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'Steel My Soldiers' Hearts': El Alamein Reappraised.1 Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 14, ISSUE 1, FALL 2011 Studies ‘Steel my soldiers’ hearts’: El Alamein Reappraised.1 Jonathan Fennell The Oxford Bodleian Library holds 293 titles under the subject of the ‘North African Campaign of the Second World War’, the British Library 308.2 That amounts to over four books a year on the subject, or about one book published every three months, for the sixty-nine years since November 1942. This constitutes a remarkable body of scholarship on what historians today might refer to as a secondary theatre in the Second World War.3 There are a number of possible reasons for this level of interest in the North African campaign. Firstly, North Africa is where British and Commonwealth forces learnt how to defeat the Wehrmacht. It had taken three long years before Britain and her allies celebrated their first decisive victory on land against Germany, at El Alamein, in November 1942. In many ways, the dynamics of the critical campaign in North West Europe, between 1944 and 1945, cannot be understood without first understanding the processes that led to victory in North Africa. Secondly, in a global conflict often characterised by brutality, North Africa represents an oasis of chivalry and sanity, an environment where, in the main, war was contained away from innocent civilians. 1 The title of this paper is from the speech of King Henry before the battle of Agincourt (Henry V, Act IV, Scene I, line 289), ‘O God of battles! Steel my soldiers’ hearts’. Montgomery pinned the quotation to the wall of his caravan before the battle of El Alamein. 2 See www.bodleian.ox.ac.uk and www.explore.bl.uk. 3 For instance Evan Mawdsley’s World War II: A New History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) devotes only 12 out of 452 pages to North Africa. ©Centre of Military and Strategic Studies, 2011 ISSN : 1488-559X JOURNAL OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES North Africa is different because it is uncomplicated by ideology and extermination. Finally, North Africa is interesting because the reasons for Allied success are controversial and still debatable. After close to seventy years of scholarship, the causes of Eighth Army’s success at El Alamein are still contested. Perhaps the most dominant explanation for Eighth Army’s victory centres on the role that the commanders played; there are 55 titles on Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, 9 on Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck and 58 on Field Marshal Erwin Rommel in the Bodleian library.4 Many works argue that Montgomery’s military nous made the decisive difference to the campaign, as he was able to defeat the Panzerarmee Afrika at Alam Halfa and El Alamein with much the same force as Auchinleck had utilised during the disastrous summer months of 1942.5 In the late 1950s and 1960s, however, a number of books were published that painted a very different picture of the events that had unfolded in the second half of 1942. John Connell’s biography of Auchinleck and Corelli Barnett’s The Desert Generals sought, in particular, to reinstate Auchinleck’s reputation and query Montgomery’s image as the ‘messiah’ of Eighth Army.6 More recently, histories such as Raising Churchill’s Army by David French, Pendulum of War by Niall Barr, Alamein, The Australian Story by Mark Johnston and Peter Stanley and Rommel’s Desert War by Martin Kitchen have offered a more balanced approach to the Montgomery/Auchinleck debate.7 These works, based on a more 4 See www.bodleian.ox.ac.uk. 5 B.L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery of Alamein (London: Pen & Sword, 1958); Brian Horrocks, A Full Life (Collins: London, 1960); Major-General F. de Guingand, Operation Victory (London: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1947); Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis, The Alexander Memoirs, 1940- 1945 (London: Cassell, 1962); Nigel Hamilton, The Full Monty: Montgomery of Alamein 1887-1942 (London: Penguin Books, 2002). 6 John Connell, Auchinleck: A Biography of Field-Marshall Sir Claude Auchinleck (London: Cassell, 1959); Corelli Barnett, The Desert Generals (London: Viking Press, 1960); C.E. Lucas Phillips, Alamein (London: Heinemann, 1962); Michael Carver, El Alamein (London: Macmillan, 1962); Michael Carver, Tobruk (London: B. T. Batsford LTD., 1964). 