SELLING 'THE SCHEME': THE BRITISH PERIODICAL PRESS AND THE DISCOURSE ON NAVAL REFORM, 1900-1910

by

Iain O'Shea

Bachelor of Arts, Simon Fraser University, 2008

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in the Graduate Academic Unit of History

Supervisor(s): Dr. Marc Milner, History

Examining Board: Dr. Gary Waite, History, Chair Dr. Sean Kennedy, History Dr. Larry Wisnewski, Sociology

This thesis is accepted by the Dean of Graduate Studies

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK

August, 2010

© Iain O'Shea, 2010 Library and Archives Bibliotheque et Canada Archives Canada

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In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne sur la Privacy Act some supporting forms protection de la vie privee, quelques may have been removed from this formulaires secondaires ont ete enleves de thesis. cette these.

While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans in the document page count, their la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu removal does not represent any loss manquant. of content from the thesis. Canada ABSTRACT

The first decade of the twentieth century marks the genesis of the modern Royal

Navy that fought, and won, two world wars. This period was the climax of two dynamic processes: a century of dramatic change in naval technology and the advent of the new mass print media, which facilitated an era of unprecedented public interest and involvement in naval affairs. The press acted as a national think tank for the navy.

The 1902 Selbome Scheme and 1904 Fisher reforms reoriented naval personnel, material and organization to modern conditions. Historians have provided very intricate and exhaustive analyses of the development of naval policy and thought at the governmental or Admiralty level, but less attention has been paid to the important intellectual discourse in the press.

This thesis will examine the elite, intellectual discussion which occurred in the periodical press from 1900 to 1910, in order to describe the detail and sophistication of the information available to the public, and the impact of public opinion on Admiralty policy.

ii ACKNOWLEDGMENT

As with any project extending over the course of years, there are a host of people who have helped in the production of this thesis. I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Marc Milner, for all of his time and effort. His wisdom and good humour made the project much easier. Dr. Sean Kennedy and the faculty of the History

Department at the University of New Brunswick provided much encouragement and a fantastic scholarly atmosphere.

I would like to thank the Brigadier Milton F. Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society for their generous support for my research, and the other graduate students of the Gregg Centre for the valuable hours of discussion and commentary. The Social

Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada provided crucial funding for the first year of this project, and the University of New Brunswick graciously provided useful teaching experience with a TA-ship in the second year.

My research was aided by the helpful library staffs at the New York Public

Library, Seattle Public Library, University of Victoria Library, University of British

Columbia Library, and Vancouver Public Library. A special thanks to the people who helpted for hours, collecting the rare periodicals: Darcy O'Shea, Valerie O'Shea and

Stephanie DiTomaso.

For my father, who has read every word it took to make this.

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS iv

ABBREVIATIONS vi

1.0 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 The Late Nineteenth Century Media Explosion 3 1.2 Factors Driving Naval Reform 13

2.0 CHAPTER 2: TRAINING UNITY 28 2.1 The Naval Engineers 30 2.2 The Development of Mechanical Training 38 2.3 The Selborne Scheme 46 2.4 The Cawdor Revision and Conclusions 56

3.0 CHAPTER 3: THE BIRTH OF MINERVA 61 3.1 Fleet Distribution 63 3.2 The Scrapping Policy 78 3.3 Implementing Nucleus Crews 90 3.4 Conclusion 99

4.0 CHAPTER 4: THE QUESTION OF DREADNOUGHT. 102 4.1 Early Design Debates 106 4.2 The Response to the Dreadnought 116 4.3 Conclusion 136

5.0 CHAPTER 5: EPILOGUE 138 5.1 The End of the Fisher Era 138 5.2 Concluding Remarks 143

BIBLIOGRAPHY 146

APPENDIX I: THE PERIODICALS 152

iv CURRICULUM VTTAE

v ABBREVIATIONS

Army and Navy Gazette ANG

Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine £EM

The (Brassey's) Naval Annual BNA

Fear God and Dread Nought FGDN

The Fleet Annual and Naval Yearbook FANY

Fortnightly Review FR

Journal of the Royal United Service Institution JRUSI

Navy and Army Illustrated NAI

Navy League Journal NLJ

Nineteenth Century {and After) NCA

Quarterly Review QR

Royal United Service Institution RUSI

St. James Gazette SJG

United Service Magazine USM

vi 1

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION The Confluence of the Press and the Royal Navy at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century

So we must have no tinkering! No pandering to sentiment! No regard for susceptibilities! No pity for any one! We must be ruthless, relentless, and remorseless! And we must therefore have The Scheme! The Whole Scheme!! And Nothing but The Scheme!!!' Admiral Sir John Fisher, 1904

Admiral Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher's confident words emphatically declared the

necessity for his brand of naval reform. The power and showmanship is obvious, but

policy-making cannot be viewed in such autocratic, all-or-nothing terms. British naval

policy in the 'Fisher Era,' so termed by pioneering historian Arthur J. Marder, was

influenced by the increasing political involvement of the growing intellectual middle

class, acting through an expanding system of national media. The contemporary

r>f»Nodical press in Britain provided educated elites, including naval officers, politicians

- ians, with a discursive avenue to pose problems, propose solutions, and

critique policy. In an age of rapidly changing technology the requirements of naval war

had to be theoretically developed, and reform proposals measured against this in both

theoretical literature and practical manoeuvres. Public discourse allowed non-official or

dissenting ideas to be voiced and debated in full view of the nation and the government,

making naval reform partially the product of this national 'think-tank.' With no hands-

on experience of modern naval combat to shape policy, the complex intellectual

interactions of the periodical press provide useful insight into the development of

theoretical conceptions of war which formed the foundation of naval thought.

1 Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre- Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905, (London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd., 1972), 488. 2

The common development of defence thought follows the principles laid out by

John A. Lynn in Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (2003), as a feedback loop

between the 'Discourse on War' and the 'Reality of War.' Building on the idea that "the

way militaries think is the most fundamental element of their effectiveness," Lynn

shows that defence thought is built upon the interaction between the discourse, created

through cultural mechanisms like literature, art and politics, and the reality, or practical

experience of combat.2 While this successfully describes most situations, it is

insufficient when considering turn-of-the-century British naval thought. In times of

extreme technological change, and in the absence of any practical experience, the

'Reality of War' can be divorced from the equation. Instead, there is a subsidiary loop

within the discourse itself, using theoretical discussion and tested with experiments and

manoeuvres, that attempts to predict the 'Reality of War' in order to maximize the

efficiency and effectiveness of defence forces. Only by developing a more accurate and

sophisticated 'Discourse on War' could the Royal Navy ensure its supremacy in the

face of growing European and worldwide challenges. This conception of war is

developed as a conversation between civilian and military intellectual elites and,

because of the increased literacy of the population and availability of news-media, was

of unprecedented size and complexity in Britain by the turn of the century.

Periodicals, unlike daily papers, offered a more in-depth and reflective means of

exploring in intricate detail the combinations of technology, strategy and training that

would provide the most efficient and effective force structure. Consensus was not the

objective, because periodical authors realized that only the Admiralty could and should

2 John A. Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2003), xxv. See "Appendix: The Discourse and the Reality of War" for a description of Lynn's methodology. make the actual decisions. But the expression of ideas and opinions created flows of

information which helped shape the world-view of British policy makers and form

schools of thought. Moreover, the process was two way - it was a dialogue. The

government and Admiralty had informal access through the press to justify and explain

naval policy, while critics had an unprecedented avenue of access to and influence on

politicians who read the periodicals. An analysis of the British periodical press during

the era of the Fisher Reforms indicates that well-reasoned, evidentially-supported

discourse was an important factor in British naval policy reform in the first decade of

the twentieth century.

The Late Nineteenth Century Media Explosion

The last half of the nineteenth century witnessed the creation of a media society

in Britain. The increasing availability of print media, coupled with a growing audience,

gave the press unprecedented power and influence. The armed forces were not exempt

from scrutiny by the new mass media. As Michael Paris's Warrior Nation: Images of

War in British Popular Culture, 1850-2000 (2000) showed, there was a growing trend

towards militarism in culture a century ago, and the 'Discourse on War' was well

developed in art and literature.3 The press offered new avenues for policy-makers in the

Admiralty and the government to garner public support, but also offered critics the

means of publicly raising their concerns. Far from demonstrating the indecision of the

democratic system, the contrasting positions of different schools of naval and defence

thought became a source of creative strength for British naval policy.

3 Michael Paris, Warrior Nation: Images of War in British Popular Culture, 1850-2000 (London: Reaktion Books, 2000). 4

The increasing importance of the media as an outlet for social expression and

political activism was built upon developments in mid to late nineteenth centuiy British

publishing and education. Eugene Rasor perhaps put it most succinctly when he

commented that, "The media of public opinion broadened and intensified its

capabilities to influence at the same time that the public [which was] able to

comprehend and respond continued to increase."* Steve Bailey has argued that, "a

'media culture' becomes one of the structuring assumptions in any attempt to theorize

social relations."5 This media culture would continue to develop in the twentieth

century with the addition of radio, television, and the internet. For this reason the

'Fisher Era' is particularly illuminating because the questions are simplified through the

monopoly of print media in the discourse. The periodical press, in particular, became a

national vehicle for shaping the attitudes and ideas of the British public, and hence their

ability to engage with naval policy and influence policy-makers.

For this thesis, the focus will be on the periodical press exclusively, meaning

weeklies, monthlies and annuals. The daily press, such as the Times, Daily Mail, Daily

Telegraph, and Morning Post will not be directly examined. The daily press, especially

the half-penny newspapers, were frequently more polemical and sensational, especially

those under the media baron Alfred Harmsworth, later Lord Northcliffe.6 The Army and

Navy Gazette (ANG), in discussing the idea of 'government by newspaper,' argued that

while in the past press criticism had been very effective because writers were

4 Eugene L. Rasor, Reform in the Royal Navy: A Social History of the Lower Deck, 1850 to 1880, (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1976), 17. 5 Steve Bailey, Media Audiences and Identity: Self-Construction in the Fan Experience, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 2. 6 See T om Clarke, Northcliffe in History: An Intimate Study of Press Power, (New York: Hutchinson, 1950). 5

knowledgeable experts, in the twentieth century "there is a good deal of naval criticism

by so-called or self-styled "experts" which is of an entirely different nature, and which

is largely based on "facts" manufactured by people whose imagination is more fertile

than their judgment is sound."7 This criticism was levelled primarily at the daily press.

The dailies were a better avenue for garnering working class, or truly mass, support, but

here the concern is on the intellectual discourse between knowledgeable authors who

give cogent arguments and strong evidence. Where the daily press provided meritorious

contributions, or where there was shared authorship, the periodicals were always quick

to take up the questions. The periodicals also provide a means of avoiding the often-

dogmatic biases of the more jingoistic dailies. By the twentieth century the left-wing

daily press had been largely supplanted by the right-wing mass papers of media barons

like Lord Northbrook and Lord Beaverbrook, unbalancing the media's political

spectrum.8 The periodicals offer more objective analysis.

Much of the value of the periodical press to historical research has come from

new understandings of how the media relates to society. It has been shown that "the

formerly univocal periodical text is increasingly to be seen as a site for competing

voices, contending within and even, at times, reorienting the very textual spaces they

occupy."9 By the late nineteenth century, "the periodicals began to operate less as

sociocultural authorities in their own right than as forums for the exercise of

7 "Admiralty Advisors," ANG, Mar 7 1903, 228. 8 James Curran and Jean Seaton, Power Without Responsibility: The Press and Broadcasting in Britain, (New York: Methuen, 1985), 35, 57-60, 284-5. 9 "Introduction," Laurel Brake, Bill Bell and David Finkelstein, eds., Nineteenth-Century Media and the Construction of Identities, (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 4-5; Jonathan Rose, "How historians study reader response: or, what did Jo think of Bleak House," John O. Jordan and Robert L Patten, eds., Literature in the Marketplace: Nineteenth-century British publishing and reading practices, (New York: University of Cambridge Press, 1995), 208. This idea of the periodical press as an area of discussion was reinforced by the ability of readers to publicly "talk back to the author" through the ever-more common correspondence columns and letters to the editor. 6

sociocultural authority derived elsewhere," such as university education or practical

experience, embodied in the editors and writers.10 This was assisted by the increasing

use of signed articles, which indicated the qualifications of each individual involved in

the discourse. Instead of being the vehicle for a particular school of thought, the press

was a means of vocalizing opinion and opening key issues to public scrutiny. A national

discourse had truly emerged!

The power of the national discourse was built upon three interrelated factors: the

decreasing cost of printing, the increase in literacy, and the development of mass

democracy. Between the removal of 'Taxes on Knowledge' in the 1850s and 1860s, the

new economies of scale made possible by new printing technology, and the dramatic

expansion of advertising revenue, the press was able to offer larger, illustrated, visually

stimulating products for hitherto unimaginably low prices." Increasing provision for

mass education, particularly the 1870 Education Act which created nationwide primary

schools, developed new generations of readers and expanded the market, particularly

for the half-penny daily press, such as the Daily Mail.12 The expansion of the franchise

with the 1867 and 1884 Representation of the People Acts meant that these new readers

also acquired growing political influence. As Peter Marsh commented, the dominant

trend of political development was the creation of mass political parties based on

grassroots organizations and media organs in place of the older elite-centric forms of

10 Kelly J. May, "The disease of reading and Victorian periodicals," in Literature in the Marketplace, 169. 11 See P.M. Handover, Printing in London: From 1746 to Modern Times, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960); Michael Twyman, Printing 1770-1970: an illustrated history of its development and uses in England, (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1970) for information on printing developments. 12 See Richard D. Altick, The English Common Reader: A Social History of the Mass Reading Public 1800-1900, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 171-212; Ruddock F. Mackay, Balfour: Intellectual Statesman, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 56-7, 61, for more information on the education reforms. 7

government.13 The importance of the daily press in cultivating mass opinion, and its

relation to defence policy has already been dealt with in depth by A.J. A. Morris' The

Scaremongers: The Advocacy of War and Rearmament, 1896-1914 (1984).14

The 'New Journalism' of the 1890s departed from the former class-based

audiences by appealing to "a broadly-defined reading community rather than a discrete

class of readers."15 The sixpence periodical, a commonly affordable sum for middle

class and upper working class Britons, dominated the periodical press, although it

remained out of the price range of lower working class people. Nevertheless, some

cheap journals and the existence of libraries and second-hand booksellers allowed less

fortunate sections of the populations to have some access to the discourse.16

The growth of both print material and audiences enabled publications to

specialize their content to suit their audience. With ever increasing numbers of readers,

publishers and editors targeted niche markets, or interest groups, while still generating a

profit through advertising revenue (which also helped advertisers narrow their

demographic focus). Signed articles, designed to appeal to educated readers who were

interested in the qualifications of the author, were more frequent.17 By the 'Fisher Era'

there were numerous specialty journals targeting specific audiences defined by

profession, class or common interests.

13 See Peter Marsh, The Discipline of Popular Government: Lord Salisbury's Domestic Statecraft, 1881- 1902, (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1978), 195, 229, 323. The National Society of Conservative Agents was founded in 1891 and The Tory journal established to improve members' knowledge and skill. 14 A.J.A. Morris, The Scaremongers: The Advocacy of War and Rearmament, 1896-1914, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984). 15 Kate Jackson, "George Newnes and the 'loyal Tit-Bitites': Editorial Identity and Textual Interaction in Tit-Bits,'" and Margaret Beetham, 'The Agony Aunt, the Romancing Uncle and the Family of Empire: Defining the Sixpenny Reading Public in the 1890's," Nineteenth-Century Media, 20. 16 Altick, The English Common Reader, 212. 17 See Mary Ruth Hillier, "The Identification of Authors: The Great Victorian Enigma," in J. Don Vann and Rosemary T. Van Arsdel, eds., Victorian Periodicals: A Guide to Research, (New York: The Modern Language Association of America, 1978), 123-48. 8

Authors, editors and readers developed shared topics and perspectives, creating

a geographically and socially widespread intertextual community within and between

periodicals.'8 Expansion and specialization gave more authors the opportunity for

publishing contributions. Jon P. Klancher pointed out that, "Audiences are not simply

aggregates of readers. They are complicated social and textual formations; they have

interpretive tendencies and ideological contours."'9 Thus, the periodical discourse on

naval reform can be understood as the product of the collective national wisdom of the

British public, and an expression of the range of opinions produced by thinkers on naval

affairs. Through the periodical discourse elite authors, either professional journalists or

expert insiders, were able to disseminate ideas, receive responses and criticisms, and

shape the opinions of British society, including the highest levels of policy makers who

were involved both as writers and readers.20

This study will cover a wide range of periodicals, both in terms of frequency,

price and audience. The Army and Navy Gazette (,ANG) and The Nation are weeklies;

Blackwood's {Edinburgh) Magazine (BEM), The Fleet, the Fortnightly Review (.FR),

the Journal of the Royal United Services Institution (JRUSI), the Navy League Journal

(NLJ), the Nineteenth Century (and After) (NCA), and the United Service Magazine

(USM) are monthlies; and (Brassey's) Naval Annual (BNA) and The Fleet Annual and

Naval Yearbook (FANY) are annuals. The ANG sold for 6d; BEM for 6s, NCA for 2s6d,

QR and FR for 2s, The Fleet for 2d and NU for 3d; BNA for 15s and FANY for Is.21 For

18 "Introduction: publishing history as hypertext," Literature in the Marketplace, 4. " Jon P. Klancher, The Making of English Reading Audiences, 1790-1832, (Madison, WI.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), x. 20 Marsh, The Discipline of Popular Government, 11, 17, 43, 51-2, 226. In 1883 Lord Salisbury wrote anonymously in the Quarterly Review critiquing popular government. He supported the creation of the National Review to provide an outlet for Conservative thinkers and politicians, even writing in it himself in 1884 and 1896; he also contributed articles in the Saturday Review. 21 Twelve pence (d) were in a shilling (j), and twenty shillings were in a pound sterling (£). 9

audience, the ANG, BNA, Fleet, JRUSI, NU and USM contained primarily naval or

service content, and were intended for a naval or navally-minded audience. BEM, FR,

NCA, QR and The Nation were directed at a primarily civilian audience, giving them

both greater circulations, in general, and a greater ability to affect non-service opinion.

Obviously this study is not exhaustive, but these journals afford a wide enough range of

British naval opinion to indicate the contours of the discourse on naval reform during

the Fisher Era.22

Part of the challenge in dealing with the press is determining the full scope of its

influence. James Curran and Jean Seaton's Power Without Responsibility: The Press

and Broadcasting in Britain (1985) pointed out that the effect of media is very

imprecise, often reinforcing particular attitudes rather than inventing them, because "the

audience was not homogenous, and society was not a simple, centrally controlled

hierarchy."23 Jonathan Rose pointed out that, "literature influences the politics of

common readers; but it also shapes their aesthetic sensibilities, psychological traits,

religious beliefs, and literary skills."24 Admiralty attention to the media as a means of

influencing public opinion, and thereby government policy, was part of a much wider

social change as Britain's democratization capitalized on a proliferating media system

to provide a forum for national discourse between political ideologies and the armed

forces. Ministers, and especially ambassadors, were keenly aware of the media, and

used it to gauge both domestic and foreign opinion, which then informed policy

decisions.25 Contemporaries believed that the press vocalized public opinion and that a

22 For more bibliographical information of the periodicals see Appendix I: The Periodicals. 23 Curran and Seaton, Power Without Responsibility, 262-3. 24 Rose, "How historians study reader response," Literature in the Marketplace, 209. 25 Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916, Vol I, (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925), 87-8, 188-9; Roy Jenkins, Asquith, (London: Collins, 1964), 137, 158. favourable public was a source of political power. This belief alone gave the media

power and influence. Ideas were presented in the press to be debated, critiqued and

improved, thus laying the groundwoik for later policies.

On the other hand, government does not operate on purely rational, functionalist

lines. The 'garbage can' model of policy development holds that rather "than viewing

policy as the result of an orderly series of distinct stages, policy emerges from the

fortuitous joining of streams of problems, solutions, and political opportunities."26 In

the Fisher Era, Andrew Gordon observed, "owing to an obstacle course of pressures and

Realpolitik compromises, the dreadnought 'Fleet that Jack built' differed fundamentally

from the one that Jack had really wanted."27 The media was the avenue for much of the

pressure, both from the public and the service, which was directed at the Admiralty. In a

democratic system, "the outcome of conflict is determined by the scope of its

contagion," and the press was, and is, the most successful way to involve the public.28

An important objective of this study is to form connections between the British

periodical discourse and naval policy reform. This can be done through the personal

letters and memoirs of prominent journalists, naval officers, and politicians.

Unfortunately, it is a very rare case for a politician or officer to explicitly lay out the

impact of a periodical debate on their own thinking, but it does happen. Fisher in

particular was especially interested in cultivating the press. "He was the first of our

Admirals to make an intelligent use of the Press for the benefit of the Navy," Admiral

26 Julio Borquez, "Newsmaking and Policymaking: Steps toward a Dialogue," Robert J. Spitzer, ed., Media and Public Policy, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), 33. 27 Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, (London: John Murray, 1996), 347. 28 E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), 2-4. 11

Sir Reginald H. Bacon claimed, although he portrayed Fisher as an informer, not

manipulator, of public opinion.29 Fisher engaged with periodical debates and frequently

wrote regarding them, including sending prospective journalist allies information to fuel

their support.30 Of course, many of his letters, publications and speeches were "for pure

psychological impact."3' Fisher did tend to be harsh to those elements of the press

which dissented from his views, claiming that such writers were using the press to

manipulate the public to believe false theories.32 On the other side of the ideological

divide, Admiral Lord Chaiies Beresford, Fisher's great contemporary rival, also

believed in the power of the press, arguing that, "It is always very hard for authorities to

make proposals involving large sums of money unless the public and the Press combine

to show that they wish such expenditure."33 Acquiring and holding public favour would

be an important source of power for any reform movement, but officials often preferred

to feign disinterest in the content and opinion of the press.

In the pre-World War I period the press was an integral aspect of the 'Discourse

on War,' particularly because the Royal Navy did not have a naval war staff to regularly

and exhaustively examine tactical and strategic questions. Andrew Lambert's

discussion of "Education in the Royal Navy, 1854-1914" described the Royal United

Service Institution (RUSI), whose lectures and proceedings were published in the

JRUSI, as "the principal military forum of the era" and the location for the key defence

29 Admiral Sir R.H. Bacon, The Life of Lord Fisher ofKilverstone, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1929), 180. 30 Lieut.-Commander P.K. Kemp, ed., The Papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher, Vol. II, (London: Navy Records Society, 1960), x, 3. Frank Hardie, The Political Influence of the British Monarchy, 1868-1952, (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1970), 2 notes that later, records became scarcer as the telephone replaced letter writing. 31 Mackay, Balfour, 177. 32 Admiral Sir John Fisher, Memories, (New York: George H. Dorian Company, 1920), 108. 33 Admiral Lord Charles William De la Poer Beresford, The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, (London: S.B. Gundy, 1914), 406-7. debates.34 Moreover, N. A.M. Rodger pointed out that the development of naval

strategic thought, beginning in the 1880's, "was led largely by men who were connected

with the Navy but not serving in it."35 The periodical press was a valuable avenue for

these men to constructively criticize Admiralty policy, and provide ongoing

commentary and analysis regarding defence issues.

Examining the role of the periodical press in connecting policy makers with the

wider British public places the development of the Royal Navy within British society.

Naval scares may have rocked British public opinion, but underneath the 'hysterical'

daily press was a long-term intellectual discourse which acted as a responsible think-

tank for policy makers. The press provided individuals across the nation and the Empire

with the opportunity to present their thoughts and solutions in a forum which attracted

the attention of officials. The concrete effects of this discourse are extremely hard to

measure, because rarely did a prominent official reference the press, let alone admit to

being influenced or guided by it. Yet, enough evidence exists in memoirs and

collections of letters to show that high policy makers were in contact with journalists,

read the magazines, and circulated particular articles, making it impossible to view

policy in isolation from the discourse. The leading authors were either a part of the

policy making establishment or of the educated elite who associated with them, and

even unofficial influences cannot be discounted in pre-World War I Britain. Policy is

produced by the representatives of society, so we must look at society's conversation to

contextualize and understand the intellectual genesis of reform.

34 Andrew Lambert, "Education in the Royal Navy, 1854-1914," in Geoffrey Till, The Development of British Naval Thinking: Essays in memory of Bryan McLaren Ranft, (London: Routledge, 2006), 47, 49. 35 N.A.M. Rodger, "Naval Strategy in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," The Development of British Naval Thinking, 30. 13

Factors Driving Naval Reform

Naval reform was a pressing national issue in Britain by the end of the

nineteenth century. The need for naval supremacy was reinforced by colonial expansion

during the last quarter of the century, and the increasing dependence of the British

population on overseas imports for both food and raw materials. This supremacy, won

unequivocally in the Napoleonic Wars, had been eroded by the increasing power of old

naval rivals, France and Russia, and the emergence of new threats both in Europe,

Germany, and on the imperial periphery, Japan and the United States. In response the

entire naval edifice, built on the traditions of the sailing navy with modern vestiges

tacked on, was almost entirely rebuilt in terms of personnel, strategy and material to

completely adapt the Royal Navy to the new naval situation. The challenge facing

British naval policy makers was the lack of hands-on experience of naval combat

between first-rate fleets. The reconceptualization of the Royal Navy as a modem force

was based on the ability of thinkers to imagine the primary aspects of future naval wars,

extrapolating from manoeuvres and small conflicts. The periodical press played a key

role in this reform.

The significance of the Fisher Era was first described by Arthur Marder's

ground-breaking work on the period.36 His two major historical works, The Anatomy of

British Seapower (1940) and From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 5 volumes (1961-70)

take as their end and beginning, respectively, the Fisher reforms of 1904.37 Marder u Eugene L. Rasor, British Naval History Since 1815: A Guide to the Literature, (New York: Garland Publishing, 1990), xv and 4. Rasor considered that the discipline has experienced a diversification of topics through the use of "social science techniques, especially those of economics, sociology, anthropology, and psychology" to improve the "quantity, quality, and scope" of naval history. 37 Marder, Anatomy; Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, Volume I: The Road to War, 1904-1914. Arthur J. Marder (1910-1980) was a highly prestigious historian of British naval history whose major works cover a period from 1880-1945. He also wrote biographies of major naval and political figures. The titles of his two main works indicate the 14

utilized a punctuated equilibrium model of change, where certain events or people, such

as the 1889 Naval Defence Act or Fisher, provide the critical catalyzing influence over

development. His work is the foundational corpus upon which all later naval histories

of the period have built. Marder still provides a remarkably thorough account of what

happened during the wider naval reform period of 1880 to 1919, and later historians

have primarily elaborated on why things happened. Marder covered technology,

economics, biography, strategy, international relations, and public opinion. Each of

these fields has received substantial attention by successive historians, with the

exception of public opinion. Marder used the press more as a source of information,

facts and figures, with some attention to the Admiralty's relations with public opinion.

By examining the press in relation to policy development, as an intellectual institution

in its own right, this study will show the existence of a well-developed discourse that

helped shape British naval educational, strategic and tactical thought.

The importance of the navy was increasingly clear to the British government and

public at the end of the nineteenth century. Captain A.T. Mahan, of the United States

Navy, was instrumental in encouraging this attention through his work, The Influence of

Sea Power on History, 1660-1783 (1890) which emphasized the importance of sea

power for the British Empire.38 His emphasis on force concentration at the centre and

the primacy of the battlefleet suited British strategic conceptions.39 Mahan's work was

critical in drawing attention to the navy, because the nineteenth century had been devoid

importance of the 1904 reforms as a turning point in naval development. 38 Stanley Bonnett, The Price of Admiralty: An Indictment of the Royal Navy, 1805-1966, (London: Robert Hale, 1968), 164-5; Marder, Anatomy, 45-6. 39 Zara Steiner, "Elitism and Foreign Policy: The Foreign Office before (he Great War," in B.J.C. McKercher and D.J. Moss, eds, Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy, 1895-1939, (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1984), 36-7. 15

of large-scale naval warfare, the Sino-Japanese War (1896) and Spanish-American War

(1898) being too minor to provide any real lessons for a first class naval action. To

replace this lack of practical experience the "first requisite is a thorough grasp of the

powers and limitations of the weapons, forces, and instruments which we will have to

use; then to evolve trial methods which can be beaten into practical shape by

manoeuvres and constant practice."40 Lt. A.C. Dewar believed in the important

theoretical foundation provided by a well-examined discourse. The NU began its

volumes with a quote from Chevalier that "When the day of battle comes it is too late to

meddle with established institutions. That is why we must unwearyingly endeavour to

perfect them in peace."41 British thinkers realized that naval reform could not wait until

the next war.

Technological development was the fundamental factor underlying the need for

naval reform at the end of the nineteenth, and beginning of the twentieth, centuries. The

transition to steam in the nineteenth century was a gradual process and still incomplete

by the twentieth century. As Marder said, "the ironclad warship was still an

experiment," so money had to continue to be spent to keep the Royal Navy ahead of the

technological curve.42 Only with the building programmes of the 1890's was sail

propulsion abandoned. The development of the shell-firing gun required battleships to

armour their sides, and move from side-mounted batteries to centrally located turrets

with dramatically larger guns. Britain's massive sailing fleet became obsolete, and, with

the new requirements for steam propulsion, had to essentially be built anew. The pace

of development only accelerated as fee century ended, meaning that ships became

40 Lt. A.C. Dewar, "Gold Medal Prize Essay," JRUSI, Apr 1904, 360. 41 Chevalier, History of the French Navy, 431 on Frontispiece, NLJ, 1904. 42 Marder, Anatomy, 8. 16

obsolescent at an unprecedented rate. Such change was beyond the experience of the

Admiralty, indeed beyond that of the government and the public, and posed the problem

of how to best adapt the navy to new circumstances, when there had been no naval war

in which to test the effectiveness of new weapons, tactics and strategies.

Rapid technological change also meant that the cost of the navy rose

dramatically in the last half of the nineteenth century. Marder argued that the genius of

Fisher's reforms was in retaining significant force capabilities and improving the

efficiency of the Royal Navy while decreasing costs. This meant that"materiel

consideration bulked somewhat larger than the more 'sublime' aspects of naval warfare,

strategy and tactics."43 Paul M. Kennedy's ground-breaking 1976 work The Rise and

Fall of British Naval Mastery (1976) tied British naval power to the economic

development of the country, particularly the "steady loss of economic primacy" at the

end of the nineteenth century.44 This connection was elaborated by Aaron L.

Friedburg's The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-

1905 (1988), which argued that British defence reforms were a calculated contraction in

response to economic decline, although leaders did not want to admit the fact in

public.45

Britain was certainly suffering economically at the end of the nineteenth

century, and was rapidly being overtaken by rivals, particularly Germany and the United

States, but contemporaries did not believe that Britain needed to reduce its

43 Marder, Anatomy, 274, 351; Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, vol I, vii-viii, 23, 28. 44 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, (New Y ork: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), xv, 181,337. 45 Aaron L. Friedburg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 168-9. See Philip Pugh, The Cost of Seapower: The Influence of Money on Naval Affairs from 1815 to the Present Day, (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1986) for more analysis of the economics involved in producing and maintaining naval forces. commitments or was unable to pay. Instead, as Bernard Semmel's Liberalism and

Naval Strategy: Ideology, Interest and Sea Power during the Pax Britannica (1986)

described, the liberal ideology of financial retrenchment and pacifism was the key

factor in driving financial retrenchment in armaments.46 The periodical discourse of the

'Fisher Era,' in contrast, demonstrated a widespread belief that it was necessary, and

also possible, for Britain to spend however much was required to ensure security,

although excessive spending was abhorred.

Economic considerations were important in instigating the 1904 reform

programme in particular. The First Lord, the Earl of Selborne (1900-1905) when asking

Fisher to return to the Admiralty as First Sea Lord in 1904 stated that, "it is necessary,

for the influence of the Admiralty over the House of Commons and for the stability of

the national finances, that we should show a substantial decrease" in the Navy

Estimates.47 Jon Sumida's In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance Technology and

British Naval Policy, 1889-1914 (1989) and Nicholas Lambert's Sir John Fisher's

Naval Revolution (1999) have argued that while the need for economy was critical in

forcing the early twentieth century reforms, the reforms were an attempt to retain

worldwide naval power using qualitative, rather than quantitative, superiority.48

The technological development of the navy also introduced a new social

pressure within the navy. Steam engines required new classes of engineer officer,

engine-room articifers (non-commissioned officers) and enlisted stokers. In its early

46 See Bernard Semmel, Liberalism and Naval Strategy: Ideology, Interest, and Sea Power during the Pax Britannica, (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986) and Donald Mackenzie Shurman, Imperial Defence, 1868- 1887, (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000), 5-21. 47 Selborne to Fisher, May 14 1904, Kemp, The Fisher Papers, 23. 48 Nicholas Lambert, Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution, (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999); Jon Tetsuro Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989). years, there was a great social divide between the working class engineers, running the

motive power, and the middle or upper class executive, who navigated the ship and

fought the guns, even though engineers were very well paid.49 Eugene Rasor noted that

the "advent of the skilled professional associated with progress - the stoker, the

engineer, the gunner, and the diver - caused complications in the hierarchical structure

and created strained relations."50 The divide between executive and engineer officers

was particularly problematic, and as steam increasingly dominated the fleet, engineers

began to agitate for greater access to command positions and authority.

