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Ac/119-Wp(59) EWMSH ONLY, NATO SECRET 15th August. 1959 WORKING PAPER AC7Ti9-WP(59)91 COMMITTEE OP POLITICAL ADVISERS SOVIET PENETRATION IN AFGHANISTAN Note by the Netherlands Delegation Strategic position of Afghanistan To get a clear idea of the significance of present Soviet- aid to Afghanistan it is necessary to take the strategic position . of this country into consideration. 2. One of the aims of Russian policy has always been to find a way to the Persian Gulf and a glance on the map showsothat there are two possible ways to achieve this aim, namely: (a) from Armenia to the valley of the Euphrates and the Tigris; (b) from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan through Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea. fr1 (a) This way seems to be the easiest and the most attractive as it offers also the possibility of forcing a way through Arabia to the Suez Canal. However, the gap was closed by the coming into being of the Baghdad Pact with Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan as participants. Although this barrier was weakened by the withdrawal of Iraq from the Pact, it still exists. Ad (b) Since then, the second possible way has become of an increased importance to the Russians, the more so as this passage . DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED became more feasible in 1947 when British military power along the South West frontier of Afghanistan ceased to exist. In this passage, Afghanistan is an essential link and therefore Russian efforts to extend its influence in this country are understandable. 3. Along the Afghan-Pakistani frontier there are three points of great strategic importance, namely: (a) The IChyber Pass, the starting point for an invasion in North-Palcistan and India; (b) The Pass between Kandahar and Quetta, opening the way to Sukkur in the middle of Pakistan and from there to Karachi and the heart of the Indian sub-continent; (c) The passage in the South to Zahidan in Iran near the extreme Western point of the Pakistani frontier« Especially this last passage iL of great importance as ' ohidan lies only 300 miles from Gwadar and Chorbar on the Arabian Sea« It can be argued that this passage, too, is blocked by the Baghdad Pact, Theoretically, the frontier between Iran and Pakistan runs from Zahidan in a southerly direction, thus isolating Afghanistan from the Arabian Sea. It should be realised, howuver, that in this frontier aren there are practically no communications between the two Baghdad Pact countries, neither by rail nor by road, and consequently an efficient military co-operation is hardly possible. For this reason, this area has sometimes been called the Heel of Achilles of the Baghdad Pact and it constitutes a highly attractive gap for a potential aggressor. Only against this background the present Soviet aid to Afghanistan gets its full significance. Soviet Aid to Afghanistan ' 5. The aid programme started immediately after the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev in 1955 by granting a Russian loan of 100 million dollars. The first object under the programme was the construction and improvement of an extensive road system, in which two highways were to form the essential part, viz.: (a) A road from Termez on the Russo-Afghan frontier via Mazir-i-Sharif and Kabul to the Khyber Pass. In 1956, large parts had already been completed and a beginning had been made with the construction of a tunnel through the Hindu-Kush mountains. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED (b) A road from Kushka in North-West Afghanistan via Herat to Farah whence it wos to be divided into two roads, viz. one in the direction of Zahidan and the other to Kandahar. 6. Both main highways were "to bo mutually connected by two crossroads: one from Herat to Mazar-i-Sharif and the other from Kzmdahnr to Kabul. After completion of these projects there will be throughout Afghanistan one circular road, not only of economic but also of great strategic importance. 7. Besides these road building projects, the Soviet bloc is also rendering economic aid in other forms, ' In 1956, the follow- ing projects had been planned, wore in execution or had even been completed: a Gzeeh cement factory, an asphalt factory, a grain sili, a largo flour mill and a bakery, all- in or around Kabul, a storage tank in Pal-i-Khurnri, a fuel depot in Kvabul, and the improvement of airfields around Kabul and Jalalabad. Further, a Russian la.bour colony, a fuel depot and a grain silo were to be established in Herat. ill though these are innocent economic pro- jects in time of peace, they are also extremely useful to advancing armies in time of" war. 8« It is generally agreed that at this moment Russian economic and political Influence is dangerously increasing. The original Russian credit has been increased to 125 million dollars. According to a barter arrangement Russia is to be repaid in goods and that is why Afghan exports are being concentrated more and more on the Soviet Union, especially the important export of cotton and wool for which the Soviet Union is ready to pay prices which are 25% higher than those on the world market. On the other hand, the export of dried fruit (y of the total export) is completely concentrated on India and Pakistan but, unfortunately, these countries themselves are short of foreign exchange and can therefore only repay with consumer goods. It is evident-that. the economic grip of Russia on Afghanistan becomes firmer at the expense of the commercial interests of the traditional 'vVest European suppliers. 9* Besides economic aid, Afghanistan receives military aid from the Soviet bloc in the form of arms, military supplies and instructors. Exact data on the extent of this military aid are not known but it is estimated at approximately 80 million dollars, while the estimates regarding the number of instructors present in Afghanistan vary from 200 to 1,000. 10. The material delivered consists of rifles, light artillery, anti-aircraft guns, tanks, ammunition, aircraft and auxiliary material. Except for the aircraft which are of the Mig-type, this material is of a type used by the Russian army in 19W+. As Russia is the sole supplier of military goods, Afghanistan is completely DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED dependent on the Soviet bloc for the equipment of its armed forces. The training of these forces is almost completely entrusted to Soviet instructors, and the political influence of these instructors on the young recruits is considered to be more important than the increasing effectiveness of the army and air force. NATO SEGRET ac/II9-WP»9)91 11. The expansion of Soviet influonce in Afghanistan is further favoured "by the strained relations between Afghanistan and its, neighbours, Iran and Pakistan. With Iran there is an old dispute on the use of the waters of the Helmand river, which has its ource in Central Afghanistan and irrigates one of the most fertile réglons of Iran. The relations with Pakistan are still troubled by tho dispute on Pashtunishtan and have especially deteriorated since the coming to power of General Ayub. 12. Finally, the Premier, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs appear to be great aemirers of Soviet Russia which fact, of course, influences Afghan foreign policy. A symptom of this influence was, for instance, the reaction of the government- controlled Afghan press to the recent events in Tibet. "Only reports from Chinese sources were published and even the Indian version was omitted. Conclusion 13. Soviet penetration in this country is one of the stages in the total effort of the Soviet Union to establish its influence on the whole of the Middle East and to isolate the West from the Asian continent. The above shows that the West has every reason to be deeply concerned about the present situation in Afghanistan. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED .
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