The Art and Science of Negotiation

tl t ,I

HOWARD RAIFFA

The BelknapPress of Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England I I i i I I I Acknowledgments

Ideas are incestuous. They commingle and refuse to sort thenr- selves out so that one can say, "These ideas are his or hers arrd those mine." I know, however, that many of the ideas in the chap- ters that follow are the ideas of others, and some of these others can be identified. To no one am I more indebted than to John Ham- mond. This book would not have been written if I had not chosen to teach a course in competitive decision making at the Harvard Busi- Copyright O f 982 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College All rights reserved ness School, a course that evolved over more than a decade. In the Printed in the United States of America mid-1960s I taught a doctoral seminar in individual, group, and irr- teractive decisions, and in the early seventies John Hammond irr- corporated some of the material from that seminar in a pioneering 'he "Competitive Art of Negotiating" is a registered trademark of Gerard I. Nierenberg. This M.B.A. course entitled Decision Nlaking." I later in- :,The Art and Science of Negotiation, is not connected with Mr. Nierenberg's herited that course from John and built on his materials. Although i or programs. my course evolved into one that was substantially different frorn John's, he had set the tone; and even when I departed from his 87 6543 work, I had a very comfortable launching pad. Occasionally, u'hen I fell flat, I picked up again from his supporting net. book is printed on acid-free paper, and its binding materials have been chosen Now Elon Kohlberg is teaching that course, and his versiorr will :rength and durability. certainly be different from mine. Some of his iderrs.too. have been incorporated into this book, without credits, bec:ruse I can't everr Library of CongressCataloging in Publication Data begin to sort out which ideas are his and which are mine. Raiffa, Howard, I92't- So it is with some of my former doctoral The art and science of nesotiation. students who worked with me at various times during the last five years. Some of me is in Bibliography: p. their dissertations, and a lot of what is in their dissertations can be Includes index. found here. I acknowledge the contributions of Kalyan Chatterjee, 1. Negotiation. 2. Diplomatic negotiationsin Zvi Livne, James Sebenius, Timothy Sullivan, and Jacob Ulvila. intemational disputes. I. Title. Jim Sebenius deserves special thanks. Not only did he teach me 8F637.N4R34 302.3 82-6L70 about the Law of the Sea, but he's a wonderfully supportive and ir.r- ISBN 0-674-04812-1 AACR2 cisive critic-and it's hard to be both. Vl /.,\C]K,\ O\\'L E DG M E NTS ACrrvOWr.E DcM ENTS/ vii

I have also drawn liberally on ideas discussedduring seminars This book is an elaboration of the H. Rowan Gaither Lectures in *'ith members of the Harvard Negotiation Workshop. In that group I Systems Science, delivered November 1980 at the University of I interactedmost closely with RogerFisher, Bill Ury, Jim Sebenius, i California, Berkeley. These lectures are named in memory of one of Frank Sanders,Larry Susskind,James Healy, and David Lax. Roger i- the founders, and first chairman of the board, of the RAND Corpora- and Bill's book,Cetting to Yes,is full of important insights,and in tion. They were established by a gift from the System Develop- nry weaker moments I thought of such titles for my own as Before ment Corporation, formerly a division of the RAND Corporation, Gr:ttirtgto Yes or BegondYes. and are held under the aegisof the Schoolof BusinessAdministra- Sonreol'the materialin this book hasbeen used in variousexecu- tion and the Center for Researchin Management of the University tive prograrnsat Harvard'sBusiness School and Kennedy Schoolof of Califomia, Berkeley. The past lecturers were Charles J. Hitch, Government,and in variousindustrial executivetraining programs. Charles L. Schultze,Alice M. Rivlin, John W. Macy, Jr., Sir Geof- I havecollaborated with and observeda masterof this type of peda- frey Vickers, Erich Jantsch,and Herbert A. Simon. gogy, Paul Vatter, who in innumerable ways has influenced my choice and treatmentof subjects. I have drarl,ncopiously from Mark G. McDonough's caseson in- ternationalnegotiations, which were prepared partially under my superwision.These casesprovided rich backgroundmaterial from which I concocted several abstractions.His help was indispens- zrble. Whenever anvoneasks me whether I prefer A or B, I almost invariably answer "Why not both?" When anyone asksme where I learnedsornething and I can't remember,I invariably answer"Tom Schelling," and I think I'm right 69.4 percent of the time. In the late 1970sI thought about writing a book on negotiation, brrt i kept postponingthe first steps.[f Wes Churchmanhad not in- r''itedme to give the 1980 Gaither Lectures at Berkeley on the topic of negotiationanalysis, I might still be thinking of thoseffrst steps. I' irurindebted to Wes and his colleaguesat Berkeley for focusingmy thoughts. Poornima Ram not only typed and retyped and retyped my evolv- ing manuscript, but her readings of the text helped me tremen- dously. Whenever she does not understandwhat I've written, I know that I'm in trouble. It's a pleasureto work with her. I deeply appreciate the superb quality of the editing of this book; Maria Kawecki's precision irnprint is on each paragraph.AII remaininggrammatical errors are hers,all errorsin the symbolsare the typesetter's,and my wife agreesto sharewith me responsibility for the rest. Contents

Prologue I

Part I: Overview

I Some Organizing Questions ll 2 ResearchPerspectives 20

Part IIl Two Parties. One Issue

3 Elmtree House 35 4 Analytical Models and Empirical Results 44 ,5 Settling Out of Court 66 6 The Role of Time 78 1 Acquisitionsand Mergers 91 8 Third-Party Intervention 108 I Advice for Negotiators 119

Part III: Two Parties, Many Issues l0 AMPO versusCity 133 I1 Tradeoffs and Concessions f48 L2 The PanamaCanal Negotiations 166 l3 Risk Sharing and Insecure Contracts I87 X/CONTENTS

L1 The Camp David Negotiations 205 .tD Mediation of Conflicts 2L8 t6 Arbitration of Disputes 235

