The Attitude of Egypt Towards Baghdad Pact
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Diverging Perceptions of the Cold War: Baghdad Pact As a Source of Conflict Between Turkey and the Nationalist Arab Countries
DIVERGING PERCEPTIONS OF THE COLD WAR: BAGHDAD PACT AS A SOURCE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE NATIONALIST ARAB COUNTRİES UMUT ÜZER - AYŞE ÜZER ABSTRACT Cold War dynamics compelled Turkey and the nationalist Arab countries, particularly Egypt and Syria, to join two opposing camps. Conflicting geopolitical interests betvveen Turkey and the nationalist Arab countries led to a rivalry for regional hegemony and an alignment pattern inimical to the security of the other countries. Turkey's membership in NATO in 1952 and the establishment of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 caused concern for the Egyptian president Gamal abd-al Nasser, vvho perceived those pacts as tools of Western imperialism. On the other hand, for Turkey these pacts vvere guarantors of Turkish security against an expansionist Soviet Union. Diverging threat perceptions betvveen Turkey and the radical Arab states resulted in a tense atmosphere in the Middle East sub-system. KEYVVORDS The Baghdad Pact, Turkish foreign policy, Syrian foreign policy, Egyptian foreign policy, Adnan Menderes, Gamal abd-al Nasser, Cold War. 102 THE TURKİSH YEARBOOK [YOL. XXXVI Introduction The Cold War (1946-1991) had different meanings for Turkey and the nationalist Arab countries, emanating from their security needs and threat perceptions. For Turkey, the Cold War was characterized by the Soviet threat, which entailed territorial demands on its Eastern region, specifically Kars and Ardahan and demands for bases on the Turkish straits. This state of affairs led Turkey to join the Western bloc, which culminated in its membership in NATO in 1952. Russians were perceived as the source of threat against which Turkey allied with the United States. -
1.0 INTRODUCTION Crete 1941 Is an Operational Level Simulation of The
CONTENTS 1.0 INTRODUCTION 2.0 SOLITAIRE GAME STRUCTURE 3.0 GAME COMPONENTS 4.0 HOW TO WIN 5.0 HOW TO SET UP THE GAME 6.0 SEQUENCE OF PLAY 7.0 THE MAP & POSITIONING OF UNITS 8.0 GERMAN FORCES 9.0 ALLIED FORCES 10.0 XI FK STAFF POINTS 11.0 INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 12.0 REFITTING GERMAN UNITS 13.0 GERMAN STAGING 14.0 GERMAN TACTICAL MOVEMENT 15.0 GERMAN AIR OPERATIONS 16.0 STRATEGIC AIR ATTACKS ON THE ALLIED COMMAND INDEX 17.0 STRATEGIC AIR ATTACKS ON THE ROYAL NAVY 18.0 AIR TRANSPORT, AIR DROPS, AIRLANDING NOTE: To remove the rules from this 3.0 GAME COMPONENTS 19.0 AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS magazine, carefully and slowly peel 20.0 FOG OF WAR & REVEAL PHASE them from the subscription card they are 3.1 Game Map attached to by peeling from the top and 21.0 ALLIED ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE The map shows Crete and the surrounding seas, then the bottom meeting in the middle. with displays (boxes) representing the German 22.0 TACTICAL AIR ATTACKS The card is not intended to be removed. 23.0 GROUND COMBAT staging areas in mainland Greece (see rule 7.0). 24.0 FIRING & CRT These rules use the following color system: 25.0 WINNING A BATTLE Red for critical points such as errata and 3.2 Game Displays 26.0 PURSUIT exceptions, Blue for examples of play. Game displays record various information 27.0 ALLIED COMMAND LEVEL during the course of a game, listed as follows. 28.0 ALLIED MIDDLE EAST COMMAND EVENTS 1.0 INTRODUCTION Turn: Shows the current turn. -
Persia & Iraq Command History & Personnel
