DOCSLIB.ORG

Cairo Will Not Capitulate 125 Cairo Will Not Capitulate Will Sterling Area Hold Together? 127 EHERAN Is Far Away from Any British Military Base

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Cairo Will Not Capitulate 125 Cairo Will Not Capitulate Will Sterling Area Hold Together? 127 EHERAN Is Far Away from Any British Military Base February 2, 1952 Volume IV—No. 5 Eight annas EDITORIALS Cairo Will Not Capitulate 125 Cairo Will Not Capitulate Will Sterling Area Hold Together? 127 EHERAN is far away from any British military base. Near Cairo T then! is the Suez Canal base manned and garrisoned by British WEEKLY NOTES troops. That is a tale of two cities. Teheran has got away with some­ thing which Cairo has not been able to achieve. Iranians knew that January 30 —The National Sector Britain could not maintain the " legal" rights of the Anglo-Egyptian —Continental Jute Mills and Oil Company by force. But Britain left Egypt in no doubt that she US Buying — How Australia was determined to stay in the Canal Zone; that she had the military Fights Inflation — Deficit in might to stick to her determination. Egypt had no illusions about her India's Balance of Payments— military prowess. She relied on her moral strength to win the battle The Direction of Trade—Deve­ for freedom against foreign domination or occupation, lopment of Sulphur Mines in Italy—Preference Shares Only Nahas Pasha won a decisive first round. When he abrogated the for Oil Refineries 128 1936 Treaty Britain immediately retorted that Egypt had no legal right to terminate the Treaty before its expiry without prior consent of the FROM THE LONDON END interested party. Cairo remained unmoved. Its stubborn attitude had Sterling Leakages 132 the desired effect. London was forced to accept, by implication, that Cairo was entitled to abrogate the Treaty. Britain abandoned her insistence on treaty rights. With the support of America, France and OFF THE RECORD Turkey, Britain offered a Four Power proposal for the creation of a Fair Price 133 Middle East Command. It was rejected by Egypt. SPECIAL ARTICLES Britain did not abandon her firm resolve to remain in the Canal Zone. But she took elaborate care to explain the Four-Power proposal Group Farming in Nigeria to Egypt. Egypt was offered equal partnership in the defence arrange­ —Kenneth Baldwi 135 ment. All the Arab States were invited to join the pact. Egypt and Quality Factor in Coal Consumption others were told that they would be allowed to participate in the —K. M. Purkayastha 137 proposed security arrangement for the Middle East without any cost or obligation on their part. They were assured by the Western Powers FROM THE CHAIR that their sovereign rights would be scrupulously honoured and respected, The Associated Cement Compa­ nies Ltd. 139 Cairo did not yield. Nahas Pasha warned the Arab States against falling into the trap laid by the Western Powers. Experience had taught STOCK EXCHANGE him a bitter lesson. He warned the Arab States that it would be 1941 all over again. He had personal experience of what happened Hesitancy After Parly Advance 143 when the British " took over" the business of preventing war in the Middle East during the last war. They remained as an Occupation COMPANY NOTES Power. Britain is still in the Canal Zone as an Occupation Power. These were the reasons why Nahas Pasha rejected the Four-Power proposal. Scmdia Turns The Corner 145 Egypt declared her unwillingness to align with Power blocks. Some of the Arab States were not so stubborn. But they followed Cairo's lead. CURRENT STATISTICS 146 Then things happened in the Canal Zone which were not unexpect­ Yearly Subscription post free ed. For a long time after the abrogation of the Treaty Nahas Pasha India and Pakistan Rs 24/- maintained a correct official attitude towards the activities of the Egyptian ForeignRs 27/- guerillas. The Government discouraged their activities.. Nahas Pasha was too shrewd not to realise the risks involved in any widespread out­ The Economic Weekly break of violence. Only after the British troops forcibly demolished Noble Chambers, Parai Bazar St., huts in the village of Kafar Abdu did the Government threaten police Fort, Bombay. resistance. There was evidence of police assistance to, or connivance Phone: 23406 at, the activities of the Egyptian " commandos " in recent weeks. Both THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY February 2, 1953 sides gradually stiffened their