. Prologue Part IV: Many Parties,Many Issues t7 Coalition Analysis 257 r8 The Law ofthe Sea 275 graduate in lo Fair Division 288 In the late 1940s I was a student mathematics at the University of Michigan, partially supportedby a contractenabling 20 Willingnessto Pay for a Public Good 300 me to do work in the theory of games.There was an amazing burst 2I EnvironmentalConflict Resolution 3f0 of researchactivity in this specialityat that tinre, especiallyat the 22 The Mariner SpaceProbes 318 RAND Corporation and at Princeton University, where in 1944 23 Voting 327 John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstem wrote their classic tome, Theory of Cames and Economic Behaoior. Very rapidly the easierresearch topics were being appropriatedand a fresh crop of Ph.D. studentswere looking for new fertile ground to explore. I Part V; General Concems was in a cohort that was beginning to studv two-person gantes where the protagonistsdid not have strictly opposinginterests (the 24 Getting People to Communicate 337 so-callednon-zero-sum games). My thinking was very much in- 25 Ethical and Moral Issues 344 fluencedby a lecturegiven by William Haber,proi'essor of econom- Eprrogue JD/ ics at the Universityof Michigan,who talked aboutthe role of arbitration in labor disputes.The lecture set me to wondering: If two playersof a non-zero-sum,abstract game asked me to act as arbitra- joint Bibliography 361 tor and to determinea outcomefor their dispute,what would I do? And thus I began somehighly abstractmathematical resealch Index 369 into this problem-research in the genre of gametheory. I was in- terestedin mathematicalelegance, and the peerswhose opinions I valued were the mathematicalcommunity. I certrrir-rlywils not driven to do empirical work, to see how arbitrationactually f\rnc- tioned in the real world; nothing could have appealedto me less. Receiving my doctoratein 1951,I drifted back and forth between ii game theory and mathematicalstatistics for the next six years.After .i rl GarnesandDecisions, written with Duncan Luce, was published in 1957, I accepteda joint appointment at Harvard: I was to teach sta- tistics in the newly created Department of Statisticsand perhaps game theory in the Graduate School of BusinessAdministration. I

'( :l Z / PRO[,OGUE PROLOGUE/ 1]

"others"? clidn't know very much about business (a vast understatement) and without assurning excessive rationality on the part of the I began by studying ioads of case studies of real-world problems. My efforts were still marginal. Practically every case I looked at included an interactive, competi- In 1967 President Lyndon Johnson asked McGeorge Bundy, then wavs- tive decision component, but I was at a loss to know how to use my president of the Ford Foundation, to explore with the Soviets expertise as a game theorist. The theory of games focuses its atten- in which science could promote international cooperation. Perhaps - tion on problems where the protagonists in a dispute are super- :'"oi"t r i" tid e?-aTl;g ke e-pln gT w av fro rii' dffi s Co n t ro I an d " " "iini" rational, where the "rules of the game" are so well understood by space exploration-would be appropriate. They weren't sure the "players" that each can think about what the others are thinking whether the effort should be bilateral or multilateral, but multilat- about what he is thinking, ad inffnitum. The real business cases I eral seemed more appropriate;if multilateral, it should involve was introduced to were of another variety: Mr. X, the vice-presi- only the advancedindustrialized nations. Bundy asked me to be dent for operations of Firm A, knows he has a problem, but he's not one of his advisers,and for fbur years I had a taste of international quite sure oi'the decision alternatives he has and he's not sure that diplomacy and negotiations,continuing in my advisory capacity his adversaries (Firms B and C) even recognize that a problenl even after Philip Handler, president of the National Academy of exists. If Firms A, B, and C behave in thus-and-such a way, he Sciences,took over the leadershipof the project in 1970.In 1972 cannot predict what the payoffs will be to each and he doesn't know twelve academiesof sciences,including ffve from EasternEurope how he should evaluate his own payoffs, to say nothing about his -and among these one from the German Democratic Repubiic, adversaries' payoffs. There are uncertainties all around besides which the United Statesdid not recognizeat the time-signed a those that relate to the choices of Firms B and C; no objective prob- charter creating the International Institute for Applied Systems ability distributions for those ancillary uncertainties are available. Analysis(IIASA), now locatedoutside Vienna. From 1972to 1975 N{r. X has a hard time sorting out what he thinks about the uncer- I was the ffrst director of that scientiffc institute. tainties and about the value tradeoffs he confronts, and he is in no I recount all this becauseit is relevant to the chaptersthat {bllow' liame of mind to assesswhat Mr, Y of Firm B and Mr, Z of Firm C I was trained as a decision analyst and game theorist. Did those dis- are thinking about what he's thinking. Indeed, Mr. X is mainly ciplines help me in my negotiations?Was I properlytrained fbr my thinking about idiosyncratic issues that would be viewed by y and role as negotiatoror as scientific administrator?Fethaps.because of Z as completely extraneous to their problems. game,theory, how- my training and profession, Ilbgggfglqle 9.-ogc-e-P!g3fly 3!oui tlle e_v_e3, i! which ultraimart, problems I was engagedin than I would have without that training, {ea_!1g1ly_ry*!'_lbglygy .'-.#r.-_- peoplesho7F6;tri""i;;;;.ttii"*llii"tio9{@Ib..ra; "tt+"o*i"g but I never really used the technlquesoI game tneory-concepts t'MrJl{E9-q1tgllft}@ ana-ideas,tai, but-technrqqg-9,nq;in my roles as negotiator and Ior tlre next ten years I stayed away from game theory and con_ dit;ctor. fficl-friiat was frustrating about this was that I was con- c'entrated on a much simpler class of problems: decisions under un- stanilfinvolved in problems that could be loosely classified as certainty in noninteractive, noncompetitive situations. I worked in competitive and interactive.The concepts of decision analysis n field that has been dubbed "decision analysis." seemedto me much more applicablethan thoseof gametheory, but Between 1968 and it. The qualitative framework of thought 1972, competitive, interactive problems grad- not in the way I had taught -d -q ualiy reclaimed my attention, and I w as repeated lv he Ipful - not iti Jiail eA; ts tte iic; fiairtiiifi as - became convinced that there -..----*#a '**-** "e should be a marriage between what I was then doing in decision pects Simple, back-oflthe-envelopeanalysis was all that seemeci analysis and what I had previously done in game theory. My main ffiIopriate. I was constantly impressed with the limitations o{ preoccupation was with real people in real situations: How could iterative, back-and-forth,gamelike thinking. I could try to be svs- analysis be used to help one pafty in a competitive conflict situation tematic,thoughtful, and analytic,but the "others" I negotiatedwith 4 / PBOLOGUE PROLOGUE/ 5

