76 Articles 77 Traces: Te UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History of the Spanish Flu and remains infuential due to its exhaustive statistical analyses and Civil Liberties in the Time of Infuenza Denton Ong thorough research from numerous localities. It remains the authoritative text on the Spanish Infuenza in the United States, focusing on the efects, scale, and spread of the Te Spanish Infuenza pandemic of 1918-1919 was one disease. Te statistics provided on mortality rates, infection rates and the disease’s spread of the deadliest outbreaks in the history of mankind, killing are still some of the most expansive in the literature. John Barry’s Te Great Infuenza over 50 million people worldwide and as many as 675,000 in (2004) compares the disease to the threat of avian fu in the twenty-frst century and 1 the United States in less than two years. Overall, the dis- covers the role of wartime censorship on the epidemic. However, Barry primarily wants ease’s mortality rate was approximately 2,500% greater than to paint a rough narrative history of the disease and the important individuals involved. 2 the average mortality rate for normal infuenza. In total, By taking a broad view of the infuenza epidemic in the United States, Te Great Infuen- the fu aficted over a quarter of all Americans and dropped za loses some of its punch, as it fnds itself trying to be several diferent kinds of histories 3 the average life expectancy in the US by 12 years. Despite all at once. the US government’s best eforts to assure the public that In Flu: A Social History of Infuenza (2008), Tom Quinn covers the efects infuenza there was no reason to panic, panic set in around the coun- outbreaks have had on society throughout history, so he only focuses on the 1918-19 try. Schools and businesses closed, churches shut down, and global pandemic briefy. However, what he does write on the 1918-19 pandemic is fairly streets lay empty. Some blamed the infuenza epidemic on uncontroversial and supported by other secondary sources. Infuenza 1918 (1999) by immigrants, while others accused the Germans. Regardless Lynette Iezzoni takes a more personal look at the Spanish Flu epidemic in the United of the origin of the disease, the virulence and lethality of the States, focusing on the personal stories and the scale of the disease. Iezzoni does not Spanish Infuenza shook American society to its core. make an original argument about the Spanish Flu, but instead describes how the infu- Although virologists and biologists have published ex- enza impacted people’s lives. Tis is why her book is full of individual stories, rather than tensive scholarship on the Spanish Flu 1918, historians have explorations of policy or death rates. Of all the books on the 1918 infuenza epidemic, 4 given it much less attention. Only recently has there been Nancy Bristow’s American Pandemic (2012) is notable because it focuses on how social a resurgence of historical work on the epidemic, yet only a and cultural identity impacted the pandemic in the United States, as well as on the fraction of it focuses on the United States. Alfred Crosby’s American public’s frustration with government ineptitude. No other work places such Epidemic and Peace, 1918 (1976) was the frst intensive study an emphasis on the social and cultural aspects of the disease. Perhaps Bristow’s most interesting contribution to the literature was on how male physicians’ failure to “cure” the 1 According to the CDC, an epidemic is an increase in the incidences of a disease within a particular area, such as country or city, well above its baseline level of occurrence. A infuenza was emasculating, while patients valued female nurses considerably more for pandemic refers to an epidemic which has spread across multiple countries. Tis paper will 5 refer to the 1918 fu in a global context as a pandemic, but in local and national contexts the comfort and tending they provided. as an epidemic. See: https://www.cdc.gov/ophss/csels/dsepd/ss1978/lesson1/section11. html. For statistics on mortality, see Alfred W. Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 1918 (Westport: Tis essay ofers a new approach to the history of the Spanish Infuenza epidemic Greenwood Press, 1976) pg. 206. 2 Taubenberger, Jefery et al., “Initial Genetic Characterization of the 1918 “Spanish” in the United States through a study of the political and legal complications surround- Infuenza Virus,” Science 1997, 275: 1793-96 3 “Te Deadly Virus: Te Infuenza Epidemic of 1918,” U.S. National Archives, Accessed ing civil liberties, which arose as a result of the epidemic. In doing so, it will analyze December 3, 2016. https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/infuenza-epidemic/. 4 For scientifc studies of the pandemic, see Jefery K. Taubenberger and David M. the infuenza in the context of early twentieth-century American politics. Te Spanish Morens, “1918 Infuenza: the mother of all pandemics,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 12, no. Infuenza pandemic of 1918-1919 triggered a repression of civil liberties within the 1 (2006): 15. Gina Bari Kolata, Flu: Te Story of the Great Infuenza Pandemic of 1918 and the Search for the Virus Tat Caused It, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005). Ann H. Reid, 5 Nancy K. Bristow, American Pandemic: Te Lost Worlds of the 1918 Infuenza Epidemic (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). Tomas G. Fanning, Johan V. Hultin, and Jefery K. Taubenberger, “Origin and evolution of Tom Quinn, Flu: A Social History of Infuenza (London: New Holland, 2008). Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 1918. Lynette Iezzoni, In- the 1918 “Spanish” infuenza virus hemagglutinin gene,” Proceedings of the National Academy fuenza 1918: Te Worst Epidemic in American History (New York: TV Books, 1999). John M. Barry, Te Great Infuenza: Te Epic Story of Sciences 96, no. 4 (1999): 1651-1656. of the Deadliest Plague in History (New York: Penguin Books, 2005). 