atti­ Command. In the past few days, cussion of the Anglo-Egyptian dis­ tude. It culminated in the brutal Mr Eden and Mr Churchill have pute. He waited too long to make military action by the British at both expressed Britain's willingness his decision. And he paid the poli­ Ismailia. Military events at lsmai- to come to a settlement. Neither tical penalty for his delay in coming lia had their reaction in Cairo. of them has made the Middle East to a definite decision. There were violent demonstrations Command a condition precedent All this will not be denied. But by the mob. The, situation got out for a settlement of the dispute. the impression will linger that Aly of control. King Farouk got the Maher Pasha may have entered into Aly Maher Pasha has requested an unholy alliance with King Farouk opportunity he was waiting for. He Britain to expedite negotiations for dismissed Nahas Pasha. Under the to sell the Egyptian people " short". solving the dispute. He is seeming­ Nahas Pasha may have failed in his Egyptian Constitution, he has the ly prepared to discuss the Four- right to dismiss the Government in mission. But in the process of ful­ Power proposal for a Middle East filling his mission he had fanned the wider interests of the country. Command. But he significantly King Farouk has fired Nahas Pasha political flames which must have mentions that any plan for settle­ provoked the Palace and the Pashas on the ground that he has not been ment must be based on the United able to maintain peace and order to take swift and decisive action. Nations Charter. Aly Maher Pasha Nahas Pasha fell not because of his in the country. Therefore, " we ", is a polished diplomat. This may King Farouk informs Nahas Pasha, failure to solve the Anglo-Egyptian be his way of saying that the dispute crisis, but because of the alarming " have decided to forfeit your man­ should be reconciled on terms out­ date ". This is not the first time internal political developments lined by Nuri es Said Pasha, the which he had unwittingly encourag­ that Nahas Pasha has been dismiss­ Iraqi Prime Minister, and by King ed. In his life-long political expe­ ed. He certainly must have had the Ibn Saud. Both Nuri Pasha and vision, but he was seemingly unable rience he. has discovered that one King Ibn Saud had suggested a cannot rely on the King and the or impotent to stem the political security pact among Arab States as tide which would have swept him Palace, When King Farouk ap­ a possible compromise solution. The pointed some politicians, who were and his class away. Where he fail­ Arab States are not eager to parti­ ed to take action, the King and the known for their hostility to Nahas cipate in the Middle East Command Pasha, as members of his Royal Palace have stepped in. Aly Maher proposed by the Western Powers. Pasha may yet succeed in coming Cabinet, it was widely anticipated But they do not deny that the Mid­ that he was preparing to take action. to a settlement with Britain on terms dle East is in need of collective which will be acceptable to the Nahas Pasha committed mistakes. defence against aggression. They He should have known that he could Western Powers, as well as to the suggest that the defence arrange­ Arab States. Britain may yet re­ not continue the struggle by force, ment for the Middle East should be Military conditions in Egypt being cognise King Farouk as the Sove­ the responsibility of Middle Eastern reign of Nubia and the Sudan. But what they are, passive resistance States. They propose a Uefente was his only weapon. He did not the Egyptian people will not for long pact among Arab States which will submit to a denial of social, politi­ directly encourage the police and the ensure collective' security without Army to participate in the struggle cal and economic equality. By dis­ direct alliance with the Western missing Nahas Pasha and by ap­ for freedom from foreign occupa­ Powers. tion. But he ignored the fanatic pointing Aly Maher Pasha as the '' Muslim Brotherhood " and the There is much to be said in favour Prime Minister, King Farouk will subversive political elements. Young of some such arrangement. It helps not succeed in suppressing the social college students crying slogans and the Western Powers to attain their ferment. Nor will the Western shibboleths cannot free any country aim. By not directly participating Powers succeed in creating a mili­ from foreign occupation. They and in a defence pact with the Western