Gvishianireasonably well, and especiaiiy always seemed to have intricate, hidden agenclas.Secretly I I cameto know Jerman in to bargain thoughtthat if I could really know their true values,judgments, and enjoyed those sessionswhere he coached me how people political constraints,I would be doubly convincedthat they were with the Austriansand with of other nationalities.Austrians, perched precariousposition under- not actingin a coherent,rational way. They certainlyweren,t satis_ in a between East and West, are fying the prescriptiveideals of "rational economicman." standablyapprehensive about the Russians.Gvishiani sometimes As director of IIAS{r$rq{Lts balance scientific jgleC$ytyflb-qo_ used his power as a Russianin talks with the Austrians on behalf of' til!4j@l;;;"tirrJiv the institute. but always in a subtle fashion-the trick was to use calted ifon to structure creative i jlsqtf. compromises.Researchers pulled in different directions,and since f'e"tr the-hint o{..pgIlI,-leibet lh"lpgygl. Austrian Chancellor government good our budget was modestin comparisonto their collectiveappetites, Bruno Kreisky and others in his lealized that the people-good people-had to be disappointed.In most of these will engenderedin one set o1'negotiationscould spill over and al'- fect negotiations, was that be de{Ily disputes I played the role of a mediator, in some the role of an other and it this linkage could arbitrator. exploited by Gvishiani. in primaw My actions were subject to the approval of a council, which was When I returned to Harvard 1975 I decided that my made up of one distinguishedmember from eachnational member aim was not to teach what I'd learned, but rather to learrnwhat I should be teachingin the art and scienceof negotiation. organization'The chairmanof the council was JermanGvishiani, deputy ministerof scienceand technologyof the soviet union. And I decided that aboveall, I needed an experimentallaboratory. I people no matter how exalted that title may seem, in reality he was even wanted to leam how actually negotiate and, knowing sorne- more powerful than that. I leamed about different national nego_ thing about how others negotiate, to exarnine how the side I u'as tiating styles,and above all about the importance of timing: one had advisingshould negotiate.Could simple analysishelp? Of course,I to keep a fluid agendaand wait for the propitious time to introduce could have goneinto the field to get vicariousexperiences, but that a contentious issue. I learned that even the Soviets are not mono- would have been slow and much anecdotal material on negotitr- Iithic and that they occasionallychange their minds. I learnedhow tions had alreadybeen written; also,I knew and could talk to a lot difffcult it is to accomplish anything substantial in open meetings of people who had been in the {ront lines of negotiation. NIy advan- when each side has to go on record for the people back home.-I tage was that I was more analytical in approach than most practi- learned that money comes from different pockets and that five mil- tioners and that I knew bits of esoteric,mathematictrl theories that, lion dollars taken from the left pocket of a country might be easier althoughnot directly relevant,might be made relevantto practice. to get than ffve thousand dollars from the right pocket, I learned I also had to teach,and there was no better way than to get stu- that if you wait long enough, someone on the other ?ie wiii dents to leam with me. My idea was to create a quasi-laboratory ",?g':iry:19::-.:!*-v'g vitt,-4r,-{$-et1t3 qglierE.sp.ri'-4."srtq where studentswould at the sametime be willing subjectsin ex- tionsiFa*t F6!lr lEti''6d-me 6 f;fth"i periments, be interpreters of the empirical findings, and be design- ";;a;f;tii;; th"t;;p"; ofThb-inneicircle. I learned that "gentlemen's agree-errts', ihat ers of modiffed experiments that could be tried with new grotrpsof are not documented are fragile; that a parly may be sincere about subjects.Collectively we could test what worked in the laboratory such an agreement when made, but that they may not be able to and we could discusswhether our heuristic insightswould be ap- withstand internal pressuresfrom objectors at home; and that be- plicable in the real world. cause negotiators are embarrassedwhen they have to back away I inherited a second-year,elective course developed by John frorn promises made, they often become more amenable to otl,rer Hammond for students in the Master of Business Administration compromises, "Competitive I leamed that the boisterousatmosphere of an Aus_ (M,B.A.)program, Entitled Decision Making," it was trian tavem often does far more to establish a proper ambience for a perfect launching pad for my interests. The students taking the negotiations than does a sedatecocktail party or dinner, course were primarily business generalists;most aspired to be 6 / pnoi-ocue

businessentrepreneurs and negotiators;all had some familiarity with the basicconcepts ol'decision analysis, but most had a low tol- part erance for theoretical acrobatics.They were eager if properly moti- vltt'd. Hammond had alreadycollected l'ascinating cases, many of which I use here. My innovations were to make the course into an I experimental laboratory, to make the payoffs in the experiments emotionally gripping by keeping records of individual scoresand Overview partially basing gradeson these scores,to spend more time on face- to-facenegotiations, to emphasizethe role of the intervenor. and to test a bit more systematicallythe potential roles of simple analysis (see appendix to Chapter 2). Hammond kept the course close to real-worldcases, while I willingly drifted off into experimentswith There is no shortageof disputes. There are disputes between hus- abstractionsof thosecases. band and wife, between siblings, between friends, between indi- In this book I draw heavily on Hammond'scases and on the em- vidual and ffrm, between firm and firm, between developer and en- pirical resultsof experimentsthat I conductedin my classes,Some vironmentalist, between regions within a nation, between a region of the accumulatedsample sizesof our experimentsrun into the or city or stateand the nation, between nation and nation*and per- high hundreds.Data have been collected, in addition, from stu- haps in the far future (who knows?) between planet and planet. dent-subiects in government and law, from high-level managers There are many establishedways for settlingdisputes: traditions, general-grade :rnd military offfcers enrolled in special executive regulations, courts, maikeii (thiough the laws of supply and de- training programs, young presidents and from members of the Or_ mandT ind n6go-tiafionf.Ev6n theliiunChest free-maiket capitalist ganization-an international organizationmade up of presidents of ack n oi I e il gi s the ?act th ;ffi rTecTin dTFaT@1- firms who are under the age of forty. An experimental psychologist e ite"e rvould be very unhappy with our experimental designs. We kept r;6- s systematic statistical records only for business students. Experi- change these rulesr f requenuy by tne Pto""tj"r!logggyyIg3.tlg_ ments were conducted outside classand we did not formally moni- negotratrng.-iin@tant tor whether our subjectswere really obeying the rules; we operated for me to state at the outset that I am not against according to an honor system,and sometimesnot all are honorable conflict per se. Progressis often achieved by engaging uninvolvecl under stress, Some of the observations that follow, therefore, individuals in a cause,and the creation of tension and conflict may should be understood with this in mind, although a few biased be a desirable organizing strategy. Some rnajor societal improve- game scoreswould not alter the basic truth of the mr.rag"s I want ments have resulted from conflicts that have been resolved by de- to convey, One may never be able to predict or to simulatein a lab- structive forces. Competitive sports,parlor games,and card gzrmes oratory setting all the aspectsof complex real-world negotiation, are conflicts that are designed to add zest to life. Competition lbr but there is no question as to the value of applying decision-theo- advancementin the businessworld and competition among ffrms retic concepts:analysis can help. generateincentives that help the system work more efficiently. All that granted,this book is concernedwith situations in which two or more parties recognize that differences of interest and values exist among them and in which they want (or in which one or more are compelled) to seek a compromise agreement through negotiation. There is an art and a science of negotiation,By "science" I 8 / ovnnvrnw OVERVIEW/ 9