The navy's requests for funds were hard to ignore when a naval defeat could

mean starvation and ruin. In the last half of the nineteenth century British thinkers were

dominated by the consideration of Britain's reliance on the Empire and on oceanic trade

in general, most obviously with the necessity of importing the bulk of the foodstuffs

required by the working population. The British army was small, and seemingly

incapable of competing with the mass conscription armies of the European continent.

Public fears erupted on numerous occasions in the last half of the century, and these

naval panics were instrumental in refocusing attention on the fleet, and making the

naval defence of the British Empire a truly national affair.

The invasion question was a permanent feature of British strategic thought, and

it provides a useful example of how the dialogue in the press influenced policy.

Debaters condensed into two semi-opposing camps. One argued for a conscription army

for home defence, whereas the 'blue-water school,' which included most naval officers,

49 Michael Lewis, The Navy in Transition, 1814-1864: A Social History, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1965), 197-205. See also Commander P.M. Rippon, R.N., Evolution of Engineering in the Royal Navy, Volume 1: 1827-1939, (Tunsbridge Wells, Kent: Spellmount, 1988). 50 Rasor, Reform in the Royal Navy, 34. 19

argued that the fleet was the principal means of defence. Britain was heavily reliant on

imported raw materials and foodstuffs, and a naval defeat followed by a blockade

would obviate any need to actually invade the British Isles.51 The 'blue-water school'

dominated the discourse on naval reform, and only interacted with the conscriptionists

in the competition for government funds, or at the strategic planning in the Committee

of Imperial Defence (founded 1902).

The most dramatic and politically significant navy scare was the 1884 panic

following the publication of W.T. Stead's six-part "The Truth About the Navy" articles

in the Pall Mall Gazette.51 Using material provided by Captain John Fisher, these

revealed that Armstrong's armaments firm was constructing the fastest cruiser in the

world for Chile, and emphasized the numerical inferiority of the Royal Navy to France

and Russia.53 The public, incensed by an alarmist press in spite of the availability of

more accurate information, ignored expert opinion in the drive to remedy an entirely

imagined threat created by officers, editors and politicians for their own reasons.54 An

investigation was made, resulting in the 1888 'Report of the Three Admirals' which set

up the Two-Power Standard and led to the five-year construction programme of the

1889 Naval Defence Act. This act provided seventy ships, including ten battleships.

Paul Kennedy considered the 1884 scare was the watershed of Britain's ability to

51 Marder, Anatomy, 68, 84-95. 52 See John B. Hattendorf et al. eds., British Naval Documents, 1204-1960, (Aldershot: Navy Records Society, 1993), 604-7 for excerpts from the six part series. For more information see Bonnett, The Price of Admiralty, 157-63; Marder, Anatomy, "Chapter IV: Public Opinion and the Navy." 53 See William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), for more information on the British armaments industry, its development, and the consequences of an international trade in armaments. British armaments firms operated in an open international market for armaments, and were willing to sell top designs, even in advance of those for the Royal Navy, to other nations. 54 John Beeler, "Review Article: The Theatre ofNavalism in Germany and Britain," The International History Review, 30:2 (June 2008): 340-1. maintain naval supremacy for little cost.ss The agitation was the first instance of the

developing mass media being applied to defence policy, and the clear effects of the

articles on naval reforms illustrated, for contemporaries and historians, the potential

power of the press.

During this era of reform Fisher and Beresford became, for contemporaries and

historians alike, the leaders of the two competing schools of naval thought. Admiral Sir

Reginald Custance, a former Director of Naval Intelligence, stated that the 'historical

school,' led by Beresford,

appeal for guidance to the great masters of the art of war by sea and land; they hold that it is very important to study tactics and strategy by the light of history. The disciples of the [material school] do not believe the lessons of the past are applicable to the present; they have neglected the study of tactics and strategy, and have devoted their energies to the development of the material - ships, guns, armour, etc."56

Fisher has been understood to be a brilliant administrator and organizer, albeit often

overbearing and vindictive to his opponents, whose nature fitted him to deal with the

material deficiencies of the fleet.57 Thus, he led the material school of thought,

including his coterie of the 'Fishpond.' Beresford, by contrast, was both a naval officer

and frequently a Member of Parliament who was socially well-connected. He was not

an intellectual officer, but was loved by his men and was very successful at creating the

55 Kennedy, Naval Mastery, 178. 56 Vice-Admiral Reginald Custance, quoted in Geoffrey Till, "The Emergence of a British School?" The Development of British Naval Thinking, 67. 57 See Richard Hough, First Sea Lord: An Authorized Biography of Admiral Lord Fisher, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1969), Ruddock F. Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973). Nelsonian 'band of brothers' ideal.58 He became the leader of the historical school,

although Admiral Sir Reginald Custance was the more prominent intellectual figure.

Historians have increasingly appreciated the multitude of personalities involved

in developing naval thought. Marder emphasized the "administrative and organizing

genius of Fisher, supported and stimulated by a galaxy of fine younger minds," known

to contemporaries as the 'Fishpond.'59 Recent scholarship has described the corporate

responsibility for naval policy through work on Lord Charles Beresford, Admiral Percy

Scott, and the Earl of Selbome.60 Marder argued that the great successes of Admiralty

policy under Selborne was due to his giving Fisher a "free rein," an interpretation that

recent work by D. George Boyce has refuted.61 Boyce argued that Fisher and Selborne

are better understood as collaborators, and that their successes were due to their

complementary talents and capability. These key figures were notable examples from a

much wider reform movement. Each had their own vision regarding the ideal structure

of the Royal Navy, and each endeavoured to advance their ideas through discussion in

the public media as well as through official channels.

58 See Geoffrey Bennett, Charlie B.: A biography of Admiral Lord Beresford of Metemmeh and Curraghmore, (London: Peter Dawnay, 1968); William Jameson, "Beresford, 1846-1919: The Sailor Politician," The Fleet that Jack Built: Nine Men who Made a Modern Navy, (London: Rupert Hart-Davies, 1962), 61-89, for more information on Beresford. " Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, v.I, 12. The amount of work, primarily by Marder, on Fisher's correspondence and contributions to naval development mean that he plays a somewhat larger role in this thesis than his actual contributions may have warranted. However, the documentary evidence tends to fixate on his role. As Bonnett pointed out, Fisher "had the gift of writing so much while often doing so little that he was clearly on record in the early 1900s" supporting the potential of submarines; but the quote applies more generally (Bonnett, Price of Admiralty, 196). 60 Bennett, Charlie B; D. George Boyce, The Crisis of British Power: The Imperial and Naval Papers of the Second Earl of Selborne, 1895-1910, (London: Historian's Press, 1990); Peter Padfield, Aim Straight: A Biography of Admiral Sir Percy Scott, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1966). 61 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 21. Hardie's Political Influence of the British Monarchy, 94, 98 argues that King Edward was a key supporter of Fisher, and was important in giving Fisher the political backing that the First Lords were not providing. In actuality, the debates were even more complex, and most journals presented

multiple positions in relation to each other, thus providing a fairly balanced and

analytical perspective. The controversial aspects of naval reform: the soundness of the

Royal Navy's research and development, the wisdom of Britain leading the

technological curve, training methods, and grand strategy, continue to focus historians

on the same questions that fueled the Fisher-Beresford conflict. Overall, many of the

criticisms leveled by Beresford at Fisher's reforms have been partially justified, yet no

one has looked in detail at the contemporary debates these officers were engaging in

with British civilian and military society. This study will examine the more nuanced

levels of debate present in the periodical press, whereby authors and editors staked out

individualized positions on multiple issues, often extending the scope of the debate

through the inclusion of sociological, political, economic and historical ideas.

As an institution, the Admiralty was increasingly aware of the importance of the

media in shaping public opinion. Marder argued that policy was "the result of Board

policy, based on the political and strategic factors of the day, as limited by financial

considerations. But public opinion was a useful ally to the Admiralty, enabling it to

squeeze more out of the treasury than would otherwise have been possible."62 The

Admiralty was not attempting to control the press but was actively courting the

favourable opinion of journalists.63 A notable example is the publication in The Fleet of

letters, one from Beresford and one from Fisher, congratulating the journal on the good

work it was doing for the lower deck.64 In March 1903 the USM offered an article on

62 Marder, Anatomy, 54. 63 Beeler, "Review Article," 335. 64 Letter from Admiral Sir John Fisher, G.C.B., First Sea Lord, The Fleet, Jul 1905, 79, and Letter from Admiral Lord Charles Beresford of July 4 1905, The Fleet, Aug 1905, 111. "The Navy and the Press" which claimed that, "No one in the Navy who has ideas about

his profession has any means of making them known if the public Press is closed to

him...''65 The influence of popular discourses is often an immeasurable quantity, but the

organization of a specific public discourse would not be ignored by politicians.

British magazines had a clear understanding of their importance for

encouraging and directing government attention, coupled with an awareness of their

limitations. Military affairs were more commonly discussed than naval, a fact

depreciated by contemporaries.66 The ANG, in discussing the idea of 'government by

newspaper,' argued that while in the past press criticism had been very effective

because of the knowledge of the experts writing, in the twentieth century "there is a

good deal of naval criticism by so-called or self-styled "experts" which is... largely

based on "facts" manufactured by people whose imagination is more fertile than their

judgment is sound."67 While this was to a certain extent true, officers acknowledged

that they were "very well posted in current professional writings in journals and

magazines... and [most had] devoted some thought to published opinions which seek to

illustrate existing controversies."68 The periodical press had the advantage in this

respect, because the authors had more experience and intellectual credibility than the

writers in the daily press. Regardless, everyone could agree that, "Outsiders may form

and express independent opinions on the action taken, and there is room for difference

of opinion; but no one will dispute the right of responsible authorities to deal with the

subject as they may think best, provided that thorough consideration precedes

65 'Telescope,' "The Navy and the Press," USM, Mar 1903, 607. 66 'Captain,' R.N., "Our Naval Policy, the Estimates, and Parliament," USM, Jun 1905, 229. 67 "Admiralty Advisors," ANG, Mar 7 1903, 228. 68 'Black Joke,' "Some Criticisms," USM, Oct 1907, 9. decision."69 The consensus that the press was the public's educator and the advisor to

the government gave the media that power, and ensured that the press debates would

not be ignored.

Chapter Summary

This study will focus on three primary aspects of naval policy reform in the first

decade of the twentieth century; personnel, strategy and technology. Personnel policy

was modified by the 1902 Selbome Scheme, while strategy and technology were dealt

with by the 1904 Fisher reform programme. By examining the discourse preceding

each, the intellectual genesis of the reforms is not only shown to be a lengthy and

detailed process, but also one that incorporated both civil and military elements to

become a holistic national conversation on the nature and future of the Royal Navy.

The Fisher-Selborne team of 1902 dealt with the training and structure of the

personnel. It replaced sail training for officers with mechanically based engineering

courses, and amalgamated the three branches of Executive, Engineer and Royal Marine

officers into one body. This unified the officer corps, provided engineers and marines

with senior positions, and enabled the executive to operate the intricate mechanical

systems on board modem warships. The Selborne Scheme was a complex response to

the needs of the navy that attempted to orient future naval personnel along rational lines

that would best provide for the needs of a combat-effective fleet. It drew on a plethora

of ideas, proposals and critical evaluations prepared by experienced authors and

presented in the periodical press, using the public as a sounding board for the

revolutionary ideas of the Selborne Scheme.

69 "British Shipbuilding Programmes," BNA, 1907, 69. See also "Reviews: Some Magazines," ANG, Mar 14 1903, 256, paraphrasing the Monthly Review. 25

Fisher's main, four part 1904 reforms adjusted the deployment, organization and

material of British naval forces in order to maximize strategic benefit while minimizing

cost. The Cawdor Memorandum of 1905 describes the first three parts, which dealt with

strategy, as:

[T]hese reforms are all related and inter-dependent.... The release of the crews from ships which would not be of value in war has made it possible to man the Reserve ships with permanent crews, thereby largely increasing their efficiency, and consequently their instant readiness for war. The formation of a Reserve fleet ready for immediate service allows of a more advantageous distrubtion of the Sea-keeping Fleet and of a better system of training for the Royal Naval Reserve.70

Fisher's programme followed years of discussion surrounding the wartime duties of the

fleet, and the best means of ensuring British strategic power. The discourse provides

valuable context for the genesis of the scheme, and the criticism is intriguing. The

prestigious commentators in the press questioned the efficacy of the reforms, and

provided elaborate and well-supported arguments for moderation. Critics were heard by

the Admiralty, and even if they did not fundamentally change policy they forced policy­

makers to consider other options, explain themselves and modify their plans.

Technological development was the fourth key aspect of the 1904 Fisher

Reforms. The design of warships was shaped to develop maximum power according to

predictions of future tactical and strategic requirements. Discussions focused on the

battlefleet, although a significant minority of the discourse examined the revolution of

the torpedo and submarine, and what would be the best balance between speed, power,

protection, size and numbers because no one ship could embody them all. Dreadnought

was the most controversial aspect of the reforms, but also the least affected by public

discussions. The periodical press shows that the British public were presented with in-

70 First Lord Cawdor, "Memorandum on Admiralty Work and Progress," BNA, 1906, 353-65. depth coverage of the technological issues, and thinkers courted public opinion to force

the government to retain, or rescind, the new construction programme.

The reform movement that will not be discussed in this study is the

developments in the Admiralty itself. The Royal Dockyards were constantly being

reformed to increase their efficiency and decrease cost.71 The Admiralty was also the

target of reforms, as duties were redistributed among the Sea Lords.72 These

developments are beyond the scope of this study, but demonstrate the wider range of

changes within the navy in this period.

British thinkers discussed these questions and issues avidly in the periodical

press, offering modern scholars the opportunity to see not only what the British people

were thinking and saying about the navy, but how their information was filtered and

developed into a self-referential whole. Over the course of these three thematic areas,

personnel, strategy, and technology, this project will address the focal points of British

naval reform in relation to the detailed and educated debates offered through the

periodical press. Through interaction with the knowledgeable and interested public over

these sorts of questions thinkers were able to curry favour and win supporters to their

ideas. The 'Fisher Era' is an early example of a complex and influential public debate

on myriad connected subjects acting as a civil-military discourse.

71 See Sidney Pollard and Paul Robertson, The British Shipbuilding Industry, 1870-1914, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), for more information on naval construction policy. 72 The civilian First Lord was the political head of the Admiralty and its representative in Parliament. The First Sea Lord was the head of die four professional naval members of the Board of Admiralty, and was responsible for general war readiness, distribution, and strategy. The Second Sea Lord dealt with personnel, manning and mobilization. The Third Sea Lord handled the fleet's material, its ships, guns, etc. The Fourth Sea Lord was responsible for transport and supply. There was also a Civil Lord in charge of naval works and buildings, a Parliamentary and Financial Secretary for finances, and a permament secretary for inter-Board communications. CHAPTER II: TRAINING UNITY The Selborne Scheme and the Periodical Discourse of Naval Training Reform

[T]he free expression of public opinion is the surest way towards advancement and reform, and that in the matter of educating the public mind, which the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution undoubtedly does, for... as the public are apt to force their ideas on the Government, it is well that the public should be educated.73 Lieutenant and Commander E.C. Villiers, JRUSI, July 1900

Villiers' comment in 1900 addressed two critical aspects of the British civil- military discourse. Firstly, the recognition that increasing the flow of information would aid in the development of superior naval organization. Secondly, the awareness of the power that public opinion can exercise in a democracy and the need for education in order to create responsible, nationally-minded citizenry. This chapter will explore the intertwined topics of the status and future of the Royal Naval Engineers and the

Executive officers. As the impetus for reform increased at the Admiralty, and as public opinion became increasingly enmeshed in the agitation for change, these two bodies of officers were subjected to new analyses and attempts to rationalize their structure in the preparation for war.

The combination of decades of peace following the Napoleonic Wars and the steady emergence of new naval technology meant that new strategies were required to ensure a ready supply of skilled manpower and the proper treatment of the men and officers. Gunnery training at HMS Excellent began in 1830, and put pressure on the navy to retain the services of well-trained gunners, especially as the transition to steam created the idea that war would come quickly and the fleet would need to be ready in peacetime.74 Naval officers' entry, training, employment and retirement became "an

73 Lt. and Commander E.C. Villiers, "Naval Prize Essay," JRUSI, Jul 1900, 719. Villiers was serving on HM S Salamander. 74 Lewis, The Navy in Transition, 180. ordered, stream-lined, state-regulated affair," creating a dedicated, lifelong profession in order to cope with the new complexities of naval science.75 The long-service system,

first offered in 1852 and fully implemented by 1870, meant that the Royal Navy's

manpower was much costlier than continental rivals, who used conscription to man their

fleets. From very early times, then, it was recognized that good publicity would enhance recruiting, and two service journals, the ANG and the JRUSI helped to improve the

navy's image in the late nineteenth century.76 The power of public opinion, acting through the press, would only increase over the course of the century.

As the pace of technological change accelerated in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the ability to master modern machinery seemed to supplant the traditional naval qualities of leadership and seamanship. Engineers, in particular, became more important than carpenters, sail-makers, shipwrights and other trades associated with sailing vessels. By 1900 the personnel structure of the fleet required a complete overhaul, and that task fell to William Palmer, the second Earl of Selborne, serving as the First Lord of the Admiralty from 1900-1905. His focus on personnel issues was spurred by the gunnery record of HMS Scylla under Captain Percy Scott on the China Station. Fifty-six hits out of seventy rounds fired from six 4.7-inch guns was an unprecedented level of accuracy due to innovative training methods and technical appliances developed by Scott. In addition the 'Black Week' of defeats at

Magersfontein, Stormberg, and Colenso in South Africa rocked the confidence of the nation in the leadership, strategy, tactics, and training of the British Army. The Royal

Navy was not subjected to the same level of criticism, but it could not ignore the

75 Lewis, The Navy in Transition, 127. 76 Rasor, Reform in the Royal Navy, 18-9. 29 reforming drive. This chapter will explore how civilian naval thinkers and service professionals effectively collaborated through the pages of the periodical press to create a new personnel structure and educational system, one that was best adapted to the new conditions and requirements of naval war, while being cost-effective and producing qualitatively equivalent officers to the old system. This discourse preceded the Selborne

Scheme, and reached the same conclusion regarding common-entry, mechanically based training as was later adopted by Selborne.

The Naval Engineers

The Royal Naval Engineers were the first group of officers to which reformers were drawn. The increasing number of engineers employed in the navy as sail gave way to steam brought up significant questions regarding the social and professional status of the branch. The division between executive and engineer branches mimicked the social situation in Britain in the late nineteenth century, where mechanics were a lower class occupation. The problem was that, "the training, pay and position of the naval engineering officer just had not kept pace with his tremendous increase in responsibility."77 The periodical discourse on these issues shows that the half-hearted attempts of George Goschen, First Lord of the Admiralty from 1895 to 1900, to patch over the most obvious complaints was insufficient to either service or civilian audiences, and that the press played an important role in publicizing more radical and thorough reform schemes.

Significantly, the position of engineers afloat was a function of their position and activism in mainstream British society. The Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE), established in 1851, was an increasingly prominent and wealthy union and hence able to

77 Rippon, Evolution of Engineering, 113. 30 act in support of pro-engineering movements and legislation.78 In 1889 the first

Federation of the Shipbuilding and Engineering Trades was formed to unify the unions, although the ASE did not join until 1905. This movement spanned British society more generally, as the increasing power of the civil engineers was exercised to improve their social position. Selbome believed that the "Trades Union of immense influence and power, [namely] the Civil Engineers of the United Kingdom," was responsible for the durability and political weight of the agitation for the improvement of naval engineers.79

Especially in shipbuilding areas like the Clyde or Tyne rivers, engineers formed unions to collectively press for improvements in pay, conditions and social status. Civilian journals, reflecting the leading role of civil interest groups, also played a leading role in developing the discourse on engineering reform in the Royal Navy.

Both service and civilian periodicals addressed the growing unpopularity of service in the Royal Navy's engineering department. This was attributed to the poor conditions of work and the institutionalized inferiority of the engineers to the executive.

By the turn of the century this resulted in serious under-manning of warship propulsion systems, which impacted combat efficiency and increased engine wear. Goschen attempted in February 1900 to ameliorate the conditions of the engineering branch by improving the pay and promotions, in the process reviving the flagging cause of pro- engineering elements.80 The criticism of Goschen's programme originated from civilian

78 P.W. Kings ford, Engineers, Inventors and Workers, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), 157. The Amalgamated Society of Shipwrights start in 1850's, but only became a centralized organisation as the Associated Shipwrights' Society, eventually amalgamating with other unions to become the Shipconstructive and Shipwrights' Association in the twentieth century. See Pollard and Robertson, The British Shipbuilding Industry, 151-72, for information on labour relations, unions, and shipbuilding from the mid-nineteenth century to World War I. 79 Selborne to Lord Walter Kerr, May 2 1901, Crisis of British Power, 119. 80 The statement of the First Lord noted an increase in Chief Inspectors of Machinery from five to eight, Inspectors of Machinery from eight to thirteen, and the end of the rank of Staff Engineer. The Engineer-in- Chief became a Rear Admiral. Chief Engineers became equivalent to Executive Lieutenants with over 31 writers in civilian periodicals, led by Rollo Appleyard's April and September 1900 articles in the FR. Appleyard believed that Goschen's retention of the "relative rank of engineer officers" failed to satisfy demands for parity and the removal of non-combatant status.81 Appleyard claimed that,

Engineers R.N. are "with" in all that requires endurance, knowledge, loyalty and fighting qualities; they are "after" in every kind of recompense. They are "with" in education, responsibility and risk; they are "after" in rank, rating, pension, advertisement, and the fair consideration of the Admiralty Board.82

Engineers deserved the same pay, benefits, pensions, residences, senior officer positions, and a seat on the Admiralty Board to compensate for their important position as the responsible officer for all mechanical systems.

The FR continued in 1900 and 1901 to host Appleyard's articles reiterating the complaints regarding the manning deficiencies. Engineering duties were often fulfilled in spite of badly deficient complements (up to forty percent) which could not be filled with untrained civilian engineers in wartime.83 It was Appleyard's hope that the new

Boiler Committee would help to expose these problems and force the Admiralty to find a permanent solution.84 In contrast, the ANG thought that the engineers would be momentarily content with Goschen's improvements but that more changes maybe needed in the future.85 The ANG's response pointed out Appleyard's lack of naval

eight years seniority, and Engineers would rank with Lieutenants of less than eight years seniority, thus ending the former "with but after" system whereby all engineers ranked after the executive. A new pay scale was also introduced. See George Goschen, "Statement of the First Lord on Naval Estimates for 1900-1," BNA, 1900,383-6. 81 Rollo Appleyard, "With But After," FR, Apr 1900, 615-6, 622; Appleyard, "We Are Always Ready," FR, Sep 1900, 430-9. 82 Appleyard, "With But After," FR, Apr 1900, 627. 83 Appleyard, "With But After," FR, Apr 1900, 616-21; Appleyard, "We Are Always Ready," FR, Sep 1900,430-6. A month later W.S. Lilly's "The Burden of Empire" briefly mentioned the importance of the fleet for maintaining Britain's food supply, and included the engine-room manning deficiencies as one of the major challenges to naval efficiency, (FR, Oct 1900, 538). 84 Appleyard, "We Are Always Ready," FR, Sep 1900,439. 85 "The Navy Estimates," ANG, Mar 3 1900, 215-6. qualifications, and argued that in wartime engine-room complements would be adequate.86 Appleyard's "Volunteers for the Fleet" in July 1901 repeated that the Boer

War illustrated the impossibility of predicting the number of men needed in war; engine- room complements were already based on half-power needs, which prevented ships from operating at their foil potential.87 While the ANG was somewhat resistant to the dramatic claims being made in the civilian press, the arguments presented by Appleyard were worthy of consideration and discussion.

A significant share of naval opinion ranged itself on the side of equalizing executive and engineer officers. In December 1900 at the Royal United Service

Institution (RUSI), Admiral John Hopkins laid out "A Few Naval Ideas for the Coming

Century." Reflecting the growing significance of personnel reforms, Hopkins advocated giving executive rank to engineering officers.88 Captain R.H.S. Bacon disagreed that engineers could act as executive officers, and claimed that they were unfit to command vessels.89 By mid-1901, however, Hopkin's ideas had gained significant currency, as shown by a letter exchange between First Lord Selborne and First Sea Lord Walter

Kerr.90 On May 2,1901 Selborne proposed a gradual and systematic amalgamation of the engineer and executive branches using common entry with subsequent specialization. Kerr responded on May 21 with doubts that executive officer training could incorporate engineering elements, and argued that there was no demand among naval engineers for that drastic a revolution. The civilian leadership in this instance

86 "The Glamour of the Stoke-Hold," ANG, Nov 3 1900, 1072-3; "A Weak Link in the Naval Chain of Defence," NLJ, Dec 1900, 197-9. 87 "Volunteers for the Fleet," FR, Jul 1901, 26-36. The article suggested 20,000 more men for the engineering branch and 20,000 volunteers. 88 Admiral Sir J.O. Hopkins, "A Few Naval Ideas for the Coming Century," JRUSI, Jan 1901, 12. The lecture was summarized in "Naval Ideas for the Coming Century," NLJ, Jan 1901, 4-6. 89 Capt. R.H.S. Bacon, discussing "A Few Naval Ideas for the Coming Century "JRUSI, Jan 1901, 31-2. 90 The Crisis of British Power, 119-122. 33 provided the deciding impulse for a far-reaching reform of the system, mimicking the positions promoted by the FR and ANG.

The NLJ was another focal point for service discussion. Charles M. Johnson,

Chief Inspector of Machinery, contributed a four-part series between October 1900 and

May 1901 in which he argued for improved training for officers and stokers, expanded authority for officers and increasing engineering complements in order to reduce stress on the personnel.91 Admiral Edmund R. Fremantle wrote in, supported by Rear-Admiral

C. Johnstone, to minimize some of the charges that Johnson made. He claimed that, in his experience, complements were not extremely deficient, nor would it be impossible to utilize civilian engineering personnel in wartime, moreover, he denied that the problems were the result of executive prejudice.92 This prompted a reply from Johnson, who argued that Fremantle had received engineering deputations on the manning problem while Commander in Chief Devonport, and that Fremantle had not given sufficient evidence for his critique.93 This interchange demonstrates the existence of debates within the pages of particular periodicals, and the widespread desire of officers to deal with the engineering question in spite of serious disagreements.

The other main service journal, the USM, presented a moderating piece in 1901.

"Lieutenants R.N., 'Worth Their Weight in Gold'" by 'Naval Officer' reminded the audience that non-specialized executive lieutenants were worse off in terms of pay and

91 Cbas. M. Johnson, "A Weak Link in the Naval Chain of Defence," NLJ, Oct 1900, 158-9; Johnson, "A Weak Link in the Naval Chain of Defence: II. Starved Engine Rooms," NLJ, Dec 1900, 197-8; Johnson, "A Weak Link in the Naval Chain of Defence: III. Starved Engine Rooms, cont.," NLJ, Jan 1902, 10-1; Johnson, "A Weak Link in the Naval Chain of Defence: IV. Starved Engine Rooms, cont "NLJ, Mar 1901, 35-6; Johnson, "A Weak Link in the Naval Chain of Defence: V. Starved Engine Rooms, cont.," NLJ, May 1901,94-5. 92 Admiral Fremantle, "A Weak Link in the Naval Chain of Defence," NLJ, Feb 1901,24-5; Admiral C. Johnstone, "A Weak Link in the Naval Chain of Defence," NLJ, Mar 1901, 34. 93 Johnson, "A Reply to Admiral the Hon. Sir E. Fremantle, GCB, CMG," NLJ, Mar 1901, 34-5. leave than specialists like engineers and surgeons, although he admitted that engineers should have executive rank like the Royal Marine officers.94 This conservative solution to the problem would leave the engineers a separate branch of the service, but satisfy demands for authority and equality of privilege. The article's real contribution is its reaction to the work of Appleyard and others, who emphasized the prime importance of the engineers, by pointing out the rigorous training and capabilities of the executive branch, thereby attempting to moderate the extremes of public opinion.

By the end of 1901 the ANG had reconsidered its position on the amalgamation of executive and engineer branches, unsurprisingly following very closely the change in official opinion. A May 31 "Navy Notes" on Appleyard in the St. James Gazette (SJG) expressed agreement with the suggestions that executive and engineers should be given common entry and early training, quoting Appleyard's argument, '"that all naval officers must be engineers, some specialised as sailors, some as gunners, some as torpedo men, but all of them efficient.'"95 The ANG agreed that executive lieutenants should be responsible for the mechanisms of their guns and torpedoes. This idea would later be instituted by Selborne in 1903. Conversely, the ANG also depreciated Appleyard's

"outrageous prejudice against the combatant branch of the Navy," desiring a more equitable approach to the situation which acknowledged the valuable contribution made by each branch of the officer corps96 On November 2 the ANG claimed that, "We have in these columns consistently supported that school which holds that the executive branch should absorb the engineering department just in the same way that histoiy tells

94 'Naval Officer,' "Lieutenants R.N., 'Worth Their Weight in Gold,'" USM, Nov 1901, 107-13. 95 "Navy Notes," ANG, May 31 1902, 518. 96 "Navy Notes," ANG, May 31 1902, 518. us it absorbed in the past the duties of handling a ship under sails and of navigation."97

The ANG had been converted to the cause of amalgamation, citing historical precedent to defend its new position.

On November 7 1901 Fisher offered some topical suggestions to Arnold White, a prominent naval journalist and a regular correspondent of Fisher's. Fisher recommended that White push for a "root and branch" reform of the engineering department, entered on a common system with later specialization, instead of simply an

Engineering representative on the Admiralty Board.98 While Fisher's letter was not likely written as a response to the ANG's article, it illustrates how the periodical discourse was keeping pace with the advancing thought of key naval figures.

Appleyard revisited the issues surrounding naval engineers throughout 1902. In

January 1902 gunnery and torpedo lieutenants became responsible for the mechanisms of their weapons, mountings and related systems, leaving engineers to focus on the steam engines, electrical generator and water/air supply systems. Appleyard argued that

Selborne's regime had witnessed increasing attention to ofiBcer education, which was a natural result of the transition to steam, but Selborne was distinct in his practice of inviting criticism and proposing measures.99 Appleyard's January 24 1902 article in SJG argued for common entry, one year at Dartmouth, two years at the Royal Naval

Engineering College, then specialization into branches, although the Marines were not included in the system.100 He elaborated on this in the November 1902 FR, providing a detailed programme of study, interspersed with purely practical work at sea, which

97 "Naval Engineers," ANG, Nov 2 1901, 1075. 98 Fisher to Arnold White, Nov 8 1901, FGDN v./, 211-13. 99 Appleyard, "Officers for the Fleet," FR, Nov 1902, 852. 100 Referenced in Appleyard, "Officers for the Fleet," FR, Nov 1902, 853-4. would create a unified officer corps and circumvent the need to put an Engineer on the

Admiralty Board.101 An ANG review of Appleyard's "Officers for the Fleet" accepted that his plan might provide good engineers, but questioned whether "we should get by it a type of officers to command our ships and fleets as well qualified as those who, by common consent, now form a standard for the world's navies."102 The ANG felt that

Appleyard overstated his case, and that the navy was not in such dire straits. More conservative opinions were willing to concede that the executive should become more proficient at engineering, but remained hesitant on whether training could be vice versa and fit engineers for command positions.

A memorandum by Lord Selborne on February 25,1902 regarding the position of naval engineers agreed with both the ANG and Fisher. Selborne argued that the service needed to take a leading role in developing a thorough reform programme before the Civil Engineers created enough public pressure for Parliament to appoint a committee. At that point the Admiralty would lose control over the pace and direction of reforms. Selborne expressed his "profound conviction that this matter can only be finally dealt with without detriment to the Service by going to its root, and that is why I point to the entry through the Britannia [the officers' training ship] for both Executive and

Engineer officers as the one and only final cure.'"03 Kerr responded that service opinion did not ask for or warrant such a bold step, but the service press contradicts this. The press was a leading forum for the engineering agitation, and it was the existence of this discourse which emphasized the need to make more than superficial reforms.

Over the course of 1900 to 1902, the agitation regarding naval engineers was

101 Appleyard, "Officers for the Fleet," FR, Nov 1902, 853-7. !m "Navy Notes," ANG, Nov 8 1902, 1073. 103 Selborne, "Memorandum: Position of Naval Engineers," 25 Feb 1902, Crisis of British Power, 139-41. 37 revitalized and became increasingly prominent. Selborne's professional letters exhibit serious concern over the public campaign being conducted by civil engineer associations. A decision was becoming overdue that would address the grievances of engineers, restore equilibrium to the service and ensure public support and confidence.

As the periodical debates show, in advance of the policy decision to implement an amalgamation scheme the media was already favouring the idea.