tary base which can defend the the people can fulfil their aspira­ Powers the Arab States can claim Middle East. No such base can tions by creating the proper moral non-involvement in world power function effectively without the con­ atmosphere. Nahas Pasha could politics. It is an open secret that sent of the people. Herein lies the not inspire such moral indignation. America is in favour of this ar­ danger The turmoil in the Middle He could not possibly resist force rangement. The Arab States can East will continue, though the by force. So he paid the penalty. rely on the United Nations Charter Anglo-Egyptian dispute, may seem in their preparations for collective nearer solution. Nahas Pasha's personal political defence without getting directly in­ vicissitudes are less important than volved in the "cold war". It is the future of Egypt. King Farouk widely believed that Britain will may he wise in making a scapegoat have to accept a compromise be­ of Nahas Pasha.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 1.0 INTRODUCTION Crete 1941 Is an Operational Level Simulation of The
    CONTENTS 1.0 INTRODUCTION 2.0 SOLITAIRE GAME STRUCTURE 3.0 GAME COMPONENTS 4.0 HOW TO WIN 5.0 HOW TO SET UP THE GAME 6.0 SEQUENCE OF PLAY 7.0 THE MAP & POSITIONING OF UNITS 8.0 GERMAN FORCES 9.0 ALLIED FORCES 10.0 XI FK STAFF POINTS 11.0 INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 12.0 REFITTING GERMAN UNITS 13.0 GERMAN STAGING 14.0 GERMAN TACTICAL MOVEMENT 15.0 GERMAN AIR OPERATIONS 16.0 STRATEGIC AIR ATTACKS ON THE ALLIED COMMAND INDEX 17.0 STRATEGIC AIR ATTACKS ON THE ROYAL NAVY 18.0 AIR TRANSPORT, AIR DROPS, AIRLANDING NOTE: To remove the rules from this 3.0 GAME COMPONENTS 19.0 AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS magazine, carefully and slowly peel 20.0 FOG OF WAR & REVEAL PHASE them from the subscription card they are 3.1 Game Map attached to by peeling from the top and 21.0 ALLIED ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE The map shows Crete and the surrounding seas, then the bottom meeting in the middle. with displays (boxes) representing the German 22.0 TACTICAL AIR ATTACKS The card is not intended to be removed. 23.0 GROUND COMBAT staging areas in mainland Greece (see rule 7.0). 24.0 FIRING & CRT These rules use the following color system: 25.0 WINNING A BATTLE Red for critical points such as errata and 3.2 Game Displays 26.0 PURSUIT exceptions, Blue for examples of play. Game displays record various information 27.0 ALLIED COMMAND LEVEL during the course of a game, listed as follows. 28.0 ALLIED MIDDLE EAST COMMAND EVENTS 1.0 INTRODUCTION Turn: Shows the current turn.
    [Show full text]
  • Persia & Iraq Command History & Personnel
    2020 www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk Author: Robert PALMER, M.A. PERSIA & IRAQ COMMAND (HISTORY & PERSONNEL) A short history of the Persia and Iraq Command (also known as ‘PaiForce’), an operational command in the British Army between ??. In addition, known details of the key appointments held between 1930 and 1950 are included. Copyright ©www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk (2020) 31 July 2020 [PERSIA & IRAQ COMMAND HISTORY & PERSONNEL] A Concise History of Persia & Iraq Command Version: 2_1 This edition dated: 5 August 2020 ISBN: Not yet allocated. All rights reserved. No part of the publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means including; electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, scanning without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Author: Robert PALMER, M.A. (copyright held by author) Assisted by: Stephen HEAL Published privately by: The Author – Publishing as: www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk ©www.BritishMilitaryH istory.co.uk Page 1 31 July 2020 [PERSIA & IRAQ COMMAND HISTORY & PERSONNEL] Persia and Iraq Command Modern Iraq is a country born out the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire following the defeat of Turkey at the end of the Great War. A government for the new state of Iraq was formed in November 1920, with Emir Feisal being proclaimed King of Iraq on 23 August 1921. The United Kingdom signed a treaty with Iraq in October 1922 defining the relationship between the two sovereign states. This treaty imposed limits on the sovereignty of Iraq and maintained British interests in the country. In 1925, the area around Mosul, which was rich in oil deposits, was ceded to Iraq from Turkey.