loosely mean systematic for problem Such training would be appropriate for diplomats, military offfcers, -'..---. -*-:----r analysis solving; and if the i ' '*- - i::- phrase"systematic analysis seemsa bit vague,I can only saythat lawyers,politicians, businessmen, and ordinary citizens who may its meaningwill becomeclearer as we go on. The "art" side of the expectat sometime or otherto be embroiled in situationswith seri- l"desr-rl-e-qrl"-llt:'-Lrypesi-u-'lsbd9iltterpersrll'ut'\'TtFg-+,+ ous conflicts of interest among contending parties. It should in- itvjg gglf-!@ry to emplova ba$qt-ful-I, clude instructionnot only in the art of interpersonalrelations, but oTbargai"i'gpl"vs. e wisdomtq know when ary!hqUalg_gS_e- also in analytical,problem-solving skills. tlelTr- The art of negotiation has been well documented throughout This book will thereforeblend discussionof the practicalside of the ages;the science,on the other hand,is not well developed,and negotiatingwith simpie mathematicalanalysis, both o{'which can what hasbeen developedis not very accessibleto the practitioner. be of use to disputantsand intervenorsalike. We'll begin with a My aims here are to explain in relatively nonmathematical lan- brief look at the varioustypes of disputesand at the u'aysin which guage some of the science (theory) that has been developed by researchershave chosento explore the field. others, to develop a bit more of my own, to sprinkle in a little art, and !-o-lhow how art and scie Often disputes are not settled amicably, and all sides suffer: chil- dren ffght each other, husband and wife separate,labor and management settle grievancesthrough strikes,and nation-statesresolve their differences through wars. Agreements often are not made when they could have been made to the advantageof all disputants. Agreements often are made that are inefffcient: others could have been made that would have been preferred by all the disputants. jgtrr1y_L"&|$,e!pe"1r{r-12_u_tesgouldbgm_q1,_9*9ffle1-eptly-.r_ec.- o+crled*if _qhege_gqti?,tqrq tyere -!!ore riiittful. Other dispute s are best reconciled through the efforts of intervenors. In labor-management relations there are reasonablytrained-but usually not well enough trained-mediators and arbitrators. Ideally these are im- partial, highly ethical, knowledgeable intermediaries who help the disputants negotiateconstructively, perhaps by suggestingcompro- mises, and, depending on their role, perhaps by dictating compro- 11i5s5-4 bit like a wise parenthelping quarrelsomechildren. Such intermediaries also exist to help counsel families. J---.tir yg1y*gl.: however, to ffnd well-trained intervenors who can help with seii- .-----1-:T._--;'.:-_--r_ rg{"trt .""tt ar tn "ffi ""rfttr, tr-"try99!_d"E!9!g.r_e!d gnvironmental_i.sts. b_etwegn_4elie4:slatqs. y"."g".r.til"*ir. *t]lt ,n {--p@{5eq!!9n, al{eyf!"v aI9 _qflgn i''..,,r calledalled_upn---:-- to_m-edia6or arbitrate in dtspu[i:i tEi-f oci.rii imong tbqgssberdiaales-- I believe that more training is desperately needed in the art and scicnce of negotiating, and in the art and science of intervening. ETHICALAND N{oRALISSUES 1345

vice in negotiation contexts.People throughout the ageshave wor- ried aboutthese moral issues;they havewarred against one another and tried to exterminate one another in defense of their own nroral precepts. "My way is better than your way, so take that"-"that" 25 being a blow of a ffst,a club, a spear,a gun, gerrn-ladengas, a mis- sile, an atomic bomb, a doomsdayweapon. Despite the fact that li- Ethical and Moral Issues braries are fflled with books that discussthese important moral and ethical concerns, I still would like to offer some observations on how to think about ethically laden choices. Disputants often fare poorly when they each act greedily and de- Ethical concernsare sprinkled throughoutthis book; indeed, they ceptively. In those casesit's easyto coachall participants:they carr all jointly gain would greedy are hard to avoid in bargainingand negotiating.Was Steve right if they be less and more open and hon- when he implied that $300,000 was unacceptable for Elmtree est with one another. It's far more difficult to know how to coach one side.Would you House, when he knew that $220,000was the value he would be adviseSteve to tell Wilson that he would settle for willing to settle for? Are negotiatorsacting appropriately when they $220,000but would very much like to cet $350,000? Most negotiations exaggeratewhat they are giving up on one issue in order to squeeze are not strictlycompetitive: there are possibili- ties for joint gains. purely out a quid pro quo compromise on another issue? Is it improper for For selfish reasens,you as a disputant may help yourself your a negotiatorto imply by his actionsthat he desperatelyneeds some- by helping adversaries.This is ffne. But thing for his side, when he knows full well that he will give that up even here there is always a tension. As all parties seekjoint gains, you still have preference at a later stagefor something else? a to favor your side. You not only would like to pie, just A subjectonce said to me: "In severalof the role-playingexer- enlargethe but you want your share,and what you think is a "just share" may not your cises I was in a quandary. I didn't know what was ethically right' I agree with adversaries'assess- ments. "right" "appropriate" was somewhatconcerned about others-but how do I know where How far is it or to push in favoring your own side when to draw the ]ine? I didn't want to be callous'but neither did I want it may be to the disadvantageof others? It's to be a starry-eyed,impractical idealist. How should I think about often said that dishonesty in the short run is a poor policy be- causea tamished reputation these ethically laden choices?" hurts in the long run. The moral question is: you Most of the subjectsin our experiments had had some education Should be open and honestin the shortrun becauseit is right to act that way, in normative ethic.s, They had at least read excerpts from the even though it might hurt you in the long run? q,ritings of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas' Hume, Kant, The hundredsofresponses I haveobtained to a questionnaireron ethical values instructive. Bentham, Mill, and others concerning normative principles of right are The distributions of the responses Irom and wrong. But knowing the distinctions between teleological (re- students of business administration, government, and law are reasonable.But the "That sult-oriented) and deontological (duty-oriented) frameworks or be- students do not overwhelmingly say, sort of behavior tween monistic and pluralistic frameworks of normative ethics may may be borderlinein my opinion for others,but is unac- not help a subject to decide as the City representativenegotiating 1. "Devon Industries, Inc, (B)," a case study written by Gerald Allan under the Daniels, to lie or to be quietly with AMPO whether, in the caseof supervision of John Hammond. The case describes hypothetical behavior in the rr.risleadingor to be open and honest. Normative ethical frameworks construction industry, some of which is borderline or morally reprehensible. The procedures, and we studentsare asked to rate anonymously on a five-point scalewhether speciffcbehav- are not designed to yield definitive decision iors are: definitely ethical, ethical so long as everyone else does it, not a matter of should not expect answersfrom these philosophical teachings and ethics, unethical but acceptable,deffnitely unethical. They are also asked: If you were in such a position, what you think you would reflections. Indeed, some of these frameworks imply conflicting ad- do do?