78 Articles 79 Traces: Te UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History United States due to measures, crafted by medical experts, which were intended to halt Spanish fu and the subsequent public reaction were a component of this broader con- the spread of the disease and bolster the war efort. Tis analysis therefore corroborates temporaneous debate. the broader literature on the restrictions of civil liberties during the First World War Several events during and immediately after the First World War reveal a govern- and its aftermath, when lawmakers expanded government power for the sake of national ment limiting civil liberties, typically on the grounds of national security. Te Committee 6 security. In addition to such federal restrictions on civil liberties, however, the Spanish on Public Information, headed by George Creel and is often considered an apparatus Flu also caused municipal governments to take restrictive measures, demonstrating that for censorship and propaganda, sought to maintain public enthusiasm for the war efort encroachments on civil liberties were not a uniquely federal phenome- and disrupt anti-war movements. Te prohibited interfering with non. Furthermor, infuenza led to public conscription eforts or spying and banned statements that might impede the American disillusionment with scientifc public war machine. Te Act of 1918 banned statements against the U.S. government. policy and raised questions regarding the Widespread labor confict and the persecution of the Industrial Workers of the World efcacy of laws requiring the sacrifce of (IWW) in the 1910s reveal a general restriction of civil liberties for the sake of security.8 civil liberties. Tis article argues progres- Tis trend of aggressive government action continued into the mid-1920s, as seen in sive municipal anti-fu measures, based the trials of Italian anarchists Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Venzetti, the 1921 Palmer on faulty scientifc principles, amounted Raids, the First , and the Wall Street bombing of 1921. In these moments and to a signifcant breach of civil liberties, others, the US government led a campaign against terrorism and political radicalism.9 but unlike contemporary subversion of As Paul Murphy has argued, the restrictions on civil liberties during the First World civil liberties, occurred on a municipal War led to their formal emergence as a legal and political concept. For example, the war Te Spanish Infuenza pandemic of 1918-1919 rather than federal level. inspired the creation of civil liberties groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union infected 500 million worldwide. Te frst outbreaks in the United States occurred in military camps, Flu, War, Terrorism and Freedom (ACLU), which developed to assist conscientious objectors. Murphy argues the Progres- including Camp Furston (pictured). (Photo courtesy of To understand the policies imposed sive movement created a centralized, paternalistic federal government rationally com- Wikimedia.) by federal and municipal governments batting the evils of industrial society, even at the cost of individual liberties. Although to restrict the 1918 Infuenza pandemic progressive organizations and fgures never explicitly sought to curtail civil liberties prior and how these policies encroached upon civil liberties, the Infuenza pandemic must be to the First World War, the administration’s approach to the war efort did just placed within the context of civil liberties . During the First World War and immedi- that through progressive policies that disproportionately targeted radical and subversive ately afterwards, federaland municipal governments repressed citizens’ civil liberties. Te groups and individuals.10 modern form of civil liberty as a concept has its roots in 1902, when Teodore Schroeder American governmental power expanded beyond the use of police power to deter founded the Free Speech League as the frst organization dedicated to civil liberties. armies and radicals, however. Indeed, the expansion of governmental authority and the When Zechariah Chafee Jr. wrote Freedom of Speech in 1920 the concept of civil liberties repression of civil liberties became particularly intertwined on a local level in the early 7 gained crucial legal footing, advancing the concept by leaps and bounds. However, the twentieth century. Tis entanglement was a direct result of the Spanish Infuenza, which public debate on civil liberties in the United States exploded during the First World War led city and state ofcials to constrain civil liberties across the country in an attempt because of the restrictions imposed by the government. Te government response to the to halt the epidemic, and support the war efort. However, the failures of the medical

6 For works on this subject, see Paul Murphy, and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States (New York: W.W. science used to justify these constraints led to a rejection of the constraints, as well as Norton and Company, 1979); William H. Tomas Jr, Unsafe for Democracy: World War I and the U.S. Justice Department’s Covert Campaign to Suppress Dissent (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008); Beverly Gage. The Day Wall Street Exploded: A Story of 8 Foner, Te Story of American Freedom, 179. America in Its First Age of Terror. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 9 Beverly Gage, Te Day Wall Street Exploded, 309. 7 Eric Foner, Te Story of American Freedom, (New York: W.W. North & Company, 1998), pg. 163 10 Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States, 31. 80 Articles 81 Traces: Te UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History a disillusionment with science more broadly. Te belief that government was obliged to sputum daily, and they would either fall unconscious and die, or die from heart attacks use science and reason to shape society for the better fell fat, further supporting a phil- resulting from sustained lack of oxygen. Many experienced major hemorrhaging of their osophical decline of the Progressive Movement. Opposition to laws restrictive to civil internal organs. If a patient survived the infuenza itself, they were then susceptible to liberties as well as the police power which was utilized to enforce them, also depended pneumonia, which was the most common form of death. Antibiotics had not yet been on the fedgling notion of civil liberties. invented, making post-infuenza pneumonia even more dangerous than the fu itself.16 Unlike the Committee on Public Information or the Espionage and Sedition Acts, Modern medicine was as inefective in treating the Spanish Flu as medieval medicine the restriction on civil liberties during the Spanish Infuenza occurred at the local and had been in treating the Black Plague. state level. Tis fact demonstrates the ability of the American state to coordinate its Medical authorities were fummoxed by the Spanish Flu. Te Spring 1918 edition of eforts, particularly its war eforts, through multiple layers of government. It also reveals the Journal of the American Medical Association failed to even mention infuenza, as it that the general trend of the late 1910s and early 1920s—wherein political ofcials sac- was not considered a reportable illness due to its usual mildness.17 At the time, doctors rifced civil liberties and expanded state power for the sake of security—was not solely a believed infuenza to be caused by a bacterium, Pfeifer’s bacillus, rather than a virus. As federal phenomenon. Te narrative of civil liberties during the First World War and the the number of infuenza cases exploded and physicians remained bereft of any bacterium Spanish Infuenza epidemic should be seen in the context of a broader, ideological con- samples, however, this bacterial theory fell out of favor within the bulk of the medical test. However, like the