    [Show full text]
  • Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal 48
    ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY JOURNAL 48 2 The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the contributors concerned and are not necessarily those held by the Royal Air Force Historical Society. First published in the UK in 2010 by the Royal Air Force Historical Society All ri hts reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information stora e and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. ISSN 1361 4231 Printed by Windrush Group ,indrush House Avenue Two Station Lane ,itney O028 40, 3 ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY President 2arshal of the Royal Air Force Sir 2ichael 3eetham GC3 C3E DFC AFC 7ice8President Air 2arshal Sir Frederick Sowrey KC3 C3E AFC Committee Chairman Air 7ice82arshal N 3 3aldwin C3 C3E FRAeS 7ice8Chairman -roup Captain 9 D Heron O3E Secretary -roup Captain K 9 Dearman FRAeS 2embership Secretary Dr 9ack Dunham PhD CPsychol A2RAeS Treasurer 9 Boyes TD CA 2embers Air Commodore - R Pitchfork 23E 3A FRAes :9 S Cox Esq BA 2A :6r M A Fopp MA F2A FI2 t :-roup Captain A 9 Byford MA MA RAF :,ing Commander P K Kendall BSc ARCS MA RAF ,ing Commander C Cummings Editor & Publications ,ing Commander C G Jefford M3E BA 2ana er :Ex Officio 4 CONTENTS OPENIN- ADDRESS œ Air 2shl Ian Macfadyen 7 ON.Y A SIDESHO,? THE RFC AND RAF IN A 2ESOPOTA2IA 1914-1918 by Guy Warner THE RAF AR2OURED CAR CO2PANIES IN IRAB 20 C2OST.YD 1921-1947 by Dr Christopher Morris No 4 SFTS AND RASCHID A.IES WAR œ IRAB 1941 by )A , Cdr Mike Dudgeon 2ORNIN- Q&A F1 SU3STITUTION OR SU3ORDINATION? THE E2P.OY8 63 2ENT OF AIR PO,ER O7ER AF-HANISTAN AND THE NORTH8,EST FRONTIER, 1910-1939 by Clive Richards THE 9E3E.
    [Show full text]
  • The Baghdad Set
    The Baghdad Set Also by Adrian O’Sullivan: Nazi Secret Warfare in Occupied Persia (Iran): The Failure of the German Intelligence Services, 1939–45 (Palgrave, 2014) Espionage and Counterintelligence in Occupied Persia (Iran): The Success of the Allied Secret Services, 1941–45 (Palgrave, 2015) Adrian O’Sullivan The Baghdad Set Iraq through the Eyes of British Intelligence, 1941–45 Adrian O’Sullivan West Vancouver, BC, Canada ISBN 978-3-030-15182-9 ISBN 978-3-030-15183-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15183-6 Library of Congress Control Number: 2019934733 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the pub- lisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.
