Deadly explosion in 's commercial district represents new kind of IED attack

17 Aug 2015 IHS Economics and Country Risk

At least 12 people were killed and dozens injured when an improvised explosive device (IED) exploded near a shrine in a busy central Bangkok intersection at the heart of the city's commercial district.

IHS perspective Significance An IED attack with the power to cause a large number of casualties is very rare in Bangkok.

Implications Suspicion is likely to fall on supporters of former prime minister or Malay-Muslim separatists.

Outlook The attack is likely to lead to a short-term downturn to Bangkok's tourist industry.

The explosion happened in front of the Erawan Shrine at the intersection at around 7 pm local time today (17 August). The Hindu shrine is located in a busy commercial district near large hotels and upmarket shopping centres such as the Central World, Gaysorn Plaza and . The shrine is popular with tourists and local worshippers. A national police spokesman, Lt Gen Prawut Thavornsiri, told the AFP news agency that the explosion was caused by a bomb and that the police were investigating the kind of explosives used. Other police officers were quoted as saying that the explosion was caused by a motorcycle-borne improvised explosive device (IED).

No group has claimed responsibility for the attack. It is highly unusual for such a powerful IED to be used in Bangkok. There was an IED explosion at a walkway connecting the Siam Skytrain station to the Siam Paragon mall in February this year. However, it was a much less powerful device and caused only minor injury to one person. Although supporters of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra (the Red Shirts) have been engaged in conflict with the Royalist Yellow Shirts since 2006, related violence tends to be unlike the IED explosion seen today. Red Shirt militants would typically use grenades, small-arm attacks, or set fire to commercial buildings owned by Yellow Shirt sympathisers, most notably in the arson attack on the Central World shopping mall in May 2010. It seems unlikely that the Red Shirts or Yellow Shirts would attack a Hindu shrine, which is also popular with Buddhist worshippers, as it would be highly counterproductive in Buddhist-majority .

Another possible Red Shirt motive for the attack would be to disrupt a popular tourist area at a time when Thailand's tourism industry has barely recovered from a downturn caused by the political conflict between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts. Prior to the May 2014 military coup, which ended street protests, Thailand's tourism industry was badly affected, particularly by the reduced numbers of visitors from other Asian economies such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, which issued travel warnings to their citizens against visiting Bangkok.

Suspicion is also likely to fall on Malay-Muslim separatists, who have carried out vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) attacks in the deep south of the country. Although Muslim rebels were suspected of a VBIED explosion in the underground car park of a shopping mall on the island of Koh Samui in April 2015, they have largely focused their attacks on security personnel and state officials in the southern provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala and Songkhla. An attack on Bangkok would represent a major change in strategy and an increase in their capability to successfully carry out attacks outside their previous areas of operation.

Below are extracts of our standing views on terrorism and protest risks in Thailand:

Terrorism hotspots and targets: State, security, and commercial assets in Narathiwat, Pattani, Songkhla, and Yala are at risk of militant improvised explosive device attacks

The separatist insurgency in the south has mainly been confined to Narathiwat, Pattani, Songkhla, and Yala that have predominantly Thai-Malay and Muslim populations. Attacks have targeted soldiers via improvised explosive device (IEDs) and individuals in drive-by shootings, but insurgents are increasingly likely to target tourism and commercial assets (hotels, restaurants, banks, automotive showrooms, and storage facilities) in IED attacks. They are also increasingly likely to hit "soft targets" (Buddhist civilians, teachers, nurses, and women).

The new military administration has announced a new round of peace talks, but these are highly unlikely to be successful, since the government has strictly ruled out autonomy – the insurgents' key demand.

Although a decline in the insurgency's operational tempo has been recorded in the second half of 2014 (due to improved counter-insurgency operations and local surveillance networks), commercial assets are still at risk of IED attacks, as evidenced by the attacks on 2 April 2015 in Pattani's Muang district targeting a vehicle rental company, a car dealership showroom, and a beverage company. The most serious attack occurred in April 2014, when a number of IEDs exploded at a furniture shop, a warehouse, a 7-Eleven store, and an ATM in Yala. A vehicle-borne improved explosive device (VBIED) that detonated at the furniture shop caused a fire that subsequently razed over 10 houses in the vicinity. The economic damage from that attack is estimated at THB150 million. There is also a risk of the conflict widening to areas that are not traditionally been hit within the four provinces themselves. In July, insurgents detonated a VBIED in Yala's Betong, which has not been targeted seriously before.

