NATO UNCLASSIFIED and - EXEMPLAIRE PUBLIC Discr~—" N-48 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH 22nd February, 1957 SUMMARY RECORD CIRIUM (Limited distribution) RELATIONS BETWEEN NAT O AND THE BAGHDAD PACT .-.-•_"•'" >--"';'.

Previous reference: C-R(57)7 " . Document: C-M (57 )20. '

I1 Mr. CASARDI (Chairman of the Committee of Political Advisers; stated that the Turkish Representative on the Committee had stressed the importance of complete secrecy so far as this question was concerned. It was not only important that there should be no leakage with regard to the substance of the discussion: the fact that the problem had been discussed at all should also be kept secret. 2. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that originally his government ha^>not been whole-heartedly in favpur of creating the Baghdad Pact. HSwe^erj once it had been created, he realised that any defection frSft^it or any weakness in it would be unfortunate from the poinï^ô£^view of NATO as. a whole. He therefore understood the Turkisft^-d^sire to strengthen the Pact. He believed that the greatest danger^^the Pact was communist propaganda to' the effect that the WesterrT^Quntries were bellicose k and were trying to influence an Asiatic Counfo ^svs-" Iraq - with their aggressive policies. He thought that an eï^^rt should be made to counter this propaganda. Further, he urgecT^t^at the Middle Eastern problem as a whole should be considered TSxthe Council, and. not only a single aspect of that problem sUch^s relations between NATO and the Baghdad Pact. 3I' The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE agreed with the Greek Representative ; ' He did not see how the problem of the Baghdad Pact could be isolated from the problem of the Middle East as a whole. He also doubted whether this was the right time for discussing the general problem of the Middle East, since there were delicate issues involved which were under consideration in another forum. It might, therefore, be better to hold over discussion until the spring.

I4. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that- this problem had been referred to the Committee of Political Advisers as a result of a statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister at the last Ministerial Meeting, a statement which had given rise to no DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED criticism of. any kind at that meeting. In particular, there had been no suggestion then that the time was not ripe for a consider- ation of the problem. He urged that the Committee of Political Advisers should be invited to look into Soviet activities in this area. The' specific question under discussion, that of relations between NATO and the Baghdad Pact, was an important element in the Middle East position. 5. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE supported the Turkish Representative's proposal. After all, the Committee was not being asked to do anything very far reaching: simply that the Council should agree to a discussion on relations between NATO and the Baghdad Pact organization, and that the Committee should consider the question in the first instance and. report back to. -2- NATO SECRET APPENDIX to. C-R(57)10 •

the Council. ' It was no doubt true that' Middle Eastern problems were delicate: but surely it was not right for the Council to postpone discussion of any problem simply because it was a delicate one ? ' 6. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE supported the views expressed by the vrjrwegian and Greek Representatives. The problem was an extremely delicate one, and he thought it was more suitable for discussion in a,private meeting of the Council.. Further, he was not 'clear as to the directives. given to the Committee of Political Advisers, with regard to the way in which it should set about its work. He urged that the Council, at a private meeting, should discuss thoroughly the terms of reference and the methods ; of work of that Committee. " . '......

7. The UIITITED STATES' REPRESENTATIVE, thought' that it would be a mistake to set up, or even to give the impression that there existed,' any formal link between NATO and the Baghdad Pact. He suggested that the two countries represented on'both organizations should keep NATO informed of developments. • He agreed with the suggestion of the Greek Representative that there should be a private_discj^sion_ in ^^_Cp.uncil _on the whqle^ problem of the Middle'East." " ~ " . ~~~ - . 8. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE agreed with the Norwegian Representative that the moment was hardly ripe for further discussion of this problem. IIe thought it was one which, perhaps after preliminary investigation by the Committee of Political Advisers, should be referred to Ministers at Bonn.

9. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE felt that to engage on a thorough study of relations between NATO and the Baghdad Pact before any overall study of the whole problem of the Middle East would be putting the cart before the horse. He, therefore, supported the idea of a review of Middle Eastern problems by the Council in private session. 10. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE agreed that there should be an early meeting of the Council on this point, but also urged that there should be a fuller discussion of' Middle Eastern problems on the basis çf a paper prepared by the Committee of Political Advisers to which delegations would be able to contribute. . A more detailed examination of this kind might take place in three or four weeks.

11.. The COUNCIL:

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED I (1) agreed to consider the problem of the Middle East • at its next private meeting; (2) agreed to'consider the.terms of reference . and the methods of work of the Committee of Political Advisers at an early private meeting.

Palais de Chaillot, Paris', XVIe.