-or-capture list. On Despite his veneer of moderation, al- September 30, 2011, two Predator drones Awlaki continued to consort with Muslim fired Hellfire missiles at a vehicle carrying radicals and came under increasing scru- al-Awlaki and other suspected al Qaeda tiny by Federal investigators. In June 2002, operatives as they traveled on a road in a Denver Federal judge issued an arrest Yemen’s al-Jawf Province. Shortly thereaf- warrant for al-Awlaki based on his fraudu- ter, Yemen’s defense ministry announced lent misrepresentations on his Social Secu- that al-Awlaki was killed. rity and passport applications in the early Herridge’s book is interesting but 1990s. He left the United States sometime leaves many questions about al-Awlaki in 2002 but returned on October 10. When unanswered. Moreover, she left out many he arrived at John F. Kennedy Airport, important details about al-Awlaki’s activi- Federal agents apprehended and held him ties after he left America, including his but quickly released him because on that stay in England and his role in al Qaeda same day the Federal judge had rescinded in the Arabian Peninsula while in Yemen. Defense Horizons 73 his arrest warrant. According to the official Surprisingly, Herridge made no mention explanation, prosecutors did not believe of another prominent American jihadist, Toward the Printed World: Additive there was enough evidence to convict him Adam Gadahn (also known as “Azzam the Manufacturing and Implications for of a crime; moreover, the 10-year statute of American”), arguably the most recognized National Security limitations for lying to the Social Security American al Qaeda spokesman on the By Connor M. McNulty, Neyla Arnas, Administration had expired. Before the end Internet. The young California native and and Thomas A. Campbell of 2002, al-Awlaki left the United States for convert to Islam is believed to be an impor- the last time, after which he went first to tant member of al Qaeda’s media commit- Additive manufacturing—commonly England and then to Yemen. tee—as Sahab—under whose direction the referred to as “three-dimensional For her part, Herridge believes the organization’s propaganda has become printing”—is a fast-growing, prospective government has not entirely come clean on more sophisticated. In recent years, Gadahn game-changer not only for national security but also for the economy as a al-Awlaki. During her investigation, she has emerged as somewhat of an Internet whole. This form of manufacturing— noted that the mere mention of his name to celebrity on Web sites such as YouTube. whereby products are fabricated through a government official can be a conversation Still, Herridge provides an interesting the layer-by-layer addition of material killer. She questions why the FBI instructed journalistic study of the radicalization of guided by a precise geometrical computer customs agents to allow al-Awlaki to reenter American jihadists and their connections to model—is becoming more cost-effective the country in October 2002. The decision, their ideological brethren overseas. As such, and widely available. This paper introduces she concludes, must have come from higher it will be of interest to students of terrorism nontechnical readers to the technology, up. Why then, she muses, did the FBI and political extremism. JFQ its legal, economic, and healthcare issues, want al-Awlaki in the country? She finds it and its significant military applications odd that the decision to rescind his arrest George Michael is Associate Professor of Nuclear in areas such as regenerative medicine warrant came the same day he returned Counterproliferation and Deterrence Theory in and manufacturing of spare parts and to the country. Adding further suspicion the U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center at specialized components. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. is the fact that the U.S. Government has not released all of the intercepted emails between the Fort Hood killer and al-Awlaki. As Herridge explains, through new media, offbeat loners can be self-radicalized and become dedicated terrorists. She char- acterized al-Awlaki as a “virtual recruiter” who almost never met his jihadists in Visit the NDU Press Web site person. In the final months of his life, for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu al-Awlaki encouraged American jihadists 102 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BOOK REVIEWS completely mistaken concept that could not Lead Turning the Fight succeed and should never have been relied upon.”3 General James Mattis, USMC, then The Joint Operational Access Concept commander of the disestablished U.S. Joint Forces Command, terminated the use of and Joint Doctrine EBO in the development of future concepts and doctrine as the “underlying principles associated with EBO, ONA, and SOSA are By Gregory Kreuder fundamentally flawed and must be removed from our lexicon, training, and operations. Current EBO thinking, as the Israelis found, Our nation and Armed Forces are transitioning from over a decade of war to a future that pres- was an intellectual ‘Maginot Line’ around ents us with a security paradox. While the world is trending towards greater stability overall, which the enemy can maneuver.”4 Although destructive technologies are available to a wider and more disparate range of adversaries. As a EBO may well have future potential, it is not result, the world is potentially more dangerous than ever before. ready for joint doctrine at this time. —General Martin E. Dempsey Although many have tried, no concept has yet improved upon the Clausewitzian In peace prepare for war, in war prepare for peace. The art of war is of vital importance to the trinity that describes the nature of war: vio- state. It is matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence under no circum- lence, chance, and reason.5 As the capstone stances can it be neglected. publication and foundation for all joint doc- —Sun Tzu trine, Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, makes the point crystal clear: “War is a complex, human ver the last decade, U.S. opera- Most concepts gradually become extant undertaking that does not respond to deter- tions in Iraq and Afghanistan and incrementally inform joint doctrine. ministic rules.”6 On the other hand, Clause- have taken advantage of an Before proposing ways to accelerate this witz describes how a war is fought, and where unprecedented level of unchal- process, it is important to emphasize that all it lies along the spectrum of conflict can O 7 lenged operational access. This linchpin concepts must first be validated. Because of and will change. Concepts that recognize to virtually all military operations will this requirement, those not familiar with the the immutable nature of war, yet correctly become increasingly contested during future process occasionally see doctrine as lethargic predict and address the changing character operations. The Joint Operational Access or nonresponsive.2 On the contrary, doctrine of warfare, have the potential to affect force Concept (JOAC) proposes how future joint can rapidly inculcate validated concepts. employment at a historic level. forces will achieve and maintain access in However, if doctrine responded to every These are the concepts that proponents the face of armed opposition by adversar- seemingly “good idea,” it would unnecessar- must learn to identify, validate, and acceler- ies under a variety of conditions as part of ily thrash the baseline for joint force employ- ate to joint doctrine. Consider the German a broader national approach.1 Until these ment. Worse yet, it could yield unpredictable