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RETREAT and EMBARKATION Y the Morning of 28Th May the Force at Suda Had Disengaged and Wa S Already Distributed Along the Road W

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RETREAT and EMBARKATION Y the Morning of 28Th May the Force at Suda Had Disengaged and Wa S Already Distributed Along the Road W CHAPTER 14 RETREAT AND EMBARKATIO N Y the morning of 28th May the force at Suda had disengaged and wa s already distributed along the road which climbed over the island t o StakiaB . That road wound up and across Crete's backbone, reaching a height of 3,000 feet. Some seven miles from Sfakia it passed through th e upland plain of Askifou, a basin about one mile in width and two in length . Farther on, the road ended a mile and a half from the little beach at Sfakia, and thence only foot tracks led down to the sea. The task of General Freyberg's fighting troops was to hold a series of rearguard positions astride this mountain road, along which a densely-packed column was no w retreating, and finally to disengage and embark. In the morning of the 28th General Freyberg, whose headquarters wer e now established in the Askifou plain, sent General Weston an order placing all troops in the western sector of Crete under his command. Freyberg informed Weston that 1,000 men were to be embarked that night, 6,000 o n the 29th-30th, 3,000 on the 30th-31st, 3,000 on the 31st-1st ; the 4th Brigade was to hold a position at the northern entrance to the plain of Askifou until darkness fell on the 29th ; an improvised Marine battalion to hold a position south of the plain until darkness on the 31st—the nigh t on which the 5th and 19th Brigades were to embark . Next day the marines and Layforce were to form a final rearguard. At dawn on the 28th the 5th New Zealand and 19th Australian Brigades, each little stronger than a battalion, were deployed along th e Sfakia road from Beritiana, which was only half a mile from Suda Bay, to Babali Inn, about six miles inland. A company of Layforce and two companies of the Maori battalion were astride the road at Beritiana . The 5th Brigade was grouped round Stilos with the 23rd Battalion forward and the 21st, 19th, remainder of the Maori and 22nd echeloned behind . The 19th Brigade was about Neo Khorion, with the 2/8th Battalion astride th e road leading up from Kalives and the 2/7th in rear of the New Zealander s on the Stilos road. At Babali Inn, some two miles south of Neo Khorion , was the remainder of Layforce. The two brigades were to withdraw that night. By 6 a.m. on the 28th the Germans reached the commandos and Maori s at Beritiana and had them under fire; in two hours they surrounded these rearguard companies and were streaming past them towards Stilos . The surviving commandos withdrew through the Maoris' positions at 11 a .m. and at 12.30 Captain Royal' began to withdraw his Maoris . They suc- ceeded in fighting their way back to their unit . At 6.30 the German attack reached the 5th Brigade ; there it was stopped with severe loss, probabl y fifty being killed or wounded . 1 Maj R. Royal, MC. 28 (Maori) Bn 1940-41 ; 2 Maori Bn 1942-43 (CO May-Jun 1943) . Civil servant ; of Wellington, NZ; b. Levin, NZ, 23 Aug 1897 . 296 RETREAT AND EMBARKATION 28May About 8 a.m. a large procession of Italian prisoners had moved alon g the road from the south toward the New Zealand rear carrying white flags. Brigadier Hargest allowed them through his lines in the hope that the y would embarrass the enemy. When they reached Stilos they came unde r German mortar fire and scattered . About 9 a.m. Hargest and his battalion commanders held a conferenc e (which Brigadier Vasey attended) at which it was decided that their me n were not fit to fight all day and march all night, an d therefore should begin to move back that day . Vasey a 'ter agreed, and it was arranged /_M°" ;es D aay by him and Hargest that, 5"da~i:..