344 346/ CENERALCONCERNS ETHICAL AND ]\'ORAI- ISSUES / 3.I7 ceptalrleto me." Most say,"lf I were in that situatior.r,I also probably would act in that borderline way"; and a few say,"I think that that behavior is unethical, but I probably would do the same." That's disturbingto me. One studentdefended herself-even though the questionnaires were anonymous-by stating that most business people in their ordinary activities are not subjected to those moral dilemmas. And SET,FISHL} although she reluctantly admitted that she would act in an unethi- r cal manner if she were unlucky enough to be in the position of the contractorwho is being unmercifully sqtreezed,she r"'ouldtry her utmost not to get into such situations. Let's abstractand simplify by looking at a simple laboratoryexer- cise concerningan ethical choice. d

A SOCIAL DILEMMA GAME Proportion of "others who Imagine thatqou have to choosewhether to act nobly or selfishly. If act noblv you act nobly you will be helping others at your own expense; if you act selffshlyyou will be helping yourself at others' expense. Similarly, those others have similar choices. In order to highlight the tension between helping yourself and helping others, Iet's Figure48. Payoffsfor the socialdilemma game, (If, for "others" exanrple,.7 of the specify that if all participants act nobly, all do well and the society act nobly,yourpayoffis $40whe"n yur-, whenyou "huor" OfiO'' flourishes; but regardless of how others act, you can always do chooseselfishly.) ""friy "ra better for yourself, as measured in tangible rewards (say,profits), if Ifthe others can see that you are acting you act selffshly-but at the expense of others, Leaving morality selffshly, then acting un- selffshly may be your prudent action aside for the moment, the best tangible reward accruesto you in from a cold, calculating, long_ term-benefftpoint of view. your good reputation this asocialgame if you act selfishly and all others act nobly. But if may be p-*y fo. future tangible rewards. But what if " all behave that way, all suffer greatly. the others (becauseof the rures of the game)cannot see how you, in particular, To be more concrete, supposethat you are one player in a group behave?Suppose that all anyoneleams is how many of iOl, so that there are l00 "others." You have two choices: act of the otherschose the ,"lgrn option.2 nobly or act selffshly.Your payoff dependson your choice and on I learned about this game from the proportion of the "others" who chooseto act nobly (see Figure 'w-Person Thomas Schelling, who dubbed it the Prisoner'sDilemma Game," generarization 48). If, for example,.7 of the others act nobly, your payoff is $40 a direct of that famous two-person game. In the literature, when you act nobly and $140 when you act selffshly.Notice that these gamesare called "social dilemmas" or "social legardlessof what the othersdo, il'vou were to switch{rom noble to traps," anclare sornelirnesdis- cussedunder the headingof "the problem "the selfish you would receive more; but becauseof your of t]-recommons" or behavior, $100 fiee-rider ..the problem." Wheneveranyone uses commons,"there switch,each of the otherswould be penalizedbv $2.00and the total ..commons,'could is a little Iessfor everyoneelse. The penalty to otherswould be $200-more than what you personally be a town you 2 In the )aboratory-versionof the game I use less gain.The barmyou causeto others,however, is shared: impose ,.act connotative terminorosv: "act co-o_peratively"instead of "act nobly; and ..;i a sn.rallharm on each of many. "o""oopui"tiu"ty;';;;;;;;";i selffshly." I'm sure that the mere labeling of these acts'influencls ro-. b"h"ril-. 348I cnuERAL coNCERNS ETHICALAND lt{ORALISSUES I349

