Construction Media Assistance As a Tool of Post-Conflict

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University of Graz

A House of Cards: Bosnian media under (re)construction

Media assistance as a tool of post-conflict democratization and state building

Student: Niđara Ahmetašević Supervisor: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Florian Bieber

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of doctor of philosophy under the Joint PhD Programme in Diversity Management and Governance.

Graz, June 2013

ABSTRACT

A House of Cards: Bosnian media under (re)construction

Media assistance as a tool of post-conflict democratization and state building

Niđara Ahmetašević

Since the 1980s, media assistance is often used as a tool in democratization processes and state building in post-conflict or fragile states. A number of international organizations, governmental, non-governmental, or inter-governmental, foundations and professional organizations are getting involved in assisting media to develop, while sending material and technical support, offering trainings but also getting involved in the establishment of regulatory bodies, and introducing media laws. This method is yet not well researched, and its effectiveness is under the question in academia as well as by practitioners in the field. In this thesis, I explore whether media assistance was an effective tool of democratization and state-building in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country that became semi-protectorate after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord. This thesis discuses if the imposition of the rules that regulate the media, can contribute to the process of democratization and state building, and look into how it affected professionalization of the media. The case of Bosnia is particularly indicative since it was one of the first and one of the biggest media assistance efforts, and some of the methods tested here have been transferred to other post-conflict countries, like Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Almost at the same time when I will be defending this thesis, it will be five years since I was diagnosed with cancer. Less than a year after operation, chemo and radiotherapy, I was on my way to the UK to start with this research. In some way, this work was like a therapy for me and after everything, on the day I submitted this work, I want to believe that I made it, again. I am immensely grateful that I was not alone in this period of my life.

I want to thank to my supervisor Professor Florian Bieber for being confident that I can do this, and for having patience with my lack of knowledge or when I was so sure I knew something, and it came out that I did not, as well as for giving me a chance to learn so much, and opening an entire new world for me.

I am thankful to my doctor Nermina Kantardžić who encouraged me to purse this PhD as a therapy for my illness. I was not sure if after exhausting therapy and trauma of being a patient in a Sarajevo hospital, in conditions that are not humane, I could do anything in my life but she told me that I will be just fine, and I am. She also advised me to be surrounded with people I love and I took that advice.

I want to thank all the people who were with me while I was sick, and to encouraged me over the years, and believed in me, and made me laugh. Thanks to Slobo, Simona and Mila, to Alma L., and teta Kaća, Amira, Maša, Marija, Elma and Sema, Jasmina, Almir, Skender and Amila, Hana, Maša K., Nataša, Heidi, Marit, Ed, Dino, Danijela, Aleksandra, Željka, Alma D., Bojan and Dada, Iva, Šoba, Saša, Danka, Senad, Kanita and my friends in Bašča. My foggy brain makes me forget some people I am sure, but I am thankful to all the people who draw a smile on my face.

I want to thank Lara Netelfield, who encouraged me to do a PhD in the first place, to Tarik Jusić, Susan Abbot and Armina Galijaš for their advice and help, Dunja Mijatović and Helena Mandić for their comments and help, Dragan Golubović, Dijana Prljić from KAS in Sarajevo, to Monroe Price for giving me the opportunity to be around him and learn, and to Nataša Kršulj without whose help I would not be able to finalize this work.

A special thank you goes to all the people who agreed to be interviewed for this research and helped me in finding documents. I would not be able to conduct this work without support from the Chevening Scholarships, Konrad Adenauer Fellowship, UNESCO/Keizo Obuchi Research Fellowships, assistance from the Norwegian Embassy in Sarajevo and the Rudi Roth Scholarship.

Finally, more than to anybody else, I am grateful to my parents Amina and Šakir who taught me to believe that I can win in any situation of my life, be it war, or cancer. I think one more time I can say that I survived.

At the end, work of many people influenced my thinking and my research, but this work is entirely mine, and all mistakes remain my own.

Contents

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...... 7 CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ...... 10 CHAPTER II: BOSNIAN EXPERIMENT ...... 12 Research question and hypothesis ...... 13 Case study ...... 14 Literature review ...... 18 Research methodology and approach ...... 21 CHAPTER III: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ...... 26 Democracy and democratization ...... 26 Media - democracy and democratization ...... 30 Media assistance ...... 32 Imposition of freedom ...... 35 Conclusion ...... 38 CHAPTER IV: THE WAR AND THE MEDIA ...... 39 Three shades of propaganda ...... 39 Political propaganda and media intervention ...... 41 New leaders - new propaganda ...... 43 Back to the roots ...... 46 Media as the weapon to attain political goals ...... 48 Words and pictures of war ...... 51 Justifying crimes ...... 54 A crucial element of war ...... 57 The end of war and the beginning of new media era ...... 58 Conclusion ...... 62 CHAPTER V: MEDIA REGULATION AND LEGISLATION ...... 64 Why regulate the media? ...... 64 Three interrelated dimensions of consolidation of media freedoms ...... 65 The power of reforms ...... 66 A state of media anarchy ...... 68 Time for the changes ...... 73 New provisions ...... 76 Limited effectiveness ...... 80 6

Establishing Broadcasting Regulatory Body ...... 85 The issue of transparency ...... 89 Clearing the mess ...... 91 Regulating the press ...... 99 Media law policy ...... 101 Embryonic implementation of a legal framework ...... 104 Conclusion ...... 107 CHAPTER VI: MEDIA UNDER (RE) CONSTRUCTION ...... 109 Elections and the role of the media ...... 110 Free of Political Colouring ...... 110 Partial solution ...... 113 Relative freedom ...... 116 Murky business ...... 119 One for all ...... 122 Conclusion ...... 127 CHAPTER VII: PUBLIC BROADCASTING SYSTEM UNDER PROTECTORATE ...... 129 “Western’s Europe Gift to civilization” ...... 130 Clash of different approaches ...... 136 History Repeating ...... 140 Disagreements and Decisions ...... 143 Not for sale ...... 148 Is anybody watching? ...... 151 Conclusion ...... 153 CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSIONS ...... 156 Topics for some further research ...... 165 REFERENCES ...... 167 Annex ...... 185

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ATV - Alternativa televizija CRA - Communication Regulatory Agency EBRD - European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ECHR - European Convention of Human Rights FCC - Federal Communications Commission FERN - Free Election Radio Network DFID - Department of International Development DIE - German Development Institute HDZ - Hrvatska demokratska zajednica HZHB - Hrvatska zajednica Herceg Bosna DPA - Dayton Peace Accord EC - European Commission HRT - Hrvatska radio televizija (Croatian radio television) IC - International Community ICTY - International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia ICG - International Crisis Group IFJ - International Federation of Journalists IFOR/SFOR - Implementation/Stabilization Forces IMSLC - Intermediate Media Standard and Licensing Commission IMC - Independent Media Commission IWPR - Institute for War and Peace Reporting JNA - Jugoslovenska narodna armija - (Yugoslav People’s Army) MDO - Media Development Office MEC - Media Expert Commission MSAG - Media Support Advisory Group NBA - National Basketball Association NUN - Nezavisna unija novinara (The Independent Journalist Union) OHR - Office of the High Representative OBN - Open Broadcast Network OSI - Open Society Institute OSCE - Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe PIC - Peace and Implementation Council PEC - Provisional Election Commission RTVBIH - Radio televizija Bosne i Hercegovina (Radio Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina) TV SA - Radio televizija Sarajevo (Radio Television Sarajevo) RS - Republika Srpska SRBIH - Socijalistička Republika Bosna i Hercegovina (Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) SFRJ - Socijalistička Federalna Republika Jugoslavija (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) SANU - Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti (Serbian Academy of Science and Art) SDS - Srpska demokratska stranka (Serb Democratic Party) SDA - Stranka demokratske akcije (Party of Democratic Action) SRT - Srpska Radio Televizija (Serb Radio television) SRNA - Srpska novinska agencija (Serb News Agency) SIDA - Swedish International Development Agency TRA - Telecommunications Regulatory Agency 8

USAID - United States Agency for International Development UNBIH - UN Mission in BiH UNHCR - UN High Commissioner for Refugees VRS - Vojska Republike Srpske (Republika Srpska Army)

There is the power over the media – what gets shown or reported, and there is power of the media – what gets changed by the media.

John Street (2001)

Democratic Principles - Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a democratic state, which shall operate under the rule of law and with free and democratic elections.

Article I - 2. Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Annex IV, Dayton Peace Accord

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) is de facto an international semi-protectorate since the end of the war and the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) in 1995. According to the Council of Europe, the status of a semi-protectorate signifies that international authorities, represented first and foremost by the Office of the High Representative (OHR), are able to intervene when they find it necessary.1 In this condition, different segments of public life in Bosnia have been under the external supervision, including the media that went through extensive reforms. Since 1996, different international organizations were involved in assisting the media sector. This assistance sometimes included methods incompatible with democratic governance, like military intervention against the media, censorship or control over the frequency spectrum. It also achieved some important changes, including the introduction of media laws, or a system of regulation and self-regulation. The entire reform efforts have been made under the premise that media can help overall democratization process and state-building in the war torn country. The aim of this research is to analyze the process of media assistance, while looking into decisions made by the outside authorities in a state of semi-protectorate, and the way in which it affected local media. I look into how and by whom the reforms were developed and led, in what way and by whom decisions were made, and the way these decisions were observed by the local media community and if it effected their everyday work. Media assistance in Bosnia was enormous project and it included many donors and receiving organizations - numbers that are hard to establish - as well as large amounts of money. This study concentrates only on one part of the media assistance – namely at those projects that attracted the biggest attention by the public, and scholars over the years, even though much more could be looked into, like media established by the international military forces, media projects developed by locals and supported by international donors, or to explore the causes why mostly independent media were almost left aside during the whole process. It is important to emphasize that this study concentrates on the role of the external powers in Bosnia, while the attitude the local political elite have had about media reforms, how they influenced and shaped the media, is looked upon only as part of the broader context. Different

1 Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee). “Honouring of obligations and commitments by Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Doc. 10200. 4 June 2004. Co-rapporteurs: Mrs Naira Shakhtakhtinskaya, Azerbaijan, European Democratic Group and Mr Laszlo Surjan, Hungary, European People’s Party. Available at http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=10559&Language=EN. Accessed on 12 April 2013. 11 international actor, in the first place the OHR, set a pace of changes and priorities in postwar Bosnia, in an atmosphere where local political agreement hardly existed on any issue, or if it did, it was more nominal that practical. This focus does not imply that the study finds no fault for the precarious situation with political elites in Bosnia, but it has intention to focus on the IC and its role in democratization and state building. The thesis argues that status of a semi-protectorate can limit media development, and slow down democratization and state-building. The study has eight chapters. After the brief introduction in Chapter I, following chapter will present the project and reasons for looking into this case study, will be introduced. Chapter III constitutes the theoretical framework in which some of the basic concepts of the study, and reasons for looking into them, are put in place. Chapter IV discusses the state of the media in Bosnia during the Yugoslav period, and the role the media have had in spreading hate and inciting the conflict during the war. This role of media in promoting extreme nationalism and justifying the war will become a key reason for the broad international community to intervene in the media sector. Subsequently, Chapter V, looks into development of media legislation and regulation after the war, and is followed with Chapter VI in which that the creation of the media by different international organizations after the war is analyzed. Chapter VI investigates probably the most complicated part of the media assistance in Bosnia – the reform of the public broadcast sector that took years but results are hardly visible. In the end, Chapter VII, identifies conclusions based on the research, and some possible recommendations that could be drawn from the Bosnian example.

CHAPTER II: BOSNIAN EXPERIMENT

The last two decades, since the early 1990s, are sometimes described as the age of intervention, or the decades in which the international community decided to use its military and humanitarian powers to stop wars, or prevent new conflicts or catastrophes (Knaus 2012: 93). To analyze international intervention in one country, one can look into different aspects, such as military or police reforms, financial or humanitarian aid, etc. Knaus writes that the hope of those who intervene - mostly Western European and North American countries - is that intervention can “tackle the long-term root causes of violence and instability, and build effective accountable, and democratic states,” (2001; 93). Success of this intervention caused many debates over the years. In some cases, the countries subject to intervention are considered as failed states, not able to provide basic security to their citizens, and to control their borders or territory.2 These countries, after the intervention, sometimes were turned into modern protectorates or semi- protectorates, which makes them a specific class of states, where governance - in times immediately after the conflict - is subject of external imposition (Price 2002; 89). Success of this approach and its reflection on the local community is focus of this research. However, in some of these countries - like in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Iraq - under the premise of democratization and state-building, different international actors engaged in development programs, including the media sector, while imposing solutions, and, unintentionally or not, creating highly dependent societies not able to function without outside help, and the media that are unsustainable when donor money is gone. In neither of these cases this status has time limitation, and its pace and duration is undetermined. Along the way, the international actors sometimes did not put enough efforts in encouraging free and responsible market place of ideas, a space in which on-going process and its different aspects could be discussed,3 but rather rely on power of imposition, and decisions that are not based on debate or

2 Definition adopted during the Crisis State Research Workshop held in March 2006. James Putzel and Joost van der Zwan Joost (principle authors). “Why Templates for Media Development do not work in Crisis States, Defining and Understanding Media Development Strategies in Post-War and Crisis States” (London: London School of Economics 2006). Available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/837/1/MEDIA.REPORT.pdf. Accessed on 12 March 2011. 3 Snyder and Ballentine, looking into John Stuart Mill work, are giving definition of a well-functioning marketplace of ideas as a space where a public debate “in which a rational arguments are more decisive than appeals to tradition or the status of actors. However, whereas both civil society and the public sphere are typically conceived as exclusively non-state realms of activity, the market place of ideas embraces both state and non-state actors, focusing on their discursive and institutional interaction.” In this context also the concept of public sphere is important, as defined by Pippa Norris and Sina Odugbemi (2010,6) who reflects Jürgen Habermans writing that democratic public sphere represents “that space between the state and the household where free and equal citizens come together to 13 consultations. The media were turned into tools for transmitting messages related to goals of external authority. In this way, the processes of media assistance - as well as the media - are becoming a tool for those who have the power, and resources. This chapter will present the approach, the topic, the research questions and hypothesis, as well as methodology and the reasons for looking at Bosnia as a case study.

Research question and hypothesis

Media assistance became part of the international intervention since the mid-1980s. This process includes a number of actions that should help the creation and maintenance of an environment in which media can work free of political pressure, while informing citizens on current affairs. In a number of cases, if the countries in question are protectorates or semi- protectorates, these actions are rather imposed, while compliance becomes a condition for receiving support. The effectiveness of the imposition as a method of introducing democracy is matter of number of academic debates, and this study aims at adding another approach into these discourses.

The main research questions of this thesis are: - What is the role of the media assistance in democratization and state building? - How does the status of semi-protectorate influence the process of democratization and stat building? - How does the semi-protectorate status influence media assistance?

My hypothesis is that semi-protectorate can hardly be a proper setting for democratization and state building in post-conflict societies. Imposition of solutions and forcing of development in any aspect of the society, including the media, limits space for public debates and can delay the consolidation of democracy and real progress. Media assistance used as a tool of democratization and state-building creates the media that are not able to perform watchdog function in the society, but are rather an instrument for legitimization and enforcement of power. Democratization and state-building are processes that are requiring external assistance that is not

share information, to deliberate upon common concerns, and to cooperate and collaborate on solutions to social problems.” 14 sufficient when dictated and driven from outside, as well as not adjusted to local societal preconditions, democracy level and specific media landscape.

Case study

Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the first countries after the World War 2 where massive international intervention has been deployed and country was turned into a semi- protectorate. Even more, a semi-protectorate is tested in Bosnia, where from it was, in somewhat different forms, transferred to other post war countries like Kosovo or Iraq. Scholars are still looking for a clear definition of semi-protectorate. Looking back to the history, a status of protectorate is associated with colonialism over the territories that were not recognised states and that were subjected to external powers that defined their internal affairs. Bojkov (2003, 54) looks even into the post WW2 Germany and Japan where some type of protectorate was introduced since both countries immediately after the war did not have national governments but were controlled by outside powers. Countries that are consider a semi-protectorates, are internationally recognised as states and do have national governments, but their powers are limited by some body that is not accountable to the local population, but to different international organizations. Bojkov (2003, 56) uses terms like “controlled democracy” and “hybrid regime” describing Bosnia as a state in which “democratic political structures coexist with non- democratic ones. In this vein, a very important focus of attention is the mode of interaction between the two. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, power is obviously on the side of the non-democratic political elements.” A number of international actors were involved in the state building, democratization and protection of a fragile peace in Bosnia. Local authorities were restricted by the powers given to the international administrators - international community (IC) - whose mandate was not limited. In description of the post war Bosnia, the Council of Europe in the 2004 report, concludes how it is one of the most decentralized states in Europe made by the formula: “One State, two Entities, three constituent people, around four million inhabitants, five levels of authority, and at least six international organizations taking care of everything.”4 Anthropologist, Kimberly Cole (2002; 67) described Bosnia as “simulation of a state,” in which internationals do exist “above and beyond” the state, and outside of the society. According to her, this situation in which those who

4 Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee). Doc. 10200. 4 June 2004. 15 are helping in building the state while not participating its daily life, has serious side effects that do reflect on the overall process of post war reconstruction. This situation made entire processes aimed at transforming the country into democracy, slow and little effective. In attempt to describe Bosnian semi-protectorate, Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin (2003; 60-73), both with experience with different international organizations in the Balkans, wrote that it is situation in which outsiders do more than participating in shaping the political agenda, while having power to set and to impose it, and to sanction those who refuse to follow their ideas. In the case of Bosnia, the IC used to set priorities that local authorities were supposed to follow, and non-governmental sector - by large created and supported by the IC - to promote and assist. The term international community in Bosnia refers to a number of international actors; including intergovernmental organizations and governments, engaged in shaping local reality, and whose powers range from making decisions to impose how the national flag should look like, or the common currency, to imposition of reforms in judiciary sector, police, military, and interventions in civil sector and the media. The level of the use of these powers varied in different phases of post-conflict reconstruction, from being extensive to almost unnoticeable. The leading organization with the task to oversee the civilian aspect of implementation of the DPA is the Office of the High Representative, formally established by the Contact Group5 and endorsed by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) guided by its Steering Board.6 By the IC internal agreement, the OHR is meant to be led by a European, while the mandate of the body is open-ended. The American was supposed to be the head of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission in BiH (OSCEBiH)7 established in December 1995 with responsibility to organize and supervise the elections, promote democracy, monitor and promote human rights. The scope of their duties also changed over the years, and today it is mostly related to human rights. The OSCE and the OHR were supposed to coordinate closely their missions, but in many points their functions overlapped, as well as of some other of numerous organizations present in the field, including the UN Mission in BiH (UNBIH),8and the UN High Commissioner for

5 The Contact Group includes representatives from permanent members of the UN Security Council, and from the countries that contribute the most in troops and assistance to peacebuilding efforts in Bosnia. In this case it was France, Germany, Italy, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and the United States. 6 The Peace Implementation Council is composed of the 55 states and agencies that attended the London Peace Implementation Conference on 8-9 December 1995, and was formally created by that Conference. The memebrs are meeting regularly to disscuss progress and define goals. The Steering Board works under the chairmanship of the High Representative as the executive arm of the PIC. The Steering Board provides the High Representative with political guidance. See http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/#6. Accessed on 10 April 2013. 7 For general OSCE BiH Mission see http://www.oscebih.org/documents/osce_bih_doc_2010122815214804eng.pdf. 8 For UNMBIH Mission see http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmibh_p.htm. 16

Refugees (UNHCR).9 These overlaps caused many conflicts inside the IC, and reflected on the entire international intervention causing delays and mismanaged projects, including those in the media sector. Beside these organizations, important voice is given to ambassadors of the major NATO countries, like the U.S., the UK, France, Germany, Italy, plus Russia. Military aspect of the DPA was shaped by the NATO-led Implementation/Stabilization Forces (IFOR/SFOR), duty that was taken over by EU Forces (EUFOR) in 2004.10 Faced with harsh criticism by scholars, analysts and the media, for lack of coordination and strategy, the IC tried on several occasions to find a way to organize all these actors, but these attempts caused even more disagreements among them.11 The imposition of the semi-protectorate, the scope and the scale of it, was never tried before Bosnia and can be regarded as an international experiment in post-conflict countries. Successes, impact, strategies, process of decision making, are just some of the issues that are subject of numerous studies over the years (Belloni 2001, Chandler 1999, Bieber 2006, Bose 2002, etc.). Most of them do mention the role of the media, and relationship of international actors with it, but rarely is it the topic of investigation. Similarities between Germany and Japan after the WW2 could be found, but are not what can really be applied in Bosnian case. Like in those two countries, in Bosnia external powers were attempting to democratize society, but, as Johnson (2012, 20) wrote, in Bosnian case where there was not unconditional surrender, country was economically underdeveloped, and “the architects of the war remained in power along with their networks” which undermined their efforts. Decision to put the media under the semi-protectorate and to use them as tool in democratization process and state-building, was based on the fact that Bosnia did not have tradition of a free press. This lack of freedom made the media into mouthpieces of local politicians, and their purpose was rather to spread a massage than to inform citizens. In times of war, media manipulation reached the point in which broadcast and press were used as a weapon of war, employed for warmongering and incitement to war and hate. When the international community decided to engage with the media, they - similarly like local politicians - used the media rather as a tool to promote ideas.

9 For UNHCR BiH Mission See http://unhcr.ba/about-us/overview-of-operation/. 10For IFOR/SFOR/EUFOR Mission see http://www.nato.int/sfor/organisation/mission.htm. In 1996, 60.000 troops were stationed in Bosnia. Today it is 600 from 18 states. 11 International Crisis Group. “Bosnia: Reshaping the International Machinery.” Balkans Report No. 121. Sarajevo/Brussels. 29 November 2001. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/bosnia- herzegovina/121-bosnia-reshaping-the-international-machinery.aspx. Accessed on 2 April 2013. 17

What has been done along the way in the field of the media assistance today is considered to be the biggest media experiment by external actors in the process of democratization that has been ever tried, or the biggest media assistance intervention in the modern history, (Chandler 2000, 130; Howard 2003). It included all the aspects known in theory and practice of media assistance, and more than that: development of the legal and regulatory framework, reform of the public broadcasting sector, creation of new media. Making the media as a tool of semi-protectorate in the process of post-conflict reconstruction, signified that the IC, primarily the OHR and partially the OSCE, had the power to impose media laws, influence editorial policies of the media that were receiving any kind of foreign help, to be involved in media regulation and licensing, or work of the public broadcasters. Even more, regulation in the sector was forced through actions of the international military forces deployed to Bosnia in order to safeguard the peace. Today, local media experts and journalists are doubtful about the outcomes of the media assistance in Bosnia. Senad Avdić, an editor from Sarajevo, described the entire process as “an absolute failure of the international community.”12 A similar belief was expressed by UK scholar David Chandler (2000, 160) fearing that if the Bosnian example, “were the most powerful world powers were involved and large amount of resources were committed,” did not work “there is something seriously wrong with the policies being pursued or no external intervention is going to make a difference.” The problem that has been recognised over the years by some authors (i.e. Udovičić 2001, Kontić 2003), is the lack of attention to the situation on the ground, while hardly having any “locals” as advisors in the process. The lack of the clear strategy or cooperation between different international organizations, accompanied by lack of experienced professionals in the field, are just some of the issues to be addressed when it comes to the media assistance in Bosnia, but also the entire intervention. More than anything, reason for scepticism among scholars but also practitioners, was the imposition of semi-protectorate. In 2003, the European Stability Initiative (ESI) compered Bosnian semi-protectorate to Colonial rule in India. Chandler (2006) in his work refers critically to the scope of the intervention in Bosnia, while questioning the length of semi-protectorate, and concluding that it has developed into the status quo in which the IC does not have a clear vision of the future. According to this author, status quo opened the possibility of sending a wrong message about the whole idea of democracy (2006; 126). While analyzing intervention in Bosnia, Bieber (2006; 145) putts emphasis on the fact that while some successes were achieved

12 Senad Avdić. “Noćas spaljujemo iluzije: Padaj sedma silo i reformirana pravdo” Slobodna Bosna, 10 September 2009. Sarajevo. No. 669, pp. 4-5. 18 through the powers given to the OHR, “the very nature of the intervention remains problematic,” that can be recognized in weak state institutions and their capabilities to support and sustain the institutional framework established by the OHR. After more of 15 years of democratization, Bosnia is still searching for its way of democracy, while state institutions are too weak to protect citizens in many instances. People in Bosnia do have a whole range of sources of information, the fact that does not signifies plurality while at the same time it is noticeable the lack of free and responsible market place of ideas. Journalists are working in difficult and unfavourable conditions, while surveys are showing a lack of media freedom.13 Bosnia today is probably more democratic state that it was before the war, but probably less that its citizens were hoping for to get from the international intervention.

Literature review

Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the biggest experiments in international intervention in modern history, and large number of scholarly works, and the fact that new research is published regularly, reflects the importance and size of this experiment. The numbers of studies dealing with the war and the breakup of Yugoslavia and wars in its succeeding countries, including Bosnia, are investigating causes of conflict and its effects on the societies (Silber and Little; Gow 1996, 2003; Kolsto 2009; MacDonald 2002). These authors, but also number of others, are emphasizing the role media played in wars starting from 1991 to 1999. According to Thompson (1999, 2002), author of one of the most important books on the role of the media in Yugoslav disintegration, it would be misleading to argue that the media made the war happen or were responsible for it, but they were rather used to transmit the message. Yet, this fact did not made the IC, Thomson concluded together with and Dan de Luce (2008), to pay a special attention to the media in peace negotiations, but it was left to be solved after the war. According to Gow (1996), the ability to manipulate, mobilize and maintain mass media support, played a critical role in break-up of Yugoslavia. This ability was developed through the years during Communism, when the media were subject of control by ruling political party

13 Survey made by Association BH Journalist and German foundation Friedrich-Ebert in 2011 shows that 35,1 percent of respondents in the country considers that there was not, or there was a very little media freedom in 2011. From Indicator for Measuring Media Freedoms in the Countries Members of the Council of Europe. “Shadow Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Sarajevo 2012. Available at http://english.vzs.ba/images/stories/ba_word_slike_pdf/indicators/SHADOW_REPORT.pdf. Accessed on 12 April 2013. 19

(Ramet 1996). In these conditions, the media were set up by the Communist party, journalists were encouraged to be members, and editors and directors were imposed. The role of the media was to promote ideas of the Party and the existing system. Post-war reconstruction, the process of democratization and state building in Bosnia is another topic for research (Bieber 2006; Coles 2006; Bildt 1998; Haynes 2008, Bose 2002, Sebastian, Belloni 2001 and 2009; Chandler 2000; Nenadović 2011). Most of these authors recognise status of semi-protectorate, while looking into how it shaped the country over the years. For Sumatra Bose (2002; 60), post-war Bosnia is a “comatose state,” not able to survive without international intervention. Belloni (2001, 163-180) concludes that the international community was overeager to develop civil society in post war Bosnia, but that it had some unrealistic expectation of how quickly it can be done and how influential it can be. Bieber (2006; 46) concludes that imposition of decisions made local population feel like their votes are less important, while politicians found it as excuse not to get involved in decision making process. Important work has been done by anthropologists who are looking into the society created in Bosnia under the influence of the international intervention, like Coles (2002) who writes about existence of the “hyper-Bosnia,” a country with two separate realities - those of local population and the one of the “internationals,” reality created due to semi-protectorate. She questions state of semi-protectorate while writing about these parallel worlds of satellite practices and institutions, laid out on top of Bosnian. The topic of the media assistance, as part of the international intervention, was until recently rarely investigated by scholars. The most important research on the media assistance in the field was conducted by Monroe Price (2002, 2003, and 2006) who looked into regulatory framework and legislation, and the changes that have been made. His work on mapping of media assistance gives insight into complexity of the efforts, goals and methods employed in different countries and under different circumstances. Price puts an emphasis on the special set of media interventions in post-conflict countries that are often connected with the peacekeeping operations giving examples of Bosnia and Kosovo as pioneering work. (2002; 49). Karlowicz (2002) points to the issue of the influence of different media cultures of those who provided media assistance, which turned the process, she claims, into gigantic experiment guided by infinitive number of theories. Based on this claim, she adds that substantial empirical and historical material exists to prove that the major mistakes were made in Bosnia. Some of these errors are shown in different parts of this study. An important addition to this research is found in work by two Norwegian media scholars - Åge Eknes and Lena C. Endresen (1999; 13) on local media support. They conclude that the 20 prevention of hate speech, the method used with the media assistance in Bosnia, should be considered a negative approach. As positive approach to fight hate speech, they see maintenance of principles of the freedom of the speech and information pluralism, something I looked into as encouragement for free and responsible market place of ideas. Some other authors, like Karlowicz (2002) or Snyder and Ballantine (1996), are proposing a certain level of regulation of freedom of the speech in conflict areas, pointing to the fact if not it can lead to misuse of this right. They write that if markets are imperfect, an increase of the freedom of the speech will tend to lead to nationalist mythmaking, unless there are strong institutions and norms to correct the imperfections in the market. Even well-developed democracies do have some limits to freedom of the speech, mostly associated to hate speech, but democracy imposes limitations to these restrictions in order not to endanger one of the basic human rights. This question of limits to the freedom of the speech and its connection to the state of imposition of democracy is important aspect of this research, too. The relationship between the media and democracy, or democratization, have been investigated for a long time (Street 2001; Schudson 2008; Kean 1999; Rozumilowicz 2002), and different answers are given. Observing this relationship, Schudson (2008; 7-21) writes how democracy does not necessarily produce journalism, or vice versa, but journalism can provide a number of different services to help establish or sustain representative government in situation where there are forces ready for democracy. Kean (1999; 44) asks important question - what is so good about democracy and why we look into journalism form that are corresponding to it? This question is especially important when we know that there is not one type of ideal democracy, but every society looks for the form to adjust it to its needs. In the spirit of this questions, I am looking to understand how and way media assistance is used as a tool in democratization process and state building, and what kind of democracy and media are the goal? Important for any research about the media is comparative study of different media systems done by Hallin and Mancini (2004). They define three different models present in established democracies, while looking into their influence on the strengthening of the media freedoms: the liberal model, which exists in Britain, Ireland, Canada, and North America; the democratic corporatist model from northern Europe (Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, etc.); and the polarised pluralist model present in Mediterranean countries of Southern Europe (France, Spain, Greece, Italy). According to these authors, the liberal model is characterized by a relative dominance of market mechanisms and commercial media. The democratic corporatist model is characterized by a historical coexistence of commercial media and media tied to organized social and political groups, and by a relatively active but legally limited role of the state, while 21 characteristic of the polarised pluralist model is a stronger role of the a state in regulating the media sector, high level of political parallelism, and weak professionalization of journalism. Through the process of democratization, different models are mixed and introduced into society. Sometimes the reason for mixing these models is in an attempt to experiment and to find a new one that has the potential to be seen as a new way of regulating the media. Sometimes the reason for this mix is a lack of agreement and coordination among different players, the problem recognized in many post-conflict countries where international intervention has been deployed. However, semi-protectorates could hardly fit into any of these models, and have to be observed from a different angle. In these countries, media development is influenced by the Western democracies, and the international organizations that are imposing solutions that are sometimes hardly applicable in given circumstances since they can have different meaning and implication in different surroundings (Voltmer 2008, 23-40). Nevertheless, the role of the media in protectorates or semi-protectorate is a relatively new topic and has only recently been investigated more carefully since this model has been transferred from Bosnia to different countries around the world (de Zeeuw 2005; Wijs 2009; Price, Noll and De Luce 2002; Kayumba and Kimonyo 2006), but still many questions remain open. Considering this fact, Voltmer writes that in the future, we can expect new systems, sometimes developed in economically and politically weak countries, which will shape the outcome. The aim of this research is not to define a new media system, but rather to examine characteristics of the media market that is created in post-war semi-protectorate, under the outside influence.

Research methodology and approach

Time frame for this study is 1996 to 2012. In 1996, the IC in Bosnia initiated large media projects by establishing radio and TV stations, and commissions to observe the work of the local media. The assistance continued over the years, and went through different phases, mostly coming to the end sometimes after 2007. Since then, only small projects, mostly supported by different embassies or foundations exist, and the OHR did not influence the media any more at all, but that was the time when earlier efforts started to show and for that reason interesting for this research. At the same time, after 2007, when political situation aggravated, it reflected on the media, 14 and more organizations went back to offer media assistance.

14 Bureau of Democracy, Human Right and Labor. “Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2012. Bosnia and Herzegovina.” US State Department. Available at 22

My point of view on topics of this thesis is not only academic, but I look into the process as a journalist whose career development was connected to different media assistance projects. In 1997, I was working for the Radio FERN, an OSCE and Swiss government run country-wide radio station in Bosnia. At that moment, I had three years of experience working for small local, independent, media in Sarajevo as well as Radio Free Europe, but was yet a beginner in journalism. Until 2000, when I left FERN, managers from different countries were coming and going, neither one speaking or understanding Bosnian, but relying on interpreters and our capabilities to express ourselves in a foreign language. All of us, locals and internationals, were employed by the OSCE and had a short term contracts, and were completely aware that FERN is a project rather than something meant to be part of the local media scene one day. At one point, sometimes in 2000, radio FERN became a burden for the OSCE or any of the donors involved, and after looking into different solutions, they decided to close it down. The issue was how to do this, and to make it look like success. The first idea was to emerge with some local media, but it did not come through. Second plan was to try to turn it into commercial station, but none of the local businesses wanted to give money for internationally founded project. The last manager was young, inexperienced Canadian who knew close to nothing about Bosnia, even less about journalism, but had many ideas. I remember him telling the team that Radio should have helicopter and equipment to enable us trace down police and firefighters signals, and then, in his imagination, our reporters would be the first once to report about it on air “like in US, or Canada.” After couple of months, the project was officially closed. The OSCE decided to transferring equipment and people to the public radio that was just established - under the IC watch - and in that way they pronounced the whole project a success. In reality, most of the people who transferred from FERN to the public radio were those who previously came from there, and they just returned to their old posts. Equipment that was given was over used, and sometimes not adjustable to needs of the public radio. The most useful part of this transfer was transmitters that enabled the public radio to become more available all over the country. Being part of this project, but also of some others that were established in accordance with the donors’ needs and ideas after the war, made me aware of how media assistance was constructed and developed. During postwar years, I had chance to work with local, private media, who received little or no help from donors, but tried hard to function in the existing http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=204268#wrapper. Accessed on 21 April 2013. 23 market. I was aware of the struggle they are going through, from working in physically unsafe conditions to having financial problems. Working as a part of different media projects, working for local media, and following political situation in the country, as well as work of different international organizations, made me aware of similarities in the process of media assistance and reforms in other sectors. What has been done in the media, mirrored the overall international intervention in Bosnia - lack of donor coordination, expertise, cooperation and trust in locals, weak or non-existent strategies, undefined goals, etc., are just some of the aspects of this process. Just one of them, looking into the media assistance, is that intervention and donor support contributed in creating further divisions of excessively divided media scene. These divisions are based on economic strength and weakness of the media, having on one side those supported by donors that are well off, and on another that are struggling to survive in the existing market and a weak economy. The first ones are usually described in donor documents, as more reliable, professional and not corrupt, that is not always an honest picture. My intention was to try to understand how media assistance was constructed and implemented, how decisions were made, what was the strategy and what were the goals, if all what was planned was achieved, and what the impact is left behind this process. I began my investigation with a search for the strategy of media assistance, to discover soon that such a document does not exist. Something like a strategy exists “hidden” in one of many declarations issued by the PIC. This document, created in 1998, mentions different aspects of the postwar reconstruction, and gives outlines of steps to be taken in the future. The steps are not clearly defined, but rather given in a broader context, which left a space for interpretations and adjustments. To learn more about these interpretation and adjustments, my approach was to analyze available documentation from organizations involved in the process, the task that turned out to be much more difficult than expected. I discovered that hardly any of the organizations involved in postwar reconstruction in Bosnia kept archives, or if they did it is not easily available for researchers. Private foundations like the Open Society Institute (OSI), kept detailed documentation and available for anybody to access, but that are just a small part of this broad process. Some others, like the UN left no trace about their work in Bosnia, except for what is available online, and that is very limited. The OSCE archive was partially made available to me. Their archives are preserved in hard copies that can be accessed only by the Mission employees who made scans for me. The OHR, the head institution in the post war reconstruction process in Bosnia, refused to provide me access to its archives with the explanation that there are no archives but what is 24 available online, and composed of press statements, press clippings and official documents like decision made by PIC or HR. Even more, I learned - off the record - that most of the documents were never disposed in any kind of archive, while part has been destroyed by employees over the years or taken away. Moreover, there have been so many organizations involved in the media assistance that soon after I started the project, I had to realize that it will not even be possible to track down all the actors, but that I should rather focus on specific issues and organizations. In given circumstances, one of the ways to research the media assistance in Bosnia, the one I choose to take, was to interview direct participants, to analyze available documentation, and media reports, local and international. I conducted 40 semi-structured interviews, with people who used to work for different international organizations, local journalists and media analysts, asking them a whole range of questions that could illustrate how the media assistance was developed, implemented and perceived. Each interview was different, adjusted to the person I spoke with and the circumstances he/she used to work in. Most of the people I contacted were willing to talk with me. Some spoke under conditions of anonymity and request not to be quoted, or names of organizations they work for mentioned. Some, a small number, refused to be interviewed with different excuses, and most of them were former local employees of different international organizations in Bosnia. The data I got from the interview, I analyzed together with media reports and available documents, creating a picture of the process. Along the way I realized what was missing in most of the available scholarly articles and books on the media assistance in Bosnia is the voice of the local media community. I tried to include this perspective in my research, too. I realized that the way local media professionals and journalists are looking into the process and benefits of it, is to some extent different from internationals who led the process. For me this fact adds to my point of lack of consultations with local community about their needs and hopes. Through the interviews I learned about existence of certain level of animosity among different international actors in Bosnia, and how that affected the entire intervention. The reason for this animosity, as I understood, often is driven by constant search for funding, or in some cases by the ambition of individuals involved. These “conflicts” affected in many cases the entire intervention, slowing down the process of reconstruction, or delaying some important steps along the way. What was interesting for me is to realize that many of the people who were involved with the media assistance in Bosnia were of military or intelligence background. To what level this 25 type of background affected their work, or the overall process, is hard to assess. It raises important questions of using media assistance, and democratization process, for the purposes that are not of benefit for the state in questions but rather for donor states and organizations. However, this aspect was not in focus of my research, but I find it peculiar and interesting, and important to be mentioned. I am aware of the different attempts to find the best way how to measure the impact media assistance has on the media and societies in questions, as well as on the democratization process. My intention was not to be part of this ongoing discussions, but rather to see impact on every day work of journalists, and my questions are asked in that way. I considered that the way how their work affect the entire society, defines levels of freedoms, and of ongoing debates. If journalists are not free to move freely around country, to write and speak, to resist political or any other pressure, to be critical of those in power, than the rest of the population hardly can have the same basic freedoms. At the same time, very important sources of this research were media reports by the local press and broadcast. In these reports, one can see how and if the media performed their duty of a watchdogs of society, while being critical toward those who hold the power and for the benefit of citizens. From my observation, it seems that even when the media made an effort to act in this spirit, being critical of those in power - local or international - their voices in most of the cases were weak or unheard. For this reason my attention focused on accountability of those with the power, and made me realized the lack of it. Most of the literature available on the topic was written by authors from the Western countries, European or North America, countries considered developed democracies with a long tradition of free media. They have different standards for the media and understand democracy differently from the authors who are coming from emerging democracies, or even more, like in my case, postwar country. From that point of view, I find it very important to encourage people from this type of countries to engage in research, not only in the field of media development, but also in the field of democracy and democratization and related subjects. It can open the doors for different conclusions, and provides a space for new ideas, questions and answers. Moreover, I do believe that it is not possible nowadays to intervene in some country and not to consult the local community on what they want and how they want to get there. One of the conclusions of my investigation in Bosnia is that many mistakes could have been avoided if the local community had been more involved in the decision making process, but also if the local community was more eager to impose their voices and opinions. 26

CHAPTER III: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Terms like democratization, state-building, media assistance are often repeated in post- conflict circumstances, in countries where international intervention is mobilized and peace building is on-going. For societies in question, this terminology is often strange and associated to something foreign, which has been imposed on them. For practitioners, these terms are like mantras they repeat daily while trying to incorporate them into strategies and working plans. This chapter looks into relationships between media, democratization and the state building in post-war countries and under the international supervision, while examining different approaches to democratization process, and explore the idea and purpose of media assistance, as well as the role of the media in democratization.