The Development of Mechanical Training

With amalgamation becoming the prominent solution to problems of inequality, usefulness and operating efficiency, the nature of the training needed to be examined.

The topic of 'scientific training,' as opposed to the traditional arts-focused classical style of education, was a long standing issue facing British society.104 Civilian discourses,

Pollard and Robertson note, were driven by a desire to "preserve the 'practical man' while at the same time retaining enough technical training to meet the competition from abroad."105 In the navy the need for mechanical training had deep roots: Fisher himself in 1873, while a torpedo instructor, claimed that it would be essential in the future.106

The situation came to a head at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the periodical press became a key source of support for the Admiralty in its efforts to modernize training.

The cancellation of the 1899 winter cruise of the masted Training Squadron and the decommissioning of the ships were a catalyst for public debate on the content and purpose of training. On December 9 1899 Beresford wrote to the Times asking that,

104 Pollard and Robertson, The British Shipbuilding Industry, 138. The British shipbuilding industry, for instance, possessed few facilities for technical or scientific instruction and had an anti-theoretical attitude which depreciated the value of education. 103 Pollard and Robertson, The British Shipbuilding Industry, 138. 106 Marder, PGDN, v./, 65. 38 since the four ships could not train all the boys, either the system should be abolished or twelve ships provided to train all the boys. His memoirs noted that the Admiralty thought "it would be inadvisable to send away so many young seamen; and they were right."107 Commentary in the press was acceptable, but the Admiralty retained sole responsibility for actions. Even during the Fisher-Beresford conflict, Beresford supported policies developed by Fisher if they were the best solution to the navy's challenges.

The 1900 BNA covered "The Recent Discussion on Naval Training," observing

"not only a sharp difference of opinion as to the relative value of what was called "masts and sails training," and of harbour and shore training for seamen, but also a wide divergence of view as to the operation and effect of training in itself, of whatever kind it might be."108 Historical school thinkers focused on the superior sea-knowledge, resilience, resourcefulness and leadership developed by sail-training and practical sea- experience. Material school thinkers argued that a modernised system could provide the same qualitative benefits while giving seamen and officers a better working knowledge of the actual weapons of war. In the case of training, debaters were less concerned with particular schools of thought than with investigating and exposing the problem to scrutiny, trusting that a free and open discussion would provide the best solutions. These intellectuals, including prominent and active naval officers, were the sharp end of the theoretical process attempting to assess the future requirements of naval war and to apply these lessons to the fleet.

107 Beresford, Memoirs, 462. i°8 "The Recent Discussion on Naval Training," BNA, 1900. 39

The initial debates on the value of sail-training focused on the effectiveness of the existing system. Rear-Admiral Sir Gerard H. Noel expressed the conservative service opinion through the USM, arguing that sail training gave officers and men a better knowledge of the sea and with long-service men there was time to teach sailing in addition to gunnery and machinery.109 The physical benefits of exercising with masts and yards was a frequent claim made in favour of the old system.110 Captain S. Eardley-

Wilmot, a prominent member of the Navy League and a frequent contributor to its journal, replied in June that the time cadets spent in the masted Training Squadron was insufficient and there were no officers skilled enough in sailing to teach it effectively.11'

The ANG rallied with the supporters of abolition, denying that sailing gave officers and men more time at sea and pointing out that it was useless because the ships had engines anyway and used them whenever the situation was difficult.112 Overall, the debate on the effectiveness of a masted Training Squadron did not result in a victory for either the progressive or traditional schools of thought, but there was growing consensus that the system needed to be thoroughly examined.113 David Hannay in the Navy and Army

Illustrated (.NAl) summarized the dilemma thus:

It is the character and the habits alike of mind and body which are of value. But habits of mind and body are not formed in a few months.... What then can the masted training squadron give? The knowledge it imparts is not practically valuable, and it is not allowed to shape the character.114

109 Rear-Admiral Sir Gerard H. Noel, "On Seamanship Training for the Naval Executive," USM, Apr 1900, 40-6. 110 See Hely Hutchinson-Almond, "The Breed of Man," NCA, Oct 1900, 656-69. 111 Captain Sidney Eardley-Wilmot, "Naval Training," USM, Jun 1900, 237-41. 112 "Sea or Land Training," ANG, Dec 30 1899, 1249; "Naval Training," ANG, Feb 17 1900, 165. Admiral Cyprian Bridge argued in the Times that the sailing squadron spent more time at sea, and Lord Graham also wrote in support of the Training Squadron. 113 See Admiral Fremantle, "Our Naval Wants," NLJ, Dec 1900, 196-7. 114 David Hannay, "Navies and Armies of the World: From Week to Week," NAl, Jun 16 1900, 293. David Hannay was a British journalist and popular naval historian. Debate on the Training Squadron centered on the amount of sea-experience acquired by officers, and whether the presence of steam engines on the ships had already eliminated the benefits of sailing. Without the risk and challenge of sailing, did the training really provide better development of the seamens' faculties?

The key break in the theoretical discussion on training came with J.R.

Thursfield's highly acclaimed June 1900 lecture at the RUSI. He eschewed any particular position on the issue, having "undertaken to open the question, not to decide it," because only the service could make such a decision.115 Thursfield demonstrated that a balance would need to exist in training between teaching men how to operate the implements of war, and to cultivate "in the fighting seaman of the future just those qualities, physical, mental, and moral, which the discipline of masts and sails imparted in perfection."116 Sail training might need to be sacrificed, but the Admiralty needed to lay out what would be lost and gained by the change.117 The Admiralty alone could decide the question, but there needed to be a clear decision on whether sail training would be worth the cost. Thursfield's lecture demanded that advocates of both change and retention clarify the benefits and costs of their positions. The greater onus was on those pressing for reform, but Thursfield effectively undercut the sail training advocates by implying that what was really needed was a modern system with qualitiative elements.

The discussion extended over two weeks, itself an indication of the importance of the lecture. Thursfield re-emphasized that he was not supporting one side or the other, but wanted "the adaptation of the training of seamen to the conditions in which they will

115 J.R. Thursfield, "The Training of Seamen," JRUSI, Sep 1900, 969. 116 J.R. Thursfield, "The Training of Seamen," JRUSI, Sep 1900, 970-2. 1,7 J.R. Thursfield, "The Training of Seamen," JRUSI, Sep 1900, 975, 980. have to fight, due regard being had to the fact that the sea itself is the first and most vital of those conditions.'"18 Seamanship was a matter of quality of training, not just operating the systems, either of sails or machinery. Supporters such as Admiral Sir

Michael Culme-Seymour, (Commander-in-Chief Portsmouth), Commander the Hon.

Henry N. Shore and Admiral E.R. Fremantle (late Commander-in-Chief China and

Devonport) argued that sails were obsolete and that men needed to be trained on the ships in which they would fight, especially, as Admiral Sir Nathaniel Bowden-Smith

(Commander-in-Chief at the Nore) observed, because stokers needed to be trained on modern steamships.119 Proponents of sails, including Rear-Admiral Sir Gerald H.U.

Noel (Admiral Superintendent of Naval Reserves), Captain George L. Atkinson

(Captain of Chatham Dockyard Reserve and ex-commander of Training Squadron) and

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick W. Richards (late First Sea Lord) argued that not only did sailing give critical sea-time to trainees, there was no effective replacement for the old system. Admiral Sir J.O. Hopkins (late Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean) replied that steamships cruising slowly would get just as much sea time, while Captain R.F.H.

Henderson (Captain Superintendent of Sheerness Dockyard) suggested that sea-time was adequate and that the modern navy needed better training for the individual, as in scientific subjects. Captain A.C. Corry of HMS Camperdown proposed that effective training required "natural pressure" from cadets performing meaningful work on board real warships, which an artificially contrived sailing squadron could not provide.120

Experienced officers were ranged on both sides, but the collective result of the

118 J.R. Thursfield, "The Training of Seamen," JRUSl, Sep 1900, 999. The lengthy discussion of the lecture spilled over into a second meeting. 119 See the discussion of'The Training of Seamen," JRUSl, Sep 1900,987-1025. 120 Captain A.C. Corry in discussion of J.R. Thursfield, "The Training of Seamen," JRUSl, Sep 1900, 1014. 42 discussion was to trigger debate and emphasize that these questions were not settled, and that service opinion did not yet have a clear solution to present.

Admiral Sir J.O. Hopkin's thorough critique of the Royal Navy at the turn of the century restated his support for mechanical training for the modern seaman, because all personnel were required to handle and work technology.121 The subsequent discussion elaborated on this basic concept in an attempt to work out practical suggestions. Thursfield denied that providing sailing ships for imperial supply routes would effectively train seamen, an interesting twist given his former neutral position.122

Rear-Admiral Henderson, presenting Fremantle's ideas, suggested that men should be trained at sea, in training-ships, and, if steam-powered, would provide stoker as well as seamen training. As with Thursfield's lecture, there was no decisive result, although

Admiral Bowden-Smith hoped that, "the Admiralty will be assisted in coming to a decision upon many important questions which will have to be considered in the coming year."123 The debaters did not presume to determine policy. However, through the discourse they were able to impress upon the Admiralty the need for a more fundamental reform programme, and to lend prestige and support to such an advance, while simultaneously suggesting potential avenues of development.

The vociferousness of the debates regarding sail training sparked a somewhat surprising rejoinder from Selborne. On January 25, 1902 the ANG repeated from a Times article the complaint that there had never been "a decisive statement that the masts and

121 Admiral Sir J.O. Hopkins, "A Few Naval Ideas for the Coming Century," JRUSI, Jan 1901, 12. In his second prize essay for the 1900 RUSI essay contest Lt. and Cdr. E.C. Villiers also suggested that the modern seaman should be able to work both weapons and motive power, as the seamen did in the Age of Sail, so there would be no need for separate classes, (Lt. and Cdr. E.C. Villiers, "Naval Prize Essay," JRUSI, Jul 1900, 750). 122 See discussion of "A Few Naval Ideas for the Coming Century," JRUSI, Jan 1901, 22-7. 123 Admiral Sir N. Bowden-Smith in discussion of "A Few Naval Ideas for the Coming Century," JRUSI, Jan 1901, 36. sails system of training has passed away, and that officers are to concentrate their attention on devising a system of training in the fleets suited to modern war conditions."124 Within a month, Selborne's statement on the Estimates for 1902-3 stated,

"I desire that there should be no ambiguity on this subject, and therefore state plainly that the Board do not consider exercise with masts and yards to be essential for the proper training of the officers or seamen of the Fleet."125 Selborne acknowledged that mast and yard work was "excellent both for mind and body," but questioned whether it was essential in providing officers and seamen with the best skills and knowledge to wage modern war. This was decisively answered in the negative.

Service opinion still held on to the qualitative benefits of sail training. The conservative Naval Annual for 1902 believed that while Selborne's statement was a predictable consequence of the abolition of the training squadron, it would lead to a

"deterioration of the quality of both officers and men."126 This opinion mimicked the arguments and criticisms presented by Kerr in response to Selborne's proposals for serious change. The onus then shifted to the progressive school to develop proposals that would ensure the adequate development of officers' and mens' faculties, to complement their knowledge of drill and equipment. Commanding the new torpedo-boat destroyers was proposed as a solution to training officers for leadership, as well as tactics, and was present in both the periodical discourse and in official thought127 These practical solutions were increasingly implemented in order to combine the qualitative benefits of the old system without relying on outdated technology.

124 "Naval War Training," ANG, Jan 25 1902, 85. 12i Lord Selborne, "Statement Explanatory of the Naval Estimates, 1902-1903," BNA, 1902, 383. 126T.A. Brassey, "Progress ofthe British Navy," BNA, 1902, 13. 127 Beresford, Memoirs, 27; 'Naval Officer,' "Naval Education - The Cart Before the Horse," USM, Mar 1902, 565-70. On the progressive side, the ANG, like the more radical NLJ, supported a reconceptualising of the foundations of naval education. All aspects of training should

"adapt the fighting man to the modern art of fighting at every point of his training and mental equipment" so he could think and act instinctively in action.128 The ANG agreed with Julian S. Corbett and other reformist authors that the British naval officer needed a greater degree of intellectual training to compete with foreiga navies, but emphasized that overly academic training should not displace practical training.129 Fred T. Jane expanded on this point, because while the public was "questioning the strategic and tactical thinking of officers, the navy was much more experienced in the practical work of seamanship which was more important in war."130 Jane was not out to restore sail training, but to give the Admiralty Board the confidence due to such a dedicated and professional body, and to remind readers that the Board was capable and entirely responsible for the decisions. Training debates began to focus on providing the most effective preparation for war, discarding any sentimental ties to Ihe old sailing navy.

In May, 1902 the NLJ reprinted a Monthly Review article by Julian S. Corbett, a friend and supporter of Fisher and the material school, which argued that, "The principle of the old mast-and-sail training was not masts and sails, but the setting of the boy at once to the duties of his life" and therefore a short spell with rigging was not a means of improving the quality of seamen.131 Thus, the new officer in a steam fleet needed to be exposed as quickly as possible to the practical aspects of his craft. Corbett's arguments

128 "Naval War Training," ANG, Jan 25 1902, 85. 129 "Navy Notes," ANG, Sep 6 1902, 858; "The Schoolmaster Afloat," ANG, Sep 20 1902, 905. Julian S. Corbett was a lecturer at the Naval War College, a close correspondent of Fisher and prominent naval historian in the pre-World War I period. 130 Fred T. Jane, 'The Navy - Is A11 Well?," FR, 453. Jane thought that in the controversy over paint vs gunnery, paint occupied the men better than excessive drill, and gunnery training was not affected. 131 Julian S. Corbett, "The State of the Navy "NLJ, May 1902,105. Extracts from Mar 1902 Monthly Review. for technical instruction, discipline, and seamanship, which included a younger age of

entry in order to provide a more thorough grounding in technical subjects while

retaining key practical training like boat sailing, were summarized in the ANG, which

was "content to ventilate the subject, and to express gratification that Mr Corbett turns

his mind to the sea."132 After Corbett's second article in April 1902, the ANG found that his scheme, while offering superior mathematical, scientific and linguistic training, "is so revolutionary, that it could only be adopted as a frank confession of utter failure of naval training on the existing lines," which the ANG could not support.133 Thinkers proposing radical solutions needed to adopt the proper attitude towards the authorities, and recognize that they could only offer suggestions and comments which needed to be moderate and reasonable.

In spite of the significance of the public discourse as an innovator and explorer of new ideas, key officers assured the public that the authorities were in control.

Beresford, summarized the ANG, "states that neither he nor any other outside reformer should get any credit for the changes which are about to take place in the Navy, it is entirely due to the authorities.... we should suppose that they intend to add to the training which gives one these qualities that other training and education which the changes in the material of the fleet have rendered essential."134 The combination of qualitative and material elements was promised, along with a confirmation of the official sanction of the anticipated reforms. Government by newspaper had its advocates, but the service press consistently reaffirmed the hierarchy of power.

132 "Reviews: Some Magazines," ANG, Apr 12 1902, 347. 133 "A Naval Education Scheme," ANG, May 17 1902,468-9. 134 "Navy Notes," ANG, Dec 13 1902, 1193. The discourse on officer training resulted in a conditional victory for proponents of mechanical training. The advocates of sail training were able to justify their opposition by demonstrating that training had two purposes, firstly teaching men the tools of their trade, and more importantly instilling the personal qualities that made the

British seaman the most effective. By utilizing destroyers for command experience and making sea service an important element of training, the Selborne Scheme addressed the reasonable commentary of the 'historical school.' Sail training had become a 'Perfected

Reality,' in Lynn's terms, where, "if reality cannot be modified to match conception, then a society might very well spin off an artificial and highly ritualized form of military behaviour that better matches the discourse on war."135 The British naval discourse, in this case, was able to circumvent the increasing ritualization of training, and through the

Selborne Scheme attempted to make training structures more realistic and effective.

The Selborne Scheme

Amalgamation and common mechanical training drew the primary threads of the personnel discourse together, and offered a thorough solution to modernizing the training system. Ruddock Mackay pointed out that, in view of the general failing of technical or specialist education in Britain, the Selborne Scheme produced "a great state- financed technical school [the Britannia] (though it has rarely been looked on in such a light) which showed what might have been achieved in the new secondary system."136 It would integrate and equalize the officer corps, while providing a coherent course of training. A letter from Fisher to Selborne on October 11,1902 stated, "We have got out a skeleton of the whole scheme.'"37 What the periodical discourse shows is that these

135 Lynn, Battle, xxi. 156 Mackay, Balfour, 104-5. 137 Fisher to Selborne, Oct 11 1902, Boyce, ed., The Crisis of British Power, 151. 47 ideas were already achieving some consensus and public opinion had been groomed to receive a thorough reform of the existing establishment.

Preceding the Selbome Scheme by more than six months, the semi-official BNA for 1902 summarized the state of affairs, rhetorically asking, "why should not the young engineers and marines join the naval college and follow the same course of instruction for a year or so until they have either voluntarily sorted themselves or had been sorted by an examination giving the choice of service to the highest?138 BNA's advocacy of combined training went further than the consensus on engineer-executive amalgamation by including the Royal Marines in the training program, thus wholly encapsulating the essence of the Selborne Scheme.139 Again, it is hard to know whether Fisher and the

Admiralty were drawing ideas from BNA, but they could not have been unaware of either the ideas being presented, or the reactions of the public, writers and officers.

The ANG in November 1902 repeatedly noted that a new training scheme, involving "nomination, common entry, a common groundwork of education, and specialisation with adequate technical and practical training" was being developed, but the issue was complicated because of sentiment and tradition. The^jVG noted that

Selborne declared that the programme would "be the fruit of long consideration, and not of the plans outlined by writers for the Press.'"40 Quoting the Engineer, amalgamation

138 'Cruiser,' "The "Britannia" Naval College," BNA, 1902, 239; "The State of the Navy," NLJ, Jun 1902, 139. This article reviewed BNA, commenting it "has long since taken rank as the standard source of information on naval subjects" as a "semi-official publication." 139 The Royal Marines were included in the Selborne Scheme. The marine officer corps had long-standing grievances over die lack of command positions available to them, and the limited number of duties they had on board ship. Turning a marine officers position into a specialty for naval lieutenants ensured that there would be the potential for more senior command positions and increase the usefulness of the officers on board ship. This element of die scheme was the least successful, however, and was ultimately dropped before any of the new lieutenants reached the specialization stage. For information on the marines, see Cyril Field, Britain's Sea Soldiers: A History of the Royal Marines, Vol. II, (Liverpool: The Lyceum Press, 1924) and James D. Ladd, The Royal Marines, 1919-1980, (London: Janes, 1980). 140 "Reviews: Some Magazines," ANG, Nov 8 1902, 1071; "Navy Notes," ANG, Nov 22 1902, 1121. would satisfy the engineers without hurting the executive, and recognized that warships were complex machines that "must be controlled by engineers, and that engineers must

be wonderfully all-round men, not merely engine drivers, but electricians, chemists and

artillerists."141 As the scheme was developed, even rumours regarding its structure were discussed and critiqued as journals and writers predicted and extrapolated the challenges facing the new reforms.

The RUSI also supported amalgamation, ensuring that the majority of serving officers would be preliminarily exposed to the idea of common entry and mechanical training. Commander H. Orpen's "The Origin, Evolution, and Future of the Personnel of the British Royal Navy" argued that the production of motive power was secondary to the utilization of that power in combat, and so men trained solely in the mechanical arts would be unable to simply assume command or combat roles. Instead, the training system needed to be revised to gradually "combine in each officer the mechanical qualifications of the engineer with the sea military knowledge of the executive."142

Afterwards, Beresford expressed his approval that the problem of training was being thoroughly discussed and examined, although he was unsure if Orpen's suggestions would be the ideal structure.

Selborne was highly cognizant and interactive with the media. Notably, Lord

Selborne's "Statement Explanatory of the Naval Estimates, 1902-3" referred to the

usefulness of the "attention... paid by writers on naval matters to the questions of the

education of the officers of the Navy." "I am glad that this was so," Selborne explained,

"because, important as the materiel of the Navy is, the personnel is much more

141 "Navy Notes," ANG, Dec 20 1902,1218. 142 Commander H. Orpen, "The Origin, Evolution, and Future of the Personnel of the British Royal Navy," JRUSI, Jan 1903, 22-3. important."'43 Selborne identified the lack of a systematic education program as the key element of criticism, focused around two themes: a lack of sea-training and the poor arrangement of course subjects. In personal documents, however, there is little systematic discussion by either Fisher or Selborne of the intellectual genesis of their ideas regarding the revolution in training.

The Selborne Scheme was promulgated in a Christmas Day memorandum in

1902. It provided for the common entry of officers at ages twelve to thirteen. There would be four years of common training at the Britannia Naval College, with practical seamanship on training ships and mechanical engineering in machine shops being two notable aspects. Promoted to sub-lieutenants was followed by a three-year training cruise, followed by a year on an active ship. The lieutenants would then be differentiated according to their chosen specialty of engineer, marine or executive (in turn as general service, torpedo or gunnery). The Scheme was partly based on an improvement to the

American system, which had instantaneously transformed into an interchangeable system. Mainly, the difference between the systems lay in the specialization of the branches after a period of common training. Thus, opportunities and duties would be more fairly distributed, but officers would become more advanced specialists in their chosen profession. Marder's description of the personnel reform noted significant confusion over the intent of the reforms, specifically regarding interchangeability, and the role of snobbery in the resistance to equalizing the status of engineers.144

The Selborne Scheme was initially well-received by the daily press, although no naval writer was willing to wholeheartedly sanction a radical new scheme without the

143 Lord Selborne, "Statement Explanatory of the Naval Estimates, 1902-3," BNA, 1902, 380. 144 See Marder, FGDN, 243-5; Marder, From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 46-7; Rippon, Evolution of Engineering, 228-232, for information on the Selborne Scheme. proviso that it be open to discussion and debate as experience was gained. Fisher even wrote a letter to Selborne to "congratulate [him] on the splendid reception the Press has given [his] memorandum."145 A naval officer's articles in the Daily Graphic were critical of the supposed lack of sea-training provided by the scheme, a claim denied by the ANG, which felt that the provision of training cruisers meant that nothing required for sea-training had been omitted from the scheme.146 The ANG's editors argued that the

Selborne Scheme was a "masterly and statesmanlike solution of a great problem," which time alone could test.147 Admiral Fremantle, a prestigious retired officer and highly prolific writer, while concerned over some of the ramifications of the Scheme, felt compelled to emphasize the "comprehensive grasp shown of the naval requirements of the personnel, which it is convenient for hostile critics to overlook, but which shows an appreciation of the true wants of the Service, and a reforming energy for which we have long looked in vain."148

The scheme was admired at least for the thoroughness of its attempt to solve the problems facing the navy, but the press did not falter in its attempts to evaluate and improve upon the system. Beresford was initially supportive of the scheme, calling it a necessary and masterful approach to the problem, a position supported by Admiral

Hopkins.149 First Sea Lord Kerr expressed to Selborne in November 1902 some of the criticisms that the scheme would face. Primarily, this involved the belief that engineering applications would drop of£ and the idea that the service was fine before.150

145 Fisher to Selborne, Dec 25 1902, Crisis of British Power, 154. 144 "The New Scheme," ANG, Jan 3 1903, 13. 147 "The New Naval Scheme," ANG, Dec 27 1902, 1240. 148 Admiral E.R. Fremantle, "The Admiralty Scheme: Lord Selborne's Christmas Box," USM, Mar 1903, 571; repeated in L.G. Carr Laughton, "Imperial Policy," USM, Vol 26, Mar 1903, 557. 149 Fisher, Records, 164-6. 150 Kerr to Selborne, Nov 30 1902, Crisis of British Power, 153. This latter point indicates the volte face of Kerr, who now accepted that the increasing civil agitation regarding the engineers was only going to increase and that a proactive stance was the best means of preventing future discord.

After the initial furor over the scheme had passed, the press began to anticipate the challenges facing the system, and predict the effectiveness of particular measures.

Concerned officers and civilians were unwilling to completely leave training reform to the Admiralty Board, instead seeing it as a patriotic duty to examine the issues and test, theoretically, the wisdom of particular choices. These assessments over the effectiveness of amalgamated mechanical training show the continuity of the pre-reform debates as well as the concern that the educated public had for the qualitative state of the navy and their willingness to be involved to ensure the continued naval supremacy of Britain.

Criticism of the Selborne Scheme focused around the issue of interchangeability rather than initial common training. Historian Ruddock Mackay admitted that there were "reasonable objections to [the] 'interchangeability'" of officer candidates, rather than simply blind conservatism that more ardent Fisherites have claimed.151 The ANG for January 10 1903 had already observed that, "It would be a mistake to over-estimate the apparently unanimous approval of the principle of the scheme and to take it for granted that Service opinion is entirely favourable."152 'A

Naval Officer' in the September 1903 USM argued that when "matters have been too long neglected [it] usually leads to panic legislation, with its accompanying errors of omission and commission; the present scheme of reform is certainly no exception to this rule."153 Reforms required thorough consideration and intellectual justification.

151 Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone, 277-8. 152 "Navy Notes," ANG, Jan 10 1903, 37. 153 'A Naval Officer,' "Some Weak Points of Naval Administration," USM, Sep 1903, 574. The confusion was over whether the junior specialist officers would be interchangeable, or just the senior officer positions. Initially, the assumption was that the specialization of officers would be permanent, implying that only those in the executive branch could rise to command positions. The ANG favoured putting all senior officers in the same class, because the scheme would be flawed if engineers and marines did not have the incentive of promotion open to them.154 However, the ANG did note that, "the announcement that the division of branches will remain definite and final is merely a record of the opinion of the present Board, and, as Lord Selborne observes, no very useful purpose can be served by speculating as to what a Board may do ten or twelve years hence."155 Criticism and suggestions were welcomed, but were not binding on the

Admiralty. Conversation and analysis would ensure not only that the scheme was built on the best theory, but by giving critics a voice it helped to unify public and service opinion and increase the acceptability of the programme.

Some critics believed that the scheme had gone farther than was needed, and were concerned that the new system would teach too much. Appleyard considered that the scheme was more extreme than the engineers had desired. Engineering knowledge would help the executive, but Appleyard argued that those who chose engineering should remain with that branch because "'Jacks-of-all-trades' and 'rolling stones' seldom attain real proficiency in any capacity whatever."156 Thus, common training was not the major problem as long as specialization into command and engineering branches was a definitive choice.

154 "Navy Notes," ANG, Jan 3 1903, 14. The ANG was responding to the suggestion in the January USM that navigating lieutenants a separate list, which was the same problem of removing important incentives. 155 "Looking Forward," ANG, Jan 17 1903, 60. 154 Appleyard, "The Admiralty Scheme," FR, Feb 1903, 470. Along this line of criticism, 'Telescope' in the USM argued that engineers were not capable of assuming command of ships. Even with steam the elements were still supreme, and so "the deck-officer with an entire absence of engineering knowledge is far more competent to take charge and command of a ship than the most highly trained engineer, whose training in constant observation of the wind and sea is inadequate."157

The best way of teaching these command and sea skills was to place young officers in command of destroyers where they could learn "Every quality necessary to make a commando- of a fleet," particularly tactics and fleet manoeuvres.158

Some executive officers were displeased with the amalgamation. 'Dubitator' in

"The Admiralty Scheme" and a 'Lieutenant R.N.' in "Against Combined Training" in the February 1903 USM made the point that the principle demands of engineers, namely equal rank, pay and authority, could have been given without "spoiling both our

Executive and Engineer officers by combining their training."159 Engineers did not have the time to learn executive duties, or vice versa. These arguments failed to convince other authors, and were largely a reactionary stance that resembled more of the 'blind conservatism' and snobbery that materiel school historians have attributed to critics.

The importance of practical training at sea was demonstrated conclusively by the

Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, which taught that training could decide battles. Hubert

Garbett in the USM expressed the consensus opinion that while the Russian officers may have been well educated, they lacked practical training in comparison to the Japanese

157 'Telescope,' "Fleet Tactics," USM, Mar 1904, 572. 158 'Telescope,' "Fleet Tactics," USM, Mar 1904, 573-4. Fleet tactics operate the same with destroyers or even picquet-boats as with battleships, and would give more officers command experience. 159 'Dubitator,' "The Admiralty Scheme," USM, Feb 1903, 467-70; 'Lieutenant R.N.' "Against Combined Training," USM, Feb 1903,472. who coupled theory with rigorous practice.160 The lesson, naturally, was that the new training system needed to maintain the proper balance between theory and practice in order to achieve peak effectiveness.

BNA also argued that combining the executive and the engineer, "who performs very dissimilar duties," was as a mistake.161 Carlyon Bellairs' "Chapter IX: The New

Naval Scheme" summed up the arguments regarding officer training as: opponents of the scheme felt that cadets would receive insufficient practical training at sea, while proponents argued that the executive was no worse off than under Goschen's program and the marines and engineers would be better off.162 Bellairs focused on the problems of interchangeability, claiming it was based on inaccurate analogies with the past and the

"false perspectives" of peacetime. As the semi-official representative of service opinion,

BNA assumed the conservative approach to the reform proposal and acted as a voice of caution against any rash dislocation of the Royal Navy.

In BNA's efforts to achieve balance, a chapter by Admiral Sir Vesey Hamilton, one of the most reactionary of historical school writers, was included. He considered that, "there had been no general demand for naval reform, let alone revolution, on the part of the country" and that therefore the scheme lacked a national mandate.163 These arguments and criticisms lacked realism. Looking back to Selborne's February 1902 memorandum, the situation required more than a simple patch.

160 Hubert Garbett, "The First Round," USM, Mar 1904, 553. 161 T.A. Brassey, "Chapter I: The Progress of the British Navy," BNA, 1903, 2. 162 Carlyon Bellairs, "Chapter IX: The New Naval Scheme," BNA, 1903, 193. Bellairs retired from the navy in 1902 because of defective eyesight He was initially an ally of Fisher, but after an article on naval guns in the Daily Graphic in 1905 he became a critic. He served as a Liberal MP from 1906-1909, a Conservative MP 1909-1910 and 1915-1931, and from 1906 onward was a vigorous opponent of Fisher. 163 R. Vesey Hamilton, "Chapter X: The New Admiralty Education Scheme," BNA, 1903, 209. What was needed was a fundamental change in the approach to officers' entry and training to eliminate the structural deficiencies of the existing system. In May 1903

Selborne clarified the scheme by stating in a House of Lords debate that complete interchangeability was not an intended aspect of the programme. This statement was not in accordance with the original views of Fisher, but addressed the dominant and pervasive criticism that the scheme was being publicly subjected to.164 Constructive criticism addressed the scheme as a step forward in naval development, and worked to improve the arrangements provided by Selborne. Interchangeability was the cornerstone of the new dialogue, rather than any attempts to turn back the policy clock and restore the old system of separately entered and trained departments.

From 1905 to 1906 a six-part article series was published anonymously in

Blackwood's by Admiral Reginald Custance which thoroughly criticized every aspect of

Admiralty policy. Custance argued that naval education needed to focus less on the mechanical and technical aspects and more on operation and management. He drew several lessons from naval history,

naval officers should be given the best general education possible before being sent to sea; should become early accustomed to a sea life; should possess a practical working knowledge of their ships and everything they contain; and the leading men should have not only a complete knowledge of the "conduct of war," but a wide and thorough grasp of the principles underlying any particular specialite which they adopt.165

Custance's critique seems somewhat out of place, because these concerns were exactly what the scheme was trying to develop. His contribution to the dialogue was to refocus

144 Fisher to Selborne, Dec 25 1902, Crisis of British Power, 154. 165 'By the author of "A Retrograde Admiralty,'" "Naval Education: Its Past and Future," BEM, Oct 1905, 446. attention on the need for tactical and strategic study, rather than over-emphasizing the detailed technical aspects which the Engine-Room Artificers were employed to handle.

Criticism of the Selborne Scheme was not particularly vicious because the scheme was always understood as a bold and thorough attempt at reform, and one in which discussion was encouraged and modifications expected. In March 1907 The Fleet concluded that, "Instead of showing the fundamental resemblance between the present and the past, [the Selborne Scheme] dwelt on the superficial difference, and thus sacrifices the strength which the new policy would have gained had it been understood that we were simply returning to the old practice" of having the motive power and armament worked by the same body of officers and men.166 Once Fisher returned to the

Admiralty as First Sea Lord in October 1904, the personnel question was revisited by a committee. By then the new system had been in place for two years, and the time had come to revisit the issues and decide which criticisms had merit and should be used to modify the programme.

