From the Desert Sands to the Burmese Jungle: the Indian Army and the Lessons of North Africa, September 1939–November 1942

CHAPTER SEVEN FROM THE DESERT SANDS TO THE BURMESE JUNGLE: THE INDIAN ARMY AND THE LESSONS OF NORTH AFRICA, SEPTEMBER 1939–NOVEMBER 1942 Tim Moreman Introduction The Indian Army contingent that fought in North Africa against German and Italian troops between 1939–42 formed a comparatively small part of the polyglot British Commonwealth armies, drawn from the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and smaller Allied countries. The degree to which different Indian Army formations took part in the Western Desert varied enormously. The 4th Indian Division was arguably the most experienced of all British formations in the theatre, seeing nearly two and half years of combat, with only a few brief intermissions to rest, retrain and reorganize, by November 1942. The 5th Indian Division also made a significant albeit smaller contribution to the desert war, after being blooded in Eritrea, before eventually returning to India in 1943. A relatively smaller part was played by 10th Indian Division from May–June 1942, when it was caught up in the tail end of the Gazala battles, savaged while escap- ing from Mersa Matruh and then participated in the defence of El Alamein. A single brigade of 8th Indian Division—the inexperienced 18th Indian Infantry Brigade—was rushed forward in July 1942, more- over, to El Alamein and was destroyed by German panzers at Deir El Shein on 1st July 1942.1 The unfortunate independent 3rd Indian Motor Brigade was also deployed in the Western Desert where on two separate occasions it was overwhelmed by Axis troops. A large num- ber of British officers from the Indian service also held senior command and staff appointments in Middle East Command, particularly 1 For an early account of the Indian Army in North Africa see The Tiger Strikes and the Tiger Kills: The Story of the Indian Divisions in the North African Campaigns (London: 1944). 224 tim moreman after General Sir Claude Auchinleck, C-in-C from July 1941 to August 1942, filled command staff appointments with officers he knew and trusted. The Western Desert was not the only place in the Middle East where Indian troops served. A far larger contingent served during the occu- pation of Syria, Persia and Iraq, under the command of GHQ Middle East, where limited fighting took place against a ‘second class’ opponent and made up the mainstay of Persia-Iraq Command post August 1942. It also acted as a pool from which reinforcements were trans- ferred to the Western Desert at time of crisis. The fast-moving war of manoeuvre fought by British Commonwealth troops across the vast North African ‘sand model’, as one commen- tator has aptly dubbed it, was the arguably most technologically advanced campaign fought by Indian troops during the Second World War.2 It proved a harsh testing ground for British concepts of modern armoured warfare against a ‘first-class’ opponent equipped with modern tanks, artillery, aircraft and other equipment and a coherent doctrine to employ them. As a result, its lessons exercised a major influence during the early war years over the Indian Army, who, whilst fighting alongside other British Commonwealth troops, learnt much about open desert warfare, large scale armoured operations and modern combat in general that affected its own evolving organization, equipment, training and overall combat effectiveness. Indeed, GHQ India’s apparent fixation on organizing, equipping and training for the war in the West to the exclusion of other commitments has, however, meant the General Staff, India has been accused of professional myo- pia severely undermining its combat effectiveness in the war in Malaya and Burma between 1941–45. This chapter argues, however, that the war in North Africa taught the Indian Army in other parts of Middle East Command and the Indian subcontinent much of lasting value, including invaluable command, staff and combat experience that in some respects positively impacted on its overall combat effectiveness. In particular, it looks how the doctrinal and training lessons learnt from the war in the Western Desert—two keys to battlefield success—were passed on, before briefly 2 Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904–1945 (London: 1985), 221. .

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