Committee on Public Information or the Espionage and Sedition community, although it would linger on the fringes for at least a decade.18 Doctors and Acts, government responses to the Spanish Infuenza epidemic were extensive in num- medical professionals gave contradictory advice about inoculation, with the Journal of ber, and are vital to understanding the history of civil liberties in the United States. American Medicine cautioning Americans against placing their faith in vaccines while “Stacked like Cordwood” health ofcials advised doctors to vaccinate their patients. Many Americans were hap- In September 1918, the Spanish Infuenza appeared in Boston at nearby Camp py to be inoculated, if only for their peace of mind, although in 1918 there was little 19 Devens.11 Colonel William Welch, one of the world’s foremost experts on pathology, evidence of fu serum’s efectiveness. Many Americans instead placed their faith in went to investigate the deaths, and he reported that the lungs of the recently deceased homeopathy, herbal treatments or other traditionalist remedies, but these were no more 20 contained a thin, bloody fuid—a highly unusual symptom for normal infuenza. Records efective. Since the fu was airborne and physicians lacked a worthwhile vaccine, many describe the bodies, purple from oxygen deprivation and emaciated from the fu, being medical professionals turned to improving ventilation in homes, hospitals, and public “stacked like cordwood” at the camp morgue, which quickly overfowed.12 Te spread of places as a means of curtailing the disease, although this only had an efect on reducing 21 the disease was staggering; in just two weeks at Camp Devens, it went from three report- patient body temperature. Bewildered by the Spanish Flu, physicians primarily encour- ed cases to 12,604 cases.13 Once the disease had hit Boston, it spread to the rest of the aged patients to remain in bed, drink fuids, and rest. country in a matter of days and weeks. Although medical professionals provided little information to understand the Span- Aside from its virulence, the Spanish Flu was a horrifying disease. Te fu turned its ish Flu, government and nongovernment agencies responded to the epidemic with victims purple, as they asphyxiated on bloody sputum, a mix of saliva and mucus built up policies based on faulty medical science and often without considing popular opinion. in their lungs; as a result, the disease earned the nickname “the purple death.”14 Nurses Because of these decisions, faith in government response and medical professionals would sometimes look at the color of a patient’s feet to determine their prognosis; black 15 16 Quinn, Flu, 133-134. feet were a death sentence. Some patients would cough up as much as six pints of 17 Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 18. 18 Ibid., 269. 11 Tomas Quinn, Flu: A Social History of Infuenza, (London: New Holland Publishers, 2008), pg. 128-131 19 Boston Post, “Urge Doctors to use Serum,” January 21, 1919 in The American Infuenza Epidemic of 1918-1919: A Digital Encyclo- 12 Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 8. pedia, University of Michigan, (accessed December 2, 2016). 13 Iezzoni, Infuenza 1918, 47. 20 Nancy K. Bristow, “Doctors, nurses and gender in the USA,” in The Spanish Infuenza Pandemic of 1918-1919: New Perspectives, 14 Ibid., 16. ed. Howard Phillips, David Killingray (New York: Routledge, 2003), 61. 15 Ibid., 47. 21 Quinn, Flu, 139. 82 Articles 83 Traces: Te UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History eroded signifcantly as the epidemic lingered, as did the public’s willingness to abide by as a result, by the onset of the second wave in late summer 1918, only 75 trained nurses government measures based upon medical science. were active in Minnesota and they worked “not only as nurses, but also as doctors and 24 Early on, assurances from medical, government or private authorities that the ep- even cooks, for, in many cases the entire family was bedridden.” While doctors and idemic was identical to the 1889-1890 infuenza epidemic tempered public reaction nurses were used to handling the annual fu, the virulence and lethality of the Spanish to the fu. Companies ran ads in newspapers to sell their cures for the infuenza. Rich- Infuenza, unparalleled in modern history, made it nearly impossible for doctors to treat. ardson-Vicks, for example, made a fortune of its “vaporub,” which it claimed could Without an efective treatment, doctors could often do very little for their patients; nurs- ameliorate the fu’s symptoms, as it did in the 1899 epidemic. Such ads, however, only es, on the other hand, provided water, blankets, food and other comforts, making nurses reassured the public that the Spanish Flu was neither new nor serious. In this way, they the most important professionals for treating the epidemic. Nancy K. Bristow contends were similar to statements from public ofcials that although there was a high demand for nurses, the epidemic ossifed gender roles in and newspaper articles that downplayed the the medical feld, as male doctors sought to research cures for the illness while female 25 severity of the epidemic.22 Furthermore, wartime nurses were left to handle patient care. Tis trend can be seen as an example of women restrictions on what newspapers could print emerging into the public sphere during the Progressive Era, but failing to attain higher limited the media response and stymied articles positions of professionalism and authority due to systemic gender norms and prejudices. that might have stoked panic. As the epidemic Te severity of the Infuenza epidemic was also exacerbated by WWI. Te move- worsened, however, the public’s opinion evolved. ment of millions of men around the United States and across oceans, in addition to the As J.H. Watkins, a concerned citizen, put it to extreme overcrowding of soldiers at encampments, enabled the disease to spread with his friend and Congressman, Claude Kitchin, “I extraordinary rapidity.26 Te war’s efect on the spread of the infuenza is evinced by had not thought at the beginning that it was at ’s refusal to halt troop movements out of consideration for the epidem- all serious, considering that this infuenza which ic.27 It is also worth noting that the disease struck the young and ft the hardest; accord- is so prevalent, was the same old grippe with ing to the Surgeon General of the Army, the disease “kills the young vigorous, robust which the people of the country were aficted adults.” Tis meant the disease had a more profound impact on the war efort than can several years ago [referring to the 1899 epi- be inferred simply from its mortality rate.28 demic] but it seems that it is a more aggravated Te fu ravaged both rural and urban areas. In rural Williamston, NC, attorney Harry 23 form.” Te erroneous belief in the similarities Many companies advertised products that Stubbs described the epidemic in October 1918: “we are in the throes of the most terri- of the 1899 and 1918 epidemics caused, at least would allegedly cure the infuenza, including ble epidemic that has ever visited our section. People are falling all around us as ‘thick as Richardson-Vicks’ “vaporub,” which was in the epidemic’s early stages in the spring of advertised in national newspapers. (Photo leaves in Vallambrosia.’ All business is suspended, and everyday seems like Sunday. Not 1918, medical professionals and public health courtesy of Wikimedia.) a countryman is seen in town and every place is quarantined.”29 Congressman Claude ofcials to underestimate its severity. Kitchin wrote similarly of Washington D.C., “We are all scared to death in Washington Te biggest obstacle to the treatment of in regard to the epidemic of Spanish fever, they call it. Many of my close friends have infuenza was the shortage of doctors and nurses. Most epidemics see a shortage of died with it.”30 Te only cases of communities being entirely spared are of a small num- medical professionals due to the sheer number of cases, but the First World War had 24 Bracken, H.M. 1917-1918, Minnesota State Board of Health, Historical iin Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia.. 25 Bristow, Nancy K., “Doctors, nurses and gender in the USA,” in Te Spanish Infuenza Pandemic of 1918-1919, 58. severely depleted the number of doctors and nurses in the United States. For instance in 26 E. O. Jordan, (1925). Epidemic Infuenza. American Medical Association. 27 Quinn, Flu, 128, 136. Minnesota, one third of all physicians were engaged in war work during the epidemic; 28 Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 215. 22 Historical Collection, Number: 4468. Richardson-Vicks, series 3.2, Folder 037 29 North Carolina Historical Collection, Number: 3623. Cameron papers, Series 1.4, October 13-21, 1918, Folder 607. 23 North Carolina Historical Collection, Number: 406. Claude Kitchin papers, October 11-14, 1918, Folder 469 30 North Carolina Historical Collection, Number: 406 Claude Kitchin papers, October 11-14, 1918, Folder 469. 84 Articles 85 Traces: Te UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History ber of rural, isolated towns, such as Gunnison, Colorado, which enforced a town-wide undertakers, who had most of their services purchased through credit. By October 18, quarantine with lethal force and barred any trafc to, from or through town.31 the epidemic had stopped; emergency hospitals, which were essentially warehouses with Of all the major U.S. cities, Philadelphia experienced the worst impact of the infu- rows of beds, began to close, and by October 30 the ban on public meetings and busi- ence. Te city also serves as a fairly typical example for how cities responded to the ep- nesses had been lifted. Over 12,000 Philadelphians died that fall due to the epidemic, 34 idemic. A city of 1.7 million residents, Philadelphia had been completely missed by the and the young (18-35 year-olds) and immigrants were the worst afected. frst wave of the epidemic, lulling its residents into a false sense of security. Furthermore, Repression of Civil Liberties a quarter of doctors and an even larger percentage of nurses were overseas due to the war. Similar to Philadelphia, cities throughout the nation instituted laws banning spitting A lack of resources and ardent denials about the scale of the epidemic ultimately exacer- and coughing, requiring fu masks, instituting bated Philadelphia’s woes. For example, the Bureau of Health did not classify infuenza quarantines, closing businesses, and forbidding as a reportable disease—which made it legal to quarantine patients--until 600 sailors public meetings. Although the application of were hospitalized with it on September 21. Despite this, and with the epidemic raging these laws was far from universal, their intent at nearby military installations, 200,000 people still gathered for the 4th Liberty Loan was the same in each city: to limit the spread parade. On October 1 alone, there were 635 new cases, and within weeks, hundreds of of the fu. Most cities enacted these measures 32 thousands were ill. with greater urgency than Philadelphia, which Te city of Philadelphia began to break down. 850 Bell telephone operators were was caught unaware. Rural areas adopted similar sick, so the phone lines ceased operating. Te police, fre department, garbage collection strategies: in Stagville, North Carolina, churches and every other public service halted operations. On October 3, all public institutions were closed and public gatherings were forbid- were closed. To make matters worse, the city morgue could only handle 36 bodies, a den during the pandemic.35 Tese laws would paltry number considering the fu was killing 4,500 people a week. Te lack of morti- often be loosened and tightened depending on Political cartoon in the San Francisco Ex- cians and the piles of bodies in the streets damaged public morale and led to concerns of aminer showing a matador with a fu mask the severity of the pandemic, but from 1918 until secondary infection. As the city’s Board of Health struggled to coordinate a multi-facet- triumphing over bull labelled “Spanish fu.” 1919 the specter of disease loomed large over (Photo courtesy of Te San Francisco Examin- ed response efort, the Philadelphia Council on National Defense took on a central role, er.) America. coordinating volunteers and organizing a help line. Te nursing shortage in Philadelphia, Many of these measures enacted by Philadel- like everywhere else, was acute; for example, Lebanon hospital only had three nurses for phia and cities across the nation appeared to many as infringements upon civil liberties 33 125 patients. and individual rights. Across the nation, people displayed their frustration with these As doctors and nurses worked 20 hours per day, the rest of society also came to- laws by protesting, fling complaints, fagrantly fouting the law, fling court cases against gether to ameliorate the efects of the disease. Te Philadelphia Auto Club volunteered anti-fu laws, or, in the cases of physicians and public ofcials, by using their positions of automobiles as ambulances and thousands of people organized soup kitchens for those power to argue against fu-time measures. While substantial agitation against local and unable to cook for themselves. Every community organization in Philadelphia mobilized state governments who imposed laws to curtail the fu occurred, widespread support for to help the sick. Quickly, burial became a limiting factor, as the city possessed ten times anti-fu measures also surfaced. Federal, state and local governments all advocated and more bodies than cofns. Te city government was able to establish fve supplementary often mandated anti-fu practices, although it is unclear how often the public abided by morgues, implement price restrictions on cofns, and ofer public funds as collateral for these laws.