The Cawdor Revision and Conclusions

On March 27 1905 Frederick Campbell, third Earl of Cawdor, replaced Lord

Selborne as the First Lord of the Admiralty. He would only hold office until December

4, when an election was called and the Unionist (Conservative and Liberal Imperialist) government was replaced by a staggering Liberal majority. In his term of office, however, Cawdor made a substantial contribution to naval reform in the shape of the

Cawdor Memorandum. Sir William H. White, KCB, FRS, a former Chief Constructor and prominent commentator on naval affairs, summarised the officer training elements of the new memorandum,

166 "Naval Policy," The Fleet, Mar 1907, 90-1. 57

Under the new system of education one class of officer can perform engineering and executive duties; specialisation in engineering duties need not be permanent: in future, the principle responsibility for the management of the machinery of [His Majesty's] ships may be entrusted with confidence to officers who will take these duties as an incident in their career - just as executive officers now take gunnery, torpedo, or navigating duties - and will be eligible thereafter to resume executive duties and to rise to the highest commands. These conclusions contradict Lord Selborne's memorandum, and involve a departure from the method of training naval engineers which has proved successful in the Royal Navy hitherto; they are also opposed to experience and opinion in the mercantile marine.167

The new approach differentiated between specialist junior officers and unspecialized command positions. W.H. White clearly objected to the new scheme, but what is significant is that Cawdor responded to the criticisms over a non-interchangeable system, and saw fit, after two years of experience, to adjust the former system.

In 1906 BNA offered a pair of articles on "The Engineering Question," one for each side of the problem. Carlyon Bellairs argued against an interchangeable system, preferring instead to "increase the emoluments of the engineers... without attempting to disturb the rigid specialisation which is necessary for efficiency.'"68 Bellairs suggested that the Selborne Memorandum provided the Admiralty with "a breathing period in which they were untroubled by the civil engineering agitation, and many officers firmly believed this to be their chief object."169 Bellairs repeated the standard arguments regarding specialisation, but the idea that the scheme was intended to quiet the civil engineering unions fits in with Selborne's anticipation of parliamentary interference in

1902. On the other hand, 'Archimedes' defended the scheme, seeing critics as making political capital out of the issues through class conflict. "The plain duty of Englishmen" he said, "is to wait and see how the new scheme, promising so well, works out in

167 W.H. White, "The Education and Training of Engineers - Civil and Naval," NCA, Jun 1906, 1035. 168 Bellairs, "The Engineering Question, I "BNA, 1906, 121. 169 Bellairs, "The Engineering Question, I," BNA, 1906,121-2. practice."170 Until more time had passed no committee could be more competent to decide the question than the current Board of the Admiralty.

The common entry and training was intended to be applied to the enlisted men of the fleet as well. The ANG was in favour of this development immediately following the

Selborne Scheme's promulgation, although it would cost more, because it would ease the manning problems of the engine room in peacetime, and enable a ship at war to reinforce any part of the crew with fully trained men.171 By 1905 'Raven' in The Fleet believed that "common entry and equal chances for all joining the Navy would eventually allocate each individual to his proper function, and produce that fighting cohesion which is curtailed and seriously impeded by the present existence of the multitudinous ranks and ratings, having no common sympathies, only apparent to those serving."172 This involved emphasizing intelligence over physical fitness.173

Commentators never reached consensus on the ideal system for training either the officers or the men of the fleet, but the continual investigations by the periodical press gave informed, experienced and intelligent officers and thinkers the opportunity to contribute to the discourse on reform. Ultimately, as 'Ward-Room' concluded,

Money is being wasted... But I do not believe there is much scope for economising with the personnel of the fleet - at least, not until some one has discovered that much-wanted officer, 'a medical missionary with an aptitude for accounts,' as some one wittingly put it not long since. By that time we may have evolved the seaman gunner-torpedo man-stoker-artificer-sick berth attendant- steward-domestic, who will suffice for all things and die in a lunatic asylum.174

170 'Archimedes,' "The Engineering Question, 11," BNA, 1906,143. 171 "Sauce for the Goose," ANG, Jan 31 1903, 109. 172 'Raven,' "The Navy and Its Traditions," The Fleet, May 1905, 16. 173 "Naval Recruiting," The Fleet, May 1905, 20-1. 174 'Ward-Room,' "Our Naval Expenditure," USM, Feb 1905,497. 59

No scheme could have satisfied all of the contributors commentating on personnel reform. By allowing and even encouraging participation, though, the Admiralty drew on the creativity and experience of a wide community of interest, and in the process garnered support for the reforms.

Ultimately, the system established by the Selborne Scheme was abandoned. In

1912 the recruitment of Marine officers reverted to a separate system because the common training experience was too naval in focus. As well, cadets were not given a choice of service, and because the seamen executive was the most popular branch, cadets posted to other branches resented the situation.175 For the Engineering branch, time showed that while the common training at Dartmouth was excellent, the six months at Greenwich and fifteen months at the Royal Naval Engineering College, Keyham were not sufficient to replace the in-depth knowledge formerly acquired during five years at

Keyham.176 After 1921, the separation for specialization of Engineers was begun at the midshipman level rather than the sub-lieutenant level in order to give four years of specifically engineering training. The press commentary in the reform years had merit, and while the scheme accurately predicted the needs of the executive officers, it could have benefited from the contributions regarding engineering reform.

After mid-1903, the issue of naval training took a back seat to the demands for strategic and technological reform. Periodicals anticipated the arrival of yet more dramatic reforms of naval policy, BNA pronouncing in mid-1904 that, "It is now known that the famous Memorandum of Lord Selborne, which appeared on Christmas Day,

1902, had reference only to one part of a larger scheme of reorganisation, of which it is

175 Field, Britain's Sea Soldiers, v. II, 229. 176 Rippon, Evolution of Engineering, 229. 60 believed that not the whole has yet been disclosed."177 Periodical debates provided less of a leadership role in the development of the material reform programmes instituted after Fisher returned to the Admiralty as First Sea Lord in October 1904, but consistently offered predictions and suggestions preceeding policy decisions. The periodical press remained an important avenue for the courting of public opinion. Repeatedly, reform schemes and ideas were presented to the educated and navally-minded public to gauge their reaction prior to their implementation.

In evaluating the role of the periodical press in the Selborne Scheme, there is very little to directly connect public discussion with the decision making. What is clearl, however, is the high coincidence of parallel development between the ideas that dominated the periodical press and those that were privately voiced by key policy makers. Frequently the reform programmes were presented in the press when private letters indicate that policy makers themselves were undecided. In this situation, the role of periodical discourse cannot be ignored in the formulation of theories and programmes addressing identical issues with identical solutions. Policy makers read magazines and journals, referred key articles to other officials, and formed part of the intellectual class involved with producing the detailed and informed articles of the periodical press. In fact, the periodical press was not simply a commentator on naval issues, but in several key areas and stages of debate proved itself to be in advance of the official thought. This was certainly the case in the Fisher Reforms of 1904-05.

177 John Leyland, "Chapter VIII: The Reorganisation of the Personnel," BNA, 1904,176. CHAPTER ID: THE BIRTH OF MINERVA The Periodical Press and the Development of the 1904 Fisher Reform Programme

[A] reform thus introduced doesn't grow up, like your shore-going reforms, with such accretions and abstraction that its own father doesn't know it. No! It emerges like Minerva out of the head of Jupiter! full-grown, armed, ready for work at once, in its prime!178 Admiral Sir John A. Fisher, 1904

Admiral John Fisher was a vigorous self-promoter, and was quick to emphasize the leading role he played in reforming the Royal Navy. This impression shaped

Marder's historical analysis, and led to an over-appreciation of Fisher to the detriment of other leading figures. Fisher often lashed out at those who disagreed with him, and belittled their ideas as blind and reactionary. However, recent historical analysis has revealed the corporate responsibility for the development and implementation of the major reform programmes undertaken during the Fisher era. The reform of the material of the Royal Navy - its ships and establishments - was the product of years of discussion over the sufficiency and efficiency of the fleet for instant war, coupled with evaluations of the international situation. The Fisher Reforms were therefore an integrated readjustment of naval resources to address the strategic challenges increasingly occupying British defence thought and public debate in the press.

After a year's sojourn as Commander-in-Chief of the Portsmouth Dockyard,

Fisher returned to the Admiralty as First Sea Lord on October 21,1904, the ninety-ninth anniversary of Trafalgar Day. Selborne invited Fisher back to implement economies in the continuously rising Naval Estimates which Parliament and the press, especially the daily newspapers, demanded. Fisher had five months notice of his posting, and began laying out his reform programme immediately.179 The 1904 Fisher Reforms took

178 Fisher, FGDN v./, 315. 179 See Fisher, Records, 129-57 for his initial proposals to Selbome on October 19,1904. 62 advantage of improvements in propulsion, weapons technology, fire control and communication systems, to redesign the Royal Navy's force structure in order to provide more effective and efficient security for the British Empire. They were a four-part system whose overarching purpose was to compensate for Britain's inability to maintain quantitative superiority by instead relying on qualitative superiority in men and material.

The Royal Navy was reaching a crisis point in terms of its strategic orientation by 1904. As Lord Selborne pointed out in 1905, "A new and definite stage has been reached in that evolution of the modem steam navy which has been going on for the last thirty years, and that stage is marked not only by changes in materiel of the British Navy itself, but also by changes in the strategical position all over the world arising out of the development of Foreign Navies."180 The Royal Navy could no longer maintain worldwide numerical supremacy in the face of growing competition both in Europe and in the world. Given Britain's economic decline, and the increasing unit cost of naval vessels, it was no longer economically possible to outbuild the world. The Fisher reforms were an attempt to maintain naval superiority within budgetary constraints, implementing a more sophisticated distribution and structure of forces. These ideas were not new or revolutionary.

The intellectual discourse in the media discussed the merits of particular changes prior to 1904, and provided lengthy critiques of Admiralty policy. Such theoretical discourse was an effective means of testing policies, and of assessing the lessons and meaning of the Russo-Japanese war and manoeuvres. Fisher also, to an unprecedented degree, kept in touch with journalists in order to cultivate public support and ensure the

"° Lord Selborne, "Memorandum of First Lord on the Distribution and Mobilisation of the Fleet," BNA, 1905, 455. success of his reforms. Public confidence also served to prevent a naval scare from prompting Parliamentary interference in his plans. Policy-makers in the Fisher Era realized that they needed to operate with an eye towards public opinion if their reforms were to succeed and endure.

Fleet Distribution

The Fisher reforms were built upon a series of strategic adjustments designed to counter foreign naval development. Periodicals were key in providing rational explanations about the redistributions of the fleet to the British public, and mitigated the effects of the scaremongering daily press. However, the redistributions of the fleet closely correlate with the dominant trends in the periodicals, demonstrating that even defence policy was formulated in the context of a much wider social conversation than historians have hitherto allowed.

The need for economy was presented to the British public as a secondary justification for Fisher's reforms, with the primary focus being the real strategic need to modernize fleet distribution, foreign squadrons and reserve manning. H. Montgomery in the December 1904 USM argued that in order to prevent uneducated parliamentary cutbacks, the navy, "needed a sane, intelligent, and intelligible naval policy, not the reckless squandering of millions in vain effort to create and maintain a fleet of all sorts, of gigantic dimensions, with vast dockyards and naval bases in every quarter of the globe. This is not statesmanship, but lunacy.. ..'"81 Writing immediately after the promulgation of Fisher's four part reform programme, Montgomery illustrates that the

British public had a very complete picture of the stakes involved in naval reform.

181 H. Montgomery, "Our Naval Expenditure - How to Reduce It," USM, Dec 1904, 247, 253. Imperial strategy and economics were intertwined, and the choice was never as simple as just paying for more ships and men.

The Mediterranean was the strategic centre of British naval planning in the first years of the twentieth century, and the sufficiency of the Mediterranean fleet was foremost in public opinion. Writers in the civilian press, such as the FR, attempted to moderate the Anglo-French antagonism, fuelled by polemical newspapers and publications, that was at the core of British foreign relations.182 Karl Blind's July 1900

FR article argued that Britain needed to pre-emptively solve the outstanding grievances with France and Russia, instead of relying on a 'muddling through' approach.183 "The

British Navy: L Naval Questions of the Day" considered that the press and Parliament were focused on the sufficiency of the Mediterranean Fleet, considering that Britain needed to have a margin of superiority over the substantial reserve personnel capacity of

France and Russia.184 The periodicals acted to moderate the discussions, and advocated the use of diplomacy in shaping the British strategic horizon.

Fisher himself, as Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Fleet, 1899-1902, frequently petitioned the Admiralty for increases in his cruiser and flotilla numbers up to the actual strength which would be deployed in war. He employed journalist allies, particularly Arnold White, to agitate and draw attention to the state of the fleet.185 Fisher was actively involved in White's writing, including reading proofs and offering suggestions and commentary.186 In 1901, similar involvement with the press backfired

182 Pierre de Coubertin, "The Possibility of a War Between England and France," FR, May 1900, 719-26. The British press is characterized as more insulting, but the French press as more irritating. 183 Karl Blind, "France, Russia and the Peace of the World," FR, Jul 1900,28-38. i«4 "jjjg British Navy: I. Naval Questions of the Day," FR, Aug 1901, 239-48. 183 Fisher to White, Mar 1901, FGDN, v./, 187. 186 Fisher to Arnold White, Jul 17 1900, FGDN, v./, 157. 65 on Lord Charles Beresford, the second-in-command of the Mediterranean Fleet, when

White published a private letter from him in the Daily Mail criticizing the provision of cruisers, destroyers and auxiliaries as well as the fitness of the fleet for war.187 It was against naval regulations for an active officer to write publicly, although being on half- pay or using pseudonyms evaded this, and service periodicals condemned the actions of a senior officer using the press to circumvent the chain of command.188 Discipline was supreme, and so while retired officers and civilians could write publicly, serving officers were only tolerated when they used a pseudonym to at least superficially conceal dissent within the service.

The Beresford incident demonstrated both the power and the risk of using the press. The ANG responded by arguing that newspaper commentators should leave the details of fleet distribution to the experts, and ridiculed "The idea that any division of our naval forces should appeal to the people of the country through the columns of a magazine 'for timely, adequate, and complete reinforcements.'"189 Fisher himself initially believed that the letter would have no effect. By October 7 1901 he expressed his appreciation that the agitation caused by Beresford's letter resulted in the Admiralty officially establishing the Channel Fleet as the reinforcement of the Mediterranean Fleet and instituting common manoeuvres.190 It was the media that ultimately pressured the

187 The now Rear-Admiral Wilmot H. Fawkes transmitted this letter to Fisher on June 27 1900, FGDN v.l, 197. These arguments had already been presented in Arnold White, "A Fool's Paradise," NLJ, Jul 1900, 106; 'R.N. Captain' NLJ, Jul 1900, 117-9; extract from Arnold White in Cassell's Magazine, NLJ, Oct 1900, 154-5. Beresford's arguments regarding the lack of preparedness in the Mediterranean fleet, including the enduring deficiencies in 1905, were repeated in his Memoirs, 463-4, 509. ,gs "Navy Notes," ANG, May 17 1902,470. 189 "The Naval Agitation," ANG, Jul 6 1901, 659; "The Gold Medal Prize Essay," ANG, May 10 1902, 445. 190 Fisher to Fawkes, Jun 27 1900, FGDN, v.l, 197; Fisher to Thursfield, July 12 1901, PGDN, v.l, 198; Fisher to Thursfield, Oct 7 1901, FGDN, v.l, 208-10; Fisher to Thursfield, Nov 28 1901, FGDN, v.l, 215-7. government to act, not months of letters sent by Fisher to the Admiralty, thus emphasizing for the future First Sea Lord the value of journalist allies.

In 1901 and 1902 writers advocated for the revision of the current strategic dispositions of the fleet. 'Naval Officer' in the October 1901 USM pointed out that while steam made ships far more responsive, fleet dispositions had not changed since the Age of Sail.191 Spenser Wilkinson in the QR, constructing an argument for improving the intelligence and planning aspects of the navy, built upon the concept of the strategic oneness of the sea which had only become smaller with new technology.192

The key contribution to the debates was the RUSI essay contest on, 'What should be the disposition of the materiel and personnel of the British Navy in time of peace, and how can the peace strength be most readily expanded to war strength?'

Lt. Lionel H. Hordern's winning essay offered a three part summation of naval strategy. Firstly, "the offensive fleet in the Eastern Seas and the defensive fleet in the

Channel are the two wings, or flanks, of a long front of operations, the security of which depends upon the assured tenure of the central position" in the Mediterranean.193 Fleets in the Channel and Far East would provide security against German, French and Russian forces under a range of strategic scenarios.194 Secondly, it retained the doctrine of the offensive as the essential goal of the Royal Navy in wartime. Thirdly, and most revolutionary, it suggested the division of the fleet into battle and commerce protection squadrons. Hordern considered that the task of trade protection was outside the

'Naval Officer,' "Fighting Strength of the Navy," USM, Oct 1901, 1-5. 192 Spenser Wilkinson, "Efficiency in the Services," QR, Jul 1902, 269-74. 193 Summarized in "Reviews: The Magazines," ANG, Jul 12 1902, 664. 1,4 Lt. Hordern, "R.U.S.I. Gold Medal Prize Essay," JRUSI, Apr 1902, 442; Lt. Hordern, "Imperial Defence and Colonial Responsibilities," USM, Oct 1902, 5. This was repeated in 'Naval Officer,' "The Distribution of the Fleet and the Protection of Colonies, Commerce, and Naval Bases," USM, Jan 1902, 340-1. necessary objective of the battlefleet, requiring its own command structure and

dedicated vessels to ensure success.195 He argued for instant readiness, because any ship

that had to be commissioned after the start of war could only reinforce the existing

squadrons either in a blockade or after an action, but denied that any fleet should be

specifically detailed for British coast defence.196 Hordern presented the public with a

thorough analysis of British naval strategy, reinforcing the ideas of instant war and the

unity of the sea. Thus, peacetime distribution would be based on the existing strategic

deployment of foreign navies, but upon war breaking out the fleets would be free to

adapt to the specific enemy, or coalition, Britain was fighting.

Admiral Fremantle and Fred Jane critically reviewed Hordem's essay in the

USM. Fremantle agreed that the separation of fighting and commerce protection

squadrons was a good idea, but thought peacetime needs required a different distribution

than wartime which could not be neglected.197 He also suggested that the navy needed a

reserve of ships to provide a squadron in home waters in wartime or reinforcements for abroad.198 Communications and commerce could not be left until after the enemy's battlefleet was destroyed, but Fremantle commented that "it is equally true that the command of the sea will ultimately rest with the stronger fleet, though it cannot consist entirely or even mainly of battleships.199 Jane considered that torpedo-craft would make the Mediterranean uninhabitable in wartime, thereby disordering the dispositions.200 The

USM provided Hordern with the opportunity to respond to critics, in which he reiterated

195 See "The Gold Medal Prize Essay," ANG, May 10 1902, 445, for a review of Hordem's paper. Lt. Hordern, "R.U.S.I. Gold Medal Prize Essay,"/*US'/, Apr 1902,440, 449. m Admiral Fremantle, "Lieutenant Hordern's Prize Essay," USM, Jun 1902, 243-4. m Admiral Fremantle, "Lieutenant Hordem's Prize Essay," USM, Jun 1902, 243. m Admiral Fremantle, "Imperial Defence and Colonial Responsibilities," USM, Oct 1902, 13. 200 Fred T. Jane, "Lieutenant Hordem's Prize Essay," USM, Jun 1902, 247-54. his former points.201 Criticism did not change Hordern's position, but forced him to clearly revisit and restate his ideas. This exchange was a clear example of how the periodical press facilitated a dialogue of commentary and criticism over fleet deployment and readiness prior to Fisher becoming First Sea Lord.

The discussions initiated by Hordern's summation of British naval strategy form a transition point between the traditional and the progressive positions. Commerce protection was dealt with as a separate issue, but the primaiy focus of strategy was upon the provision of a battlefleet. As Fremantle suggested, the fleet was beginning to be evaluated on a more complex criteria than the mere number of battleships, and attention was being given to more elaborate and qualitative strategic designs.

By the early twentieth century traditional force structure was adapting to the new strategic environment. A key aspect in both the containing of Russia and France in the

Far East and allowing the refocusing of the British fleet westwards was the 1901 Anglo-

Japanese Alliance.202 As Churchill said in May 1903, Britain needed to use diplomacy and foreign relations to provide an alternative to trying to outbuild every other naval nation.203 A European ally would help protect Japanese interests, while Britain was able to rely on Japanese naval strength, and infrastructure, which eliminated the need to match French and Russian reinforcements in the Far East.

Marder's history of the Fisher Era emphasized the significance of the German navy for determining British naval policy. This was natural in light of two world wars

201 Lt. Hordern, "The Peace Distribution of the Fleet: A Reply to Some Criticisms," USM, Aug 1902, 447- 54; these points were reiterated in Lt. Hordern, "Imperial Defence and Colonial Responsibilities," USM, Oct 1902, 1-10. 202 See Ian Nish, "British Foreign Secretaries and Japan, 1892-1905," in Shadow and Substance, 57-76 for a description of the development and negotiation of the alliance. 203 Winston S. Churchill, "Navy Estimates, May 14, 1903, House of Commons," Speeches of Winston Churchill, Robert Rhodes James, ed., (London: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974), 188-9. which profoundly influenced historians. However, the periodical discourse suggests that while much of the polemical daily press, amply described by Morris's The

Scaremongers, was violently anti-German, the periodicals attempted to leaven this attitude through temperate discussion of policy.204 Recent historical work by Keith

Neilson and Michael Paris indicates that British naval authorities "created a policy designed to prevent war generally, while at the same time safeguarding Britain's interests against all-comers."205 Nicholas Lambert has argued that Fisher intentionally exaggerated the threat of the German fleet in order to counteract possible reductions in the Navy Estimates.206

The rapid growth of the German navy nonetheless provided a positive stimulus towards reorienting the Royal Navy to home waters. The German Navy Law of 1900 doubled the 1898 Navy Law's provision of battleships from nineteen to thirty-eight and caught the eye of British writers.207 Arnold White wrote in 1900 to the NLJ arguing that the current structure and training of the Channel Fleet was insufficient, while Sidney

Eardley-Wilmot and J. Tod-Mercer argued that Britain needed two fleets in home waters, the Channel and the Atlantic, to ensure one was always present.208 The periodical press also identified the new strategic situation, but writers attempted to minimize the antagonism between Britain and Germany. Karl Blind in the April 1900 FR historically legitimized the German navy because of Germany's growing commerce and imperial

204 Morris, "The Kaiser Sends a Telegram and Chirol is Aggrieved," Scaremongers. 205 Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia, 1894-1916, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), xii; Michael Paris, Warrior Nation, 89. The two turning points are the 1904 Anglo- French Entente and the 1905 Morocco crisis. 206 Lambert, Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution, 8. 207 Archibald S. Hurd, "The Kaiser's Fleet," NCA, July 1902, 41. 208 S. Eardley-Wilmot, "Submarine Boats," NLJ, Mar 1900, 67; J. Tod-Mercer, NLJ, Jun 1900; Arnold White, "A Fool's Paradise," NLJ, July 1900, 106. interests.209 The periodicals justified both German naval expansion and British reorganization, arguing that neither should harm diplomatic relations.

British politicians and senior naval officers were increasingly oriented toward the German naval challenge. Selbome had "sounded a warning note about the German

Navy in a cabinet memorandum of 16 November 1901," which was made worse in 1902 with the impression of an anglophobic public pressure.210 Historian Keith Wilson argued that Selbome had initially fixated on the Franco-Russian combination, but by 1902 was noticing the growing power of the German navy, an attitude that Wilson tied to the change in public opinion.2" Fisher too felt the difference, commenting on a NCA article that it was only a German who could object to an Anglo-French alliance.212 In a letter shortly after being offered the post of Second Sea Lord, he noted that, "The German

Emperor may be devoted to us, but he can no more stem the tide of German commercial hostility to this country of ours than Canute could keep the North Sea from wetting his patent leather boots. It's inherent."213 British strategic awareness and preparation became increasingly open and flexible, to deal with a variety of potential enemies and coalitions.

France was not ignored, however, and when a 1903 Committee of Imperial Defence sub­ committee investigated the invasion risk, France was used as the primary enemy.214

The Admiralty's response to the future German battlefleet was to form a new fleet in home waters. In October 1902 the former Portguard ships of the Royal Navy

209 Karl Blind, "Germany as a Naval Power," FR, Apr 1900, 602-?. Blind noted that the public supported the Kaiser's creation of a large navy, but that some political parties opposed the additional expense. 2,0 Mackay, Balfour, 117. This resulted in a decision to secretly purchase land for a naval base in Northeast England. 211 Keith Wilson, "Directions of Travel: The Earl of Selbome, the Cabinet, and the Threat from Germany, 1900-1904," International History Review, 30: 2 (June 2008), 260-4. 212 Fisher to Arnold White, Aug 6 1902 in FGDN v.//, 259-62. 213 Bonnett, Price of Admiralty, 178. 214 Mackay, Balfour, 158. Balfour believed that not only was the particular nation irrelevant for the study, but France remained the closest power and was militarily capable of mounting an invasion. were collected at Portland and placed under the Admiral Superintendent Naval

Reserves, at the time Vice-Admiral Sir Gerard Noel, as the sea-going Home Squadron.

Combined with the scattered Coast Guard ships, the new Home Fleet would provide a

base of power in waters surrounding the British Isles, as the Channel Fleet's primary

function was to reinforce the Mediterranean Fleet in case of war with the Dual Alliance.

The ANG was full of praise for the Home Fleet reform, believing that the new, practically sea-going squadron, "entirely fulfils the demand which it was proposed to impress upon the Admiralty for a naval force in the North Sea," and "should completely satisfy the demands of all reasonable naval critics."215 Including the destroyer flotillas in the fleet structure demonstrated that they were sea-going elements and removed the impression that they were intended primarily for port defence.216 The ANG considered the Home Fleet to be an important response to public fears, but one in which unsound strategic demands, such as local defence, were modified to ensure the best possible functioning of the fleet.

The daily press was a leading agitator in the Anglo-German antagonism, and played a significant role in shaping the teutophobia in mainstream British society.217 On the other hand, the periodicals attempted to moderate this attitude using basic strategic reasoning. Archibald Hurd in the May 1903 issue of the USM described the new strategic positioning as the result of a definite and considered application of Admiralty policy. Hurd argued that,

A disposition of ships which was made when the North Sea was devoid of the possibility of menace naturally needs to be changed when men-of-war appear in those waters, manoeuvring and exercising and practising all the arts of war. The

2,5 "Navy Notes," ANG, Feb 21 1903, 181; "Fixed and Flying Bases," ANG, Feb 28 1903,204-5. 216 "Navy Notes," ANG, Mar 14 1903, 253. 217 See Morris, Scaremongers. re-organisation of the Home Fleet is, however, no more a menace to Germany than the continued maintenance of British naval forces in the Channel and Mediterranean is to France or Russia.218

By separating international relations from strategy, the navy could distribute its forces to match potential rivals without creating international complications. The Home Fleet was not the end of the line. Six months before the Fisher programme Hurd argued in the FR that while the improvements in training were a great accomplishment, "the time is ripe for further reforms in the disposition of ships, the employment of officers and men, and the training of reserves."219 These basic elements would form the foundation for the

Fisher programme, and played a role in both breaking-in public opinion to the radical ideas and then mobilizing that public opinion to apply pressure on the Admiralty.

In light of the public discourse, Marder's claim that the 1901-1904 reforms were more significant in laying the foundations for later refinement appears to be accurate.220

The distribution element of the Fisher reforms were part of a much longer process of reorientation to Home waters, with an emphasis on the North Sea and English Channel, as the Royal Navy was forced to critically evaluate its actual capacity and aims in war.

This need for increasing concentration and readiness for war in Northern European waters was well established in the public discourse, and accounts for some of the reasons why the refocusing of the battlefleet met with little criticism.

When Fisher reentered the Admiralty on October 21 1904 as First Sea Lord, his first action was to promulgate a new four-part reform programme, one that had been outlined by July 1904, and firmly defined by August 17.221 The redistribution of the

218 Archibald S. Hurd, "The Navy First,'" USM, May 1903, 122-4; Hurd, "Naval Concentration - And a Moral," FR, Apr 1904, 697. 219 Hurd, "Naval Concentration - And a Moral," FR, Apr 1904,685. 220 Marder, Anatomy, 417-8. 221 See Fisher, Memories, 181. battlefleet was the first of four parts in the 1904 Fisher reform programme. The fleet was to focus more strength in the four European fleets: the Mediterranean based in Malta

(decreased from twelve to eight battleships), the Channel in Portsmouth (seventeen battleships), the Atlantic in Gibraltar (eight battleships) and the Home Fleet (reserve ships with nucleus crews). Overseas stations were consolidated, with the China,

Australian and East Indies being amalgamated into a Far Eastern fleet commanded from

Singapore. Others were decommissioned, like the Pacific, South Atlantic, North

America and West Indies stations. This redistribution ended the dispersed force structure required by the slow-moving, wind-dependant sailing ships of the pre-steam navy.

Naturally, the elimination of numerous independent commands and naval facilities was bitterly opposed by some vested interests. The redistribution also included rationalizing ship repair, to minimize the percentage of any fleet laid up for maintenance.

The German menace was verified by the Dogger Bank incident in the Russo-

Japanese War (1904-5), where the Russian Baltic Fleet fired on British fishing trawlers after mistaking them for Japanese torpedo craft. The incident was believed to be the result of German scheming to expand the Russo-Japanese war to include Britain and

France.222 Afterwards, Fisher and the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) Prince Louis of Battenburg organized the distribution scheme against Germany and Russia, hinging on the Atlantic Fleet.223 Arthur J. Balfour, the Prime Minister (1902-05) was more

222 Mackay, Balfour, 179,190. In December 1904 Anglo-German relations plummeted, and Vanity Fair and the ANG supported a pre-emptive strike against Germany. Prince Bulow responded to the^WG article in the QR, but Mackay discounted this incident, calling (he ANG a "specialist journal, appealing to a small audience." 223 Mackay, Balfour, 130, 177-8. Yet Fisher advised Selborne not to spend any more money on the Rosyth naval base in northeast England, indicating that he did not expect war with Germany soon. 74 sceptical, but did not alter distributions.224 Fisher was pleased that the Channel Fleet would now train on the likely battlefield, the North Sea.22S The Fisher programme, however, offered a flexible solution in the face of an uncertain strategic position. While

Germany may have been the most important threat, Fisher also recognized that Britain needed to plan for an indefinite future where diplomatic alignments could change.226

Modifications to the 1904 distribution would be taken as international relations increasingly solidified into two opposing alliance systems of World War I.

The experience of the Russo-Japanese War only intensified the attention on the

German fleet. German naval construction had continued, and by its very nature was concentrated within striking distance of Britain. Writers throughout the service and civilian press agreed that this had to be a determining factor in British naval strategic positioning. German economic and population growth was anew and permanent factor that had to be planned for.227 Some civilian writers believed that the new distribution was to protect the British Isles, but service articles quickly pointed out that the fleets needed, and were intended, to find and destroy the enemy wherever he was.228 Germany was identified as the premier opponent by the cheaper, mass journals, and particularly the daily press. However, as before, periodical writers made conscious efforts to show that British dispositions were based on "the large and permanent conditions of the

224 Mackay, Balfour, 141. Service writers, like Balfour, believed Germany required an ally to challenge Britain, see Captain C. Ross, "The True Interests of Great Britain in the War Between Russia and Japan," USM, May 1904, 142-56. 225 Fisher to Corbett, Jul 28 1905, FGDN v2, 63. 226 Fisher, Records, 108. 227 'Calchas,' "The New German Intrigue: A Note of Warning," FR, Sep 1904, 389; C. De Thierry, "England and Germany," USM, Apr 1906,28. m For some examples, see 'Captain R.N.,' "The Past Naval Year," USM, Jan 1905, 323; Robert Machray, "The Collapse of Russia: V. Great Britain, Germany, and Sea Power," NCA, July 1905, 60; Thursfield, "Imperial Defence: The Strategy of Position," USM, Oct 1905, 24, 29; 'Captain, R.N.,' "The Navy in 1905," USM, Nov 1905, 154-5; D.C. Boulger, "British Distrust of Germany," NCA, Jan 1906, 5-6. 75 situation" rather than any international animosity.229 Hurd argued that it was ultimately a matter of decreasing the cost of maintaining ships on foreign station, and redistribution would have been done even without German naval construction.230 Even Hurd, an ardent

Fisherite, moderated Fisher's ideas that, "Germany is our only possible foe for years to come!"231

Experienced service writers asked if the new distribution deserved some moderation. Between May 1905 and May 1906, Admiral Reginald Custance's BEM articles critiqued Admiralty policy. He took issue with scope of the application of the doctrine of concentration, arguing that, as in the past, "Not only must the great battle be won, but detachments, and especially important ones, must not be unnecessarily exposed to defeat."232 Concentrating the fleet may win the war, but at the cost of unacceptable depredations on the imperial periphery. The ultimate point of Custance was not that the battlefleet should be dispersed, but that there needed to be moderation in the

Admiralty's fleet distributions that took into account the worldwide political and commercial interests of the nation. 'Experientia Docet' in the April 1905 USM admitted that closing small dockyards and garrisons was a wise economy, but, "The risk now is that the pendulum may swing too far the other way."233 "England in the Mediterranean" in the QR pointed out the strategic importance of that sea, resisting the pressure to focus

229 Hurd, "A Policy of the "Clean Slate" Towards Germany," FR, Dec 1908, 914; Thursfield, "Imperial Defence: The Strategy of Position," USM, Oct 1905, 24, 29; "Admiralty Policy," FANY, 1907, 15; Captain, R.N.," "Ten Years of Naval Administration: Part II. Abroad," USM, Apr 1906, 16; 'The Naval Situation," QR, Oct 1906, 307-33; "German Naval Ambitions and British Supremacy," QR, Jul 1907, 1- 27. 230 Hurd, "The Colonies and Our Challenged Sea Supremacy," FR, Sep 1908,408. 231 Fisher to Tweedmouth, Sep 26 1906, FGDN v.//, 90-3. 232 'By the same author as "A Retrograde Admiralty,"' "Admiralty Policy Historically Examined," BEM, Jun 1905,739. 233 'Experientia Docet,' "The Navy and Coast Defence," USM, Apr 1905,19. 76 entirely on northern waters.234 These writers appreciated that the exact nature of future

wars was not known, and that any substantial changes to the tried and true knowledge needed to be thoroughly examined and justified. The Prince of Wales confirmed the reasonability of these arguments, writing to Fisher asking that if obsolete vessels were to be removed from overseas stations, they should be replaced with new vessels.235

Arnold White, an outspoken promoter of Fisher and one of the Admiral's

frequent correspondents, criticized, rather harshly, the BEM articles as being the product of ignorance and blind conservatism. White declared that Custance's "opinions conflict with those of the majority of naval officers afloat, who regard the allotment of the

Atlantic Fleet to Gibraltar as a brilliant piece of strategy, since either the Channel or the

Mediterranean Fleet can thus be repeatedly reinforced" from the pivot fleet at

Gibraltar.236 The Fleet supported White's line of reasoning, commenting that "The

Blackwood Baalam may bray and other critics may lament the 'withdrawal of the flag' from the highways and byways of the world, but the heart of the nation must be protected."237 John Leyland presented a lecture educating a working class audience on the issues of food supply, arguing that concentration at the centre was the best means of protecting trade.238 The Fleet believed that the redistribution and scrapping policies showed that "our Navy was in a 'Russianized condition,'" a conclusion which Fisher himself denied.239 Even a pro-Fisher periodical like The Fleet could espouse ideas

234 "England in the Mediteiranean," QR, Jul 1906,1-28. 235 Prince of Wales to Fisher, Nov 10 1904, PGDN v.//, 48-9. 236 Arnold White, "The 'Blackwood' Balaam," USM, Jun 1905, 248. 237 John Leyland, "The Uses of the British Navy: A Lecture Delivered at the Whitechapel Art Gallery to an East End Audience," USM, Sep 1904, 576-7; "German Friendship," The Fleet, Mar 1906, 78-9. 238 John Leyland, "The Uses of the British Navy: A Lecture Delivered at the Whitechapel Art Gallery to an East End Audience," USM, Sep 1904, 576-7. 239 'Raven,' "The Navy and Its Traditions," The Fleet, May 1905,16; Fisher to Cawdor, Jan 23 1906, FGDN v.//, 67. contrary to Fisher's position. The Admiralty may have had press allies, but they were not centrally controlled or subservient.