~ '''~ a .rcata l while the 2/7th acted as r,Tianat Kal,ve\` kak trouvarL tst los rearguard, the 5th Brigade Tsivaras \ r -- ((! Neo Khorion\ Arme headquarters (about 140 onlak ^°; men including the band) ~_--,\a~=- i ? m° . acel, i "~ would march south to Babali _ ~ .: .;FfeS (( 1 Inn and reinforce the line e`~`4 = Layforce was holding there . The battalions would then pass through this line to Vrises at the junction of the Georgioupolis and Suda roads, where Hargest hoped to hide his men during th e heat of the afternoon. The forward units thinned out and withdrew in good order, the v8r 2000- -l'. men marching in single file 00-2000 800-1400 M I L E S on either side of the road HeiyhTS' in4O0 Metres800 z s tz with sections well spread out . When the 2/8th arrived at Babali about 2 p .m. it took position with Layforce, and Hargest's headquarters moved on to Vrises, followed b y the 5th Brigade and the former rearguard, the 2/7th Battalion, which left Babali in the afternoon after having been held in reserve there for som e hours. The enemy followed fast and at 1 .35 p.m. attacked the Babal i rearguard . Until dusk Layforce was under intermittent machine-gun fire , though, throughout the day, for the first time since the 20th, air attack wa s inconsiderable, probably because the German aircraft were concentrated over Heraklion. At 9.15 p.m. this rearguard began to withdraw to Vrises . There the 5th Brigade and the remainder of the 19th had assembled early in the after - noon and thence, after a few hours' rest, the New Zealand battalions a t 6 p.m. had moved on with the intention of reaching Syn Ammondari, 1 2 miles away, that night. This necessitated an exacting march up hill to th e top of the pass. The men were footsore and very weary . Near Cadiri 28-29 May ROUND SFAKIA 297 engineers blew up the road before the rearguard had passed and cause d a galling delay to the infantrymen who had to make a difficult detou r round the demolition. The 4th Brigade was already deployed at the entrance to the Askifou plain, the 23rd Battalion having established a coverin g position at Amygdalokorfi. The 2/7th had marched back to the Askifou plain where it took position just north of Askifou village itself. It was in good heart and in perfect order . As it was marching that night, dispersed in sections on each side of the road, a German aircraft dropped a flare. Walker sent a spoken message along the column that if a flare was dropped again he would blow his whistle and every man would lie face downward off th e road. The message was repeated swiftly back along the column and forward again . Another flare was dropped, the whistle blown, and instantly every face was on the ground (where they would not catch the light) , every body motionless, and the flare illuminated only an empty road . The 2/8th was now wearily marching towards the Kerates area, wher e it arrived about 5 a .m. Layforce followed, withdrawing to Imvros sout h of the plain. According to the German report, in the morning of the 28th May, the 85th Moun- tain Regiment after "bloody hand-to-hand fighting" had destroyed two Britis h "medium tanks", captured Stilos, and "made prisoners a British battalion" [evidentl y a large part of "A" Battalion of the commandos] . It continued the pursuit towards Sfakia, but was held for the remainder of the day . The German commander con- sidered that the defenders would withdraw at dusk, and decided to await this event and continue his advance next morning . On the 27th and 28th General Ringel, not realising that the main body of the defending force was in retreat southwards towards Sfakia, had ordered the thre e mountain regiments to thrust eastward towards Retimo . Even on the 29th he detached only the 100th Mountain Regiment to take up the pursuit towards Sfakia while the 85th and 141st Regiments pressed on towards Retimo . Meanwhile, round Sfakia, General Weston had been preparing for a series of embarkations . Early on the afternoon of the 28th he went t o Imvros, where Major Burston2 commanded a group which included the headquarters of the 2/3rd Field Regiment and other detachments . Weston arranged that Burston should organise about 60 men of the 2/3rd Field Regiment to guide units from the top of the escarpment to the beach . Burston and Captain Forbes 3 reconnoitred the escarpment and dispose d their men along a track winding across the Komitadhes ravine an d through Komitadhes village, and that night these guides kept the flo w of traffic moving steadily to the beach.4 At Sfakia that night (the 28th) four destroyers embarked 230 wounde d and 800 British troops, including the men of the air force . It was on this Maj V. C . Burston, MBE, VX29 ; 2/3 Fd Regt. Maltster; of Toorak, Vic; b. Brighton, Vic, 2 3 Dec 1908 . Maj A. M . Forbes, MC, WX1521 ; 2/3 Fd Regt. Dry cleaner; of Mount Lawley, WA; b. Northampton, WA, 12 Sep 1914 . * Lt-Col Cremor and Capt F. H. Wood of the 2/2 Fd Regiment also commanded control points on this night. 298 RETREAT AND EMBARKATION 28-29 May night also that three cruisers and six destroyers took off practically the entire force at Heraklion. The misfortunes of the Heraklion convoy, already related, greatly influenced the decisions that followed these fine achieve- ments.
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