    [Show full text]
  • From the Desert Sands to the Burmese Jungle: the Indian Army and the Lessons of North Africa, September 1939–November 1942
    CHAPTER SEVEN FROM THE DESERT SANDS TO THE BURMESE JUNGLE: THE INDIAN ARMY AND THE LESSONS OF NORTH AFRICA, SEPTEMBER 1939–NOVEMBER 1942 Tim Moreman Introduction The Indian Army contingent that fought in North Africa against German and Italian troops between 1939–42 formed a comparatively small part of the polyglot British Commonwealth armies, drawn from the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and smaller Allied countries. The degree to which different Indian Army formations took part in the Western Desert varied enormously. The 4th Indian Division was arguably the most experienced of all British formations in the theatre, seeing nearly two and half years of combat, with only a few brief intermissions to rest, retrain and reorganize, by November 1942. The 5th Indian Division also made a significant albeit smaller contribution to the desert war, after being blooded in Eritrea, before eventually returning to India in 1943. A relatively smaller part was played by 10th Indian Division from May–June 1942, when it was caught up in the tail end of the Gazala battles, savaged while escap- ing from Mersa Matruh and then participated in the defence of El Alamein. A single brigade of 8th Indian Division—the inexperienced 18th Indian Infantry Brigade—was rushed forward in July 1942, more- over, to El Alamein and was destroyed by German panzers at Deir El Shein on 1st July 1942.1 The unfortunate independent 3rd Indian Motor Brigade was also deployed in the Western Desert where on two separate occasions it was overwhelmed by Axis troops. A large num- ber of British officers from the Indian service also held senior com- mand and staff appointments in Middle East Command, particularly 1 For an early account of the Indian Army in North Africa see The Tiger Strikes and the Tiger Kills: The Story of the Indian Divisions in the North African Campaigns (London: 1944).
    [Show full text]
  • Fighting Against the French: Australians in the Allied Invasion of Lebanon and Syria, 1941
    Fighting against the French: Australians in the Allied invasion of Lebanon and Syria, 1941 Daniel Seaton Introduction In the nearly three quarters of a century since the end of the Second World War, popular memory of Australia’s involvement in the conflict has been shaped around several key cornerstones of engagement. Tobruk, Kokoda, and Singapore, for example, are easily understandable stories of heroism and sacrifice, which have been etched into Australian national consciousness as symbols of the nation’s contribution to the war. These symbols provide unambiguous displays of the courage and determination shown by Australian service personnel, fought against easily recognisable enemies: the Germans and Japanese. Where areas of conflict did not fit into these clear-cut criteria, they often became subsumed by the popular narrative of the war. An example of this is the Lebanon-Syria campaign of June–July 1941, fought against pro-Axis Vichy French forces, which has remained a far less well-known and understood area of Australian engagement to this day.1 Though the campaign was a relatively minor event in the grand scheme of the war, it held great significance for the men, mostly of the recently-formed 7th Australian Division, who fought there. In his 1989 memoir, Corporal Anthony MacInante, a veteran of the campaign, wrote that “very little credit, if any, has been given to the Commanding Officers and troops who secured this vital northern flank of Lebanon- Syria … In Australia we hardly get a mention”.2 MacInante’s complaints may have been
    [Show full text]
  • The Southern Flank of NATO, 1951-1959: Military Stategy Or Poltical Stabilisation? Chourchoulis, Dionysios
    The southern flank of NATO, 1951-1959: military stategy or poltical stabilisation? Chourchoulis, Dionysios The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author For additional information about this publication click this link. https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/jspui/handle/123456789/702 Information about this research object was correct at the time of download; we occasionally make corrections to records, please therefore check the published record when citing. For more information contact [email protected] 1 THE SOUTHERN FLANK OF NATO, 1951-1959. MILITARY STRATEGY OR POLITICAL STABILISATION? Dionysios Chourchoulis Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Queen Mary University of London Department of History September 2010 2 ABSTRACT In 1951-52, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation established the Southern Flank, a strategy for the defence of the eastern Mediterranean in the Cold War involving Greece, Italy and Turkey. Among its many aims, the Southern Flank sought to mobilize Greece and Turkey as allies and integrate them into the Western defence system. Throughout 1950s, the alliance developed the Southern Flank and in 1959, it was finally stabilized as fractious Greek-Turkish relations were improved by the temporary settlement over Cyprus. These events are the focus of this thesis. It examines, among other things, the initial negotiations of 1951-52, the Southern Flank‟s structure and function and relative value in NATO‟s overall policy, and its response to the challenges of the eastern Mediterranean in the early Cold War.