While some of White's comments were legitimate, the tone and exaggerations of his article provoked a response from 'A Naval Officer' who argued that the present

Board of the Admiralty "have simply been fitting the coping stones to the edifice which was prepared for them" by previous Boards through the creation of the Home Fleet, armoured cruiser squadrons and the reorganisation of destroyer flotillas.240 'Captain

R.N.' added that labelling the Admiralty's critics the 'Blue Funk' School was witty, but extremely discourteous to the respectable and knowledgeable officers and journalists who disagreed with certain aspects of policy.241 Of course, Fisher himself claimed that his critics were irresponsible, failed naval officers who were manipulating public opinion.242 White's claims that previous Admiralty Boards were blindly conservative and retrograde ignored the important foundations that were laid, and the fact that the current members had served on the Boards he criticized.

The new distribution scheme instituted by the Fisher reform programme was generally accepted by the British public. It fit with the general assessments of naval strategic requirements and addressed, in the public mind at least, the current arrangement of worldwide naval power. Service writers emphasized that the reforms were connected with the Admiralty policy of previous Boards, thereby placing the developments within a wider continuum of progress that was not always ascribed to by more populist, sensationalist, writers.

240 'A Naval Officer,' "Biassed Criticism," USM, Aug 1905, 473. 241 'Captain R.N.,' "Uneasiness! Is It Justified?" USM, Dec 1906, 238. 242 Fisher to Thursfield, Oct 26 1905, Marder, FGDN v.II, 64. 78

The Scrapping Policy

At the beginning of the twentieth century the transition to the steam-powered steel warship, mounting significant armour and breech-loading shell-firing armament, was largely complete. The relatively short period of transition, 1860-1899, meant that for the first time in two centuries the Royal Navy was confronted with the problem of obsolescent warships.243 The removal and scrapping of ships on the fighting line was an action that the public demanded justification for, because it entailed spending on new ships to replace the old. It also raised questions regarding the quality of British designs, when relatively young vessels were consigned to the scrap-heap. As Marder stated, the

"tremendous capital investment involved made the Admiralty reluctant to scrap many ships that were of little value to the fleet."244 If quality was going to replace quantity, then the public needed to have more information on how the British ships would be able to maintain naval supremacy.

Fisher's 1904 naval reforms boldly eliminated ships on the fighting list which could not 'fight or run away' and would not only be useless in war, but could be a death­ trap for the crew. Balfour, in a speech at Manchester in 1905, called it "a courageous stroke of the pen."245 Hurd noted that, "As a general principle it is recognised that ships which are not fit to fight under the conditions of the present day, or to perform some auxiliary service, should be sold and broken up."246 Most commentators on the scrapping

243 The Royal Navy, unlike the German navy after 1900, did not set out specific regulations for the regular replacement of obsolete vessels. This deficiency was compounded by the accelerating pace of technological change, which ensured that even the 25 year life of a battleship assumed by the 1900 German Navy Law was often an exaggeration. This lead to a situation where the active list of the Royal Navy at the beginning of the twentieth century include some of the oldest steam warships in the fleet, which could not in any stretch of imagination provide a useful contribution in a fleet action. 244 Marder, Anatomy, 351. 245 Fisher, Records, 65-6. 246 Hurd, "The Balance of Naval Power," NCA, Feb 1905,228. 79 policy would have agreed with this statement. Instead, the discourse was divided over what ships would actually qualify under these criteria. The scrapping of ships was particularly prone to criticism because to the public eye, it was a clear reduction in power, and no diminution in naval strength had ever been readily accepted.

The Foreign and Colonial Offices were predictably unhappy with the cutbacks because they no longer had vessels to 'show the flag' or respond to disasters in distant places, but these functions no longer had pride of place in the modern navy. Ninety ships were sold off, thirty-seven earmarked for auxiliary duties, and twenty-seven were laid up as temporary reserves without money for maintenance. There were scone strikingly obsolete ships, but more than fifty were fairly modern or refitted second and third class protected cruisers. Historians, supported by hindsight from World War I where the

British fleet was chronically short of auxiliary craft, have argued that the scrapped ships would have been useful in wartime, especially in the early stages of a commerce war. In spite of the massive periodical discussion surrounding the Royal Navy's foremost role as a protector of trade and the British food supply, Fisher prioritized the combat effectiveness of the British battlefleet over commerce protection units.

The first critiques of the quality of the Royal Navy's ships focused on the obsolete battlefleet. Some of the warships on the Navy List dated back to the 1870s and were strikingly obsolete. The NLTs prominent writers, such as Captain Sidney Eardley-

Wilmot, argued that the Admiralty needed to either retrofit older ships or, preferably, build new ones to ensure that all ships on the navy list could fight and would not be suicide for the crews.247 With other powers retrofitting ships, older British vessels on the

247 Sidney Eardley-Wilmot, "Replace Muzzleloaders with Breechloaders," NLJ, Feb 1900, 14; NLJ, Mar 1900, 31-2; Navy League letter to the daily press, NLJ, Mar 1900, 32-3; "The Press on the Estimates," NLJ, Mar 1900, 42-3. Navy list were only deceiving the public about the navy's strength.248 The rapid sinking of HMS Bellisle, an older battleship, in a test-firing showed that the old armour was no longer sufficient (and very costly to replace) and that the wooden fittings were a major fire hazard. The Navy League was notable for its drive to keep up naval spending, and its agitation for new vessels over retro-fitted ships was quite likely an attempt to prevent any decrease in the estimates. By November 1900 the NLJ was able to comment on their success, with the removal of six obsolete battleships from the active list.249

The Admiralty did not appreciate the Navy League's interference. Fisher was critical of its irresponsible stimulating of public opinion, commenting to Captain

Wilmot H. Fawkes in late October 1900 that the Times had publicized and given

"notoriety to the stupid exaggerations of the Navy League" to the detriment of real progress.250 The Navy League was an apolitical radical voice, and the conservative press often looked askance at the methods employed as somehow impolite. Nevertheless, it was only after public agitation that glaringly obsolescent vessels were removed.

The MJdid not underrate the importance of numerical superiority, but acted, with other service journals like the ANG, to raise the public appreciation of the qualitative aspects of the British Fleet. There was a growing appreciation that combat efficiency is a complex value including "plenty of ships and plenty of men, but if the ships are not in the right place at the right time, and the man behind the gun cannot shoot straight, we shall hardly have that efficiency which is so much to be desired, and which is indeed essential to success."251 No longer would 'numbers alone annihilate,'

248 "Our Antiquated Fleet," NLJ, May 1900, 79. 249 "Navy Notes," NLJ, Nov 1900,176-7. 250 Fisher to Fawkes, late Oct 1900, FGDN v./, 162-3. 251 "Naval Efficiency," ANG, Jul 12 1902, 660-1. because quality was increasingly important as rapid technological advances allowed the nation with the most modern vessels to obtain a significant advantage in wartime.

Concern over the quality of British battleships was part of pressing for an increase of naval strength, by removing the psychological cushion that protected the British national mind from the knowledge of its own naval weakness.

The discourse on the qualitative reforms of the 'Fisher Era' quickly focused on cruisers. Battleships, a separate issue dealt with in the next chapter, were designed for the single purpose of winning a fleet action. The role of the cruiser was much more fluid, incorporating scouting, commerce raiding and protection, and communications.

The dialogue both before and after the Fisher Reforms centered on the balance between cruiser unit power and dispersion, and attempted to define exactly what the nature of future commerce warfare would entail. A critical distinction in the cruiser force was between protected cruisers, which had a 'turtleback' sloped armour deck to shield the ships vitals, and armoured cruisers, which were larger and added armoured sides to the turtleback deck.

Mobile cruiser squadrons were a potential compromise between numbers and power. Supporters argued that this would not only be cheaper, but more efficient. These would utilize new communications technology to respond to imperial needs.252 Fisher proposed in February 1902 scrapping isolated ships in favour of creating cruiser squadrons.253 These ideas were being explored concurrently and subsequently in the periodicals. 'A Naval Officer' suggested in the February and July 1902 USM that the

"establishment of cruiser squadrons, composed of efficient ships, both officers and men

252 See Nicholas A. Lambert, "Transformation and Technology in the Fisher Era: the Impact of the Communications Revolution," The Journal of Strategic Studies, 27:2 (June 2004): 272-97. 253 Fisher to Selborne, Feb 25 1902, British Naval Documents, 751-4. 82 would alike benefit by the increased opportunities of practising tactics, gunnery, and all warlike exercises."254 Even in showing the flag, armoured cruisers would give "a better idea of the might of the British Navy than a poor little "bug-trap," or even a small cruiser, can convey," and would be powerful additions to the fleet.255 Hurd and

Thursfield, in a civilian and service periodical respectively, reiterated older arguments that only armoured cruisers would act as commerce raiders, so Britain needed only armoured cruisers for commerce protection.256

After the promulgation of the Fisher Reforms the debate on cruiser squadrons largely died out. These were now a reality, and even such critics as 'Captain R.N.' agreed that they added to the fighting efficiency of the fleet, although he made sure to give the credit to the former Admiralty Boards for providing the numerous armoured cruisers that made the new organisation possible.257 'Captain R.N.' shows that critics picked and chose what they supported, and each individual had a different conception of the ideal fleet. Ideas were shared, but the discourse was not homogenous.

The dialogue on the usefulness of armoured cruisers originated before the

Fisher Reforms, and continued throughout. The problem that critics found with the armoured cruiser was that it concentrated too much force in an ultimately inferior unit.

'Black Joke,' his ideas preceded by B.W. Lees, argued against armoured cruisers as a

254 'Naval Officer,' "The Distribution of the Fleet and the Protection of Colonies, Commerce and Naval Bases," USM, Jan 1902, 334-44; 'A Naval Officer,' "Admiralty," USM, Jul 1902, 344. The editor, A.W.A. Pollock, supported focusing strength at the centre while increasing the efficiency of the overseas squadrons, ("The Distribution of the Fleet," USM, Feb 1902, 464-5). 255 "Navy Notes," ANG, Feb 14 1903, 158; Hurd, "Russia and England: I. The Navy as Peacemaker," FR, Dec 1904, 958; 'Captain,' R.N., "Our Naval Policy, the Estimates, and Parliament," USM, Jun 1905, 237. 256 Hurd, "The Contest for Sea-Power: Germany's Opportunity," NCA, Aug 1905,317; Thursfield, "Imperial Defence: The Strategy of Position," USM, Oct 1905, 31-2; Thursfield, "The Attack and Defence of Commerce," BNA, 1906, 63. Yexley supported this in "Service Notes," The Fleet, May 1905, 4. 237 'Captain R.N.,' "The Past Naval Year," USM, Jan 1905, 325; 'Captain,' R.N., "Our Naval Policy, the Estimates, and Parliament," USM, Jun 1905, 237. 83 warship class because,

They can do nothing in the line that could be done more efficiently by battleships costing the same money. They can do nothing in beating down the resistance of the enemy's screen of cruisers that could not be done more efficiently by fast battleships detached from the fleet for the purpose. And to use such ships against commerce must fail from the sheer inability to have enough of such costly articles; while for protection of commerce, of convoys, their speed is quite unnecessary, and obsolescent battleships would serve equally well.258

As long as armoured cruisers were expected to be the primary commerce raiders, it was easy to defend the scrapping of protected cruisers. The periodical commentary focused on the balance between power and distribution, with the consensus remaining in the middle, some armoured cruisers to match the enemy's, coupled with numerous protected cruisers for scouting and commerce protection. The obvious solution was to provide both, but the debaters had budget constraints and had to prioritize.

In a RUSI discussion, Admiral F. Arden Close admitted that, "It is true that these third-class cruisers could not fight, and they could not run away;" but made the highly astute observation that, "every fleet requires half a dozen or a dozen such cruisers, who are not wanted to fight or run away, and who are the eyes and ears of the fleet."259 These duties would need to be performed by first-class cruisers, a waste of such ships, without the protected cruisers. The necessity of wireless repeating ships to connect fleets and bases further emphasized for many service authors the need to maintain a cadre of cheap ships that could fill such roles. The problem was one of balance. In February 1897 Lord Charles Beresford had written in the NCA supporting

258 B.W. Lees, "The Armoured Cruiser: A Compromise Vessel," USM, Jan 1901; Lees, "Naval Scouts," USM, Apr 1903, 8-9; 'Black Joke,' "The Speed of Men-of- War," USM. May 1906, 130; 'Captain R.N.,' "Uneasiness! Is It Justified?," USM. Dec 1906, 251; 'Black Joke,' "The Fast Wing," USM, Jan 1907, 373- 4. 259 Admiral F. Arden Close in discussion ofCdr the Right Hon. the Lord Ellenborough, "The Possibility of Our Fleet s and Harbours being Surprised," JRUSI, Jul 1905, 802. the elimination of obsolete sloops and gunboats on foreign stations and, significantly,

"replacing them by modern vessels."260 When the scrapping extended to decent protected cruisers and no replacements were envisioned, then he became a critic.

Beresford published a thank-you letter in the September 1902 USM to 'A Naval Officer' for supporting his arguments for smaller cruisers, and for fomenting discussion.261

Admiral Custance and Sir William Henry White, a prominent British warship designer and former Chief Constructor of the Royal Navy, played a leading role in the critiquing of the Fisher Reforms, and did so from a position of experience and insider knowledge. Custance argued, supported by Selborne's statement upon leaving office, that in the Russo-Japanese War both fleets had found use for all classes of vessel.262

Applying the doctrine of concentration which defined the Fisher programme, he argued that before the command of the sea was decided, the concentration of armoured ships would leave the small vessels free to act as commerce destroyers or protectors, and after command of the sea was won, the victor would be able to use his small ships freely.263

Numerous ships of varying power would be necessary for commerce protection because, as in the past, old or somewhat obsolete craft would be suitable for escorting convoys.264

Many of the protected cruisers had been recently refitted, and to scrap them appeared to be a waste of the money invested.

Arnold White responded to the BEAfs charges by defending the Admiralty policy. White implied that naval opinion was "practically unanimous that the majority of

260 Beresford, Memoirs, 405. 261 'A Naval Officer,' "Admiralty," USM, Jul 1902, 339-46; Beresford, letter to the Editor, USM, Sep 1902, 651. Beresford followed the USM and quoted 'A Naval Officer's' February 1899 account of the troubles in Cyprus in his Memoirs, 429-30. 262 [Admiral Custance], "A Retrograde Admiralty," BEM, May 1905, 606. 263 'By the same author as "A Retrograde Admiralty,'" "Admiralty Policy Historically Examined," BEM, Jun 1905,747. 264 [Admiral Custance], 'The Growth of the Capital Ship," BEM, May 1906, 589. these ships should have been put on the scrap-heap years ago, and that many of them should never have been built."265 White was quickly called out by 'A Naval Officer' in the USM, who claimed that naval officers did not agree that "trade can best be protected by, relatively speaking, a few large cruisers, instead of a large number of smaller ones."266 White frequently attempted to claim the support of the service, but in reality

Admiral Custance and W.H. White had better claims to know its desires.

In May 1905 W.H. White embarked upon almost two years of articles published in the NCA criticizing Fisher's scrapping policy. As the man who designed a great many of the ships in question, W.H. White had a personal interest in defending the policy of former Boards, but his analysis brought out many of the more disputable aspects of the new scheme, and offered legitimate commentary on the reforms. W.H. White reacted against the opinions of writers like Arnold White to correct the "widespread misunderstanding in regard to some of the changes made or in progress" resulting from obscure and confusing Admiralty proclamations and media articles which gave

"unstinted praise for action of which the bare outlines have been announced."267 W.H.

White presented a clear articulation of the key objections to the scrapping policy on strategic grounds.

W.H. White also argued that a reserve of materiel was absolutely critical, and that even obsolete ships "increase in relative value as war makes ravages in the ranks of the more recent and powerful vessels."268 While the less powerful ships would always be

265 Arnold White, "The 'Blackwood' Balaam," USM, Jun 1905, 246. 266 'A Naval Officer,' "Biassed Criticism," USM, Aug 1905, 474. 267 W.H. White, "The Defence of the Empire: I. Is Our Reserve of War-ships Ample?" NCA, May 1905, 701. m W.H. White, "The Defence of the Empire: I. Is Our Reserve of War-ships Ample?" NCA, May 1905, 703. W. White had already made this point in "Admiralty Policy and the New Naval Estimates," NCA, Apr 1906, 606-7. vulnerable, "My clear conviction," W.H. White argued, "is that there are and will long remain services which can be efficiently fulfilled by cruisers of the protected type," which were the predominant class of ship scrapped.269 He cites Selborne's comments on the Russo-Japanese war as proving lhat in wartime almost every type of ship was useful.

However, Fisher "saw war in Trafalgar dimensions: fleets on a heroic scale. He did not see clearly enough that in a war every ship is useful, particularly for patrol and convoy duty."270 Even if Fisher's ideas of instant war and a large fleet action were proven by experience, then W.H. White's criticisms needed to be accounted for. World War I would later show that small craft were extremely valuable in wartime.

W.H. White demolished the claim that the scrapping policy had effected economy in the estimates. Most of the ships scrapped had already been removed from the effective list, while many protected cruisers had recently undergone costly refits.271

"No clear principle seems to have been followed in the selection" of ships to scrap, he claimed, "Sister ships receive different treatment, and vessels are retained which are distinctly inferior to others assigned to the scrap-heap" and to vessels maintained on the active lists of foreign navies.272 The new Admiralty policy did not, therefore, improve efficiency, but decreased the hard-won numerical superiority of the British fleet.

The debates on the balance between protected and armoured cruisers only increased in intensity in the latter years of the decade. The arguments would later merge into very similar discussions of the battle-cruiser, a lightly armoured all-big-gun cruiser

269 W.H. White, "The Defence of the Empire: I. Is Our Reserve of War-ships Ample?" NCA, May 1905, 714, 721-4. 270 Bonnett, The Price of Admiralty, 186. 271 W.H. White, "The Defence of the Empire: I. Is Our Reserve of War-ships Ample?" NCA, May 1905, 713; W.H. White, "Admiralty Policy and the New Naval Estimates," NCA, Apr 1906, 606-9. 272 W.H. White, "The Defence of the Empire: I. Is Our Reserve of War-ships Ample?" NCA, May 1905, 719. with high speed. The annual naval manoeuvres for 1906 were designed to test the effects of commerce raiding by a weaker but still powerful fleet against a numerically superior foe. Thursfield pointed out that the success of third-class cruisers operating independently "seems to suggest that a guerre de course conducted by isolated ships engaged on a roving cruise is by no means out of date yet."273 However, Thursfield was unwilling to use this experience to support Admiral Custance's theories, preferring instead to adopt the reasoning of the Chief Umpire, whom Thursfield quoted: '"it is practically certain that the commencement of the third week of the war would have seen all commerce-destroying ships either captured or blockaded in their defended ports.'"274

The 'Red' forces were pursuing the command of the sea, and could afford some mercantile losses in order to destroy the enemy's battlefleet; without the battleships the commerce raiders would then be "very quickly disposed of."275 When faced with information that contradicted the theoretical views, both in officers and journalists, the experience was subordinated to the existing conception of war and contrary information explained away. The reality of the situation was of far less importance than the interpretations through which it was filtered, and these were created by the intellectual context primarily developed and distributed in the periodical press.

The USM acted not as the purveyor of a particular position on the protected cruisers, but as the provider of a forum for discussion. 'Captain, RN' wrote in June 1905

USM that protected cruisers would be "invaluable against the hordes of vessels of all

273 Thursfield, "British Naval Manoeuvres in 1906," BNA, 1907, 81. The Sappho and Scylla, third-class cruisers, operated independently for most of the manoeuvres and together accounted for nine merchant ships out of fifty-two captured or sunk, approximately one-fifth of all captures made by the 'Blue' forces against British commerce. Destroyers operating singly or in pairs accounted for twelve merchant ships. 274 Thursfield, "British Naval Manoeuvres in 1906," BNA, 1907, 82. 275 Thursfield, "British Naval Manoeuvres in 1906," BNA, 1907, 82. kinds which almost certainly will be let loose to prey on our commerce," especially on isolated stations.276 Commerce raiders would not remain in port until the beginning of a war, where they could be blockaded, but would be dispersed beforehand to achieve maximum destructive effect. The Russo-Japanese War did not verify the uselessness or vulnerability of the protected cruiser, but did show that in war "we shall probably want every vessel we can lay our hands on."277 The USM Editor, A. W.A. Pollock, agreed with

'Captain, RN,' pointing out that the recent estimates made no provision to replace the scrapped cruisers despite their importance for commerce defence.278 While the Editor may have sided with 'Captain RN,' counter-arguments by 'Veritas Vincet' were included. 'Veritas Vincet' argued that since steam had given large ships the same speed as smaller craft, then all the scouting and detached duties formerly performed by small ships could be done by larger and more powerful vessels.279 By offering a forum rather than a stance, the USM gave readers a more balanced perspective and the opportunity to draw their own conclusions. Rather than seeking to influence people, the journal was working to educate them.

The editor of BNA, T.A. Brassey, agreed with 'Captain R.N.'s arguments. BNA had supported the removal of obsolete gunboats and sloops, but the new policy might

"leave our commerce in any quarter of the globe at the mercy of any small cruiser or armed merchantman."280 The Royal Navy required mid-sized cruisers, because

276 'Captain,' R.N., "Our Naval Policy, the Estimates, and Parliament," USM, Jun 1905, 235. 'Captain, R.N.,' "The Navy in 1905," USM, Nov 1905, 156; 'Captain, R.N.,' "Food for Thought," USM, Jan 1907, 358-9. 277 'Captain, R.N.,' "Food for Thought," USM, Jan 1907, 355. 278 Editor's Note appended to 'Captain, R.N.,' "Ten Years of Naval Administration: Part I. At Home," USM, Feb 1906,515. 279 'Veritas Vincet,' "Modern War Vessels," USM, Sep 1906, 591-7. He accepted that small ships were better for imperial policing, but declared that imperialism had made the world better policed, so fewer craft were needed. 280 T.A. Brassey, "Comparative Strength," BNA, 1907,46. Invincible-class battle-cruisers were too precious to waste against enemy protected cruisers and that, while "a medium sized cruiser could not fight an Invincible is obvious,

.. .the chance of meeting an Invincible is small."281

As the discourse shifted to focus on the battle-cruiser and conflict with Germany, commerce defence diminished from naval thought. Percival A. Hislam explained that

"the absolute concentration of attention on the German Navy, with its policy of massed squadrons and its contempt for the guerre de course, largely removed the problem of commerce defence from the scheme of things to be considered; though whether such concentration... is wise, is open to very serious question."282 This allowed the less numerous armoured cruiser, as the battle-cruiser was known until after 1909, to successfully replace the protected cruiser. Hislam satirized the "inexplicable craving after exaggeration" which continued to produce monster ships, the battle-cruiser and

1800-ton destroyer, while reducing the mid-sized cruisers, but predicted that design would return to the "saner, if more prosaic and mediocre, paths of all-round war fitness."283 Hislam makes the useful point that Britain did need to be prepared for a variety of wartime scenarios, and any future changes to the diplomatic situation. As a maritime empire, it was unacceptable to place Britain in a position of existing at the sufferance of other naval powers.

After the extensive scrapping of protected cruisers and the ensuing construction hiatus, the policy was reversed with the laying down of six light cruisers in 1910. After the struggle in the late nineteenth century to get sufficient cruisers, "In later years the

281 T.A. Brassey, "Comparative Strength," BNA, 1907,49. 282 Percival A. Hislam, "The Strategical Features of the North Sea "BNA, 1907,119-20; Hislam, "The Progress and Present State of Warship Design," USM, Aug 1907, 486. 283 Hislam, "The Progress and Present State of Warship Design," USM, Aug 1907, 488-9. requisite ships were provided; only, in a moment of retrograde impulse, to be abolished," but, Beresford pointed out triumphantly, "After a period of uncertainty and uneasiness, the cruiser force is once more being slowly increased."284 Protected, or

'light,' cruisers were important for a balanced naval force, and in World War I were a vital part of convoy escorts and trade protection, duties which required greater numbers rather than greater power. Armoured cruisers were kept in squadrons with the battlefleet.

The problem faced by commentators on the scrapping policy of the Fisher reforms resolved itself into a debate on the future character of commerce raiding. Each side presented a concrete, well-argued position, and the debate could only be resolved by the practical experience of commerce war, experience that was not provided by the

Russo-Japanese War. The discourse on the scrapping of supposedly obsolete warships provides the most coherent example of how useful the periodical press could be in developing the British theoretical conception of war. The problem was not solved, but the fact that it was identified and varying interpretations were presented, critiqued and defended at least gave the Admiralty a body of information on which to evaluate and reform their policies. Ultimately, the advent of the submarine, and the shift from capturing commerce to simply sinking it, fundamentally changed the nature of commerce war and protection, and upset many of the prewar assumptions about wartime conduct and legalities.

Implementing Nucleus Crews

The third element of the Fisher reforms was the institution of nucleus crews.

Combat readiness was an important theme in strategic thought, whereby 'instant readiness' was integral to combat effectiveness. To this end, the ships of the Reserve

284 Beresford, Memoirs, 184. fleet, grouped at Plymouth, Sheemess and Portsmouth, were outfitted with nucleus crews, initially two-fifths of the complement and later increased to three-fifths, supposedly drawn from the men freed from the decommissioned ships. Before nucleus crews, the ships were fitted out with naval reserve men and performed poorly in manoeuvres due to the sailors' unfamiliarity with their ships. A nucleus crew, supplemented with reservists, would theoretically be more accustomed to the vessel and thus be combat-effective in shorter time. Of course, keeping a far larger proportion of officers and ratings in home waters improved service conditions for the men.285

Dissenting naval officers pointed out that the nucleus crew system, while useful, could not deliver the combat-readiness that Fisher promised and shake-down time would still be essential. As with many of his reforms, opponents questioned whether his system had considered all the ramifications and would be able to do everything it promised.

Naval reserves were cheaper and could fill the unskilled or semi-skilled posts.

The nucleus crew system attempted to capitalize on this by only providing active ratings in skilled positions. Although it was a prominent part of the 1904 programme, the nucleus crew system had been developed by the end of 1903 and was being slowly instituted.286 Beresford claimed to have suggested it after seeing the French system in practice, which would ensure the men operating the reserve ships would be familiar with the vessels.287 This reform was largely praised. Critics may have doubted whether the system could provide the readiness for instant war which supporters claimed, but overall it was the most approved element of the reforms and answered long-standing concerns over the reserves.

285 Henry Baynham, Men from the Dreadnoughts, (London: Hutchinson, 1976), 19-21. 286 Marder, FGDN v./, 248. 287 Beresford, Memoirs, 464-5. The nineteenth century reserve system had become obsolete and insufficient for

British naval needs. The Royal Naval Reserve was based primarily on the merchant marine, the traditional source of seamen in wartime. By the twentieth century this body no longer had the numbers or skills to reinforce the navy. The NLJ, FR and QR pointed out that the merchant marine was a vital necessity for food and raw materials in wartime and therefore could not be wantonly denuded of trained men to fill naval billets, nor were these men qualified to operate the current technological systems on warships.288 In the Age of Sail sailors were the primary trained personnel, and were interchangeable between merchant and naval ships, but such men could not reliably operate modern naval guns or even engines. In response to these issues, the Admiralty appointed a committee in 1902. Admiral Fremantle recognized the need to "avoid the danger of sending ships to sea in war-time badly manned by inexperienced crews," but thought the committee would ultimately fail unless it could modify the long-service system.289

C.E.H. Chadwyck-Healey, the Chairman of the Admiralty Volunteer Committee, wrote to the NLJ in January 1904 to promote "The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve," the product of the 1902 Naval Reserves Committee, which would tap into civilian enthusiasm to help man the fleet.290 British manpower needed to be better organized and structured in order to achieve full wartime efficiency.

The Admiralty had already recognized the deficiency in the reserves, but the discourse doubtless reinforced the determination to find and implement new solutions.

Eventually, Fremantle's point was taken, and the long-service system was modified by a

288 See "The Manning of the Merchant Service," NLJ, Feb 1900, 19-20; Appleyard, "Volunteers for the Fleet," FR, Apr 1901, 715;"The British Mercantile Marine," QR, Apr 1904, 323-54. 289 Admiral Fremantle, "A Reserve for the Navy from the Navy," JRUSl, Aug 1902, 985-90; Hurd, '"The Navy First,'" USM, May 1903, 125. 290 C.E.H. Chadwyck-Healey, "The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve," NLJ, Jan 1904, 25-6. new entry of men that would still enlist for twelve years, but would only serve five before being released into the new Royal Fleet Reserve. This ensured a navally-trained body of reserve seamen and stokers, while decreasing the cost of the non-effective vote, the primary element of which was pensions. Some doubt existed in the public mind about whether these men would be as efficient as long-service ratings, and suggested that having to train more men may be too costly.291 However, these comments were rare.

Discussion in 1901 and 1902 had already begun to deal with the issue of increasing the efficiency and combat-effectiveness of the Reserve fleet. This became increasingly important as naval expenditure escalated and writers and policy makers tried to get better value for the money spent. Commander Harry Jones' "Second Prize

Essay" for the 1902 RUSI contest stated that, "For purely fighting purposes, then, I see no reason why a man-of-war should not rapidly become efficient, if commissioned with a portion only of her crew trained in the peace methods of the Navy," an idea repeated by other thinkers.292 Thus, in the years before the Fisher programme, it was appreciated that there were gradations in the amount of training different ratings required, and that saving money by using reserves for the unskilled positions was a useful economy.

Building on these foundations, writers accepted the large-scale implementation of nucleus crews in the reserve fleet. Hurd praised the Fisher Reforms for replacing "the partly manned and exercised battleships... [with] an entirely new fleet which is always at sea preparing for war, with full crews and stores."293 Moreover, it would decrease repair costs by providing sufficient men permanently onboard to effect minor repairs and

291 'Captain, R.N.,' "The Navy in 1905," USM, Nov 1905,162. 292 Cdr Harry Jones, "Second Prize Essay," JRUSI, Jun 1902, 757; John Biddlecombe, "A Naval Policy for Australia," USM, Dec 1902, 226. 293 Hurd, "Russia and England: I. The Navy as Peacemaker," FR, Dec 1904, 955; "Admiralty Policy," FANY, 1907, 17. maintenance.294 W.H. White supported this argument, but nuanced it by pointing out that this was the intention of the former reserve system, but the "real want has been men, not method, so far as the facts stated enable an opinion to be formed."295 The actual implementation of sufficient nucleus crews united even diehard opponents of Fisher.