31 Quinn, Flu, 141. 32 Crosby, Epidemic and Peace, 80. 34 Ibid., 75. 33 Ibid., 85. 35 North Carolina Historical Collection, Number 3623 Cameron Series 1.4, Folder 607. 86 Articles 87 Traces: Te UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History Aside from preventing people from dying, these government attempts to inhibit the wearing fu masks was a patriotic duty.41 Spanish fu were also designed to further the war efort. A public ravaged by disease Patriotic urgings aside, the reasons for obedience to anti-fu measures varied wide- could not produce the ammunition, uniforms, and healthy soldiers that were required for ly by locale. In Salt Lake City, movie theater a global confict. Te Philadelphia Housing Administration released a statement to the operators wanted a ban enforced in order to press that stated it was out of patriotic duty that the epidemic must be contained, and curb infuenza in the belief that the quicker the that the nation must enact public health measures in order to combat the disease and, epidemic was resolved, the more proft would be 36 by extension, the Germans. In a press release, Ohio Governor James Cox encouraged reaped in the long run.42 In Philadelphia, Rev. citizens not to be discouraged by the infuenza epidemic and continue to purchase lib- Dr. Robert Johnston, disagreeing with many of 37 erty loans, as it was their patriotic duty to support the war despite ongoing epidemics. his fellow pastors, wrote enthusiastically in the With a shortage of physicians and nurses, a variety of municipal organizations sprung Philadelphia Evening Bulletin to express sup- up to coordinate a response to the epidemic, such as collecting medical supplies, manag- port for closing churches in such dire times. He ing ambulance services and setting up emergency hospitals. However, the prime goal of wrote, “men digging graves for their own wives; 38 these organizations was to boost the war efort. A memorandum from to the Virginia children their parents’ graves; devoted Roman State Council of Defense from the Federal Agencies Section, a federal body responsi- priests the graves of their own parishioners, are ble for coordinating defensive eforts, said: “when the nation must maintain top speed, At the local level, business operators and evidence enough of the grave situation.” He the health of the civilian population is an important factor in the war…. Civilian health public ofcials dissuaded those infected with even went so far as to support limiting funeral the disease to attend public events and use 39 43 must be maintained by preventative rather than curative measures.” Tis evinces federal public facilities. In Seattle, street car drivers services. However, many people did not volun- support for the use of local measures which were restrictive to civil liberties. would not allow anyone onboard without a tarily attend church. Rev. S.L. Morgan, a pastor mask (pictured). In Seattle, 120 Red Cross Tus, the fu prevention eforts taken at the local level around the country are part workers created 260,000 masks for this pur- in rural North Carolina, noted that hardly any- of the broader repression of civil liberties during the First World War, as civil liberties pose. (Photo courtesy of Library of Congress.) one had attended church between September were sacrifced for the purpose of waging war. Although the US Public Health Service and January due to the epidemic, although the lacked any enforcement powers, its pronouncements and recommendations carried a law only required churches to close for a few great deal of weight, although they were not always followed.40 Furthermore, voluntarily weeks.44 People were terrifed of the epidemic, and often limited contact with others vol- taking steps to fght the fu, in addition to obeying laws intended to combat infuenza, untarily without government intervention. As a result, transgressions of fu laws did not were imbued with a sense of patriotic duty. A Red Cross public service announcement in necessarily accompany intentional dissent against them. For example, while the Portland San Francisco in October 1918 questioned the patriotism of “mask slackers” and stated city government received an astronomical number of complaints about the mandated quarantine of any sick individual, no arrests occurred, demonstrating widespread willing- 45 36 “Must Protect Public Health: Philadelphia Housing Association Declares Tat It Is Patriotic Service To Keep Workers Well,” ness to obey city ofcials presumably for the sake of slowing the epidemic. Philadelphia Housing Association, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). 37 “Statement by Governor James M. Cox,” Ohio Council on Nation Defense, October 14, 1918 iin Te American Infuenza Epi- Even in a city that experienced a great deal of backlash over its fu mask laws, there demic Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). 38 For information o the Ohio Council of National Defense, see: S. J. Brandenburg,“Letter, To Several County Councils,” Letter. 41 San Francisco Chronicle, “Wear a Mask and Save Your Life!” October 22, 1918. in in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclope- November 26, 1918, Columbus: Ohio Council of National Defense in Te American Infuenza Epidemic of 1918-1919: A Digital En- dia(accessed December 2, 2016). cyclopedia, (accessed December 2, 2016). For information on the American Red Cross in Pittsburg, see: Pittsburgh Chapter American 42 Deseret Evening News “Moving Picture Men Want To Know Why Law Is Not Enforced,” November 19, 1918 in Te American Red Cross, “Rules Governing Te Distribution Of Supplies By Te Infuenza Committee Of Te Pittsburgh Chapter, American Red Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). Cross,” 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia(accessed December 2, 2016). 43 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, “Tis Pastor Lauds Church Closing,” October 15, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Ency- 39 “Memorandum, To: Virginia State Council of Defense, From: Federal Agencies Section,” October 8, 1918 in The American clopedia(accessed December 2, 2016) Infuenza Epidemic of 1918-1919: A Digital Encyclopedia, (accessed December 2, 2016). 44 North Carolina Historical Collection, Number: 04228, S.L. Morgan papers, 1895-1970., Subseries 1.1.5. 1917-1919, Vol. 3, 79. 40 Jason Marisam, “Local Governance and Pandemics: Lessons from the 1918 Flu,” University of Detroit Mercy Law Review 85, 45 Te Oregonian , “Flu Quarantine Is Causing Complaint And Cases Increase,” December 13, 1918 in Te American Infuenza No. 3, (2009): 347. Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed February 25, 2018). 88 Articles 89 Traces: Te UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History was still demonstrable support for them along with other anti-fu ordinances.46 order. However, although medical experts argued that the order from the State Board Public Resistance of Health lacked any scientifc rationale, doctors were still forced to abide by its direc- Quarantine was one of the most common, yet controversial, responses to the Spanish tives. Te lack of proven medical efcacy led to a formal protest by the Chamber of Infuenza epidemic. Tis method entailed the closing of public places and the detaining Commerce, which saw the quarantine as a useless policy instrument cutting into their 52 of sick individuals in their homes, similar to house arrest. While many businesses com- business. In St. Paul, doctors opposed the institution of a quarantine because of the lack plied with the law, in several cases business owners publicly demonstrated their frus- of medical evidence in support of such a response. City health ofcials instituted them 53 tration as they saw fu ordinances as illogical or unethical. In Minneapolis, two theaters regardless. allegedly violated the city’s fu rules that required theaters to seat patrons in alternating Te most potent reactions to public closure full and empty rows. Tis same law applied to churches.47 City governments were willing orders were religious in nature. In Dallas, two and