concept of “mission-type tactics,” or Auf- concepts become reality, there will be a gap and potentially tragic consequences. tragstaktik, which specified a clearly defined in joint doctrine regarding how U.S. Armed To highlight the damage an unproven goal and empowered subordinate leaders to Forces synergistically leverage cross-domain concept can cause, consider the example act independently in order to achieve their capabilities to overcome emerging threats of effects-based operations (EBO). Initially commander’s intent.8 The German army and and ensure operational access. The good seen as a reasonable approach to help air force combined this concept with maneu- news is that the joint doctrine community targeters metaphorically “see the armored ver warfare and unleashed a historic offensive has options available that can help solve this division, not just the tank,” it later became that overwhelmed numerically superior dilemma. This article discusses how the something else. Along with operational net French and British forces in May 1940.9 changing operational environment, com- assessment (ONA) and system of systems General Mattis describes two additional con- bined with emerging antiaccess/area-denial analysis (SOSA), EBO morphed into an cepts that had a similar effect on U.S. military (A2/AD) threats, is creating doctrinal gaps. attempt to bring mathematical certainty to forces in the 1980s: It then discusses the relationship between warfare, an inherently uncertain endeavor. doctrine, policy, and concepts, along with The Israeli Defense Forces applied EBO in Concepts can transform organizations. I ways to accelerate the transition from concept the Israeli-Hizballah conflict in 2006 and believe this. I have witnessed it twice in my to doctrine. Finally, this article draws current failed. Israeli Major General Amiram Levin, concepts from the JOAC and suggests tools former commander of Israel’s Northern that proponents can use to make their Command, lamented that EBO, “ignores . . . Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Kreuder, USAF, is a concept reality and to ensure U.S. operational the universal fundamentals of warfare. This Joint Doctrine Planner Action Officer in the Joint access for future joint operations. is not a concept that is better or worse. It is a Staff J7 Joint Doctrine Division. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 103 JOINT DOCTRINE | Lead Turning the Fight military career, when the introduction of the There is nothing new about the need to The JOAC outlines three emerging Air Land Battle doctrine transformed the gain and maintain operational access in the trends that will challenge operational access. Army and Air Force in the 1980s and the face of a formidable and capable adversary; this The first is the dramatic improvement and introduction of maneuver warfare similarly has been a consideration throughout history. proliferation of weapons and other technolo- changed the Marine Corps a few years later. For any force to fight on foreign land, it must gies capable of denying access to or freedom One may argue these were doctrines rather first gain access to it. This is understandably of action within an operational area. These than concepts, but at the heart of each was an not in the best interest of the opposing force threats can employ not only advanced tech- innovative operating concept—an underlying that attempts to deny access by any means nologies, but also innovative applications of idea for how Army or Marine Corps forces necessary. Throughout history, opposing forces basic, even crude, capabilities. The second would operate in dealing with their respective have sought an asymmetric advantage that will trend is the changing U.S. overseas defense challenges—and that concept was a driving deny access. This ability can blunt an otherwise posture, which is a consequence of markedly force behind the dramatic institutional overwhelming offensive by a vastly superior decreased support abroad for an extensive changes that those Services experienced.10 force. King Leonidas of Sparta demonstrated network of military bases around the globe the importance of A2/AD during the Battle and projections of severely contracting It is reasonable to conclude that the of Thermopylae in 480 BCE. His numerically resources following a decade of war. The JOAC could produce as profound an effect on inferior yet determined force exploited local third trend is the emergence of space and the joint force as Auftragstaktik and Air Land geography, significantly delayed operational cyberspace as increasingly important and Battle. The JOAC is derived from the Cap- access to the Persian Empire, and arguably contested domains in the projection of mili- stone Concepts for Joint Operations, which altered the outcome of the Persian war in the tary force.13 outlines 10 primary missions through which Greeks’ favor.12 Although operational access Potential adversaries are exploiting U.S. joint forces will protect future Ameri- has proven a challenge throughout history, the rapidly evolving and relatively inexpensive can interests. Of these missions, the JOAC underlying conditions that will affect future technologies to upgrade their A2/AD capa- emphasizes the importance of being able to U.S. operations are going through slow moving bilities. Furthermore, antiaccess technology “project power despite [A2/AD] challenges.”11 yet tectonic shifts. is generally much easier to develop than Way Ahead: A Campaign Approach to Operational Access Antiaccess and Area-denial Capabilities in an Integrated Defense Space and Antiship Attack boats, cyber attacks ballistic surface-to-air on the missiles and missiles; systems and surface rotary-wing networks that combatants aircraft and support unmanned deployment, aerial systems employment, Unconventional and Guided rockets, attacks on sustainment Theater Fixed-wing artillery, mortars, and infrastructure that ballistic aircraft and missiles; naval and supports deployment, missiles and advanced land mines; ground submarines antiship cruise employment, and missiles maneuver units; and sustainment antiaircraft artillery 104 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KREUDER technology that ensures access. Technolo- A2/AD challenges. As a consequence, the tive words such as ‘shall’ and ‘must,’ then gies under various stages of development doctrinal gap is large and growing. the void is in policy and policy development could also create antiaccess challenges This highlights an important point. As should precede doctrinal development.”18 In for the United States including accurate the emerging trends outlined in the JOAC other words, doctrine should not be used as a surface-, air-, and submarine-launched gradually challenge future U.S. operational forcing function to change policy, yet policy ballistic and cruise missiles; long-range access, mitigating concepts requiring new can and often does drive changes to doctrine. reconnaissance and surveillance systems; capabilities will need to be inculcated into Doctrine shares a similarly close and antisatellite weapons; submarine forces; and the joint force. These concepts may someday complementary relationship with con- cyber attack capabilities. Key area-denial have a sweeping impact on joint doctrine cepts. In general, a concept expresses how capabilities include advances in adversary similar to Auftragstaktik, Air Land Battle, something might be done. Before discuss- air forces and air defense systems designed and maneuver warfare. The key is in iden- ing how the JOAC can inform joint doc- to deny local U.S. air superiority; shorter tifying these concepts early, validating them, trine, it is imperative