green, common grazing land, a common river, the ocean, or the at- swayedby your moral pleadings,Now yotr not only have benefited rnosphere,Overpopulating our commonplanet is a prime manifes- financially,but you feel morally righteousas well. Unfortunatelv, tation of this problem. Whenever we enjoy a public benefit without your actions have also made it more profftable for the remaining 25 paying our due share we are a "free rider." One variation of the who have not joined your coalition.Each conversionadds g2.00to free-rider problem is the noble-volunteerproblem: Will a hero the payoff of each of the others,including the selfishholdouts- please step forward-and risk his or her life for the good of the they've been helped by your successfulproselytizing. This mtr1, many? really bother some of the converted ones; it's un{!ir, they may Subjects were asked to play this social dilemma game not for argue, that the selfish, undeservingones shoulclprofit lrorn the monetary payoffs,butas f there would be monetary payoffs.There noble actionsof the majority. (A retrl-wor.ldanalogue is the case might, therefore,be some distortion in the results-probably not where most of the nations of the world might agreenot to catch blue much, but in any casethe experimental results are not comforting. whales,and becauseof this pact it becomeseasier for one nonco- Roughly 85 percent of the subjectsacted noncooperatively-acted operating whaling country to ffnd its prey.) Some of your converts to protect their own interests. Most subjects believed that only a may be so bothered to see that the undeserving are doing better. small minority of the others would choose the cooperative (noble) than themselves,that they may decide to defect. They may argue act, and they saw no reasonwhy they should be penalized; so they that the coalition is not working, when in absoluteterms it may be clrcrsenot to act cooperatively.They felt that it was nottheir behats- working for them; but it may not be working in comparative terms. ior that was wrong, but the situation they were participating in. Un- It rankles them that they are helping someonewho is taking advan- fbrtunately, many real-world games have these characteristics.A tage oftheir noble behavior. So a few defect, and as a result the co- i'ew subjects acted cooperatively because they were simply con- alition can easily come apart. lused; but others-the really noble ones-knew exactlywhat was going on and chose to sacriffcetheir own tangible rewards for the good of the others, even though the others did not know who was A DIALOGUE acting for their benefft. If the rules of the game were changed to mtrke "goodness" more visible, then more subjects would opt for Once again,a troubled negotiatorposes the basic question:"How the noble 6qtien-5srne, perhaps,for long-rangeselfish reasons. should I think about ethically laden choices?" This suggestsa positive action programi we should try to identify "First of all," I say,"I think it's right that you should think about asocialgarnes (social dilemmas) and modify the rules, if possible them. Ethical reflections should be a continuing imperative."s (which is easiersaid than done). "Fine-but how?" Now let's supposethat you are in a position to infuence the 100 "About 2,500 years ago, Tzu Kung allegedly asked Confucius othersto act nobly by publicly appealingto their consciences.Do whether the Tme Way could be epitomizedin one word. Confucius 'Reciprocitg: you need to influenceall to follow your lead? No*you will get a replied: do not to otherswhat you do not want them to higher monetary return for yourself by converting 50 selffshsouls to do unto you.' During the reign of Herod the Great in Palestine, the noble causethan by joining the ranks of the selffsh.But balanc- Rabbi Hillel repeatedlyechoed this injunction, and decadeslater ing tangible and intangible rewards, you might still prefer to act Jesuspreached this as &e Golden Rule," nobly if you could get,say, 40 conversions;with fewer conversions "That still doesn't tell me whether Steve did wrong when he inti- vou might be sacriftcingtoo much. Supposethat you are wildly suc- mated that he would not settle for $250,000.As a City player against cessful: 75 others join your coalition. Say that 17 of these would have acted nobly anyway; 3 are despicableposeurs who join the 3. A paraphrasefiom "Basic Frameworks lbr Normative Ethics," a casestudy pre. pared by Kenneth E. Goodpaster, p. l. See the bibliography, under the heajing nobles but who will defect secretly; and 55 have actually been "Case Studies." ETHICALAND MORALISSUES / 35I 350i GENERALCONCERNS

"If somethingis done all the time, that doesn'tmake it right. Cer- AMPO, would I do wrong if I acted as if I wanted Commissioner tainly I would agreewith you that in judging the morality ol'one's Daniels when I secretlydesired to get rid of him?" proposedactions, one should reflect on the norms of society.But "Well, here'sa way of thinking that probably doesn'tgo back to society would change for the better if each of us tried to nudge it in Confucius:before you act,think of facingyourself in the mirror to- more righteousways, It's a matter of degree. Before taking an action moLrow.aIs this the personyou would like to see?Would you feel you might askyourself: What kind of societywould we be living in comibrtablediscussing your actionswith your spouse?Your chil- if everyone acted the way I'm about to act? Or: If I remove myself dren? Your friends?Let's refer to this cluster of concems as self' from involvement in the situation and if I imagine that someone re,spect." else is occupyingmy role, how would I as a disinterestedparty ad- "I'nr still confused,"the negotiatorpersists, "You're telling me to vise that other person to behave,taking into considerationwhat's think about the Golden Rule and to think about my self-respect. right for that person, what's right for other protagonistsin the nego- You're not telling me to alwaysobey the Golden Rule or to always tiation, and what's right for society?There's an implicit contractual honol my self-respect.How doesthat help Stevein his negotiations understandingin our socialobligations." lbr Ehntree House?" The negotiatoris not satisffed."But these rights-to mysel{, to "I'm trying to be helpful, but it's not easy to be dogmatic about others,and to society-might, and usually do, conflict.That's the these issues," I sayhesitatingly, "Unfortunately, for me, there is no problem. If I'm an interested party, and if I can help myself at the overarching atomistic, moral premise from which everything else expenseof someoneelse, how should I weigh my interestsagainst flows. Unlike Kant, I recognize no categorical imperative that I my perception of the interests of others?This is what I ff.ndhard to think is universallyapplicable. I can alwaysthink of counterexam- answer." ples, such as the fact that I would lie or steal or kill to savemy coun- "You're not the only one, I, too, ffnd the line hard to draw. But try or to save multitudes of innocent people. The best I can do is we're talking about ways to think about the problem. You might draw upon variousschools ofphilosophical thought and enunciate imagine yourself and the other negotiators in an original position principlesthat are importantto refect upon when I am at a morally where you as yet do not know the roleseach of you will assume.In intricatedecision node." this ex ante position, what would be a reasonablecontract for be- "But once you have severalprinciples of moral behavior,they havior to guide the mutual actions of all? How would you agree rnay conflict in a given situation.Should you lie, or break a prom- aheadof time that in the positionyou now find yourself,someone- ise?Aren't you troubled by that?" not necessarilyyourself-should actPThis is somethingyou might "Certainly I am, But before we talk about coping with inconsis- think about." tencies, let's formulate a few more principles that may be relevant "Thinking is easy.Acting is hard. lf I did this, and temperedrny in bargainingand negotiating." actionsaccordingly, I would be at a competitivedisadvantage if my Another negotiatorasks: "Don't you think there is enough guilt altruistic behavior were not reciprocated.Behave unto others as in our society?Are you telling us to be ashamedto look at ourselves yorr don't cxpect thern to behaveunto you. Is that it?" in tl'rcrnirror if'we don't live by the GolclenRule? It seentsto nle "No, that'snot itl I'm trying to tell you to be consciousof and to that the very art of negotiation involves some amount o{'deception reflect about conflicting rights-to be more consciousof others and rrndsome skillful exerciseof power, ShouldI be ashamedof the fact of long-run societalinterests." that in one negotiationexercise I purposely linked two issuesso Another negotiatorjoins the discussion."That last piece o{' ad- that I could use the threatpowerof one issueto getwhat I wanted vice cuts two ways," she says."An employer might want to fire a on the other?That's done all the time. If I'm not for myself, who worker who is incompetentbut who desperatelyneeds the money. *'ill be?" The employer might also empathize with the worker and decide that the bit of extraprofit he could gain by the dismissalis not worth 4. SeeDmcker (I981) 352/ cexERAL coNCERNS ETHICALAND N{ORALISSUES / 353