Democracy and democratization

Very basic definition of democracy, and the one that fits the purpose of this research since it points out to the relationship with the media, is that it is the rule of the people, which depends on their capacity to form a judgment about politics or representatives they choose, and their performance. Judgments are formulated and based on received information, and on ability to convert that information into a coherent assessment (Kean 1991, 186). This definition presupposes societies that have access to variety of sources of information, and individuals who used to judge those sources as well as information, and to form their own opinion. Precondition for this type of environment is the existence of the free and responsible market place of ideas, space where citizens are encouraged to freely speak about different ideas, to ask questions, to agree or disagree, while offering arguments based on acquired knowledge. Scholars like Schmitter and Terry (1991), are claiming that democracy became a catchword of contemporary political discourse, similarly like political scientist John Kean (2004) who believes that today it is almost a cliché that serves as shorthand communication device among actors who otherwise may have little or nothing in common. Both claims are easy to recognize in the society today, even in the media, where the term democracy is repeated and placed in different contexts from the war against terrorism, to development or gender issues. Observing the outcomes of democracy, Dalton, Doh and Jou (2007; 144) concluded that freedom and liberty are emphasized as essential goals that are achieved through democratic institutions. For this author, democracy is a process without an end that is always becoming. For 27 scholars like Schmitter (1994; 57), there is no proof that democracy is “inevitable, or a historical necessity”. Even more, Grugel (2002; 12) would add that this democracy can be understood as ideal, according to which to be a democrat means to have a faith in people, and to believe that people should have right to make their own decisions, while being committed to the idea of equality of all people in fundamental and essential way. All existing definitions and known history, nevertheless, does not make more clear what democracy really is and how it affects our lives. Dalton, Doh and Jou (2007; 143) are giving example of a Chinese student in 1989 Tiananmen Square who, allegedly, held a poster saying “I don’t know what democracy means, but I know we need more of it.” Maybe the message could be carried out today by the people in different parts of the world, who are dreaming about democracy as some promised island, where everything is almost perfect. In post-conflict countries these dreams are often equal with the one about the peace and prosperity. Scholars mostly agree that a set of preconditions has to be met in ordered to establish democracy. According to Ivan Krastev (2002; 44) these preconditions are “a healthy economy, a healthy institutional environment, and a functioning state.” He points out that democracy does not only mean that people can vote freely, but also that they have influence on public policy. Fukuyama (2005; 88) claims that “stateness” and democracy are connected, and this has to be carefully considered “the precise sequencing of how and when to build the distinct but interlocking institutions,” which makes democratization efforts a challenge that takes thoughtful consideration and carefully designed strategy. While debates about the meaning of democracy, and how to achieve it, are on-going in academia, number of governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations are involved in the process of democratization, offering it an ultimate solution for number of problems, especially in cases of weak and failed states. Democratization ideology comes from the Western style liberal democracies, where it is considered as a model for peace, prosperity and freedom. Some countries, like US, consider themselves as carriers of democratization in the world.15 For the authors of 2009 German Development Institute (DIE) briefing paper, democratization is “a boom industry of 1990s” (Gravingholt, Leininger and Schulumberger; Paper No.1). For them, democratization process eventually leads to the liberal democracy, with responsible government, political pluralism, and subordination of the military to a civilian

15 According to The New York Times article from 1996, Anthony Lake, that time president Bill Clinton national security advisor, describes US as those “who wave democracy’s banner around the world.” Anthony Lake. “Not Perfect, But Right”, The New York Times, September 11, 1996, Section A; Page 19; Column 1; available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/11/opinion/not-perfect-but-right.html, Accessed 2 March 2011. 28 authority. But this model, even though maybe ideal is hardly achievable even in very developed Western countries. Today, it can be said that scholars achieved the point of agreement that democracy means different for different people living in different cultures, which makes the process of democratization even harder since its goal is not entirely clear. For Horowitz (1993; 18), democratization is a worldwide movement, “but it is neither universal nor uniformly successful,” who rises the need to carefully consider methods every time before their deployment. Even though it achieved its peak in the 1990s, in theory three waves of democratization are broadly recognized. The first one took place from the 1820s to the 1920s, and that was a period when over 29 new democracies emerged around the world. The second wave came after the WW2, with the high point in 1962, with 36 new democracies, while the third wave started in the 1970s and resulted in over 100 new democracies around the world (Huntington 1991; 12-34). According to the same author, each wave is followed with one in reverse that comes because countries have a problem to consolidate democracy. On-going debate is about the fourth wave that is, according to some authors, on its way with new democracies emerging in the Middle East. Others claim that this wave started before, at the beginning of the 1990s with the fall of Communism (McFaul 2002; 212-244),16 the stream I align with finding that democratization in those countries was different from those who went through the same process before, and that it has resulted with quite different type of democracy, or the process is taking a very long. In this wave we can also place some of the post-conflict regions, like the Balkans, where this process was influenced by peace settlements and transitional justice processes. In practice, even simple analysis of the international news media is telling us that democratization is ongoing process around the world, and that it is strongly supported by some of Western democracies, like reports about efforts in the Middle East17 and reports about so called revolutions that were initiated through the social media. At the same time, also from the

16 Michael McFaul argues that Transition in post-communist countries is different from the third wave of democratization, and that they should belong to the fourth wave in which democracy emerged as a result of transition. In many of these countries, changes resulted in power sharing agreement about the future of the state. These democracies that are created in transition counries, and that are somewhere in between thired and fourth wave, are subject of interest for many scholars. Some of them, like Puhle or Merkel, based on their research, are concluding how the processes of democratization, or of democratic consolidation “can be very different from one another, and that they follow their different lines and trajectories which are characterized by the constellations not only of the respective actors involved, but also of the broader socio- economic, institutional and cultural context.” (Puhl 2005; 4). 17 See Ewan MacAskill, “Barack Obama to back Middle East democracy with billions in aid,” The Guardian. 19 May 2011. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/19/barack-obama-middle-east-aid. Accessed on 1 June 2013. 29 news media that are reporting about street protest in capital cities in established democracies (like Occupy movement18), we can learn that consolidation of democracy is still ongoing in established democracies, which adds to the claim that democratization is never-ending process. In his writing on democratization, Hauss (2003) concluded that even though it is a relatively simple idea, if we take it as establishment of a democratic political regime, in practice, it has been anything but easy to understand “let alone achieve.” His conclusion is easy to be tested in many examples around the world where democratization is on-going for many decades, while the process moves back and forth, taking different directions. Political scientists do not agree how democratization occurs, when it starts or ends, or what criteria should be used in different countries and circumstances. They agree that it is a process that takes time, and requires development of new institutions, including civil society and the media. However, proponents of consolidation theory are arguing that democratization is much deeper than institution building and that it relates rather to sustainability of those institutions. Diamond (1994; 15) defines consolidation as a process by which democracy becomes „so broadly and profoundly legitimate among citizens, that it is very unlikely to break down. “ For him, this process involves behavioral and institutional change that will in its outcome; normalize democratic policies which requires stronger civil society and the most important, political institutionalization, something that is missing often in a specific class of states. Most of the authors do agree that democratization is increasingly linked to state building, in the sense of Fukuyama’s (2004) definition of the process in which new governmental institutions are created, and the old ones strengthened. The connection between the two is crucial for Carothers (2007; 12-27) who finds that democratization can be a mistake for countries that are not ready for democracy. Bad results, according to Carothers, can lead to illiberal leaders or even extremists, virulent nationalism and ethnic or other types of conflict, coming to power: “To prevent such results, certain preconditions, above all, the rule of law and a well-functioning state should be in place before a society democratizes,” he argues pointing out to issues that are maybe are crucial, but often forgotten in protectorate or semi-protectorates (Carothers 2007; 13).

18 See The Guardian reporting on the Movement http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/occupy-movement. Accessed on 1 June 2013. On eof the examples is strugle for the freedom of the speech online. Dunja Mijatović, the OSCE representative for freedom of the media repeted on several occassion in her mandate how both democratic and transition governments in her remit were often acting against openness in the media and on the internet. See James Ball, “Internet freedom 'under threat from hasty legislation in UK and US',” The Guardian. 1 May 2012. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/may/01/internet-freedom-threat-hasty-legislation. Accessed on 1 June 2013. 30

For Burnell (2000, 11), democratization should be understood as every type of assistance in development that leads toward advancement of the social, economic and other conditions believed to be beneficial for democracy. In this sense, even assistance in the media sector, with the goal of creating professional, responsible, and free press, could be placed under democratization efforts. One more definition, applicable to this research, is that democratization refers to the process in which the political space becomes open for different opinions, and variety of participants, in order to improve society, but also life of the individuals taking in consideration human rights, including right to freedom of speech (Jarstad and Sisk 2008, 17). Nevertheless, even though numbers of actors are involved in democratization process around the world, there is no kind of manual on what and how should be done. What is going on is rather mix of different approaches, developed under the influence of the various interests, whether those by individual donors, or foreign policy concerns, even the traditional external attachments and opportunism (Burnell 2000, 51). In her study of 20 years of democratization, Geddes (1999; 117) concludes that the basic problem faced by analysts is that the processes of democratization varies from case to case and from region to region, what makes it hard for studying, and it is difficult to develop a common strategy that could be applicable anywhere, a fact that is proven in many countries around the world today.

Media - democracy and democratization

In theory, democracy is based on the rule of people who have the right to express their opinion in public, to hear opinion by others and to form judgements based on what they have learned, and concluded. To make up their opinion, people often rely on information offered primarily by the news media, which I focused on in my research or any of those media that brings information about current affairs. For McQuill (1978, 12), media are a powerful resources that could be used as a tool of influence, control and innovations in one society, but also media can serve as debate arena for different aspects of public life. Keane (1991, 190) connects the role of media and democracy through their mutual task to provide the citizens with the information they need to form and reconsider their judgments. With that power, the media can contribute to determine the fate of politicians and political causes while influencing citizens how to vote (Street 2001, 231). 31

This power of the media in the society comes from the fact that the news is telling us something we otherwise would not know (Schudson 2008, 13). For this reason, the real power is in the hands of those who control the media, since they have the power to control how society is developing, and often in what level of democracy it should be (Street 2001, 231). This idea represents a very important point for my research since I am looking into the media development under influence from the outside and in countries that are going through democratization after the war, and questioning the influence of their local media if they are controlled by the outside power. However, the power of the media in informing us is, according to Schudson (2008, 13), what makes the media important for democracy, “but it does not mean it is sufficient for democracy to work.” Generally, the media helps to sustain the hallmark of democracy – accountability, meaning the obligation of officials to inform public about what they do, and explain why (Caplan 2005; 464). For Norris and Zinnbauer (2002, 7), accountability rests on three underlining conditions; transparency in decision-making, institutional mechanisms for holding public official responsible for their decisions and actions, and suitable sanctions to enforce accountability. In that sense, the media are serving a corrective function pointing out to the wrongdoings by the government. Finally, an exact relationship between the media and democracy is not something agreed in theory, or practice. Even more, three forms of democracy – liberal, direct and deliberate – define press freedom in a different ways: liberal urging some notion of free but responsible media, direct for more tightly regulated media and deliberate for regulated pluralism (Street 2001, 230). Over the last 20 years, part of democratization efforts relates to media development, with the premise that the media are one of the institutions of the democratic society. Pasek (2006; 22), however, calls for attention writing that to expect that democracy will result from increase in media freedom, or that the free media could result from democratization process, could be “misplaced”. Furthermore, Asp writes (2007, 32) that free exchange of ideas, which can be done through the media, is one of the fundamental democratic values, together with sovereignty of the people. That precondition is only possible where free and responsible marketplace of ideas exists, and is encouraged by the governments, as well as by the societies that moves toward creation of a society in which flow of information and debates is constantly encouraged, and results with new ideas. 32

The role of the media in democratization is seen differently by researchers who are still looking for certain connections, and practitioners who by large agree that two are inseparable. Putzel and Der Zwan (2006) see the creation and sustainability of the free and independent media as crucial to theories of democratization, but they do not forget to mention that in fragile states, like many after the wars are, encouraging the creation of free and independent media does not mean that automatically it will help straightening of civil society or democracy, itself. “This approach underestimates the complexity of the context of fragile states,” they are warning (Putzel and Der Zwan 2006; 2). Jarstad and Sisk (2008) believe that donors see the media as a mode of democratization in post-conflict countries, or a tool necessary to promote democracy, because of their role during the war as tools of hate propaganda. Through the process of democratization, those involved are trying to erase effects of the war propaganda and to introduce new models of the media system - independent from the government control, and able to resist the pressure. The method is to assist the media in different ways, while involving huge investments and many actors, who among other things, are creating and running the media in the country of intervention. Ross Howard (2003) describes the media as “an actor on its own right” in the process of democratization, stressing that by fostering dialogue and giving voice to different segments of the population, if a responsible media exist they mobilize social forces for peace building. He continues concluding that the media unintentionally can play the role in conflict resolution while delivering an essential part – communication. Kumar (2006) also believes that democratization success can depend on a free and unfettered flow of information. My argument is that society itself has to find a way how to form rules in which free and responsible market place of ideas will be promoted, and protected from any kind of manipulation, without restricting freedom of the press and speech. Those societies have to develop their own concept of democracy, and to lead democratization toward this goal.

Media assistance

Media assistance, as part of democratization efforts, aims to enhance development of the sector, but also to introduce democracy ideas using the media as a tool. The success of this method is yet to be explored. Practitioners in the field of democratization concentrate on how to organize the media and free flow of information before the elections, in order to enable them to perform their duty of informing citizens about candidates and voting procedures. For this purpose, different assistance to the media in emerging democracies is given, starting with establishment of the new media that are giving space to 33 alternative voices, or helping the existing to be independent from the government and less prone to manipulation. The assistance can include material support, as well as training, but also enhancement of the media legislation in order to encourage freedoms. Price, De Luce and Noll (2002; 29) are adding to this list support given for development of trade associations, legal defense, conflict prevention initiatives, security training, and support for legal advocacy. Miller (2009; 24) refers to media assistance as “economic, technical, and financial assistance” provided by the IC with the purpose to build and strengthen independent media. Going back through the history, media assistance emerged after the World War 2 when the media in Germany and Japan were transformed by the Alliance occupation. In the second half of the 1980s, and the beginning of the 1990s, media assistance became an industry, or “the latest fashion in the field of democracy promotion, “and it has included enormous budgets (de Zeeuw 2005; 493). De Zeeuw describes the objective of media assistance as creation of a well-trained, free and independent media “that facilitates debate and discussion about public policy issues,” and serves as a watchdog that keeps officials accountable to the public. Miller (2009; 27) describes media assistance “as an act of political-culture intervention,” with warning that relations between media and democracy are much more complex that the rhetoric of media assistance often allows. He becomes very critical when writing that media assistance “seeks to universalize some very specific media forms and practices that arose out of quite particular historical conditions in North America and Western Europe.” (Miller, 2009; 16) In his dissertation, Wijs (2009, 9-10) offers an overview of different approaches in the literature to the relations between democratization and media assistance, identifying four main positions: the media supremist position that argues how free and independent media generate democracy and that the media are necessity in the struggle for power in all the regimes; the democracy-supremist which suggests that democracy determines and produces media freedom and independence; the media-is-an-element-of-democracy position argues that the media and their freedom is an outcome of democracy; the null-effect position which denies any relationship. He adds two alternative positions mentioned in the literature: a media-freedom-hinders- democracy which suggest that the media undermine democracy; a democratization-hinders- media freedom that claims that while democratization takes place, media regulation that evolves during this process restrict media freedoms. In post-conflict countries, media assistance is related to peacekeeping, and the steps taken are developed in that manner (Price, Noll and De Luce 2002; 48). Those steps include, as the three authors argues, among other things, analyzing a possible regulation framework that will 34 help achieve stability and meet needs of peace-keeping organizations; establishment of a legal framework, including framework for licensing; or establishing a regulatory framework for a free speech. My research concentrates on how successful this model is, while focusing on specifies examples from the practice of one of the countries where media assistance was deployed and directed by outside actors, at the same time when massive peace building efforts were taking place. According to Kayumba, Twagitamungu and Kimonyo (2006, 211-237), genocide and war have devastating effects on the media sector, both physically and psychologically, and public trust in media is severely damaged. To find a way to rebuild this scene after the war is one of the concerns of the media assistance. Media professionals, represented through the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) are generally critical about the use of media assistance. In the report from 2006, IFJ raised the question of the effectiveness of this method to improve media freedoms. Aiden White (2006), former general secretary of Federation, wrote that media assistance works sometimes for journalists (emergency humanitarian aid, for example), while being critical of all other aspects concluding that “for most there is little to show for the millions that has been scattered,” a statement that was often proven in practice. One of the reasons can be, as Price, Noll and De Luce (2002; 53) observed as a lack of an overall long-term vision, which creates programs that are completely unsustainable when donor money is gone. According to Johnson (2012, 40), donors involved with the media assistance, craft their programs to support professional, sustainable and independent media:

If we unpack those terms; professional means a mass media that adheres to Western ideals of truth-seeking through an open marketplace of ideas and balanced sourcing of information, independent means striving for an editorial line free from political and business influences, and sustainable means that ultimately the news media is expected to be financially stable yet maintain a public service mandate. (ibid)

Media assistance often concentrate on building constructions, like regulations, laws, equipment, training of journalists, different important aspects but rather something that can be seen only from the outside, while sometimes it has little effect on what is the core of the problem in those societies, such as lack of the notions of a free and responsible marketplace of ideas. 35

Donors, though, do take care more of these constructions, than on the impact that their project could have on a certain society.

Imposition of freedom

While it can be true that unlimited and unconditional freedom of the speech in emerging democracies can potentially lead to political manipulations and propaganda that could fuel enmities and potentially create new or awaken the old conflicts, as mentioned before, it is important to give a possibility for development of a notion of importance of the freedom of thought, speech, to the people who felt suppressed for years without having possibility to express ideas and to be owners of the process of state building, which may impose responsibility. Post- conflict reconstruction, however, especially in countries with limited sovereignty, under the close watch of the outside actors, is hardly area where many of the above mentioned characteristics of democracy exist, including freedom of the speech. Result can be a building up of Potemkin villages, where from the outside everything looks good, while inside nothing has changed, or if it is, it is rather for worse than for good. Often these countries are considered weak or even failed states, where the outside players have an important role in every aspect of the life. Over the last 20 years, a new form of protectorate or semi-protectorate has been introduced in more than one country.19 Traditionally, the term protectorate dates back to 19th century and it defines relationship in which one country exercise some decisive control over another country or region. The level of control varies from country to country. Bojkov refers to Encyclopaedia Laws Eng. quoted in Zucconi and Akerhurst when defining protectorate, and writes that the term refers to the Colonial Conference of Berlin in 1885 when it was used to indicate the relation of “a European power to a territory inhabited by native tribes and not recognised as a state.” According to this work, a protectorate state retains control over its internal affairs, but is has its protector in charge of its international representation, while the exact relationship depends on the terms of the instrument established. (Bojko 2003;54) In modern times, control is often overtaken through the agreement signed by the country in question, and the international authorities. The situation in those countries, according to Sampson (2003; 148), sometimes can be described as benevolent colonialism that is created by the rhetoric of partnership in which one partner is not equal. The goal in this relationship is to

19 Including Bosnia, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq. 36 make country of concern more amenable for the West, he considers. Sampson uses the term benevolent because the countries that are imposing protectorate, unlike in the past, do not want to exploit locals but rather to convince them into their way of thinking, and in given circumstances it is usually a democracy. Democratization in these countries is the way of conversion, which is sometimes done through the imposition, and the locals are not expected to be critical to the process. Democratizers are deciding which model of democracy will be imposed, and how, while the process is going on in territories where the Fukuyama’s basic preconditions for democracy are often missing, like stateness or functional institutions that should protect citizens and the state. The media assistance projects in these circumstances are explained as starting point for the creation of the media surrounding that will help democratization. Projects that are considered as a part of the process, sometimes do not examine existing economic realities, or culture in the country of the intervention, creating realities that could exist only as long as the external actors are willing to be engaged with the material help. Media created within this process, are often nothing more than just a short-term projects, hardly sustainable when the donors’ money is gone. These media do not have even a long-term impact on media scene, or the society itself. In some cases, these media projects could be close to success, especially if developed with locals and on time, but often they are vulnerable and prone to collapse as time is passing. Media professionals in these countries are offered with different trainings led by the experts coming usually from Western Europe or North America, who rarely speak local languages and have no knowledge about the local conditions. Even more, these trainings, even though sometimes useful, often lack notion of the surrounding and culture of the local people and tradition of the media, and because of that is sometimes not applicable at all. At the same time, these trainings are usually short-term projects, and just rarely ideas that have intention to be developed into institutionalized programs. De Zeeuw (2005; 497) argues how the biggest weakness of trainings is that they are focused mainly on correcting performance of journalists, but not addressing the root causes. Media assistance includes even introduction of new laws and regulations that should contribute to freedom of the media and speech in general. Again, even with this process the IC does not consider existing situation while imposing solutions and pushing for their implementation, even when it is hardly realistic. This results in creation of the fine laws and regulations, but for the existing systems hard to implement. Approach like this one can produce 37 opposite effect, being seen by the locals rather as a new type of propaganda or control, and as such, being unwelcome and finally rejected. An important aspect that is missing in protectorate and semi-protectorates is the accountability for those who are leading the process of democratization, and it can become precedent for behaviour of local elite. Caplan (2005; 474) finds this as a “fundamental contradiction that lies at the heart of international administration”, while acknowledging that international administrators are not elected in a democratic way, and not supposed to be, but appointed by some international body. Furthermore, he recognises that the IC in protectorates and semi-protectorates works in extraordinary situations that could - to some extent - justify their lack of accountability to local community. Still, the fact is that they are not accountable even to the IC since there are no mechanisms for sanctions, and often they remain above the law. Existing media in these surroundings cannot function as watchdog of society, a function that is related to accountability of those who hold the power since the real power is in the hands of the “unaccountable” IC. In practice, people cannot build the confidence in the media, but also in their own power to make decisions and change things, knowing that those who are making decisions are that whey cannot be elected nor dismissed from their positions of power. De Zeeuw (2005; 500) sees this problem in all of the countries that are going through the externally imposed democratization. According to his conclusion, the IC over the time becomes more interested in stabilizing the fragile peace, than institutionalization of the democratic rules in the political game: “Therefore, international democracy assistance rarely comprises serious institutional-reform programs that challenge the status quo in a post-conflict country.” Unlike protectorate, or semi-protectorates, sovereign people are able to receive diverse information and ideas, and to exchange them. In La May’s (2006) words, the news media is often what makes sovereignty meaningful. Semi or full protectorate status limits the free exchange of ideas, and results with creation of the externally dependent societies, with donor dependent media, which are not able to stand on their own feet or to perform their basic role - to inform people who will later on make their opinion based on the received information. The role of media assistance, as well as of the entire process of democratization, should be “to encourage, develop and straighten” local capacities for the exchange of information, while supporting democratic institutions and culture (Kumar 2006). This is unlikely to happen in protectorates or semi-protectorates, where stabilisation has sometimes priority over democratisation. Media assistance should be directed toward creation of media diversity, the 38 system in which there is a whole array of different news and information, but also a range of choices for expression and debate of different views in society (Kumar 2006). I agree with Mansfield and Snyder (1995) when they say that for those involved in democratization a top priority has to be placed on “creating a free, competitive, yet responsible marketplace of ideas”, as the only solution to pave the road toward democracy.

Conclusion

The eexistence of a free and responsible market place of ideas is one of the characteristics of the democratic societies. Their existence gives citizens the arena where they can talk about anything related to the functioning of the society. Media in those societies do have freedom, and do exercise that freedom, constantly questioning and testing the system. Citizens are offered with information that can help them in making their decision on the Election Day. The creation of this type of society should be the goal of democratization. If that is the goal, the role of the media is very important. The media can be seen as one of the arenas for exchange of the ideas. In this sense, existence of free media becomes extremely important, as well as creation of the media that are professional in performing their duties, and responsible toward the society. Media assistance, in theory, should help the societies in which the existing media do not have capability to perform their duties this way, and do not provide arena for exchange of ideas. This help should be free of ideologies and any type of pressure, and directed in the way that society in need decides. To impose any ideas in the process, can harm the whole process and instead of creating an arena for free exchange of ideas, can create passive society that is not capable of taking the role in democratization.

CHAPTER IV: THE WAR AND THE MEDIA

The media in Bosnia and Herzegovina during three and a half years of the war were used as weapons by all warring sides. War mongering propaganda was constructed in political cabinets with the purpose to arose fear and hate between people, and then spread throughout the media. When the war was stopped, the country remained divided along lines established by warring sides, and confirmed, with some modifications, with peace negotiations that were held under the auspices of the United States, Russia and the European Union. The media remained captured inside of these new division lines, whose strength relied on the strong presence of nationalist ideologies. Some were trying to fight these divisions and ideologies, but their voices were less powerful. To describe devastating effects of the war propaganda in the successor states of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), Renee de La Bross (2003) an expert witness for the prosecution of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY), used the term mediatisation of death. This chapter looks into development of the propaganda in the wake of breakup of Yugoslavia, and its role during the war in Bosnia. I will also look into the influence of war propaganda in post-war Bosnia.

Three shades of propaganda

During conflict, or any other extreme situation, people often desperately search for information that will help them to understand what is happening around them. To be informed, people are prone to trust any source that delivers information in even minimum convincing way, becoming in this way open and vulnerable to different types of propaganda. News media whose role is to provide information to the public, if not performing their duty in professional manner, and respecting the ethical standards, can easily become a tool for transmitting propaganda, a mode to transmit hostilities, or to “exacerbate tensions by spreading misperceptions or exaggerations,” becoming in that way mobilizers, even actual weapons or “instigators connected to force” (Price, al Marashi and Stremlau 2008; 3). The media in this context cannot be seen as independent entity, and cause for conflict, but they do have powerful influence in the society and on the dynamics of the conflict (Ellis 2006, quoted in Jusić and Palmer 2008; 110 - 138). 40

Denis McQuill (1978; 12) considers the media as a powerful resource or a potential means of influence, control and innovation in society. For the same author, the mobilisation of all existing media combined at the same time, is what makes a successful propaganda “that is considered a manipulative phenomenon, a top down process, and an ‘action’ that is favouring a partisan approach” (ibid; 14). Propaganda, a phenomenon that exists for centuries, can be considered to be one of the essential elements of warfare (Jowett and O’Donell 1992; 10). Like these two authors, modern propaganda theory, is making a distinction between black, white and grey propaganda. White propaganda is coming from the source that is easy to recognized, unlike grey propaganda whose source may or may not be identified, and the accuracy of the information is uncertain. Like grey, black propaganda comes from unattributed source, or the one that is falsely attributed and it can include false information. Propaganda uses lies, contradictions, misinformation, or just silence, to promote certain ideas (Ellul 1974; 34). Hitler led his propaganda war under the premises that the bigger the lie, the bigger is the chance of it being believed. At the same time, his main propagandist Joseph Goebbels recommended the use of the information that could be true, but is difficult to be verified, for successful propaganda. These methods are used even today for the purpose of propaganda that aims at spreading war and hate messages. The use of propaganda to promote war and spread hate speech during the conflicts that occurred at the beginning of the 1990s in the Yugoslav succeeding countries, is one of the reasons behind development the concept of information intervention. This term was coined by Jamie F. Metzl (1997; 15-20), a former U.N. Human Rights Officer, who called for the establishment of the UN body that will observe the media and intervene, if necessary, in conflicts situations. Explaining his idea, Metzl, who was aware of the devastating effect that propaganda had in former Yugoslavia, but also in Rwanda where genocide was encouraged by the media reports20, warned that if the great powers are not willing to address mass human rights abuses with armed interventions, they should search for less risky alternatives, offers the possibility of the monitoring, countering, and blocking radio and television broadcast that incite violence in crisis zones. Used in post-war Bosnia, information intervention showed only limited impact (more in Chapter V), showing that if it is not accompanied by other methods it can have only limited effect in suppressing hate of propaganda.

20 Three journalists were sentenced in 2003 by the International Criminal tribunal for Rwanda for inciting genocide. Decision summary available at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Nahimana/judgement/Summary- Media.pdf. Accessed on 12 April 2013. 41

Price, al Marashi and Stremlau (2008; 11-12) are identifying four phases for the emergence of a “conflict media”: a strong ideology, control over a mass medium/media, psychological preparation to hate and call to violence. The third step, they recognize, as the most important one and the one in which the media are transformed into a tool of conflict, which includes, among other thing, the use of the hate speech with the purpose to spread chauvinism, xenophobia, racism and other negative feelings toward groups or individuals. Hate speech is considered to be a powerful way of public expression that has as a goal to “identify, demonize, possibly destroy some ethnic, national, racial, confessional, social or political groups, what in the war conditions can be like annunciation of physical liquidation,” (Bugarski 2001; 117). Even though there is no unique definition of what hate speech is, most of linguists agree that the first step is linguistic separation of we (us) and them (they) groups. Group we is considering to be a victim, but at the same time superior, what is one of the reasons to became victim. Group them is the one in which enemies belong. To confront these two groups is a base for further conflicts (Bugarski 2001; 117). If not suppressed, or if there is no alternative to hate speech, consequence can be development of, what I consider, as a language of hate, when different forms of hate speech are becoming a part of the everyday language, so deeply in people’s minds that they can hardly recognised it as problem. It leaves societies divided, and people prone to manipulation and victimization, like in the case of the post-Yugoslav states after the wars. Over the last 20 years, the media were increasingly used as a tool in wars all over the world. Even more, as Price noticed (2000; 1), examples like Rwanda or the Balkans are pointing toward the increased use of the media to encourage and sustain genocide and other war crimes. In both cases, the media helped to the local politicians to spread ideas of the fear and hate before and during the wars, and in the case of former Yugoslavia, to maintain these feelings even after the war and justify the role of perpetuators of crimes.

Political propaganda and media intervention

Before the war, the media in the SFRJ, as well as in the most communistic states, were nothing more than a propaganda tools for the ruling Communist Party (Party). According to the predominant doctrine, journalists were given the task to promote the socialistic system, while encouraged then to become members of the Communist party, especially those who wanted to report on the current politics, or those who wanted to advance in their careers. By the official Code of Journalists of SFRJ - adopted in 1965 and revised in 1969 - journalists were defined as 42

“socio-political workers,” expected to serve the government and the Party (Thompson 1999; 13- 14). According to the Code, journalists were obligated to fully engage in political life, while supporting the policy of reform and “struggle against bureaucratic, monopolistic, chauvinist, nationalist, anti-self-governing aspirations, as well as against all phenomena which are considered as retarding to the development of socialist democracy.”21 The media were established, financed and controlled by each of the six republic branches of the Party, including the Socijalistička Republika Bosna i Hercegovina (Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina - SRBiH). Editors and directors were appointed by the Party, with the task to carefully control that all reports are in accordance with official policies. The media were obliged to inform, in the first place, about party leaders and governmental policies, while not being critical of the government. At the same time, the role of the media was to show “the commonalties of the Yugoslavian people rather than focusing on the differences” (Taylor and Kent 2000; 357). The Party judged mistakes, and even the smallest one could have been sanctioned severely, and one might lose the job or even go to prison. Any critical writing about the Party or Josip Broz Tito, lifelong president and the supreme commander of SFRJ, was forbidden, and journalists used to be extremely careful. Self-censorship was recommended, and even considered as an act of patriotism - the highest value a person could have in Tito’s Yugoslavia (Pešić 1994). By the law, every publisher was obliged to send a copy of the newspaper before print to the office of the state or republic’s prosecutor, who had the power to ban the issue or individual articles or photos (Ramet 1996; 65). The prosecutors concentrated on the most prominent daily publications and religious press. It was the time when, according to some journalists, no open official censorship existed, but an open political debate or space for different opinion or criticism of the current internal politics, was a vague notion (Kurspahić 2003; 99). Very strict control over the media was imposed in Bosnia due to the complex ethnic composition of the republic in which three big ethnic groups (Serbs, Croats and Muslims22) alongside with many minorities, lived. Anything that could cause even smallest misunderstandings between those groups had to be avoided. Kurspahić (2003), who was journalist and editor for different publications in Yugoslavia, and later on in Bosnia, recalls how the Party intended to control the ethnic balance of the media while imposing strict rules about equal representation of the dialects spoken in public (Serbo–

21 Zdenko Antić. “Yugoslav Journalists’ Code Emphasizes Ethical and Professional Standards” (Radio Free Europe Research, Communist Area, Yugoslavia, Information media, August 12, 1969), available at http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/pdf/78-4-320.pdf. Accessed on 12 January 2011. 22 Since 1993 the name Bosniaks (Bošnjaci) is officially in use when referring to Bosnian Muslims. 43

Croatian language, as it was called back that tine) and alphabet, as well as about equal presentation of all the nations in any aspect of the public life. Just one of the examples was the daily Oslobođenje, where Kurspahić used to work, that was established in 1945 as a publication of the Socijalistički savez radnog naroda Bosne i Hercegovine (Socialist Alliance of the Working People of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), and promoted into a leading daily newspaper over the years in Bosnia. By the rule, the daily has to be printed one day in Latin and the other in Cyrillic alphabet; if director is Serb, the chief editor had to be Muslim or Croat, and vice versa. The composition inside of the newsroom mirrored ethnic picture of Bosnia, meaning the percentage of Muslims, Serbs, Croats and all the others as the last census was reflected. The same approach was used at the Radio televizija Sarajevo (Radio Television Sarajevo - TVSA), the main republic TV station, part of the Yugoslav Radio Television system (Kurspahić 2003). One other former journalist from Bosnia, Neven Anđelić (2003; 89), wrote how the media lords in SFRJ were almost as powerful as politicians, having power to order news information and directing propaganda. However, it is important to add to this that these “media lords” were people appointed by the politicians, and did not have a role or the mission of their own, but was part of the existing system. In this atmosphere, development of journalism that would be critical of government and serves only as the information provider, rather than as tool for transmitting political messages, was difficult.

New leaders - new propaganda

Josip Broz Tito died in 1980, and soon after, the system started collapsing with old communist elites feeling threatened by the changes and demands for democratization. The disappearance of “the supreme power authority” brought insecurity among people about present and the future (Popov 2000; 96). In the years after Tito’s death, the economic and political situation in SFRJ worsened. The leaders in each of the republics started blaming each other for problems, using power over the media to spread nationalist discourses that were created to help them keep their positions. Noel Malcolm (1996; 217) observed how, during this period, “non-stop bombardment of misinformation and fear-mongering, through the media and local politicians” was used all over SFRJ to radicalize the population. It was the time when local politicians started advocated for more autonomy from Belgrade, while politicians in Serbia 44 argued for imposing the stronger restrictions toward other republics and, especially, autonomous provinces.23 By the late 1980s debates, first timid and that open, about freedom of the media were opened by so-called-youth media, that were established and run by Socijalistički savez omladine (Alliance of Socialist Youth) branches of the Party. Soon those media were becoming leaders of progressive and open reporting, starting to broach issues that were never before addressed publicly in Yugoslavia, such as the crimes committed by the Communists in the aftermath of the WW2, but also to question the legacy of Tito and the Communist Party. This trend created an impression that new era of the free press is coming, the press that will be independent from the government and that could open the road toward democratic society, while allowing debates and different opinions, and acting as a watchdog of the society. Even investigative journalism, which is considered as the main attribute of the free and democratic media, started to appear in the local press (Ramet 1996; 11). Journalists from the youth media were the first to demand for legislation and regulations changes, asking for more freedoms and the establishment of independent, private media outlets. Finally, in 1989, laws were changed and, among other things, new legislation granted private persons, as well as city governments or municipalities, the ability to establish media outlets. This situation reflected in Bosnia, where the most progressive media at the time were Radio Sarajevo Omladinski program, the monthly Naši Dani, SA 3 the youth program of TV Sarajevo, and the daily Oslobođenje. Omladinski program had - in Bosnian circumstances - a revolutionary approach by opening program for the public to talk freely on the air and live, about any topic, including politics, and they did attract attention, but mostly in the cities. Bosnian journalists would say today that it was the time, from 1988 on, of professionalization, when they gained more freedoms even inside the newsrooms, including the possibility to elect editors by themselves. Gojko Berić (2010) called “a miracle” and a day when Oslobođenje “acquired its own little island of freedom.” The law that was introduced in 1989 liberated TVSA and Oslobođenje from political control, while at the same time forbidding their journalists active participation in politics. In practice it meant that if any journalist was a member of political party, he/she was obliged to or leave their job, or not to write on current politics. (Kurspahić 2003; 106) “However, although the changes were of a revolutionary character, it has to be remembered that these developments were largely confined to the capital,” Anđelić wrote (2003; 89) pointing to the fact that the media in the provinces continued to be under the strong

23 SFRY was composed of six republics and two autonomous provinces. 45 political control of local branches of the Party. Later on, as the war was nearing, media in the provinces were the first one to be turned into war propaganda tools. The new anti-Communist leadership was often represented by the same people as previous one, just affiliated to different political parties. Those were the people with already established connections with the local media that remained under political control during and after the war, with little or no possibility to resist, unlike the media in bigger cities. Recently before the war, in 1989, Sarajevo became headquarter for the Yutel, a Yugoslav station supported by the Reformist Movement led by the last prime minister Ante Marković. The intention was to use this TV station to combat existing war propaganda, but also to promote Marković’s political ideas, and one of them was to keep Yugoslavia together. When Yutel started broadcasting it did offer different forms of TV journalism, more critical toward politicians, and investigative in attempt, but yet politically very opinionated and close to one party. While the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) was already involved in attacks on Slovenia, later on in Croatia and Bosnia, Yutel journalists insisted on promoting Yugoslavia as the only solution for the emerging conflict, avoiding to name JNA’s role in on-going enmities, while covering party relies of Reformist Movement. In reality, the audience was not getting realistic picture of the events on the battle field. Just one of the examples is report from war in Slovenia, and conversation between a young soldier and Yutel journalist:

J – How it’s going? S – Fucking awful, that’s how it going. J – Do you know whom you are fighting against? S – I only know they’re shooting at us. J – Who are they? S – Members of the Territorial Army and others. J – And do you know why you are fighting this war, this battle? S – How the hell do I know? They sort of want to secede, and we sort of want let them. But we just want to go back to the barracks.24

However, any kind of Yutel influence was limited by the impact of much more powerful propaganda machinery from existing state broadcasters, accompanied by print media. Yutel

24 Yutel. Report by Ivica Puljić. Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ZVQ1Hbg7xY. Accessed on 20 April 2013. 46 program was banned from many part of Yugoslavia, and at the end, April 1992, it was broadcasting only in Sarajevo that already was under the siege by the JNA.

Back to the roots

Taking control over the media, and building strong ideological background that will serve as the base for future war propaganda, began in the mid-1980s when stories about victimization of one group/nation, were starting to appear in the public. At the beginning was the idea of Kosovo “separatism,” a term introduced to describe intentions by the Kosovo Albanians, a majority in this province, to gain more independence from Serbia, as opposite to the idea of more centralization that was coming from Belgrade. In 1981, Kosovo Albanians organized mass rallies under the slogan “Kosovo republic” but were stopped by force, while some of the organizers and participants were arrested, and put on trial or in prison. Divisions in Kosovo between Albanian majority and Serb minority, were becoming more obvious, and reflected on the entire SFRJ, with each of the republic’s leaders, and the media, taking sides. In her analysis of the state of the media during the 1980s, Sonja Biserko (1997) explained that at the beginning hate speech was focused on the ethnic Albanians, then on Slovenians and Croats, and finally on Muslims in Bosnia. Creation of the ideology that will develop into hate speech and language of hate came along with Slobodan Milošević’s rise to the power in Serbia. In 1983 he became high-ranking official in the city government of Belgrade, which was a very good position to get closer to the media - individual journalists, editors and directors. Later on, Milošević start climbing inside of the Party in Serbia, and with the help of the media, to gained support of the public, which finally brought him to the position of the head of the state. Kurspahić claims that the media helped to Milošević’s myth to awake. “It was some kind of love on the first sight between young politician, who was hungry for the power, and journalists who intended to prove themselves and to strengthen their position inside of the Party,” (Kurspahić 2003; 37). Milošević will in years to come, be indicted by the ICTY - among other crimes - for misuse of the media. His indictment read that the propaganda was an important tool and contributed for the crimes to be committed, first in Croatia, later on Bosnia and finally in Kosovo25.