to fully understand range antiship missiles and submarines and finding ways to accelerate their intro- this relationship: employing advanced torpedoes; precision- duction into joint doctrine. Proponents must guided rockets, artillery, missiles, and take a proactive approach and not passively In military application, a joint concept mortars; chemical and biological weapons; wait for concepts and capabilities to gradually describes how a Joint Force Commander computer and electronic attack capabilities; become fully extant in the field before social- may plan, prepare, deploy, employ, sustain, abundant land and naval mines; armed izing them throughout the joint community. and redeploy a joint force; guides the further and explosives-laden small boats; and Before identifying the tools available development and integration of the Capstone unmanned aircraft and vehicles, which to accelerate these concepts and capabilities, Concepts for Joint Operations and subordi- could loiter to provide intelligence collection it is first important to briefly discuss what nate joint concepts into a joint capability; and or fires in the objective area.14 doctrine is and what it is not. Chairman of articulates the measurable detail needed for Many of the more advanced capa- the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instruction . . . assessment and decision making. From a bilities, for example the Chinese HQ-9 and 5120.02C, “Joint Doctrine Development ways, means, and ends perspective, concepts Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile systems, System,” and CJCS Memorandum 5120.01, and doctrine both describe how (the ways) are already extant. Others are progress- “Joint Doctrine Development Process,” a joint force uses given capabilities (means) ing through the prototype stage, such as provide guidance on the development of joint in a generic set of circumstances to achieve a the Chinese J-20, J-31, and Russian Sukhoi doctrine: “Joint doctrine establishes the fun- stated purpose (ends). There also is an impor- PAK-FA stealth fighters. Other threats do damentals of joint operations and provides tant distinction between the two. Approved not require advanced systems, yet highlight the guidance on how best to employ national joint doctrine is authoritative, describes potential vulnerabilities that a savvy adver- military power to achieve strategic ends.”15 operations with extant capabilities, and is sary can exploit using available technology, More specifically, joint doctrine is: subject to policy, treaty, and legal constraints, similar to how improvised explosive devices while joint concepts—whether near-term or (IEDs) have challenged access for U.S. forces based on extant capabilities; i.e., current futuristic in nature—can explore new opera- in Iraq and Afghanistan. The joint force force structures and materiel. It incorporates tional methods, organizational structures, must reorient itself to meet these existing and time-tested principles (e.g., the principles of and systems employment without the same emerging A2/AD threats. war, operational art, and elements of opera- restrictions. Joint concepts provide the basis Although the emerging trends tional design for successful military action) for . . . assessment. These concepts are refined addressed in the JOAC reflect vulnerabilities as well as contemporary lessons learned that and validated during . . . modeling and simu- that in some cases already exist, current exploit US advantages against adversary vul- lation, selected training events and exercises, joint doctrine’s coverage of A2/AD is not nerabilities. Joint doctrine is authoritative and capabilities-based assessment.19 keeping pace. JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry guidance and will be followed except when, Operations, is dedicated to overcoming area in the judgment of the Joint Force Com- Concepts respond to perceived inad- denial in order to establish a lodgment, but mander (JFC), exceptional circumstances equacies in current joint capabilities, test new does not yet address these emerging chal- dictate otherwise.16 capabilities, or propose innovative solutions lenges and has only seen modest updates to military problems. Worthwhile concepts during the last decade. JP 3-01, Countering To alleviate some common mispercep- should improve upon joint force effective- Air and Missile Threats, and JP 3-09, Joint tions, it is worth noting what joint doctrine ness, not only propose another way to do Fire Support, vaguely reference the impor- is not. First, joint doctrine is not policy, something already addressed in approved tance of overcoming A2/AD challenges to although the two are closely related. Each doctrine. However, lessons learned from operational access. None of these, or any fills separate requirements, as policy can recent operations and emerging capabili- other JPs, address the emerging trends and “direct, assign tasks, prescribe desired capa- ties with relevant military applications also challenges identified in the JOAC; this is bilities, and provide guidance for ensuring improve upon methods in doctrine. Since partly intentional, as many of the necessary the Armed Forces of the US are prepared concepts usually project an operating envi- capabilities are not yet extant. Aside from to perform their assigned roles.”17 In most ronment in the future, they describe new IEDs, however, ongoing operations in Iraq cases, policy informs doctrine. If an identified approaches and capabilities that, when devel- and Afghanistan have not faced significant need can only be satisfied “using prescrip- oped, should enable the military to operate ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 105 JOINT DOCTRINE | Lead Turning the Fight successfully. On occasion, forecasting may capability that recently became extant and have demonstrated early and strong potential uncover ideas that could improve how joint the affected publication was just signed. to positively impact joint force operations. forces operate now and could have an imme- Any member of the joint community can Although predoctrinal, JDNs present gener- diate impact on current doctrine. Before submit changes at any time. These changes ally agreed fundamental principles and guid- changes are made to doctrine, operational are specifically designed to assist when a ance for joint forces. Although they must joint force commanders will validate these joint publication is current and not under- contain capabilities and concepts somewhat concepts. These concepts must represent an going revision. Urgent changes are “those rooted in reality, they are not necessarily extant capability and clearly demonstrate . . . that require immediate promulgation constrained by purely extant capabilities. how they will improve doctrine. Finally, the to prevent personnel hazard or damage to JDNs also have flexibility in scope and size, joint doctrine community assesses concepts equipment or emphasize a limitation that and they can address doctrine at any level and their exercise results to determine neces- adversely affects operational effectiveness.”22 and range, from a few pages in length to sary changes to approved doctrine.20 Actions on urgent changes begin within 24 several hundred. Now that we have established what doc- hours of submission. If the change does not Since they are not approved joint doc- trine is, what it is not, and its relationship to meet urgent criteria, a routine change may trine, JDNs are not necessarily beholden to policy and concepts, it is time to discuss how be more appropriate: “Routine changes are the same vetting requirements that JPs are. concepts can make their way into approved those changes