    [Show full text]
  • XIII Corps History & Personnel
    2020 www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk Author: Robert PALMER, M.A. A CONCISE HISTORY OF: XIII CORPS (WESTERN DESERT FORCE) (HISTORY & PERSONNEL) A concise history of XIII Corps, a higher level formation of the British Army formed in 1940 as Western Desert Force, that existed until 1945. It saw service in the Western Desert (Egypt and Libya), Syria, Sicily and Italy. In addition, known details of the key appointments held during that period are included. Copyright ©www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk (2019) 28 September 2020 [XIII CORPS HISTORY & PERSONNEL] A Concise History of XIII Corps (History & Personnel) Version: 1_1 This edition dated: 28 September 2020 ISBN: Not allocated All rights reserved. No part of the publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means including; electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, scanning without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Author: Robert PALMER, M.A. (copyright held by author) Assisted by: Stephen HEAL Published privately by: The Author – Publishing as: www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk © www.BritishMilitaryH istory.co.uk Page 1 28 September 2020 [XIII CORPS HISTORY & PERSONNEL] Western Desert Force (XIII Corps) On 3 November 1939, the Headquarters of the 7th Infantry Division moved from Palestine to Mersa Matruh in Egypt to take command of the Allied Forces facing the Italian Army in Libya. It was redesignated as the 6th Infantry Division on that same date. The divisional headquarters closed in the Western Desert on 13 March 1940, returning to Palestine. On 8 June 1940, the Divisional H.Q. closed in Palestine and moved back to the Western Desert, where on 17 June 1940 it was redesignated as Western Desert Force taking command of the: • 7th Armoured Division; • Mersa Matruh Garrison.
    [Show full text]
  • The Attitude of Egypt Towards Baghdad Pact
    Tarih ve Günce Atatürk ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi Dergisi Journal of Atatürk and the History of Turkish Republic I/3, (2018 Yaz), ss. 125-146. THE ATTITUDE OF EGYPT TOWARDS BAGHDAD PACT Özgür Yıldırım Abstract Middle East has become the attraction center of the World through the hu- man history. It has been home to many of civilizations. A big colonial race began with the industry era in the World and the petroleum and raw mate- rial race of colonial states were accelarated vehemently. Especially, after the math of 19 century, the weakining power of Ottoman Empire resulted in a big gap in the Middle East. It caused the severe competiton between the states which were eager to fill that gap. It made the region which was im- portant from the view of strategical and having wealthy oil reserves more attractive. The region was shared in 1st Wold War with secret agreements. Western countries foremost UK made the deals with tribal leaders and prominent families to organize the rebelions against Ottoman in order to collapse it. After 1st Wold War, The Kingdoms and the states were established based on colonial and mandate regime in place of Ottoman Empire. The colonial states which Imperial states never give up were established. Untill 2 nd Wold War, Colonial Systems and Mandate regime were led, after 2 nd Wold War, The dipole system which was comprised of USA and USSR was domi- nated the World. Untill that time, USA, UK and France had been dominant in the region, USSR became the rival of them.
    [Show full text]
  • 'Steel My Soldiers' Hearts': El Alamein Reappraised.1
    Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 14, ISSUE 1, FALL 2011 Studies ‘Steel my soldiers’ hearts’: El Alamein Reappraised.1 Jonathan Fennell The Oxford Bodleian Library holds 293 titles under the subject of the ‘North African Campaign of the Second World War’, the British Library 308.2 That amounts to over four books a year on the subject, or about one book published every three months, for the sixty-nine years since November 1942. This constitutes a remarkable body of scholarship on what historians today might refer to as a secondary theatre in the Second World War.3 There are a number of possible reasons for this level of interest in the North African campaign. Firstly, North Africa is where British and Commonwealth forces learnt how to defeat the Wehrmacht. It had taken three long years before Britain and her allies celebrated their first decisive victory on land against Germany, at El Alamein, in November 1942. In many ways, the dynamics of the critical campaign in North West Europe, between 1944 and 1945, cannot be understood without first understanding the processes that led to victory in North Africa. Secondly, in a global conflict often characterised by brutality, North Africa represents an oasis of chivalry and sanity, an environment where, in the main, war was contained away from innocent civilians. 1 The title of this paper is from the speech of King Henry before the battle of Agincourt (Henry V, Act IV, Scene I, line 289), ‘O God of battles! Steel my soldiers’ hearts’. Montgomery pinned the quotation to the wall of his caravan before the battle of El Alamein.