25 Slobodan Milošević indictments available at http://www.icty.org/case/slobodan_milosevic/4. Last time accessed on 10 May 2010. 47

In Milošević's hands, the notion of Serbia as victim became one of his regime's major psychological and political props (Sell 2002; 46). According to Bennett (1996; 298), through his rigid control of the media, Milošević organized a powerful campaign to portray Serbia as the victim of the other republic’s media attacks, while emphasising the need to readjust Yugoslavia due to its alleged bias against Serbia. For this author, the key events in Yugoslav’s disintegration did not take place in the past, but in the years before the wars started:

It is a tale not of ‘ancient hatreds’ or centuries of ethnic strife and inevitable conflict, but of very modern nationalist hysteria which was deliberately generated in the media. (Ibid; 298)

In September 1986, the Belgrade daily Večernje Novosti published parts of the draft document later known as the Memorandum on the Position of Serbia in Yugoslavia, that was prepared by the members of the Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti (Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts –SANU), and which became “the ideological underpinning of the Serbian nationalist programme,” (Judah 2002; 49-50; Gow 2003; 40). The Memorandum focused on the alleged discrimination against the Serbs within the SFRY:

All nations are not equal: the Serbian nation, for example, did not obtain the right to its own state. Unlike national minorities, portions of the Serbian people who live in other republics in large numbers do not have the right to use their own language and alphabet, to organise politically and culturally, or to develop the unique culture of their nation.26

Following Večernje novosti, some other media publish parts of the Memorandum, accompanied by commentaries and opinion pieces by editors, or some public figures, while exploiting on the topic of victimization, and use of hate speech. Initially, the purpose of publishing this document was not to express support, but rather opposite. However, Milošević's propaganda found it useful with the time and directed interpretations of the Memorandum for their own purposes Looking into effects of propaganda in Yugoslavia, Jack Snyder (2000; 214) wrote that unevenness of journalistic standards and the plausibility of myths to the ethnically segmented

26 Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) Memorandum, 1986, Making the History of 1989, Item #674, available at http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/items/show/674. Accessed 28 September 2011 48 targeted audience, contributed to ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, propaganda dictated from Belgrade easily spread all around the country, and soon found its counterparts in other republics. The war with the words and pictures started by the end of the 1980s, and moved to battlefields at the beginning of the 1990s, and continued to stay in decades to come.

Media as the weapon to attain political goals

For Bosnia, the most ethnically diverse republic, with central position within the country that was falling apart, the situation was the most complex. Three explicitly mono-ethnic parties won the first democratic elections that were organized in the fall of 1990, and form of a loose coalition. Stranka demokratske akcije (Party of Democratic Action - SDA) as a Bosniak party; the Srpska demokratska stranka (Serbian Democratic Party – SDS), exclusively Serb party in the same way as the Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (Croatian Democratic Community – HDZ) was only for Croats (Bieber 2006; 20-21). These three parties could not agree on the most of the things concerning the future of Bosnia, including the crucial one at that moment – to remain part of the already broken Yugoslavia or to succeed, following examples of Slovenia and Croatia, both independent countries since the fall of 1991. Croats and Bosniak politicians were in favour of leaving Yugoslavia as it was at the moment, while most of the Serb politicians were for staying. Three parties could not agree on many things, but one they did was to impose full control over the media, dividing them along party lines and at the same time, ethnic lines. Soon the law was again changed and appointment of editors and directors became one more time a political issue. Journalists tried to fight, but newly elected politicians had the power over the police, and were willing to use them against the media. In October 1991, Bosnia declared sovereignty, too.27 In September SDS began forming parallel institutions, and finally in January 1992 they established the Skupština srpskog naroda BiH (Assembly of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the Srpska Republika BiH (Serb Republic of BiH) that was renamed into Republika Srpska (RS) in August the same year (Donia 2008). Almost at the same time, November 1991, HDZ proclaimed Hrvatska zajednica Herceg Bosna (Croatian Community of Herceg Bosnia HZHB). Both, one backed from Belgrade and the other one from Zagreb, formed their own armies, police and parallel institutions.

27 Laura Silber. “Bosnia Declares Sovereignty.” The Washington Post. 16 October 1991, Page A29. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/independence101691.htm. Accessed on January 14, 2013. 49

Finally, in March 1992, citizens were called in for referendum for independence. The SDS invited Serbs to boycott, but majority of the citizens of Bosnia turned out (63, 4 per cent) and voted for independence.28 By the end of the same month, armed groups, backed by the Jugoslovenska narodna armija (Yugoslav People’s Army JNA) that was supported from the government in Belgrade, crossed the border from Serbia entering cities in the northern Bosnia, and starting the campaign of ethnic cleansing (see Nettelfield 2012, Silber and Little 1997, Malcolm 1996). Before the armed conflict, in august 1991, the JNA took over 9 out of 11 TV transmitters in Bosnia, redirecting it to transmit programs from the State TV in Serbia. Soon, TV Sarajevo signal, now Televizija Bosne i Hercegovina (Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was minimized to less that 25 percent of the territory. Programs of all existing stations were filled with hours and hours of political shows, followed by reports from battlefields, contributing the tensions growth and spreading the fear. As Sabrina Ramet noticed, the media were becoming “a fairly precise barometer of the broader institutional and political context,” (2003; 57). Commenting on the same period, Gordana Đerić, as quoted by Kolsto (2009; 194), concluded how Yugoslavia and Yugoslavism - the idea about life in one united country - was “destroyed under direct television coverage,” with other media coming along. Consequently, as Renaud de La Brosse (2003) coined the term a mediatisation of death, to describe a situation in which elected politicians used the media “like a weapon which could help them to attain their political goals:

To do this, those in power in each republic sought to control the media in their territory, and in particular television, and transform them into the regime’s instruments of propaganda responsible for getting the population to subscribe to their political conceptions and actions. (de la Bross 2003)

During the war, from TV screens and front pages of daily and weekly newspapers all over Yugoslav succeeding countries, people were confronted with pictures and words of horror and hatred. Eventually, hate speech became language used by the media, but also by broader public. Patriotic journalism became the new, and almost the only form of reporting, while

28 Commission and Security and Cooperation in Europe and US Helsinki Commission. February 29, 1992, Report: The Referendum on Independence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, available at http://csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=UserGroups.Home&ContentRecord_id=250&ContentType=G&ContentReco rdType=G&UserGroup_id=5&Subaction=ByDate. Accessed on 13 January 2013. 50 journalists accompanied soldiers at the front lines, not as observers but sometimes dressed in uniforms, and to serve as message carriers about war goals and achievements. Most of the citizens in Bosnia, at the very beginning of the war, were cut off from the communications channels, including phone lines, access to the media; roads were blocked, and traveling almost impossible. In this situation, only handful of media outlets, mostly in Sarajevo, refused to give up on ethics, and tried to resist political pressure. RTVBIH in Sarajevo struggled to keep their independence, but eventually came under the influence of the ruling SDA. Even though in extreme situation, according to different sources, wartime censorship did not exist in the part of Bosnia that was controlled by the government in Sarajevo, self-censorship was present partly as heritage from the past, but also as reaction to the given situation and existing political pressure. Different authors are claiming that no planned political propaganda existed in this part of Bosnia (de la Bross 2003, Gow and Peterson 1996, Thompson 1999). Certain number of the media remained independent during the war, reporting critically while trying to be open for different opinions. UN Special Reportteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki in his report about freedom of the media from 1994 noticed that RTVBIH in 1992 was often critical about Serbs and Croats, but never about the local government, unlike some independent media which existed mostly in Sarajevo. For journalists from bigger centres, like Zenica, Tuzla or in the capital, was to some degree easier to resist political pressure, and some insisted in doing so, like Oslobođenje, monthly Naši dani (now Bh. Dani), radio Studio 99 or Radio Zid, and later on the weekly Slobodna Bosna. In other areas of the country independent media hardly existed, and those ones based in Sarajevo could hardly break a Siege. The situation was even harsher for the parts of the country under the SDS and HDZ control where the only purpose of the media was to serve the local politicians. In part that was controlled by the SDS, the media system was created under the heavy influence from Belgrade and Milošević. The system created TV and radio channel - Srpska radio televizija (Serb radio television SRT), as well as the news agency Srpska novinska agencija (Serb news agency - SRNA), and took over the daily Glas renaming it into Glas Srpski. Mazowiecki (1994) found out that the media in Republika Srpska entity were created by force with the aim to invert the truth, and to help achievement of the political and military goals. In the part of the country controlled by HDZ, no new media were created but the media from the neighbouring Croatia covered the territory, establishing only local affiliate offices in just several cities, with reporters who were loyal to local politicians, and followed the instructions from Zagreb. 51

After the war, the ICTY dealt with number of cases in which the role of the media and propaganda in Bosnia were treated, but they never had any case against journalists or editors. Number of witnesses, in different trials, talked about how they remember the media roles in communities they were expelled from during the war. One of them, Redžep Zukić, from the area of Sanski Most, northern Bosnia, recalled how the local Radio Sana used to broadcast “offensive songs and called Muslims with offensive names,” saying that in spring of 1992, this radio was used to invite Muslims from the region to leave their homes with the white flags in their arms.29 Enes Kapetanović, testified how in the late April 1992, “after Serbs gained control over Prijedor,” they used to inform civilians through the media that they have to carry white bands around their arms to show loyalty to the new authorities. “All of us, adults and children alike, had those bands around arms,” Kapetanović recalled in the court room.30 Civilians, wearing white bands on their hands, were taken to the detention centres-camps formed in this area. The role of media and propaganda is recognized by the verdict pronounced in 2000 against Duško Tadić, the first person indicted by the ICTY. The trial chamber acknowledged “the virulent propaganda,” that incited fighting and helped those “who sought territorial and political gains,” to initiate “a campaign to realise these goals by force of arms with limitless cruelty and viciousness.”31 The role of the propaganda was recognised in the case of Milan Gvero, high-ranking military official for Vojska Republike Srpske (Republika Srpska Army - VRS), too. The trial chamber’s concluded that Gvero, among other things, “by disseminating false information,” contributed to the joint criminal enterprise, part of whose goal was to ethnically cleanse Srebrenica, area in eastern part of Bosnia where genocide was committed in July 1995.32

Words and pictures of war

Some of the examples of the wartime media reports could illustrate fierce propaganda and hate speech that led to escalation of hostilities, and incited people to commit crimes.

29 Nidžara Ahmetašević. “Mediji i rat: Megafoni mržnje.” BIRN Justice Report. Available at http://www.bim.ba/bh/172/10/20499/. Accessed on 16 January 2013. 30 Ibid 31 ICTY transcript, available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/trans/en/970714it.htm, accessed on 20 February 2010 32 Nidžara Ahmetašević. “Hague Recognizes Propaganda’s Role in Srebrenica Genocide.” Balkan Insight. 7 July 2010. Available at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/hague-recognises-propaganda-s-role-in-srebrenica- genocide. Accessed on 16 January 2011 52

In May 1992 SRT broadcasted a report about “Muslim extremists who invented the most horrible way to torture people, throwing Serb children in Sarajevo to lions in the city Zoo.”33 The news was horrifying and shocking: most of anything to those people who did not know what is going on in the city and did not have a chance to check accuracy of the story. In her work about hate speech and fear, Skoljanac (2000; 17) concluded how the other face of the hate is fear from everything that is different, “fear from one’s own incapability to react to some things, believe that one can live forever if I live in fear.” She adds that the manipulator knows how to keep this fear alive; to make aggressiveness and then to discipline it through the military or paramilitary formation, like it was done in Bosnia.

In 1993, Hrvatska radio televizija (Croatian Radio Television - HRT), broadcasted report made by journalist Silvana Menđušić from central Bosnia about alleged crimes against Croats in the city of Zenica. She interviewed woman and two girls, who were telling the story about how they escaped the city. The woman talked about rape of Croat girls and women by Muslims, and her worry for her 13 years old daughter:

We even though to cut off her hair and make her look like a boy. Just to save her,” the woman told to the reporter, who continued the story telling that this family was hungry while living in Zenica forced to sell belongings in order to buy food ... Every day they heard about killed Croats in the city. In the city of Kakanj, for 250 days, 350 Croats are surrounded. At the city of Vareš, UNPROFOR refuses to protect Croats. From Zenica, where about 10,000 Croats are living, we are getting alarming news how the life for them has become unbearable. Somebody is trying to get out. Some manage to do it, some not. We could call it evacuation. They call it escape for a life!34

In following days, Croatian media reported about civilians, Croats, hanged publicly in the city centre of Zenica, giving no verification for such claims such as photos or reports from the city, or quotes from neutral sources, but just recalling unnamed sources or attributing claims to refugees.

33 Rada Đokić. SRT. Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LzUqQxNb8qw. Accessed on 16 January 2013 34 Silvana Menđušić. HRT. Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6fJcN45uO4Q. Accessed on 13 January 2013. 53

In Sarajevo, local government used RTVBIH to spread their messages that most often were oriented toward the international community with the intention to show the effects of the war over civilian populations, and to provoke military intervention. The beginning of the war was announced on 14 April 1992 from the TV:

It isn’t official, it hasn’t been declared, it’s being waged, for now, over a limited area, but it’s already fair to say: this is the war! This is the war against innocent; this is the war against our children. This is the war against all of us. We aren’t killing each other – they are killing the rest of us. Don’t listen to the rumours. Don’t believe anything you haven’t seen for yourself. This is the war with no holds barred, and armaments aren’t the only weapons!35

Less than a month after this announcement, on 2 May, the same anchor was in position to negotiate release of the president of Bosnian Presidency Alija Izetbegović, live on air. Izetbegović, who was kidnapped at the airport by the JNA, after given possibility for a phone call, called RTVBIH asking to go live on air. The conversation was broadcasted in full, while he explained how he was captured and what conditions for his release are.36

Not only news was used for political propaganda purposes, but even the music. Each of the warring sides forbid the media they controlled to broadcast music by the musicians from the other side of the front lines. According to Mazowiecki report to the UN from 1994, the Ministry of Culture in Sarajevo issued an order to the media not to play music “from the aggressor states,” while calling on them to “adjust the policy,” toward the music played by those musicians who left the country during the war “no matter if they crossed to the aggressor side, or if they just left the country.” 37 War correspondent Anthony Lloyd (2001; 70-71) in his book observed how propaganda influenced ordinary people describing an encounter with elderly women in central Bosnia who “launched into a tirade against Islam” when they met’:

35 Senad Hadžifejzović. TVBIH. Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MX1Rln5_Ltk. Accessed on 15 January 2013. 36 TV Sarajevo. Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g_406HUJwFg. Accessed on 5 February 2013. 37 E/CN.4/1995/54. 13 December 1994. Question of the Violation of Human Rights and fundamental Freedoms in Any part of the World, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent countries and territories, Situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia: Special report on the media: Report of the Special Rapporteur submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1994/72. Available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/65f96626d11ff18f80256712004e5084?Opendocument. Accessed on 28 March 2013. 54

There were thousands of Arab mujahedin swarming through the hills, she told me. They had radicalised the minds of the Bosnian Muslims who now waging a jihad, a holy war, upon the beleaguered Croat people who for so long had been persecuted by the filth of the Ottoman empire, Bosnia was now Europe’s frontier against the fundamentalist legions of Allah, the Croatian people the brave hajduk vanguard in the battle for Christianity…If I, relatively impartial foreigner with access to a free media, could be frightened by local scaremongering and propaganda, imagine what it was doing to the minds of isolated rural communities with no access to outside news, no experience of media impartiality, reliant instead on the voice of local authority for ‘truth’. (ibid)

These examples are just a small part of the hate propaganda present in the Bosnian media during the war, which created an atmosphere of fear and hate among people, and incited to crimes, but went unpunished until today.

Justifying crimes

As the war became bloodier, propaganda had to follow and to find explanations for everything that was going on at the battlefields, and to justify crimes that were committed on a huge scale. After the VRS forces fired the bombshell that caused the massacre at the Markale market in Sarajevo on 5 February 1994,38 SRT broadcasted the report denying the responsibility of the Army:

Capital city of ex Bosnia and Herzegovina Sarajevo is heading toward the most tragically road to became like Beirut, city of the horrible civil-religious war that lasts over one decade, which shows, on the war scene, all the preciousness and monstrousness and the evilness of Muslim way of fighting. Today Sarajevo was the scene for the new crime at the market Markale, in the old part of the city. The massacre happened around 11.30am. 66 persons were massacred, and 100 wounded. Do we need to say that Muslim side stopped negotiations

38 Stanislav Galić, Sarajevo Romanija Corps of the VRS Commander, was sentenced to life by the ICTY for, among other things, massacre that was committed at Markale market. Details about the case available at http://www.icty.org/cases/party/690/4, accessed on 20 January 20013. 55

that were held at Sarajevo Airport under the supervision of Momčilo Krajišnik and Haris Silajdžić, starting the new media campaign of demonization of Serb people? Serb government reacted urgently to what Muslim leadership that do not constrain of any kind of massacre of their people tried to do... 39

A day after the Markale massacre, SRT editor and presenter Risto Đogo dedicated prime time news almost entirely to this event. At the end of the show, studio was made to look alike the Markale market after the massacre. In the centre was placed a “human body” without head and hands, and then suddenly from one sleeve the hand aroused waving with three fingers in the air.40 In his book about the media during the wars in SFRY, Mark Thomson (1999; 251) wrote that Đogo was appealing to his audience “to remember that those Muslims are absurd, ridicules, the natural butts of jokes. Their suffering is not a human suffering, not like ours.” Thompson adds how SDS propaganda was so confident of unquestioned support from masses, while their military recourses were (“thanks to Serbia and the JNA”) so overwhelmingly superior that their propaganda did not need to be clever (ibid). In the same line, De La Bross (2003) concluded how Đogo was “a preacher about Serb superiority, and Muslim degeneration.” Propaganda from Pale was the most carefully prepared after genocide was committed by VRS in Srebrenica in July 1995.41 Journalists who were allowed to enter the city after VRS were carefully chosen among those who used to work for Serbian and RS media. Some of them were embedded with army that entered the city led by General Ratko Mladić. On 11 July, SRT presenter of the prime time news announcing “Serb Army liberated Srebrenica in torrential attack of Serb soldiers”:

It was done after the Muslim side attacked the area of the protected zone of Srebrenica and burned down some villages around the city. In this moment, acceptance of the civilians and UNPROFOR representatives is going on. Everything is under control, and in accordance with Geneva Convention. Every armed man is treated in accordance with the Convention. At this moment, soldiers are giving up their arms. During a night it is expected that even paramilitary forces around Žepa, will give up fighting. Republika Srpska president, Doctor Radovan Karadžić, ordered that civilian government should

39 Video Archive, SRT, Dnevnik 2, editor and anchor Dragan Božanić, 5 February 1994, by S.and N. Kreševljaković, Sarajevo 40 Ibid. 41 ICTY judgment in the case of Radislav Krstić, Chief-of-Staff/Deputy Commander of the Drina Corps of the VRS. Available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/cis/en/cis_krstic_en.pdf, accessed on 20 January 2013. 56

be established in Srebrenica. He appointed civilian commissioner, with high responsibilities, Miroslav Deronjić. Everything goes according to the plan, and in accordance with the international conventions. Muslims, especially those who did not commit any kind of crime, do not have reason to be afraid. They are invited to cooperate with the civilian authorities of Srebrenica.42

Exactly the same lines were red three times during half an hour news broadcast, without any pictures from the city to justify report. In following days, pictures from Srebrenica, carefully edited so that not even one dead body could be seen, were broadcasted on SRT, and selected media in Serbia. General Mladić was interviewed saying “my fellow Serbs ... I am offering you today as a gift this city of Srebrenica!”43 Some of the videos materials recorded in Srebrenica were later on used as the prosecution evidence during trials before the ICTY and local courts. One of them, not carefully edited which showed dead bodies, and that was broadcasted at Belgrade based Studio B, were introduced as one of the crucial proofs of massacres committed after the fall of the city.44 To justify the role of the VRS and the SDS leadership in genocide, all the available media were engaged. Željko Cvijanović, editor for weekly Javnost at Pale, published an editorial with the statement that what did happen in the Srebrenica did not disturb anybody; “Not even Muslims were really concerned. They simply regarded it as one less mouths to feed.”45 At the same issue, Tihomir Burzanović wrote that day after “the liberation,” Srebrenica is being ventilated “of the smell of those who lived before, heavy and mouldy smell.”46 Dušanka Stanišić and Mladen Krsmanović went a step further writing that only after Serb liberation Srebenica can start to live; “Serbs are back… It is true though that Muslim way of life is present everywhere, and to be honest, it is not a civilised way of life.”47 All these reports by large affected general attitude toward the crimes committed all over Bosnia where propaganda achieved the ultimate goal diverting hate speech into the language of hate, and denying crimes committed. Part of the media, remained under the political influence

42 Vedran Škoro. SRT, 11 July 1995. Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ojc-inpKo0Y. Accessed on 15 January 2013. 43 SRT available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-hThYazVN6A. Accessed on 15 January 2013. 44 Sense news agency. “Istraga o srebreničkom videu beogradskog novinara.” 11 November 2010. Available at http://www.sense-agency.com/tribunal_(mksj).25.html?news_id=12231. Accessed on 28 March 2013. 45 Željko Cvijanović. “Mapa bez mrlja” Javnost, 22 July 1995. Copy on file with the author. 46 Tihomir Burzanović. “Povratak Srebreničana na ognjišta; Vetrenje bivše kasabe.” Javnost, 22 July 1995. Copy on file with the author. 47 Dušanka Stanišić and Mladen Krsmanović. “Zasijalo nemanjsko srebro.’ Srpsko Oslobođenje, 14 July 1995. Copy on file with the author. 57 while continuing to spread the same messages of fear, promoting silence and ignorance towards the responsibility for war crimes.

A crucial element of war

It is common opinion in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia that shootings come from TV screens and newspapers, and continued at the battlefields. Ivan Zvonimir Čičak (1997), member of the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, considers that printed words could be even more powerful weapon than bullets: “The bullet can kill one, two, three, five persons. But the words are able to destroy the whole community,” he concluded in his 1997 speech. Ivan Čolović (2000; 36) expresses similar opinion writing that explicit opponents of the war do consider that beginning is easy to be found in ideas and words “which are easy to be spread around.” In his 1994 report, Mazowiecki reported how deliberate spreading of rumours and disinformation formed a “crucial element” of the war, greatly contributing to ethnic animosity. According to the same report, information published by the media in Yugoslavia in the wake of wars, were primarily consisted of “nationalistic discourse and omnipresent insults and offences aimed at other peoples.” Based on the facts he established, Mazowiecki recommended that as “crucial step for democratization” - media assistance - should be under way, calling the international media foundations, governmental and nongovernmental organisations, to get involved. He also recommended that responsibility for the role that media played during the war should be proven, what has never been done. Media assistance was initiated during the war, helping primarily to the existing independent media in Bosnia, who survived by large with the help of the foreign donations. 48 According to the Media Plan Institute estimations, from October 1992 until the end of 1995, around seven million dollars’ worth donations were given to the media in Bosnia, mostly those in territories under the Sarajevo based government control.49 And it was only the beginning of the media assistance that flourished in the years to come.

48 Senka Kurt, former journalist and editor for Oslobođenje, remembers how from 1994 journalists of this daily started receiving help from the outside, including food and supplies, while part of the help was offered as paper to enable daily to continue publishing on a regular basis. Senka Kurt interview, 10 August 2012, Sarajevo. 49 Institute for War and Peace Reporting - IWPR and MediaPlan Institute Sarajevo. “September 1996 election in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Media coverage of the election campaign, Final monitoring report.” Copy on file with the author. 58

The end of war and the beginning of new media era

The war in Bosnia stopped when the Dayton Peace Accord (DPA) was signed at the end of 1995. 51 The New York Times described it as the document “full of artful ambiguities and disguised contradictions, trying to create a unitary, multiethnic state in Bosnia, while preserving strong sub-states based on largely ethnic lines,” pointing to the problem present over the years after the war.52 DPA defined Bosnia as state composed of two entities - Republika Srpska and Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine with 10 Cantons inside of it, plus District Brčko created later on - March 1999 - in arbitrary process. The agreement introduced the Office of the High Representative (OHR) as institution in charge for overseeing the implementation of the Accords, what with time became the embodiment of the semi-protectorate empowered to issue binding decisions. During the conference that followed the negotiation in Dayton, held in London in 1995, the Peace

50 Map available at http://www.expiscore.com/?page_id=82. Accessed on 15 February 2013. 51 Peace agreement was negotiated in Fall 1995 in Dayton, Ohio, USA under the supervision and the guidance of the IC. DPA available at http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380. Accessed on 20 October 2010. 52 Steven Erlanger, “Bosnia Uproar: Why U.S. Pushes for Early Vote,” The New York Times, 12 June 1996. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/12/world/bosnia-uproar-why-us-pushes-for-early- vote.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. Accessed on 7 January 2012. 59

Implementation Council (PIC) was established, with the responsibility to oversee the work of the OHR and give it directions.53 This body is composed out of the members representing of 55 states and organizations that were present in Bosnia, and involved in post-war reconstruction. The conglomerate of different international organizations and governments that influenced policy in Bosnia is often referred as the international community, the term I will use in this research, too. The DPA did not provide any specific instructions about the media. Several articles do mention it, while there are mostly those in relation to the organization of the elections (Article 3), as well as the Constitution, which is also part of the DPA. The Constitution incorporates the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) as guarantee for freedom of the media (Article 4). According to Article 10 of the ECHR, everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to hold opinion and to receive impartial information and ideas without interference, regardless of frontiers.54 However, in order to exercise these freedoms, the state can impose certain conditions and formalities, as well as penalties as defined by the law. Furthermore, the media are mentioned in Article 3 of the DPA that refers to the organization of elections. It is stated that all the parties, meaning all the signatories of the DPA, are obliged to ensure conditions for free and fair elections, “including freedom of the expression and the press.”55 The attachment to Annex 3 states that those who signed the peace agreement must ensure that “no legal or administrative obstacle stands in the way of unimpeded access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis for all political groupings and individuals wishing to participate in the electoral process.”56 Over the time, those provisions were not proved sufficient as the bases for the media development, so further steps were introduced. Each decision to get involved with the media by the IC made was introduced through these provisions from the DPA, while recalling on the ECHR. Pauline Neville-Jones, led the UK delegation during peace negotiations, and she remembers that other things than media preoccupied negotiators in Dayton:

We were so preoccupied with all sorts of other things. We spend a very great deal and the time just solving very fundamental issues like the geographical

53 Conclusion from the PIC Conference held at Lancaster House London on 8 December 1995. Available at http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5168. Accessed on 28 March 28 2013. 54 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm. Accessed on 22 November 2011. 55 DPA, Annex 3, Article I 56 Ibid 60

divisions between Srpska and the Federation, and time to get some sort of outline of a government for Bosnia. It was not easy because there were very widely different views, and quite strongly different views between Europeans and Americans on negotiations. So it was hard work what we did.57

Katherin Nyman Matcalf and Krister Thelin (1999-2000: 582), both involved with media reforms in Bosnia, do believe that the reason the role of the media was not mentioned during the peace negotiation, or incorporated into the DPA, is that the whole document was to a large extent drafted by the USA that preferred commercial media and were relying on the development of this sector. They claim that the idea not to get involved in regulating the media relied on the belief that “the market would regulate media and that on the legislative side a guarantee of freedom of expression would be enough, and with a strong and independent judiciary as the ultimate arbiter,” (ibid). However, the reasons could be various, and some probably connected with the need to find the best possible way to stop the war in the fall of 1995, and the media were just left out hoping that in time it will be dealt with the time.58 Neville Jones remembers that the media finally were discussed at the conference in London that she was in charge off:

The actual agreement itself was followed by the implementation conference in London. At that point we thought about what one needs to do in order to make success of the outline that has been sketched at Dayton, and we began to be very serious about the details. We only had a sketch of the future state with an immense amount to fit in, of which the media were just one element.59

The DPA left the country split in two parts, allowing to each of the political parties to continue to control the media. The segmented media picture in Bosnia in 1996 consisted of the media in Republika Srpska,60 and those in the territory controlled by the HDZ,61 where no independent media existed at all. The picture in the part of the country that was dominated by the SDA was to some extent different since there was number of independent media that, despite

57 Paulin Neville-Jones interview 1 March 2013. Skype 58 In an email interview with the author, Nyman Matcalf said how it could be felt by many commentators that the media had not been well considered in the General Framework Agreement for Peace and that this omission had had serious negative consequences.” Email interview conducted in 21 January 2010. 59 Neville-Jones 2013 60 According to the IWPR and MediaPlan Institute in 1996 25 newspapers, 36 radio and seven TV stations, one news agency existed. 61 10 newspapers, 15 radio and five TV station, and official news agency HABENA. ibid. 61 pressures, strived to be professional, while being much less influential that those who were controlled and run by the local politicians, including RTVBIH and some media created by political parties during or after the war. 62 At the same time, the media from neighboring countries, Serbia and Croatia, continued to be present in the Bosnian media market. As well as in Bosnia, in these two countries hardly any independent media existed at the time, or if they did, they were not powerful enough and had small audience. Regimes stayed the same as during the war, as well as discourses and political aspirations of the leaders. Even more, leaders in all three countries were the same ones who led the war and influenced propaganda, while most of the people indicted for war crimes were not arrested since the ICTY, created in 1993, did not have a mechanism to arrest them. It was the time when freedom of movement was limited, while postal and telecommunication links within the country were not restored. In 1996, the International Crisis Group (ICG) published report about the conditions of the media in Bosnia noticing how the existing separation of the country and the media space, did not enabled people to follow all the media, what further deepened divisions established by arms. In practice it meant that people in Mostar or Sarajevo could not watch or read what the media in Banja Luka were reporting about, or vice versa (ICG Report 1996; 70). The overall media picture completely changed during the war. Print media experienced a huge drop of circulation, while broadcast media were mushrooming, largely with the help of international donations, or local political parties. According to the Media Plan Institute report from 1996, one year after the war ended, 145 print media, 92 radio stations, 29 TV stations and six news agencies were registered. The same source claims that audience share declined for 62 per cent in comparison to pre-war times, but it mostly reflected in print media, while broadcast media enlarged more than doubled and were essential for the purpose of war propaganda. High number of the media did not mean that free and responsible market place of ideas was created and results of this research are imposing a question if the media assistance was directed in a different way, maybe it could have been a nutshell for its creation? Giving the picture of the leading media controlled by ruling politicians and the weak alternative media, ICG recommend “concrete steps” for the IC to be taken in order to improve situation “presumes that donors will continue to make a large financial investment in the Bosnian media throughout 1997 and 1998, but that from 1999 Bosnian news organisations will largely be

62 110 newspapers, 41 radio and 17 TV stations, plus four news agencies. Ibid. In 1994, SDA, with intention to weaken Oslobođenje and other independent media influence, formed daily Dnevni Avaz, and later on weekly Ljiljan. 62 on their own,” (ICG Report 1996; 16). The ICG recommend strengthening of media established by the IC, but also focusing its effort on quality of the media, in consultations with the local experts, the instruction that were not followed in the years to come.

Conclusion

For more than half of the century, the media in Bosnia and Herzegovina were just part of the existing system, a tool for achieving political goals, and as such were not even created to serve the society in providing necessary information that could help its citizens to make decisions. When the system started collapsing, politicians, afraid to lose their power, continued with the practice to use the media as a tool in spreading fear and hate, and mobilization of desired emotions. Some media did try to resist, but most of them continued to work in the same way, just changing the “the boss.” Society that were formed in one party system, were much more prone to accept the messages of this propaganda, knowing the source it was coming from. At the same time, Bosnian society was deeply divided by fear, and citizens after the war were prone to be more open toward the messages that were coming from the media associate with one particular ethnic group. It is one of the reasons why they almost ignored information coming from the media that tried to be free, that were newly created and often run by very young people who openly rejected to be associated with any political option. While authorities in SFRY used the media to spread ideology of brotherhood and unity, newly, democratically elected political elites used the media to enforce divisions, and incite to war destroying any notion of the previous ideology. Meanwhile, journalist, trained to work for the system, just adopted themselves to the new given circumstances and ideologies, being often nothing more but mouthpieces for those in power. War in Bosnia did not only have devastating effects on media development or professionalization of their journalists, but also on the entire Bosnian society that lived in a fear for years. Divisions that were established during the war were confirmed with the peace agreement, as well as legitimacy of the people who led the war and dictated propaganda of fear since they were not removed or put on trials. Responsibility of journalists, who were spreading the hate propaganda, even though it was recommended by different observer, was not established. The result was that the war ideas remained excessively present in the media, while journalists continued with the use of hate speech. 63

The media, impoverished and staffed with young people with little experience, were too weak to resist any type of pressure. No regulations or legislation to help in straightening the media sector or to help to the journalists existed. It was a time crucial for media development, and the time for the international community to open the era of media assistance.

CHAPTER V: MEDIA REGULATION AND LEGISLATION

Part of the media assistance process in Bosnia was the introduction of a number of new laws and regulations for the sector. For the IC, the creation of the legal environment was an important step to introduce more freedom of press, and to fight hate speech. Laws and regulations that were introduced were made to mirror those in developed countries, mostly Western European and Northern America. But, they were meant to be implemented in a fragile state, where the rule of law, as well as notion about need and importance of media legislation and regulation, was almost nonexistent.

In this chapter, I look into the way how the regulations in the media sector were introduced, how decisions were made and incorporated into existing system. Implementation and reaction of the local media and legal community are also part of my analysis in this chapter.

Why regulate the media?

It is generally accepted that consolidated democracy needs the media as a watchdog of government - a function which, if fulfilled professionally, helps citizens to stay informed and make informed decisions, while keeping governments in check. However, the laws that are created to ensure media freedoms could not be effective if there is no independent judiciary to oversee its implementation, and a state to protect citizens. Hardly any of these preconditions exist in post-conflict countries, even less in those considered ‘failed states’, which can no longer provide basic security and provision of key functions to its citizens (Putzel and der Zwan 2006;5). In conflicts, many rules are abandoned, including these that safeguard the freedom of expression. Media are rather used as the weapons of war, propaganda tools that are aimed at achieved war goals. Beata Rouzumilowicz (2002; 13) considers freedom of speech as one of the basic human rights, stating that “in a certain way,” human life is not fully realized “unless it can express and communicate its state, concerns and interests.” The media, according to the same author, could be seen in this context as a public forum for people to express their opinions, and 65 exchange ideas with others in the free marketplace of ideas (Ruzmilowitz 2002; 14).Where there is no history of freedom of expression and the press, where people are not accustomed to the exchange of ideas, the consequences of this type of oppression could be even more harmful once the media market is liberalized – in such circumstances people can easily become victims of propaganda, pushed into wars and conflicts. Societies where the freedom of speech is not respected, where human life is not fully realised are, in Rozumilowicz words, suppressed and could be more prone to different types of conflicts, of which examples could be found in many cases over the last 20 years. With intention to assist in rebuilding the post conflict countries, different international organisations get involved, offering solutions that should, eventually and hopefully, create a space for the exchange of ideas, enhance democracy and lay down the foundations for building a democratic state. This process can be directed by some “outside forces,” if local governments are seen as weak, or not willing, to take responsibility over the process and to lead reforms. In these cases solutions are sometimes invented or copied from other countries, and incorporated into the newly built fragile system. Instead of the government, the IC takes a leading role, often not sure which direction to take, or have no clear goal, and usually not being fully accountable to anybody in the process, which represents a topic for numerous debates in academia.63

Three interrelated dimensions of consolidation of media freedoms

The process of democratization strives to build a media system which will help democracy to consolidate. In post-conflict countries it is often accompanied by the state- building, a process whose goals is to make institutions functional and capable of serving its citizens. In post-conflict societies the process of building the media system can be part of the state-building efforts or building of institutions, made with the intention to enhance development of a state that is based on the rule of law. To achieve this, consolidation of media freedoms, a process which, according to Bajomi-Lázár (2008; 79) is consisted of three interrelated dimensions, requires: - institutional dimension, or the establishment of laws, regulatory authorities, and funds to protect media freedoms;

63 David Chandler (2006; 10) calls this situation “empire in denial”: “Empire in Denial, unlike more direct forms of colonial rule, exercises power without the drawback of overt or transparent mechanisms of political accountability. The traditional rights of state sovereignty, those of self-government and non-intervention, have been increasingly undermined.” 66

- behavioural dimension related to the rise of consensus among the political elites and the journalists regarding the importance of the media freedoms; - attitudinal dimension which relates to the commitment of citizens to media freedoms. All three are often missing in fragile post-conflict states, and do have to be built from scratch. In post-conflict countries free and independent media are often missing, being lost during the war or might never has existed. Moreover, being subject to propaganda for a long time, people might lose confidence in the media and do not see them as a relevant source of information, and sometimes even blaming them for negative developments in their society, and even for the war. Free media could not function in a state where there is no legal environment that supports freedom of speech and the media. Price and Krug (2002) are defining four aspects of the legal environment that are acting in promotion of the media freedoms. For them, the key function of the press is the news-gathering process, which has to be protected by the laws that enable access to information held by the government, and creates the environment in which journalists can work. In the second place, they put content-based regulation, relating to the laws that regulate conditions of market entry and regimes of subsequent punishing for perceived abuses of journalistic freedoms. Finally, great importance is placed on the content-neutral regulations that are intended to shield media from external influence, and regulations protecting journalists and media owners from influences and guaranteeing basic physical security to those who are working in the media sector. These conditions are difficult to be provided in any country, whether transitional, or those with a fully established democracy, but when it comes to the post-conflict countries, which are in the process of democratization, it gets even harder since there is no functional state that would provide implementation of those regulations, or it is very weak.

The power of reforms

Two steps are considered by scholars to be most important for the media reforms in transitional countries - being on the path from one political and economic system to another, or from war to peace: creation of media laws, and defining the rules for licensing the broadcast media. 67

Media laws are defined as those that regulate defamation and libel, the licensing of broadcasters, and accreditation of journalists; laws related to censorship or control of content; antitrust laws; or tax laws. Price and Krug (2006) argue that any law reform facilitates change in a society, becomes a vehicle for articulating goals and establishing the machinery for meeting those goals, and it refers also to the media laws reforms. However, the power of reforms in the media sector depends not only on the laws and rules that are introduced, but how they are incorporated into the system and implemented. Appreciation of these laws by society makes them relevant for the success of the media reforms. Finally, even the goal of creating free and independent media, and the role they play, depends on the society. Rozumilowicz (2002;12) concluded that free and independent media are not necessarily sufficient in themselves but only in degree they can support other values and goals of the democratic society, its particular economic structure, greater cultural understanding, general human development, and so on. This notion is particularly important when we look into the post conflict countries, that are hardly able to support any values of democracy, or structures that are making state more effective. Nevertheless, it has to be added that in order to have such media, media laws are necessary, but their implementation is pivotal, as well as understanding of their importance within the society. In a same way is important the process of licensing of the broadcast media. Each broadcaster has to obtain a frequency, while the frequency spectrum has to be managed in order to function properly. Usually the role of regulator is given to the state with the task of ensuring that the use of the spectrum is in accordance with the internationally recognized rules. The power of the state to license any broadcaster could be seen as a possibility of giving permission “to exercise freedom of expression” (Lindberg 2002), or even a thin line between censorship and legitimate regulation, and states have to be very careful how to walk on this line and not jeopardise media freedom (Price and Krug 2002). Nevertheless, in countries that are under the international authority, even media regulation, function of media regulation, including the frequency spectrum, can be subjected to outside control. Practitioners will connect media reforms with democratization process and state-building, bearing in mind the influence that media could have on the public. Media images can be used to build a nation, to strengthen connections or establish new ones between the state and its citizens, or as a tool of persuasion and consensus building, according to Price and Krug (2002). Furthermore, Price (2002; 37) believes that it can be less expensive to assert sovereignty while emphasising imagery rather than force, and it may be cheaper to build loyalties than to rely on 68 terror. “It stands to reason, then, that a state, unchecked, would prefer to have a monopoly over media imagery than to leave such a critical tool in the hands of others,” he claims.

However, in fragile states with a significant presence of the IC, this control of imagery sometimes is placed outside the state’s powers and is taken by the different international organizations with the goal to preserve stability. Price (2002; 42) uses the term market for loyalties to describe a field in which large-scale competitors for power, in a shuffle for allegiances, use the regulation of communications to organise a cartel of imagery, and identity among themselves. This author sees government as a mechanism that allows the cartel to function, while being part of the cartel itself. Furthermore, governments can use this cartel for different purposes, including the creation of a national identity, or any other identity that is needed. After the conflict, if the media are under the international protectorate, like it was in Bosnia, this image is often directed toward peace-building, reconciliation and democratization.