to JPs that provide validated JPs can take years to develop; a JDN can be joint doctrine. There are roughly four general improvements; address potentially incorrect, written and published in less than 1 year. methods: through scheduled JP revision, incomplete, misleading, or confusing infor- This can save significant amounts of time through a change recommendation, through mation; or correct an operating technique.”23 that would otherwise be required before a a joint test publication (JTP), and through a The third method of introducing concept gains visibility in the joint commu- joint doctrine note (JDN). concepts into doctrine is the joint test publi- nity. If the joint community accepts a pub- The first method, routing a JP for revi- cation. Although concept-based changes to lished JDN, it can then be transitioned into sion, is the traditional and most common doctrine are usually incremental rather than a JTP for validation. If already sufficiently method of informing doctrine, and it sweeping, on occasion a concept addressing validated and extant, the JDN can instead employs the preexisting doctrinal review a doctrinal gap may be large enough in scope transition directly into an existing JP or process. The Joint Staff J7 Joint Doctrine either to affect a significant portion of an become a JP of its own. JDNs thus introduce Division (JDD) goal is to maintain current, existing JP or justify creating a new JP. Semi- flexibility into a necessarily procedural doc- relevant doctrine that is no more than 5 years annual joint doctrine planning conferences, trine development system and have the ability old. The JDD has conducted multiple user hosted by the Joint Staff J7, approve proposals to bridge the gap and accelerate the transition studies that consistently indicate doctrine for developing JTPs. Once the designated lead of a concept into doctrine. over 3 years old begins to lose relevance to agent develops the JTP, it enters the assess- The JOAC is already driving the cre- the joint warfighter. To meet that objective, ment phase, where combatant commanders ation of several concepts that demonstrate approved doctrine is normally assessed for exercise the JTP and its associated evaluation potential as future JDNs and JTPs. The revision when approximately 2 years old. to “field test” the concept. Air-Sea Battle concept, under development Revision begins with a formal assess- Unlike testing of emergent concepts, by the Air-Sea Battle Office, is a prime candi- ment of the JP, where the combatant com- JTP field-testing should use extant forces date. It describes how to organize, train, and mands, Services, Joint Staff, and combat and capabilities. Concepts that propose a equip land, naval, and air forces to address support agencies provide feedback on different way of performing a mission with evolving adversarial A2/AD threats. The recommended changes. The percentage of today’s forces are also known as concepts of preliminary objective of Air-Sea Battle is to the publication affected by the recommended operations. Exercising concepts with capa- provide combatant commanders networked changes determines the scope of the change. bilities and forces that are still emerging can and integrated forces that ensure freedom If 20 percent or less of the publication needs yield useful information, but should not be of access in the global commons.25 Air-Sea to be revised, a change-in-lieu-of-revision is included in joint doctrine. Once testing of Battle’s goal is to develop forces capable of likely; if greater than 20 percent, a full revi- the JTP is complete, evaluation results will “networked, integrated, and attack-in-depth” sion is warranted. In either case, any autho- recommend one of the following disposition operations across land, sea, air, space, and rized organization can recommend changes, options: “discontinue work on the JTP with cyber domains in order to counter A2/AD which will be evaluated on merit during the no impact on joint doctrine, incorporate capabilities and provide operational advan- joint doctrine development process.21 This the JTP or portions of it in existing JPs, or tage to friendly joint and coalition forces.26 traditional method is the simplest, although develop the JTP into a new JP.”24 In 2012, then–U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff not necessarily the most timely. With suf- The fourth method, the JDN, is rela- General Norton Schwartz outlined the ficient justification, however, proponents can tively new to U.S. joint doctrine, although importance of this emerging concept: accelerate this timetable and request an early the British Development, Concepts and revision to a JP. Doctrine Centre has used them successfully Ballistic and cruise missiles, the advanced The second method of informing for years. The JDN is considered part of the submarines, fighters, and bomber aircraft, doctrine is through an urgent or routine initiation stage of the joint doctrine develop- enhanced electronic and cyber warfare change recommendation. This may be the ment process. JDNs are intended to socialize capabilities, and over the horizon surveil- best choice if a proponent wants to submit a potential best practices and capabilities that lance and modern air defense systems, as 106 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KREUDER well as the improved ability to network and global commons and “ports, airfields, foreign When sufficient joint force capabilities integrate these capabilities; these all present airspace, coastal waters, and host nation are identified and then created to address significant challenges that will contest our support in potential commitment areas” AD, proponents should consider creating access to and freedom of action, freedom of will become increasingly competitive.28 In a JDN, which would inform the joint force movement in strategically important areas. addition to emerging adversary capabilities, and ease the transition to joint doctrine. And in vital areas such as the Hormuz or internal factors will complicate the applica- Although discussing a concept still in its the Malacca Straits, even low technology tion of the principles of war. For example, early stages, GAMA is an important step in capabilities such as rudimentary sea mines surprise will be more difficult to obtain due recognizing how emerging trends will make and fast attack craft or shorter range artillery to “political transparency combined with the future operational access both more impor- and missiles can turn vital free flow move- instantaneous transmission of information tant and challenging. The JDN can be a mix ments in the global commons into maritime around the world.”29 of concept and extant capabilities, but should choke points to be exploited by aggressive or The central idea of GAMA is to be executable with the existing joint force. coercive actors. These capabilities, both the “contribute to the joint effort to gain and Similar to the suggestion for Air-Sea Battle, more advanced and the less exquisite, are maintain operational access by entering this JDN (if accepted by the joint force) can increasingly available, effectively affording hostile territory without benefit of domain be transitioned into a JTP for validation or modestly resourced actors, including some dominance and by using littoral and ground transitioned directly to joint doctrine if it non-state entities with the ability to shape maneuver to locate and defeat area-denial meets doctrinal requirements. outcomes in regional operating environments challenges.”30 As with A2, many AD threats Finally, the JOAC itself may someday and perhaps even on the geostrategic environ- are already extant, such as