Thinkers did not create arguments against the Fisher Reforms simply to disagree with

Fisher. In the absence of reasonable criticism of naval reforms, critics wrote to show their support.

Admiral Custance in BEM, however, remained somewhat unconvinced about the claims made regarding the efficiency of the nucleus crews. Primarily, he disagreed that ships needed to be scrapped to provide the men, indicating that instead the 40,000 men at home, training or in barracks, could have been trained on the sea-going reserve ships.296 Like W.H. White, he was not objecting to the essential idea of nucleus crews, but by deconstructing the rationale behind the reform, which Fisher always presented as an indivisible package, he showed that it was not an 'all or nothing' deal. Beresford afterwards concluded that the implementation of "nucleus crews, which are officially stated to be as efficient as full crews... [is] a state of things which is as dangerous to the national security as it is unfair to officers and men."297 Fisher claimed that his critics ignored that nucleus crews had made the whole fleet ready to fight at "LITERALLY one hour's notice," but the discourse clearly shows that this was not the case.298 The truth of

294 For an example of the good work done on board ship, see Beresford, Memoirs, 489-93 on the collision between HMS St George and HMS Hannibal. 295 W.H. White, "The Defence of the Empire: I. Is Our Reserve of War-ships Ample?" NCA, May 1905, 706-7. 296 'By the same author as "A Retrograde Admiralty,"' "Admiralty Policy Historically Examined," BEM, Jun 1905,748. 2,7 Beresford, Memoirs, 465. 298 Fisher to Captain Seymour Fortesque, Apr 14 1906, FGDN v.II, 71-2. this statement was called into question, but all commentators accepted that efficeincy was improved to some degree by the reform.

The manoeuvres of 1905 verified the wisdom of the new system for the nation.

Previously reserve ships had performed poorly and frequently suffered mechanical failures, whereas in 1905 the ships were more efficient and functioned properly. Nucleus crews were more experienced with their ships, and maintained their vessels. The only complaint, voiced by The Fleet and FANY, was that it put a heavy strain on the men which needed to be remedied before it hurt morale and left the men exhausted at the outbreak of war.299 FANY rightly predicted that this would be remedied by increasing the nucleus crews to three-fifths of the complement.

The role of the new reserve system was highlighted by concurrent changes in

Britain's strategic situation. With the United States effectively excluded from comparisons of naval strength, and Japan as an ally, the international situation increasingly dictated a German-oriented strategy. FANY noted that the "destruction of the Baltic Fleet and consequent passing away of Russia as a naval power placed us in a position that we had never hitherto held," and it was only improved by the Anglo-French

Entente Cordiale.300 This change in naval power had permitted the withdrawal of the five

British battleships from the China Squadron in June 1905, but it was not radical enough to merit serious discussion. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed in 1906, ensuring British security in the Far East. In 1907 the Anglo-Russian Convention settled

2,9 "Admiralty Policy: The Effect, Redistribution and Reorganization," FANY, 1906, 21. 'The New Order," The Fleet, Aug 1905, 120. 300 "Admiralty Policy: The Cause, Germany's Position and Ambition," FANY, 1906, 13-4; the ability of Britain to increase fleet concentration was reiterated in "The Naval Situation," QR, Oct 1906, 307-33. 96 outstanding colonial disputes. The formation of what would become the Triple Entente clarified that Germany constituted the strategic threat.

On October 23 1906 the Home Fleet was restructured to increase its instant readiness and combat efficiency. The three sea-going fleets were reduced to create a fully commissioned division of six battleships based at the Nore, including the most modern British battleships. The second and third divisions were composed of increasingly older ships, and were maimed by nucleus crews according to a sliding scale based on their importance for the fighting line. Edward Maijoribanks, or Lord

Tweedmouth, the First Lord of the Admiralty (1905-8) explained in his statement on the

1907-8 Navy Estimates that, "the Home Fleet is still in process of development, and that it will be some time before it can reach its full strength."301 In March 1909 this development culminated with the incorporation of the Channel Fleet into the Home

Fleet as the second division, and the Atlantic Fleet was designated as its reinforcement.

These changes were hotly debated, and would culminate in a serious controversy, discussed in the epilogue, that drove Fisher from the Admiralty in 1910.

The changes to the Home Fleet were initially hidden from the British public, likely because the Admiralty was hesitant to fuel more criticism of its policies before the decision had been made. The Fleet in March 1906 informed readers that, "there is no truth in the rumour that the Mediterranean Fleet is about to be considerably reduced," as the Daily Mail had claimed.302 The problem that Beresford expressed, as the

Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet, was that the numbers and dispositions of the two fleets in home waters were constantly changing in 1906 and 1907, with consequent

301 Tweedmouth, "First Lord's Statement Explanatory of Navy Estimates, 1907-8," BNA, 1907, 321. 302 "The Admiralty," The Fleet, Mar 1906, 75. disorganization and confusion.303 The Admiralty could keep information hidden from die public, but rumours were always circulating and being tested theoretically.

Marder's analysis of the Home Fleet agreed with Fisher's claims that the nucleus crewed ships could put to sea in a few hours "in an equal state of efficiency with the Nore Division."304 Contemporary critics, particularly in the USM, repeatedly denied such arguments. 'Captain R.N.' in December 1906 asked, "Uneasiness! Is It Justified?" and concluded that it was, his arguments being reiterated by 'Carausius' in November

1907. The new distribution scheme materially reduced the fighting strength of Britain's primary fleets, rather than simply rearranging forces, because, "Ships only two-thirds manned, distributed at different ports, only concentrated as a fleet for occasional cruises, can never be as efficient as a fully commissioned fleet, which is kept constantly at sea and in perpetual training for war."305 The Admiralty failed to prove its case to naval critics that the Home Fleet was actually an improvement.306 It deceived the British public into thinking that this was actually an increase in efficiency, but "the attempt to make one part of the reserve into a sea-going fleet in order to justify the reduction of the fully commissioned fleets has, as this analysis shows, proved in practice to be a dismal failure."307 Marder accepted Fisher's claims as to the working of the fleet, but knowledgeable serving officers were unconvinced and could marshal significant arguments against the scheme, to practice, the Home Fleet was not fully manned nor instantly ready to respond to emergencies, as the Admiralty's statement claimed.

303 Beresford, Memoirs, 551-3. 304 Marder, FGDN v.//, 33. 305 'Captain R.N.,' "Uneasiness! Is It Justified?" USM, Dec 1906, 247,251. 306 'Captain R.N.,' "Uneasiness! Is It Justified?" USM, Dec 1906, 248. 307 'Carausius,' "The Home Fleet: A Criticism," USM, Nov 1907, 132, 137-9. These arguments were repeated in the conservative National Review and sarcastically reviewed by "Admiralty Policy," FANY, 1907, 19. 98

Nucleus crew ships were certainly more effective than the late nineteenth century reserve ships, but they could not compare to a fully manned ship exercising daily as part of a sea-going fleet.

The Admiralty was forced, in light of the intense criticism, to defend its policies. In a letter to Lord Tweedmouth, the First Lord of the Admiralty (1905-1908), of October 11 1906 Fisher anticipated their meeting by setting out a preliminary defence of the new distribution of naval forces.308 He obviously took the criticism over the reduction of the active fleets seriously enough that he felt the need to frequently reinforce his position. The First Lord's statement for 1909-10 claimed that "all the Flag

Officers concerned agree that the nucleus crew system ensures a readiness for war and a general efficiency which has never before been obtained."309 This argument, which avoided the real issue, was intended to placate the public.

The discourse on naval maiming was a complex issue. The concept of a nucleus crew was universally accepted as a tremendous step above the unmanned and poorly maintained reserve ships of the former system. Commentators were not convinced that a nucleus crew ship was automatically the equivalent of a fully-manned vessel. The

Admiralty was criticized because the policy attempted to claim that they were equivalent, and that declaration has carried a great deal of historical weight. The discourse was complex and nuanced enough to distinguish the fine gradations of efficiency within the nucleus crew system, and the Admiralty was not able to easily avoid the searching analyses to which its policy was subjected, nor were commentators ignorant and gullible.

308 Fisher to Tweedmouth, Oct 11 1906, FGDN v.II, 98-9. 309 Reginald McKenna, "First Lord's statement explanatory of Navy Estimates, 1909-10," BNA, 1909, 338. 99

Conclusion

The 1904 Fisher Reforms were a thorough restructuring of the strategic organization of the Royal Navy. The importance of these reforms cannot be overstated, because regardless of what debate existed, the attempt to thoroughly modernize the

Royal Navy was bold and innovative. Substantial sections of intellectual opinion concurred with the basic ideas inherent in the scheme, and it was only in the extent of their application that a spectrum emerges.

Archibald S. Hurd, a civilian writer specializing in naval affairs and an ardent

Fisherite, summed up the new reform program:

ships which are not fit to fight under the conditions of the present day, or to perform some auxiliary service, should be sold and broken up. By this means the Navy is ridding itself of its 'ghosts.' By the reorganisation of the fighting fleets and the Reserves the striking power of the Navy has been doubled, if not trebled; while at the same time it will be found when the estimates are submitted this month that the expenditure has been reduced by nearly four millions sterling.310

Here Hurd has not only provided an accurate summation of the Fisher reform programme, but also demonstrates that the proposed changes increased efficiency while decreasing cost. In promising to create greater strategic and tactical effects with a smaller outlay, Fisher not only attracted the attention of Lord Selborne, but ensured the continued support of the 1906 Liberal government under Henry Campbell-Bannerman.

Critics denied Fisher's claim that it was 'the scheme, the whole scheme, and nothing but the scheme,' pointing out that there were numerous aspects of Fisher's programme that were more extreme than the theoretical conception of war, or economic considerations, justified. BNA characterized it best, stating that while the navy was better prepared for war than ever, in recent times, "There is none the less anxiety in the

310 Hurd, "The Balance of Naval Power," NCA, Feb 1905, 228. 100

opinion of competent authorities as to the wisdom of some changes, and as to whether

others have not been carried too far. In dealing with a great service, revision and

reconsideration are always needed."311 Discussion was an important and desirable aspect

of naval policy development in peacetime, although Fisher's autocratic nature made it

difficult for him to tolerate opposition.

Even critics accepted that the reforms were part of a long chain of progress in the

navy. 'Captain RN' argued that, "there is undoubtedly a strong opinion forming which

is by no means so favourable to the scheme," because of certain elements went further

than needed and in actuality lessened the efficiency and sufficiency of the navy.312 He

believed that the new reform programmes were "the result of the well-considered and

consistent building policy followed by successive Admiralties, backed up as they have

been by public opinion, since the revelation of our naval weakness in 1888 roused the country to a sense of the dangers it would incur should such weakness be allowed to continue."313 'Captain RN' accepted the new scheme as part of a long-term progression,

built, and therefore verified, by successive Admiralty Boards.

Admiral Custance was more critical, thinking that the "recent changes in

Admiralty policy have been carried out somewhat hastily, and without fully considering the conditions of war or recognising the wide and complex interests involved."314

Custance was more interested in moderating the extreme actions of the reforms, such as the scrapping of protected cruisers. There was insufficient knowledge of the nature of future naval warfare to confidently choose one strategic and tactical conception. This

311 T.A. Brassey, "Preface," BNA, 1907, iii. 312 'Captain, R.N.,' "The Navy in 1905," USM, Nov 1905,163. 313 'Captain, R.N.,' "Ten Years of Naval Administration: Part I. At Home," USM, Feb 1906,501, 508. 314 'By the same author as "A Retrograde Admiralty,' "Admiralty Policy Historically Examined," BEM, Jun 1905,748. 101 range of criticism illustrates the variety of perspectives available to the public. The opposition to Fisher's actions was not a purely retrograde movement seeking to recreate the Victorian Royal Navy, but an equally progressive movement that had different views, some of which would be verified by later war experience.

The periodical press shows that the educated British reading public, both civilian and service, was well-informed regarding the strategic and economic aspects of the Royal Navy, and that there was a critical appreciation of the importance of superior naval organisation beyond the simple consideration of individual unit power.

Distribution, vessel quality, and the readiness of reserve vessels to fight were critical elements of naval power, and appreciated as such. Critics included highly experienced and knowledgeable members of the service, who acted in the navy's interest by expressing their expert opinions to an increasingly navally-minded public.

Moreover, the periodical press shows that the reforms were not conceived in a vacuum, and certainly not by Fisher alone Fisher may have declared his scheme whole and inviolate, but it was neither. It built upon existing trends of fleet redistribution and reserve manning policies, and was surrounded by a detailed dialogue that continually assessed the current situation while predicting and suggesting solutions for the future.

The decisions made by the Admiralty, including the reforms to the 1904 scheme, were part of the give-and-take that was policy-making in a media society. Decisions needed to be justified to the public to ensured parliamentary support, or non-interference, and public opinion was always considered for the same reason. The same was true of

Fisher's most dramatic innovation, the building of HMS Dreadnought in 1906. 102

CHAPTER IV: THE QUESTION OF DREADNOUGHT Naval Technological Development and the Periodical Discourse

[M]y friend Admiral FitzGerald... read a paper on 'Scouts,' at the Institution of Naval Architects seven or eight months ago. What do we see now? We see that the Admiralty are building scouts. I do not say that was the outcome of his paper; I do not suppose it was; but at the same time he was working at the subject just a little ahead of the time - a few months. Therefore, it shows that when anybody thinks these things out and puts them clearly before the public, the time has arrived, possibly, for some action in that direction.315 Admiral Sir John O. Hopkins, JRUSI, May 1902

Admiral Hopkins offered a positive appraisal of the valuable role played by public institutions in affecting the attitude of the country and the government's defence policy. He wisely avoided suggesting a causal chain, whereby the Admiralty followed public whims, but he also appreciated that the public discourse was not a slavish imitator or puppet of the administration. The British civil-military discourse prior to

1914 provides a useful backdrop against which to evaluate national policy precisely because writers, both civilian and naval, were able to publicly illuminate and examine pressing problems. Even in a technical subject like warship design, the public discourse proved to be a critical avenue for the education of the British public, an important source of political clout for both reformers and critics, and a means by which officers were able to openly and fruitfully discuss the future of naval warfare. Historical interest in the periodical discourse is not, therefore, in the concrete cause-effect analysis, but in understanding of information generation and the increasing complexity of ideas as the volume of information interchange increases.

The fourth part of the Fisher reforms illustrates this point well. These reforms dealt with the need to restructure the system of warship design, using the strategic, tactical and technological ideas that had been developed in the pre-reform period. The

315 Admiral Hopkins, "Is a Second-class or Smaller Battle-ship Desirable?" JRUSI, May 1902, 657. 103 most majestic and controversial result, produced by Fisher's Design Committee in 1905, was HMS Dreadnought. In contemporary and historical thought, the Dreadnought signified the emergence of the fully modern battleship. All subsequent uniform calibre all-big-gun battleships were known as dreadnoughts, and the preceding ships as pre- dreadnoughts. A substantial public discourse preceded the design and construction of the

Dreadnought, and neither naval nor civilian opinion was united on the necessary attributes of the ship. It is evident, nonetheless, that a complex understanding of ships' value existed, and that the conservatism in design was due to an awareness of the lack of experience necessary to prove technology, and unwillingness to commit to a radical course that time and combat experience could de-value.

The Dreadnought was not only a controversial new design, but was a locus of economic criticism. The uniform-calibre, all-big-gun battleship made all previous battleships obsolete, and therefore eliminated almost at a stroke Britain's enormous preponderance in pre-dreadnought battleships. The political impact of this decision was especially severe with the new Liberal government, elected in December 1905, which had campaigned on retrenchment in armaments spending. The Fisher Reforms in Philip

Pugh's view were ruined by the dreadnought building program because it ignored the fundamental superiority of the German economy, forcing Britain into a naval race that it could not win in the long term.316 Nicholas Lambert's Sir John Fisher's Naval

Revolution has even defended the Dreadnought as a subtle ploy by Fisher to maintain naval expenditure and building infrastructure in the face of fiscal retrenchment. These arguments are not new. Many contemporaries of the reforms were concerned by the potential financial consequences of initiating a new technological standard.

316 Pugh, The Cost of Seapower. 104

The traditional historical view of Marder considered Fisher's decision to construct Dreadnought to be a bold combination of size, speed and heavy gunpower which relied on new advances in range-finders, fire control and other gunnery technology.317 For the first time tactics would determine naval desiga Jon Sumida's In

Defence of Naval Supremacy (1989) complicated this view. The key to Dreadnought was long-range gunnery, upwards of 8,000 yards, yet the technology required to control fire at long ranges did not yet exist. Sumida claimed that the Pollen fire-control system might have worked, but this advanced technology was not adopted by the Admiralty until after the First World War.318 As Sumida pointed out, personality, finances and confused strategic ideas shaped the opinions and decisions of the Admiralty's research and development policy so there is no simple answer to 'Why Dreadnought?' This chapter will provide the contemporary public dimension of this debate, and illustrate the parallel role of the periodical press in exploring the theoretical issues facing the Royal

Navy, in light of new predictions regarding the nature of naval combat.

The battlefleet and fleet action were the central tenets of British naval thought, and thus the focus of the discourse. Lambert argued that Fisher was actually secretly implementing a radical new strategy of flotilla defence. Torpedo craft would hold coastal waters and narrow seas, freeing up mobile squadrons of battlecruisers, large,

317 Eric Grove, "The Battleship is Dead; Long Live the Battleship. HMS Dreadnought and the Limits of Technological Innovation," The Mariner's Mirror, 93:4 (November 2007): 415-27; Marder, Anatomy, 516-26. 318 Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy, 72-3, 316. Arthur Hungerford Pollen was a British inventor in the 1890s and early 1900s who patented the Argo Clock and other apparatus in order to calculate gunnery ranges when the rate of range change was itself changing. Such complicated mechanisms were integral to gunnery effectiveness, although it required good rangefmders. Pollen had some support at the Admiralty, but overall the historical perception offered by Andiony Pollen and Sumida shows the Admiralty's lack of appreciation for the value of good range calculating equipment and a lack of support for Pollen. For more information see Anthony Pollen, The Great Gunnery Scandal: The Mystery of Jutland, (London: Collins, 1980). 105

lightly armoured all-big-gun cruisers, for service on the imperial periphery. The

periodical discourse supports this interpretation, thoroughly discussing the actual and

potential effectiveness of torpedo craft to perform these operations in wartime, and the

necessary response of the baltlefleet. For want of space, this aspect of the discourse cannot be covered.

Contemporaries believed that public discussion and criticism was an important influence for reform at the Admiralty. 'A Naval Officer' in the May 1903 USM commented that, "The great improvement in the King Edward class [battleships], was only wrung from a reluctant Admiralty and a Director on the eve of retirement, by the importunate objurations of critics, able to point out the powerful armament and improved methods of distributing gun-power adopted by the Americans and others."319

Not only was Admiralty policy influenced by the public critiques, but these critiques were based on sound technical data and theoretical conceptions of war. This commentary was provided either by writers in the press, or by lecturers whose material was distributed nationally through the media Technical data had, unsurprisingly, less appeal to the readers of civilian journals and therefore was focused in the service press.

The discourse shows that the existence, interconnections and potential advantages offered by various design options were already being discussed between sailors and civilians years before Dreadnought. The conclusions applied in Fisher's reforms were therefore the culmination of years of debate, criticism and suggestion.

319 'A Naval Officer,' "The Royal Corps of Naval Construction, and its Connection with the Ordnance and Engineering Department," USM, May 1903, 145. 106

Early Design Debates

The RUSI annual Gold Medal Prize Essay contest, alternating between military and naval subjects, provides a useful starting point to indicate the traditional view of warship classes and design in the late nineteenth century, and the future channels of the discourse. In 1900 the RUSI asked, "What are the best types of war-vessels for the

British navy, including armour, armament, and general equipment for ships of all types."320 The RUSI's contribution to the periodical debates is particularly significant, because it was the closest the Royal Navy had to an academic institution for the study of war. All four papers included in the JRUSIpresented a symmetrical force structure of battleships, cruisers and torpedo-craft, particularly the increasingly efficient destroyers, whereby each class of ship would fight others of its own class. The battlefleet, in true

Mahanian fashion, took the prime place in the fleet structure envisioned by naval authors. Warships were inherently a compromise "between the guns, torpedoes, protection, coal, ammunition, and speed," but needed to be specialized to maximize their fighting potential.321 The fleet envisioned in 1900 by prominent service thinkers was a symmetrical force built around the battleship and the blockade. The efficacy of modern ships to implement this strategy was increasingly complicated, but it would take years of debate to fully comprehend the magnitude of the impact technological change made on naval strategy and tactics, and then more time to fully apply these principles.

320 The full question was "Considering the changes made in Naval Construction during the Past Twenty Years, and in view of the Experience gained during the Chino-Japanese and Spanish-American Wars, what are the Best Types of War-Vessels for the British Navy, including Armour, Armament, and General Equipment for Ships of all Types?" 321 Cdr. G.A. Ballard, "Gold Medal Prize Essay," JRUSI, Apr 1900, 361-2; Lt and Cdr. Villiers, "Naval Prize Essay," JRUSI, Jul 1900, 720-2. Ships would be best constructed in homogenous tactical units of four or eight ships. 107

Speed, size and gunpower were interrelated elements of warship design. Large

battleships dominated, despite some arguments for smaller ships, because only large

ships could carry the required weight of armour and armament at sufficient speed in a

seaway.322 High speed was valuable, but a secondary consideration in battleships and

should not be obtained through sacrificing fighting power.323 War experience had shown

that "battles were lost, not by damage to the machinery or water-line, but by the effects

of shell explosions amongst the guns' crews and the upper parts of the ship."324

Improvements in armour had made it lighter and tougher, enabling the protection of

more areas of the ship. Beresford supported increasing the extent of armour, arguing that

unarmoured ends would be easily destroyed, impairing speed and manoeuvrability.325

Armoured cruisers were judged superior to protected cruisers, but because of their cost

the Royal Navy only required enough to match other powers. The fleet "cannot afford to scatter our finer cruisers, let alone battle-ships, broadcast on these duties [of commerce protection], so it is necessary that we should have a class of smaller, cheaper, and less well-armed cruisers."326 Battleships were the primary vehicle for concentrated force, but the navy needed the capability to disperse sufficient forces world-wide.

Armament was a mixed-calibre compromise between the power of the heavy guns and the rapidity of the larger quick-firing (QF) ordnance. Ballard and Villiers both

322 Cdr. Ballard, "Gold Medal Prize EssayJRUSI, Apr 1900, 359, 363, 394. 323 Cdr. Ballaid, "Gold Medal Prize Essay," JRUSI, Apr 1900, 368-9; Cdr. Harry Jones, "Second Prize Essay," JRUSI, May 1900, 518. Ballard envisioned an 18-knot ship, while Jones considered a 16-knot vessel to be sufficient. The exception was battleships designed as flag-ships on overseas stations that would need to work with fast cruisers. 324 Cdr. Ballard, "Gold Medal Prize Essay," JRUSI, Apr 1900, 364-7, 379-82; Cdr. Harry Jones, "Second Prize Essay," JRUSI, May 1900, 526; Lt. and Cdr. VilUers, "Naval Prize Essay," JRUSI, Jul 1900, 727-8; Major C. Field, "Naval Prize Essay," JRUSI, Aug 1900, 851-2. 325 Beresford, Memoirs, 369. 326 Lt. and Cdr. VilUers, "Naval Prize Essay,"JRUSI, Jul 1900, 738. See also Cdr. Ballard, "Gold Medal Prize Essay," JRUSI, Apr 1900, 387-91; Cdr. Jones, "Second Prize Essay," JRUSI, May 1900, 542-3; Major Field, "Naval Prize Essay," JRUSI, Aug 1900, 860, 871. 108 argued that battleships should carry four 12-inch heavy guns, necessary to penetrate battleship armour, with a secondary battery of 6-inch QF and numerous light guns as anti-torpedo boat armament.327 Ballard believed that medium quick-firing guns, like the

9.2-inch, were either too heavy or too light to be useful, even on cruisers, but the other contestants argued that, "the wonderful rapidity of fire possessed by even the heavier natures of modern QF ordnance has proved such a close rival in destructiveness" to heavy guns that medium-calibre weapons were better for cruisers and secondary batteries, particularly with the rise of the armoured cruiser.328 The balance between individual shell power and rapidity of fire tended towards the more flexible mixed- calibre armament, thus maximizing the potential uses to which the ships could put, a decided benefit when the exact nature of war was largely indeterminate.

Admiral Hopkins' December 1900 lecture at the RUSI filled in a few of the topics that were left untouched in the prize essays. Hopkins demanded that British small cruisers should possess greater speed to match their foreign rivals, and argued that second-class battleships would be a cost-effective addition to naval strength. Older ships should be refitted, and auxiliary vessels built, which could be used as transports in peacetime.329 Rear-Admiral W.H. Henderson's discussion comments agreed that

327 Cdr. Ballard, "Gold Medal Prize Essay "JRUSI, Apr 1900, 363, 373; Cdr. Jones, "Second Prize Essay," JRUSI, May 1900, S12. Ballard pointed out that the Spanish-American War and Sino-Japanese W ar had concealed the need for heavy guns because one side had either not had them or had not used them. Although a 7.5-inch QF gun may have been desirable, Ballard opted in favour of the 6-inch because the "introduction of a new gun would involve the far greater evil of adding yet another variety of ammunition to the present list." 324 Cdr. Ballard, "Gold Medal Prize Essay," JRUSI, Apr 1900, 371-3, 385. See also Cdr. Jones, "Second Prize Essay," JRUSI, May 1900, 503-6, 531-2; Lt. and Cdr. Villiers, "Naval Prize Essay," JRUSI, Jul 1900, 730; Major Field, "Naval Prize Essay," JRUSI, Aug 1900, 853-5. Ballard disliked medium QF, like the 8-inch, because they could not penetrate battleship armour, and were hence useless on battleships, but were heavier than necessary to penetrate cruiser armour or unarmoured ends and could not fire as quickly, thus inferior on cruisers. Plus the ammunition for the 8-inch and 9.2-inch guns was not easily handled, unlike the 100-lb shells of the 6-inch. Jones also pointed out that these medium-calibre guns would be very useful in attacking unarmoured ends and funnels of battleships. 329 Admiral Hopkins, "A Few Naval Ideas for the Coming Century,"JRUSI, Jan 1901, 13-18. 109 auxiliaries should be provided in peacetime in order to practice with them in manoeuvres.330 Thursfield, on the other hand, disagreed that British ships were slower, arguing that the stated speed of British cruisers' was close to their real speed, but for foreign cruisers it was more exaggerated.331 In later debates, Thursfield's approach would be repeated, and quite often the discussion hinged on what writers assumed the true speed of the ships in question would be, and how it would be affected by wear and combat damage. The foundations on which later thinkers would build was a symmetrical fighting force of powerful battleships, fast armoured and protected cruisers, and flotilla craft for night or local defence. Yet, these essays indicate that contributors were increasingly assessing technology and design in relation to its use, with an acute awareness that the strategic and tactical requirements of the fleet needed to be interconnected with warship design.

The interest in warship design influenced Fisher. Assisted by W.H. Gard, the

Chief Constructor of the Malta Dockyard, Fisher began in 1900 to work on the preliminary design features of his ideal warship, later culminating in the battlecruiser.332

The 1900 RUSI essay contest demonstrated the key aspects of battleship design that would dominate the public debate: armament, armour, speed and size. Subsequent discussion of battleship designs expanded these in detail and in scope. While the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, particularly the 1905 Battle of Tsushima, has been considered to be the key source in planning the next-generation design of the

Dreadnought, the discourse clearly illustrates the existence of these theoretical

330 Rear-Admiral W.H. Henderson, discussion of "A Few Naval Ideas for the Coming Century," JRUSI, Jan 1901, 22-4. Auxiliary craft included hospital, repair and store ships, fast fleet colliers and oil tankers. 331 Thursfield in discussion of "A Few Naval Ideas for the Coming Century," JRUSI, Jan 1901, 24-7. 332 William E. McMahon, Dreadnought Battleships and Battle Cruisers, (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1978), 11. 110 constructs prior to the war. Instead of the war being analysed and conclusions drawn, an entire landscape of naval strategic, tactical, and technological theories already existed, often extrapolated from small and experimentally inconclusive naval actions, into which the Russo-Japanese War was drawn simply to provide additional arguments. The 1900 to 1904 debates offered increasingly complex syntheses of tactical, strategic and technical elements of the fleet. Writers attempted to distill the essential elements of future naval combat and applied these conceptions to warship design in order to procure the most qualitatively superior, combat-adapted vessels for the Royal Navy.

Dreadnought may have been the first vessel specifically designed with modern combat- conditions in mind, but the need for suiting vessels to their application had already been appreciated in the public discourse, and was seen as an asset by naval thinkers.

From December 1901 to March 1902, a series of articles by 'De Profundis' in the USM entitled "The Elements of Fire Control in the Navy" complicated the simple

'point and shoot' Nelsonian idea of gunnery by describing the complex subsystems required for effective long-range gunnery. Victory would rely on getting a concentration of rapid and accurate gunfire on the enemy through a complex fire-control system, perfected in peacetime, observing splashes, determining the range, and with good training of the guns.333 While the captain navigated the ship, a separate and decentralized fire-control system would provide good long-range observation of splashes from salvo- fired shells and inter-ship communications to transmit range and bearing information to the guns.334 At short range a projectile's flight could be observed. As range increased, salvo-firing ensured that guns could all fire based on one set of range calculations; a

333 'De Profundis,' "The Elements of Fire Control in the Navy," USM, Dec 1901,215-23. 334 'De Profundis,' "The Elements of Fire Control in the Navy," USM, Jan 1902, 345-52; 'De Profundis,' "The Elements of Fire Control in the Navy," USM, Mar 1902, 576-85. long-range observer would have to watch the fall of shells to report on the changing

range, but with more than one ship firing, this style of range-finding was thought to be

unlikely.335

This detailed article series draws attention to the increasingly complex approach

to gunnery. Future warships would need to take into account the needs of fire-control, such as spotting, director-firing, and salvo-firing, in their design in order to maximize

this power. 'De Profundis' elicited a response from 'Zadok,' who argued for a decentralized system of fire-control based on gun captains, because in action fire would

be impossible to observe and gunnery lieutenants would be unable to control fire.336 By making the public aware of this complex array of requirements, 'De Profundis' helped to educate the readers, including those in the public service, and enable commentators to make more accurate assessments of British strength and Admiralty policy.

Armament, size and speed were increasingly addressed together, as theorists attempted to match warship design to modern tactics and strategy.337 Fred T. Jane, the inventor of the Naval War Game, in the February 1903 JRUSI contributed "Guns: Are

12-inch Guns in Battle-ships the Best Value for the Weight entailed? A Plea for Ships designed to suit our Strategical Needs." Jane wanted to dispense with at least two 12- inch guns and the heavy turret armour in order to create a fester, smaller and more manoeuvrable battleship with, "an armament of medium calibre [guns] numerous enough to crush the enemy with superior fire," and torpedoes for close range fighting.338

335 'De Profundis,' "The Elements of Fire Control in the Navy," USM, Feb 1902,451-8. 334 'Zadok,' "Fire Control in the Navy: An Answer to De Profundis," USM, Jun 1902, 231-4. 337 For instance, 'Zadok,' "Comparison of Battleships: England, France, and Russia," USM, Sep 1902, 560-74, gave equal value to gunpowerand speed. 338 Jane, "Guns: Are 12-inch Guns in Battle-ships the Best Value for the Weight entailed? A Plea for Ships designed to suit our Strategical Needs," JRUSI, Feb 1903,171-5. 112

Penetration of armour would not be the key to winning a naval action, and therefore the heavy guns were actually inferior because of their slow rate of fire. Significantly, Jane was proposing an almost uniform-calibre battleship, but he was supplanting the heavy gun by the QF, using volume of fire to compensate for smaller shells, which would still give the basic advantage of a single calibre armament - the rationalization and economy of ammunition supply. Moreover, at this point the accuracy and rate of fire of heavy guns was too deficient to convince all thinkers that the future lay with larger ships and larger guns. The conservative ANG's review hoped that Jane would stimulate discussion, but otherwise remained sceptical of abandoning the range and power of heavy artillery.339

The Italian Colonel Cuniberti published in 1903 a description of a uniform- calibre, all-big-gun battleship in Jane's All the World's Fighting Ships. This annual was practically standard naval reading. Cuniberti offered a "theory of a ship so powerful it could overwhelm any enemy with one blow," an appealing design for Fisher's instant war.340 The ship would be well-armoured, fast and mounting twelve 12-inch guns; the intellectual origins of the Dreadnought design. While this idea would slowly win converts at the Admiralty, critics outside remained doubtful over abandoning the medium guns.