A state of media anarchy

The huge part of the media in Bosnia after the war were left under the control of the ruling elites, often the very same who fought the war. The media functioned in a hostile environment, while being exposed to political and economic pressures, with no set rules and regulations, in conditions that did not allow development, while journalists were often targeted and restricted not only of freedom of expression, but even basic rights like freedom of movement. Kemal Kurspahić (2005), long time journalist and editor, describes immediate post war media landscape as the least favourable for the development of a free and pluralistic media.

On the one hand, the international institutions fully realized that the media had played an instrumental role in creating and maintaining the war mentality... On the other hand, the agreement left the “bad guys” in control not only of their by now “ethnically pure” territories but also of the media in all three states as well as Bosnia’s two entities and ten cantons. (Kurspahić 2005;163)

Nevertheless, Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) and Media Plan Institute in their report from 1996, which is based on three months of monitoring project, did recognized some positive trends in media pluralism, “particularly in big cities,” where different media with 69 range of opinion could be found. Those media were mostly considered independent, ran and staffed by journalists who used to work before the war for the youth media, or young people who became journalists during the war. But their influence covered a part, mostly big cities, of predominantly rural country, with too many media controlled by different interest groups. During the London meeting in December 1995, the PIC,64 and representatives of different governments, mostly from Western Europe and Northern America, as well some intergovernmental organizations who got involved in post-war reconstruction in Bosnia, made decision to be more engaged in media reforms, while encouraging the creation of independent media, and ensuring that existing laws and regulations are in compliance with the DPA.65 Pauline Neville Jones was present at the conference, representing UK government. She remembers that the media were for the first time considered in London:

That was what we needed to prevent competing voices on the airways between the different parts of BiH, which could have exacerbated differences between constituent people and the entities. At the same time, we needed to do something positive which was to create the notion of identity and a single country ... there were numbers of motives which were of a nation building kind and a promotion of democracy.66

London meeting was just the first one in the series of meetings where the PIC members discussed the future of the media in Bosnia.

64 Chandler describes the PIC as “a legal figment, designed to cohere the international management of the Dayton process, but without the restrictive ties of international law.” (2006; 129) 65 PIC London Conference. 66 Neville-Jones 2013. She adds: “Subsequently I became the international governor of the BBC, the governor which is a non executive, and the one who is looking into BBC World Service. Any British diplomat is very conscious about that because it is the part of the BBC which we all grow up with, and which is the instrument of British influence in the world. There are always pretty conscious of the power of broadcasting. So it would be quite natural for somebody like to me have thoughts about the media, and certainly I think I shared that with Karl Bildt.” 70

Table

PIC meetings with conclusions related to the media

London meeting 8/12/1995

Broadcasting Media Statement 24/4/1996 London Conference 5/12/1996

Sintra Conference 30/5/1997

Bonn Conference 10/12/1997

Luxembourg Conference 9/6/1998 Madrid Conference 16/12/1998

About the same time, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) got involved with the media, given their important role in the pre-election campaign. The DPA obliged all political parties to be engaged in creation of the environment without obstacles for the free access to the media before the elections. 67In accordance with the DPA, the elections were scheduled nine months after the end of the war. The DPA put the OSCE in charge of organizing and overseeing the elections, and the duty to observe the media conduct in relation to this process. To fulfil this role, in December 1995 the OSCE in Bosnia established the Media Development Office (MDO) (Domi, 2005). Ambassador Robert Frowick, head of the OSCE Mission at the time representing at the same time the position the US government had, believed that the IC needs to be engaged with the media, and thus provide a fuller and freer debate, in order to hold successful elections (Price 2002;7). The idea was supported by the OHR and the first High Representative Carl Bildt who issued binding decision that the IC should not only help to the existing independent media, but also to establish the country wide broadcasters in order to decrease the influence of the government run media on the public (Bildt 1998; 260). The OSCE decision was made that persons indicted for war crimes by the International Tribunal, cannot run.68The IC in Bosnia decided that the elections should be held as scheduled,

67 DPA, Annex 3. 68 “A summary of the OSCE study concludes that three vital conditions for free elections are not yet in place: a politically neutral environment, freedom of movement, and freedom of association. Independent media are thin on the ground, especially in the Serb and Croat areas, and it is impossible to phone between the Muslim-Croat federation and the Serb-controlled Republika Srpska.” Tony Barber, “US and Europe ignore Bosnia poll warning; 71 even though different concerns were raised. Bojkov mentions two main reasons why elections were set as priority in the first post-war year. The first reason “on general level” elections in post-war societies “have been justified conceptually in terms of the democratic peace thesis and the assumed power of the ballot box to negate the attraction of political violence”. As second reason he sees in the need to provide legitimacy for the the huge international presence through establishing contacts with officially elected domestic politicians. “The first supports the idea that there are indeed elements of democracy in the political system of the country, the second negates this by stressing the primary importance of the protectorate-like non-democratic structure of governance imposed from without. (Bojkov 2003; 50). The US government - according to the media reports - was pushing for early elections, while most of the European countries were opposed. The New York Times reported that the Americans were pushing for the elections, while being ignorant to the fact that “basic freedoms necessary to form free opinions do not yet exist in the country,” including freedom of the media, but also of movement.69 Even more, in op-ed commentary the same newspaper claims that President Clinton, who was running election campaign for his second mandate at the same time, needed this election as “the only exit strategy.”70 Under the American influence, the IC made decision to hold the elections, but to try to find the way to suppress propaganda and hate speech, hoping that this measure will have impact over the public. In April 1996, the PIC issued the Broadcast Media Statement, asking the authorities to fulfil their obligations from the DPA.71 This document also announced creation of the independent TV network that was soon put in place, but not soon enough to have any important influence on the overall situation in Bosnia (more on this issue see Chapter VI). As it could have been predicted, with few free media and high tensions in the post- conflict country, nationalist parties won the elections (Bieber 2006; 91). This victory by large

Group monitoring elections believes conditions for free and fair contest will not been met,” The Independent, 12 June 1996, pp. 10. 69 Steven Erlanger. “Bosnia Uproar: Why U.S. Pushes for Early Vote,” The New York Times. 12 June 1996. Section A; Page 3. 70 “The desperation derives from the fact that Mr. Clinton promised the U.S. public that U.S. troops would not be asked to unify Bosnia by force, that they would be out in about a year and that they would accomplish their mission. Since the Administration couldn't use force to unify Bosnia, and since it has to be out by Dec. 20, elections are the only tool it has left to achieve its aim of setting Bosnia on a path to unification.” Thomas L. Friedman. “Bosnia Election Blues.” The New York Times. Section A; Page 23; Column 5; Editorial Desk. 12 June 1996. 71 “In light of the influence and dominance of television in the former Yugoslavia, this medium should be given priority. The same principles must, however, also apply to the print media.” PIC Steering Board Press Communique: Broadcast Media Statement, 24 April 1996. Available at http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=6791. Accessed on 2 October 2010. 72 was helped by the media reports that were biased and non-professional in their performance.72 The IC was powerless, even though number of measures and mechanisms were introduced to monitor media and create space for opposition parties to express their programs and ideas, but most of them were either too weak or came too late. Around that time, the High Representative did not have powers to intervene with the media, and the actions that were taken by the IC were sporadic and not coordinated. In their 1997 report, the ICG partially blamed the IC for the lack of improvement in media sector in the first year after the war, due to lack of strategy and absence of expertise, which reflected on overall democratization process. The overall conclusion of the report was that the media, 15 months after the DPA was signed, remained divided into three separate and mutually antagonistic components, due to lack of communication and freedom of movement, essential for journalists, and strong political influence in the government controlled media that were the most influential;

Instead of analysing the Bosnian media in detail, then working out a long-term approach to help improve it and combining forces to implement such a policy, donors have for the most part done their own thing. Worse still, they have on occasions even been competing with each other over which projects to back. (ICG 1997; 9)

This is probably the most accurate and comprehensive picture of the IC engagement in the media development during the years immediately after the war that can be used even to describe what was happening along the way, in years to come, with the media assistance. According to Richard Byrne, Boro Kontić describes this process like “a vanity fair of unfocused international donors and local media.”73 Unfortunately, this lack of strategy, coordination, ideas and expertise, as well as unwillingness to consult locals, left long term consequences not only on the media in Bosnia, but also on development of the civil society as whole, and marked the process of democratization and state building.

72 “All three ruling parties--Serb, Croat and Muslim--spent the election "campaign" cracking down on opposition candidates, obstructing the media, stomping out free expression and blocking refugee repatriation. As a result, the vote proved empowering only to those who already held power. The joint institutions so crucial to preserving peace and so often hailed by the Clinton administration as the "way forward" will now be almost exclusively composed of undemocratic, uncompromising and generally unsavory individuals.” Samantha Power. Pale Imitation. New Republic. 12 October 1996. Available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/pale-imitation#. Accessed on 27 February 2013. 73 Richard Byrne, “Casualties of War,” Alternet.org. International Reporting Project. 25 April 2000, available at http://www.alternet.org/story/1701/casualties_of_war. Accessed on 1 June 2013. 73

Time for the changes

In 1997, Simon Haselock, was appointed Deputy HR in charge for media development. With no previous experience in this field, Haselock led the small team of four people who also had limited or no experience with the post war reconstruction or with the media as well. According to Haselock, they decided to look how the media works in Western Europe, Germany in the first place, and try to transfer these experiences into present situation. The team also decided not to look at the media in Eastern Europe countries which were emerging from Communist considering war-induced transition in Bosnia to be of a different nature.74 The decision to follow the German model relied on the premises that after the WW2, where huge efforts were put into media reforms. The Alliance countries employed different methods to fight propaganda left from the National Socialism. However, unlike in Bosnia after the war, the Alliance forces were united and determent in their intention to suppress Nazism, and to introduce new standards in every aspect of the life, and to implement them. In Bosnia, the IC was not sure what attitude to take towards the past, or towards the future of the country. Chris Riley, who was engaged first with SFOR and later on with the OHR Media Department, remembers that the IC did not really have a strategy for the media, but instead “we had Dayton, and that was our Bible.”75 In the meantime, in 1997, high-level meeting - the crucial one - was held in Sintra, Portugal. Participants, members of the PIC, agreed to broaden the powers of the OHR related to the media, encouraging the promotion of the independent media as an “essential step for developing democratic institutions,” as well as the work of independent publishers and broadcasters.76 In Sintra, PIC members decided to give the OHR rights and powers “to curtail or suspend” any media network or programme believed to be working contrary to the DPA. This was an introduction into the media protectorate that was put in place by the end of the year, after the PIC meeting in Bonn, Germany. At this meeting, the OHR was empowered to impose the

74 Simon Haselock. Interview 21 July 2011, Oxford 75 Chris Riley. Interview 23 May 2010. Skype. 76 PIC Sintra Declaration. Available at http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5180. Accessed on 3 November 2011. 74 laws or dismiss any politician from the office. 77 These powers concerned even the media sector.78 The Bonn Declaration is seen by some scholars as a proof of the PIC “firm commitment to establish free and pluralistic media,” and the strong support for the OHR involvement in media reforms (Price 2006; 198).79 In practice, it meant that the OHR had the power to observe, punish and steer any media in the direction they decided. If any Bosnian expert will be consulted along the way, it was depending entirely on the will of the OHR individuals and its staff at any given moment, and it varied from the one High Representative and his methods of work to another. The PIC members in Bonn expressed satisfaction with the on-going media reforms, warning that further improvements could be achieved if the local governments expressed more willingness.80 They invited governments at the state and entity levels to adopt and fully implement media laws, as well as to “legally establish a permanent public body to impose internationally recognised standards of journalism and issue frequency licences for the media.” 81 During this meeting, Haselock presented the PIC with the plans for the future OHR engagement with the media, which referred even to the role of some other organizations involved in media assistance. The document was based on three pillars:

1) editorial intervention and media reconstruction and regulation; 2) encouragement of independent media and the provision of alternative sources of information, and 3) the reform of public broadcasting.82

77 PIC Bonn Conclusions. Available at http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182. Accessed on 5 September 2011. 78 According to The New York Times, concerns were raised if that if IC takes over to govern a country, it can make the state become dependent of outside help. "We have become deeply involved in the functioning of the state," said Christian Clages, the head of the political department. "We may not run essential functions from start to finish, but at all levels we must monitor to make sure the work is being done. We have an unprecedented amount of control on the legislative and executive branches of government. We do not know, however, how we will exit, how we will not perpetuate Bosnia’s culture of dependency." Chris Hedges. “Diplomat Rules Bosnia With Strong Hand.” The New York Times. 10 April 1998. Section A, Page 10. 79 In a very critical article about the Bosnian protectorate published by The New York Times in 1998, reporter Chris Hedges quoted Christian Clages, that time Head of the Political Department with the OHR, saying: "We have become deeply involved in the functioning of the state...We may not run essential functions from start to finish, but at all levels we must monitor to make sure the work is being done. We have an unprecedented amount of control on the legislative and executive branches of government. We do not know, however, how we will exit, how we will not perpetuate Bosnia’s culture of dependency.", Chris Hedges. “Diplomat Rules Bosnia With a Strong Hand,” The New York Times, 10 April 1998. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/10/world/diplomat-rules-bosnia- with-a-strong-hand.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. Accessed on 10 July 2011. 80 PIC Bonn Conclusions. 81 Ibid. 82 Haselock 2011. 75

Haselock’s team continued working on the document after this meeting. A different strategy was prepared by the OSCE in 1998, and it referred only to the elections and the media. According to this document, the existing media were under the political control which left “a particular negative effect on elections because it is used to deprive the citizens of Bosnia of the information they need to make informed decisions during the election process.”83 In their strategy, the OSCE put emphasis on the importance of the Media Expert Commission (MEC), created in 1996 and the role of the IC-created media.84 The plan was to expand their broadcast area, being fully confident that these media can have influence over the local audience. The OHR did not find this strategy, or the efforts of the OSCE, satisfactory and Media Department Office approached the PIC in 1998 during the meeting in Madrid, Spain,85 presenting its final media development strategy, a document that was incorporated in declaration as the Annex:86

The strategy consisted of various things; it mentioned PBS idea since we wanted to have TV that will represent the whole Bosnia. That time state TV was seen as Izetbegović’s television the same way SRT was seen as Karadžić’s television. The idea was to have the media that will create a national identity, and at the same time give voice to minorities. And we needed to have PBS for that. The second element was creation of independent regulator that will establish licensing for broadcasting and introduce standards in programming and advertising. We also looked at trainings for the journalists. And then creation of the legal framework, not only for PBS but even framework related to hate speech, libel and all the sorts of speech that can create bad feelings.87

The PIC supported the OHR, expressing opinion that international assistance to the media in Bosnia was “invaluable in the promotion of pluralism and dialogue, and coexistence among

83 OSCE Media Strategy for 1998 Bosnia and Herzegovina Elections. Document obtained by the author 84 Simon Haselock (2011), who was head of the Media Development Department for the OHR from 1997 to 2000, said that he was not completely satisfied with the work of the OSCE in relation to the media reforms, believing that a more firm attitude should be taken by the IC. 85 Haselock 2011. 86 Madrid PIC declaration. Available at http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5191. Accessed on 3 October 2010. 87 Haselock 2011. 76 constituent peoples,” and called for continued assistance to extend press freedom. They also expressed the need for establishing “stricter criteria” in allocation financial aid to the media, stressing that it should be ensured that only the media “which display a certain level of journalistic professionalism and, as much as possible, address the interests of all three constituent peoples, along with the others” should be given help.88

New provisions

Analysing media reform in Bosnia, Laurent Pech (2000; 3) concluded how the OHR played the most important role while creating rules and regulations, laws, and bodies to oversee its implementation. Nevertheless, it must be stated that from the very beginning of its mandate, the OHR claimed that the media reform process, as well as the process of state-building, had to be locally owned, while at the same time performing huge influence in every aspect of public life. In this way, the IC created a space in which they could avoid any responsibility for decisions made, and transferred it to the local authorities. In his observations of the situation in the country in the aftermath of the war, Tarik Jusić (2000; 237) rightly noticed how the IC was faced with “the enormous challenge” of total reconstruction of the existing media. According to Jusić, none of the ruling parties was willing to support such a reconstruction seeing it as a threat to the power that they have had over the media. At the same time, this author elaborates, that no basic state institutions or legal system existed in a country without democratic tradition, civic culture or any form of a grass-roots civic movement. Politicians continued to control the media and use it as propaganda tools, hardly having any idea, or intention, how to create a democratic and functional state, or unify the people. To suppress their power and existing propaganda, the OHR, but also some other organizations involved in post-war reconstruction like OSCE, or NATO-led peace implementation military forces, as well as some of the governments involved, decided to use similar methods, while imposing ideas and using the media to spread their messages. Julian Braithwaite, who served as the OHR Chief of the Press and Media Development Office from 2002 to 2004, confirms this by saying that the IC in Bosnia had “a political agenda: to promote some kind of civic society, non- ethnic, democratic options,” and in order to do so, they were “buying editorial policy.”89

88PIC Madrid Declaration, Annex. Available at http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5191. Accessed on 5 October 2010. 89 Julian Braithwaite, Interview, Skype, 15 August 15 2010. 77

Senka Kurt, journalist and editor for daily newspaper Oslobođenje from 2001 until 2007, remembered how representatives of the OHR used to call her office and were critical and judgemental about the editorial policy, giving advice on what would be good to be published. “To be honest, we listened to them. It was like in the past when somebody from the President’s office or some high-ranking politician is calling you. We have to admit that High Representative was for a very long time the de facto president in Bosnia,” Kurt added: “I am not sure what would been the punishment if did not do what we were advised to do, since we always did it.”90

Information intervention

In their efforts to introduce some system into chaotic media scene in post-war Bosnia, the OHR and OSCE were creating different commissions. The first one was the MEC created in April 1996, a few months before the first post-war elections were to be held. The body was established by the Provisional Election Commission (PEC) and had the task to establish the rules, and supervise their implementation before and during the elections. The head of the MEC was the OSCE Senior Advisor for Media Development Office at the time, and members were from the OHR, OSCE Human Rights Department, alongside with representatives from some of the embassies in Bosnia, interior ministries from both entities, and persons appointed by each of the parties who held positions in the government. Later on, one IFOR observer joined. The MEC mandate was to enforce the media’s compliance with the elections rules regarding the media, but also, as described in a report from 1998 about two years of Commissions work, “to advocate for journalists’ freedom of expression.”91 To empower MEC, the IC held two important meetings. The first one was held in Washington D.C. in May 1996 - Federation Forum Meeting - that resulted with the agreement asking all broadcasters to provide equal time for election programming during campaign period, and freedom of movement to the journalists.92 The most important one was Sintra PIC meeting in May 1997, which gives support to the MEC and gives broader powers to the OHR in relation to the media regulation. First assessments about the MEC work were not positive. The IWPR-Media Plan report from 1996 was highly critical to the MEC composition, especially the way how the local representatives were elected, which, according to them, allowed political influence;

90 Senka Kurt. Interview, 8 August 2012. Sarajevo. 91 MEC Final Report Media in Election 1998. Copy obtained by the author. 92 Ibid. 78

Entrusting the governments with the power to appoint all the local members of the MEC was just as bad. But this, of course, was in the nature of the DPA. The "parties" were always responsible for everything. Such a structure guaranteed, however, either paralysis or rule by the lowest common denominator. The latter tended to prevail. And given the dissension to be expected between servants of these particular governments, that common denominator could only be low indeed. Moving by consensus meant hardly moving at all. Decisions were regularly deferred as more information was sought, more or better translations were requested and the return of frequently absent members was awaited. (IWPR-Media Plan Institute)

The PEC issued the Electoral Code of Conduct,93 defining rules for the media, and taking the role to supervise the implementation with monitors all over the country (Pech 1999-2000; 8). The MEC was supported with the Media Access Support Team (MAST) tasked with facilitating contact between the media and political candidates. The other body was the Media Monitoring Centre (MMC) that followed the work of the media, and their respect for the given rules. Until September 1998, MEC acted on 201 cases against the media that violated the rules.94 Such supervision turned MEC into a powerful body, with the possibility to give recommendation to the PEC for sanctioning of any media or journalist, or person and institution they considered to violate the rules. At the same time, MEC had the power to recommend to PEC financial penalties, or removal of candidates from electoral lists, even though this power was not frequently used (Chandler 2000; 116). In May 1996, PEC organized a meeting in Banja Luka between local media representatives from both entities, and representatives from different organizations and embassies in Bosnia.95 During this meeting, representatives of the IC explained the rules they expected from the media to obey, including not to use what they called “rhetorical jargon of war,” referring to wartime hate speech, and terms such as “the Serb entity” instead of Republika Srpska, or “the Muslim-Croat Federation” instead of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, considering it inappropriate after the war, while the same terms were overly used by the international media and academics. Even though not introduced as such, this was de facto

93 Available at http://www.geneseo.edu/~iompress/Archive/BiH_Provisional_Election_Commission.pdf, Accessed on 16 February 2013. 94 MEC 1998 report. 95 OHR Bulletin 2-13 May 1996. Available at http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=4927. Access on 16 February 2013. 79 censorship. Years later, Tanya Domi, who was MEC member and at that time, in charge of the OSCE Media Development Department, claimed that the request to forbid some terms was initiated by “local MEC members”:

That was the time with lot of incendiary comments in the media about ethnic identities. To be honest, to even think about something like that in US, would be impossible. But, we are talking about a post-war country and we did come up with the list. It was sort of a guideline for the media telling them ‘if you are using these terms in regular news stories, it is inappropriate.96

In years to come, especially broadcasting media followed these rules that were expanded along the way. No written document that forbids the use of certain terms can be found, but the media were given oral recommendations, which probably meant that there was no system of punishment, but if such recommendations were not obeyed, it would probably meant that the international support would be lost for that particular media. Or at least that was the fear of director and editors. While the IC was observing the language used by the media, local journalists were struggling to find the way to move freely around the country. Even though DPA, Annex 4, guaranteed freedom of movement, it was a slow process. People did not have the confidence in local police and avoided to travel around the country. Journalists were maybe the first ones who started with changing this attitude. For those journalists who worked for the media created and controlled by the OHR or OSCE, it was much easier to organize their movements, and they were often accompanied by some internationals, or even driven in cars with insignia by these two organizations, which guaranteed certain level of security. The others had to find their own way, which did not stop them of travelling. Snježana Mulić in 1996 was working as journalist for monthly Dani, often travelling outside Sarajevo and covering different stories, mostly related to the war. First time she left the city was just 10 days after the DPA was signed:

Nobody helped us back at that time. We just wanted to go and write about life ‘on the other side.' During 1996, I was in Srebrenica, Mostar, Banja Luka, Pale... Anywhere I could find a story to write. I travelled by myself all the time. The only time somebody from the IC was with me if I had some friend working

96 Tanya Domi. Interview. 18 February 2012. Skype. 80

for an international organisation who would take me along. But, they never took care of me, or anybody else, they were just friends who offered a ride.97

The IC was aware of the this issue, as well as other threats to the freedom of the journalists but only in 1999 they managed to establish the Free Media Help Line.98 First, it fell within the International Media Commission (IMC) tasks, the MEC successor, 99 and later on it was handed over to the OSCE, then to the OHR and finally to the BH Journalist Association, where it stayed until today. The Help Line was part of the project the Protection of Professional Rights of Journalists.100 Nevertheless, it was never able to offer to the journalists in danger anything more than to hear their complaints, and possibly to alert the public. It was established after Željko Kopanja, editor-in-chief of Banja Luka independent daily Nezavisne Novine, in October 1999, was badly injured in a car bomb. Before this attack, according to the OSCE data, over 90 per cent of journalists reported one or more serious incidents of threats, harassment or interference, attributing more than 70 per cent of those incidents to government and/or party officials (Popović 2005). Being journalist in post war Bosnia was dangerous not only because of the war time divisions, but because local nationalist politicians were fighting hard to suppress freedom of the press. Senad Avdić remembers that this period immediately after the war was “hectic” and not safe. “It was not safe to be a journalist back then, but also to do anything that is conflicting with the interests of the local political leaders anywhere in Bosnia.”101 Despite this lack of safety, journalists continued with to travel and report, being the first to break the entity divisions after the war, and to starting cooperation among them.

Limited effectiveness

The work of the MEC has been criticized by professionals, as well as by scholars, though the reasons for criticism are to some extent different. Laurent Pech (1999-2000) noticed that the MEC did not manage to exclude the influence that nationalist parties have had over the media in

97 Snježanja Mulić. Interview. 12 January 2012. Sarajevo. 98 More on Free Media Help Line at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/media-d/fm-helpline/default.asp?content_id=29522, Accessed on 16 February 2013. 99 Dunja Mijatović, Interview, 13 March 2012. Vienna. 100 White Paper IMC, 2001 101 Senad Avdić interview, 8 September 2012, Sarajevo. 81

1996 and 1997. In their 1997 report, the ICG observed that the work of the MEC was disappointing because “the defeatism which seemed to pervade the entire organisation,” and due to “the absence of leadership and expertise,” (ICG 1997; 7). In their report from 1998, the MEC admitted that their effectiveness was limited after the war “mainly because of a failure to use the tools available to its greatest effect.”102 Generally, at the time when MEC was active, the media were not getting any better. Hardly any efforts were made toward professionalization of the media, while working conditions did not improve, leaving the media close to the politicians where could have been easily influenced by any interest group. Meanwhile, the number of the media, especially broadcasting, was mushrooming, partly as result of the uncoordinated media assistance.103 Daniel De Luce, described this approach as "carpet bombing to media funding,"104 while Chris Riley said that the overall goal was to break political control over the media while creating alternative voices, but the method was hardly effective.105 According to the OSCE, in 1996 existed over 300 electronic media outlets in Bosnia, a country with a population of about 3.6 million at that time.106 Dunja Mijatović, who used to work for IMC/CRA, remembers that only Paraguay had more electronic media than Bosnia. “It was not media pluralism, but pure media anarchy,” she recalls.107 At the beginning of 1998, in February, the OHR took decision to form the Intermediate Media Standards and Licensing Commission (IMSLC), as a regulatory body to succeed the MEC. The body was supposed to reported to also newly created Media Support Advisory Group (MSAG), composed of members of the OHR, OSCE, UN Mission in Bosnia and SFOR, who used to meet once a week. The plan was that the IMSLC would have broad powers, and possibility to license broadcasters, and set up structural and editorial policy standards for the media.108 Part of the plan was that the IMSLC will have an intervention tribunal whose task would be to rule on disciplinary procedures and impose sanction and penalties (Price 2001). Part of the international

102 MEC 1998. Report. 103 The ICG report gives an example of the Radio Krajina, station run by the VRS military and Ratko Mladić deputy Manojlo Milovanović. This radio was the only opposition to Karadžić, since two fraction were in conflicted by the end of the war. The IC decided to give material help even to this radio. 104 Byrne 2000. 105 Riley 2010. 106 Domi 2012. She said that it was one media outlet for every 17.000 people, while the European standard at the time was 250.000 people per media outlet. 107 Mijatović 2012. 108 OHR Bulletin 66, 23 February 1998. Available at http://www.ohr.int/ohr- dept/presso/chronology/bulletins/default.asp?content_id=4991#6. Accessed on 17 October 2011. 82 media were extremely critical about this body, describing it as “a tribunal that will have the power to shut down radio and television stations, and punish newspapers,”

While acknowledging that they felt uncomfortable regulating broadcasters and print reporters' work, Western officials refused to describe the tribunal as the sort of censorship usually associated with an occupying military power. The officials said they felt they had no other option, given the venomous propaganda that they said often masquerades as news coverage in Bosnia and that can threaten the safety of the American-led NATO peacekeeping force there. "Basically there's a tradition here of propaganda in the class of Goebbels," said Simon Haselock, a spokesman in Bosnia for the civilian operations of the peacekeeping force...According to a draft charter for the panel, it "will provide a mechanism by which the media of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be restructured in accordance with internationally recognised standards. “It is intended," the draft says, "that this should take place with sufficient speed to insure the provision of free, balanced, unbiased and pluralist information before the September 1998 elections, thereafter to insure that Western democratic standards governing the media are permanently embedded.”109

However, this body was never truly functional, but from October 1998, the MEC was replaced by the IMC. One of the MEC biggest accomplishments was the action against SRT in 1997 when the Stabilization Forces (SFOR), at the request of the OHR, were called to prevent this TV station - controlled by the SDS 110 - from broadcasting, due to their constant refusal to obey the rules, and constant use of hate speech. “The seizure was the first significant action against non-compliant media by the international community. The severity of this action has proven to be unique, yet it

109 Shenon Philip, “Allies Creating Press-Control Agency in Bosnia.” The New York Times. 24 April 1998, pp. 8. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/24/world/allies-creating-press-control-agency-in- bosnia.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. Accessed on 10 September 2011. 110 With the approval by the IC, the president of the SRT Board was Momčilo Krajišnik, war time close associate of Radovan Karadžić, who was later sentenced by the ICTY for his involvement with war crimes. Under his direct supervision, SRT used to report on events in the Federation in the section “From Abroad” of the news program or even in a weather forecast. 83 reverberated throughout the country and served as a wake-up call for the entire media community in BiH,” the MEC concluded in its final report.111 According to Frane Maroević, the head of the Media Department for the European Commission (EC) delegation in Bosnia, the decision to use force against the SRT was the real beginning of the international intervention in the media sector.112 The same opinion expressed Krister Thelin, the IMC director and later head of the CRA board, saying that the IC would not even think about the ways of regulating the media sector if they were not forced to react against TV station in Pale.113 The intervention was provoked by the SRT insulting program toward the IC, which came after number of other irregularities including frequent use of war jargon, reporting about event in Federation of BiH in the section “news from abroad,” referring to Bosnia as “former state”, etc.114 SRT was created in 1992 when rebel Serbs led by indicted war-crimes indictee Radovan Karadžić, started establishing parallel institutions in RS. This TV station stayed under his control until summer 1996, when Karadžić was forced to pull out from public life following the agreement made between Serbian President Slobodan Milošević and US Special Envoy for the Balkans Richard Holbrooke.115 That year, the IC decided to support a former Karadžić’s ally, now his opponent, Biljana Plavšić,116 whose seat was in Banja Luka (Collins 1998). Karadžić was banned from political life since indicted by the ICTY for war crimes, but he used to appear occasionally in the public. His influence however was excessively present in political and public life in RS, and SRT openly supported his successors. According to the IWPR and Media Plan media monitoring from 1996, during pre-election campaign, SRT hardly gave space to any other political party but SDS. When they finally decided to invite political candidates from the Federation, suddenly and without clear explanation the power in the studio went off.

111 MEC report 1998. 112 Frane Maroević, Interview. 2 April 2011. Vienna. 113 Krister Thelin, Interview, 18 December 2011. Skype. 114 IWPR-Media Plan Institute 1996. 115 Nidžara Ahmetašević “Exclusive: Pentagon behind Karadžić Immunity Deal, Expert” Balkan Insight. 6 August 2008. Available at http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/investigations/12277/. Accessed on 10 September 2011. Jane Perlez “Top Bosnian Serb Agrees to Resign,” The New York Times. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/20/world/top-bosnian-serb-agrees-to-resign.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. Accessed on 10 September 2011. 116 In 1999 sentenced to eight years in prison for war crimes. 84

In August 1997, the IC decided to use the provisions from the Sintra declaration, 117and to seize several SRT transmitters while giving ultimatum to SDS to restrict its control over the media, and to guarantee a half-an-hour daily presence of the IC at SRT (Riley 2001).118 At the same time, it was requested that SRT would refrain from inflammatory language against the IC, or any ethnic group in Bosnia.119 The IC planned to use the half-an-hour space for their video messages that were to be broadcasted unedited (Chandler 1997; 126).120 SRT refused this type of imposition, claiming that it signified limits of the freedom of the speech and the media. Eventually, they had to accept it after the US sent three Air Force EC-130 Commando Solo planes from military base in Italy, ready to jam SRT signals. According to the US based media reports, the Government sent warfare-planes to Bosnia “to try to silence anti-NATO broadcast by rebel Serbs.”121 Following this move, the IC dismissed editorial and managerial personnel from the SRT, and imposed an international supervisor. In December 1997, British daily The Guardian reported about US plan to influence SRT and its audience. According to this article, that time NATO’s supreme commander American general Wesley Clark said that NATO was aware that Serbs like to watch television rather than read newspapers. “We did not want to punish the people, but we wanted to make sure that the opponents of the Dayton peace process could no longer use the instrument of the media to spread their message of hatred." The articles discovers that, after seizing transmitters, the IC decided to use another “carrot to win the sympathies of Serb viewers,” offering possibility to SRT to rebroadcast games by the US National Basketball Association (NBA). “Robert Gelbard, Washington's special envoy to Bosnia, declared that, as part of a $12 million US aid package to reform the media, the NBA games, along with popular US films and television programmes, would only be available to Bosnian stations "which are prepared to participate as open and democratic media," The Guardian reported.122 Soon, the

117 Riley 2010. 118 Ibid. 119 IWPR and Media Plan Institute Monitoring Report 1997. 120 David Chandler quotes one of the messages given by the OHR: ’We are your friends, and not your enemies. We are not an occupying force. To compare SFOR [the NATO force in Bosnia] with an occupying army is irresponsible. … It is not just, we are here to help you, as I said; to present us as your enemies, rather than friends, is not just and we cannot accept that. … I have the responsibility of restricting or suspending those programmes which are contrary to the truth, impartiality and peace.’ 121 Associated Press. “U.S. Send Electronic Warfare Planes to Bosnia,” The New York Times. 12 September 1997. “The propeller-driven planes, modified versions of a basic Air Force transport plane, can jam local radio and television transmissions, as well as insert broadcasts of their own. NATO commanders in Bosnia requested the craft "in response to the perceived pattern of vehement rhetoric and incitement to violence" that has been broadcast on Bosnian Serb radio and television, said Col. Richard Bridges, a Pentagon spokesman. 122 William Drozdiak. “Bosnia TV put through Nato’s hoop.” The Guardian. 22 December 1997. Foreign Page, pp. 11. 85

NBA games were available only at the OBN network, a countrywide TV station created by the IC (for more more on OBN see in Chapter VI). Finally, in 1998, the OHR decided that SRT has to be renamed into Radio televizija Republike Srpske (RTRS), with the main studio in Banja Luka where Biljana Plavšić and Milorad Dodik, politicians supported by the IC, were stationed and not objecting the influence this new political option have had over the media in RS.

Table

Media Commission

Decision on the Establishment of the IMC 11/6/1998

Decision on Appointment of Members of the Council and of the Enforcement 5/8/1998 Panel of the IMC Decision on Appointment of new Members of the Commission of the CRA 29/11/2001

Decision Combining the Competencies of the IMC and TRA 2/3/2001

Decision Amending the Structure of Expenditures of the Communications 2/12/2002 Regulatory Agency for 2002

Establishing Broadcasting Regulatory Body

The Independent Media Commission (IMC) was formally established in June 1998 by the OHR.123 Creation of the IMC was endorsed at the PIC meeting in Madrid.124 The IMC had the task to establish regulatory and licensing regimes for the broadcast media, as well as ethical rules for the media to follow. The IMC was given power to sanction the media, including financial penalties or license suspension, as well as seizure of equipment or closing down operations, and terminating the license. The decision also stated that the IMC “may enlist the support and assistance of all law enforcement agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina and will seek assistance from the Peace Stabilisation Force or its successors,” if needed.125

123Decision on the establishment of the Independent Media Commission. Available at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/mediadec/default.asp?content_id=95. Accessed on 12 January 2012. 124PIC Madrid Declaration. Available at http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5190. Accessed on 10 September 2011. 125 Decision on the establishment of the Independent Media Commission. 86

The OHR appointed the IMC international personnel, and had their work in appointing the locals or their promotion. The first appointed General Director for the IMC was former Swedish judge Krister Thelin. The plan was that the body would become fully local with the time, which came into realization in 2003. From the very beginning, the IMC was observed differently by authorities in two entities (Topić 2005; 157-184). In the Federation it was mostly welcomed, while in the Republika Srpska the authorities objected their work and existence. The RS government rejected the decision on establishment of the IMC on 10 July 1998, stating that the Commission interferes with the entity’s government responsibilities, referring to the licensing of frequency usage. However, the decision was obligatory, as were all others made by the OHR. Even though the Commission was established by the OHR, according to Thelin it was independent. He understood that he as director was entitled with the Bonn powers in relation to the media.126 Nevertheless, the OHR had different interpretation, trying to influence the IMC work: I clashed with Simon Haselock and OHR on more than one occasion. I do not remember all the details, but they were trying to influence us. For instance, when we were deciding the license start date, they wanted to have their say, they wanted to say that whatever they say we should follow, but it was not the way it works since we were set up as an independent body.127

Media professionals were divided in their opinion about the IMC from the very beginning, but for different reasons than politicians. Some were afraid of censorship, while others were sceptical if this body will be professional. Nezavisna unija novinara (The Independent Journalist Union - NUN), created in 1994, expressed their concerns because most of the international staff appointed by the OHR were of military background. In an open letter, the Union demanded from the OHR to dismiss all the military personnel and to appoint professionals. At the same time, the NUN demanded close cooperation with the local media community on establishing the rules for the media. The NUN got support from the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), and some journalist associations from Serbia and Croatia.128 The IMC and the OHR rejected complains concerning the personnel appointment stating that “each person was carefully chosen based on their personal competences and work

126 Thelin 2011. 127 Ibid. 128 Letter addressed to the OHR and the IMC, dated October 5, 1998, was written during the meeting of associations in Zagreb. On file with the author. 87 experience,” and that employment of former soldiers was not a secret.129 Thelin explains high military presence with the fact that Bosnia was post-war country:

I think we had about 12 internationals. Giving the fact that the IFOR was there at the time, the whole scene from 1992 onward was very much conflict prevention. And in the UN forces and the IFOR you had many military personnel. So, when you started to work on something new, you could pick from good people with knowledge of the region... I did not mind because military people are usually good in organization, and here we needed to do something from scratch, and I did not want to waste any time. I am reserve officer myself, so I did not have a problem relating with ex-army.130

Mijatović did not mind working along former soldiers, too: “They were professionals in what they were doing at that moment, and their background did not affect my work in any way. I did not even think about it,” she said adding that the work of the IMC was just part of the ongoing state-building efforts:

It was just part of the process of state-building which included creation of the Agency but also the State Court, the Central Bank and many others. That process was successful in relation to some institutions, but in some other was not. I believe that in relation to the media, it was done in the best possible way, if we know the situation in the country back that time.131

129 ONASA, General service, “IMC odgovorila na protest novinarskih asocijacija BiH, Hrvatske i Srbije,” 19 October 1998. 130 Thelin 2011. 131 Mijatović 2012. Mijatović is referring to the fact that the IC established all those institutions in Bosnia after the war. 88

Table Media regulatory bodies

Media Development Office (OSCE 1995) - to define goals for media reforms

Media Expert Commission MEC (Provisional Election Commission 1996) - to set the rules for political parties and the media, and to supervise their implementation before the elections.