    [Show full text]
  • Force Headquarters, Creforce]
    9 September 2020 [FORCE HEADQUARTERS, CREFORCE] Force Headquarters Creforce (1) Force Headquarters, Creforce Infantry 1st Bn. The Welch Regiment (2) 9th Bn. The King’s Royal Rifle Corps (The Rangers) (3) 2nd/2nd Australian Field Regiment (4) Detachment, 2nd/3rd Australian Field Regiment (4) 16th Australian Infantry Brigade Composite Battalion (4) 17th Australian Infantry Brigade Composite Battalion (4) 11th Searchlight Regiment, Royal Artillery (5) ‘S’ Searchlight Regiment, Royal Marines (5) ‘Royal Perivolians’ (5) 1st Echelon, New Zealand Divisional Supply Column (5) 2 Greek Regiment (6) Artillery Commander Royal Artillery 102nd (Northumberland Hussars) Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery (7) 106th (Lancashire Hussars) Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (8) Royal Engineers (9) Chief Engineer, Creforce 42nd Field Company, Royal Engineers Crete Composite Company, R.E. 1003 Docks Operation Company, Royal Engineers Royal Engineers Stores Depot Details, Australian Engineers and Australian Army Service Corps Stevedores Details, New Zealand Engineers Stevedores Royal Corps of Signals Creforce Signals, Royal Corps of Signals ©www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk Page 1 9 September 2020 [FORCE HEADQUARTERS, CREFORCE] Royal Army Service Corps (10) Assistant Director Supplies and Transport 231st Motor Transport Company, Royal Army Service Corps 101st Petrol Company, Royal Army Service Corps 1st Petrol Depot, Royal Army Service Corps Two Supply Depots Base Supply Depot 37th Detail Issue Depot, Royal Army Service Corps Detachments, 1st and 26th Field Bakeries,
    [Show full text]
  • Britain in Iraq During the 1950S: Imperial Retrenchment and Informal Empire
    Britain in Iraq During the 1950s: Imperial Retrenchment and Informal Empire A thesis presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts Rebecca M. Perry August 2013 © 2013 Rebecca M. Perry. All Rights Reserved. 2 This thesis titled Britain in Iraq During the 1950s: Imperial Retrenchment and Informal Empire by REBECCA M. PERRY has been approved for the Department of History and the College of Arts and Sciences by Peter John Brobst Associate Professor of History Robert Frank Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 ABSTRACT PERRY, REBECCA M., M.A., August 2013, History Britain in Iraq During the 1950s: Imperial Retrenchment and Informal Empire Director of Thesis: Peter John Brobst Following the Second World War and the independence of India in 1947, Great Britain recognized the importance of the Middle East to its postwar economic recovery and to the maintenance of the British Empire and Commonwealth. During the 1950s, British officials turned to Iraq as a crucial foothold from which to both secure Britain’s continued dominance of the Middle East and prevent the Soviet Union’s penetration of the region. This thesis examines how Britain sustained its position in Iraq during the 1950s by adapting its formal relationships and connections into informal advantages that fit with postwar realities and international, domestic, and regional attitudes and pressures. Ultimately, Britain managed to maintain its position in Iraq through the pursuit of informal economic, cultural, and military influence. 4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to acknowledge and thank my advisor—Dr.
    [Show full text]