able to shut down public establishments and they also interfered with the operations separate church organizations protested the of those establishments, including religious ones. In Pittsburgh, theater owners only mayor’s decision to close churches as a means of abided by municipal fu laws after losing a court battle against Dr. B. Franklin Royer, curbing the epidemic. One group was opposed acting state commission of health, over the closing order, demonstrating public dissatis- to conventional medical practices while the oth- faction with municipal governments closing businesses regardless of its efectiveness as a er maintained its religious right to worship on a 54 public health measure.48 weekly basis. In Washington, DC, St. Patrick’s Because these laws discriminated against certain businesses, they produced some Catholic Church protested against the order to complaints of unfair treatment. For example, in Cleveland, ministers and anti-saloon close all churches, stating “the question involves leagues protested preferential treatment given to saloons, which allowed them to remain a grave curtailment of our rights as citizens.” open longer than other businesses.49 In, Atlanta theater owners protested theater clo- Tis was a blatant questioning of fu-closing sures, maintaining that other forms of entertainment were not subject to the same level orders based on ethical and legal grounds and of scrutiny.50 Something similar occurred in Chicago, when the city instituted bans on refected a common concern about repression 55 dancing and athletics in public, but allowed other public establishments to operate nor- among Catholic. Episcopalian pastors in Phil- mally.51 Public discontent did not solely target government overreach, but at the uneven adelphia protested the shuttering of churches, Public ofcials encouraged ill people to stating publicly that people need prayer in time stay home, as seen in this newspaper ad by distribution of that overreach as well. Chicago’s Health Commissioner John Dill of epidemic; however, they did not openly dis- Doctors also attacked the science behind such public health measures, sometimes Robertson. Not everyone agreed with this obey the closing order, instead choosing to voice strategy. Some doctors did not believe that publicly. According to almost all doctors in Nebraska, quarantining victims of the Span- quarantine was efective and business owners their objections to it.56 ish Flu was a useless measure, yet the State Board of Health still issued a quarantine who lost revenue due to the outbreak of Some groups opposed closing orders more infuenza opposed such measures. (Photo 46 Te San Francisco Examiner, “Te Masked Marvel,” November 22, 1918 in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia, (ac- courtesy of Te Chicago Tribune.) cessed February 25, 2018). 47 Te Milwaukee Journal, “Several Break Flu Rules,” December 16, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed 52 Omaha Daily Bee, “Business Men Aroused Over Health Order,” February 25, 2018). December 24, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). 48 Te Pittsburgh Sun, “Teaters Quit Fight Against State Ofcial,” November 6, 1918, inTe American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclo- 53 “St. Paul Pioneer Press, Fights Quarantine,” October 20, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed De- pedia (accessed February 25, 2018). cember 2, 2016). 49 Cleveland Plain Dealer, “Protest Saloon Hours,” October 24, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed 54 Dallas Morning News, “Two Protests Against Church Closing,” October 15, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclope- February 25, 2018). dia (accessed December 2, 2016). 50 Atlanta Constitution, “Protest is Made by Teater Men,” October 15, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia(ac- 55 Te Evening Star, “Opposes Further Church Closing,” October 28, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (ac- cessed December 2, 2016). cessed December 2, 2016). 51 Chicago Herald And Examiner, “Only Dancing And Athletics Now Are Banned,” November 3, 1918, in Te American Infuenza 56 Te Philadelphia Inquirer, “Pastors Protest Church Closing,” October 18, 1918 in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). (accessed December 2, 2016). 90 Articles 91 Traces: Te UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History openly. In Bufalo, Christian Scientists, chiropractors and osteopaths unsuccessfully laws had a basis in constitutional rights. protested a quarantine law on the grounds that the law “violates their rights as citizens, is Opposition to overly restrictive and inefective anti-fu laws existed inside of local 57 un-American in spirit and gives despotic power to the health commissioner.” Christian government as well. In one instance, the New Jersey Supreme Court overturned a law in Scientists across the nation were ardent opponents of the public health measures during the city of Paterson for being too indefnite the infuenza epidemic, but they were particularly opposed to church closures. In Los in its scope and powers. Te law in question Angeles, after a Christian Scientist church planned to openly faunt the church closing gave the city the authority to fne individ- order, Mayor Woodman used the police to forcibly prevent the Christian Scientists from uals up to $100 for being in a place of poor 58 meeting. Five members of the Ninth Church of Christ were arrested as part of a delib- ventilation, sanitation or uncleanliness.63 erate attempt to drag the case to court and thwart the constitutionality of Los Angeles Tis law further reinforced the Dillon Rule, 59 closing churches. Te attorney for the Christian Scientists, Robert Clarke, promised which placed the powers of a state over the to take the case to the U.S. Supreme Court if necessary, charging that the law was an powers of a locality, as the state had failed “unwarranted exercise of police power in the city, and is unconstitutional as a violation to make an unambiguous argument about 60 While politicians and citizens debated the of the Fourteenth Amendment.” While the case never made it to the Supreme Court, efcacy of closing public spaces and encouraging the risk of infection. Te court explicitly it serves as an example of a deliberate, planned reaction to the curtailing of civil liberties the sick to quarantine themselves, nurses and rejected the assurances of health ofcials, doctors continued to treat sick patients in often during the Spanish Infuenza epidemic. dreadful conditions. In many cities, Red Cross requiring them to prove that their measures In neighboring Pasadena, Christian Scientists managed to obtain an injunction workers erected makeshift hospitals, such as the were “efective and efcient,” exemplifying a one in Oakland pictured here. (Photo courtesy of against the city law which barred public gatherings. While the judge made his decision Wikimedia.) governmental unwillingness to wholeheart- based on the technicality that Pasadena had never actually imposed a ban on public edly accept health ofcials’ scientifc rec- gatherings, but merely authorized the city health ofcer to do so, the outcome of the ommendations.64 In Newark, Mayor Gillen case is still notable as other theaters and churches began to operate after the decision.61 took a liberal approach to the Spanish Infuenza, defying state law and refusing to follow Church closures and the extension of governmental authority they represented perturbed the Department of Health’s quarantine order. Tis led to the law being amended to cut Christian Scientists elsewhere. Peter V. Ross wrote in the San Francisco Chronicle: “Chris- down on further defance.65 Gillen expressed a fundamental rejection of the standard tian Scientists here have ofered no opposition to epidemic regulations adopted by health public health practices of the time on the basis of civil liberties and efcacy. His stance authorities but they do not view with complacency the idea with having the city afict- demonstrated how anti-fu laws were seen as clear infringements upon civil liberty by ed by restrictions which are ruinous to business and subversive to personal liberty and many Americans. 62 constitutional rights.” Tis indicates public agitation against measures they viewed as In the years after the epidemic, medical professionals concluded that banning pub- infringing on their civil liberties was sometimes successful and that criticisms of anti-fu lic meetings or closing schools had virtually no beneft and that quarantines were only