The USM continued to host articles that explored the contrasting advantages of volume and weight of projectiles in a naval action, supporting the use of quick-firing guns. In September 1902 another article by 'Zadok' in the USM argued that, "An overwhelming shell-torrent from Q.-F. guns will do more to decide an action than the

339 "Navy Notes," ANG, Jun 7 1902, 541. 340 Bonnett, Price of Admiralty, 180-1. 113 slower and more crushing fire of die heavier guns; four 6-inch shells bursting in different parts of the ship will have a more destructive effect than a single 12-inch confined to one locality."341 'Gunner' responded in April 1903 by arguing that common shell would be superior in action to the armour-piercing shell because of the latter's small bursting charge, but "to use common effectively, the gun must very much overmatch the plate attacked."342 His projected, uniform-calibre, 92-inch armament, with 4-inch anti-torpedoboat guns, was consistent with "Lord Charles Beresford's ideal of a ship with the smallest effective heavy gun and the heaviest effective small gun," which would rely on the toipedo to penetrate belt armour.343 Beresford's position coincidentally mirrors that of Jane, illustrating the parallel course of intellectual development offered to educated Britons through the detailed and innovative naval press. Debaters could not arrive at a consensus on the balance between volume and power of gunfire, but the logistical benefits of uniform-calibre armament was clearly acknowledged- the best size of gun was not.

The threat of the torpedo and submarine mine to large armoured vessels became a focal point for debate over the increasing size and cost of warships. Lord Brassey, the founder and first editor of BNA and a strong proponent for the navy, recognized that because the "largest ships are as vulnerable below the belt as those of less dimensions..." the navy should, while making sure some ships were able to match the strongest vessels in other navies, provide "a less costly type."344 A series of letters in the Morning Post by

341 'Zadok,' "Comparison of Battleships: England, France, and Russia," USM, Sep 1902, 561. 342 'Gunner,' "Ship Armour and Its Attack," USM, Apr 1903, 4-6. He also suggested that the horizontal protection needed to be increased to deal with plunging fire, which is notable considering the importance of deck armour in post-World War I designs. 343 'Gunner,' "Ship Armour and Its Attack," USM, Apr 1903,6-7. 344 Brassey, "Our Naval Strength and the Navy Estimates,"NCA, Oct 1904, 598; see also 'Sea-Power,' "The Torpedo in War," USM, Feb 1904,437-43. 114

Major-General J.F. Crease, RMA, on "Defenceless Battleships" pointed out that there was no reliable anti-torpedo defence. Admiral Hopkins argued that if only the larger ship provided the necessary qualities, then Britain must build it, but the potential risk of loss inherent in larger vessels also needed to be considered.345 These debates on the ideal structure of armament were based on the traditional use of heavy guns at short ranges, a debate that changed in later years as long-range gunnery became a prominent and well- trained element of the Royal Navy. It does illustrate, however, how the threat of the torpedo at short ranges was fundamentally altering naval tactics. There were concrete reasons for an increase in battleship size, but the need to temper this with a dispersal of risk was clearly evident in the discourse.

While speed would later become a primary element in the discussion of

Dreadnought, which advanced from 18 knots to 21 knots in speed, in the pre-

Dreadnought period the question is really about whether the power of the battleship would be sufficient. What 'A Chief Engineer, R.N.' did examine was "Coal Economy and the Price of Speed in War-Ships" in the JRUSI. He emphasized that modern cruisers were significantly less economical in their fuel consumption than older models, due to the price of speed, which needed to be considered in designs and training because strategic mobility depends upon endurance as much as speed.346 Naval officers in particular provided the public with a more complex understanding of the basic principles and requirements of good gunnery, and dealt with some of the major threats, such as the torpedo. This period was not particularly rife with suggestions. In technical matters, the

345 Admiral Hopkins in discussion of "Is a Second-class or Smaller Battle-ship Desirable?" JRUSI, May 1902, 675. 544 'A Chief Engineer, R.N.,' "Coal Economy and the Price of Speed in War-Ships," JRUSI, Jul 1902, 917-28. Training was important because stokers needed to be able to feed the engines fast enough. 115 press acted as a contact zone between the Admiralty and the public, forming a conduit of information as naval officers attempted to educate the public on the qualitative aspects of naval affairs. What is significant in light of later events were the calls for an educated and thorough approach to design.

The solution to these design questions was to pressure the Admiralty for a committee to address them. 'Cruiser' in the February 1902 USM, repeated by 'A Naval

Officer' in October 1904, argued that the Admiralty required a full department of capable constructors, with a staff to keep up with foreign innovations, and a technical committee to define what the navy actually wanted in its warships.347 It was the

Admiralty's implementation of a technical committee of this nature, under the

Chairmanship of the new First Sea Lord Admiral Fisher, that would produce the much- vaunted, much-debated Dreadnought. This argument was taken up by 'A Naval Officer' in May 1903, who argued that warship design had stagnated under the 'one man' dominance of Sir William White, and that the Admiralty Board should include the

Director of Naval Ordnance, Director of Naval Construction and Engineer-in-Chief, who together were responsible for designs, in order to have a more corporate, efficient, and effective means of formulating designs.348 With increasing attention being paid to a thorough theoretical and practical application of the principles of naval warfare, the desire for a committee to deal with these issues began to be expressed. Authors realized that they were not qualified themselves to provide the detailed analysis and designs

347 'Cruiser,' "The Need of a Technical Committee at the Admiralty," USM, Feb 1902, 445-50; 'A Naval Officer,' "A Short-Handed Admiralty and Some Overdue Reforms," USM, Oct 1904, 13-23. 348 'A Naval Officer,' "The Royal Corps of Naval Construction: And Its Connection with the Ordnance and Engineering Department," USM, May 1903, 142-8. He also argued that the Naval Intelligence Department needed to be strengthened and expanded to take on the duties of a General Staff. 116 needed by die Admiralty, but the mobilization of navally-minded theorists would

provide the intellectual stimulus for action.

The Response to the Dreadnought

The creation of a Design Committee, under Fisher, resulted in the construction of

HMS Dreadnought, launched in 1905 and completed in 1906. Dreadnought was the

product of years of debate on the form of the ideal battleship, a conversation tied to the changing conception of tactics and strategy in modem war. It quickly became the most vociferously debated element of the Fisher Reforms, and has become in more recent years the focal point of revisionist historians' reevaluation of the aims of Fisher. The press recognized that certain information would be withheld from the public, but still discussed more generally and contextually the value of certain design elements to naval strategy and tactics. What is remarkable is the degree to which publications were able to evaluate the strategic and tactical implications of these developments and point the way to applying the basic concepts to future designs.

HMS Dreadnought was an 18,000 ton battleship designed to produce maximum offensive power using the cutting edge design concepts which had been described and elaborated on in the periodical discourse. Ideas regarding rationalizing the ammunition supply were applied in the uniform-calibre, all-big-gun armament of ten 12-inch guns. A

12-inch main armament was chosen because of the greater accuracy and hitting power of the guns at long range, and the increasing rate of fire of the heavy guns minimized the advantages of QF ordnance. Twenty-two 12-lb QF anti-torpedo boat guns distributed around the superstructure were deemed sufficient, given the 2,000 yard range of the current Whitehead torpedo. Underwater subdivisions and double hulls protected against 117

torpedoes and mines. Parsons steam turbines replaced reciprocating engines. Coupled

with water-tube boilers, this greatly decreased the weight of engine machinery, thereby

allowing a substantial increase in engine power and in speed, 21 knots in the

Dreadnought as opposed to 18 knots of the pr^-Dreadnought battleships.349

The Dreadnought has become a focal point for discussion about the Fisher

programme for two reasons. Firstly, its construction was the application of the strategic

principles of the Fisher reforms to the problem of providing the most combat-capable

vessel. Secondly, there was no clear experience on which to base the design. Marder

points out that even by the twentieth century "the ironclad warship was still an

experiment," but that, "All available evidence leads to one conclusion - that the

dreadnought was on the naval horizon in 1904-5."35° Revisionist historians have

challenged this opinion, pointing to the economic and technological problems with the

ship. The periodical conversation demonstrates that these arguments and positions were

long established, and informed the policy decisions of the Admiralty and government

when the decision was made to build Dreadnought.

Britain was not the only nation developing larger, all-big-gun battleships. The

Japanese and American navies were beginning construction of all-big-gun uniform- calibre battleships by 1905, although the Japanese design was modified to a mixed- calibre ship. However, these vessels were launched in 1910 and 1908 respectively and

349 At this point, the revolutionary propulsion system of the steam turbine was beginning to enter naval designs. Charles Parsons had developed a working prototype which he had first demonstrated at the 1897 Naval Review at Spithead. In 1900 the destroyer HMS Viper, using the Parsons turbine, became the fastest vessel in the world. The King summarized the advantages of the turbine: increased economy, increased speed, increased carrying power, shallower draft, increased stability, increased safety, decreased engine weight, decreased engine volume, and decreased cost in terms of maintenance and manpower. The turbine would increasingly figure in warship propulsion, and contributed to making the Dreadnoughts possible. See Herbert C. Fyfe, "The Fastest Vessel in the World," The King, Aug 4 1900, 141. 350 Marder, Anatomy, 8, 539. See Marder, From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, v./, 57-8; Marder, FGDN v /, 29-31, for more information on the debates regarding Dreadnought. 118

did not utilize the steam turbine. In practical terms, then, the Dreadnought was part of a

generally accepted evolution in battleship design. This was not entirely apparent at the

time, and thinkers were forced to grapple with the fact that Britain had led the world in a

major technological development that entirely devalued Britain's enormous superiority

in pre-Dreadnought warships. Philip Pugh's The Cost of Seapower (1986) argued that,

"Britain's interest then lay in slowing down the pace of change and to live off the capital of her existing fleets for as long as possible."351 Some contemporary sources held this view. BNA described how, "it has been the rule for the British Navy to look to what is

being built elsewhere, and to try to go one better."352 For Britain to lead the

technological curve was a wasteful extravagance when British shipbuilding could easily

overtake other nations and benefit from their experimentatioa Beyond the economic

arguments, thinkers and writers argued about the relative tactical and strategic merits of

the new departure, and made predictions regarding the impact of Dreadnought.

The most important event for naval design was the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5, and in particular the fleet action at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905.353 A destroyer raid by the Japanese against the Russian Far Eastern Fleet at Port Arthur began the actual hostilities, and several Russian ships were sunk at anchor by torpedoes. Small cruiser actions followed, including another unsuccessful raid on Port Arthur and several sinkings by floating mines, before the Russian fleet was destroyed. The Russian cruiser squadron at Vladivostok was also put out of action. The Russians then sent the Baltic

351 Pugh, The Cost of Seapower, 150. 352 Brassey, "Our Naval Strength and the Navy Estimates," NCA, Oct 1904, 598. 353 See R.M. Connaughton, The War of the Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear: A Military History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5, (Routledge, 1988); Eric Grove, Fleet to Fleet Encounters: Tsushima, Jutland, Philippine Sea, (Arms and Armour, 1991); and Rotem Kowner, Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5, (Global Oriental, 2007). 119

Fleet east to fight. After an epic voyage, including a mistaken attack on British fishing trawlers, the Russian Baltic Fleet was cornered by the Japanese at the Battle of

Tsushima and annihilated. The fleets were fairly evenly matched: the Russians had more battleships and more heavy guns, while the Japanese had more armoured cruisers and QF guns and were better trained. The interpretations given to this conflict, the only fleet action on terms of numerical equality until the battle of Jutland in 1916, shaped the ideas regarding naval technology and design throughout the decade.

The first lesson of the war was the danger from torpedoes and floating mines. H.

Montgomery in the USM of December 1904 argued that,

The Russo-Japanese War affords abundant food for reflection to our naval authorities. It indicates pretty clearly that the construction of gigantic battleships is very far from being sound policy. The days of armour are ended, and high speed, coal endurance, a small target, and long-range guns of great power are likely in the future to be the desiderata in an efficient warship.354

The conclusion that ships needed to be small and unarmoured was an over-reaction to the challenges of the underwater explosive, but illustrates that the problem was seen as serious enough to require a radical counter-strategy. The similarity of this suggestion to the radical design of the battlecruiser is also worth noting. T.A. Brassey focused on the danger of "putting so many eggs in one basket," but other writers argued that smaller ships would actually be more effective.355 Admiral Fremantle, citing the support of Sir

John Hopkins, Lord Brassey and other authorities, reiterated the advantages of smaller battleships in January 1905, pointing out that a larger number of battleships may provide better dispersal and protection for the British Empire because for some duties "the monster ships we are now building are less suitable than smaller vessels."356 Large ships

354 H. Montgomery, "Our Naval Expenditure - How to Reduce It," USM, Dec 1904, 253. 355 T.A. Brassey, "The British NavyBNA, 1905, 2. 356 Admiral Fremantle, "A General Staff for the Navy," USM, Jan 1905, 341. 120 entail a great deal more risk, and without an effective counter-weapon or defense against torpedoes and mines, it was sensible to spread out investment among many ships.

Although Tsushima would later dominate the naval aspects of the Russo-

Japanese war, two fleet actions were fought earlier in the war. On August 10 1904, the

Battle of the Yellow Sea between the Russian Far Eastern battlefleet and the Japanese battlefleet ended in a tactical draw, with the former's return to its harbour of Port Arthur without connecting with the Vladivostok armoured cruisers. On August 14 1904, at the

Battle of Ulsan, however, the Vladivostok cruisers were demolished. The discourse surrounding these lessons was fractured and chaotic, especially regarding battleships' secondary batteries, and speed. Consistency was achieved, to a substantial degree, on the importance of anticipating greater distance in battle ranges, from 6,000 to 12,000 yards.357 The need to utilize long-range gunnery, and the complicated nature of the systems and training involved, was realized before the war, but combat experience confirmed the existing conception of long-distance fighting. Thus began the race to increase the effective range of guns.

The Japanese had a great superiority in training and personnel during the conflict, including better morale and accommodations, which played a key role in compensating for their numerical inferiority. British thinkers quickly realised that this human aspect of naval forces needed to be addressed even when analysing material.

Commander the Hon. Henry N. Shore in the May 1905 USM summed up that, while "It is not the interest of Great Britain to initiate new departures in the science of warfare; and although she cannot afford to lag behind in the ruinous race, it would be a fatal

337 "Progress in Gunnery," BNA, 1905, 383. See also 'Circa,' "The Ram in the Light of Recent Events," USM, Feb 1905, 477. Due to a lack of smoke, and hence of surprise, 'Circa' argued that the ram had very little chance of succeeding in war, particularly as a result of the expansion of battle ranges. 121 mistake to trust in mere mechanical appliances, and to neglect the cultivation of those qualities in her seamen which... have enabled the numerically weak to snatch victory from the strong."358 Service writers in the USM argued that without proper attention to the workload and conditions of the men, and hence their morale, no material advantage could be realized.359 This idea was easily conformable to the increasingly obvious lessons of the Russo-Japanese War, namely that while the Japanese were on paper and in terms of material the inferior power, they had the advantage of better training and better gunnery which allowed them to win. Material is to a certain extent divested of instrinsic value, and becomes one part of a fleet structure that draws upon many different attributes to provide a quality force.

In February 1906, Dreadnought was launched. The ship would be more than a year fitting out, but the general characteristics of the vessel were clear, in a general sense, to the public. Despite an unprecedented level of secrecy, size, armament and armour were known, and overall the secret was not as well kept as the Admiralty hoped.

One strategic element of the Dreadnought that was entirely approved of was the attempt to streamline and speed up the rate of construction. W.H. White in July 1905 NCA said that, "Thorough settlement of the designs, careful pre-arrangement and organisation of the work of construction, ample financial provision, and rapid execution should always be embodied in our naval policy."360 The most cost-effective method of construction would be to build a few ships rapidly and lay down new craft, rather than have many ships under construction for a long time.

358 Cdr. the Hon. Henry N. Shore, "Fashions in Sea-Fighting," USM, May 1905,120. 359 For this line of reasoning see 'Wardroom,' "Speed," USM, Aug 1905, 478; Charles de Grave Sells, "Stokers and Their Work," The Fleet, Oct 1905, 192. 360 W.H. White, "The Provision for the Maintenance and Repair of Our Fleet," NCA, Jul 1905, 68. 122

The cheaper, more radical papers tended to support Fisher's move with the

Dreadnought. The Fleet described the ideal battleship as a 17,000 ton ship with 12-inch armour, twelve 12-inch guns, ample ammunition and high speed, along the lines proposed by the Kalian Colonel Cunberti, arguing that "The 'Dreadnought' is the answer to that question."361 Later, The Fleet defended the 12-inch armament using Admiral

Rodjestvensky's claims that at Tsushima, even where the 12-inch did not penetrate, the impact broke rivets and separated plates, effectively sinking them.362 More mainstream periodicals also airayed themselves on the side of Fisher and his 'big-gun' mentality, seeing Dreadnought as a necessary technical response to changing conditions. Fisher promoted his fast battleships and battlecruisers by claiming that 'speed is armour,' and would keep ships out of range of enemy gunnery.363 The battle of Jutland in 1916 showed that armour was an important quality, when three British battlecruisers were sunk, and the insufficiency of speed to protect ships from equally skilled enemy gunfire.

This consequence was predicted by the Admiralty's critics, who aigued for a moderate approach to design with fewer inherent risks. It was predicated not on short-range actions, but on the effective long-range (of the time), approximately 8,000 yards.

Dreadnought was a huge international issue, even Captain Mahan wrote to the

National Review criticizing the increase in ship size on financial, technical and strategic grounds.364 In Britain two main avenues of criticism opened up over the question of warship design in early 1906, and dominated the discussion. The first was written anonymously in BEM by Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Custance, a former Director of

361 "The British NavyFANY, 1906, 65. 362 "Naval Ordnance Department,"FANY, 1906, 36. Admiral Rodjestvesky was the Russian admiral in command of the Baltic Fleet on its mission to the Far East in 1904-5. 363 Fisher, Memories, 106-7. 364 Sumida, "Geography, Technology, and British Naval Strategy," 93. 123

Naval Intelligence, who disagreed that the Russo-Japanese war or naval history had proven the primacy of the large calibre gun or the need for larger ships. He argued that,

up to now increase of size has been justified by the demands for greater enduring mobility and for some increase in fighting power... [but] a point has been reached when tactical and strategical requirements point to distribution rather than to a further concentration of fighting power. They have appealed for support to the ignorant public, but the trained professional judgement will eventually decide.365

Tackling the issue of increasing size, Custance made the well-reasoned point that a balance had to exist between numbers and individual power. This was a peculiarly

British position, based on the extent of worldwide naval commitments, in comparison to other nations' geographically focused strategic position, and the ability to concentrate medium sized ships for action. "The best defence is a vigorous offence," Custance argued, "and therefore the weapon which plays the double role of striking, and thus preventing a return blow, must never be sacrificed to the inert plate which feebly suffers without reply."366 Fighting power and tactical skill were the most important elements of victory. Custance denied that the Dreadnought was so revolutionary that it made other ships obsolete. Ships have greater life expectancy than guns, and so well-designed ships of the pie-Dreadnought classes could provide useful contributions in war.367 Custance was a prominent naval officer and thinker, thereby making his indictment of Fisher's policy even more powerful.

The Fleet responded in July, arguing that Custance's article was "laughable" and had "reduce[d] such arguments to an absurdity" by claiming that increased speed encourages running away, or that improved technology would decrease the quality of

365 Anonymous, 'The Growth of the Capital ShipBEM, May 1906, 593. 366 'By the author of "A Retrograde Admiralty,"' "Lessons From the Battle of Tsu Shima," BEM, Feb 1906, 159-62; [Admiral Custance], 'The Growth of the Capital Ship," BEM, May 1906, 592. 367 [Admiral Custance], 'The Growth of the Capital Ship," BEM, May 1906, 585. 124

training.368 While the mass public was being influenced by the newspapers and cheap

periodicals which favoured Fisher, the elite press was greatly complicating the

evaluation of the effectiveness and benefit of the Dreadnought policy. Fisher too

repeated these arguments, claiming that it was because of superior speed that the

Japanese were able to catch the Russian fleet.369

The major impetus for increasing the size of warships was the desire for greater

speed, and hence more machinery. Service writers and periodicals adopted a moderate

position, not denying the usefulness of speed but questioning whether high speed was

worth the price. Lt. B.E. Domville defined the question as "where is the Rubicon on the

other side of which the sacrifices involved commence to outweigh the advantages?"370

T.A. Brassey in BNA said that, "Speed is of no value to a battleship or cruiser which

cannot fight the enemy when she catches him."371 Like pre-refbrm discussions over the

right combination between size, speed and power, Brassey adhered to the traditional

view which ascribed supreme importance to combat-effectiveness. Vice-Admiral

Custance moderated these ideas, taking a neutral position that the tactical value of speed

was an unknown quantity, which needed to be investigated and tested to determine.372

The lessons of the war were not clear on the efficacy of speed, although this would

change with the analysis drawn from the Battle of Tsushima. Following a press attack by

Arnold White against Admirals Bridge and Custance, 'A Naval Officer' took him to

task. He supported the officers' argument that, "speed is only one of the factors which

368 "Service Notes," The Fleet, Jul 1906,192-3. 369 Fisher, Records, 113-4. 370 Lt. B.E. Domville, "Gold Medal Prize Essay," JRUSI, Mar 1907, 394. 371 T.A. Brassey, "The British Navy," BNA, 1905,4. 372 R.N. Custance, "A Plea for the Study of Tactics,"BNA, 1905 75. 125 go to make up an effective fighting ship, and that care should be taken not to give undue prominence to any element over the offensive."373

The 1906 BNA provided a relatively impartial analysis of "The Problem of

Speed - Both Sides of the Question," and stated that, "In the abstract, few deny the value of speed, but modern ships always represent a compromise, and there are those who think that speed may be purchased at too great a price by the loss of protection, gun power, or range of action, and who even question the value of superiority of speed."374

At least now, the USM approved, "it should be admitted that there is a problem."375 The article summarised the various contributions that Admirals Bridge and Custance used to advocate against high speed, but argued that the actual decision to build the

Dreadnought meant that serving officers, supported by Hopkins and Fremantle, had decided on the value of speed. Hopkins and Fremantle repeated the claims that speed would allow choice of range, and that the strategic value was self-evident.376 The new experience that the Russo-Japanese war offered reignited the issues, although the lessons were not so clear cut that existing schools of thought abandoned their beliefs.

The USM hosted an article series in 1906, shortly after the issuance of BNA, by

'Black Joke' analysing the method of application of naval force to determine the necessary qualities of warships. "Look where you will in the service press, and of course still more so in civilian papers," 'Black Joke' claimed, "you will find the iteration of the demand for speed, more speed.... [but no] reasonable statement of the arguments on

373 'A Naval Officer,' "Biassed Criticism," USM, Aug 1905, 472. 374 Anonymous, "The Problem of Speed - Both Sides of the Question," BNA, 1906, 144-5. 375 "Reviews: 'The Naval Annual,'" USM, Aug 1906, 582. 376 "The Problem of Speed - Both Sides of the Question," BNA, 1906, 144-5, 150-2. The ANG of May 5 1906 criticized 'Black Joke' and argued that superior speed had allowed Togo to head off the Russian line and pick off individual ships. 126

which the demand rests."377 In an action, "if fleets are of equal speed the battle will be

fought on parallel lines; if of unequal speed on concentric circles," but no tactical

advantage in gunpower or arcs of fire would accrue to the fleet in the outer position

because "all navies are already armed with guns of approximately equal range and

power."378 Not only were great and costly sacrifices in fighting power required to

provide the machinery for speed, speed was itself a "capricious and transitory" quality

subject to battle damage, hull condition, and weather.379 The solution that 'Black Joke'

proposed was to have a fast division coupled with a slower, more powerful and

numerous main fleet, which would entail building some fast battleships but focusing

primarily on normal speeds for the bulk of the fleet.380 With no tactical advantage

accruing from increasing speed, and certainly no economic incentives, these arguments

pressured the Admiralty to either abandon such a wasteful policy, or explain how high

speed would actually aid the navy in the performance of its duties.

In early 1907 'Black Joke' continued to push for an official response to the

voluminous and cogent arguments that were being presented. He argued that, "it is now

almost universally admitted that the assertion [of the value of high speed] will not stand,

377 "Black Joke", "The Speed of Men-of War" USM, May 1906, 117-8. 378 'Black Joke,' "The Speed of Men-of War," USM, May 1906, 121, 125, 128; 'Black Joke,' "Tactical Speed," USM, Oct 1906, 7-9. He lays out the tactical reasoning thus: a fleet's primary weapon is the gun, and more guns are engaged on the broadside; in combat, simple movements are best. Therefore, fleets operate in parallel lines, and if the faster fleet tried to 'cap' the enemy line, the enemy would turn inward, and the fleets would sail parallel. Neither fleet would have any superiority in the number of guns brought to bear on any part of the line. 379 "Black Joke," "The Speed of Men-of War" USM, May 1906 119; 'Black Joke,' "The Fast Wing," USM, Jan 1907, 362. See also 'Captain, R.N.,' "Food for Thought," USM, Jan 1907, 352. 'Captain R.N.' pointed out that damage to funnels could dramatically decrease the speed of a warship, and neutralize a fleet's advantage. 380 "Black Joke," "The Speed of Men-of War," USM, May 1906, 120, 126-7; 'Black Joke,' "Tactical Speed," USM, Oct 1906, 13; 'Black Joke,' "The Fast Wing," USM, Jan 1907, 375. He said that "by reducing the speed to the normal we can have probably four ships of equal fighting power for the cost of three of the fast ships." The problem with the fast division was that if the enemy spent the same money on slower ships, the fast division would find itself outclassed. 127 and that so strong a case has been made out against it that the official policy of continued silence must necessarily be construed as a confession of weakness."381 In summation,

The arguments seem all to point in one way. Decide upon your standard speed. Build all your battleships to have that speed. Build many cruisers, as small as may be, for very small dimensions are not possible if high speed is to be maintained. Provide plenty of small craft for narrow waters. Use elderly battleships for convoy duties. If for cruiser duties there needed a force greater than cruisers can give, detach ships of the line.382

'Black Joke' attempted to craft an ideal force structure which would provide not only the best ships, but at a price that would allow sufficient ships to be constructed. More importantly, it shows a fundamentally different conception of force integration. 'Black

Joke' was arguing that a combination of different ship classes tactically would provide the best task force for particular duties, instead of trying to create one ship that would do it all. He shows that naval thinkers had to deal with the financial implications of the construction problem, and that in the compromise inherent in naval vessels, the true purpose of the ship must be considered first.

Admiral Custance's arguments against speed repeated many of'Black Joke's' points. Tsushima and manoeuvres had shown that speed "is less important than tactical skill, and it gives a very limited control over the range" as well as being strategically discounted "by the demands of enduring mobility, by the conditions of war, and by the strategical ability of the admiral. In all cases its uncertainty is such that reliance cannot be placed upon it."383 Custance tried to convince his readers "that proof of the tactical advantages due to superior speed should be forthcoming before fighting power is

381 'Black Joke,' "The Fast Wing," USM, Jan 1907, 364. He did admit that it would be difficult for the Admiralty to defend the policy publicly without giving up some secrets. 382 'Black Joke,' "The Fast Wing," USM, Jan 1907, 375. 383 [Admiral Custance], 'The Speed of the Capital Ship," BEM, Oct 1906, 448. 128 sacrificed to obtain it."384 Like 'Black Joke,' Custance had an educated opinion on events, but he refrained from pronouncing new Admiralty policy. Instead, the periodical discourse is used as a vehicle for constructive criticism, with the onus of proof always being on the new technology to prove its efficacy. Custance's arguments mirrored those of Captain Mahan, who argued that "the choice of central position, insuring interior lines, and by adequate measures for receiving intelligence" by Admiral Togo, the

Japanese admiral during the Russo-Japanese War, had shown that speed was not required to bring an enemy to battle successfully.385

BEKTs articles are one of the few instances in which a leading policy-maker, in this case Fisher, interacted with the periodical press directly. Fisher's letter to Arnold

White of February 4 1906 noted that the "Blackwood Balaam doesn't seem dead" in the quest for small battleships with slow speed.386 In a letter to Lord Esher, Fisher claimed that Germany could not overmatch Dreadnought in guns or size, implying that the new ship design would discourage German naval competition.387 German dredging for the new ships would also allow British warships to attack Germany.388 Since Custance was perhaps the best-informed of Fisher's critics, it appears that Fisher was feeling the intellectual and moral weight of the anti-Dreadnought reaction.

Fisher replied to the commentators, largely in the daily and weekly press, by issuing "Admiralty Policy; Replies to Criticisms" in October 1906 in order to disprove allegations against the efficiency and sufficiency of the fleet. Fisher insulted his critics

584 [Admiral Custance], 'The Speed of the Capital Ship," BEM, Oct 1906, 443. 385 Captain A.T. Mahan, "Reflections, Historic and Other, Suggested by the Battle of the Japan Sea," JRUS1, Nov 1906, 1332-3. Reprinted from the Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute. 386 Fisher to A. White, Feb 4 1906, FGDN v II, 68. Fisher noted that it was Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Custance who was writing the articles. 387 Fisher to Lord Esher, Feb 21 1908 in Fisher, Memories, 184. 388 Fisher to King Edward, 1907 in Fisher, Memories, 31-2. 129 as officers "whose names were bywords of inefficiency and ineptitude when they were afloat," some of whom believed that "slow speed and 6-inch guns are of primary importance in a sea fight!! !"389 Fisher gave no credit to his opponents' intelligence or legitimacy. Fisher believed that, "The advocates of small battleships and slow speed have been so often pulverized that it's wonderful how they can even get anyone to print such nonsense."390 The periodicals, however, show that his critics were still strong, and respected by the public. His declarations are unconvincing because he offered nothing like the mathematical and logical analysis that his critics were providing to the public, instead reassuring the public that the Admiralty was the most capable body to pronounce decisions on these questions. For instance, he claimed that anyone could see that high speed would allow fleet concentration in Home waters in the most timely fashion. This claim was not disputed by critics, and Fisher avoids addressing the real question they raised, namely how much fighting power should be sacrificed to speed?

The only bright light for the proponents of speed were the naval manoeuvres of

1906, in which Admiral May was able to temporarily command the Channel due to his ability to out-distance the defending fleet.391 After this clear indication of the potential benefits of speed, Lt. A.C. Dewar wrote in the USM in late 1907 pointing out the legitimate, albeit minimal, advantages that a significant, ie. 3-knot, margin of superiority would provide. It would certainly allow the faster fleet to alter the range at will, "but if fire skill and armament are equal, command of the range will give little or no

389 Fisher, Records, 102-5. 3,0 Fisher to Tweedmouth, Oct 5 1906, FGDN v.//, 95-7. 391 "The Naval Manoeuvres of 1906," FANY, 1907, 46. Admiral May's fleet was composed of the eight battleships of the King Edward F7/-class and had a two-knot superiority in speed. Lt. Dewar's "Speed in Naval Tactics," USM, Sep 1907, 600, noted that the King Edwards fine performance was partly due to the use of oil to supplement the coal-fired boilers. Liquid fuel was more transportable, easier to use, and more powerful, and was one technological area in which the Admiralty actually led the merchant marine. 130 advantage" and strategically it was less important than good communications and

peacetime dispositions.392 However, speed was of considerable advantage in "evading action [which] permits isolated ships to traverse the sea in safety and frees all reinforcements and junctionary strategy of the incubus of being brought to action by a superior force."393 A fast battleship squadron could not only evade superior forces, but chase and bring to action any inferior forces, and as long as a squadron was operating the enemy could not consider the area to be effectively controlled.394 In terms of the strategic needs,

it may be asserted that high speed would not be wanted strategically by an enemy almost equal in strength who was ready to accept action but not desirous of forcing it. High speed is required by an enemy inferior in strength who aims at disputing or dislocating the control of an area without being forced into action, and conversely by a power with vital sea interests requiring it to force an enemy's fleet to action if it issues from its ports.395

Thus, Britain had to invest in fast battleships, although Dewar does leave it open to discussion how much of battlefleet strength should be fast, in order to ensure that a weaker opponent could not practice a strategy of sea denial with small, fast squadrons.

'Black Joke' admitted that Dewar did not give significant strategic advantage to speed, but claimed "what he does allow is excessive."396

As the quality of speed became increasingly complicated, the proponents of

Dreadnought worked on the second controversial tactical element, namely gunpower, although the two were intimately related Limited displacement had to be allocated to one or the other. The QR for October 1906 claimed that Britain had "obtained a notable

392 Lt. Dewar, "Speed in Naval Tactics," USM, Sep 1907, 600; Lt. Dewar, "Speed in Battleship Strategy," USM, Oct 1907, 2. 393 Lt. Dewar, "Speed in Battleship Strategy," USM, Oct 1907, 3. 3,4 Lt. Dewar, "Speed in Battleship Strategy," USM, Oct 1907, 3. 395 Lt. Dewar, "Speed in Battleship Strategy," USM, Oct 1907, 5. 396 'Black Joke,' "Some Criticisms," USM, Oct 1907, 15. 131 lead in vessels which embody, more or less completely, the main lesson of the Far-

Eastern war" namely, the primacy of the large-calibre gun.397 Before Tsushima, 'A

Naval Officer' had already pointed out the importance not only of hits, but of actually penetrating the target.398 After witnessing the aforementioned criticisms in the USM,

'Captain RN' offered a piece on Dreadnought and Inflexible, the first of Fisher's battlecruisers, which suggested that whatever the faults of the ships may be, at least they were "unquestionably completely up-to-date, and embodie[d] the very latest improvements in armour, armament, and machinery, while their rapid construction allows all these advantages to be fully used. Whether she will really prove, as we are told, an epoch making ship, remains to be proved."399 Even The Fleet remained doubtful of the revolutionary status of Dreadnought.400 For Dreadnought to make good on

Fisher's claims that it made all preceding ships obsolete, the tactical value of uniform- calibre heavy gun armament needed to be proven.