the harm that would be done to this loyal but not-too-brightworker. businessmanin the constructionindustry; and if I were to behave However, if the employer thinks of the big picture, thinks of the with my customerson a complete-disclosurebasis, I'd be out of long-run interestsof society, then perhaps he should fire the man. businessin a flash,I don't lie in the factualassertions I make; but As a whole, society may be better off if employers were tough- certainly I should be allowed, like everyone else, to choose ma- nrinded about efficiency. If employers fire incompetents, they terial selectively to favor my side." make placesavailable for competent people, and with increasedef- "I'll grant you the point that a competitive imperative may force ffciency more jobs may be created.That's part of the free-enterprise you toward a norrn of behavior that is a f'actof life in marketing and ethic," advertising.Butthere aredegrees. As a businessleader, you should "I grant you the point that we sometimeshave to take actions that set higher ethical standardsfor yourself than you perceive are com- have short-run liabilities for long-run gains-actions that appear to monplace around you: exemplary behavior on your part can influ- be hard-hearted.I agree that in thinking about society as a whole, ence the behavior of others. You should strive by your own behav- one should think about secondary,tertiary, and long-range effects ior to improve the standardsof morality in business.Just as in the as well as immediateeffects. But I would violently argueagainst a socialdilemma game,it's not necessaryfor you to influenceall the philosophysaying that since I can'tpredict what'sgoing to happen others to act cooperatively before it's worth your while to shift f;on) in the long run, I might as well look after myself right now. Well- noncooperative to cooperative behavior. And remember, there's ir rneariing people can have dilferent assessmentsof long-run effects dynamic at play herer if you act in society's interest, others might for somecases, but there are lots of other caseswhere the answers not only follow suit but they in turn will influenceothers. People will be perfectly transparent.For instance,society and the free-en- help create the society they live in. If they want to live in a more terprise systemwould be better off if people didn't tamper with the cooperative society,they can do so, though possibly at some cost to odometersof used cars before selling them, if advertisersdidn't fal- themselves,Most people, I believe, are willing to sacriffcea little sify information about the safety of products, if realtors informed for a more ethical world, but only so much, Many processesin our prospective home buyers that a particular furnace or a particular society do not exploit this limited altruism. We should seek ways to roof lvas in poor repair." change the world, or small parts of it, to take advantageof people's "Wtrit a minute on that last one," intedectsone of my interroga- willingness to sacriffcea little bit of their own comfort for the gen- tors. "Selling and buying is a little like the legal system.Lawyers eral good," are :rclvocates:they select the material they chooseto discloseto "You're saying that aspiring leaders should shun behavior that favor their side. It's up to the other party to protect itself. Am I, as they would not respect in others-that they should be exemplars. the sellerof an automobile,supposed to tell the buyer that my car is But if someonefollowed that gospel, he or she probably would not not as good as another on qualities P, Q, and R? I would rather be become a leader. Do you know a political leader who can truthfully quiet about P, Q, and R and tell him my car is much better than the exposehis full record?Compromises have to be made.Would you other car on qualities S, T, U, V, and W. And I rnight be stretching blame someonewho acted improperly on a minor issue so that he the point on qualities V and W. This is part of the bargaining could be in a positionto standup for his principles on really major ganle," issues?Are you sayingthat virtuous ends can't ever justify means "I'm not sure I agree.We'd be better off if we were a lot more that fail a morality test?" honest with each other in bargaining and negotiating. A lot of ad- "I'm not an absolutist,In specialcircumstances I might condone versarialbickering should be replacedby collegial,joint-problem- actions that, in general, I do not deem ethically appropriate; but a 'ends solving interchanges.Remember those nineteen points of the Rule lot of harm comesfrom an overly cavalier attitude about justi- of Reasonused in the National Coal Policy Project." fying means.' I believe that many people who intuitively do this "That's fine for the National Coal Policy Project, but I'm a small type of benefft-cost analysis do it poorly: they do not adequately 354I CENERALCoNCERNS ETHICALAND l\ ORALISSUES / 355

consider the effects of linkages and precedents. If an immoral ac- where eachof us has to decide how much we should act to benefit tion (rneans)is adopted for glorious ends, it makes it easier for others.The vast majority of us would like to participatein a rnoLe others to adopt similar actions for not-so-gloriousends, We're on a cooperative society, and all of us may have to make some sacrifice slippery slope, and it's hard to know where to draw the line." in the short run for that long-run goal. We have to calculate,at least "Exactly," says yet another negotiator. "I don't at all like your informally, the dynamic linkages between our actions now and the utilitarian-tradeoffs philosophy. There are certain actions that are later actions of others. If we are more ethical, it makes it easier for iust plain wrong in an absolute sense,and no analysisof conse- othersto be more ethical.And, as was the casein the multiperson justify quences can them. Unless certain basic principles are invio- socialdilemma game,we shouldnot becomeexcessively distraught people justify late, can or rationalize any foul deeds." if there are a few cynical souls who will tangibly profft by our com- "You're taking the strong deontologist position-that there are bined beneficentacts, absolute rights or wrongs regardlessof the consequences.Those "Ifyou actto help othersand hurt yourselfin the shortrun, and if who are religious believe that these are God-given. But, as I said your act is visible to others, you may profit from it in the long run before, I don't know of any overarching deontological principle becauseofcyclical reciprocities.In that sense,your noble-appear- from which all other moral principles derive. At least, I don't know ing action may be in your selffshinterest. But we should not de- of any single principle that could operationally guide my behavior, meanvisible actsof kindness,even though in part they may be seif: even though most of the several deontological principles that are serving, because your actions may make it easier for others to act offered seem appropriate heuristic guides for my behavior. But I similarly, and the dynamics reinforce behavior that is in the com- must admit that I think they're appropriate becauseof my utilitar- mon interest. An action that representsa moderate sacrifice in the ian calculations.If one adopts, as I do, a broad-gauged,rules- short run may represent only a very modest sacrifice in the long oriented, utilitarian framework, with a Iittle deontological and con- run, when dynamic linkagesare properly calculated.And as I said tractarianreasoning thrown in, then this viewpoint, while flexible, before,many people are willing to make small (long-run)sacrifices is not operational: it does not specify appropriate actions. One for the good of others,all things considered.The visibility of benef- needsheuristic guidelines or auxiliaryprinciples for ethicalbehav- icent actsthus plays a dual role: it reducesthe tangible penalties to ior; one cannotalways go back to basic principles. So as I see it, the actor, and it spurs others to act similarly; these two facetsthen whether one adoptsa deontologistor a teleologist(result-oriented) interact cyclically. Finally, empathizing with others may be re- position or a mixture of the two, one must be guided by a workable, flected in your own utility calculations: a sacrifice in long-range operationalset of ethical principles. And one should then realize tangible effects to yoursel{ if it is compensatedby ample gains for that these principles may occasionallyconflict with one another. others,could be tallied as a positivecontribution to your cognitive But these principles are guidelines not to be broken lightly! As utilitarian calculations," 'Ihomas 'Compromising Schelling so aptly put it: a principle "That's wonderful," saysmy first questioner."Now tell me, how soundswrong; but compromisingbetween principles sounds right.' do I use all this sermonizingto decide what I, as a City player, And compromising,after all, is what negotiationis all about." should do about Daniels?" Another negotiatorobviously thinks that we have reached the "That's left as an exercise." point of diminishing returns: "This conversationhas meandered over a wide terrain in normative ethics. Can you summarizeany insights you have from an analyst's perspective?" "Well, as an analyst I believe that most utilitarian calculations in situationalethics are too narrowly conceived.In a loosesense, all of us are engaged in a grandiose,many-person, social dilemma game :j-i {::,'i Epilogue