2020 www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk Author: Robert PALMER, M.A. PERSIA & IRAQ COMMAND (HISTORY & PERSONNEL) A short history of the Persia and Iraq Command (also known as ‘PaiForce’), an operational command in the British Army between ??. In addition, known details of the key appointments held between 1930 and 1950 are included. Copyright ©www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk (2020) 31 July 2020 [PERSIA & IRAQ COMMAND HISTORY & PERSONNEL] A Concise History of Persia & Iraq Command Version: 2_1 This edition dated: 5 August 2020 ISBN: Not yet allocated. All rights reserved. No part of the publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means including; electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, scanning without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Author: Robert PALMER, M.A. (copyright held by author) Assisted by: Stephen HEAL Published privately by: The Author – Publishing as: www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk ©www.BritishMilitaryH istory.co.uk Page 1 31 July 2020 [PERSIA & IRAQ COMMAND HISTORY & PERSONNEL] Persia and Iraq Command Modern Iraq is a country born out the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire following the defeat of Turkey at the end of the Great War. A government for the new state of Iraq was formed in November 1920, with Emir Feisal being proclaimed King of Iraq on 23 August 1921. The United Kingdom signed a treaty with Iraq in October 1922 defining the relationship between the two sovereign states. This treaty imposed limits on the sovereignty of Iraq and maintained British interests in the country. In 1925, the area around Mosul, which was rich in oil deposits, was ceded to Iraq from Turkey. -
Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal 48
ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY JOURNAL 48 2 The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the contributors concerned and are not necessarily those held by the Royal Air Force Historical Society. First published in the UK in 2010 by the Royal Air Force Historical Society All ri hts reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information stora e and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. ISSN 1361 4231 Printed by Windrush Group ,indrush House Avenue Two Station Lane ,itney O028 40, 3 ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY President 2arshal of the Royal Air Force Sir 2ichael 3eetham GC3 C3E DFC AFC 7ice8President Air 2arshal Sir Frederick Sowrey KC3 C3E AFC Committee Chairman Air 7ice82arshal N 3 3aldwin C3 C3E FRAeS 7ice8Chairman -roup Captain 9 D Heron O3E Secretary -roup Captain K 9 Dearman FRAeS 2embership Secretary Dr 9ack Dunham PhD CPsychol A2RAeS Treasurer 9 Boyes TD CA 2embers Air Commodore - R Pitchfork 23E 3A FRAes :9 S Cox Esq BA 2A :6r M A Fopp MA F2A FI2 t :-roup Captain A 9 Byford MA MA RAF :,ing Commander P K Kendall BSc ARCS MA RAF ,ing Commander C Cummings Editor & Publications ,ing Commander C G Jefford M3E BA 2ana er :Ex Officio 4 CONTENTS OPENIN- ADDRESS œ Air 2shl Ian Macfadyen 7 ON.Y A SIDESHO,? THE RFC AND RAF IN A 2ESOPOTA2IA 1914-1918 by Guy Warner THE RAF AR2OURED CAR CO2PANIES IN IRAB 20 C2OST.YD 1921-1947 by Dr Christopher Morris No 4 SFTS AND RASCHID A.IES WAR œ IRAB 1941 by )A , Cdr Mike Dudgeon 2ORNIN- Q&A F1 SU3STITUTION OR SU3ORDINATION? THE E2P.OY8 63 2ENT OF AIR PO,ER O7ER AF-HANISTAN AND THE NORTH8,EST FRONTIER, 1910-1939 by Clive Richards THE 9E3E. -
UCLA Historical Journal
UCLA UCLA Historical Journal Title Strife Among Friends and Foes: The 1958 Anglo-American Military Interventions in the Middle East Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/65h504r9 Journal UCLA Historical Journal, 17(0) ISSN 0276-864X Author Nadaner, Jeffrey M. Publication Date 1997 Peer reviewed eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California 82 UCLAHistoricalJournal Strife Among Friends and Foes: The 1958 Anglo-American Military Interventions in the Middle East Jeffrey M. Nadaner ^ m ^ wight D. Eisenhower found it much easier to stop the British, >* # J French and Israelis at Suez than to maintain a pro-Western order * -^ in the Middle East afterwards. In the two years following the Suez imbroglio, the Eisenhower administration determined that it was locked in a struggle for the Arab world with Egypt and its Soviet patron, and that the West was about to lose. Post- Suez tension came to a head on July 14, 1958, when the Hashemite monarchy of Iraq fell in a coup d'tat. Fearing the demise of other pro-Western regimes, Eisenhower sent the marines to Lebanon and agreed to the British