57 Bufalo Express, “Health Ofcers’ Power Assailed Before Council,” February 25, 1919, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Ency- efective when enforced rigorously. Modern research has shown non-pharmaceutical clopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). 58 Los Angeles Evening Herald, “Must Follow Health Rule Says Mayor,” November 2, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic interventions, namely quarantine, to be highly efective when applied in sustained, Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). 59 Los Angeles Evening Herald, “Church Heads May Carry “Flu” Fight To Highest Court,” November 5, 1918, in Te American immediate, and robust ways. During the epidemic, this was not often the case, as many Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). 66 60 Los Angeles Evening Herald, “Appeal to the Constitution,” November 13, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia cities lifted their fu laws only to implement them again later. According to a 1918 (accessed December 2, 2016). 63 Public Health Reports, “Closing of Saloon During Epidemic: Ordinance Held to be Too Indefnite to Require Closing of 61 Los Angeles Times, “In View of Victory,” December 12, 1918 in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed Decem- Saloon During Epidemic,” September 5, 1918, 2023, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). ber 2, 2016); Los Angeles Times, “Scientists of Pasadena Win,” December 12, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia 64 Marisam, 33. (accessed December 2, 2016). 65 Newark Evening News, “Epidemic Ban Defance Basis for Amending the Law,” October 26, 1918, in Te American Infuenza 62 San Francisco Chronicle, “Christian Scientist Gives View on Masks,” December 9, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). 66 E.O. Jordan, Epidemic Infuenza, 231, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). Howard 92 Articles 93 Traces: Te UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History paper by Dr. Royal Copeland, a health ofcer in New York City, cities that “imposed the 110 people were arrested for not wearing fu masks in San Francisco. Furthermore, these most rigid orders” for closing public spaces “failed to experience any marked reduction in arrests were in open defance of fu mask ordinances, according to the police. Tis pattern the prevalence of the disease.” New York ofcials abstained from banning public gather- continued throughout the fu epidemic; one of the most curious reasons given for not 67 ings, instead focusing on public sanitation and a swift, strict enforcement of quarantine. wearing the mask in public was that it inhibited smoking, a reason given repeatedly by 68 Copeland attributed this strategy to New York’s success in handling the epidemic. dozens of people.76 Enforcement of these laws could even turn violent. At one point, an However, New York still experienced extensive use of police power for the sake of public inspector for the city health department in San Francisco got into an altercation while sanitation; although police did not arrest people for meeting in public, they did arrest sev- enforcing the fu mask ordinance and shot three people, two of whom were bystand- 69 eral hundred people for spitting in public. ers.77As late as January 1919, one thousand people protested the continuation of the fu Every city enacted slightly diferent measures, but almost all of them constituted a mask ordinance.78 clear and drastic expansion of governmental authority. Whereas many cities instituted Tis reaction demonstrates something very important: many of the ordinances bans on public coughing and spitting, others, like Chicago, curtailed smoking. In De- passed by cities stretched on for months, and were not short-term emergency measures, cember 1918, Te Milwaukee Journal published an article warning people not to kiss resulting in a great deal of resentment, particularly as the epidemic waned. Public frus- 70 while Spanish fu is raging. While the ban was not enforced by the state, it was part of tration led the Board of Health, at one point, to refuse to continue the San Francisco the broader sanitary etiquette which arose during the Spanish fu. Other cities, such as fu mask mandate in a 7-9 vote, as politicians responded to public sentiments and ex- 71 Dayton, Ohio, banned kissing. Twenty-fve people in Philadelphia fned for spitting pressed doubts about such actions themselves.79 Despite the Board of Health’s decision, 72 in public, while Boston arrested people for the same ofense. Meanwhile, San Antonio fu masks would be required in San Francisco into February, 1919.80 Attempts to require 73 instituted a law banning coughing in theaters. Chicago, by order of the health com- mandatory face masks were met with derision by physicians and public protests, which missioner, banned smoking on street cars throughout the duration of fu epidemic, as a even included an Anti-Mask League.81 Of course, there was no certainty that face masks 74 means of improving the ventilation on street cars. would prevent the transmission of the fu.82 No city reacted to public health measures with as much vehemence as San Francis- Medical professionals at the time hotly debated vaccination. While several doctors co, where citizens revolted against city fu mask ordinances. “Mask slackers” were given in many cities claimed to have invented serums to cure the Spanish fu, none proved to 75 fnes or even jail sentences for failing to wear fu masks in public. On October 27, 1918, be efective.83 In fact, the British army had completely abandoned using serums to curb 84 Markel, Harvey B. Lipman, Alexander J. Navarro, “Nonpharmaceutical Interventions Implemented by US Cities During the 1918- the fu because they were highly inefective. Nevertheless, multiple cities encouraged 1919 Infuenza Pandemic,” Journal of the American Medical Association, August 8, 2007, (accessed December 2, 2016). citizens to be inoculated, but the only major city to enforce compulsory vaccination was 67 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, “Science and the Infuenza,” November 9, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (ac- cessed December 2, 2016). 68 New York Times, “Epidemic Lessons Against Next Time,” November 17, 1918, 42. in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Ency- 76 Los Angeles Evening Herald, “Smoke in Flu Mask Leads to Arrest,” January 21, 1919, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Ency- clopedia; Annual Report of the Department of Health of the City of New York for the Calendar Year 1918 (New York City: 1919), clopedia (accessed December 2, 2016); San Francisco Chronicle, “110 Arrested for Disobeying Mask Edict,” October 28, 1918, in Te 210-11. in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia. American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). 69 Te New York American, “500 Spitters Arrested by Copeland Men,” October 26, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Ency- 77 Te San Francisco Examiner, “Tree Shot In Row Over “Flu” Mask,” October 29, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Ency- clopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). clopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). 70 Te Milwaukee Journal, “Kissing Infuenzial Sweethearts are Admonished,” December 17, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epi- 78 Te San Francisco Chronicle, “Tousands Attend Protest Meeting,” January 29, 1919, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclo- demic Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). pedia (accessed December 2, 2016). 