It's time to take stock. I could go on to analyze other examples of negotiations: intemational arms-limitation talks, economic trade agreements, cartels, divorce mediation, g)obal negotiations with developing countries, corporate takeovers, and so on. Frankly, if space and time permitted, I would be sorely tempted to include such additional material in this book, since or-reof rny pedagogic aims is to broaden the horizons of people who think narrowly about negotiations. Executives, for example, frequently assertthat they're not interested in the role of the intervenor in conflicts because that's not what they do as businessmen. It always gives me special pleasure when, during seminars on negotiation, such executives realize that mediating conflict is what they do all the time in the internal management of their organizations. Executives rarely think of themselves as mediators, even while they nrediate. Many of the ideas developed and formalized in this book are well understood by men and women of experience-but understood in the world of practice, and not in the world of thought. Practitioners often act intuitively in bargaining situations in ways that are far more sophisticated than they can conceptualize and articulate. I do believe, however, that even sophisticated practitioners of the art of negotiation can profit by contrasting negotiations in their own ffeld with those in other ffelds; they can profft by reflecting about what lies within the common core of most negotiation problems, and also about what lies outside this core and is somewhat special to the nar- rower class of their own negotiating problems; and they crrn profit merely by labeling recurrent key concepts in this common core, such as reservation prices, value tradeoffs, joint gains, contingency contracts, and efficient frontiers. In this way, they gain a deeper un-

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derstandingof what they are actuallydoing and can better commu- more conceptually integrated fashion, about the dynamics of nego_ nicatethese insightsto otherswho have been similarly sensitized. tiation, But my aim in writing this book goesdeeper. Often, disputants The principal theme of the book is that analysis-mostly simple flil to reach an agreementwhen, in fact, a compromisedoes exist analysis-can help, It can help a single negotiatingparty as he that co'ld be to the advantageof ail concerned.And the agreements thinks refectively about what he (prescriptively)should do, given thev clo ma.keare frequently inefficient; they could have made his assessmentof what others, in some quasi-rational descriptive otliersthat they all would havepref'erred. It is here that systematic sense,might do, Thus, the book departs from the traditional came ^'aly'sisc:irr be ol'serviceto the negotiator,facilitator, mediator, ar- theory approach,which simultaneously analyzeshighly rational be- bitrator,and rules rnanipulator.I am not thinking of grandiose any havior of all negotiating parties who are constantly thinking itera- new kind of analysisspecially devised for problems of nelotiation, tively about one another's thoughts, In certain highly repetitive but ol simple prosaicanaiysis that is part of the curriculum most of simple problemsthis type of equilibrium theory,so reminiscentof schoolso1'business and public policy: what your are arternatives? game theory, is highly relevant; and even in more intricate prob- What are your objectives?How do your objectives conflict?What lems for which iterative interactive thinking has its limitationi and are vour vaiue tradeoffs? What are the primary sources of uncer_ is not directly relevant to a specific case,the theory could neverthe- ttrinty that you face?What objective data do you have that bear on less be of practical relevance to the rules manipulator who is con- theseuncertainties? How ca' you tap the knowiedge of relevantex- cerned about how actual fallible players might play after they ab- perts,and what are their biases?Can you defer actionand accumu_ sorb a modicum of evolutionarylearning, late lurther inlbrrnationbefore you commit yourself? The approach of this book has been asymmetrically prescrip- These tluestionsand their actionimplications constitutea frame- tive/descriptive: prescriptive for yourself as a protagonistwhen pit- work o{ thought that applies to lnost decision problems. What is ted against the highly uncertain descriptive behavior of others. It often overlookedis that this framework alsoapplies to problemsof has also been prescriptive with regard to the intervenor, whether negotiation.But in the subclassof decision problems that is pecu- facilitator, mediator, arbitrator, or rules manipulator. There are, of liar to the domain of negotiation,a new classof concernsarises: course, intervenors who do not fft very well into any of these cate_ What are the interests, motives,concerns of the other negotiating gories. Five important points are worth reiterating. parties? What are their altematives to a negotiatedagreement? First, in hierarchical organizations,both private and public, the What are the opportunitiesfbr exploiting di{ferencesin values. be- executive is often cast in the role of an intervenor in disputes. so, lief-s,constraints? How should you shareinformation joint for prob- too, is the shop foreman, the lawyer, the newspaper editor, the uni_ lem-solving without making yourself too vulnerable when the versity departrnent head, the military leader-even the mother (hopefull.venlarged) pie has to partitioned? be Interpersonalskills who intervenesin disputesamong siblings. are critically importantin the negotiationexchange, but so is anal- Second,a negotiator,representing one side of a dispute, might ysis; and too many coursesin negotiationstress interpersonalbar- simultaneously play the intervenor's role as he confronts disparate, gaining skills at the expenseof analysis.My intention in this book conflicting advice from others on his side of the bargaining table. is not to minimize the importanceof interpersonal skills,but to bal- Third, a protagonist in an ongoing negotiation may wish at some ant.ethe ledger a bit. stageto suggest,or may need to react to the suggestionof, the inter_ This is nof a book addressedprimarily to analystsand academics; vention of an outside paty. The protagonist should therefore be it neither introducesa new, nor enhancesan old, theory of the ne- able to assessthe potentialimplications of sucha move and should gotiationprocess. Rather, it is addressedto practitioners ofnegotia- be creative about the many forms that this intervention can take. tion-and they are legion. It publicizesa need and an opportunity Fourth, negotiation and intervention are so intimately connected for theur to think more systematicallyand consciously, and in a conceptually that training in one can enhance performance in the 360/ aprtocrrr

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