dispatch of paratroopers to Jordan. The administration, however, lacked a coherent idea on how to use the troops or what to do next. Using recently declassified sources, this article shows that the elements comprising a strategy evolved only later, in the days and weeks ahead. The Eisenhower administration would, over the course of the 1958 crisis, attain a modestly deeper understanding than before of the forces ani- mating Middle Eastern politics. Equally significant, the administration would begin to prioritize among Western interests in the region and develop a more sophisticated approach than it had earlier of how best to secure them. -
Nato Unclassified N-48
NATO UNCLASSIFIED and - EXEMPLAIRE PUBLIC Discr~—" N-48 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH 22nd February, 1957 SUMMARY RECORD CIRIUM (Limited distribution) RELATIONS BETWEEN NAT O AND THE BAGHDAD PACT .-.-•_"•'" >--"';'. Previous reference: C-R(57)7 " . Document: C-M (57 )20. ' I1 Mr. CASARDI (Chairman of the Committee of Political Advisers; stated that the Turkish Representative on the Committee had stressed the importance of complete secrecy so far as this question was concerned. It was not only important that there should be no leakage with regard to the substance of the discussion: the fact that the problem had been discussed at all should also be kept secret. 2. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that originally his government ha^>not been whole-heartedly in favpur of creating the Baghdad Pact. HSwe^erj once it had been created, he realised that any defection frSft^it or any weakness in it would be unfortunate from the poinï^ô£^view of NATO as. a whole. He therefore understood the Turkisft^-d^sire to strengthen the Pact. He believed that the greatest danger^^the Pact was communist propaganda to' the effect that the WesterrT^Quntries were bellicose k and were trying to influence an Asiatic Counfo ^svs-" Iraq - with their aggressive policies. He thought that an eï^^rt should be made to counter this propaganda. Further, he urgecT^t^at the Middle Eastern problem as a whole should be considered TSxthe Council, and. not only a single aspect of that problem sUch^s relations between NATO and the Baghdad Pact. 3I' The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE agreed with the Greek Representative ; ' He did not see how the problem of the Baghdad Pact could be isolated from the problem of the Middle East as a whole. -
ABSTRACT Saudi Arabia and the United States' Plan for Middle East Defense William J. Bowers Chairperson: George W. Gawrych, Ph
ABSTRACT Saudi Arabia and the United States’ Plan for Middle East Defense William J. Bowers Chairperson: George W. Gawrych, Ph.D. The Dwight D. Eisenhower administration’s Cold War concerns shaped the United States’ policy in the Middle East during the 1950s. Relations with Saudi Arabia proved critical as the U.S. pursued its interests in the region. At first, the administration did not recognize the importance of Saudi Arabia and later it over evaluated the kingdom’s significance. Saudi Arabia proved decisive in the politics of the region throughout Eisenhower’s time in office. This study examines the U.S.-Saudi relationships, the environment in which it developed, and results that were derived from it. Primary sources, published and unpublished, as well as secondary sources in the form of monographs and periodicals were utilized in the research of this study. TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Abbreviations v Acknowledgments vi Chapter 1. Historical Background to the U.S.-Saudi Relations and Middle East Security 1 2. The United States’ First Moves toward the Baghdad Pact 11 The Administration’s Final Effort to Implement the Middle East Defense Organization 11 The Administration Looks to Alternatives to MEDO and Egypt 19 United States Turns to the Northern Tier 22 The United States Still Included Egypt in Northern Tier Plans 29 Nasr No Longer Considered for Role in the Baghdad Pact 32 Saudi Arabia Considered for the Baghdad Pact 35 3. Saudi Arabia Rebuffs the Baghdad Pact 38 Saudi Arabia’s Perception of U.S. Loyalty Pushed It Away the Pact 39 Saudi Arabia’s Fear of the Hashemites and its Impact on the Baghdad Pact and U.S. -