71 Te Dayton Daily News, “Mistletoe Loses Its Flavor; Kissing Ban Because of Flu,” December 23, 1918, in Te American Infuenza 79 San Francisco Chronicle, “No Mask Law For SF, Supervisors Decide; Flu Ordinance Defeated By 9 To 7 Vote,” December 20, Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). However, the next month, public from the local 72 Te Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, “25 Fined for Spitting,” October 16, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia Health Board chief, Dr. William Hassler, pushed an unpopular re-masking ordinance through, see Crosby, 112. (accessed December 2, 2016); Boston Post, “Will Round up Spitters,” September 11, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Ency- 80 San Francisco Examiner, “‘Flu’ Masks Banished By Rolph Edict,” February 2, 1919, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclope- clopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). dia (accessed December 2, 2016). 73 San Antonio Express, “Tose Who Cough in Teater Must Leave, Is Ruling,” January 15, 1919, in Te American Infuenza Epi- 81 Crosby, 112 demic Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). 82 E.O. Jordan, Epidemic Infuenza, 232, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016) 74 Te Chicago Tribune, “Te Anti-Smoking Order,” November 8, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed 83 State Board of Health, “Quarterly Bulletin,” September 1919, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (ac- December 2, 2016). cessed December 2, 2016) 75 Te San Francisco Examiner, “Mask Slackers Given Jail Sentences, Fines,” October 27, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic 84 H. W. Pierson, “Our Present Epidemic of Infuenza,” North American Journal of Homeopathy, October 1918, 910-911, in Te Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016) 94 Articles 95 Traces: Te UNC-Chapel Hill Journal of History Des Moines, in October, 1918.85 Tere were clear signs of opposition, as citizens orga- conservative retrenchment. 86 nized against the compulsory vaccination of school children. Many well-respected phy- Conclusion sicians spoke out against the use of serums or vaccines to inoculate people against the fu. Te widespread repression of civil liberties experienced in the U.S. during the Span- Despite this, the U.S. Public Health Service, the national agency responsible for coordi- ish Infuenza epidemic is notable for several reasons. For one, it occurred on the local nating public health eforts and providing fnancial and organizational support to more level. While many local governments, such as Boston, Philadelphia, and Cleveland, 87 local organizations, endorsed inoculation. Occasionally, public workers would be forced implemented Surgeon General Blue’s recommendations, head of the federal U.S. Public to undergo inoculation, such as in Louisville, Kentucky, where the entire police force was Health Service, the local enforcement and maintenance of anti-fu measures demon- 88 required to be treated with serum. Tis represented a clear expansion of government strates the repression of civil liberties had a signifcant local element. Terefore, the power, which had not been seen before, and a decoupling of the scientifc consensus from broader repression of civil liberties not only included the wartime measures of the federal the public policy which claimed to represent it. government, but also the anti-fu measures of countless local governments. Tese anti-fu While much of the public obeyed emergency fu ordinances regarding out of a belief laws are comparable to the contemporary Creel Committee, Espionage Act, or Palmer in the efcacy of such regulations and fear of infection, the epidemic resulted in a pro- Raids, which represent expansions in government power at the expense of civil liberties. found loss of faith in science. In the St. Paul Pioneer Press, an editorial titled “Where is Of course, President Wilson and all the local and state health commissioners did not Our Medical Science?” argued that medical science had entirely failed to mitigate the aim to limit civil liberties; they aimed to win the war. So, the rationale behind the limita- efects of the fu, that physicians were divided over the usefulness of prophylactic in- tions on individual freedom was the same for national wartime laws, post-war counter- oculations, and that the complacency of the public over the restrictive laws imposed by terror or anti-radical measures, and local anti-fu laws. All were seen as steps necessary 89 medical authorities had allowed infringements on civil liberties. An article by reporter for the war efort against the Germans and to provide basic security to the American Walt Mason ran in Salt Lake City’s Deseret Evening News, lamented that physicians were public. Adopted for the sake of the war efort, these anti-fu laws fueled the fedgling no- 90 nothing more than bafed hacks. Perhaps the most notable sign of declining pub- tion of civil liberties in the United States. Civil liberties as a term had not been popular- lic faith in science was the continued use of home remedies and alternative medicines. ized by the time of the Spanish Infuenza, and it was far from being an established legal Believing the fu to be a sign of the end of days, religious organizations turned to prayer concept. Tus, the arguments and the vocabulary of protestors and dissenters against as a cure. Others sought pseudo-medical treatments, such as Dr. Kilmer’s swamp-root, or restrictive fu ordinances are notable for being early examples of agitation in the develop- voodoo medications. Some people sought relief by abstaining from whiskey, while others ment of individual freedom. argued for its rapid consumption.91 Science, it appeared, no longer seemed to be the Crucially, the epidemic damaged the credibility of science as a basis for public poli- ultimate authority on the matter, a trend that ultimately laid the groundwork for later cy, which was one of the cornerstones of the Progressive Era. As warehouses of patients

85 Chicago Herald and Examiner, “Boston Serum For ‘Flu’ To Be Tried Here,” October 19, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic turned to warehouses of corpses, and physicians remained inept and incompetent in the Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016); Ohio State Journal, “Epidemic Serum Ofered City Beneft for All,” October 27, 1918, in treatment of the infuenza, people began to lose faith in medical science. Tis was an Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (December 2, 2016); Des Moines Register, “City Empowered to Enforce Vaccination,” October 8, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016) indictment not only of science, but also of progressivism. Te government, using pro- 86 Des Moines Register, “Vaccination Discussed,” December 31, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016). fessionalized and scientifc practices, had failed to ameliorate the blight of disease, an 87 Te Albany Knickerbocker Press, “Use of Vaccine in Albany Not Urged,” October 23, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016); Te Charleston Evening Post, “Inoculation is Advised,” January 29, 1919, in Te American archetypal woe of urban societies throughout history, and had compromised the liberties Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (accessed December 2, 2016) 88 Louisville Times, “Inoculate Police with Flu Serum,” December 3, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia (ac- of citizens in the process. Te credibility of science was damaged along with the credibil- cessed December 2, 2016) 89 St. Paul Pioneer Press, “Where is our Medical Science?” December 13, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia ity of government actions based on that science. (accessed December 2, 2016) 90 Walt Mason, “Bafed Science,” Deseret Evening News, December 19, 1918, in Te American Infuenza Epidemic Encyclopedia(ac- cessed December 2, 2016) 91 Nancy K. Bristow, “Doctors, nurses and gender in the USA,” in Te Spanish Infuenza Pandemic of 1918-1919, 67.