© 2015 IHS.. No portion of this report may be reproduced, reused, or otherwise distributed in any form without prior written consent, with the exception of any internal client distribution as may be © 2015IHS. permitted in the license agreement between client and IHS. Content reproduced or redistributed with IHS permission must display IHS legal notices and attributions of authorship. The information page 1 of 2 contained herein is from sources considered reliable but its accuracy and completeness are not warranted, nor are the opinions and analyses which are based upon it, and to the extent permitted by law, IHS shall not be liable for any errors or omissions or any loss,damage or expense incurred by reliance on information or any statement contained herein. Should the Thai army escalate its crackdown on insurgents, there is a latent risk of the conflict widening to other parts of the country. In December 2013, a VBIED was discovered outside a police station in Phuket and defused. There has been no significant act of sabotage on major energy installations. Unsophisticated attacks have been launched on local power relay stations, but insurgents are unlikely to be capable of sophisticated attacks on energy installations outside the south. In October 2013, in Yarang, Pattani, suspected militants set fire to a mobile phone signal transmission post.

The February 2012 plot by Iranian nationals to attack Israeli diplomats in Bangkok confirms that Israelis in Thailand are a target for Iran-backed groups. This risk will increase in the event that Israel and Iran go to war. Phuket and Pattani are popular with Israeli tourists and would probably be targeted with similar IED attacks in that event. On 17 April 2014, Thai police arrested two individuals who were believed to be Hizbullah-linked terrorist suspects and who allegedly travelled to Thailand to perpetrate attacks on Israeli tourists in the Khao San backpacker district over the Jewish Passover, which in 2014 coincided with Songkran, the Thai New Year Begging, pick-pocketing, and other street crimes are commonplace. Crowded streets, the areas just outside tourist hotels, and marketplaces are particularly hazardous. There are also increasing reports of motorcyclists grabbing the possessions of pedestrians.

Protests and riots: Risk of improvised explosive device attacks on state, tourist, and Yellow Shirt assets persists while Thailand remains under military rule

Thai politics is divided into two factions: the Red Shirts, who support the Pheu Thai's (PT's) former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra who was ousted by a military coup in 2006, and the anti-Thaksin Yellow Shirts. Previous protests by Red and Yellow Shirts resulted in substantial losses of life and damage to commercial and government assets in Bangkok. In May 2010, the army forcefully ended protests by 100,000 Red Shirts, resulting in 91 deaths, while protesters set fire to over 30 government and commercial properties, causing approximately USD1 billion in damage.

Anti-PT protests in Bangkok's tourism and financial districts re-ignited in November 2013, aimed at shutting down the capital and ousting the PT government. In Bangkok, armed paramilitaries staged sporadic attacks on rival protests camps, prompting the military to stage another coup on 22 May 2014. Although military rule has temporarily restored order in the capital, state, tourist, and Yellow Shirt assets remain at risk of sporadic, low-level improvised explosive device (IED) attacks (involving grenades and petrol bombs) by disgruntled PT stalwarts/Red Shirts, so long as Thailand remains under military rule. In February, twin IED attacks were launched on Bangkok's Siam Paragon shopping mall, followed by another IED attack on the Bangkok criminal court in March, exposing the fact that a political consensus has not yet been reached at the elite level between the military administration and Thaksin.

The removal of the government raises longer term risks of violent protests by Red Shirts, who now face a harsh crackdown by the military and who will be faced with no other options but to incite violence and destabilise the state the longer the military holds power without calling for elections. In the event of a civil uprising against the coup, Red Shirts would probably set fire to fuel trucks to block road access to various Bangkok districts (such as Bang Rak, Din Daeng, Dusit, Phaya Thai, Pathum Wan, Phra Nakhon, and Ratchathewi). The Red Shirts' capacity for violence is likely to increase as the coup continues, especially if they were to be joined by members of the police and armed forces sympathetic to their cause.

The Red Shirts' strategy will probably centre around supporting a retreat by leaders of the deposed PT government to their strongholds to control swaths of the north and northeast effectively, with the military controlling Bangkok and the south. As the coup continues, Red Shirts will probably eventually attempt to occupy airports in Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, and Udon Thani, as well as to seal Bangkok off from the surrounding provinces by blocking access to major roads.

Analyst Contact Details: Anton Alifandi

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