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The USSR and Permanent Neutrality in the Cold War

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The USSR and Permanent Neutrality in the Cold War The USSR and Permanent Neutrality in the Cold War ✣ Wolfgang Mueller Like the Bolshevik doctrine in general, the Communist theory of international law was instrumental for legitimizing Soviet claims and behavior in the national and international arenas and, therefore, often subject to power interests.1 This applied also to the Soviet attitude toward and definition of “permanent neutrality,” a vaguely defined international status that can have non-neutral consequences as well. Whether neutrality, in Soviet eyes, was good or evil, whether it was rejected or promoted, and how it was defined and to what end thus depended on specific circumstances and the Soviet perception of how neutrality might affect the fate of Communism in the USSR. To advance the objectives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in a changing environment and to justify contradictory actions, the Soviet theory of international law and attitude toward neutrality had to be adjusted periodically. This happened in a top-down process. Each new po- sition was publicized through statements by political leaders, fashioned by articles that were published under party control, and finally elaborated in spe- cialized treatises by experts.2 Although the frequently updated textbooks of international law contained only brief references to the rules of wartime neu- trality, hints at the various Soviet interpretations of permanent neutrality could 1. See Gabriel Gorodetsky, “The Formulation of Soviet Foreign Policy: Ideology and Realpolitik,” in Gabriel Gorodetsky, ed., Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1991: A Retrospective (London: Frank Cass, 1994), pp. 30–44; and Mark Kramer, “Ideology and the Cold War,” in Michael M. Cox, ed., Twentieth Century International Relations,Vol.2:TheRiseandFalloftheColdWar(London: Sage, 2008), pp. 26–68. 2. See, for example, L. A. Modzhoryan, Politika podlinnogo neitraliteta—Vazhnyi factor bor’by narodov za mir i nezavisimost’ (Moscow: Znanie, 1956); B. V. Ganyushkin, Sovremennyi neitralitet (Moscow: In- stitut mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii, 1958); L. A. Modzhoryan, Politika neitraliteta (Moscow: Znanie, 1962); B. V. Ganyushkin, Neitralitet i neprisoedinenie (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1965); O. I. Tiunov, Neitralitet v mezhdunarodnom prave (Perm: Gosudarstvennyi universitet im. Gor’kogo, 1968); L. A. Mojoryan [Modzhoryan], “Neutrality in Present-Day International Law,” in Grigory Tu n k i n , e d . , Contemporary International Law: Collection of Articles (Moscow: Progess, 1969), pp. 216– 232; and Yu. M. Prusakov, Neitralitet v sovremennom mezhdunarodnom prave (Moscow: Znanie, 1972). Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 18, No. 4, Fall 2016, pp. 148–179, doi:10.1162/JCWS_a_00683 C 2017 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 148 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00683 by guest on 27 September 2021 The USSR and Permanent Neutrality in the Cold War be found in the semi-official Diplomatic Handbook, of which four editions appeared during the Cold War.3 In the 1950s, when Soviet foreign policy began to assign neutrality a larger role than in earlier eras, Western researchers were quick to analyze the contemporary Soviet specialized literature on neutrality.4 By the start of the 1990s, this stream of interest had greatly diminished, and in the post-Cold War era only a few analyses have appeared.5 Over the past decade-and-a-half, the most active scholars in this regard have been Finnish historians, who published archive-based research on Soviet policy as it related to Finland’s neutrality. Despite these efforts, small-state neutrality has remained, as described by Jussi Hanhimaki,¨ “one of the less researched topics of the Cold War.”6 3. A. Ya. Vyshinskii, ed., Diplomaticheskii slovar’, 1st ed., 2 vols. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1948– 1950); A. A. Gromyko et al., eds., Diplomaticheskii slovar’, 2nd ed., 3 vols. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1960–1964); A. A. Gromyko et al., eds., Diplomaticheskii slovar’, 3rd ed., 3 vols. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1971–1973); and A. A. Gromyko et al., eds., Diplomaticheskii slovar’, 4th ed., 3 vols. (Moscow: Nauka, 1984–1986). On the rules of wartime neutrality, see, for example, G. I. Tunkin, Osnovy sovremennogo mezhdunarodnogo prava (Moscow: Vysshaya partiinaya shkola TsK KPSS, 1956); F. I. Koschewnikow, ed., Volkerrecht¨ (Hamburg: Hansischer Gildenverlag, 1960); Drei sowjetische Beitrage¨ zur Volkerrechtslehre¨ (Hamburg: Hansischer Gildenverlag, 1969); V.I. Lisovskii, Mezhdunarodnoe pravo (Moscow: Vysshaya shkola, 1970); and G. I. Tunkin, Theory of International Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974). For Western bibliographies, see Boris Meissner, ed., Sowjetunion und Volkerrecht¨ 1917 bis 1962: Eine bibliographische Dokumentation (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1963); and Boris Meissner, Dietrich Frenzke, and Erika Chilecki, eds., Sowjetunion und Volkerrecht¨ 1962 bis 1973: Bibliographie und Analyse (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1977). 