Monitoring teams - Media Access Support Team

International Media Standard and Licensing Commission (PEC 1998) - to license the media (press and broadcast)

The body report to the Media Support Advisory Group (MSAG) - (OHR, OSCE, UN, SFOR)

Independent Media Commission - IMC (OHR 1998) - to establish regulatory and licensing regime

Telecommunications Regulatory Agency - TRA

Communication Regulatory Agency - CRA (OHR 2001)

Press Council (self-regulatory body)

The issue of transparency

Many of the decisions made by the IMC in the following period provoked further dissatisfaction and sometimes even harsh critiques by the local media community. One of them demanded that all the broadcasting media dedicate equal access and fair representation to all political parties in the pre-election period, for free. Broadcasters objected understanding this decision as financial burden and the IMC changed this provision for the commercial broadcasters, but soon had to put it back since PIC demanded that. Beside financial influence, this decision had impact on the daily program schemes for all broadcasters in Bosnia turning them into nothing more that open platform for over 2000 political candidates, offering low quality program hardly interesting to the audience. The idea was to open the broadcasters for the opposition voices, and to offer the voters information about the candidates, but results was hours or unappealing program that had little influence. In 2003, the ICG published a report in which described the election programming offered by the broadcasters as “unbearable tedium,” (ICG 2003; 10). The report goes on stating how most election programs took the form of panel discussions “among a veritable throng of party representatives”, whose debate “usually turned into rhetorical excursions around everything but that topic,” (ibid; 10-11) The ICG continues noticing the absence of “hard-hitting journalism or meaningful debates”, saying that it probably contributed to the public’s lack of interest in the proceedings. It certainly did nothing to arouse it. OSCE observers noted, too, that most political reporting by the broadcast media was parochial,” (Ibid;11). In 2001 Sarajevo based magazine Dani published a critical article about the IMC, claiming that the success of this body did not match the amount of money provided for it. 132 The author recalled unnamed sources from the EC and the US Embassy in Bosnia figuring out that the annual budget of the IMC was approximately 1.5 million Euros. Furthermore, it states that the Public Relations officer at the IMC, Zinaida Babović, refused to provide financial documents and to answer questions about the projects on which money was spent, quoting her saying “it is not the money of our taxpayers.” Dani claimed that

132 Jasna Hasović. “Amaterizam plaćen milionima,” Dani, No 194, 23 February 2001, pp. 26-28. Available at http://www.bhdani.com/arhiva/194/t19410.shtml. Accessed on 10 October 2011. 90 the IMC is not “eager to practice the standards of financial transparency,” and to be “an open source of information,” concluding that no institution, local or IC, should be immune to public inquiry. Almost 15 years after, Thelin could not remember what the IMC budget was. Yet, he said, it was “a considerate amount of money,” which provided possibility for the internationals to be “pretty well paid.”133 He recalls that 50 per cent of funding came from the US, while the other half was donated from the European countries and institutions.134 According to Dani, until 2001 the EC donated millions of Euros for the IMC, from which the biggest part was given for staff salaries. Lack of willingness to share financial information could point to the issue of general lack of accountability on the side of the IC in Bosnia, the issue authors like Bieber (2006) or Chandler (2006) raised while pointing its possible negative effect on entire democratization process, while making the public having less confidence in it, as well as in those who are leading the process. Nevertheless, Katrin Nyman Metcalf, Head of the Legal Department for the IMC, considers that the body was much more transparent than any other international organization in Bosnia claiming that the only secret data concerned firm’s business secrets and certain information about personnel:

Everything was available for anyone to see and we had specifically instructed all staff how to provide access: there was a place to sit and read files in our premises, no-one was allowed to ask why someone wanted access, we could also send information and the cost could never be more than a small fee for photocopying... At the same time, I understand where the allegations about lack of transparency come from as they tend to be linked to the process of how the IMC was set up, where decisions were taken within the OHR. OHR is not a particularly secretive organisation but it did, especially in the early years, lack an organisational culture and structure. One person might say something is secret that someone else gave out, etc. Also the design of the IMC was made by a firm of consultants that reported to their donors but that could not make working material public. Thus the birth of the IMC and if and how this should

133 Thelin 2011. 134 Ibid. Thelin adds that the US paid regularly and on time, while the EU did not which caused occasional shortages in cash. “I remember that after one year we needed to persuade Brussels that needed to pay and it took three commissioners to get it done.” 91

be done could indeed have been discussed more openly, but the organisation itself could hardly have done more to be transparent.135

Clearing the mess

According to the IMC document from 2000 titled The White Paper, the media in Bosnia were the most politicised in Europe.136 Hence, the IMC task was to find the way to create a legal framework for broadcasters, which would “just by affecting its mandate as a regulator” contribute to democratization, while helping the creation of the conditions in which the media could work free of political influence.137 The same document states that the mandate of the Commission was to promote a “just, tolerant and democratic society,” through the media, while establishing rules for licensing, encouraging the development of private and public media, and the growth of the domestic media market.138 To fulfil its task, the IMC was forced to create the system, rules and procedures while working in a legal vacuum, in situation that Metcalf describes as a “very chaotic.”139 Back than many broadcasters were afraid of going off the air because of strict technical conditions related to regulating frequencies spectrum. At the same time, media continued to be used for incitement to hatred and violence, and many were even set up for that purpose, without the clear strategy or business plan. One of the examples is Radio Sveti Jovan, run by Radovan Karadžić doughtier. The radio used to broadcast religious program, occasional news, and aired political messages on the side of SDS and Karadžić. The first goal for the IMC was to establish the exact number of broadcasters, and issue them short term licences, and it was accomplished by October 1999.140 The second phase of their work was to issue longterm licences, a process that took over four years (See Annex 1). Krister Thelin remembers that, in order to develop plan of work for the IMC, different models were

135Metcalf 2010. 136 Special Report, Bosnia and Herzegovina, White Paper of the Independent Media Commission, Sarajevo, Media Online, Southeast European Media Journal, available at http://www.mediaonline.ba/en/?ID=4. Accessed in 4 November 2010. 137 Ibid. 138 IMC Mission Statement from document “Case Analysis for the first two years of IMC operation, issued on 11 June 2000, IMC. On file with author. 139 Matcalf 2010. 140 Before the establishment of the IMC, frequency management and broadcast licensing was handled by different bodies in different parts of the country, with no co-ordination and little respect for any rules. In addition, as the situation was known to be chaotic, broadcasters in many cases just did not apply for any licence at all but just started broadcasting or changed frequencies or other parameters. The Telecommunications Directorate nominally existing on the State level in reality only represented a small part of the country and the Bosniac (Muslim) part of the population. 92 looked upon. Finally, the one that was considered was the independent US government Federal Communications Commission (FCC), in charge with regulating interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite and cable.141 According to the former IMC director, this model could not be directly transferred, but reduced to be with some European variants.142 Mijatović remembers that it took time and lot of efforts to explain the local media community what was the task of the IMC is and how it will be performed:

We faced much resistance from different sides, lot of controversies and politicisation. But, what we decided was to go out and talk to the people. It is understandable that an explanation was needed since it was the first time that type of the institution was formed anywhere in the region. I have to say that back then we had 330 radio stations in the country. Some broadcasting was undertaken from private houses, churches, mosques, having their antennas even on trees, on stables ... broadcasting without any kind of permission. Simply said – total chaos.143

The IMC looked into the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) to establish the rules for the media (Metcalf and Thelin, 1999-2000). It was the time when no judiciary system in Bosnia functioned, and the existing one was divided between entities and the state. The decision about the establishment of the IMC from June 1998, Thelin understood that no other body is above the IMC, including the OHR. By the same decision, an Enforcement Panel was created with to take most of the decisions, while the Council was established where appeals could be filed and was considered as the supreme policy-making body.144 However, the head of the Council was the same as the head of the IMC.

141Federal Communication Commission. Available on http://www.fcc.gov/. Accessed in 2 February 2012. 142 Thelin 2011. He explained how the IMC was established: “We started by building an organisation from scratch basically taking a blank piece of paper on the back of the consultancy report. The whole thing started with OHR hiring consultants to see what could be done since Dayton left this black hole on this particular topic...Once we set up the international team, we started drawing up the model while looking at different models.... It was much more comprehensive to take as a model an American FCC that any European one since there is no one unique model in Europe. However, the notion of public broadcasting, which is unknown in the US, was asking for something from Europe. We looked at my own country, Germany and France. They called German to be Chairman of the Board.... “ 143 Mijatović 2012. 144 In an email interview, Nyman-Metcalf explained the complicated system of decision-making inside of IMC: “In a step by step description: I would normally have the main responsibility to make a first draft rule/regulation, usually together with my Bosnian deputy. This would be circulated in-house to all departments. The product of that would be made public as a draft on our web-page and we would present it at outreach meetings/hearings. Other international organisations could comment at this time as well but depending on the content, sometimes even before 93

As explained in the IMC report about the first two years of their work, the role of the Council was to determine general policy and acts as an appellate body for reviewing decisions made by the Enforcement Panel or the Director General. “The Enforcement Panel and Director General decide on serious breaches of the license conditions and the IMC Codes. Both Enforcement Panel and the IMC Council are comprised of three international members, experts in media and regulatory matters, and four esteemed citizens of BiH representing all the constituent peoples.” 145 The IMC issued the Broadcasting Code of Practice on August 1, 1998, and amended it on June 9, 1999. (See Annex 2) The Code instructed the media not to broadcast any material which incited ethnic or religious hatred, to observe general community standards of decency and civility, and that the media should not promote the interests of one political party. It also stated that the right of the reply was required when broadcast material unjustly placed a person in an unfavourable light or otherwise if fairness and impartiality required it. In 1999 the work of the IMC aroused more controversy when they issued several warnings and decisions sanctioning media that transmitted programs from neighbouring Serbia or Croatia. It was the time when Bosnian government received help from the outside to rebuild and repair transmitters inside the country in order to be able to cover the whole territory, and these efforts were directly endangered by the neighbouring TV signals. Croatian government financially supported Erotel, a broadcaster that operated in Mostar retransmitting mostly HRT programs with limited in-house production. Between 1998 and 2000, the IMC issued several decisions related to the Erotel breach of the rules, and working remaining them that transmitting HRT programs presented competition to the local broadcasters, while the US State Department, who backed up the IMC on this, described Erotel as “Mostar-based, Zagreb-controlled company.”146 Erotel protested calling on the IMC to reconsider its decision to suspend their program and revoke the license, while stating that there were no sustainable legal or economic reasons for

the final draft was made. For more important rules there would sometimes be a working group to make the draft, with our staff, people from ministries or such and other international organisations. When comments had been received a new draft would be made, and republished for comments if there were important amendments. The Council of the IMC would adopt the rule. Also they could suggest amendments (or reject them) and if these amendments were very substantial we might have another round of comments again (although I do not recall if this ever happened). Adopted rules were published on the web-site as well as sent to licensed broadcasters. Certain rules for internal matters etc could be adopted by the Director General.” 145 IMC Mission Statement. Case Analysis for the first two years of the IMC operations. 11 June, 2000. On file with the author. pp 11. 146 “US state Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour. February 2000. Available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/321.htm. Accessed on 5 February 2013. 94 banning HRT programs from being transmitted in Bosnia.147 They also wrote that suspending their work interfered with the development of the national TV channel for Bosnian Croats, a political issue HDZ was involved with for years, an issue the IC did not know how to deal with. Nevertheless, in May 1999, the IMC asked Erotel to stop rebroadcast HRT programs, announcing that they could not any longer keep the frequencies. In the fall the same year, the IMC was forced to react again since Erotel did not obey their decision and continue broadcasting without license. In November the station was ordered to cease its work. Since they ignored order, the IMC sought the assistance from SFOR. Finally, SFOR decided to intervene and used the force in February 2000, when - with the OHR support - Erotel was shut down in for the IMC first physical enforcement of decision.148 The IMC issued several decision related to the broadcasters in RS that transmitted programs from the state TV Serbia in Belgrade during the NATO air strikes on Serbia in 1999. At the end of March that year, the IMC publicly announced plans to monitor the media during the NATO actions in Serbia.149 Soon after, the IMC concluded that most of the programs that were broadcasted by RTRS, but also some private media in RS, including Kanal S. In one of the wordings issued for these stations, the IMC wrote that how the media should not base their news stories only on one source, referring to official Belgrade. For part of the media in RS this was an attempt of censorship, and they rejected the demand:150

The IMC and the OHR are trying constantly to stop the media in RS from broadcasting RTS program in Bosnia, while they do not even try to interfere with the media who are retransmitting program from different international media, even though some of them are pro –NATO and their programs represent support for the attacks on Serbia.151

Later on, in 1999, the IMC revoked the licence from the Orthodox Radio Sveti Jovan for different breaches of the rules. Among other issues, this radio transmitted the speech given by Radovan Karadžić, the wartime president of the RS, when he was banned from public life.

147 ONASA, General Service, “Erotel pozvao IMC da povuče zabranu reemitovanja programa HRT u BiH,” 24 January 1999. 148 CRA “Report on cases of violations of Rules and Regulations June 1998 – December 2001.” December 2001. Copy on file with the author. 149 ONASA, General service. “IMC nadgleda elektronske medije u BiH tokom napada NATO na SRJ.” 29 March 1999. 150ONASA, General service. “Udruženje novinara RS pogrešno protumačilo stav IMC u vezi sa reemitiranjem programa RTS.” 17 April 1999. 151 Ibid. 95

However, previously the IMC issued permission for this radio, even though being aware that it was owned by Sonja Karadžić, who during the war was his Chief of Public Relations, and the radio started with its broadcasting in the summer of 1996. 152 The radio used to have the most powerful transmitter in entity of RS back that time, covering big part of Bosnia, and even crossing the border toward Serbia.153 Beside the IMC, the Telecommunications Regulatory Agency (TRA), established in 2000, was responsible for telecommunications and frequency management. The OHR merged the two agencies in March 2001, creating the Communications Regulatory Agency (CRA),154 and in October 2002 the Law on Communications was imposed.155 This law formalized in legal terms the role of the CRA and regulated communications. By the law, the Council of Ministers is responsible for policy-making and the CRA for regulation, while the Director General, who is nominated by the CRA but approved by the Council of Ministers, heads the body. CRA is meant to finance its work from technical license fees, meaning that it is not dependent on the state budget. However, its funds make an integral part of the State budget which makes it fall under the set of laws regulating budget institutions, thus becoming more dependants in financial terms. In 2003, the CRA became Bosnian institution. Mijatović recalls that it was the first ever OHR created body to become fully “local”:

One of the reasons for this success was that local people were given almost from the very beginning very responsible functions. It was not like in many other IC created institutions where locals were secretaries, drivers, and similar. Everything was created for the local community and finally, we

152 “While enormous international effort has been devoted to persuading Radovan Karadćić to step down from political life, his daughter, Sonja Karadžić, head of the government-controlled International Press Centre in Pale, notorious for its exorbitant fees for foreign press accreditation and the imposition of "bodyguards" on foreign journalists, has quietly proceeded to invest heavily in a powerful new radio station, Orthodox Radio St. John... What may have been even worse from the perspective of those parties dedicated to the goal of democratization and to the consolidation of a free and independent media environment was that in fact some of the same interests involved in the war resurfaced in its aftermath. When it came to winning the hearts and minds of the public at large, one of the first community favourites to reach the airwaves was Radio Krajina, run by Colonel Milovan Milutinović, and spokesperson to indicted war criminal General Ratko Mladić. The irony was that the army-run station was among the very first to deviate from a sanctioned government line and offered the service of providing political phone in debates featuring every party which wished to participate.” Letter from William A. Orme, Jr., Executive Director of the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), to His Excellency Flavio Cotti, Chairman in Office of OSCE, quoted in the IMC White Paper, 2001. 153 Novosti u medijima No 32. “Oduzeta dozvola Radio Sveti Jovan.” 17 May 1999. 154 Decision Combining the Competencies of the Independent Media Commission and the Telecommunications Regulatory Agency. Available at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/mediadec/default.asp?content_id=75. Accessed on 3 September 2011. 155 Law on Communications. Available at http://media.parlament.org.ua/uploads/files/f153.pdf. Accessed on 3 October 2011. 96

became the first state institution to function on its own, at a moment when everybody was saying that something like that would never happen since no state institution can have authority and credibility in this type of state.156

Nevertheless, over the years, political pressure on the institution persisted. The OHR reacted several times, defending the CRA and issuing different obligatory decisions in order to provide support, including the Decision Amending the Structure of Expenditures of the Communications Regulatory Agency.157 When nothing else was left to be done in order to suppress the CRA work, in 2007 the Council of Ministers refused to approve the nomination of the director general. In 2008, group of former international CRA employees, now from different positions, wrote and letter to the PIC warning about the problems the regulatory body is facing. (See Annex 3):

We, therefore, urge you to take all necessary steps in order to preserve the independence of the Communications Regulatory Agency as a matter of the highest priority. Failure to do so could be seen both as a failure of the most successful project of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton Peace Agreement and also as a failure of BiH toward its path to EU Integration.

However, political pressure continued in 2009 when the CRA Council’s mandate expired, and the procedure of appointment of the new Council was never finalised. This has left the body functioning under extremely difficult conditions for years to come.158

Limited success

The local media community remained divided about the success of the MEC, IMC or the CRA. The creation of these bodies, and their existence until transferred under local control,

156 Mijatović 2012. 157 Decision Amending the Structure of Expenditures of the Communications Regulatory Agency for 2002. 2 December 2001. Available at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/mediadec/default.asp?content_id=28612. Accessed on 3 October 2011. 158 Mijatović also recalls that staff had to face different types of pressure over the years, from physical threats to political pressure. Mijatović, 2012. 97 represented semi-protectorate of the media. Very strict methods - like seizure of the transmitters or reworking of licences - were used, and can be seen as non-democratic since it interfered with the freedom of the media. The MEC admits this in their 1998 report stating that creating the condition for fair elections in a post-conflict society does not come without a price. “We feel it would be fair to say that MEC imposed guidelines that were considerably more restrictive than those found in an advanced democracy.”159The use of these measures, the MEC explained with the actions toward the media local political parties made during and after the war:

In such an environment, not atypical of the Balkans at this time, mechanisms such as MEC may prove especially useful, for they impose stricter rules but evaluate compliance using democratic standards and practices as due process and transparent proceedings. Those conditions are not like those found in advanced democratic societies, where basic freedoms, protections, and responsibilities are inculcated fully and effectively through the society. In such a place a MEC would be inappropriate; a MEC would also be unnecessary. In post-conflict societies, media often play a pernicious role in fanning hatred and spreading misinformation. MEC-like bodies may prove to be powerful tools in earliest efforts to move conflict-filled societies to stable, democratic societies.160

However, over time, these methods proved to be ineffective in Bosnian circumstances. What did have a level of effectiveness was introduction of licences rule, and establishment of basic regulations not know in Bosnia before the war. Part of the media professionals, including Zoran Udovičić (2003), considers the CRA, probably the most skilled institution to be handed to “locals”, as well as Mehmed Halilović who claims that this body was the most successful part of media reforms efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina.161 Both are acknowledging the fact that, unlike other IC created institutions, the CRA survived and was transferred to the locals. Over the years it became fully local institution, whose work was recognized and praised internationally. The MEC/IMC/CRA, beside all the critiques, did manage to set the rules and to make the media obey these rules.

159 MEC report 1998. 160 Ibid. 161 Mehmed Halilović, Interview, 25 April 2012, Sarajevo. 98

Importance of the this institution is in its reflections on the process of state-building, since it is one of the rare institutions which operates at the state level, uniting the media from both entities and setting the same rules for their functioning. At the same time, the CRA weakens reflects how state is weak, prone to politization and different influences. Important achievement of the regulation of the broadcast sector is in the better allocation of frequencies, lowering level of the hate speech use, and setting up of technical standards, but it could not eliminate political influence over the broadcast sector. This became more obvious when the IC decided to pull out from the process, which by most accounts happened in 2006, the year when the local politicians failed to agree on proposed constitutional changes, and the IC decided to take more passive role.162 The new approach was introduced through the conditional offer of the EU membership, but it had a little effect on the media development. In 2012, the OSCE commissioned report about the CRA in Bosnia from Article 19, organization that works to promote freedom of expression around the world. According to this report, although the independence of the CRA is guaranteed by the Law, “and there are many positive aspects elaborating on this issue, specific guarantees of such independence are lacking through other provisions.”163 The report concludes that, in order to secure independence for the Agency, the Law should be changed in many aspects, including the way that nomination of the Agency bodies is made:

The appointment of both the Council and the Director General is not completely immune from political pressures. As for the members of the Council, it appears that the Government (the Council of Ministers) takes an ultimate selection of those who shall be nominated to the post by the Parliament. Although the Parliamentary Assembly can reject these

162 Dunja Mijatović points to this year as a critical one for media development in Bosnia, connecting it to the loss of interest by the IC in Bosnian media. Mijatović, 2012. In his article “Granice stvaranja države: Da li Bruxellesu dovoljan Dayton?” Florian Bieber mentioned this period as turning point in post-war reconstruction in Bosnia, and the time then the attitude of the IC changed. “From 2006, different forms of the international intervention is more under the question. It can no longer have influence on the strenghtening of the state. The international actors, at the beginning, voluntarily, rejected of direct intervention and today, they can almost not use it at all.” In Helmut Kurth (ed.), “Bosna i Hercegovina – 2014. Gdje želimo stići?” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2009. pp. 12. See also 2012 ICG Policy Briefing Paper on constitutional changes “Bosnia’s Gordian Knot: Constitutional Reform.” Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/b068-bosnias-gordian-knot- constitutional-reform.pdf. Accessed on 13 February 2013. 163 Barbara Bukovska. “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Legislative Framework on the Communications Regulatory Agency.” OSCE and Article 19. September 2012. Available at http://www.osce.org/fom/94101. Accessed on 21 January 2013. 99

nominations and process can be returned to the original list of nominees, we believe that such possibility of political interference should be limited.164

The report numbers other problematic legal issues that should be changed in order to provide independence and proper functioning of the CRA, making the Law questionable in its core.

Regulating the press

The OHR and PIC did have intention to regulate even the print in Bosnia, but the IMC, that was given this task, refused to comply fully with it. Decision was made by Thelin who justified it with European practice:

We did not want to regulate print. I draw that decision on Swedish experience where a system of self-regulation exists. Of course, there are regulations saying that if you print something that incites to hatred, the newspaper will be held responsible. With electronic media there is a physical restriction in regard to frequencies, and you need to create order. That is why you need to have licensing regime. But with print, there is not such a need.165

Following this attitude, the PIC issued instructions for the local media professionals to embrace self-regulation for the print.166 The PIC recognized that journalists' ethics and professional standards are mainly a matter for journalists, and invited them to evaluate the possibilities of establishing a press complaints council or similar body “which would be composed of journalists and respected citizens,” but expressing their intention to have “one or more” international representatives. The Madrid Declaration reads that this body should be established “following further discussions within the journalistic community under the auspices of the IMC and in consultation with the OSCE and the High Representative,” giving them power over the print, but not openly as in the case of the broadcast.167 Following this decision, Bosnia became the first transitional Southeast European country to establish self-regulation in print, while organizations like the OSCE, the EC Mission in

164 Ibid. 165 Thelin 2011. 166 Madrid Declaration. 167 Madrid Declaration. 100

Bosnia, the IMC and American organization Irex-Pro Media played an important role in creating the body, and its functioning. According to Dieter Lauren,168 the IMC/CRA employee and member of the Press Council from the very beginning, in April 1999, the five journalist associations adopted a 16-article Press Code, and all the major newspapers and magazines published it.169 As soon as July 1999, all associations agreed on the establishment of the Council. In March 2000, a survey among journalists showed 80 per cent support for the establishment of the Council.170 The first chairperson was British Lord John Wakeham, once Chair of the British Press Complaints Commission. Beside him and Lorain, 12 Bosnian members were appointed, six members of the press, and six lay members who were representatives of the local academic community and the non-governmental sector. Members were from both entities, journalists from print, but also lawyers, university professors and prominent public figures. The Council was financially supported by the EC, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the OSCE, British Embassy, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the USA Embassy, Press Now, etc. being from the very beginning a donor dependent organization and remained until today. Only in May 2001, the first local director was appointed, while the international chairperson remained for little bit longer. The first complaint the Council was received in September 2001. The Press Code was basically translated from UK, but officially the group composed of international and local media and law professional created it. It sets general rules for journalists to maintain high ethical standards at all times, and under all circumstances; to respect the needs of citizens for useful, timely and relevant information; and to defend the principles of freedom of information, and the right to fair comment and critical journalism. The Code also prescribes the responsibility of the press in ensuring a respect for factual truth and the right of the public to know the truth. According to the Code, the media will not incite or inflame hatred, discrimination or intolerance. It has established the rules for the protection of children and minors, of the accused, as well as the right of citizens to privacy. 171The print media were asked to sign the Code and participation in the work of the Council, but in the years to come, local print media showed little

168 Lorain was a former British marine and author of a book on Royal Marine combat training. He was appointed by the Foreign Office. 169 Dieter Loraine, Interview, 2 July 2010, London. 170 Hronologij available at http://www.vzs.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=227:sekretarijat- vijea-za-tampu-u-bosni-i-hercegovini-arhiv-1998-2006&catid=7:o-nama&Itemid=10. Accessed on 5 June 2011. 171 Kodeks za štampu. Available at http://www.vzs.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=218&Itemid=9&lang=bs. Accessed on 2 June 2011. 101 interest for the work of the Press Council, and its influence remained very week leaving it as the body with not executive powers, while the compliance with the Code is matter of a good will.

Media law policy

Table

Decisions related to media laws and regulations

Electoral Code of Conduct June 1996

Press Code 29/04/1999

Decisions on the restructuring of the Public Broadcasting 30/7/1999 System in BiH and on freedom of information and decriminalization of libel and defamation Freedom of Access to Information Act 7/11/2000 Communication Law 21/10/2003 (adopted by the parliaments under the OHR directive) Broadcasting Code of Practice of the IMC 1/8/1998

While establishing regulatory bodies, the OHR, together with the OSCE, engaged in the Media Law Initiative with the goal to develop a system of protection and promotion of media freedoms and rights of journalists. Media law reform were initiated in 2000 when the Law on Freedom of Access to Information that was imposed by the OHR. 172 Over the next two years entities were obliged to incorporate this law into legislation, and to start implementing it. The law defines any material that communicates facts, opinions and data or any other content, including any copy of it, as information. At the same time, a public authority is considered to be an executive, a legislative, judicial or any administrative authority, as well as a body appointed or established by the law to carry out a public function. It guarantees free access to information for every private and legal person, while prescribing some limits, as well as rules and procedures for requesting access. Bosnia became the first country in the Southeast Europe to have this law. It was amended at the state level in 2006, and again in 2009. Local media analysts welcomed the law naming it a

172 Decisions on imposition of Freedom of Access to Information Act for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/media-d/med-recon/freedom/default.asp?content_id=7268. Accessed on 2 October 2011. 102 cornerstone of civil freedoms, since it creates “a mechanism of constant testing, and control of the authorities, while at the same time generates the trust of citizens and respect for the authorities” (Kontić 2003). The group of internationals created the law, while local law professional’s opinion was hardly considered;

As I remember, three local lawyers were with the team of international experts. I am not sure if those locals could influence the process … Finally, the law, like many others, were written in English and translated into Bosnian. A group of local media professionals were called to give their comments. But I am not sure if those comments were relevant at all at the end, or the call was more just formality.173

Halilović also points to the fact that most of the laws imposed were written in English, and only translated into Bosnian, which caused additional problems. “So many things get lost in translation,” Halilović claims.174

Next in the series was law that decriminalized libel and defamation, imposed on June 30, 1999, by the OHR.175 Year before, the IMC called for decriminalization of defamation warning about journalist who was prosecuted for what they wrote. (See Annex 4 )

Again, governments at all levels were asked to adopt the necessary legislation in order to create civil remedies for defamation, libel, and slander. Republika Srpska did so in June 2001 and the Federation in November 2002. This law no longer defines defamation as criminal but civil matter. According to Halilović (2001), Bosnia was one of the first countries in Europe to regulate defamation in this way, but application of the law began only in 2004 due to the fact that judiciary did not have enough experience in this field. (Halilović and Srdić 2012; 134)

The decision to impose this law was based on the fact that from 1996 to 1999, some 50 charges were issued against journalists only in Sarajevo, and the majority was initiated by politicians. In several cases, journalists were sanctioned with suspended prison sentence (Halilović 2001). One of them was Senad Pećanin, editor for than fortnightly Dani, who was

173 Halilović 2012. 174 Ibid. 175 Decisions on the restructuring of the Public Broadcasting System in BiH and on Freedom of Information and Decriminalization of Libel and Defamation. Available at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/mediadec/default.asp?content_id=98. Accessed on 23 October 2011. 103 sentenced for criminal libel, and received a two-month suspended prison sentence, which he would be required to serve if caught violating any law in the following year.

Nevertheless, in years to come, courts were overflowed with civil cases in relation to the media. Close to 350 complaints were filed at different courts all over the country in two-and-a- half year’s period (Halilović 2005). “If we look at the number of media companies in Bosnia, which is close to 300, we could say that every media was sued at least once,” Halilović wrote (2008). Political magazines Slobodna Bosna and Dani, considered as publications where investigative journalism was in attempt, has the biggest number of complaints filed against them, mostly by politicians and public figures. According to data from Slobodna Bosna, until 2008, in over 14 years of its existence, more than 250 court cases were filed against this weekly, and only 20 initiated before the law on defamation was introduced. Over the last 14 years, editors and journalist of this weekly attended the courts as accused over a thousand times. According to study published in 2012, in the first years of application of this law, the amount of compensations was generally very high - some up to millions of Bosnian convertible marks - but later these amounts were much smaller under the influence of the court practice (Halilović and Srdić 2012; 134). In practice, the law allowed any private person to sue the media for their reporting, but no official or official institution could claim against the media. If some official wants to sue the media he/she has to do that in private capacity. The burden of proof is with the plaintiff (Halilović 2005). Years after, Senad Avdić is skeptical that any of these laws meant important difference for day to day journalism:

I believed that one of the most important laws is the Law of Freedom of Access to Information. But, we were so naive. Before we did not have anything similar to that law, and we believed that now we will have access to all the things when it comes to the functioning of the government. Until today this law, as many others, is interpreted in the way local politicians want to interpret it. To illustrate - when we want to know about the salaries of the local elected officials, we cannot get that information though the regular, law defined, ways, but we have to have insiders, or to hope that those we are asking for the information will be benevolent and decide to answer our questions. At final 104

remark, that law was made to help to the public but it was never like that in practice since there is no mechanism to make somebody obey that, or any other, law.176

However, Halilović claims that the law on freedom of access to information is not a tool for the journalists to assist them in every day news-gathering, but it can help for investigative stories, the one Slobodna Bosna as weekly relies the most on (Halilović 2012; 113). The same authors adds that the purpose of this law is to enable citizens to know what is happening in the process of decisions making at all level of the government. To be implemented this law needed additional legal remedies that did not exist for a long time. In this sense, the law was too advanced for post-war fragile state that did not have capacity to implement it. Even more, local governments adopted other laws that reduced implementation of this one, Halilović (2012; 116). 177 One more problem is that, with exemption of the law on the state level, no sanction are defined for those public bodies that do not respect the law (Halilović; 122). Ideal hope that this law will enhance democracy is buried under all these issues that those who imposed the laws did not took in consideration when decisions were made.

Embryonic implementation of a legal framework

In 2010 in their report about the state of media in the Balkans, Reporters without Borders concluded that although the necessary laws do exist their implementation is embryonic. But, that is not the only problem when it comes to practising journalism in Bosnia according to this organization: In a precarious situation, caught in a vice between the violence of ultranationalist groups and authorities who have not yet rid themselves of old reflexes from the Communist era, an increasing portion of journalists are settling for a calculated self-censorship or a mercenary journalism which pays better, but gradually ruins the profession’s credibility.178

176 Avdić 2012. 177 This primarily refers to the Law on Protection of Secret Data of B-H, the Law on Intelligence and Security Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Law on Criminal Procedure of FB-H, the Law on Tax Administration of FB-H, and the Law on Tax Administration of FB-H. (Halilović 2012; 116). 178 Reporters Without Borders. “2010 World Press Freedom Index.” Available at http://www.rsf.org/IMG/CLASSEMENT_2011/GB/C_GENERAL_GB.pdf. Accessed on 2 June 2011. 105

In 2005, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia conducted research on the implementation of the Freedom of Access to Information Act.179 Committee posted 110 requests to different institutions in Bosnia asking different questions. “We decided to send requests in the name of five different categories: NGOs, media, private entrepreneurs, marginalised groups and citizens,” the report reads. Requests were sent the same day by post. From 110 requests, they got replies for 63, from which 52 offered detailed answers to questions posed. In the case of 47 requests, no reply was ever received. This issue of problem with the implementation was open already in 2001 when Matevž Krivič, a judge from Slovenia, analysed the law of freedom of access to information concluding that it was “excellent, brief and clear”, but inapplicable in countries that do not have developed structures, like Bosnia. The problem was, as the judge noticed, that the existing administration was not ready to implement such modern law. According to his legal analysis, the law on freedom of access to information was introduced too early in Bosnia, since it should be the roof and the foundation of the media legislation. He compared Bosnia to his native Slovenia, estimating that this country will be mature enough to absorb such an act above European standards in some 10 or 20 years. Finally, the judge concludes that the “path to hell is paved with good intentions. What’s an excellent law worth when it produces miserable results?” (ibid) Mehmed Halilović, argues how even if those laws were too progressive for Bosnia at given historical moment (“and they were”), “it is much better to have something good to look forward than something bad and to try to survive with.”180 Finally, the low level of implementation of this law, as well as other media laws, resulted with no benefit for the public in general, or for the process of democratization, or state building. Institutions inside the country did not became more open toward the public, and years after the Law was introduced, are still uncertain how to use them. It was similar in the case of the implementation of the law on defamation. Sarajevo judge Mladen Srdić (2008) analysed data from the court practice on the implementation concluding that, even though the Law existed since 2002, implementation started only in 2004, “the first and foremost reason was that judges were inexperienced in relation to acting on this law, as well as other subjects involved in the proceedings’.” It was exactly this issue that Price and Krug were writing about stating that the gravest threat to the exercise of media freedoms does not come

179 Đorđija Laketa Blagojević, “Ko pita taj i zna ako mu kažu. Istraživanje – Kako funkcioniše Zakon o slobodnom pristupu informacijama.” Glasnik Helsinškog komiteta za ljudska prava, br.4, str.46. 1 November 2005. On file with author. 180 Halilović 2012. 106 from bad laws “but from administrative acts that apply the laws arbitrarily or are completely outside the boundaries of the laws” (Price and Krug 2002; 98). After this law came into practice, most of the cases before the courts involving media were journalists against journalists. The media were often full of mutual accusations, of harsh words with one journalist pointing to another. Finally, the media, due to this, started with losing even the minimal confidence gained after the war by the public, and they often forgot their role as watchdogs of society, concentrating only on mutual disputes. Some analysts, including Halilović, described this phenomenon as economic struggle to survive on small and over saturated market.181 However, Avdić believes that even this was orchestrated by local politicians who used to use certain media to fight against the other, while putting enormous material pressure on journalists and the media, a claiming that only if the cases are being analyzed in front of the courts that can be confirmed or denied.182 Again, the IC created the tool that was hardly applicable within a country with such weak institutions. Savima Sali-Terzić, a legal expert, finds it odd that the IC forgot along the way to introduce legal provisions on hate speech, even though its extinction was a primary reason why the whole media reform was initiated. “I cannot really say why it is so, but I guess that all the experts from around the world who were coming to Bosnia did not know how to define hate speech, and they just left it aside,” Sali-Terzić said.183 However, even though it was never defined by the law, there are a number of other mechanisms that are referring to the hate speech. The Criminal Code in Bosnia forbids the spreading of national or religious hate, while the Broadcasting Code of Practice, since 1998, contains a provision which prohibits all electronic media from inciting violence or discrimination, which was considered substantial by the IC at given moment.184 According to Snyder (2000; 65) banning of hate speech can be counterproductive since it does not help the establishment of norms of debates, or it is setting the standards for the people how to argue their case. Furthermore, he argues that establishing norms of debate is matter that regulates content of speech, what can easily become censorship, and create the media and the public not ready to debate. Looking at the Bosnian case, exactly this happened. The IC imposed strict rules on hate speech and vocabulary that can possibly be regarded as inflammatory. Journalists reacted in a way to return to the old practice of self-censorship, and just avoiding some topics, like war and

181 Ibid. 182 Avdić 2012. 183 Savima Sali-Terzić, Interview, 24 April 2012, Sarajevo. 184 Kodeks o audiovizuelnim medijskim uslugama i medijskim uslugama radija, Službeni glasnik BiH 98/11, Član 4. 107 crimes committed during the war. This attitude left a void which filled with emotions, and when the IC stopped controlling vocabulary used by the media, it went back to hate speech. In 2011, the US State Department in its yearly report on the state of human rights around the world, in the Bosnian section noticed how “many media outlets used language, often nationalistic, considered incendiary on matters related to ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and political affiliation”, showing that the problem persist, in spite of all that has been done over all these years, to suppress it. 185 In 2010, the OSCE mission in Bosnia published a report expressing deep concerned over the political pressure on the media.186 The OSCE warned about a number of dismissals within the media, continuing disagreements on the work and appointments in the CRA, the lack of media laws implementation, and the rise of threats and physical assaults on journalists, giving the picture that is very similar to those one from the post war time.

Conclusion

Analysing the importance of the media laws, Price (2000) wrote that sometimes they are made rather as “idealised hopes” than based on internal realities. Bosnian example is to a certain extent good to illustrate of this statement. Instead of opening the space for creation of arena in which freedom of the media will flourish, the IC deployed military intervention against the media, the decision that was followed with number of imposed solutions. In this way, democratization was led by undemocratic means, which tainted the idea of democracy. Over the years, new institutions were created, regulations and laws introduced, in many cases as response to different emergency situations in the country. For the moment it looks like it is more important to have new institutions and rules, that to make them really functional. It cannot be denied that all the imposed measures did have some influence on the media development in Bosnia, but it was limited and to certain extend superficial. The IC created framework that stopped the anarchy within the media sector, and helped the birth of something that potentially could have been turned into healthy surrounding for further development. What was missing was a firm commitment by the IC to implement some of its decisions, and them to adjust it to existing situation.

185 US State Department. “2010 Human Rights Report: Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/eur/154416.htm. Accessed on 7 January 2012. 186 OSCE. “Spot Report. BiH Media and Media Regulators Under Pressure.”18 February 2010. Available at http://www.oscebih.org/documents/17160-eng.pdf. Accessed on 6 January 2012. 108

Going into debates if the laws imposed by the IC are good or bad, is maybe, after all, not even relevant, since these laws are meant to be implemented in a country where there is hardly basic agreement among existing politicians that they do want to have the functional state to secure rule of law. In the same way, institutions created to regulate the media, do not have support of the local politicians, something that the IC could have been expecting if thoughtful research was conducted before decisions were imposed. Ever Nevertheless, it can be said that the media in Bosnia are today more free than they were before the war, or shortly after. If they really contributed to democracy, it is hard to tell having in mind that Bosnia is still considered a fragile state, where democracy is not fully established, while at last formally, the IC still has so called Bonn powers at its disposal.

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CHAPTER VI: MEDIA UNDER (RE) CONSTRUCTION

In 1996, immediately after the war, the international community got engaged in creating and managing the media in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the plan to influence creation of the more pluralism, but also to try to fight with the existing political propaganda present in the local media. Those media were created as a donor run projects, without any type of business or sustainability plan, and at the beginning it was not clear for how long these projects are meant to exist. Soon after creation, organizations that were involved in day to day running and financing these media had to face lack of public support for these media, and the fact that it is too expensive to run nonprofit television and radio station. At the same time, these newly created media outlets, contributed to the existing “media anarchy” in a market that was economically weak, and professionally even weaker. The media that were created and managed by one of the many international organizations, were often led by the strong hand of the bureaucratic apparatus, and hardly could be used as example of professionalism or good journalism. Even more, they offered the same type of reporting that already existed with editorial policies shaped by everything else but professional standards. In this chapter, I will look into Open Broadcast Network (OBN), countrywide TV station, and Free Election Radio Network (FERN), two biggest IC projects when it comes to creation of the new media. I question if the media strictly controlled by one center of power, could have been an example of democratic and professional media, and if it had any impact on democratization and state building? What were the lessons meant to be learn from the process, and what was left behind when donor money was gone, and artificially created media were forced to close down, or were transformed into entertainment media? Nevertheless, it is important to stress that I will not analyze all media outlets created and run by the IC in Bosnia.187 I have chosen to look only into TV OBN and Radio FERN since they have had attracted, over the years, the biggest attention of scholars as well as media professionals in Bosnia, and are the most known to the local population, and from that point of view it can be said that they did play some role in an overall media reform.

187 NATO and UN had their own media whose influence was even less significant than of those established by the OSCE and OHR. Those media just disappeared with no trace left, and no influence made over the public. US government helped creation of Nezavisne Novine daily in Banja Luka, that is also not a subject of this research, even though influential and significant, but close to different political options. 110

Elections and the role of the media

The organisation of elections in the post conflict surroundings is considered to be the first important step for testing the peace. A pre-election campaign represents a test of maturity for political parties, but also for the media and their professionalism. The media should be the space for journalists to bring information about candidates, their programs and plans, while examining their competence and asking questions that could be relevant for the public in order to make their decisions. Scholars are describing elections as “a sanctioning device that induces elected officials to act in the best interest of the people” (Vergne 2009). To vote, people are relying on information that they get from media. To achieve this function media should question, comment, offer critical analysis about candidate’s strategies and programs, or to provide contextual information about the campaigns (Norris and Zinnbauer 2002; 4). Finally, this is the idealized role of the media in Western democracies, but hard to be fulfilled anywhere, especially in the case of weak states where journalists are sometimes fighting for their basic security and survival. In post-conflict countries international organizations involved in the democratization processes, are sometimes placing too high expectations in media, expecting that they can change the attitudes of people and set direction for development. At the same time, the basic role of the media - to inform - is often forgotten. Cornel (2010; 130) reminds that media keeps citizens informed, but finally, they by themselves are deciding what to do with information that is offered, and makes changes or not, while Wolfsfeld (2001; 12) emphasizes that while news media can be important agents in accelerating political changes, “to suggest that they initiate such changes contradicts most of what we know about how journalism operates.” Having in mind this basic principle of journalism, expectations from that the media in transition countries that they can influence changes are rather based on hopes then on facts and reality.