Anti-Dreadnought authors, such as 'Captain RN' and 'Black Joke' continued to press for the restoration of heavier secondary batteries, in order to moderate between power and volume of fire. FANY, a popular annual and major supporter of Fisher, presented the pro-big gun position by claiming that the 6-inch gun could not perform at the long ranges expected in future battles and pointing out that improvements in gun design allowed greater power, accuracy and rate of fire.401 'Captain RN' stressed that when targeting funnels, critical for crippling an enemy's speed, and unarmoured

3,7 "The Naval Situation," QR, Oct 1906, 332. 398 'A Naval Officer,' "A Short-Handed Admiralty and Some Overdue Reforms," USM, Oct 1904, 19-20. 399 'Captain, R.N.,' "The Inflexible and the Dreadnought," USM, Nov 1906, 123. 400 "Events of the Year: Material," FANY, 1907, 5. 401 "Naval Ordnance," FANY, 1907, 64; 'The Navies of the World: The American Navy," FANY, 1907, 97. 132

structures, "a ship with a powerful secondary battery, with its much-increased volume of

fire, has far better chances of oftenest hitting its opponents."402 'Black Joke' accepted, as

was the universal consensus by 1907, the arguments against the 6-inch batteries, but

pointed out that, "The 9'2-inch can put a greater weight of metal into a target at battle

ranges in a given time than any other gun."403 The claims that uniform-calibre

armaments provided greatly superior fire-control, he said, was invalid because "in a fleet

action, when half a dozen or more firing at the same target, it loses its value."404 'Black

Joke' essentially argued for a return to the Lord Nelson design, with four 12-inch and six to eight 9.2-inch as the best combination of power and rapidity. On the other hand,

Dewar argued that, compared with the Lord Nelson class, Dreadnought threw a greater weight of shell per minute and the three knot speed superiority would more than overbalance the numerical advantage of the less costly battleship.405 The appeal of quick-firing guns was related to the notion that medium-range actions may offer a more decisive result than long-range gunnery duels.

There was a significant current of opinion which decried the increase in battle ranges in general. 'Nemo' in the USM argued that, "A fire duel at long ranges between two fairly equal fleets, each well-trained in gunnery, can never lead to any decisive results."406 He used this idea to argue that speed would be an asset in narrow seas to catch or cut off the enemy, but it was foolish to advocate speed only to avoid the necessary range for achieving a decisive victory. Moreover, it would be "wrong to

402 'Captain, R.N.," "Food for Thought," USM, Jan 1907, 354. See also Captain Mahan, "Reflections, Historic and Other, Suggested by the Battle of the Japan Sea," JRUSI, Nov 1906,1338, reprinted from Proceedings of the USN1. 403 'Black Joke,' "A.B.G.B.S.," USM, Mar 1907, 586. 404 'Black Joke,' "A.B.G.B.S.," USM, Mar 1907, 584. 405 Lt. Dewar, "Speed in Battleship Construction," USM, Nov 1907,117-8. 406 'Nemo,' "'Closer Action,'" USM, Nov 1907, 122-3, 127-9. He argued that the Japanese had fought at long ranges because they could not afford to risk a single ship. 133 centralise the fighting capacity of the ship in a single fire-control station, which the first chance shell may destroy" or to pass up the traditional British penchant for close and decisive action.407 'Executive Officer' in March 1908 USMfound 'Nemo's arguments refreshing, arguing that the Royal Navy should be trained in long-range fire in order to advance to close, decisive range while hitting the enemy, but using the superior discipline and morale of British crews to full advantage at shorter ranges.408 Lt. A.C.

Dewar also depreciated the drive to increase battle-ranges, arguing that even with good fire control the projectiles would lose too much energy, and the number of hits would substantially decrease.409 The importance of long-range gunnery was not universally accepted. These critics were not arguing for a range of a few hundred yards, but a moderate distance of4-5,000 yards. The battle would be risky, and possibly costly, but the losses would be justified by quickly winning and holding command of the sea, an interesting idea in light of the indecisive actions of World War I.

The 1907 RUSI essay contest was a direct response to the increasing intensity of the debates on speed and armament, asking "What is the relative value of speed and armament, both strategically and tactically, in a modern battle-ship, and how far should either be sacrificed to the other in the ideal ship?" Lt. B.E. Domville continued to defend the mixed-gun battleship, because while the 12-inch was necessary to penetrate armour, the lighter guns would do good work on unarmoured sections, fire-control systems and communications; there was "no advantage that can be obtained by a high speed to

407 'Nemo,' '"Closer Action,'" USM, Nov 1907,130. 408 'Executive Officer,' "Materiel v. Personnel," USM, Mar 1908, 570-4. British discipline and morale would be superior because of the long-service system. Captain Mahan, "Reflections, Historic and Other, Suggested by the Battle of the Japan Sea," JRUSI, Nov 1906, 1343-4. Reprinted from Proceedings of the USNI. 409 Lt. Dewar, "Speed in Naval Tactics," USM, Sep 1907,599. compare with that ensured by a well directed fire.... It pays better to defeat men than armour - to capture the ship than to sink her."410 He concluded that while speed was an asset, it could never decide the actual battle, only gunnery could.

Julian Corbett contributed to the 1907 RUSI discussions with "The Strategical

Value of Speed in Battle-ships" in which he distinguished between maximum speed, which applies tactically, and endurance, which matters strategically.411 He argued that historically faster ships had been desirable, and so if thinkers were going to deny die importance of having a high speed, the burden of proof lay with them; although he admitted that critics had done good work in questioning the unthinking faith in high speed412 Lt. E.V.F.R. Dugmore made the useful observation that, "the value of speed has been much diminished by the tremendous advance in the range and power of ordnance."413 The danger he saw in smaller and slower battleships was that it would rely on torpedo craft to limit the enemy's motions to ensure that a fleet action could be fought, but these small craft could be built much faster and allow Britain's enemies to neutralize such a strategy in fairly short order.414 He calculated mathematically the relationship between gunpower and speed, concluding that the value of speed v. armament was 1.283:1 tactically and 1.7:1 strategically, making a 2-knot speed superiority the desirable figure for British ships.415

After such serious and perceptive criticism of the Dreadnought concept, the

Admiralty was forced to respond. The First Lord's speech to the House of Commons on

4,0 Lt. B.E. Domville, "Gold Medal Prize Essay," JRUSI, Mar 1907, 397-9, 413; Lt. N.F. Usborne "Second Prize Essay," JRUSI, Apr 1907, 513-38. 411 Julian Corbett, "The Strategical Value of Speed in Battle-ships," JRUSI, Jul 1907, 825. 412 Corbett, "The Strategical Value of Speed in Battle-ships," JRUSI, Jul 1907,829. 413 Lt. E.V.F.R. Dugmore, 'Third Prize Essay," JRUSI, Dec 1907,1450. 4.4 Lt. Dugmore, "Third Prize Essay," JRUSI, Dec 1907,1459. 4.5 Lt. Dugmore, "Third Prize Essay," JRUSI, Dec 1907,1463-4. 135

March 16 1909 admitted that the Dreadnought did not make all previous battleships obsolete, but that it did shorten their expected life.416 Substantially, the Admiralty's critics were arguing for moderation. Battleships were expensive articles of war, and optimizing the combat value of the construction budget was an important factor in naval efficiency. The Admiralty did not have a monopoly on either the facts or the analysis, and critics were able to provide cogent arguments against overly high speed and all-big- gun uniform-calibre armaments. These concepts have been verified by Sumida's work on fire-control, which showed that the technology required to successfully fight at the long-ranges that would have justified both speed and heavy gunpower was insufficient to implement the force structure Fisher envisioned.

As information regarding the new class of battleship emerged, debates regarding technology took up increasing space in the naval articles of the British periodical press. However, in spite of the weighty words and actions contributed by both sides, the questions of, "What is the average battle range? and Can volume of fire compensate for inferiority in the weight of individual projectiles?... have been answered many times, [but] they have never been answered satisfactorily."417 The most coherent and systematic critiques of the Dreadnought, those by 'Captain RN', Admiral Custance, and 'Black Joke,' are obvious examples of the high level of technical, tactical and strategic information presented to the British public. These writers were not simply blind, reactionary critics of a progressive policy, as Fisher would have liked people to believe, but presented thorough attempts to comprehend how a future naval action would progress, based on very few experiences, and what type of ship would most

416 Reginald McKenna, "Navy Estimates, 1909-10: Speech of the First Lord on the Motion to go into Committee of Supply on the Navy Estimates," BNA, 1909, 385. 417 Hislam, "The Progress and Present State of Warship Design," USM, Aug 1907, 483. 136 effectively prosecute such an action. Dreadnought may have been the inevitable product of modern thought and warship design, but the effectiveness of the ship was not fully realized until the Admiralty had demonstrated that it would successfully perform in combat conditions and that its fire could be effectively controlled at great ranges.

Conclusion

The public discourse surrounding naval construction and design shows the lack of a functional approach to new technology. The merits and demerits of new systems were tested against widely varying conceptions of war, leading to little consensus within and without the navy on the new policy. The Russo-Japanese War was an important experience, but it was used to prove contradictory concepts, illustrating that it was the discourse through which it was filtered that provided the dominant paradigm for the reforms. By laying out the ebb and flow of the periodical discourse, this chapter demonstrates that the key element in reforming the Royal Navy was not the feedback loop between the 'Reality of War' and the 'Discourse on War,' but in the sub-system of the 'Discourse on War' where theoretical concepts are developed, undergo testing with experiment and manoeuvres, and are then refined.

In 1910 Charles a Court Repington aigued that, "The mine, the improved torpedo, the submarine, the destroyer, the airship, wireless telegraphy, and long-ranging coastal ordnance, have revolutionised the conditions of operations off an enemy's coast, and strategy, whether it likes it or not, has to take count of a new situation."418 None of this would come as a surprise to the informed British public. The periodical press offered knowledgeable officers and critics a chance to publish and discuss ideas in a forum where they would quickly attract the Admiralty's attention, as well as giving the

4,8 Colonel A Court Repington, "New Wars for Old: I. The Submarine Menace," BEM, Jun 1910, 897. Admiralty the capacity to respond to critics and enlighten public opinion. In his April

1906 summation of Admiralty policy, W.H. White stated that, "problems of strategy and tactics are likely to find better solutions when they are thoroughly and openly discussed.

British naval officers of large experience and great ability have urged the necessity for careful investigation and extended experiment of many features affecting armament, speed, and other qualities; and their opinions should not be ignored."419 The periodical press offered a forum for these commentators, and it was quickly utilized by naval officers, both by name and pseudonym, to express their doubts regarding the new technology and the need to explore, theoretically and then practically, the tactics and strategy of naval war in order to understand whether the Dreadnought was the penultimate design, or one more ship on a long roll of evolution.

419 W.H. White, "Admiralty Policy and the New Naval Estimates," NCA, Apr 1906, 618. 138

CHAPTER V: EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION The End of the Fisher Era

It is always imagined in times of peace that the puzzling questions arising out of new and untried engines of war will be answered when the next battle comes along; but the battle is fought, and some men explain the results one way and some another, and the problems are as hotly discussed as ever and have found no solution.420 'Nemo,' USM, November 1907

The 'Fisher Era' was a period of radical reconstruction of the Royal Navy's personnel, material and administration. These reforms occurred within a large and intricate environment of intellectual dialogue regarding naval issues, and must be seen as the product of British society rather than of a particular man or school of thinkers.

Fisher was undoubtedly a substantial figure, but he was not alone and his press allies were quick to promote his programme to the public to create pressure on Parliament.

However, the press was neither universally pro-Fisher or anti-Fisher. Both his allies and his critics created their own positions, combining certain elements of the reforms with certain historically-based ideas to create unique constructs of the ideal navy. The navally-minded intellectuals of Britain investigated the questions facing the Royal Navy with an attitude of curiosity and responsibility, patriotically attempting to ensure that no necessary reform went unperformed, or any important elements were needlessly sacrificed.

The hindsight afforded by World War I has verified several of these serious criticisms. In particular the use of submarines as commerce destroyers, while unexpected, was better met by the protected cruiser-rich force structure envisioned by the historical school than the armoured cruisers of Fisher's plan. Fisher's inability to accept criticism, let alone adopt other proposals, played a significant role in his fall from

420 'Nemo,' '"Closer Action,'" USM, Nov 1907,121. 139 power in January 1910.

The 1909 naval panic and the Beresford inquiry were the major factors in ending the 'Fisher Era.' The first challenged the ability of the Admiralty Board to resist the

Liberal Government's financial retrenchment, in the face of supposedly accelerating

German construction. The second struck at the Admiralty's preparation for war, and aired the increasingly deep division in the service between the 'Beresfordites' and the

'Fishpond.' Caught between these two developments, Fisher was forced to resign in

1910, although he would return from 1914-1915 as First Sea Lord, departing only after the Dardanelles fiasco.

The 1906 general election was a devastating blow to Balfour's Unionist government. The Liberal Party was returned with an enormous majority. Stephen

McKenna described the new scene, "Never before and never since has a House of

Commons containing so much reforming zeal or so little knowledge of the limitations imposed on idealists by procedure, time and human strength."421 The new government was committed to the liberal ideas of retrenchment, particularly in armaments.422 Herbert

Henry Asquith, Chancellor of the Exchequer, writing to the Prime Minister Henry

Campbell-Bannerman, offered a clipping from the Spectator, claiming that even such big-navy supporters had to admit that British supremacy allowed some retrenchment in armaments.423

421 Stephen McKenna, Reginald McKenna, 1863-1943, (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948), 38. 422 Semmel, Liberalism and Naval Strategy, chapter 8. For an example of the new ideology, The Nation, a liberal weekly established in 1907, vociferously campaigned for retrenchment in naval spending throughout 1907 to 1909. The primary argument was that Germany required a large navy because Britain was unwilling to declare commercial vessels inviolate in war. German construction would therefore slow to reasonable levels if Britain were to give up this right. 423 Jenkins, Asquith, 167-8. 140

The cutbacks in July 1906 to three battleships, instead of the four mandated by

Cawdor's Memorandum, and criticisms over the design of the Dreadnought had triggered public anxiety. Fisher defended the cuts, but argued conversely that because a new threshold of construction had been reached, the navy "can therefore not rest content with the advantage which we secured in an era which is passing away."424 In 1907 at the

Lord Mayor's Banquet, Fisher had praised the efficiency of the Royal Navy, and the powerful fleet concentrated in home waters, telling his audience to "Sleep quiet in your beds."425 This advice would cost him a great deal of public support when the panic began. Fisher argued that HMS Dreadnought had caused substantial delays in foreign construction, and that this advantage justified the cuts to the 1906-7 estimates by one dreadnought (one more dreadnought being made conditional on the Hague Peace

Conference). There was a minor naval scare over whether Germany would be catching up to British naval power in 1907, but the real challenge to the Board came in 1909.

In 1908 rumours surfaced that Germany was making excessive orders of battleship subsystems from Krupp, including turrets, leading some British writers and politicians to believe that Germany was accelerating their construction.426 The Nation blamed the newspapers; "The two nations, like the animals of the Colosseum, have been goaded into the arena by the malicious pricks of these pitiless attendants."427 German politicians denied any aggressive intentions, claiming it was only to ensure employment, but a panic began in Britain that in 1912 there would be only twelve British to face

424 Fisher, Records, 110. 425 Fisher's speech at the 1907 Lord Mayor's Banquet, Fisher, Records, 90-2. 426 For information on this agitation, see "British Shipbuilding Programmes," BNA, 1907, 68; 'Excubitor,' "The British Reply to Germany's Dreadnoughts," FR, Mar 1908, 456-69; Hurd, "A Policy of the 'Clean Slate' Towards Germany," FR, Dec 1908, 913-24; "The Basis of Security," The Nation, Feb 27 1909, 808; 'An Admiral of Fifty-one Years Service,' "Naval Defence by Panic," BEM, May 1909, 735-43. 427 H.S. Tasker, "Scares and Scaremongers," The Nation, Oct 3 1908, 16. See also "British Shipbuilding Programmes," BNA, 1907, 68. 141 eleven German dreadnoughts, and an unacceptably close margin.428 The Admiralty asked the Government for six dreadnoughts in 1909-10, which was countered by an offer of four. In the end, after the public cry of 'We want eight, and we won't wait,' they compromised on eight.429 The German acceleration was in fact a myth, but the public's confidence in the Admiralty's ability to ensure British naval supremacy was badly shaken.

The second, and final, step in ending the 'Fisher Era' was the 1909 Beresford

Inquiry. Beresford charged the Admiralty with a failure to fully develop strategic ideas and ensure that commanding Admirals were aware of naval planning. He was building on a long-standing drive for the creation of a naval general staff which would provide the intellectual equipment for naval war planning and organization.430 Before Fisher was

First Sea Lord, he had also supported a naval general staff, but once in office was unwilling to accept any limitation to his power.431 His autocratic nature alienated sections of the service. A report from Captain Bacon illustrates officers' grievances with the lack of consultation, respect and information provided to senior officers.432 The creation of a general staff with a key role in the administration of the navy would

428 The QR published "The German Peril" in Jul 1908, 264-98 to which Prince Bulow replied in the Standard. The QR rebutted his commentary in "The German Peril: A Rejoinder to Prince Bulow," QR, Oct 1908,576-98. 429 See McKenna, Reginald McKenna, 64-9 for a brief description of the course of the agitation. For information on the 'People's Budget' see Bruce K. Murray, The People's Budget 1909/10: Lloyd George and Liberal Politics, (Clarendon Press, 1980). 430 For some articles on a naval general staff, see "Efficiency in the Services," QR, Jul 1902, 270-5; 'A Naval Officer,' "The Royal Corps of Naval Construction, and its Connection with the Ordnance and Engineering Department," USM, May 1903, 146-7; 'A Naval Officer,' "A Short-Handed Admiralty and Some Overdue Reforms," USM, Oct 1904, 22; Admiral Fremantle, "A General Staff for the Navy," USM, Jan 1905, 335-42; 'St. Barbara,' "Fool Gunnery in the Navy.-11," BEM, Mar 1908,442-60; For Beresford's arguments for a naval war staff see Beresford, Memoirs, 478-84. 431 Fisher to Selborne, Feb 25 1902, British Naval Documents, 880-1. 432 Bacon to Fisher, Apr 15 1906, PGDN v.//, 75-7. 142 provide the best theoretical planning for war, and ensure that important questions were not neglected because of lack of time or manpower, or individual caprice.

Archibald Hurd noted in the January 1908 FR that, "For two years past a demand has been made for an inquiry into the state of the Navy by a small section of critics of the present naval administration, who have remained anonymous, and whose authority and influence cannot therefore be appraised."433 Given that, for example, one prominent critic was W.H. White, Hurd's comment is deceptive. The inquiry was a fair response to the aggressive attacks that Fisher made on critics, which were contrary to the open discussion necessary for naval development in peacetime. The Nation considered that the Royal Navy's

two most salient figures - Sir John Fisher and Lord Charles Beresford - have undoubtedly succeeded in dividing both the service and 'society' into schools of vehement and active partisans of the one personality or the other, and of the ideas in organisation, ships, and gunnery which they represent.... Both appear to command adherents in the Press and to make free use of their advocates.434

The situation could not be allowed to continue, but neither side was clearly right.

Beresford was acting insubordinately, while Fisher behaved autocratically.

The Beresford Inquiry ended up supporting Fisher's position, that there was sufficient strategic planning to ensure British security, but it also hedged by stating that the Admiralty should make more effort to keep fleet Commanders-in-Chief in the know.435 In 1912 a War Staff was created, and Beresford noted with triumph lhat its justification was proved by the immense amount of work that had fallen to it after its

433 Hurd, "An Inquiry into the State of the Navy," FR, Jan 1908, 45. 434 "The Quarrel in the Navy," The Nation, Jul 11 1908, 514-5. 435 Beresford made a not-so-subtle jab at Fisher in his Memoirs, 486, describing how important it was for the senior admiral of the fleet to communicate clear and explicit orders to subordinates, and to be available to those subordinates whenever needed, insinuating that Fisher and the Admiralty had failed in doing so. These accusations had been more fully elaborated earlier in his book The Betrayal, (London: P.S. King & Son, 1912) which was a vindictive attack on the whole of Fisher's policies. 143 implementation.436 Ultimately, the solution was to remove both men. They had divided the service too deeply, and after a decade of profound change, perhaps what the Royal

Navy really needed was time to re-solidify as a service.

Concluding Remarks

The periodical press played an important role in reforming the Royal Navy during the pivotal first decade of the twentieth century. As The Nation stated,

"Government are not all-powerful.... and they require, therefore, the constant check which public opinion supplies."437 The 'Discourse on War' and the 'Reality of War' did not form a simple feedback loop in the reform of the Royal Navy at the beginning of the twentieth century. The intellectual discourse, involving politicians, journalists, naval officers and citizens, comprised an important theoretical testing ground for predictions regarding the future of naval warfare and the necessary personnel, material and technological structures to meet it. To understand peacetime reform in an era of radical technological change, it is important to incorporate an additional methodological layer to Lynn's model, whereby theory is developed, tested, and interpreted in order to perfect organizational structures for future conflict.

The first decade of the twentieth century was a critical time period for the periodical press and naval reform. The pressure of revolutionary technological change meant that modernization was desperately needed, but the exact nature of the requirements was uncertain. The belief in instant war, and the decisiveness of the first days of war, meant that it was not possible to wait for war experience to determine the nature of reforms. Britain could not afford to 'muddle through' the next war, because,

436 Beresford, Memoirs, 479. Beresford had begun agitation in 1902. 437 "Further Steps to Peace," The Nation, Aug 22 1908, 726-7. 144 with the new reliance on imports of food and raw materials, a blockade would destroy the nation before the fleet could be reconstructed. The navy needed to reach its peak efficiency and readiness in peacetime. The periodical press provided a means of exercising intellectual innovation, so as to ensure the best application of resources in order to secure permanent naval supremacy.

With no naval general staff to investigate these questions, the intellectuals writing in the periodical press acted as a 'think tank.' Public opinion was a useful ally for reformers, but also served as a check on those same people, questioning and challenging the effectiveness of particular changes. The Admiralty may have used the press, unofficially, but they certainly did not control it or have the power to simply ignore commentators. The press could not, and particularly the service press would not, decide naval policy, but in an increasingly democratic system the influence of the press, as the public's voice, became an important consideration for government activities. The threat of parliamentary interference in naval affairs was frequently a factor in naval policy reform, and pre-empting public agitation with reforms was more appealing to the

Admiralty than allowing ignorant and potentially disastrous interference.

The need to discuss and determine naval reforms coincided with the radical increase in the scope and depth of the periodical press. More people were able to get involved, and naval debates attracted increasingly large audiences. The huge burst of popular service periodicals in the late 1890s and 1900s, such as the NAI, NU and The

Fleet, encouraged public interest and disseminated information.

The growing pervasiveness of the media in British society spread awareness of naval questions downwards, forcing the Admiralty to explain and justify its position to 145 voters. The study of the media discussion shows that every aspect of naval organization was discussed and examined. No change went unnoticed or unremarked, and the

Admiralty was provided with constant commentary on the successfulness of policy. The identification of problems, actual and potential, helped to rectify these issues before the test of war.

Historians have tended to favour top-down investigations of policy, treating policy-making as a rational development of experts. The press demonstrates that while decisions are based on carefully reasoned arguments, these arguments extend beyond the experts to encompass a much wider range of extra-Admiralty thinkers. With the availability of the press, being outside the positions of power did not preclude the exertion of influence. The press was a coalescing into a radically new means of developing political influence, proving sufficient to pressure the government and major public departments like the Admiralty.

Most importantly, the periodical discourse demonstrates the active responsibility the public was taking for the fitness of national defences. The Royal Navy was the foundation of Britain's world power, and its only line of defence in an increasingly militarized and hostile Europe. The fitness of the fleet was not part of party politics, nor even the sole preserve of the government. The twentieth century naval revolution occurred in a social environment washed through with information and dialogue. This discourse shaped the approach which policy-makers took to naval reforms, and needs to be accounted for in any discussion of policy. Society in general felt the privilege, and the obligation, of ensuring British security was sufficient, and an efficient use of public monies. 146

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APPENDIX I: THE PERIODICALS

Army and Navy Gazette: Journal of the Reserve and Auxiliary Forces (ANG)

The ANG was the journal for the reserve and auxiliary forces, and provided weekly listing of the 'Gazettes,' or postings, of naval and army officers. The journal sold for 6d weekly, putting it beyond the range of the British working class civilian or enlisted recruit, and the advertising supports this conception of a middle and upper class audience.438 The articles in the ANG were unsigned, creating the impression of a unified journalistic stance under the editor W.H. Russell and the naval sub-editor John Leyland.

The ANG was conservative and attempted to rationalize Admiralty policy for its largely service audience. By appealing to the reserves and auxiliaries, it targeted the marginal service groups and expanded awareness of active service issues and conditions.

Blackwood's {Edinburgh) Magazine (BEM)

BEM was a civilian periodical and a mainstay of the elite literary press. Published monthly, it targeted the British upper and middle classes and sold for 6s. While primarily a literary magazine, publishing famous works like Joseph Conrad's Heart of

Darkness, a regular portion of content was devoted to current political issues. Defence policy was a tegular, albeit small, aspect. Prominent officers and politicians contributed, for example Lord Wolseley in the 1880s used BEM to advocate for military reforms.

Due to its extensive circulation and cultural weight within Britain, indicated most

438 Advertising in the ANG included fine Scotch and Irish whiskies, and military accoutrements like field- glasses. Since officers were obliged to provide much of their own equipment, the target audience is obvious. 153

clearly by its publishing run from 1817 to 1980, BEMwas an active cultivator of elite

opinion, and was common reading among British policy-makers.

The (Brassey's) Naval Annual (BNA)

BNA was founded by Lord Brassey in 1886. From 1900 to 1910 it was edited primarily

by his son, T.A. Brassey, with the assistance of John Leyland. The annual sold for 155,

and was aimed at wealthier people. Biyan Ranft described BNA as a "compilation

depending for its accuracy and comprehensiveness on the contributions of a wide range

of specialists working under editors remarkable for their balanced views on defence

matters."439 BNA gained a reputation for being a semi-official and highly reliable

publication. Notable officers and journalists, such as Cdr. Charles N. Robinson (Editor

of The Navy and Army Illustrated, 1895-1903), Admiral Sir Vesey Hamilton, James R.

Thursfield and assorted specialists contributed articles. Moreover, BNA reprinted

essential Admiralty documents, such as the 'First Lord's Statement explanatory of the

Navy Estimates' and 'Statement of Works.' BNA provided an avenue for the Admiralty

to disseminate essential information, although BNA's content was not officially

sanctioned. For instance, Lord Brassey was a constant proponent of increasing reserves

and consistently used BNA to put pressure on the Admiralty.

The Fleet: An Illustrated Journal for the Navy and the Nation

The Fleet was founded in 1905, in response to the clear need for a journal dedicated to

providing the lower-deck with information and an outlet for opinions. A 1909

439 "Introduction," Bryan Ranft ed., Technical Change and British Naval Policy, 1860-1939. (Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), xvi. advertisment declared that, "'The Fleet' is the Recognised Journal of the British Navy and is read by practically every Officer and Man in the Service."440 Lionel Yexley, who served 21 years on the lower deck before turning to journalism, had a buoyant and humorous editorial demeanor which "won the respect and confidence of officers and officials in high positions who were able either to adopt his suggestions or to give them influential support in the right quarters."441 Bonnett flatteringly stated that "Yexley was,

in fact, the most remarkable public relations officer the Navy has ever known."442

Yexley served under Fisher at HMS Excellent, the gunnery training establishment, and

later was able to offer, unofficially, the views and opinions he received as editor to the

First Sea Lord. The Fleet acted as an agitator for better conditions for the enlisted men.

Canteen and uniform reforms were particularly noteworthy in 1905 and 1906, with the declared result that it was The Fleet which had provided the major forum for grievances, and was a leading actor in the agitation which achieved both a committee and later a series of reforms.

Fleet Annual and Naval Yearbook (FANY)

The FANY sold for Is, a very affordable sum. The frequent advertising for canteen contractors, ships logs, naval and military breweries, and sporting equipment indicate it target audience was both service officers and enlisted men.443 Edited by Lionel Yexley, also the editor of The Fleet, it was intended to be readable and accessible while

440 Advertisement, Fleet Annual and Naval Yearbook {FANY), 1909. The motto of The Fleet was 'The efficiency of the Service and the comfort of the men,' "Service Notes," The Fleet, May 1905, 3. 441 "Mr. Lionel Yexley: A Champion of the Lower Deck," Times, Mar 21 1933, 16. Fisher also corresponded with Yexley, primarily regarding lower-deck reforms, see Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought (FGDN), v.2, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1952), 22. 442 Bonnett, Price of Admiralty, 208. 443 An advertisement in the 1906 volume of The Fleet claimed that 315 copies had been ordered by naval officers. containing accurate information. Essentially, FANY was significantly shorter and much more colloquial version of BNA, except with a more radical stance consistent with The

Fleet's position.

Fortnightly Review (FR)

The FR was founded in 1865 and was a two-shilling monthly published for a general civilian audience, hence its predominantly literary, religious, political and scientific content. While the proprietors were Conservatives, the editor W.L. Courtney adhered to the founding conception of a balanced political perspective, including using signed articles. The FR was more willing to criticize naval policy because it did not have the same moral ties to the service.

Journal of the Royal United Service Institution (JRUSI)

The JRUSI was the publication of the Royal United Service Institution, which was established in 1858 to act as the intellectual institution for the army and navy. An annual prize essay contest was held, usually alternating between military and naval subjects, which encouraged theoretical activity among officers. Other speakers were invited to give lectures, with attendant discussions, which were afterwards published in the journal. Foreign articles of note were also included. The JRUSI was distributed to members, who joined for a sum of 1£ annually. 156

The Navy League Journal (NU)

The 3d NU was the organ of the reconstructed Navy League of 1895, targeted at all

sections of middle and working class society except the very poorest.444 Arthur Marder

noted that public awareness organizations like the Navy League played a "conspicuous

role in molding public opinion on the needs of the fleet," its avowed purpose.441 The

TVL/was the primary venue through which the League could influence the public. It included original articles by prominent members, such as Rear-Admiral Sidney Eardley-

Wilmot or Lieutenant Carlyon Bellairs MP, but also contained excerpts from notable

naval articles in the daily press. These inclusions illustrate the degree of interconnection

within the media. The NLJ would include articles from opposing viewpoints and engage

with the criticisms.

United Service Magazine: with which is incorporated The Army and Navy Magazine and Naval and Military Journal (USM)

The USM was intended for a wealthy, elite audience. It was first edited by Major-

General Sir Frederick Maurice and later Colonel A.W. A. Pollock, who tried to make the magazine a vehicle for anyone interested in service reform, although Maurice himself often wrote in order to '"guide and calm' the judgment of the public."446 The USM tended to act against the exaggerations of public opinion, providing a braking influence on the discourse. As these journals illustrate, the cheaper and more accessible works

444 See "The Navy League: Its Posters and Its Work," The King, vol. 1, Jun 23 1900, 779-80. The League had risen from modest beginnings, and had become a prestigious society with high-class members; the purpose was not to use the League to acquire power, but to apolitically agitate to pressure the government and expose problems with the state of national defences. 445 Marder, Anatomy, 52. 446 Jay Luvaas, The Education of an Army: British Military Thought, 1815-1940, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964),195. 157 were often the more radical, whereas journals with elite audiences tended towards a conservative response to change. CURRICULUM VTTAE

Iain Darcy O'Shea

Universities Attended: Simon Fraser University, Bachelor of Arts, 2003-2008. University of New Brunswick, Master of Arts, 2008-2010.

Conference Presentations: "The Birth of Minerva: The Role of the British Periodical Press in the Development of Admiral Sir John Fisher's 1904 Reforms of the Royal Navy." Presented at the Dalhousie Graduate History Society Conference. Halifax, NS, Canada. March 19-21, 2010.

"Training Equality: The 1902 Selborne Scheme and the Periodical Discourse on the Naval Training Reforms." Presented at the 11th Annual University of Maine/University of New Brunswick International History Graduate Student Conference. Fredericton, NB, Canada. 25-27 September 2009.

"A Case Study of The Navy & Army Illustrated, 1895-1903, Reflecting the Role of Military Periodical Literature as an Area of Discourse in the Civil-Military Relationship of Late Victorian Britain." Presented at the Simon Fraser University History Student Union 4th Annual Undergraduate Conference in World History. Vancouver, BC, Canada. March 9, 2008.