air and missile drive a joint publication and subsequent ment indirectly. And the ability that was once defenses, antishipping capabilities, and realignment of subordinate joint doctrine. As the exclusive domain of only well funded and enemy maneuver units. Precision-guided a recent example, in December 2012, Lieuten- well endowed nation states.27 munitions have seen widespread use since ant General George Flynn, USMC, director Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and poten- of Joint Staff J7, approved development of Proponents looking to create a JDN tial adversaries have had over two decades JP 3-XX, Joint Support to Security Coopera- concerning Air-Sea Battle in the near term to similarly upgrade their arsenals and tion. This publication recognizes security should select portions of this concept that employ them to deny operational access. cooperation as the overarching activity that can employ existing capabilities in new ways Other adversary threats under development encompasses other joint doctrine such as JP to counter the A2/AD threats that General include guided rockets, artillery, mortars, 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, and JDN 1-13, Schwartz highlights as similarly extant and missiles. Security Force Assistance, which is currently today. It may take the Air-Sea Battle Office Despite these threats, GAMA discusses under development. Once this new joint significant time to develop some of the the importance of “seizing key terrain in publication is developed, it may either absorb capabilities that would be appropriate for a order to deny it to the enemy or to facilitate doctrine on foreign internal defense and JDN. Proponents could justify a JDN much the introduction of follow-on forces” and security force assistance or retain them as sooner, however, by developing innovative rapidly project “follow-on forces that can be subordinate publications. solutions that synergistically apply current employed with minimal need for reception, As capabilities become extant, the joint force capabilities to counter extant A2/ staging, onward movement, and integration JOAC may drive production of a JTP or AD threats. The JDN, when published, could or dependence on local infrastructure.”31 even a JP similar to JP 3-XX, perhaps inform the joint force on a timeline years Forces must be able to conduct “simultaneous entitled Achieving Joint Operational Access. before a JP ever could. If the JDN gains wide- force projection and sustainment of numer- This publication, once validated, could spread acceptance by the joint force, it can ous maneuver units via multiple, distributed, provide authoritative guidance for ensur- be transitioned into a JTP to be validated by austere and unexpected penetration points ing the Armed Forces are prepared to gain combatant commanders or, if both validated and landing zones in order to avoid estab- and maintain operational access in future and extant, can be transitioned directly into lished defenses, natural obstacles, and the joint operations. This could subsequently joint doctrine. presentation of a concentrated, lucrative drive subordinate joint publications, pos- Another JOAC concept that proponents target.”32 GAMA proposes to counter these sibly including Air-Sea Battle and GAMA. could soon seize to create a JDN is Gaining effects through cross-domain synergy in Regardless of the mechanisms that propo- and Maintaining Access (GAMA). Prepared “the air, sea, space and cyberspace domains nents employ to make JOAC a reality, joint by the Army and Marine Corps, this concept by locating/seizing/neutralizing/destroying doctrine stands ready to assist. recognizes emerging AD trends identified in land-based capabilities that threaten those The JOAC outlines concepts that the JOAC. It is a logical extension in the scope domains.”33 Potential adversaries may field address emerging trends that will challenge of operations designed to seize a lodgment, layered and fully integrated A2/AD defenses the relatively permissive operational access currently only discussed in JP 3-18. GAMA in multiple domains in an attempt to deny U.S. forces have enjoyed in recent operations. recognizes that future operations will face operational access altogether, “while others The joint force is rapidly developing con- increased challenges to the relatively permis- with less robust and comprehensive capa- cepts that attempt to address the widening sive operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that bilities may simply attempt to inflict greater doctrinal gap these trends are creating. The allowed forces to build in-theater before losses than they perceive the United States traditional method of informing doctrine commencing operations. Future access to the will tolerate politically.”34 may prove too slow and, in the meantime, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 107 JOINT DOCTRINE | Lead Turning the Fight holds the joint force ability to gain and main- 17 Ibid., A-3. 18 tain operational access at risk against extant Ibid. Joint Publications (JPs) Under 19 Revision threats. The JTP and JDN are available tools Ibid., A-7. 20 Ibid. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States that proponents, who are willing to pick up 21 Ibid., A-8. JP 1-05, Religious Affairs the flag, can use to accelerate the validation 22 As described in CJCS Memorandum JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence and subsequent transition of valid concepts 5120.01, “Joint Doctrine Development Process,” JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the into joint doctrine. By proactively employing B-20. Operational Environment these available tools, JOAC proponents can 23 Ibid. JP 3-00.1, Strategic Communication and Communications Strategy help keep the leading edge of joint doctrine 24 Ibid., B-26. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations razor sharp and ready to provide authorita- 25 “Air-Sea Battle: Multi-Service Collaboration JP 3-05, Special Operations tive guidance to the joint warfighter. JFQ to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial (A2/AD) JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations Challenges to the Joint Force,” Washington, DC, JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations Air-Sea Battle Office, 2013, 6. JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support Notes 26 Ibid., 6. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater 27 Air-Sea Battle Doctrine: A Discussion with 1 JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Chief of Naval and Nuclear Environments Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: Department of Operations (Washington, DC: The Brookings JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations Defense, January 17, 2012), 1. Institution, 2012), 9. JP 3-14, Space Operations 2 28 Joint doctrine is much more responsive than Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, JP 3-16, Multinational Operations it was a decade ago. The average age of the 82 joint Version 3.0 (Washington, DC: Department of JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations publications is 2.8 years, or roughly half what it Defense, January 2009), 6. JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations 29 was then. Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army– JP 3-26, Counterterrorism 3 Matt M. Matthews, We Were Caught Unpre- Marine Corps Concept, Version 1.0 (Fort Eustis, JP 3-27, Homeland Defense pared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, The Long VA: U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities War Series Occasional Paper 26 (Fort Leaven- Marine Corps Combat Development Command, JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance worth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 2012), 5. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations 62. 30 Ibid., 7. JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime 4 James N. Mattis, “USJFCOM Commander’s 31 Ibid. Operations Guidance for Effects-based Operations,” Param- 32 Ibid. JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction eters (Autumn 2008), 23. 33 Ibid. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control 5 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. 34 JOAC, 13. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: JP 3-63, Detainee Operations Princeton University Press, 1976), 89. JP 3-72, Nuclear Operations 6 Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed JP 4-0, Joint Logistics Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: The JP 4-01, The Defense Transportation System Joint Staff, 2009), I-1. JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning 7 Clausewitz, 220. To avoid confusion, joint JP 4-08, Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations doctrine distinguishes between “war,” which JP 4-09, Distribution Operations is unchanging, and “warfare,” which is ever JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support changing. 8 Jochen Wittmann, Auftragtaktik (Berlin: JPs Revised (within last 6 months) Miles Verlag, 2012), 33. 9 JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint David T. Zabecki, World War II in Europe: Operations An Encyclopedia (London: Taylor and Francis, JP 3-04, Joint Shipboard Helicopter Operations 1999), I-1175. JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations 10 James N. Mattis, “Vision for Joint Concept JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations Development,” attachment to Memorandum JP 3-13, Information Operations for U.S. Joint Forces Command, Subject: Joint JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations Concept Development Vision Norfolk, VA, 2009, 1. JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations 11 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations Force 2020 (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, Sep- JP 3-60, Joint Targeting tember 10, 2012), 1. JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore 12 Alfred S. Bradford, Leonidas and the Kings of Sparta: Mightiest Warriors, Fairest Kingdom (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011), 87. 13 JOAC, 9–12. 14 Ibid., 9. 15 As described in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS) Instruction 5120.02C, “Joint Doc- trine Development System,” A-5. 16 Ibid., A-2. 108 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu interaction with other humans, machines, and subsequent cognitive determinations or decisions. This information environment Redefining Information further comprises three interlocking dimen- sions—physical, information, and cogni- tive—that are interwoven within a decision- Operations making cycle (see figure 1). This article uses historical vignettes to offer greater clarity in understanding the difference between By Carmine Cicalese strategic communications and information operations and adding depth in recognizing how military information-related capabilities affect the decisionmaking process. hether it is strategic com- command.2 The Air Force continues to munication, information increase the number of behavioral influence T he New War of Words operations, or cyberspace analysts, integrating them into joint com- A Secretary of Defense memorandum W operations, the Depart- mands.3 In August 2012, the Joint Forces Staff signed January 25, 2011, stresses the impor- ment of Defense (DOD) recognizes the College hosted the Office of the Secretary of tance of strategic communication (SC) and importance of conducting operations within Defense–sponsored Information Environ- information operations (IO) in countering the information environment. Over the past ment Advanced Analyst Course to further violent extremist organizations, while also decade, several information-related capabili- develop the military’s ability to analyze and redefining IO for DOD and subsequently the ties have grown or matured revealing that the operate in the information environment. joint force. As Dennis Murphy noted on mas- military recognizes the value of conducting To capture the power of information, tering information, “The U.S. military will operations in the information environment. DOD must recognize the value in under- achieve such mastery by getting the doctrine Computer network operations have standing the information environment right.”4 The Secretary’s memorandum was a expanded to cyberspace operations, and the and articulating the integrating processes step in the right direction leading to recent Services have established cyberspace compo- required within information operations. doctrinal changes. Joint IO is now defined as nent commands to complement U.S. Cyber Despite continued misunderstanding and the “integrated employment, during military Command.1 Military information support rewording, information operations is an operations, of information-related capabili- operations forces have also matured as the important integrating function for achiev- ties in concert with other lines of operations U.S. Army Special Operations Command has ing the commander’s objectives through the to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the established the Military Information Support information environment—a complex and decision-making of adversaries and potential Command and added another group-level dynamic environment depicted by human adversaries while protecting our own.”5 This new definition detaches itself from Figure 1. Decisionmaking Cycle: Dimensions Are Linked a reliance on the previously included core capabilities of computer network operations, operations security, and military information support operations—previously known as psychological operations, electronic warfare, and military deception. This change should benefit the force. First, it allows the com- mander and staff to consider more options for affecting decisionmaking than simply relying upon the previously stated capabili- ties. Simultaneously, it allows capabilities to grow and change unencumbered by a doctri- nal or fiduciary connection to IO. Lastly, the new definition recognizes the ability of the commander to affect adversary and potential adversary decisionmaking. All the while, IO remains an integration function, not a Colonel Carmine Cicalese, USA, is a former Director of the Joint Command, Control, and Information Operations School at the Joint Forces Staff College. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 109 JOINT DOCTRINE | Redefining Information Operations capability owner, and one that is directed at conference discussion duly adjusted. IO is the commander’s message is part of the dis- foreign rather than domestic audiences. much more than coordinating themes and semination step within this cycle. To affect This new IO definition is a long overdue messages or being the military’s version of a adversial decisionmaking and protect his improvement, though one might make the chattering class. own, the commander must demand his IO improper interpretation that IO is only about While several military information- cell look beyond best practices and templated coordinating the themes-and-messages related capabilities deliver a message that planning. He must insist upon an agile plan part of the SC “say-do” rubric as it is can support communication strategy and capable of affecting the information environ- included within the same overarching DOD IO, IO is still about affecting information ment in more ways than coordinated themes memorandum on strategic sommunication. content and flow as it relates to adversaries’ and messages. The joint force commander (JFC) should and potential adversaries’ decisionmaking synchronize communication and opera- cycles. Synchronized communication itself, More Than Themes and Messages tion efforts to support the national-level SC while a contributing factor, is not enough Just as J2 has the intelligence and coun- process and overall narrative. By conducting to affect adversary and potential adversary terintelligence mission and J3 (operations) IO coordinated with public affairs, the JFC decisionmaking because it solely focuses on has the fires and counterfires mission, the can effectively communicate to the variety the broadcast or dissemination of the com- Information Operations Working Group, on of intended audiences and affect adversary mander’s message. behalf of the commander, should also con- decisionmaking to maximize effects in the Even though listening, understanding, sider the countermessage mission. Limiting information environment. and assessing are all part of the communica- oneself to coordinating and delivering mes- Since 9/11 and the start of the war on tion process, the primary communication sages as a countermessage mission, however, terror, the author has frequently heard fellow goal is to send a message. While important, is insufficient when engaged in a contest as it military officers calling for a supporting global the commander’s message is but one of is both limited and inherently reactive. IO campaign. These continuous calls are several messages competing for the audi- Phase 0 (shape) is the predominant problematic because, doctrinally, IO in itself is ence’s attention. This only affects the phase across the combatant commands, not a campaign. The applicability of a global commander’s information content output and the commander’s communication IO campaign can be challenged as the military to adversaries and potential adversaries. It plan should include all information-related cannot apply many IO or information-related does not affect the adversary’s information capabilities. Still, the IO professional needs capabilities, such as military deception or mili- content or flow, neither is it the sole means of to think beyond just messaging. He needs tary information support operations, toward a protecting the commander’s decisionmaking to maintain a holistic perspective of affect- U.S. domestic audience. capability. Figure 1 depicts a comprehensive ing the adversary’s decisionmaking cycle to Synchronizing communications and decisionmaking cycle and annotates how include part of the countermessage mission. actions may not yet be a doctrinal campaign, but it is vital to support a combatant com- mander’s coherent theater campaign plan. Figure 2. Notional Operation Plan Phases For those who insist on some sort of an information campaign, a synchronized com- munication plan could supplant the here- tofore unending calls for an IO campaign. Because of these reasons and the previous IO core capabilities having improved capacity, one might infer that IO is no longer relevant, as the strategy’s narrative or message would be paramount to all information. However, the narrative without IO is not enough to affect decisionmaking. At the 2011 World Wide IO Conference, much of the first day’s discussion supported the notion that strategic communication and IO are the same. The discussion centered on coordinating geographic combatant command Phase 0 (figure 2 depicts the notional phases) messages and the programs that support these activities to shape the operational environment. It was not until the afternoon panel session—when Colonel James Gferrer, then commanding officer of the Marine Corps IO Center, commented, “IO is more than just messaging”6—that the 110 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu CICALESE In practice, the IO cell needs to consider a Meanwhile, the coalition inclination to ance on any tentative agreement. It is not counterinformation or even counterdecision counter AQI information was mostly limited uncommon for one of the parties to return cycle approach. to delivering broadcasted messages via hand- to the meeting with a renewed reluctance to As former Secretary Robert Gates noted bill, radio, television, or any standard means agree with what was otherwise tentatively to Congress, “adversaries leverage multiple of communicating across the tactical, opera- achieved, such as an agreement to disarm. At communications platforms, to proselytize, tional, and strategic levels. The proclivity this point, the IO professional should con- recruit, fund, exercise [command and toward using paper resulted in an insufficient sider actions and outcomes to the following control], share tradecraft and perpetuate “death by a thousand paper cuts” approach. possibilities: their ideology. Understanding the increasing The tactical coalition commanders complexity of the information environment saw a threat in AQI’s Internet presence. This ■■ What happens if the town hall rep- and the compelling need to leverage infor- could have warranted a coalition response to resentatives are unable to communicate with mation effectively as an element of national deny AQI freedom of access on the Internet. their superiors during the break and thus power is critical to achieving the Depart- The Internet presence, however, is just the unable to renegotiate a new position? ment’s military objectives.”7 transmission point within the communica- ■■ What happens if a public demonstra- Other nation-states have acknowledged tion process. An online video of an impro- tion calling for immediate disarmament a similar approach when they removed media vised explosive device destroying a coalition occurs inside or outside the town hall? access to their countries’ populations. For convoy vehicle is the culminating point of the ■■ What happens if the host nation example, on February 12, 2010, U.S., British, process. A videographer must first record an media suddenly confront the supreme leader and German broadcasts accused Iran of event and move the video to a point where it of the most powerful ethnic group over his deliberately jamming their outputs to deny can be uploaded to the Internet. Today’s vid- plans to support a tentative disarmament? Iranian citizens access to an opinion that eographers often have the means to complete counters the Islamic Revolution.8 Also, on the entire information cycle, thus taking a The answers to these questions lie in March 12, 2010, Yemeni authorities seized the tactical kinetic attack and transforming it the IO professional’s ability to understand transmission gear of al Jazeera and al Arabiya into a strategic information attack. the culture, emotion, and status within channels over their coverage of deadly unrest Presuming the videographer broke host the adversary’s decision cycle and a way to in the south of the country. Yemeni officials nation law by inciting violence toward legal integrate a variety of activities as a means stated such equipment “should not serve to authorities, the tactical commander could to inform, influence, or even persuade the provoke trouble and amplify events in such a realistically interdict the information cycle adversary into taking action favorable to the way as to harm public order.”9 by arresting the videographer. The terrorist commander’s mission. While the events may Iran and Yemen are not engaged in a message is never transmitted—or at least it occur around the spoken events of the town legally declared war with one of