Free of Political Colouring

Back in April 1996, PIC issued Broadcast Media Statement acknowledging the influence the electronic media had before and during the war saying that “in light of the influence and dominance of television in the former Yugoslavia, this medium should be given priority” in 111 media assistance efforts.188 At that moment, broadcasters that covered the most of the territory were divided along entity and political lines. Political parties had their word in appointment of editors, and had the possibility to choose “trustworthy” people and make them into prominent journalists. Opposition voices, being political or from the civil society, were hardly present in the media, except the small number of those that managed to survive while striving to be independent. The IC decided to create the broadcast media as an alternative to those that existed, but along the way, they used sometimes similar methods as local politicians in order to control those media while appointing people, and influencing editorial policies. In 1997, the OHR and OSCE made these two made as the corner stone of their media strategy for elections. (See Annex 5) One of these projects was TV OBN that is until today considered as one of the most expensive media assistance projects in the country. The exact amount of the money spent for this project is estimated to be over 20 million dollars in a period of five years.189 This project was supported by a group of organizations - including OSI, EC, USAID, IFJ - foundations and governments that were coordinated by the OHR.

In 1996, The New York Times published an article announcing that the IC in Bosnia will establish TV station before the first post war national elections take place, with the purpose to “provide equal time for all political parties and candidates, as well as news coverage free of political coloring.”190 The idea to establish TV station was born in the spring 1996 within the OHR. In his book about Bosnia, HR Carl Bildt (1998; 260) wrote that his plan was to have TV station before the first postwar elections in order to “bring decency to the media and life to democracy in Bosnia.” He recalls getting supported by the Head of the OHR office in Brussels, Pauline Nevill-Jones,191 who then introduced it to the European Commission (EC), securing material, but also political support for the project.

The idea of setting up a TV network was announce by the PIC Steering Board in April 1996.192The PIC warned local politicians that establishment and work of such TV station cannot

188 Broadcast Media Statement.” Available at http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=6791. Accessed on 19 April 2013. 189Julie Poucher Harbin. “The Fall of OBN, IWPR.” IWPR. 2001. Available at http://archiv.medienhilfe.ch/News/2001/BiH.IWPR275M2.htm. Accessed on 2 September 2009. Frane Maroević (2011), former spokeperson for the European Commission Mission in Sarajevo used the same number. Janny Ranson (2005), former CEO for the OBN, in her Master thesis wrote that it was the most expensive single media project even undertaken by the IC. Simon Heselock confiremd $20 milion amount. He claims that money that went for the OBN, initially was offered to the TV BiH, but was not accepted by local Bosniak politicians who refused the IC conditions. 190 Chris Hedges. “TV station in Bosnia Feeds Serbs propaganda,” The New York Times. 9 June 1996. 191 Former head of political department of FCO. 192Broadcast Media Statement. 112 be made conditional, and that just a formal application for its operation will be submitted to the government that should approve it by the end of May. The statement reads how “all interested journalists, program producers and broadcasters must be given the opportunity to take part in the work of this network,” and that “the full transmission of its programming must be permitted throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, in both entities.”193

The group of experts estimated that $17, 6 million is needed for a new TV network, and soon after, donors pledged $13, 5, and more were to come (Price 2002). The same author claims how donors wanted their pledged money to be directed for some specific pieces of equipment, often of its own manufactures, which arouse first misunderstandings and arguments.

Back that time, Boro Kontić, the founder and director of the Media Center Sarajevo, met with a group of international experts who were hired by the Open Society Institute, foundation that was helping even Media Centre. This group introduced him with the idea for new country wide, television station. Kontić did not find this idea appealing, and he advised the group to rather look into the existing statewide TV and radio network, and to put efforts to transform it into a public broadcast system. “But they did not want to listen,” Kontić remembers. 194

According to British daily The Independent, the team Kontić remembers was Anglo- American, with members from Open Society Institute (OSI), the International Federation of Journalists, and the World Bank:

A Russian cargo aircraft is scheduled to leave Stansted Airport, near London, today, carrying pounds 3m-worth of transmission, editing and production equipment supplied by NTL, the British television transmission company. A team of six technicians will help set up the channel. Also on hand will be personnel from Harris, a leading US manufacturer, which has agreed to install a new transmitter at Banja Luka, site of the British military contingent in Bosnia. IFOR, the United Nations peace implementation force, is to ensure that there is no interference with the service. It is expected that it would continue after the elections, and could form the embryo of a new national channel. 195

193 PIC Press Communiqué 1996. 194 Boro Kontić, Interview, 2 September 2011, Sarajevo. 195 Mathew Horsman. “West to set up 'balanced' TV news service for Bosnia.” The Independent, 8 August 1996, Section: International, Page 9. 113

Nevertheless, preparations took a long time and the TV was ready to broadcast only couple of days before scheduled elections. Bildt (1998; 261) was aware that it was too late to achieve any impact, but he believed that the effort was long term and “crucial” in order to support a long-term democratization strategy. What happened later proved his expectations were unrealistic.

Partial solution

Reflecting on the years in Bosnia, Simon Haselock, the member of the OBN Board of Trusties appointed by the OHR, remembers how the TV was supposed to provide “programming that viewers could trust.”196 Jenny Ranson 197 (2005; 31), member of the Steering Committee and Governing Council for the OBN and general manager for the station, understood that the OBN goal was to promote peace and reconciliation, “while preserving news values and being a training ground for the best in journalism.”

The OBN had a very complicated ownership structure, being partly registered in London as the OBN Trust and partly in Bosnia as OBN d.o.o, formally owned by the group of people selected by the OHR and donors.198 Later on, Jadranko Katana, one of the Bosnian ‘owners’ explained that in order to register the OBN, the OHR decided to use the law from SFRY which allowed foreign ownership of the media only up to 49 percent. London based company was the owner of the technical equipment, while the local one was entrusted with furniture and some of the computers in Sarajevo. “In reality, none of us ever considered to be a real owner of anything that has to do with the OBN. It was only partial solution before new law is to be introduced that should regulate ownership of the media. But it took ages to move from that point,” Katana spoke for the local media.199

For Haselock, as well as for many others internationals, this was the first time ever to be engaged in any job related to the media reforms:

196 Haselock 2011. 197 Former senior official of Communications Branch, the U.K. Cabinet Office, CEO of the OBN from 1998 until 2000, member of the Steering Committee and Governing Council for the OBN from 1995. 198 Ranson describes this group as individuals who were chosen from those employees who felt to be both loyal and efficient. (2005; 106) 199 Saida Mustajbegović. “Skandali: Televizija – najskuplji medijski projekat u BiH, nakon što je privatiziran za 50.000 KM, postao predmet osvete: OBN: Kusur od 40 miliona maraka.” BH Dani, No. 379, 17 September 2004. 114

Malcolm Maclay,200 the OHR media advisor, recruited me to work in public relations department. They asked me to look into the OBN, which has been set up that time, and I became a project director, or to say, the OHR person for OBN. It came as a surprise to me since I had no previous experience in the field, but yes, I knew how to make decisions, how to get advice, to put the plan together… and we nearly got to know how to implement the plan. What was the plan? To make it work. I cannot remember specific details. However, while I was doing that, Maclay left, and I was told to take his position and became in charge of the OHR Media Department.201

The TV staff was local, some experienced, some very young and new in the job, and they had limited role in decision-making process, being it program or project oriented. Plus, little trust was placed in them, according to Ranson:

Finding qualified staff, especially managers, was a constant problem. Older experienced people had been trained under the communist centralized system and so found it hard to adjust to a Western management regime including delegation and responsibility. Younger newly qualified (or in many cases unqualified) staff were enthusiastic but without experience or judgement. As many younger people had not managed to complete their education because of the war, there was often basic ignorance about subjects like environment, foreign affairs and history ... Many staff, including journalists, editors and managers, did not believe they needed training, and used it to enjoy study visits abroad or time off with no discernible changes in practice. When faced with a politician or ‘expert’ they tended to accept all that was said at face value without any investigation pre or post the interview. There were some notable exceptions but it took a long time to change news broadcasts from being full of verbatim statements and press conferences. Staff, while mostly loyal to the network, lacked ethical standards of professional behaviour. Some were moonlighting with competitors, some accepted financial incentives from clients or advertisers. Some of this arose because of a sense of insecurity, and a need

200 Used to be political advisor to Douglas Herd, and long time journalist in UK before coming to Bosnia. 201 Haselock 2011. 115

to keep their options open in case the OBN was closed. Drinking on duty, even among senior staff, was a problem. It was impossible to keep plans confidential as the gossip network ran wide. There was no accepted code of practice for journalists. (Ranson 2005; 44-45)202

While local staff was not told what to do on a day to day basis, they were given clear directions that the editorial policy has to be in compliance with the international community mission that is to encourage peace and reconciliation in all segments of the program.

The introduction of the OBN was not well planned move. The project was initially named TV IN. Promotional campaign was developed, and only than the OHR realized that there was the furniture shop in Sarajevo with exactly the same name and this resulted with the change of the name and changed the entire campaign just a few days before the TV was to start with broadcasting.

The new name, as well as the old one, was an English acronym, what according to some analysts, showed lack of cultural sensitivity from the part of the OHR, and could have contributed the alienation of the audience toward the whole project, which persisted over the years (Bratić, Dente Ross and Kanga-Graham 2008). That it did contributed alienation confirms the fact that for years TV OBN was called “Bilt TV.” At the same time, the IC official language was English and many of the people who used to work for different organisations could not even speaking local language that alienated them further more from the local community, and polarized the entire atmosphere.

Initially the OBN was constituted of a group of five affiliates, and later on nine more joined. These affiliate TV stations were from all around the country, who were – in exchange for broadcasting the OBN program –given equipment and possibility to air some of its program under the their label, and they were paid for their contribution. The main studio was in Sarajevo, where editors and manager were stationed. Ranson (2001; 53) describes that affiliate stations were of mixed ownership structure - private, municipal and mix involving business, political parties and private individuals. Some, like Alternativa televizija (ATV) in Banja Luka were

202 Ranson (2005) adds to this description: “OBN tried to improve professionalism by encouraging its staff to pay attention to on-screen appearance, traditionally untidy and extremely casual on all channels. Sponsors provided jackets, ties, shirts and scarves for presenters a smart T-shirts for cameramen. But this has been only partially successful: in a country where government ministers regularly appear at functions in very informal garb, TV presenters do not feel the need to dress any differently.” This her attitude is illustration of the relationship between the international and local staff, which affected by large programing. 116 created with the purpose to serve as the OBN affiliate in RS entity, since no other media willing to cooperate with the IC under these conditions. 203

However, less than a year after the OBN initiation, some of the affiliate stations left the project unhappy with the role they were given in decision-making, as well as with the financial side of the project. ATV remained part of OBN until 2000, and left than due to the same reasons. Nataša Tešanović, today ATV director, and local head of the office in Banja Luka in 1996, remembers that it was not easy to work for the country wide TV station from the RS during the period right after the war:

It was considered that we are part of the state network, and some people used to call us traitors or foreign mercenaries. At the same time, being only affiliate station, and not the TV station with its own program and editorial, put us in to some extent subordinate position toward the office in Sarajevo where people had a chance to influence editorial. People in Sarajevo, unfortunately, did not understand how hard it is for us to be part of the network and every attempt from us to produce more programs, to have say in editorial, was real a potential threat. Even the people from the IC who were involved from Sarajevo did not understand our position.204

When they left the network, ATV kept the equipment while some of the donors continue supporting them in different ways.

Relative freedom

Over the time, OBN became recognizable for its news program and political talk shows, which offered predominantly the IC point of view on current politics, but also did give a space to opposition political parties that were hardly present in other electronic media. Being under the influence of donors and international patrons, signified that OBN will provide time to any message that IC wanted to send to the public, which resulted with the high presence of the international officials in their program. The OBN journalists were not supposed to challenge

203 “ATV was practically the first and the only OBN affiliate in the RS. The TV was created after the IC nominated one Swede as director and send him to Banja Luka. He found 15 people, locals, brought all the needed logistics, and we initiated with production of short stories that were send, by bus, to Sarajevo to be aired in OBN.” Nataša Tešanović. (2012). 204Ibid. 117 international officials and their messages, or to offer public different picture. According to Ranson the OBN give too much space to the interests of the international community:

Like all media, OBN/TV-IN paid lip service to its sponsors, in this case not to the political parties, but by giving more attention to ‘reverent dull coverage of the international representatives running Bosnia.’ This problem was eventually tackled by intensive training and a very strong control over the Newsroom. But it damaged the fledgling network’s struggle to establish objectivity, something that was not always obvious to the Donors, happy to see their representatives and policies featured every night. (Ranson 2005; 98)

Haselock claims that the IC did not direct the OBN editorial policy:

Yes, they were international experts who were running it, but they were not coming to ask what you want us to put in the news today. They were looking at the news from professional point of view as accomplished professionals.205

Unlike Haselock, Alexandra Stiglmayer, press officer for the OHR, claims that the IC did have certain influence over the media they created. “We thought that we were right, and we wanted that the media give us enough room to spread our messages, and to spread it without distorting them,” she said.206 Furthermore, in her Master thesis Ranson recalls that quality of programming was a constant problem for the OBN. Donors were sending old or second-rate shows “including B movies and 20 years old sitcoms,” while the network could not afford to buy something of a better quality. The exceptions were NBA basketball games (see Chapter 3) and Latin American soup operas that were also offered to Bosnia as part of the media assistance projects, as well as some BBC documentary programs. The program could hardly compete with local TV stations, and it took four years for the network to arrive at a five percent audience share.207 Ranson (2005;

205 Haselock 2011. 206 Alexandra Stiglmayer, interview. 16 April 2011, Skype. 207 There are no relabel data about audience share from postwar years in Bosnia. All the numbers that can be find in different publications are more estimations by different organizations. 118

47) also remembers that there was little attempt to consult local population over what they wanted to see on TV.208 At the same time, even though the OBN was made on the premises that it will contribute to overall professionalization of the local media, it did not put an effort to introduce investigative journalism, or anything innovative, but relied on the old forms that already existed in Bosnian electronic media, derived from the times before the war. News program was made up of press statements by the officials, local or international, with hardly any critical or even analytical approach, and the audience remained in many cases not informed about the background of certain decisions made by the IC or local politicians. Local employees were satisfied with working conditions at OBN, including salaries that were at least three times higher than most of the local media could offer their journalists at the time.209 The salaries were set up by the American team of consultants that was in charge of recruitment people. They did not make any type of research about local salaries resulting without sustainable salary structure s ranging from 2000 to 5000 German marks for local, and much higher for the international staff (Ranson 2005;136). With the time, local salaries were readjusted, but remained much above the Bosnian standards.

For Branko Perić, back that time member of the NUN and Banja Luka editor for news agency ONASA, these high salaries were a reason for many journalists to leave local media, a process that led into a future problem. “It could have been much better idea if they, the IC, helped to some local, already existing media, to keep these people, and become strong independent voices,” Perić believes.210

Duška Jurišić, from 1998 to 2000 one of the editors for the OBN news program, explained that “decent” salaries was one of the reasons for her to start working for the OBN, after years with the state broadcaster. However, Jurišić said that she was well aware that existing concept of the network, or plans to make it self-sustainable in the period of five years, a plan

208 “‘Buffy, the Vampire Slayer’ and US Basketball were assumed by donors to be ideal for the Bosnian audience. Locally produced programmes had to be low-budget, though staff were very inventive when designing sets and finding locations.” (Ranson 2005; 47). 209 Gabriel Vukadin, general manager, told IWPR that with average monthly salaries of 1200 DM (approx. $600) the 150 staff at OBN were among the highest paid journalists in Bosnia, a country where the average journalist's salary is between 200-300 DM. Vukadin said his own salary was the fourth or fifth highest salary of all media managers in Bosnia. Almir Đikoli, cameramen at OBN, remembers that he used to receive only cash. “Once a month, we were called into a room with Mark Challenger. He used to give us our money, and we had to sign a blank paper that did not say how much we got. We did not complain since it was after the war, and we were desperate just to be paid.” Interview, Ljubljana, 7 January 2013. (Challenger was Operations Director, and ex BBC employee with experience in transmission systems). 210 Branko Perić. Interview, 7 September 2012. Sarajevo. 119 made in 1999 by the international consultants, was hardly realistic giving the existing economic situation in the country, and small marketing share among more than 300 broadcasters.211

One year after the OBN was established, the ICG called it “a disaster which should be scrapped," stating that it was not sustainable from the very beginning (ICG 1997; 18). Donors were aware of this, or at least some of them. Frane Maroević, who oversaw the OBN from the position as head of the Media Department for the EC Mission in Sarajevo, considered that plans for the OBN were not working from the very beginning: “All the business plans indicated that OBN will become a commercial network within five years. But, it was not like that in reality. Everything started ad hoc, and from that moment on, no rules was established.”212

For the EC, he explains, a huge issue was that it was hard to justify extensive expenses, and soon they asked for financial revision, which resulted negatively for the OBN:

Just to mention the fact of the complicated registration for the OBN - two companies both with their own expenses… While these types of negotiations were ongoing, the OBN was going down. Finally, somebody suggested that it has to be closed, or sold. But the company was hardly worth anything at the time, and had huge debts.213

While trying to find ways to save the project, in 1998 a small marketing and advertising department was set up but, according to the IWPR, the resulting income was low.214 Maroević considers that this team did not really try to commercialize the OBN, but more concentrated on getting the money from donors.215

Murky business

The first donor to pull out, as early as 1997, was the OSI, followed by the EC, and soon after others left. Ranson (2005) mentions that beside financial difficulties, donors could not agree among themselves about the OBN, its goals and aims. By 2000, the OBN accumulated huge debts; satellite bills were not paid, as well as salaries for local staff. According to the local

211 Duška Jurišić. Interview, 12 May 2012, Skype. 212 Maroević 2011. 213 Ibid. 214 Harbin 2001. 215 Maroević 2011. 120 media, the OBN had debs of over three million dollars.216 Desperate to save the project, the IC decided to try to join it with Radio FERN, but with no success. Second possibility was to sell it to whoever is ready to cover the debts. It was not clear who is selling, or to whom the money will go. Milan Trivić, Bosnian who was part of the OBN Trust in London, where he lived at the time, said that he was not involved in sale, nor had any information about it until the very end.217

The first candidate to buy was a murky Bosnian businessman who withdrew after the IC questioned his business ties to Karadžić and General Ratko Mladić.218 Finally, in 2003 in London, the station was sold to a TV mogul from Croatia. Officially, 51 percent was registered to one Bosnian citizen, and the rest to the new owner. Details of the deal were kept away from the public.

“The company was worth nothing at the moment,” Maroević remembers explaining that it was hard to find buyer because of debts and complicated ownership structure. “At the same time, we had a very philosophical clash – US vs. EU approach toward the media. While the EU preferred public service, the US promoted the idea of private, commercial networks.”219 This “clash” was acknowledged by the IWPR article which recalled how High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch in 2000 tried to find a compromising solution, calling upon donor countries to support transformation of the OBN into public broadcasting system:220

This controversy goes to the heart of US-European differences regarding Public Media, in particular television. While the US, traditionally, prefers - and supports - almost exclusively - the commercial sector (even PBS, is funded mostly by donations), Europe is different. Even the United States’ most trusted partner, - the UK - is in this case on the side of the continental Europeans. The BBC, in fact, is the role model for every Public Broadcaster worldwide. This is the reason why my vision was to set BiH firmly on the path to a true public broadcasting system.221

The new owner immediately started with transforming the OBN from the news into entertainment channel. By 2004, from 110 initial employees only 30 were left, and news

216 Damir Hrasnica. “Prodaja ničije televizije: Bobar dan, ovo je OBN.” Bh. Dani, No. 283, 1 December 2000. Available at http://www.bhdani.com/arhiva/183/t18316.shtml. Accessed on 3 January 2011. 217 Milan Trivić, interview, 12 February 2012, Sarajevo. 218 Harbin 2001. 219 Maroević 2011. 220 IWPR 2001. 221 Wolfgang Petritch. Email interview. 22 January 2013. 121 program department was closed down with the explanation that it is too costly. Employees who lost their jobs, and did not receive their salaries for months were offered to be paid off partially in cash and partially with coupons that they were able to spend only in shops the OBN had commercial contracts with.222

Today, Haselock claims that commercialization of the project was the goal, and that it was not “necessarily intended to live forever.”223 As one of the reasons for loss of the interest among donors for the network, Ranson (2005) mentions the fact of the beginning of the new massive international intervention in Kosovo that included media assistance, too. Duška Jurišić believes that one of the reasons why the entire project was not successful was lack of support by the local community:

That is what happens when you have something implanted from the outside, and you put it on the ground and it needs to grow, but it cannot since it does not have strong roots. It is important to enable working conditions, to pay people, but you also have to establish these roots. And the OBN was all the time some kind of combinations of international expectations and reality on the ground.224

Today, peace journalism scholars are considering OBN to be the first attempt of this form, acknowledging that even though it was not successful in its mission it is important example to be looked upon since it was the first ever media established to promote the resolutions of a peace agreement, even before the idea of peace journalism was not well developed (Bratić, Dente Ross and Kang-Graham 2008). However, the local media community hardly finds something to learn from this example. “It was artificially made, and could not be successful in any sense. And it was just not made to be self-sustainable, so it was not even meant to survive,” Senad Avdić said,225 and his attitude shows that the idea of the project was never really accepted by Bosnian journalists, who did not looked at the OBN TV as a role model, or competition, but just as another international project.

Years later, OBN, or at least a TV station with that name, still functions as a commercial network covering with its signal the entire country, and the region. The most popular segments

222 Emir Imamović and Saida Mustajbegović. “Mediji: OBN – pozadina 10 iznenadnih otkaza u nekada najskupljoj bh, Akcija čišćenja zagrebačkog miliona Ivana Ćalete.” Bh. Dani, no. 393, pp 54. 24 December 2004. 223 Haselock 2011. 224 Jurišić 2012. 225 Avdić 2012. 122 of their programming are soap operas and entertainment, the model that had more influence on the local media scene than anything else.

One for all

Radio FERN was a similar story like the OBN – a media outlet created and run by donors and the IC - in this case OSCE - with no clear strategy and the purpose to serve as a platform for the ideas and goals set up by the DPA. After several years of functioning, it was transformed into public radio, employing most of the people who used to work for FERN. For this reason, the ICG considered FERN as a success story.226 Others reflect on it as another too expensive international project (estimated costs were nearly $100,000 for a month), and as such not able to survive. There are even some, who were involved in FERN functioning, who believed that it should have never been formed as internationally run media.227 This radio was established in July 1996 with the Memorandum of Understanding between Swiss, Bosnian governments, and the OSCE Mission with the purpose to “ensure the necessary conditions in the media field for the preparation and conduct of democratic elections in accordance with DPA.”228 (See Annex 6) It had 18 transmitters and represented a network of 20 radio stations, and its slogan was One for all! (Jedan za sve!) referring to the idea of one radio station that covers with its signal, program and network of correspondents, the entire country. The Memorandum did not specify for how long the project should last, but it was renewed on a regular basis until decision was made that the radio should be closed down. Lejla Omeragić Ćatić, one of the FERN journalists, remembers that employees at the beginning were given short-term contracts. “The first one was for duration of three months and we were told that it is the project that will last only until elections are over. Then we signed a new one, also for three months, followed by one for a one year, as I remember. And it was like that until the very end, one after other short term contract.”229

226 ICG report 1997. 227 Heyman, Jeffrey. “Radio FERN: Branches towards democracy in Bosnia and beyond.” AMARC, an international non-governmental organization serving the community radio movement. Available at http://europe.amarc.org/index.php?p=bonus_articles!. Accessed on 3 March 2012. 228 “Concept paper Radio FERN Business Plan 1999-2000,” Prepared by the OSCE on behalf of the Radio FERN, March 1999. Document on file with the author. 229 Lejla Omeragić Ćatić. Interview 12 May 2012, Skype. 123

Borka Rudić, who was “actually the editor,” remembers that her salary was 1.800 DM, unlike 300 DM she used to receive while working for daily Oslobođenje. 230 In the case of FERN, as well as OBN, no benefits were paid for any of local employees.231 Initially, the Swiss government and the Open Society Found, who were also in charge of the establishment and day to day running of the project until the end of 1997, founded the project. However, the project had a Board of three members with people from the Swiss government, the OSCE and the OHR, who had their say even in appointment of the employees. (See Annex 7) In 1998, a new Memorandum was signed, and the OSCE took some of the financial responsibility for it. The network of correspondents was established from all around the country, and for professional journalists it was one more good reason to work with FERN:

For many of us it was for the first time after the war to even communicate with somebody who was at the “other side,” so to speak. It was weird to go to Pale in 1996 and stand on the street giving away FERN promotional materials. Everybody asked us where we are coming from. When we answered from Sarajevo, we had to say which one – Serb or Muslim, as they called it. Reactions were different to what they heard - some just left, some were not excited, some were more open to communicate. I still remember it as a very weird experience.232

In the case of the Radio FERN, the restrictions on programming imposed by the internationals that were involved in the whole project were more obvious than with the OBN. One of them was that no music from former Yugoslavia was to be played on the air. “It was kind of strange, but in a way, maybe it was a proper decision at the time? They explained to us that we should avoid playing local music since some of it can be offensive for somebody,” Omeragić-Ćatić remembers.233 According to Rudić and Omergić-Ćatić, no other type of control existed, or at least they did not perceive it like that:

The only thing I can recall is that we had one local supervisor was listening the entire program and write reports that were translated and sent to the OSCE or

230 Borka Rudić. Interview, 18 August 2012, Skype. 231 “At the beginning my salary was 900 German marks, while most of the media had about 300, and we were paid in cash since no bank system existed back that time.”, Omeragić- Ćatić 2012. 232 Omeragić- Ćatić 2012. 233 Ibid. 124

MEC. Also, every morning, we used to have meetings and one of the foreigners used to be present and give their comments about program that was aired day before.234

FERN policy for covering election campaign was to give to each political party the same space without comments or analysis of the content of press statements, or speeches given by politicians who were running for the elections. Often press statements by political parties were red in full on air. Rudić remembers that people from the OSCE were regular guests and editors had to give priorities to the Mission statements, and full coverage of their work. In 1998, the OSCE became significant donor for the Radio, but the equipment was still owned by the Swiss government. A new manager, American Jeffrey Hayman was hired marking bigger US involvement in the project. One of the first decisions Hayman made was to introduce open program and to play local music on air:

Swiss have very structured way, while Americans are different. I think their attitude was that if they could not understand the music, it maybe can be political, hate speech, or just that something can be going on. I thought that it was the most ridiculous thing I ever heard. How in the world you are going to attract local audience if you do not play local music on the radio? It just did not make sense for me.235

For Hayman, FERN was a “strange animal” which suffered from luck of ideas, but it was also a victim of disagreements between different international organisations:

The whole thing was supposed to be media development program, but it ended up like a sort of a struggle for the money with the OSCE and Swiss. You had the OSCE which wanted to do transition of FERN into public broadcaster, and Swiss who wanted to kind of pull out. While they are struggling, you are trying to run 24 hours radio station, to run a good program, and create good environment for the freedom of the speech.236

234 Rudić 2012. 235 Jeffrey Hayman, Interview, 2 March 2012, Skype. 236 Ibid. 125

Finely, by the end of 1998, the IC, far away from the Bosnian public, decided to create a new project called OBNIT. The idea was to merge radio FERN and the OBN. Swiss government first agreed, but later changed their minds deciding to pull out from the whole project, while declining transfer of transmitters to OBN Trust. Nevertheless, the OSCE did not want to leave the whole project to vanish, and, with the support from the OHR, they talked Swiss government into changing their mind proposing to incorporate FERN into the new public broadcast system. (See Annex 8) At the same time, the US, pushed for the commercialization paying six international marketing professionals to train local staff in developing a marketing plan and department, but with little success. By the end of the year, the OSCE Chief of the Mission called for more donations in order for the Radio to survive until it will be transferred to PBS.237 A business plan for transforming FERN from donor-dependent to a fiscally independent radio station within 15 to 18 months period was made in March 1999.238 The OSCE claimed that at that moment, FERN was followed by 28 per cent of the population.239 On the contrary, the Media Plan Institute data are showing that in 1999, only 5.5 per cent audience regularly watched TV OBN, while regular audience of Radio FERN was 3.6 per cent (Udovičić 2001). At the same time, the IC got more involved in neighbouring Serbia in attempt to overthrow Slobodan Milošević from power. Milošević’s response was to shut down as many independent media as he could. The IC reaction was to help to Bosnian media to create programs that will be rebroadcasted in Serbia. Radio FERN was used for this purpose. According to Heyman, the IC broke international rules while engaged in cross-border broadcasting. Meanwhile, in March 1999, NATO started 11 weeks long campaign of bombing Serbia. FERN was enabled to reach a large huge part of Serbia and become the only non-Serbian broadcast program available. Hayman, claims that the network was given American finances, and NATO logistical assistance in placing additional transmitters in locations in Bosnia favorable to cross-border reception of Radio FERN's signal:

The ethical question of such cross-border transmissions has been raised. During the 1998 Bosnian elections, for example, the IC sanctioned Croat

237 Ambassador Robert L. Barry, Head of the Mission, wrote a letter to the representatives of OSCE delegations who met in Vienna in December 1998, calling them for “voluntarily contributions for Radio FERN in 2000” explaining that it need “only” 65 percent of its budget from donors, while the rest has been provided from “sponsorship, foundations, advertising, and free-for-service production and broadcast activities”. Letter from the Ambassador, dated 13 December 1998. On file with the author. 238 Business Plan on file with the author obtained from the OSCE Mission archive in Sarajevo. 239 Ibid. 126

politicians who used Croatian Radio and Television (HRT) to broadcast political programming to Bosnia from Croatia. In this regard, Radio FERN's independence and cross-entity representation, of course, is also questioned. Nonetheless, during the Kosovo crisis the international community has seen Radio FERN as one of the only media outlets in the region by which unbiased information can be transmitted in an otherwise polarized media climate.240

Hayman soon left the station, and a new manager, a Canadian, came to complete its transformation. Local staff was not aware of what was going on, according to Omeragić-Ćatić. “I had a feeling that Shawn Dearn came to close down the radio. And it happened like that. He did not have any idea of how to make program.”241 In 2000, 17 days before the new elections took place, the OSCE gave possibility for web live streaming of FERN, with the explanation that is should reach Diasporas in order to educate them about the elections.242 Again, it was too late to achieve anything. Finally, in mid-2001, Radio FERN was integrated into public broadcast service - Radio 1 that started broadcasting from May that year.243 Domi calls this process a “miracle “explaining that it was hard to get the IC support for it until the end:

The US government did not want to support the idea since they wanted a commercial viable TV and radio network. And I thought it was really stupid for many reasons. For one, existing economy could not support independent radio, and it is much cheaper than the TV. However, they refused to support it. Finally, until today, I believe, in terms of the media development, this was one thing the OSCE done outstandingly.244

Radio FERN equipment and people, transferred to public broadcast radio, influencing its production in coming years a lot. New approach was introduced in radio reporting, and accepted until today making the FERN one of the most successful intervention projects.

240 Heyman, Jeffrey, AMARC. 241 Omeragić- Ćatic 2012. 242 Transcript: Joint Press Conference, 21 March 2000, Coalition Press Information Centre Tito Barracks. Available at http://www.nato.int/sfor/trans/2000/t000321a.htm. Accessed on 6 February 2012. 243 OSCE. ”10 years OSCE mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995-2005.” Available at http://www.oscebih.org/documents/osce_bih_doc_2011030815040118eng.pdf. Accessed on 8 February 2012. 244 Domi 2012. 127

Conclusion

According to OSCE, the first postwar elections went “technically well,” even though the general climate was “below the minimum standards” established by this organization.245 The problems were identified in almost every field, including registration, the media, the campaigns, and freedom of movement, etc. Until 2001, when OBN and FERN were transformed, four rounds of elections were held, each resulted in nationalist parties’ victory, but went technically well. After the OBN and FERN were closed down, Zoran Udovičić analyzed their impact, concluding how they contributed to remove entity barriers, being the first broadcast media to cover the entire state, but did not contribute in eliminating negative effects of long-standing nationalist propaganda, the purpose both were created for (Udovičić 2001). Over the years, OBN and FERN were assessed more critically: analysts claimed that precious time was lost, while their impact was not significant (Udovičić 2001, Avdić 2012, Kontić 2011). According to Mehmed Halilović, projects like OBN and FERN were mistakes being too expensive and having little to no impact on overall situation. “Even more, the time was lost with those projects, as well as the money, and all of that could have been directed toward PBS reconstruction.”246 The OBN and FERN did open cooperation between broadcast media from two entities soon after the war. Nevertheless, the same was happening in part of the print media, those independent, without international assistance, but more out of journalistic curiosity and under circumstances dictated by business. It can be said that the partial success for both projects was that they did survive in some forms - one became commercial network, while the other transformed into public broadcaster. It was not part of the plan, but rather forced upon them after realized that the projects in their original function, could not survive. It hardly can be said that either OBN or FERN contributed democratizations process or state-building. The international community claimed that both were created to help bring more pluralism, but situation in the field was that alongside OBN and FERN over 300 broadcast media existed. The work of the OBN or FERN did not influenced public attitude toward nationalist politicians who continue winning year after year. At the same time, neither one of these two networks led to the decrease of political propaganda or hate speech in local media, but it was

245 OSCE. “The Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Second Statement of the co-coordinator for international monitoring (CIM)” 14 September 1996. Document on file with the author. 246 Halilović 2012. 128 achieved only with strict regulations introduced through regulatory bodies, and after both stations were already transformed. Local journalists do not find that either OBN or FERN influenced professionalization of the local media. Journalists who used to work for these networks were not introduced to new journalistic techniques, or even modern equipment. While influencing editorial policies in both cases, appointment of editors, having no respect for workers’ rights, working without business plan, or plans for self-sustainability, both projects did not even set an example of how the media should and could be run in developed countries. They rather set an example, later followed by many new media project established in Bosnia, of a donor dependent media, that have little responsibility toward society they work in, but serve the purpose of those who are funding them, and cannot function in a real market. Indeed, what was going on in the background of these projects, until today is hardly known to the public, but also to the people who used to work for these media. The way, in which the IC was running those media, challenged notion of the basic values they came to promote – transparency, accountability, human rights, freedom of the speech and finally, democracy.

129

CHAPTER VII: PUBLIC BROADCASTING SYSTEM UNDER PROTECTORATE

The reform of the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) system in Bosnia and Herzegovina was probably the most complicated part of the media assistance, for all those who participated, being the IC, local authorities, or media community. The lack of a clear strategy, political obstructions, disagreements between different participants in the process, accompanied by the absence of cooperation, or even consultations with the local media community, are just some of the characteristics of this process that has been going for over fifteen years. Over that period of time, the PSB was put under a semi-protectorate, deconstructed and reconstructed again, and then left to Bosnian politicians to find a solution. The protectorate over the PBS in practice signified that the OHR established, and for a while ran the entire system, having possibility to appoint directors and editors, but also to shape the editorial policy. In this sense, the power of the international actors over public broadcasters resembled that during Communism, and was not much different from the way how local politicians acted towards the media. When the IC relinquished its role, being unable or not patient enough to implement its own decisions, Bosnian political elites took over control, initiating again a media war. The system was ones more turned into a megaphone for political parties or as a tool in advancing the polarization of the already fragile political environment. From time to time, journalists tried to resist political pressure, but usually lost the fight, and the PBS system became a political battlefield, loosing audience and relevance. Asked by the local journalist what could, or should be done with the PBS, Senad Avdić replied that “maybe the best thing could be if we close the whole system down for about one month, and then, if nobody complains, not open it ever again.”247 In this chapter, I will retrace the process of creation and development of the PBS system in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Besides looking into different decisions made by the IC, I will analyze reactions of the local and international media community, and their proposals for solutions, as well as how did the IC, if at all respond.

247 Emir Imamović. “Dosje Dana: Propast javnog RTV servisa.” Bh. Dani, No. 313, 13 June 2006, Sarajevo. 130

“Western’s Europe Gift to civilization”

The idea of a PBS emerged in Europe in between the two World Wars, and was used by the governments to spread its political views. Over the time it evolved into a concept of broadcasting available for everybody, made to serve the public that is financed through subscription fees. Thomson and Bašić-Hrvatin (2008; 8) even described PBS as “one of Western Europe’s more recent gift to civilization,” for its role in promoting democratization and the professionalization of media. Today, different intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations are promoting PBS as a model that provides information for all, independent from political or economic influences.248 UNESCO defines PBS as “broadcasting made, financed and controlled by the public, for the public:”

It is neither commercial nor state-owned, free from political interference and pressure from commercial forces. Through the PBS, citizens are informed, educated and entertained. When guaranteed with pluralism, programming diversity, editorial independence, appropriate funding, accountability and transparency, public service broadcasting can serve as a cornerstone of democracy.249

The model, as well as the idea, emerged in the UK and most of the definitions that are used until today are drawn from the experience of the British Broadcast Corporation (BBC).250 According to Matos (2009; 203-220), the BBC established the core values of the PBS - to inform, educate and entertain - and those standards are still seen as being at the very heart of what it is, while it is offering public-oriented and balanced journalism free from both political and economic constraints.”

248 The EU, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the UNESCO support PBS and promote its idea in their member countries. 249 UNESCO definition available at http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php- URL_ID=1525&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. Accessed on 7 December 2012. The Council of Europe definition available at http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc04/EDOC10029AD.ht m. Accessed on 7 December 2012. 250 BBC Charter from 2006 defines that it “exists to serve the public interest” while its main object “is the promotion of its Public Purposes.” Available at http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/about/how_we_govern/charter.pdf. Accessed on 13 December 2012. 131

The same author refers to a comparative study of the media systems in the UK, the US and in Scandinavia. According to this research, countries with a strong PBS tradition - Britain, Denmark or Finland - are giving to the citizens’ possibility to know more about current politics and international affairs, than countries - like the US - where the commercial media system predominates. Matos concludes that “such findings highlight the strong impact on public knowledge perceptions and citizenship ideals of the type of relationship that is established between media systems, the market and the state in different countries,” (Matos 2009; 203-220). Similarly, Sipos (2001) finds that the PBS has an important role as “a platform for open debate” in democratization, a statement that can be argued if we look into development of the services in some of the post-communist countries. Considering the experience of Western Europe, the PBS can have a role in enhancing democracy, but when this concept was introduced as part of democratization efforts to Eastern European countries, after the fall of Communism, success has been very limited. For Thompson and Bašić-Hrvatin the transition from state controlled broadcasters to PBS in former communist states was an epic story of misunderstandings “mixed intentions, scarce resources, institutional stagnation and shameless delay tactics,” (2008; 10). In most of the cases all over Eastern Europe, the PBS remained controlled by the governments, and the audience did not correspond with the idea of public media seeing it still as governmental tool.251 The role of the PBS in the process of democratization became even more problematic with the weakening of the sector. Some of the authors have seen the biggest challenge for PBS to play its role in plural societies, especially if they are post-conflict or fragile states, which are governed by power-sharing systems, like Bosnia (Bašić-Hrvatin and Thompson 2008; 32). In the Bosnian case, PBS system was created in circumstances of extreme politicization in every aspect of the life, including the media. Formerly state media in this region have been transformed into public media, but either politicians or audience accepted the concept, or in some cases even understood what does it brings to the society. In this region, PBS remained state controlled, and used for propaganda purposes in the same or similar way, as it was in the past. It is important to note that the PBS was introduced in post-Communist states while the whole concept came under question in Western Europe due to the rise of new media (internet

251 In his analysis of the public media in transitional countries, Olaf Steenfadt wrote: “Former State broadcasters were not shut down but kept as largely oversized institutions, which in most cases became quickly disconnected from the revolutionary momentum and, ultimately, from societies as such – some of them still are today. Not only were they exposed like dinosaurs to a new habitat overnight. On top came the economic challenges of an open, more and more globalized marketplace. One might call it irony or just coincidental timing that during the late 1980ies and early 90ies, commercial broadcasting arrived just in time for the fall of the Berlin Wall. Not surprisingly, these fresh new channels were easily associated with freedom and independence, while the former state broadcasters remained incapacitated by carrying the burden of their past as being the old regime’s mouthpieces.” (2011) 132 and social media), and the change in commercial broadcasters that are often addressing the same topics as public media, but in a more appealing way. While the citizens in the Western Europe and Northern America were embracing new media, the Eastern Europe was struggling to find a way to incorporate this, to some extent old model, into their media systems and, to accept it as a way to promote democracy. At the same time, the sustainability of the PBS became an issue after many people in the Western Europe started to use internet as primary source of information and entertainment, deciding not to own TV or radio, and starting questioning obligatory fee for every household that owns it, what had endangered their independence and opened a door for political influence. With this new reality, many started to question the future of the PBS. In academia, some authors urged for changes, both in programming and technology, but also in the way of financing, that will allow modernization, and secure viability and relevance, and the support should come with it (Jakubowicz 2006). The key, for Jakubowicz, is change in PSB relationship with the audience in times when so much of PSB content can be found in the programming of commercial broadcasters “or is/can be produced by others, that PSB organizations as such are no longer necessary for the audience to have the access to it.” For this reason, among others, Steenfadt (2011) argues that public media can only survive if they manage to keep the pace with the transitional speed of society, or some new concept will have to be introduced and tested.