The Baghdad Set
The Baghdad Set Also by Adrian O’Sullivan: Nazi Secret Warfare in Occupied Persia (Iran): The Failure of the German Intelligence Services, 1939–45 (Palgrave, 2014) Espionage and Counterintelligence in Occupied Persia (Iran): The Success of the Allied Secret Services, 1941–45 (Palgrave, 2015) Adrian O’Sullivan The Baghdad Set Iraq through the Eyes of British Intelligence, 1941–45 Adrian O’Sullivan West Vancouver, BC, Canada ISBN 978-3-030-15182-9 ISBN 978-3-030-15183-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15183-6 Library of Congress Control Number: 2019934733 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the pub- lisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. -
Cairo Will Not Capitulate 125 Cairo Will Not Capitulate Will Sterling Area Hold Together? 127 EHERAN Is Far Away from Any British Military Base
February 2, 1952 Volume IV—No. 5 Eight annas EDITORIALS Cairo Will Not Capitulate 125 Cairo Will Not Capitulate Will Sterling Area Hold Together? 127 EHERAN is far away from any British military base. Near Cairo T then! is the Suez Canal base manned and garrisoned by British WEEKLY NOTES troops. That is a tale of two cities. Teheran has got away with some thing which Cairo has not been able to achieve. Iranians knew that January 30 —The National Sector Britain could not maintain the " legal" rights of the Anglo-Egyptian —Continental Jute Mills and Oil Company by force. But Britain left Egypt in no doubt that she US Buying — How Australia was determined to stay in the Canal Zone; that she had the military Fights Inflation — Deficit in might to stick to her determination. Egypt had no illusions about her India's Balance of Payments— military prowess. She relied on her moral strength to win the battle The Direction of Trade—Deve for freedom against foreign domination or occupation, lopment of Sulphur Mines in Italy—Preference Shares Only Nahas Pasha won a decisive first round. When he abrogated the for Oil Refineries 128 1936 Treaty Britain immediately retorted that Egypt had no legal right to terminate the Treaty before its expiry without prior consent of the FROM THE LONDON END interested party. Cairo remained unmoved. Its stubborn attitude had Sterling Leakages 132 the desired effect. London was forced to accept, by implication, that Cairo was entitled to abrogate the Treaty. Britain abandoned her insistence on treaty rights. With the support of America, France and OFF THE RECORD Turkey, Britain offered a Four Power proposal for the creation of a Fair Price 133 Middle East Command. -
From the Desert Sands to the Burmese Jungle: the Indian Army and the Lessons of North Africa, September 1939–November 1942
CHAPTER SEVEN FROM THE DESERT SANDS TO THE BURMESE JUNGLE: THE INDIAN ARMY AND THE LESSONS OF NORTH AFRICA, SEPTEMBER 1939–NOVEMBER 1942 Tim Moreman Introduction The Indian Army contingent that fought in North Africa against German and Italian troops between 1939–42 formed a comparatively small part of the polyglot British Commonwealth armies, drawn from the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and smaller Allied countries. The degree to which different Indian Army formations took part in the Western Desert varied enormously. The 4th Indian Division was arguably the most experienced of all British formations in the theatre, seeing nearly two and half years of combat, with only a few brief intermissions to rest, retrain and reorganize, by November 1942. The 5th Indian Division also made a significant albeit smaller contribution to the desert war, after being blooded in Eritrea, before eventually returning to India in 1943. A relatively smaller part was played by 10th Indian Division from May–June 1942, when it was caught up in the tail end of the Gazala battles, savaged while escap- ing from Mersa Matruh and then participated in the defence of El Alamein. A single brigade of 8th Indian Division—the inexperienced 18th Indian Infantry Brigade—was rushed forward in July 1942, more- over, to El Alamein and was destroyed by German panzers at Deir El Shein on 1st July 1942.1 The unfortunate independent 3rd Indian Motor Brigade was also deployed in the Western Desert where on two separate occasions it was overwhelmed by Axis troops. A large num- ber of British officers from the Indian service also held senior com- mand and staff appointments in Middle East Command, particularly 1 For an early account of the Indian Army in North Africa see The Tiger Strikes and the Tiger Kills: The Story of the Indian Divisions in the North African Campaigns (London: 1944). -