the offended is delayed—and the ability to keep transmit- hall, the message is but a facilitator to some- parties, but they still chose to limit a platform ting is affected without having to fight for thing larger. that was disseminating nonsupportive mes- authorities to stop a possible Internet trans- To accomplish some of these hypotheti- sages. The author does not advocate this mission. This is how an IO professional must cal tasks, especially disrupting potential com- tactic as a form of censorship, but instead rec- view the situation. mercial communication means, the IO cell ognizes the action as part of the IO integrat- should consult with the electronic warfare ing function. Iran, a potential U.S. adversary, Beyond the Information Cycle and staff judge advocate staff to understand recognizes the value of affecting the informa- The IO perspective is not limited to the commander’s authorities. According to tion flow of its potential adversaries. IO pro- counterterrorism or counterinsurgency. It is the UN Charter, electronic warfare jamming fessionals should understand how to affect also applicable in stability or peacekeeping may violate national sovereignty and be the cycle depending on the overall situation operations (PKO) where adversaries may legally construed as an act of war.10 Likewise, more than the designated operational phase. not be shooting at the U.S. military but are it may violate the UN General Assembly Thus, a geographic combatant commander nonetheless in opposition to the combatant determination that freedom of information could ably adjust from Phase 0 to Phase 1 commander’s objectives and mission. For is a human right.11 Still, these determinations (deter) and future phases depicted in figure 2. example, three ethnic groups are vying for may not apply to the situation. To overcome position. Two are willing to disarm, but the any limitations, the IO staff must make an T he Wartime Information Cycle third and most powerful is reluctant. United argument for what the current situation Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) demonstrated Nations (UN) and coalition-led town meet- requires as opposed to what the past allowed. an understanding of using a range of options ings are popular operations during PKO Authorities underpin the mission at all levels, to affect information during the period of the as a means to bring the belligerent parties and much of the responsibility for acquiring organization’s apex from February 2006 to closer toward mutual governance. The the authorities for the commander rests on July 2007. AQI destroyed antiterrorist radio typical pattern for a town hall meeting is for the joint IO staff. stations in Baghdad, deliberately assassinated representatives from the parties to socialize, Iraqi reporters in Mosul, and lethally targeted discuss matters for an hour, come to tentative T he Authorities Barrier U.S. psychological operations teams in an agreements, and then take a break. During In spring 2002, the Coalition Forces effort to limit the messaging capabilities of the break, the representatives contact their Land Component Command (CFLCC) in AQI adversaries. superiors via mobile devices for further guid- Kuwait developed the ground invasion plan ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 111 JOINT DOCTRINE | Redefining Information Operations that became known as Running Start. IO coalition government official or agency has Notes planners were embedded within the com- ever confirmed this, the notion of instigating 1 “Army establishes Army Cyber Command,” mand’s strategic plans and civil military a coup that targeted regime member deci- available at 112 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu NEW from NDU Press The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities Edited by Richard P. Hallion, Roger Cliff, and Phillip C. Saunders The People’s Liberation Army Air Force has undergone a rapid transformation since the 1990s into a formidable, modern air force that could present major chal- lenges to Taiwanese and U.S. forces in a conflict. To examine the present state and future prospects of China’s air force, a distinguished group of scholars and experts on Chinese airpower and military affairs gathered in Taipei, Taiwan, in October 2010. This volume is a compilation of the edited papers presented at the confer- ence, rooted in Chinese sources and reflecting comments and additions stimulated by the dialogue and discussions among the participants. Contributing authors include Kenneth W. Allen, Roger Cliff, David Frelinger, His-hua Cheng, Richard P. Hallion, Jessica Hart, Kevin Lanzit, Forrest E. Morgan, Kevin Pollpeter, Shen Pin- Luen, Phillip C. Saunders, David R. Shlapak, Mark A. Stokes, Murray Scot Tanner, Joshua K. Wiseman, Xiaoming Zhang, and You Ji. Strategic Reflections: Operation Iraqi Freedom, July 2004–February 2007 By George W. Casey, Jr. General, U.S. Army Retired Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom were the first major wars of the 21st century. They will not be the last. They have significantly impacted how the U.S. Government and military think about prosecuting wars. They will have a generational impact on the U.S. military, as its future leaders, particularly those in the ground forces, will for decades be men and women who served in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is imperative that leaders at all levels, both military and civilian, share their experiences to ensure that we, as a military and as a country, gain appropriate insights for the future. When General George W. Casey, Jr., was the Army chief of staff, he encouraged leaders at the war colleges, staff colleges, and advanced courses to write about what they did in Iraq and Afghanistan so that others could be better prepared when they faced similar challenges. This book is General Casey’s effort to follow his own advice, offering narratives and insights about his tenure as commander of Multi- National Force–Iraq so that future leaders can be better prepared for the next conflict. Available in PDF and e-book formats at: www.ndu.edu/press/strategicreflections Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–1991 Steven L. Rearden’s Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–1991 surveys the role and contributions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) from the early days of World War II through the end of the Cold War. The JCS, an organization of military advisors and planners established early in World War II, first advised the President on the strategic direction of U.S. Armed Forces in that war and continued afterward to play a significant role in the development of national policy. Because of their relations with the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, a history of their activities, both in war and in peacetime, provides insights into the military history of the United States. The importance of their activities led the JCS to direct that an official history of their actions be kept for future generations to study. Dr. Rearden’s Council of War follows in the tradition of volumes previously published about JCS involvement in national policy, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Using a combination of primary and secondary sources, and adopting a broader view of previous vol- umes, this fresh work of scholarship examines the military implications of problems from 1942 to 1991. Although focused strongly on the JCS, Rearden’s well-researched treatise deals too with the wider effect of crucial decisions and their ensuing policies. JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University Press National Defense University, Washington, DC