One System Under Three Roofs

The Public Broadcast Service system in Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of three broadcasters: the countrywide public service broadcaster Radio and Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with one TV and one radio channel (BHT1 and BH Radio 1), and two entity public broadcasters - one in the Federation and the Republika Srpska - each with one radio and TV channel.252

252 PBS Statute available at http://www.bhrt.ba/lat/?p=873, and Law on PBS available at http://www.bhrt.ba/lat/default.wbsp?p=50, both web sites accessed on 27 November 2012. Each of the entity broadcaster has its own law, that is only partially harmonized with the state one. 133

PBS System of Bosnia and Herzegovina

PBS System

RTVFBIH - FTV BHRT - BH1 TV RTRS - RST - Radio - Radio 1 - Radio RS Federacije

According to the law that was adopted under the pressure from the IC, these broadcasters should function together, exchange programs and cooperate on different segments, while in practice, they compete, and all of them are barely surviving.253 System’s Board coordinates the activities, proposes license fee policies, and coordinates between the three broadcasters. Each of the entity broadcasters has their own boards, too. The members of the boards of the RTRS and PBS are proposed by the CRA, and approved and appointed by the entity, or state parliaments. According the law on PBS, public broadcasters in Bosnia should ensure diverse and balanced programs, while meeting high ethical and quality standards. Their program has to include information, culture, education, and entertainment. The law imposes some restrictions including banding of broadcasting any material that incites national, religious or racial hatred, intolerance or discrimination against individuals or groups, or that could incite violence, disorder, rioting or criminal activities.

253 Biside these three broadcasters, inside of the Federation, each of 10 cantons have their own TV that is financed from the cantonal budget. Local governments maintain control over these broadcasters, while appointing directors and editors, and often influence their editorials with different requests. The IC never dedicated its time to the influence or the way of functioning of these broadcasters. 134

The system is primarily financed from the subscription fees, and partly from advertising and sponsorship. BHRT receives 50 per cent of the total collected fees, and the rest is equally shared between two entity broadcasters. At the same time, broadcasters do have possibility to apply for state funding in some instances, like for the preservation of the archives, but, this type of funding should not influence editorial policy. In practice it is often different, and state or entity subsidies are used for different purposes, and they make broadcasters prone to political control. The law demands that the system should be united under the body called Corporation, which should coordinate work of three broadcasters, and take care of the technical and financial aspects. However, due to many reasons, political above all, the Corporation was never established. The Balkan Media Barometer 2011 found that the PBS in Bosnia suffers “from an absence of professionalism,” noticing “uncertainty as to the very purpose of their existence, lack of financial resources, and political interference with editorial decisions, and a lack of public awareness about the specific role to be played by public broadcasters.”254 This report goes on and points out that the PBS program is not much different from what commercial media are offering, and does not give balanced and objective information in their news and information programs:

There are hardly any children’s and educational programs, or programs that foster human rights. Public broadcasting services have become commercialized and offer a large share of cheap and entertainment driven formats of questionable quality. There are also hardly any programs for minorities, or programs which would promote common values of all the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, something surely needed in the process of stabilizing the country and achieving post-war reconciliation.255

Additionally, in 2012, a study of the Bosnian PBS by Article 19 concluded that, while existing legislation is in accordance with European practice, it fails to oblige the system to be an integrative factor for all the communities in the country, or to serve “as forum for pluralistic public discussions and to be promoter of broader democratic participation or produce innovative

254 Nataša Tešanović (ed). “Balkan Media Barometer 2011.” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Sarajevo. Available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/sarajevo/09052.pdf. Accessed on 24 March 2013. 255 Ibid, pp 50. 135 content.”256 Furthermore, report continues, existing laws does not prohibit censorship “and a priori control of the activities of public service broadcasters and the taking of any instructions whatsoever from individuals and bodies outside the Public Broadcasting Service System. The safeguards against conflict of interest are also weak.”257 In this respect, the Article 19 refers to the system of the appointments and dismissal of the boards of governors of PBS.

According to the existing laws, the CRA nominates the candidates for the boards of RTRS and BHRT, but not for FTV whose members are nominated by a parliamentary commission. This procedure was envisaged as a tool in preventing or at least minimizing the political influence in the appointment process, however it did not quite work that well in practice. At the same time, the National Assembly in RS amended the Law on the RTRS, so that each time no candidate is appointed from the list submitted by the CRA, the Agency has to repeat the procedure. There is no such provision in the Law on BHRT, but BiH Parliamentary Assembly has failed to appoint two members of the Board from the list submitted by the CRA, and the Agency was forced to repeat the process. The Parliament of the Federation has the power to collectively dismiss the Board of Governors of FTV. “Furthermore the laws pertaining to the public broadcasting system do not provide safeguards against arbitrary and politically motivated dismissal of member of the boards of governors and director generals of public broadcasters such as the requirement to provide reasons for dismissals and the right to appeal the latter in court,” reports reads.258

Article 19 notices that the broadcasters do not have, or are not even required to have, internal complaint mechanisms that would allow audience to comment or complain on programming.259

Further problems related to functioning of the PBS are listed in this and other reports. In conclusion, it can be noted that the system is not sufficiently developed, and does not serve the public, and as such its role in democratization, or unification of the country, can hardly be seen. According to some analysts, the existing law has become a “hampering factor” for development of the PBS in Bosnia (Udovičić 2011; 48). Even more, the system hardly presents what should

256 Boyko Beov. “Analysis of the laws pertaining to the PSB system of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Article 19. The analysis was commissioned by the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, September 2012. Available at http://www.osce.org/fom/94107. Accessed on 13 December 2012. 257 Ibid. 258 Ibid. 259 Ibid. 136 be the public space for open debate, and does not serve as integratory element but very often the opposite.

Clash of different approaches

The establishment of the PSB in Bosnia was initiated by the OHR, in 1998, three years after the end of war. Haselock remembers that some efforts were made even before the OBN was established, help and financial support was offered to the local politicians for the reform of RTVBIH, but they have rejected given conditions.260 Neville-Jones, who was involved with the media reforms from the very beginning, could not give a precise answer why PBS was not explored when the media assistance was discussed, or why a new country wide television network was created (OBN) instead supports the existing broadcasting system. “I think we felt that the existing stations did not have the right values, and that it would be better to start afresh. At the time we were very concerned about hate speech and provocation to violence, the security situation not being at all stable,” she said alluding to the fact that hate speech was the strongest from the existing entity broadcasters, during and after the war.261

To create a PBS, the OHR got involved in a very complicated process which included the creation of a completely new system, as well as creating new laws: “When everything from policing and education to transport, housing and criminal justice are not only politicized to the maximum degree but also contested by two or, more usually, three parties, control over the media is bound to be contested as well,” Bašić-Hrvatin and Thompson rightly described difficulties that anybody who was willing to open this chapter had to face (2008; 32).

Until 1992, RTV Sarajevo was one of the eight principal broadcasting centers in Yugoslavia.262 In 1991, this system was destroyed, and Bosnian broadcasting divided along warring sides (for more see Chapter III). Radio televizija Bosne i Herzegovina (RTVBIH) was created in 1992 in Sarajevo, and managed to cover most of BiH. It was influenced by the ruling SDA that appointed directors and had their word in choosing editors. Within the territory controlled by HDZ in Federation, with the help from the neighboring Croatia, established EROTEL that mostly transmitted program produced by HRT, Croatian state TV, with limited own productions. The RS was covered by Srpska radio televizija (SRT), which was controlled by

260 Haselock 2011. He did not explain details of the conditions that were offered to the government. 261 Neville-Jones 2013. 262 Each capital city of each of the republics and autonomous provinces had its own centre. 137 the SDS. The first step toward reforms were made in 1997, and it included jamming of the signal, imposition of the board of directors, and changing the name from Srpska radio televizija - SRT into Radio televizija Republike Srpske - RTRS (for more see Chapter V). Soon after, the IC starts looking for solution that will free even remaining government controlled broadcasters from political influence.

In 1998, the OHR initiated the process of establishment of public countrywide broadcaster. Alexandra Stiglmayer, the OHR spokesperson from 1998 to 2001, remembers that the idea of establishment of the PSB came from person who was in charge for media assistance in the Office - Simon Haselock:

For the country that wants to grow up together, people have to know what is happening in all parts of it, they must hear what is happening in Banja Luka, or Mostar, or Sarajevo... And that is how the idea of PSB came up.263

Haselock remembers how different models and approaches were considered by different international actors in order to reform the government-controlled media. Before taking the decision to create PBS was made by the PIC, and introduced by the OHR into the public:

We (OHR) argued strongly that PSB is needed since the economy was underdeveloped in Bosnia and commercial services would not function. It was logical argument based on where the money was. You can have commercially funded business if there is a business, and it was not the case. The next was to create the system that is sustained by the government or public money, but protected from direct political control.264

At the PIC meeting in Luxembourg in June 1998, the council issued a declaration about creation of a single public broadcasting service system.265 The PIC urged the OHR to “swiftly” complete the restructuring of RTVBiH and simultaneously invited donor countries to continue supporting OBN project that was still alive. From this decision it can be read that the IC was undecided if they should concentrate on public or commercial media. This indecisiveness had

263 Stiglmayer 2011. 264 Haselock 2011. 265 Conclusions from Ministerial Meeting of the Steering Board of the PIC, Luxembourg 9 June 1998. Available at http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5188. Accessed on 26 November 2012. 138 serious consequences on the whole process of creation of the PSB. Nevertheless, a firmer decision was made in Madrid during the PIC meeting in 1998, which resulted with the declaration about establishment of the public broadcaster, placing it together with overall media reform plans under the IC democratization efforts.266

Back in 1998, the European Broadcast Union (EBU) raised their concerns about the plans made by the OHR concerning the PBS and the OBN. They questioned OHR decision to transformed OBN into countrywide commercial network. “The EBU believes that democratization in Bosnia would be harmed hardly if the OHR installs state commercial network, cutting the wings of the RTVBIH which would be slowly transformed, declining huge advantages they have, into authentic public TV,” the letter signed by Albert Scharf, EBU president said.267

The OHR replied rejecting accusations, and calling on EBU to appoint somebody to take a part in the future PBS reforms, which they did:

This reform intends to keep RTVBIH as TV service for the whole country. The idea or intention by the OHR or PIC to diminish the system of the public TV, and to promote commercial alternative, including OBN as substation, never ever existed... As a HR, I am dedicated to the vision of the RTVBIH as the symbol of the BH statehood. At the same time, I am dedicated to stop the practice of political party control over any media that is financed from the public funds, including RTVBIH. There is not space for political influence over the media that are financed by citizens’ taxes.268

Back at the time, the deputy director of the EBU was Boris Bergant, a Slovenian. He remembers that the Union was given advisory role in the process of reforming PBS in Bosnia -

266 Madrid Declaration reads that Public Broadcasting Corporation should be created “across the country which will respect the cultural identities of the constituent peoples and others.” 267 Letter by High Representative Carlos Westendorp to EBU. Novosti u medijima, No. 6, 18 May 1998. Available at http://www.mediaonline.ba/en/arhiva/arhiva/pdf/1998/mnbr06en.pdf. Accessed on 13 December 2012.

268 Novosti u medijima, No. 6. 139

“from time to time” - but was never fully involved in the whole process, or had a possibility to influence it.269

At the meeting in Madrid in 1998, PIC concluded that a free and open media will help in keeping peace, and therefore media reform is “vital.” They observed, optimistically, that political control over the media “has been dramatically reduced,” while “creation of an open, free media environment based on professional journalistic standards is well underway.”270 The PIC also recognized the role played by the OHR in creating a new atmosphere, while encouraging the Office to continue with the process of creating free media and the adoption of the legislation that should provide space for editorial independence at public broadcasters. “Such legislation must contain provisions designed to prevent any political party from exerting significant control over public broadcasting and to ensure public broadcasters attempt to address the interests of all the constituent peoples in current affairs programming.” 271It continues concluding that a robust public broadcasting sector is an important element of democratic development and calling on donors to continue support creation of one.

Even more, the PIC gave the OHR full authority to create new public broadcasters, giving it full control, and responsibility to appoint editors and directors, and in that way to influence editorial policy.

First step in implementing of the new PIC conclusion was the effort to push local nationalist politicians to agree to create the countrywide broadcast system. The IC negotiated with members of the Bosnian Presidency on a Memorandum of Understanding outlining the directions for the future reform, and the creation of a new broadcaster to cover the entire state, moreover included the creation of the public broadcaster for the Federation, and further support for reform of the RS broadcaster.272 In the end, the Memorandum was accepted by Bosniak and Croat parties, while politicians from the RS refused to participate, rejecting even the notion of having a countrywide broadcaster, regulated at the state level. The principal reason was that the RS government was not willing to accept any institution on a state level, because it would signify less influence the entity politicians could have.

269 Boris Bergant, email interview, 20 January 2013. 270 Madrid Declaration. 271 Ibid. 272 The entire Memorandum was printed in Novosti u medijima, No. 7. 1 June 1998. Available at http://www.mediaonline.ba/ba/arhiva/arhiva/pdf/1998/mnbr07bh.pdf. Accessed on 13 December 2012. 140

Looking into the Memorandum and this part of the process, Thompson and De Luce (2002; 220), concluded how it “planted the seeds for future political conflicts and contradictory international policies.” In their analysis of this document, but also the efforts made by the OHR and the rest of the IC that supported PSB reform, those two authors asked if country small and poor as Bosnia, needed two entity networks in addition to the statewide service. The question often rose until today.

Furthermore, Thompson and De Luce (2002; 221) rightly rejected every possibility that two entities could have reached an agreement on state-wide TV at that moment, stating that “in practice, SRT and probably RTVBIH too, would only cooperate in a countrywide public broadcasting system if they were first reformed beyond recognition, removing them from political control and rendering them accountable to the public,” but it was neither the case, nor probably the goal at that moment.

History Repeating

In their efforts to create public broadcasters, the OHR choose as partners’ local politicians, leaving media and law experts aside as occasional consultants whose opinion was just rarely considered and incorporated into final decisions.273 The Independent Union of Journalists objected from the beginning to the international plans for a PBS, embedded in the Memorandum, by sending an open letter to the OHR in 1998. In this letter, the Union expressed the opinion that Bosnia clearly needs a countrywide broadcaster with independent editorial policy, and that the concept should be discussed with local politicians, media professionals and people who are currently employed by the existing broadcasters: “With this letter, we are calling on the IC and the OHR to publicly present concept of the RTVBIH transformation and to give arguments for the proposed changes.”274

In 1999, HR Carlos Westendorp issued the Decision on the Reconstructing of the PSB.275 The Decision was issued a day before he left the office. With this decision, the HR called local authorities to establish new legal framework that will allow for the operation of a countrywide

273 Halilović interview 2012. 274 Open letter by NUN as printed in Novosti u medijima No. 7 - SAfax, 1 July 1998. Available at http://www.mediaonline.ba/ba/arhiva/arhiva/index.html. Accessed on 13 December 2012. 275 Decisions on the restructuring of the Public Service Broadcasting System in BiH and o Freedom of Information and Decriminalization of Libel and Defamation. 141 and Federation public broadcaster, and required establishment of the PSB for RS, establish principles for funding and of liquidation of the RTV BiH.

The HR used Annex 10, the one that established the OHR and give it the mandate of overseeing civilian aspect of the DPA implementation, and which allowed him to get involved with functioning of the state institutions as basis to establish country wide broadcaster.276 According to Chris Riley, the OHR interpreted the peace agreement “very broadly” for this purpose: “We had lawyers who were looking at DPA and find way how to do it. We were determined to break entity media and build state. It was necessity,” Railey said.277

This decision warned local authorities to comply; threatening that „further exercise of the powers vested in the High Representative” could be used “in order to address further problems and obstructions.”278

Local media professionals gathered around the Media Plan Institute were closely following OHR engagement with the public broadcasters expressing their opinion publicly through the project called Novosti u medijima that aim to report and debate different aspects of media sector reforms in postwar Bosnia, including the PBS. In October 1999, they published a series of reactions by local media experts, politicians and lawyers, on the process.279 One of them was Izudin Isović, at the time deputy general director of the RTVBiH, who was very critical in his reflections toward the IC efforts:

The first most striking fact for me, and something I heard about for the first time ever in my professional career, is decision by the HR to start implementing the project, and only afterwards to research programming, the technical side, human resources, space and economic background for the implementation of a such idea... 280

Local media were also critical about the process, but their writings were often regarded by the OHR, and the wider IC, as hostile towards reforms, and has been rejected as something that is coming from “circles who have vested interests in the status quo, another solution that

276 DPA Annex 10 available at http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=366. Accessed on 2 June 2013. 277 Riley 2010. 278 Decision on the restructuring of the PSB. 279 Novosti u medijima, SAfax, Sarajevo, 1998-1999. Available at http://www.mediaonline.ba/ba/arhiva/arhiva/index.html, Accessed on 13 December 2012. 280 Izudin Isović. “Javni RTV servisi: daleko od ekonomske samoodrživosti.” Novosti u medijima No. 45. 15 November 1999. Available at http://www.mediaonline.ba/ba/arhiva/arhiva/pdf/1999/mnbr45bh.pdf. Accessed on 13 December 2012. 142 would be to their liking, or who are simply spiteful as the project has every chance of succeeding,” (Riley 2001).

Those that do become involved are often branded as lackeys or traitors. Fortunately, the governing bodies, management and many of the employees of the public broadcasting system are more aware than their foreign guests as to the derivation and purpose of such attacks. Some find it increasingly difficult to accept such pressure, but an encouraging core have steeled themselves to see through the huge challenge of transforming an old state system into a professional, public institution which will serve the interest of all the citizens of BiH. This alone encourages OHR more than anything to stay on the course, and to continue to provide the support required to enable such an essential and bold transformation.”(ibid)

To some extent, Riley was probably right since some of the opinions expressed in public were coming from those who opposed reforms, trying to keep status quo that would secure political control over the broadcast sector in Bosnia. At the same time, some of the criticisms were coming from people who were willing to see changes and ready to participate in looking for the solutions, like Union or people gathered around Novosti u medijima project, as well as part of the local media, but the IC has rejected even their opinion.

Table

IC decision related to the reconstruction of the PBS

Memorandum of Understanding on the Reconstructing of RTVBIH 1/6/1998 Interim Arrangements for the Management of SRT 13/2/1998 Decision on the Establishment of the Law on RTV Federation 6/12/1999 Decision on Amending the Law on RTRS 1/9/1999 Decision on Reconstructing of the Public Broadcast Service in BiH (and 30/7/1999 on freedom of information and decriminalization of libel and defamation) Decision on the Liquidating Procedure to be Applied in the Winding-up of 24/5/2002 Public Enterprise RTVBIH Decision Imposing the Law on RTVRS 24/5/2002 Decision on Imposing the Law on FRTV 24/5/2002 Decision on Imposing the Law on the Basis of the Public Broadcasting 23/5/2002 Service and Public broadcasting System of BiH 143

From 1999 to 2004, the OHR issued a series of decisions leading to what is today the Public Broadcasting Service System, but these new laws also needed to function in practice. With these laws being externally imposed, or forced upon local parliaments to be adopted, the environment was hardly conducive to their implementation. The OHR remained fully responsible for the process until 2003 when the approach changed, and made into one of the preconditions for the EU access. Since then, Bosnian authorities were required to take ownership of the reform and the High Representative refrained from imposing any further decisions regarding PSB. Success was limited, again.

Disagreements and Decisions

The transformation of the PSB triggered new conflicts inside the IC in Bosnia, between those who were against creation of the PSB, and those who were strong proponents. Above all, it was conflict between two the different approaches toward the media – the American one, which believes in the commercial sector, and the European one, which promotes public broadcasting service. Determined to introduce the European model, HR Wolfgang Petritsch in 2001, issued binding decision to establish PSB. This decision came after the Bosnian politicians did not followed what was requested from them with HR decision from 1999, while the OHR did not put enough effort to make them to do so. Alexandra Stiglmayer remembers very high tensions between the IC members at the time:

It was all the Europeans against all Americans. Maybe the Brits were in between? For Americans it sounded like state interventionism and a state broadcaster. Their argument was - how you can say that this broadcaster will be independent if the state collects the money and gives it to the broadcaster? Argument was that it will never work. They agreed that it works in Austria or maybe in UK, but in case of Bosnia, they said, it was not possible, and that it is much better to have free market. And then Europeans said - no, look at the TV stations in the States, we do not want Bosnia to become like that. And so on and so on. The European model won because of the OHR.281

281 Stiglmayer 2011. 144

Petritsch issued three decisions on his way out of Bosnia, all three concerning laws on the PBS.282 All three were signed minutes before Petritsch went to the airport at the end of the mandate, and without the US embassy agreement. Previous HR, Carlos Vestendorp, done the same for the same reasons. Stiglmayer explains that Petritsch done that because he knew the Americans will be “very angry. And they were. But, he was leaving and was sure he will not get job in US, and he believed that it was the right thing to do. Having Americans angry meant that they would not give any money for it,” she explains.283

Petritsch remembers tensions from this time, saying that he regret little today:

I only regret that I did not have enough time to do more – which, of course, would only have been possible if the overall political, economic and social situation would have changed faster. This was not the case, and today we are – in BiH – in a protracted situation of inertia, corruption and backtracking, when it comes to democracy and the rule of law. Both the local political and intellectual elite and the Europeans (not to speak of the US) have failed the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They are the real victims of this botched and mismanaged transition. The media are but a reflection of the overall sociopolitical malaise; they cannot be better than politics – they just reflect – and sometimes deepen – the sorry state of Bosnia and its people.284

However, the clashes were not going only between different international organizations or countries involved in the process, but also inside of the OHR. Haselock, who was deputy HR, did not agree with Petritsch, and at one moment was not willing to push together with him for PBS, leaving the OHR, and Bosnia, in 2001.285

Even before Petritsch decided to issue final decisions on introducing the laws, some of his earlier resolutions regarding PBS provoked negative reactions inside of the IC. One of them was imposition of foreigners to oversee transformation of the existing broadcasters into public service.

282 Decisions were issued on May 24, 2002. It was Decision imposing the Law on RTVRS, Decision on Imposing the Law on FRTV, and Decision imposing the Law on the Basis of the Public Broadcasting System and on the Public Broadcasting Service of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/mediadec/archive.asp?m=&yr=2002. Accesson on 24 March 2013. 283 Stiglmayer 2011. 284 Petritch 2013. 285 “I did not get along with Petrich. I could no longer operate freely as I used to. I became a big fish in a small pond, and it was time for me to go”. Heselock 2011. 145

The IC estimated that the hardest part would be separation of the property between newly established services, and the OHR appointed an international transfer agent with the task to oversee this process. 286 This decision was issued in the summer 1999 and deadline for the whole process to be over was January 1, 2000. Without support of the rest of the IC, the OHR managed to install the agent, John Shearer, a British citizen and former BBC producer, on the OHR pay roll only in April 2000.287 One year later, the transfer agent was renamed into a “Broadcasting Agent of the High Representative,” decision which gave him a very broad powers of the de facto governor of the PSB.288 For the local media, Shearer came to announce the “final death” of RTVBIH, and “turn the situation upside down to create the system.”289 His first decisions were to let go some people who were the most recognizable faces of the existing broadcast media in Bosnia, and these decisions were highly criticized by the public.290 The harshest reaction came from the part of the independent media, led by the weekly magazine Dani, which published a series of critical articles. In one of articles, the author wrote about “Napoleonic style” and “divine powers” of Shearer.291 The other one reads:

While we follow how the OHR officials are lamenting about necessity of training...about disciplining a cow that for years was sucking on the state udder, and all other proposed revolutionary changes of Shearer concept, we can hardly resist the feeling that all that is just a one more political-economic experiment with the media and the people, led by our soul keepers from the OHR.292

The IC was not completely satisfied with Shearer’s performance, either, as well as with work of BBC consultancy team, which came in 2002 to draft a plan for future PSB. Frane

286 Decision on the appointment of the Transfer Agent and the Expert Team for the establishing of public service broadcasting, 15 April 2000. Available at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/mediadec/default.asp?content_id=86. Accessed on 24 November 2012. 287 By decision, Mr. John Shearer was named as the Transfer Agent, while Mr. Mike Gilmore (accountant) and Mr. Jeff Baker (engineer), were named as the members of the Expert Team “to provide the Transfer Agent with relevant technical assistance.” 288 Second Decision on Restructuring the Public Broadcasting System in BiH, 23 October 2000. Available at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/mediadec/default.asp?content_id=91. Accessed on 28 November 2012. 289 Čengić, Nermin, “Zemljotres u Sivom domu”, Bh. Dani, No. 171, 8 September 2000. 290 “Shearer and his associates, acted as they had ultimate say in everything. He used to dismiss or hire people. He was the one to let go Senad Hadžifejzović, probably the most recognizable TV person in the country, with explanation that he has was “face from the war”!? And we all can have different opinion on Senad, it is true, but you cannot let somebody go because he had a face that was too familiar during the war. That is not good explanation for such decision. And Senad was not the only victim of Shearer,” said Radenko Udovičić, former journalist and member of the Board of Director for FTV. Interview, 30 August 2012, Sarajevo. 291 Emir Suljagić. “Izvan kontrole.” Bh. Dani, No. 175, 6 October 2000. 292 Nermin Čengić. “Zemljotres u Sivom domu,” Bh. Dani, No. 171, 8 September 2000. 146

Maroević remembers that Shearer was “the chief” at the TV, acknowledging that BBC team did have some good ideas “but they did not know how to implement it to the end.”293 Maroević recognises the good sides of this engagement, like the creation of the countrywide radio station BH Radio 1, as well as development of the FTV, but considered that countrywide broadcaster remained underdeveloped.294

According to Bergant, the EBU met British team sporadically:

When they learned that what we think is much different from their opinion, they decided to stop contacting us. To my knowledge, the whole reform of the PBS in Bosnia had a good intention, but disagreements among locals and internationals led to imposition, and final results are not satisfactory. Locals made mistake since they were not open enough in their negotiations, but also political will was missing for something to be done. Even more, there was, sometimes, open blocking of the process. The head of the British team was not professional at all, especially not in the field of the modern broadcasting management.295

Over two years of engagement, the team drafted a so-called reconstruction plan, which became a blue print for the future law on PSB. 296 The plan was adopted by the management of the broadcasters in April 2004, but never fully implemented.

The main principle of the plan was a technical solution in which all the production and transmission would be separated from the broadcasters and undertaken by the common enterprise - the Corporation. As stated in the plan, the entity broadcasters would keep their editorial independence, and buy all the technical services from either the Corporation or some private producer. With this, an internal market would be established, and naturally be developed and retained.297

The Corporation was never established. Radenko Udovičić noticed that the system was rather an idealistic plan that realistic:

293 Maroević 2011. 294 ‘Finally, the whole Shearer story was over when he got in dispute with OHR people and he left living TV on the half way to nowhere,” Maroveći remembers. 295 Bergant, 2013. 296 “BBC plan rekonstrucije za Javni RTV sistem u Bosni i Hercegovini.” On file with the author. 297 “This was a very fine idea, but hardly possible to be put it in place in Bosnia since people just could not understand all the benefits of the system, and they used to work with completely different approach.” Trivić 2012. 147

This was ideal construction of the system, but it clashed with different obstructions, divers readings, different economic interests, heritage from the war, unclear legal solutions, employees feeling of being forgotten along the process and public atmosphere that was not supportive. In the meantime, from the strong and decisive international interference, the situation changed and everything was left to the local authorities, and management of the three broadcaster, and employees. (Udovičić 2012:126)

Daniel Lindval, who worked for the OHR on PSB reform for a while, expressed a similar opinion:

This model was just a bit too intelligent for its own good. By proposing a technical solution to a political issue, a failure in implementation of issues of practical nature could bring grave consequences for the total system and even open up for re-politicalization of the broadcasters. In addition, when it came to implementation of the technical issues, the international community was less interested.298

Maroević claims that the plan was perfect, but not realistic for post war Bosnia:

They drafted proposal based on BBC experience, with only tiny incorporation of Bosnian particularities. The same as it was done in the case of the CRA, or the Freedom of Access to Information Law, the Press Council... All of these decisions were all based on copy-paste principles, and hardly applicable in reality.299

The BBC team left in 2004 when the state-wide channel, BHTV1, begun to broadcast. Shortly before the team left, Milan Trivić was appointed as director of the newly established countrywide broadcaster. As he remembers, every decision he made had to be elaborated with the team.300 Duška Jurišić, long time journalist for FTV and BHTV 1, remembers that John Shearer used to intervene in the daily work of editors and journalists;

298 Daniell Lindval Interview, 2 October 2011, Skype. 299 Udovičić 2012. 300 “It was very hard to work in these circumstances. Every morning I had to report to those experts and to explain each single decision I made day before, and plans for that day. Honestly they were directors not me, and they were giving me decisions I had to implement and some were impossible to put in practice since they were just transferring something from highly develop society in post-country and TV system that was on the level of development from the70s.” Trivić 2012. 148

He used to call us in for a talk, and I always wonder what his job is really, since he used to call us in for petty arguments we had among ourselves, but at the same time, he did not intervene in editorial policy. It was strange for me.301

Both are claiming that this attitude of the “experts” left journalists insecure of what and how they can do, in the same or similar way politicians used to observe their work previously.

Not for sale

Two decisions made by the BBC team caused enormous dissatisfaction, contributing to final rejection by the public, and employees of the System, but also authorities, of almost all other aspects of the plan. First idea was to dismiss a large number of employees, and the second to sell the radio television building in Sarajevo where RTVBIH was situated since 1984 and at the time was home for FTV and newly established PSB.

The idea was to sell this large building, and from that money to cover some of the debts, and from the rest to build two new ones - one in Sarajevo and the other one in Banja Luka, which should in the future be less expensive to maintain.302 The solution was based on the fact that the whole system is very expensive, and that it generated more and more debt, since there was not sustainable system of financing. When it was time to implement this part of the reform, new High Representative Paddy Ashdown, came to Bosnia, and he together with his team and newly appointed head of the EC delegation in Sarajevo who became more influential back that time, were less interested in the PSB.303

The trade union immediately rejected dismissal of the employees, and the OHR was not too eager to push for it. Despite criticism, Ashdown decided to go on with the plan of selling the

301 Jurišić 2012. 302 Snježanja Mulić. “Poslije Shearera - Fürer.” Bh. Dani No. 330. 10 October 2003. Radenko Udovičić (2003) wrote “The international community put classical pressure on RTV employees and management to accept the BBC plan, as well as the new law. Blackmail was resorted to using an earlier announced European Commission donation of 1.5 million euros, as well as support to a new way of collecting the obligatory RTV subscription fee. Namely, public broadcasters were given the message that if they do not accept the plan and the law, the international community would withdraw donations and would no longer insist on a new solution according to which RTV subscription fee amounting to six marks (3 euros) would inseparably be attached to the land telephone bill. “ 303 “Paddy Ashdown did not care about PSB or the media. Inside of the EC delegation, we had Hansjorg Kretschmer who was very supportive, and then came Michael Humphrey who did not want to get engaged too much. And that was the time when everything related to PSB started to end. The EC for a while continued giving some money for it since reform was connected to EU enlargement process, but it was not that important anymore.” Maroević 2011. 149 building and called for buyers. Same day, employees in Sarajevo placed a huge banner on the building saying “Not for sale”. However, no buyer came and the building was never sold.

“The main problem with BBC and Shearer, and the international involvement in PSB reform, was that they were building a house of cards, with no real foundations to rely on in any given moment,” Milan Trivić said, adding that all the changes did not affect the attitude of the local population who did not understand what does it mean to have a public broadcaster.304 “Even people who are working for PSB still do not understand what their role is. They have to be responsible to the citizens, not politicians. And they do not get that. That is why PSB hardly has any perspective in Bosnia, even though there is no alternative for it,” Trivić said.305

Duška Jurišić agrees that people in Bosnia still believe that state broadcasters are controlled by the governments, and that they never really accepted the idea of public media. But, as someone who worked for the System for a long time, she observed that the IC, in this case the OHR and EC, at one moment gave up on the reform, and left the broadcasters to local politicians, which was a huge set back.

Bergant joins in this skepticism saying that the IC in Bosnia made many mistakes in the process of media assistance. “The main mistake was transferring foreign models without learning enough about local conditions, tradition and aspirations. I believe that the entire Bosnian episode was a bad example. Much better would be done, with respect toward professional and ethic norms,” he adds.306

Trivić is very skeptical whether the international organizations who were involved in media assistance ever had any vision of the countrywide broadcaster. He argues that from the very beginning, three broadcasters were developing in different directions - RTRS was downsizing, while FTV and the state PBS grew. And all three were becoming burdened by growing financial crisis:

Our problem was that FTV was so strong since people understood that the goal is that two entity broadcasters collaborate and become stronger. But it made countrywide TV weaker. It is very political and comes along with the idea that Bosnia is a weak state union compromised of two strong entities.

304 Trivić 2012. 305 Ibid. 306 Bergant 2013. 150

At the end, two entity broadcasters became strong competitors with BHTV, and the IC supported that.307

Trivić gave better illustration of this issue remembering that he hardly got any support from the international team for the idea of branding BHTV1 as broadcaster for the entire country:

My intention was to make a logo, the sign that will be brand and symbolize something that connects the country. BBC consultants were firstly strongly against it. I proposed it to the Board, and they rejected it. At the same time, the BBC team kind of changed their mind supporting me. And it continued like that - back and forth - for a while. For me, it was time to finally understand that we are not supposed to work on something that will integrate the whole country in one information space.308

Both, Trivić and Jurišić, consider that PBS was less dependent on local politicians when under the control of the IC. “When they left, a real struggle who will take TV over began, and it is still ongoing,” Trivić concludes.

The possibility for the politicians to control public broadcasters was opened through unclear legal aspects of the system. For example the way how the managerial board is chosen. Trapped in the DPA, the board has to be composed of people who represent biggest ethnic groups in the country - Bosniak, Serb, Croat and other. Their nationality is often more important than their expertise. At the same time, even though nominated by the CRA and appointed by the parliaments, people who are board members are often chosen among those who are close to the local political options.

Radenko Udovičić, who was a member of the FTV board for more than two years as Serb, believes that he and his colleagues were “incarcerated” by the national patterns of the communities that they were representing:

If you want to do something different, you are afraid how it will be accepted by ‘your group’. I have to say that it is true that often members of the board do

307 Jurišić 2012. 308 Trivić 2012. 151

have political strings with those in powers, too. It is impossible to work like that. You have boards with one Bosniak, one Serb, one Croat and one representative of the Others, but no people who understand what is their task. It is a huge burden when somebody expects from you to make decision in the name of one nation. For me it was not that hard, I have to admit, since I am Serb in the Federation - for those in RS, they do not have anything to do with me and they do not care about me since I decided to be Serb in Federation. And those in Federation also do not care since they know that RS does not care.309

Udovičić adds that the only solution is to have boards with more people from NGOs, the academic community and others who will represent interests of all the people, no matter of ethnical background. “But, we have to change a law, and that is impossible for the time being,” he concludes pointing to the biggest obstacle to PSB reform in Bosnia.310

Is anybody watching?

Unfortunately, along all these reforms, little attention was given to the quality of the program, after all one of the most important aspects for any media. During the process, some of the observers warned the public about this forgotten aspect:

Television can have billions of cameras, 100.000 scopes and transmitters strong as CIA spy satellites, but if there is no program, it is like it does not exist at all. In the same way the TV does not have reason to exist if that program is not good, and does not respect some of the basic rules of the profession and market, and if it does not attract audience.311

In his book, Udovičić point to the results of an unofficial survey made by Media Plan Institute showing how many of the viewers in Bosnia are following TV Nova, a Croatian commercial station, followed by Croatian state television HRT (Udovičić, 2012, 130). However,

309 Udovičić 2012. 310 Ibid. 311 Emir Imamović. “Stvaranje nacionalne televizije: Loša prvoaprilska šala,” Bh. Dani, No 246, 1 March 2002. 152 the same survey shows that among the most popular TV channels is FTV. Mareco Index Bosnia agency conduct regular surveys on audience share in Bosnia, based on a panel of 500 households. Their survey for 2012 are pointing that different TV stations outside of Bosnia have 35, 4 percent audience share, while FTV is the most popular local TV station. The same source shows that the most popular program, beside evening news on FTV, are soap operas and reality shows. Out of 10 programs mentioned in Mareco Index, only three are news program, while the rest is entertainment.312

According to Jusić and Džihana (2008; 89), TV ratings and viewers’ habits can be seen as a confirmation of the overall division of BiH along ethnic lines. Those two authors are quoting existing data, based on studies conducted in Bosnia, according to which in Federation the most popular TV is FTV, while in RS is RTRS. However, these ratings can be interpreted in a way that people are primarily looking for the information about events in their nearest surroundings, and that is what keeps these channels in the list of the popular programs. However, both broadcasters do not pay much attention how to inform their audience about what is going on in the other entity, and above all often they even do not provide information about the events in remote parts of the part of the country that they cover. More important, their program is not appealing to the audience, unlike HRT that has a good quality program with all different aspects that public broadcaster has to have, from educational to entertainment program.

This observation is corroborated by results of the Media Plan Institute’s survey conducted in 2009 about the trust of the audience have in local media, asking, among other questions, how important it is that editorials are “in accordance with my ethnic group.” Only 11 per cent of the people answered that it does matter, while 35 per cent considers it “relatively important”, and 54 per cent of respondents said that it is not important at all (Udovičić 2012; 205). The same survey showed that for the most people in Bosnia (79 per cent) TV remains primary source of information followed by the Internet (10 per cent), radio (8 per cent) and print (3 per cent) (Udovičić 2012; 194).

When it comes to the public broadcasters, while FTV and RTRS do have significant audience share, BHT is hardly popular. “BHT has to exist because state of Bosnia and Herzegovina exists. The real problem is that nobody is watching this channel. According to

312 It is important to stress that most of the people I spoke with, and who are working in the media, express serious doubts in relevance of any of available survey on audience share in Bosnia. 153 every survey, it is only at the sixth or even seventh place for the audience share,” Udovičić said.313

The program that one can follow on any of the three public broadcasters in Bosnia is composed of old or new soap operas, repetition of low quality domestic or foreign educational program, lot of sports, and news programming that is produced in an old fashion way, often biased and politicized. Editorial policy, in the case of the entity broadcasters, is clearly influenced by ruling parties, that do have their say in appointment of editors and directors, and existing legal framework does not provide protection. According to 2010 yearly report on activities, BHRT, state wide broadcaster, broadcasted around 7220 hours of programming, with about 40 per cent of its own production.314 Almost half of that is news programming, about 11 per cent entertainment, about 10 per cent documentary and about 9 per cent children's program.

According to the existing rules, at least 40 per cent of the weekly program should be composed out of news and educational program, including 10 per cent dedicated to the issues of refugees and displaced persons, minorities, and all the vulnerable groups of population. At the same time, at least 6 per cent of the weekly program for public broadcasters has to be for children. These rules are hardly respected in practice. Just one of the examples is that none of the public broadcasters has any program that is adjusted for deaf people, or any other vulnerable group. 315

Editorial policy, in the case of the entity broadcasters, is clearly influenced by ruling parties, that do have their word in appointment of editors and directors, and existing legal framework does not provide any protection against it.