7 David French, Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War against Germany 1919-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Niall Barr, Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein (London: Jonathan Cape, 2004); Mark Johnston and Peter Stanley, Alamein: The Australian Story (Oxford: OUP Australia and New Zealand, 2002); Martin Kitchen, Rommel’s Desert War: Waging World War II in North Africa, 1941-1943 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 2 | P a g e VOLUME 14, ISSUE 1, FALL 2011 thorough investigation of the primary sources, have stressed the contribution of both Auchinleck and Montgomery to victory at El Alamein. The other dominant explanation for Allied success in North Africa focuses on the role played by materiel in the campaign. Literature on North Africa is replete with references to the quantitative disadvantages suffered by Germany and Italy in comparison to their enemies in the desert.8 The unbending logic of numbers and economics, as many argue, made it impossible for the Axis forces to win a campaign against the combined strength of the arms of the British Empire and the economy of the future superpower, the United States. The British Official History of the North African campaign expounds in great detail on the significance of the amount, and quality, of materiel available to Eighth Army.9 The Afrika Korps’ war diaries claimed that the ‘heroic troops’ of the Panzerarmee ‘were denied victory . due to enemy superiority in numbers and material, and not in leadership and morale.’10 Walter Warlimont, who served as Hitler’s Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff between September 1939 and September 1944, described El Alamein as “a typical battle of material in which no military genius on the part of the commander, and no amount of courage on the part of the men, could make up for the catastrophic situation brought about by the failure of 8 See for example, John Ellis, Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War (London: Viking, 1990); John Keegan, The Second World War (London: Pimlico, 1997); Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995); Barr, Pendulum of War; Barrie Pitt, The Crucible of War: Wavell’s Command (London: Cassell, 2001); Barrie Pitt, The Crucible of War: Auchinleck’s Command (London: Cassell, 2001); Barrie Pitt, The Crucible of War: Montgomery and Alamein (London: Cassell, 2001); Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904-1945 (London: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 1982); Stephen Bungay, Alamein (London: Aurum Press, 2002); Jon Latimer, Alamein (London: Harvard University Press, 2002). 9 I.S.O. Playfair, et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume I: The Early Success against Italy (London, 1954); I.S.O. Playfair, et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume II: The Germans Come to the Help of their Ally (London: HMSO, 1956); I.S.O. Playfair, et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume III: British Fortunes Reach their Lowest Ebb (London: HMSO, 1956); I.S.O Playfair and C.J.C. Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume IV. The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa (London: HMSO, 1966). 10 South African Military Archives Depot (SAMAD) Union War Histories (UWH), Draft Narratives, Box 316. 15th Panzer Division Report on the Battle of Alamein and the Retreat to Marsa El Brega, 23 October to 20 November, 1942. 3 | P a g e JOURNAL OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES the [Axis] overseas supply lines.”11 Nevertheless, Montgomery in his memoirs made it clear that he saw materiel as an adjunct to the much more important human dimension at El Alamein.12 He believed that battles were “won primarily in the hearts of men.”13 He dissented from the view that the outcome at El Alamein had been determined by Eighth Army’s numerical and technological advantages.14 Another issue, morale, has taken a back seat to these explanations in the historiography of the desert war. This is in spite of the fact that in their memoirs, many of the Generals involved, including Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, Major-General Sir Francis de Guingand and Lieutenant-General Sir Brian Horrocks, stressed, among other things, the significance of a morale crisis that severely hampered Eighth Army’s combat performance in the summer months of 1942. These memoirs hailed Montgomery’s arrival in August 1942 as the catalyst for a revival of morale that greatly facilitated the victories at Alam Halfa and El Alamein in September, October and November 1942.15 This viewpoint has been broadly supported by authors such as Michael Carver and Nigel Hamilton who argued that Eighth Army fought with less élan and determination at Gazala than in later battles such as El Alamein.16 Barr, and Johnston and Stanley have also acknowledged that there were morale difficulties in the British Army during the North African Campaign.17 Barnett and Connell, however, downplayed the idea that there was a morale crisis in the summer of 1942. Barnett argued that “it would be wrong to place too much emphasis on the moral effects produced by [Montgomery]: for in the words of the Official History, Auchinleck ‘had retained to a remarkable degree [his army’s] 11 Walter Warlimont, ‘The Decision in the Mediterranean 1942’ in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Jürgen Rohwer (eds.), The Decisive Battles of World War II: The German View (London: Putnam Pub Group, 1965), p.
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