Fighting Against the French: Australians in the Allied Invasion of Lebanon and Syria, 1941
Fighting against the French: Australians in the Allied invasion of Lebanon and Syria, 1941 Daniel Seaton Introduction In the nearly three quarters of a century since the end of the Second World War, popular memory of Australia’s involvement in the conflict has been shaped around several key cornerstones of engagement. Tobruk, Kokoda, and Singapore, for example, are easily understandable stories of heroism and sacrifice, which have been etched into Australian national consciousness as symbols of the nation’s contribution to the war. These symbols provide unambiguous displays of the courage and determination shown by Australian service personnel, fought against easily recognisable enemies: the Germans and Japanese. Where areas of conflict did not fit into these clear-cut criteria, they often became subsumed by the popular narrative of the war. An example of this is the Lebanon-Syria campaign of June–July 1941, fought against pro-Axis Vichy French forces, which has remained a far less well-known and understood area of Australian engagement to this day.1 Though the campaign was a relatively minor event in the grand scheme of the war, it held great significance for the men, mostly of the recently-formed 7th Australian Division, who fought there. In his 1989 memoir, Corporal Anthony MacInante, a veteran of the campaign, wrote that “very little credit, if any, has been given to the Commanding Officers and troops who secured this vital northern flank of Lebanon- Syria … In Australia we hardly get a mention”.2 MacInante’s complaints may have been -
Wilbur Eveland Papers
http://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt229032dm Online items available Register of the Wilbur Eveland papers Finding aid prepared by Beth Goder and Hoover Institution Library and Archives Staff Hoover Institution Library and Archives © 2012 434 Galvez Mall Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305-6003 [email protected] URL: http://www.hoover.org/library-and-archives Register of the Wilbur Eveland 80118 1 papers Title: Wilbur Eveland papers Date (inclusive): 1941-1983 Collection Number: 80118 Contributing Institution: Hoover Institution Library and Archives Language of Material: English Physical Description: 14 manuscript boxes(5.6 Linear Feet) Abstract: The papers contain drafts and galleys of the book by Wilbur C. Eveland, Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East (New York, 1980), relating to the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in American diplomacy in the Middle East, and photocopies of personnel records and correspondence with Central Intelligence Agency officials and others, relating to publication of the book. Digital copies of select records also available at https://digitalcollections.hoover.org. Creator: Eveland, Wilbur Hoover Institution Library & Archives Access The collection is open for research; materials must be requested at least two business days in advance of intended use. Publication Rights For copyright status, please contact the Hoover Institution Library & Archives. Acquisition Information Acquired by the Hoover Institution Library & Archives in 1980. Preferred Citation [Identification of item], Wilbur Eveland papers, 1941-1983, [Box no., Folder no. or title], Hoover Institution Library & Archives. Alternative Forms of Material Available PDF files of declassified documents available through reading room workstations. Digital copies of select records also available at https://digitalcollections.hoover.org.