Conclusion

The process surrounding PBS reform in Bosnia maybe the best mirrors the process of a state-building. It is characterized with constant political obstructions, the lack of clear vision and strategy, bad timing and wrong partners. The imposition of the decisions, instead of the process based on consultations and fact-finding, was one more cause for the lack of the progress when it

313 Udovičić 2012. 314 Radio televizija Bosne i Hercegovine, “Izvještaj o radu i poslovanju BHRT-a za 2010. godinu.” Available at http://www.bhrt.ba/lat/?p=863. Accessed on 26 March 2013. 315 Pravilo 57/2011 o javnim radio i televizijskim stanicama. Available at http://rak.ba/bih/index.php?uid=1324649058. Accessed on 26 March 2013. 154 comes to PBS reform. Protectorates that was imposed over the PBS that did not have a lasting impact on the professionalization of journalism, nor did it transform the PBS into a tool for enhancing democracy. Many mistakes were made along the way, starting with delay in creating public broadcasters. According to Kontić, there is opinion that mistakes in strategic thinking, or more accurately overpowers of private interests of some individuals closed to the IC funds, are the key reason for delay in establishment of the PBS (2006). Senad Avdić is doubtful if the whole idea of establishment of the PBS establishment would have been more successful if initiated earlier, or if the money invested in some other projects were directed toward the PBS. According to him, the real mistake was that the whole process was made upside-down, and created from above with imposed decisions, and the result is that “the overall picture of the media is not changed, or even profited, in professional terms.”316 It is questionable if this produce better results, or if it was realistic approach, at all in early postwar years. But, it is one of the options that could have been looked into if more investigation has been conducted in the field. There is one more aspect that the creation of the PBS in Bosnia mirrored the state- building process: the establishment of three channels, to cover the territory based on division made by the DPA, basically ethnic and one countrywide. Over the time, the two entity channels developed, while the as countrywide one remained poor and marginal.

Finally, the system that was created from the very beginning, as well as today, is too expensive for the small postwar country, and as such it is hardy possible that it will survive. Collection of the monthly subscription fee in recent years rose, in Federation, to 70 percent.317 One of the primary reasons is political since some of the political parties are advocating boycotting of subscription fees to show disagreement with editorial policy. They can do that as long as there is no law regulations that will secure that citizens’ have to pay obligatory fees.

At the same time, PSB has even bigger problem with debts that accumulated over the years. Because of debts, BHRT was in 2010 excluded from possibility to broadcast over the satellite. According to the official yearly report from 2010, BHRT has to pay each month 40.000 Euro to cover debts. 318 Over the last couple of years, RTVFBiH managed to decrease its debts

316 Avdić 2012. 317 Udovičić 2012. 318 Izvještaj o radu i poslovanju BHRT-a za 2010. godinu. 155 from 12 to 9 million Euros.319 The rest of the system is in similar position of everyday struggle for survivor.

“We have not one system to take care of, but three - three boards of directors, three general directors, 15 executive directors, who know how many editors, about 2000 employees... And what to expect with all that?”, Udovičić rightly concluded mentioning the issue often forgotten by all those involved in the process of reforming the PSB, or the media in Bosnia.320

319 Udovičić 2012. 320 Ibid. 156

CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSIONS

It is generally accepted that the media mirrors the society that creates it. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the media then – like the society – are over politicized, prone to manipulation, hostile to dissenting opinion, and constantly on the edge of some kind of conflict. This is a society still searching for meaningful interpretation of democracy. In the meantime, over 17 years since the end of the war, Bosnia exists as a barely functional state. Those with the power – be the local politicians or foreign administrators – are no accountable to the people in the country, who in turn have made very little effort to change the situation. Like the media development, the entire country is moving in circles since the end of the war.

Media assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a huge project, nearly as big as the process of democratization and state building. The project was successful as long as it was supported by huge amounts of money, and glamorous enough to attract international attention. Once the novelty wore off, however, and money began drying up the development of Bosnia and its media began to fade away. The entire democratization and state building process took place within the framework of external imposition of solutions and forcing of development. This imposition, at least in the case of Bosnia, created dependent society, unable to function on its own. While democratization might require external help to flourish, it is meaningless if the entire process is driven or dictated by external powers. Only through a respectful transfer of knowledge can the process result in a functional state and a democratic society that cherishes a free and responsible market place of ideas.

Today in Bosnia there are nine daily newspapers, 101 periodicals, 143 radio and 44 TV stations, plus a public broadcasting system.321 Despite this seemingly flourishing media scene, the reality is quite bleak, as evidenced by number of studies. One of them is the Media Barometer published in 2012, a tool described as “a self-assessment instrument to gauge the status of freedom of expression and of the media in a national context.”322 Panel of experts from different sectors was composed and, based on these parameters, concluded after 17 years of international intervention and media development programs, the standard of journalism in Bosnia is “fairly low.”

321 Source CRA and Press Council BiH. 322 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Balkan Media Barometer 2012. 157

According to IREX Media Sustainability Index, from 2010 to 2012, every aspect of the Bosnian media is in decline, including free speech, professional journalism, plurality of news sources, business management and supporting institutions, all characteristics of democracy.323 Both indexes are describing the situation after donors became less interested in the media, leaving them to survive on small advertising revenues in a barely functional economy. Those media organizations created with support from international donors, often with unclear or nonexistent self-sustainability plans, were faced with two choices – seek help from politicians, or fight for survivor in the existing, for media, unfaivorable market.324

This study has shown that the intervention in Bosnia was a large experiment by many organizations that had little or no coordination, weak strategic planning, and was accompanied by constant clashes among participants - and as such left little positive impact on the society. Often the methods worked against the supposed aims. In that process, undemocratic methods were used to achieve democracy, including imposition of laws and decisions, or even use of the military power against the media, and with the purpose to introduce freedom of the speech, democratic and pluralistic media. In the case of media assistance, this happened with the regulatory bodies, with the media that were established by the IC, and with the PBS reform. I could not find any decisions, or strategy, that mentioned creation of a free and responsible market place of ideas, or anything similar. Even if we consider that this term is more used in academia than by practitioners, it can still be argued, based on results and media situation that more should have been done to create an environment receptive to a wide range of opinions. Unfortunately the OHR, even more than other organizations, was hostile to any criticism and reluctant to exchange ideas with the local population or the media. Furthermore, the findings of the study above shows that the Bosnian media faced pressure from the IC in much the same way as it did from local politicians, before, during or after the war.325

323 IREX “Media Sustainability Index 2012.” Available at http://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/u105/EE_MSI_2012_Bosnia.pdf. Accessed on 10 February 2013. 324 One of the examples is from Republika Srpska where government started donating money before the elections in 2010 for private media outlets, as well as to the public media. The practice continued. Asked if this affects their work, Željko Kopanja, director and owner of two biggest dailies in RS entity said that the money did not make his media to be more “good intentional” toward the government, but that in “journalist’s and editor’s minds probably exist certain level of self-censorship. “Everybody will tell you that is out of question, but probably there is some type of not maybe ethical obligation, but some kind of feeling that the government helped us when it was very hard to survive,” he said. “Vladini milioni za privatne medije u RS.” Center for Investigative Journalism BiH. Available at http://www.cin.ba/Stories/AdHoc/?cid=1048,2,1. Accessed on 13 February 2012. 325 The High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch, at the press conferance in Sarajevo at the end of his mandate, said: “The media should critically examine the actions of the government, point out the good things and the bad things, and not simply shrug their shoulders, declare governments incompetent and ask for the Office of the High 158

The fact that Bosnia today is such a weak state should lead to serious questions about the effectiveness of semi-protectorate methods used in the process of democratization and state- building. At the same time, the postwar reality made choice of local political partners rather difficult, the IC failed to put enough effort and trust in local professionals and experts when it came to setting the directions of the changes.

Other than to stop the war, it is hard to define the final goal of the international intervention in Bosnia. If we suppose that it was the creation of democratic and functional state, the research suggest the actions of organizations involved in democratization and state-building were not always consistent with those aims. Having that in mind, we can wonder whether it was likely that the media turn rapidly into a trustworthy source of information. Can the media even function freely in a semi-protectorate situation, after the conflict, in a country where the rule of law is limited?

Branko Perić, a lawyer who worked briefly as a journalist, considers that it was never realistic, finding the main problem within the existing constitutional arraignments. “We have two entities, 10 cantons, a strong entity of RS, weak central government ... All this effects people, and the how they think much more than media could have done in any given moment,” Perić believes.326 Similar was conclusion in the 2001 ICG report (20), suggesting the Dayton Agreement was effective as an armistice in 1995, but it has failed to provide a foundation for a functional state. According to this report, DPA constitutional machinery, “with a weak central government required to wrestle with a structure deeply divided into two entities, three constitutive peoples, ten disparate cantons in one half of the country, and effectively three armies ... it is unworkable and self-defeating.”

Dayton is probably reflected most clearly in the PBS system composed of three separated channels that in theory should cooperate while in practice, as shown in the chapter IV, they compete and undermine one another, while being excessively politicized. As such, the system is weak and expensive, and does not serve to the public interests.

Representative’s intervention, as the media has tended to do in the past. This is now a new era, and this needs to be taken into account. At the same time, I wish that the media would also scrutinize my Office more seriously than they have been doing lately. We are not perfect. I regularly read your newspapers and watch television as much as I can, and I take serious criticism seriously. But I cannot accept malicious and factually wrong campaigns, which simply shower us with baseless and libelous accusations, such as that the international community is corrupt or a Mafia- like gang.” OHR Press Release from the Press Conference “From Dayton to Europe.” 16 August 2001. Sarajevo. Transcript available at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressb/default.asp?content_id=5125. Accessed on 2 April 2013. 326 Perić 2012. 159

Both the DPA and the PBS system reflect how most of the projects developed in Bosnia during the democratization process are reflections of the interests by the various international actors. The PBS was pushed by the Europeans who cherish public broadcasting; experiments were made with introduction of media laws almost impossible to implement in a weak state. Borka Rudić and Duška Jurišić recognize this trend with media assistance pointing to two examples - OBN and FERN, bot created to satisfy and reflect ideas of the IC, rather than being based on local needs and reality. Jurišić argues that creation of these media constructs the overall international intervention, which she characterize as been made up of ad hoc ideas, without a clear strategy, or lacking an explanation for many important steps. Many of the projects, like OBN, were abandoned when faced with difficulties, or the need for sustainable plan: “If you decide to get involved with something, you have to take responsibility, and finish what you have started,” she concludes.327 Similarly, as in the case of artificially created media, the IC abandoned the laws imposed along the process, being active in promoting them and pushing for adaptation, but implementation was never a priority.

Senad Avdić thinks some good came from the entire process, “but not at the level it was promised, and definitely it does not match efforts and money invested along the way.”328 He instead sees the positive changes on the media scene coming from a process that would happened even without media assistance, as a result of the post-Communist transition. Even this can be transferred to overall situation in the country, where, 17 years after the war, some improvements are traceable, but it is hard to say if they were achieved due to the international intervention, or are just produces of time and the influence of global factors.

Avdić notices one aspect forgotten in Bosnia, but it is similar in many other countries where media assistance was deployed - that the media were not introduced with new technologies or methods of work. This approach left local media underdeveloped, and old- fashioned in every sense. “I am not sure if we are where some of our colleagues in the West are today, and that is a huge issue when it comes to the media. The IC, if they wanted to help, could have introduced us with new technology and standards, and that would make us if not equal than closer to Western standards,” Avdić said.329 Today, most of the Bosnian media are still using very old, outdated technology, and their presence online has become significant since 2010. The Internet sites from the local media are far from what online media in more developed countries

327 Jurišić 2012. 328 Avdić 2012. 329 Avdić 2012. 160 look like, with little use of anything else but simple text, with little or no possibility for interaction with the audience, mirrored by a will to interact from the side of the local media. At the same time their peers in the Western countries are facing radical changes in the media sector, as traditional media struggle to deal with the influence of the Internet.

This study showed how the IC approach toward the media was often similar to that towards political parties, and hardly can be described as democratic. In their report from 1998, the MEC admits that methods used are not in accordance with democratic standards, stating that it is the way to work in post-war surrounding. Some of the interviewees openly talked about the influence of the OHR or OSCE in shaping of editorial policies, stating that the same was done by some individual governments. This fact is illustrated in what Senka Kurt said recalling the practise according to which OHR used to call Oslobođenje asking from editors to interview their officials if they wanted to transmit some message. 330 Julian Braithwaite explains that the IC has had a political agenda, and was buying editorial policy for that purpose. “Many embassies were doing much more, directly, while trying to buy media coverage. At the same time, the media had to accept that since they would not survive without that sort of support.” 331

Milorad Živanović, scholar and NGO activist, with a short time career as journalist, believes the international intervention in Bosnia happened without clear goals, while the main organizations involved did not know what would happen at the end, and how the things will develop.332 His conclusion is similar to that of Tanya Domi, as somebody who did have the power to influence the process, and who admitted that the IC in Bosnia did not really know what to do. She recalled the fact that Bosnia was the first country after WW2 where international intervention on such a large scale was deployed. “We made many mistakes - right from the DPA itself and omission of the media in that document. We lost at least three years to address the fundamental problems of the media there. Today, when politics are quite polarised in Bosnia, it shows that we have not done a good job”, she concludes.333

Unlike Domi, Haselock, who had the most important role at the very beginning of the media assistance in Bosnia and was an architect of the process, thinks it was moderately successful. What could have been done differently, he said, is to make some decisions earlier, with more public consultations: “But the structure, the idea to turn state into public broadcaster,

330 Kurt 2012. 331 Braithwaite 2010.

332 Živanović 2012. 333 Domi 2012. 161 to create legal structure for regulating the sector, and to introduce some forms of standards for broadcast, would be the same.”334 Haselock’s attitude is similar to what can be found in other post-conflict situations where international intervention took place and practitioners were not able to see mistakes when projects were over.

One of the reasons for this attitude is that they measure success in technical terms. For the OHR, the goal was to establish new media before the elections, to introduce the laws, and to spread the messages and spirit of the DPA. From that point of view, their mission could be considered completed. In this reading, it was not up to the IC, but the responsibility of the local community who, once given the tools were expected to learn how to use them and then build themselves a functional state. From this point of view, any failure is due to the locals, rather than to the international actors. This way of looking at the entire process is only possible because of the semi-protectorate status, which drained responsibility from everyone in the process an also allowed everyone involved to blame someone else for any failures.

Braithwaite, also former employee of the OHR, finds a problem in the fact that some of the projects - primarily artificially established media - did not make a difference in overall media situation. It is important to say that Braithwaite was with the OHR at the moment when the media were not priority any more, and when OBN, the biggest project, was shut down. He considers that help received from different donors made those media vulnerable, while local community regarded them as the voice of the IC, rather than the media they should rely on - the same issues some local analysts (Bratić) recognized as a source of alienation of local populations from internationally supported media projects. “These media were neither recognizable as genuine media in a Western European sense, nor commercially success. And in a certain way were patronized with non-transparent donations from people with political agenda,” Braithwaite said.335

Similarly, Jeffrey Hayman, who finds it “a little bit strange for the IC to come and dictate how the things should look like,” adding that the local media community should decide on their needs, while the IC should only provide support and guidance. 336 The same conclusion came from different studies over the last decade - development cannot be dictated but built up in

334 Haselock 2011. 335 Braithwaite 2010.

336 Heyman 2012. 162 accordance with needs of the local community.337 In 1996, number of local media professional advised donors not to establish a county wide media but instead to look the existing broadcasters controlled by the governments. The advice was not considered, and the only people that benefited were local politicians who used opportunity to continue spreading their messages though the existing local media. Finally, maybe it is hard to judge the impact of the media assistance on democratization and state-building though what the direct participants in the process concluded - and it was not my intention to do so. However, their assessment of the situation points toward some of important aspects in the process that should be considered. According to interviewees for my study, this method is hardly to be recommended since it conflicts with basic democratic principles, as well as the role of the media in the society. Democratization is the process of gaining freedoms, and learning about responsibilities that freedoms has, and status of semi- protectorate limits natural development of this process. This study has sought to understand if media assistance in semi-protectorate is a good tool for democratization and state building. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina was taken as an example of exceptionally large international engagement, with debatable results, where solutions were more often imposed, than introduced through consultations and cooperation with local community, being politicians or professionals. The main conclusion shows that accountability, responsibility, cooperation, coordination, and strategy are just some of the missing elements in a semi-protectorate, important in the democratization process, and to help building of an effective state. When it comes to media assistance, the semi-protectorate that was introduced in Bosnia after the war imposed a new regulatory and legal framework. This framework was supposed to work in a weak state, where local politicians were not willing to work on strengthening institutions, and the state, but instead worked to maintain positions gained during the war as the only way to hold on power. The IC, at the same time, afraid of possible a new outburst of the conflict, constrained by different interests and by lack of experience and knowledge, was more willing to keep status quo that to force state-building or democracy, which requires changes.

337 Just one of the examples is latest project of the Center for International Media Assistance conducted by Tara Susman-Peña and published under the title “Making Media Development More Effective.” 9 October 2012. The report concludes that; “understanding the local context is absolutely critical to success, but even beyond understanding, letting a country drive its own development means that it will be a partner rather than just a passive recipient. Further more it recalls Ellen Huma’s first commandment of media development - build from the bottom up, not the top down. Western models don’t necessarily work. The best media development is local. Available at http://cima.ned.org/publications/making-media-development-more-effective. Accessed on 31 March 2013. 163

Given this situation, enhancing on the freedom of the speech and creation of the free and responsible market place of ideas was not something either local politicians or the IC were likely to support, since it could signify a loss of the power for both. Explanation for this could be found in existing fears that it could lead to a situation they would have found hard to control – even a new conflict – but they would have been equally nervous about the creation of a free and open minded society that would reject a semi-protectorate and the roll of the outside players, and demanded democratic leadership. If such a marketplace could have been good for citizens of post-conflict state, we cannot learn from Bosnian example. The imposition of solutions and widespread non-democratic practice signified here was no space for the exchange of ideas, or debates. At the same time, those who did imposing were not accountable to the local community, or responsible for the consequences. For much of the local community the IC became a burden, and they remained passive while waiting for their mandate to be over. The semi-protectorate, and imposition, could have been more effective if strategies employed were more thoughtfully planned, and made in consultations with local professionals, in this case in the field of the media, that should have been made into partners in the process. Mistaken strategies, according to Izabella Karlowicz (2002/2003; 116), can have disastrous long-term effects on democratization process, and can provoke a backsliding of the entire situation. In this case, mistaken strategies did led to the creation of the media that are, almost 17 years since the end of the war, still not professional, often biased, politicized, barely sustainable, and too close to politician to perform their watchdog function. Instead, political reporting is very opinionated, and trivial journalism dominates even when it comes to very important topics.338 Different sources are showing that the media, as well as public, are maybe even more “Daytonized” today than ever before, as I tried to picture in this chart. Constant obstructions from local politicians, a weak civil society sector and lack of readiness by the media to control development of their sector additionally worsened the entire situation, creating cyclic reality in which everything is spinning for years.

338 One of the examples is media coverage of the arrest of Radovan Karadžić which lacked credibility and relevance. See Nidžara Ahmetašević and Marcus Tanner (eds). “History Overshadows by Trivia: Regional Media Coverage of Radovan Karadžić Arrest.” BIRN Justice Report and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Sarajevo, 2009. 164

Looking at the entire process, it can be said that “Daytonized media,” that is a media deeply divided along ethnic lines, are more problematic than ever. Despite all the efforts and non-traceable amounts of money invested, Bosnia’s media still cannot be considered a reliable source of information on which citizens can base their decisions which - as many authors are showing - is one of the cornerstones of democracy in a functional state.

However, many of the methods used in Bosnia could be taken as guidelines for what (not) to do in the future. In the first place, the Bosnian example teaches us that, before any strategy is made, those involved in reconstruction need to have in depth knowledge of the local circumstances, traditions, and needs. However, it I also recognized that this is not always easy to achieve, especially when country concerned is a post-conflict society where urgent assistance is needed.

The timing of the intervention also makes a huge difference in outcome. In Bosnia, a big mistake was to hold the first post-war elections to early, when voters were not able to make judgments about candidates based on thorough consideration of their programs, but instead just relied on old fears and hate from the war, which were reinforced by the unreformed media. 165

The lack of accountability and responsibility from those supposed to introduce democracy to the country is probably the biggest problem faced by the Bosnian semi- protectorate, or any other. The imposition relied for its strength on military and economic power of the IC and the donors who came to the country to implement projects. Unfortunately, these projects were often based on the interest of the donating countries or organizations, rather than on that of the local community. Considering the Bosnian experience, the method of establishing new media and just hoping they will offer different voices and enhance plurality, did not prove successful. The strengthening of existing public and independent media, combined with assistance to develop professionally and technologically, and a clear plan for how to make them self - sustainable, would have been a better option.

Probably the biggest obstacle in Bosnia was that the Peace Agreement that failed to create functional state, but it rather recognized and that entrenched the divisions established through the war. And as the entire intervention, including the media assistance, was made in the spirit of the DPA - with politicians who profited from these divisions as partners - it could hardly led to success. Thus the media assistance reinforced these divisive structures, rather than helping in creating space for new ones.

Topic for some further research

At final notice, I turn to topics I did not investigate in this research, even though it came up in many of the interviews.

The IC did not dedicate enough attention to the process of dealing with the past in years immediately after the war and the topic was to a certain extent pushed aside. Instead, the IC dictated the language that should be used when the media are referring to events during the war, which provoked silence and the attitude that it is better not to talk about the war and war crimes. That left a void which was filled by nationalist politicians when the IC strong presence disappeared, with rhetoric about the war based on hate speech and propaganda. At the same time, neither the ICTY nor any local judicial or non-judicial body ever dealt with the role of the media during the war. If that had been done, an important message about the role of the media could have been sent to the public, and people responsible for ‘media-crimes’ sanctioned and removed from the position of influencing public opinion. 166

The role of the media and the media assistance in the process of facing with the past is something to be investigated more in the future, since not much is available presently.

One other topic for some future research could be the role of the local independent media. In the late 1980s Bosnia, like the rest of Yugoslavia, opened up its media. Youth media, which I discussed in my first chapter, introduced investigative journalism and became open and critical toward the government. Some of the media that exist today in Bosnia were created during that time and rely on the tradition of the socialist youth media. In many cases, they employ some of the journalist who were active even that. Additionally, during the war, part of the local media managed to keep professional, as much as war conditions allow them, and could have been good start for professionalization of the journalism. It could have been interesting to look into the impact of these media on democratization, and influence they had on shaping the way the public perceive overall situation, or did not have.

One other research that can follow the one presented in this study can concentrate on countries where the same or similar models like in Bosnia were applied. It is important to compare different case studies, but also to see how much the international community learned from Bosnian example and if some of those lessons were applied in similar circumstance, and what were, if any, achievements.

167

REFERENCES

Some references have been citied fully in the notes, mainly - References to newspapers, magazines such as The New York Times, Slobodna Bosna, Dani, The Independent, The Guardian, Novosti u medijima, ONASA, Javnost, Srpsko Oslobođenje, Službeni List BiH, Balkan Insight, IWPR, Associated Press. - Web sites such as www.ohr.int, www.icty.org - Documents like Dayton Peace Accords, indictments by the ICTY - Conventions like European Convention on Human Rights - Articles, OHR decisions and websites that have been fully referenced in the notes are not repeated here.

Sources

Interviews

Senad Avdić - journalist and editor for Sarajevo based weekly Slobodna Bosna. (8 September 2012, Sarajevo)

Christopher Bennett - From 1996 to 1999 he was a political analyst and deputy director of the International Crisis Group, specialising in the Balkans and based in Sarajevo, and then from May 2000 to June 2006, editor for NATO Review. In 2006 he returned to Bosnia as OHR Director of Communications and later on worked at different high level position inside of the OHR. Former journalist who covered war in Croatia and Bosnia. He is author of the two books about Bosnia. (28 March 2011, Banja Luka)

Boris Bergant - Deputy President for EBU 1998-2008 and member of the Administrative Council for EBU. (20 January 2013, email)

Julian Braithwaite - Political adviser and Director of Communications to HR Paddy Ashdown in 2002. Before Coming to Bosnia, he worked for the UK Foreign Office, first, in 1994, on NATO’s role in the Bosnia war, that he was seconded to the staff of the UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary general Thorvald Stoltenberger, than he served in the British Embassy in Belgrade as a political officer covering Kosovo. During the 1999 NATO bombardment of Serbia, he was special advisor to the Suprime Allied Commander General Wesley Clark. After his engagement in the Balkans, he returned to FCO. (15 August 2010, Skype)

Tanya L. Domi - Used to work with the OSCE from 1996 to 2000 at different position related to the media, including chairperson of MEC and Director of Press and Public Information Office. In US, she served as a congressional aide to the late Frank X. McCloskey, chief of staff to Hawaii State Senator Anthony Chang and served 15 years in the U.S. Army as an enlisted soldier and commissioned officer. (18 February 2012, Skype)

168

Almir Đikoli - TV and film carman in Sarajevo. (January 7, 2013. Ljubljana)

Duška Jurišić – editor and journalist from Sarajevo. She used to work for TV Sarajevo, TVBIH, OBN, FERN, FTV, and weekly Dani. (May 12, 2012, Skype)

Boro Kontić – professional journalist from Sarajevo, director of the Media Centre Sarajvo and BBC School of Journalism in Sarajevo. (2 September 2011, Sarajevo)

Senka Kurt - journalist and editor from Sarajevo. Senka was editor for daily Oslobođenje from 2001 - 2007, and journalist before that since 1991. (10 August 2012, Sarajevo)

Simon Haselock - came to Bosnia in late 1995 as NATO Spokesman in Sarajevo, from 1997 until early 2000 Mr. Haselock was the OHR Deputy High Representative for Media Affairs. Before coming to Bosnia, Mr. Haselock served for 23 years in the Royal Marines. (21 July 2011, Oxford)

Mehmed Halilović - former editor and journalist for daily Oslobođenje. After the war he was first media Ombudsman in Federation. (25 April 2012, Sarajevo)

Jeffrey Heyman – General Manager for Radio FERN 1998-1999. Before that he used to work for UN Radio in Croatia, Angola, Rwanda, and Cambodia. Before UN, Mr. Heyman was a Deputy Director at Kroll Associates, Inc., an international investigative firm in New York, directing matters involving highly specialised investigations, information gathering and analysis. (2 March 2012, Skype)

Dieter Loraine - Between 2001 and 2003 he was Acting Deputy Director General and Director of Communications for the CRA, and served as Special Adviser to the UK Press Complaints Commission. He took active role in designing and establishing from scratch the Bosnian Press Council. Between 1998 and 2001 he held two senior positions as Director of Broadcast Licensing and Director of Public Affairs in the IMC. Before working in the Balkans, Dieter ran a public relations company in the UK, and before he had career in the Royal Marines retiring in 1995 as Assistant Director of Public Relations for the Royal Marines in the UK Ministry of Defence. (2 July 2010, London)

Daniel Linvall - Senior Media Officer with OHR in 2005, responsible for PBS reform. Before the OHR, he worked for the EU Police Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina, between 2007 and 2008. From 2001 to 2005 he held the position as Advisor to the Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina and was involved in the EU pre-accession negotiation process. (2 October 2011, Skype) Frane Maroević – Director of Communications for the OHR from 2007 to 2010. Before OHR, he was spokesperson for the EC Mission in Bosnia 1999-2007. Before coming to Bosnia, from 1992 to 1999, he used to work as assistant producer at BBC World Service. (2 April 2011, Vienna)

Kathrin Nyman Macalf - Sweedesh law scholar. In Bosnia she was engaged as media expert on several projects including IMC and CRA. (21 January 2010, email)

Dunja Mijatović - One of the founders of the CRA in 1998, and was involved in establishing a self-regulatory Press Council and the first Free Media Helpline in South-Eastern Europe. 169

Mijatović was appointed Chairperson of the European Platform of Regulatory Authorities in 2007, from 2005 to 2007, she chaired the Council of Europe’s Group of Specialists on freedom of expression and information in times of crisis. Currently she is OSCE representative on freedom of the press. (13 March 2012, Vienna)

Snježana Mulić - editor and journalist from Sarajevo, used to work for different media including Dani and Slobodna Bosna. Currently working for Al Jazeera Balkans. (12 January 2011, Sarajevo)

Pauline Neville-Jones - was head of the UK delegation in Dayton during peace negotiation, and head of the OHR department in Brussels in 1996 for nine months. She has a career as a high ranking UK diplomat from 1963 serving in different mission around the world. From 1991 to 1994 she was Head of the Defense and Overseas Secretariat in the Cabinet Office and Deputy Secretary. During 1993 and 1994 she was Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, and the Political Director in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in which capacity she was involved in issues related to war in Bosnia. (1 March 2013, Skype)

Lejla Omeragić Ćatić – professional journalist from Sarajevo, used to work for FERN, currently working for Slobodna Evropa. (12 May 2012, Skype)

Wolfgang Petritsch - High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1999 to 2002. Before coming to Sarajevo, he was the EU's Special Envoy for Kosovo (1998-1999), EU chief negotiator at the Kosovo peace talks in Rambouillet and Paris (1999). In Austria, he held different position over the years, from Press Secretary to the Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky (1977-1983), he Director of the Austrian Press and Information Service in the U.S (1984-1992), and was in charge of the Information campaign in Austria’s bid to join the European Union in 1995. Since March 2008 je is Austrian ambassador to the OECD in Paris. (22 January 2013, email)

Branko Perić - Judge with the career in the media. He used to be editor for AIM and news agency Onasa, president of the Independent association of journalist from Republika Srpska entity, member of the IMC and CRA. (7 September 2012, Sarajevo)

Chris Riley – He was spokesperson for SFOR, NATO led forces. In 1998 he started working for the OHR as head of Press and Media in Mostar and later on head of Media Development for the OHR in Sarajevo. Before coming to Bosnia he served 10 years as British Army Officer in the Parachute Regiment. (23 May October 2010, Skype)

Borka Rudić - Journalist from Bosnia, used to work for Radio Sarajevo, Radio BiH, radio FERN, daily Oslobođenje. Since 2000 general secretary for Independent Union of Journalists. (18 August 2012, Skype)

Alexandra Stiglmayer – From 1998 until 2002 she worked as the head of the press office for the OHR. Professional journalist from Germany covered the war in former Yugoslavia for different US and German newspapers. (16 April 2011, Skype) Nataša Tešanović - director and editor for TV ATV in Banja Luka. (3 October 2012, Belgrade) Sevima Sali Terzić - law expert from Sarajevo. (24 April 2012, Sarajevo) 170

Milan Trivić – professional journalist from Sarajevo, former director of PBS. (12 February 2012, Sarajevo)

Krister Thelin -Judge from Sweden. From 1997 until 2003 he was engaged in several positions in the Balkans, mainly Bosnia including his work for the European Union and the Swedish Foreign Ministry; Support for the Constitutional Institution-Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Director-General of the IMC and CRA, Chairman of the South East Europe Stability Pact “SEEUROPE Initiative”, and Director of the Policy and Legal Advice Centre in Belgrade, Serbia. (18 December 2012, Skype) Radenko Udovičić - Media analyst and professor in media and communications, former journalist. He was member of the Board for FTV. (30 August 2012, Sarajevo) Miodrag Živanović - professor in philosophy, active in non/governmental sector, former editor for magazine Novi prelom. (18 October 2012, Banja Luka)

Reports

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Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. Honoring of obligations and commitments by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Doc. 10200. Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee). Co- rapporteurs: Mrs Naira Shakhtakhtinskaya, Azerbaijan, European Democratic Group and Mr Laszlo Surjan, Hungary, European People’s Party. 4 June 2004. Available at http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=10559&Language=EN. Accessed on 3 June 2013.

European Stability Initiative. Travails of the European Raj. 3 July 2003. Berlin. Available at http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=59. Accessed on 10 December 2011.

Independent Media Commission. The White Paper. Special Reports. Medina Online, Sarajevo, 2000.

International Crisis Group. Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina, How International Support Can Be More Effective, Report No 21, 18 March 1997.

International Crisis Group. Bosnia: Reshaping the International Machinery. Balkans Report No. 121. Sarajevo/Brussels. 29 November 2001.

International Crisis Group. Bosnia’s Nationalist Governments: Paddy Ashdown and the Paradoxes of State Building. Balkan Report No 146, 22 July 2003.

171

International Crisis Group, Bosnia’s Gordian Knot: Constitutional Reform. Policy Briefing Paper on constitutional changes. Europe briefing No 68. Sarajevo, Istanbul, Brussels. 12 July 2012.

International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia. Origins of Republika Srpska. Expert report by the Robert Donia. (Report compiled at the request of the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY, 2008).

International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia. Expert report by Renaud De La Brosse. Political Propaganda and the ‘All Serbs in one Country’ Project: Consequences of Using Media as an Instrument of Ultra-nationalistic Goals. (Report compiled at the request of the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY, 2003).

Institute for War and Peace Reporting - IWPR and MediaPlan Sarajevo. The September 1996 election in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Media coverage of the election campaign. Final monitoring report, 1996.

IREX Media Sustainability Index 2012. Available at http://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/u105/EE_MSI_2012_Bosnia.pdf. Accessed on 10 February 2013.

OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 10 years OSCE mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995-2005.Available at http://www.oscebih.org/documents/osce_bih_doc_2011030815040118eng.pdf. Accessed on 8 February 2012. OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Media Reform in Post-Conflict Bosnia 1996-2001. Report prepared by Tanya L. Domi, January 2005, Sarajevo.

OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Concept paper Radio FERN Business Plan 1999- 2000, March 1999.

OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. BiH Media and Media Regulators Under Pressure. Spot Report, 2010.

OSCE Office of the Representative of the Freedom of the Media and Article 19. “Analysis of the laws pertaining to the PSB system of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Article 19. The analysis was commissioned by the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, September 2012. Available at http://www.osce.org/fom/94107. Accessed on 13 December 2012. Report by Boyko Beov.

OSCE Office of the Representative of the Freedom of the Media and Article 19. Expert report by Barbara Bukovska. Bosnia and Herzegovina: Legislative Framework on the Communications Regulatory Agency. OSCE and Article 19. September 2012. Available at http://www.osce.org/fom/94101. Accessed on 21 January 2013.

Press Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Association BH Novinar. Indicator for Measuring Media Freedoms in the Countries Members of the Council of Europe. Shadow Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sarajevo 2012.

172

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Annex

1. IMC Rule 01/1998 Qualification for a Broadcast Licence 2. Independent Media Commission Broadcast Code of Practice 3. Letter to Members of the Peace Implementation Council 11 June 2008 4. “Decriminalize Defamation Law” says IMC 5. Free Election Radio Network (FEN) and Open Broadcast Network (OBN) Election 1997 Programming 6. Establishment o Board of Directors FERN 7. Letter from OSCE Ambassador to Swiss Ambassador in Bosnia 8 December 1998 8. OHR endorsement for transforming FERN into Public radio – Letter to Swiss ambassador in Bosnia 9 December 1998

The Peace Implementation Council

PIC Members

11 June 2008

Your Excellencies,

We use this opportunity to address you on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the Independent Media Commission1, the predecessor of the Communications Regulatory Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter: Agency). As international experts that were appointed by the High Representative to enforce the aforementioned Decision, we express our deepest concern over the existing and, thus far, one of the most significant impediments to the successful and independent work of the Agency.

As you will know, the Agency has functioned as an independent media regulator since 1998, setting an example of a successfully established converged regulator2 for both broadcasting and telecommunications to the countries in the region and beyond. In fact, the establishment of the regulatory authority is being referred to as one of the greatest institutional success stories in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since the earliest days of the regulatory authority, the international community, including US State Department, European Commission and the Council of Europe, have devoted significant efforts and means towards the Agency’s functions in accordance with best practices.

1 High Representative’s Decision on the establishment of the Independent Media Commission, June, 11, 1998. - http://www.ohr.int/decisions/mediadec/default.asp?content_id=95

2 High Representative’s Decision Combining the Competencies of the Independent Media Commission and the Telecommunications Regulatory Agency, March, 2, 2001 - http://www.ohr.int/decisions/mediadec/default.asp?content_id=75

In a country devastated by war, the Agency introduced a system of regulation into a chaotic media landscape.The fight against the worst examples of hate speech in the history of electronic media, establishment of a transparent licensing process that put an end to piracy in broadcasting, successful monitoring of election coverage, issuing licenses to telecom operators (mobile, Internet and cable providers etc.), price rebalance for voice telephone services and introducing interconnection to the BiH telecom market are among the exceptional results achieved in spite of the unfavourable social and political environments in the country. Moreover, the Agency's role in promoting media freedoms and enhancing professional and technical standards in broadcasting has greatly contributed to the democratization process in the country. Thanks to its well-established institutional and legal mechanisms based on the principles of transparency and independence, the decisions of the Agency are respected and fully implemented. Over the last two years, the Agency has successfully updated some of its regulatory documents in order to harmonize them with the EU regulatory framework.

The Agency was the first among internationally-founded institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina to undergo a successful transformation from an international to a domestic state-level institution, functioning entirely in accordance with the principles of transparency and independence and the responsibilities defined as one of the conditions in the process of accession negotiations with the European Union. The phasing out of both international expertise and donations, resulted in a painless and smooth transformation into an organisation led by some of the most renowned and internationally-recognized experts within BiH, and funded entirely by technical licence fees.

Since the end of our term as International experts, we have continued to follow the work and the success of the Agency with great interest. We were extremely pleased to see that its effectiveness greatly relies on highly professional and well-trained staff equipped with the specific knowledge and skills needed to regulate the communications sector. The empowering of the Agency in terms of human resources has been among the priorities of the international community implemented through a number of training activities, seminars and cooperation projects including a successful Twinning project with the Italian regulatory body, AGCOM, funded by the European Commission. The expertise of the Agency’s national staff has been widely recognised through training projects provided by the Agency to the regulators in Armenia, Kosovo, Iraq, Montenegro etc.

The independence of National Regulatory Authorities is an essential element of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications, especially considering the importance of the work of this sector, the importance of the development and maintenance of free speech and work relating to all aspects of the right to freedom of expression, as well as the essential role of an independent regulator in the telecommunication sector in the interest of competition and consumer protection.

We would like to take this opportunity to emphasize that the Agency faces challenges which are of crucial importance for the further democratization process of BiH society, most importantly the monitoring of media coverage of BiH Elections in 2008. Among the challenges ahead is the process of digitalization that the Agency had initiated by establishing the Digital Terrestrial Television Forum in 2006 in charge of producing a strategy for digital switch-over in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only by maintaining its full operational and financial independence will the Agency be able to fulfil and implement these tasks in a professional and transparent manner.

We, the undersigned, express concern over the latest developments concerning the appointment of the Director General and the inclusion of the Agency in the Draft Law on Salaries in BiH Institutions. These developments are significant and blatant examples of attempts to undermine the Agency, dating from October 2007, since when the Agency’s day-to-day activities have been heavily restricted and all its initiatives blocked. In addition, the initiatives and recommendations of the European Commission concerning the independence of the Agency have been completely ignored by the relevant domestic authorities.

The extent of the pressure to reduce the Agency’s independence and the concern it has generated is also contained in the latest report of the High Representative submitted to the UN Security Council3, in which he emphasized that “Ensuring the independence of the Communications Regulatory Agency is another European Partnership requirement”, but also that “the appointment of a new director has become enmeshed in the larger ethno- political game”. All this has posed an obstacle to the proper functioning of the regulator and threatens to jeopardize the positive results achieved over the last 10 years.

Since the very beginning, there have been pressures and attempts by political structures to influence the Agency's work and decision-making. Independent regulators are subject to political pressure in many countries, but the volatile and still unstable situation in Bosnia Herzegovina makes such pressure potentially much more dangerous. The protection of the Agency and its staff from political pressure, whether long- or short-term, has always been actively supported as a matter of principle by the international community and it is crucial that this support is maintained.

The Communications Regulatory Agency has a unique position, due to the fact that its achieved independence is of crucial importance to the development of the broadcasting

3 Thirty-Third Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, April, 30, 2008 http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=41694

3 and communications markets, and as such, is one of the key elements of a successful stabilisation and accession process, which has been confirmed by all relevant international institutions, most notably the European Commission. We, therefore, urge you to take all necessary steps in order to preserve the independence of the Communications Regulatory Agency as a matter of the highest priority. Failure to do so could be seen both as a failure of the most successful project of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton Peace Agreement and also as a failure of BiH toward its path to EU Integration.

Sincerely,

Brian F. Fontes, Ph,D Chief Executive Officer, National Emergency Number Association, US Former Chairman of the IMC/CRA Council [email protected]

Clare Mulholland Broadcasting Consultant and Former Deputy Chief Executive, Independent Television Commission, UK Former Vice-Chair of the IMC/CRA Council [email protected]

Krister Thelin Judge, The International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Former Director General of the IMC and former Chairman of the IMC/CRA Enforcement Panel [email protected]

Katrin Metcalf Professor, International University Audentes, Tallinn and communications law consultant Former Head of IMC Legal Department and former CRA Legal Consultant [email protected]