4. Heinz Fiedler, Der sowjetische Neutralitatsbegriff¨ in Theorie und Praxis: Ein Beitrag zum Problem des Disengagement (Cologne: Politik und Wirtschaft, 1959); George Ginsburgs, “Neutrality and Neu- tralism and the Tactics of Soviet Diplomacy,” in The American Slavic and East European Review, Vol. 19, no. 4 (1960), pp. 531–560; Gerhard Hafner, “Die permanente Neutralitat¨ in der sowjetischen Volkerrechtslehre,”¨ in Osterreichische¨ Zeitschrift fur¨ offentliches¨ Recht, Vol. 19, no. 2–3 (1969), pp. 215– 258; Peter H. Vigor, The Soviet View of War, Peace, and Neutrality (London: Routledge, 1975); Harto Hakovirta, “The Soviet Union and the Varieties of Neutrality in Western Europe,” in World Politics, Vol. 35, no. 4 (1983), pp. 563–585; Stelianos Scarlis, Neutralitat¨ in Europa aus sowjetischer Sicht im Zeitalter der Entspannung: Die Rolle der neutralen Staaten Europas in der Außenpolitik der Sowjetunion 1969–1975 (Munich: Tuduv, 1984); and Bo Petersson, The Soviet Union and Peacetime Neutrality in Europe: A Study of Soviet Political Language (Stockholm: MH Publishing, 1990). 5. Vladislav Zubok, “The Soviet Attitude towards European Neutrals during the Cold War,” in Michael Gehler and Rolf Steininger, eds., The Neutrals and the European Integration, 1945–1995 (Vienna: Bohlau,¨ 2000), pp. 29–43; Wilhelm Agrell, “Silent Allies and Hostile Neutrals: Nonaligned States in the Cold War,” in Vojtech Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger, eds., War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 141–162; and Peter Ruggenthaler, The Concept of Neutrality in Stalin’s Foreign Policy 1945–53 (Lanham: Lexington 2015). On the Soviet attitude to and understanding of neutrality, see Wolfgang Mueller, A Good Example of Peaceful Coexistence? The Soviet Union, Austria, and Neutrality, 1955–1991 (Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen¨ Akademie der Wissenschaften 2011). 6. Jussi M. Hanhimaki,¨ “The Lure of Neutrality: Finland and the Cold War,” in Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood, eds., The Cold War after Stalin’s Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace? (Lanham, MD: Rowland & Littlefield, 2006), p. 257. See also Seppo Hentila,¨ “The Soviet Union, Finland, and the ‘Northern Balance,’” in Wilfried Loth, ed., Europe, Cold War, and Coexistence, 1953–1965 149 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00683 by guest on 27 September 2021 Mueller This article, which relies on Soviet treatises of international law, comple- mented by documents from the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Fed- eration (AVPRF) and the Russian State Archive of Recent History (RGANI), delineates the changing Soviet attitude toward permanent neutrality as well as toward four European neutrals (Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland) during the Cold War. After an introduction describing the fundamental aspects of the Soviet theory as it emerged in the 1950s, the article proceeds chronologically from the 1960s up to the dissolution of the USSR, analyzing Soviet theory and practice during each period of the Cold War. The Soviet Theory of Neutrality in the Late 1950s and 1960s In Marxism-Leninism, the general attitude toward neutrality was shaped mainly by the theory of class struggle. Until the final victory of socialism was achieved, this struggle would not allow any sort of neutrality. Any per- son not supportive of the proletariat was by definition a “class enemy.” With regard to wartime neutrality, Vladimir Lenin declared that in the case of a war between two imperialistic powers, the neutrality of a socialist state was possible. However, if a war was revolutionary, defensive, or a war of liberation, and therefore “just,” according to Lenin, no type of neutrality was justifiable.7 In the context of the Soviet rediscovery of neutrality in the early 1950s, the USSR underlined its interest in this status by subscribing, in a note of 7 March 1955, to the Hague Conventions of 1907 on wartime neutrality.8 This did not rule out the Soviet criticism, albeit unofficial, that, after World War II there was no general “right to war,” and thus wartime neutrals should follow Leninism in distinguishing between just and unjust wars. Because of the circumstances of the Cold War—a tense struggle between two blocs for political influence, albeit in the absence of a general war—Soviet (London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 239–257; Kimmo Rentola, “Der Vorschlag einer europaischen¨ Sicherheitskonferenz und die stille Krise zwischen Finnland und der Sowjetunion,” in
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