EGYPT-PROTESTS-DOWNFALL.Pdf

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

EGYPT-PROTESTS-DOWNFALL.Pdf EGYPT EGYPT’S REVOLUTION 2.0 SPECIAL REPORT 1 EGYPT REVOLUTION 2.0 The first democratically elected president in Egypt began his last day at work as a free man and ended it as a prisoner of his own Republican Guard. Here’s how it happened BY YASMINE SALEH AND PAUL TAYLOR CAIRO, July 5, 2013 or Egypt’s military chiefs, the final spur to rebellion came on June 26. FThat day top generals met Mohamed Mursi, the country’s first democratically elected president, and spoke bluntly, telling the Islamist leader what he should say in a major speech he planned as protests against him intensified around the country. “We told him it has to be short, respond to opposition demands to form a coalition government, amend the constitution and set a timeframe for the two actions,” an of- ficer present in the room told Reuters. “Yet he came out with a very long speech that said nothing. That is when we knew he had no intention of fixing the situation, and we had to prepare for Plan B.” The officer added: “We had prepared for NO MURSI: Anti-Mursi protesters in Tahrir Square on July 3 (front page), the day Egypt’s armed forces all scenarios, from street violence to mass removed the president and suspended the constitution. REUTERS/ SUHAIB SALEM; Mursi (above), just clashes, and had troops ready to handle before a speech at Cairo University on June 30 last year, the day he formally took charge of Egypt. both situations.” Like other serving officers REUTERS/STRINGER interviewed for this report, the person re- quested anonymity because of the sensitiv- ity of the situation. He came out with a very a popular uprising ousted veteran autocrat As tensions rose over the following long speech that said nothing Hosni Mubarak. days, Mursi remained defiant. In a final The ease and abruptness of Mursi’s over- telephone conversation with armed forces Military officer who met with Mursi throw underlines the fragility of the Arab commander General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi eight days before he was ousted Spring that toppled a string of Middle on Wednesday, the president laughed and East autocrats. Hopes that popular rebel- made light of mass demonstrations against lions might lead to democracy taking root him, a military source said. confining Mursi as a prisoner in his own remain largely unfulfilled, although the ex- “He just didn’t believe what was going Republican Guard compound, arresting periment is still in progress in Tunisia. on,” the source familiar with Sisi’s contacts key supporters in his Muslim Brotherhood Mursi’s downfall in Egypt, a strategic said. Any hope that the bearded, bespecta- and seizing control of parts of the media. hinge between the Middle East and North cled Mursi would call a referendum on his Thus ended the first attempt to graft po- Africa, makes plain the fractured nature of own future or go quietly, had evaporated. litical Islam and democracy onto the Arab the region and the lack of institutional depth Soon afterwards, as millions took to the world’s most populous and historically to sustain democracy when the tides of pop- streets, the military executed their plan, powerful state, two and a half years after ular opinion change. The result in Egypt and SPECIAL REPORT 2 EGYPT REVOLUTION 2.0 Mursi’s approval ratings elsewhere are deep divisions and instability. During his 12 months in office Mursi’s ouster has also renewed the debate around whether democracy and Approve Disapprove political Islam can co-exist. The Muslim Brotherhood’s first taste of power lasted lit- 100 tle more than a year. Muslim Brotherhood 90 members in Egypt point to the irony of 80 the West encouraging democracy but qui- etly supporting a military coup, even if few 70 61% Western leaders are calling it that. 60 The military’s move has also further 50 exposed the many ways in which the 40 Muslim Brotherhood struggled to govern. Egyptians and investors alike complained 30 32% that some ministries had descended into 20 chaos, with key positions filled by Muslim 10 Brotherhood stalwarts who knew little of 0 the workings of a modern economy. The 50 60 80 100 5 678910 11 12 Egyptian stock market rallied the day after days months Mursi’s overthrow. Mursi’s own shortcomings were stark, Survey sample size for the first 50 days to 11 months ranged between 1,000 to 2,000 Egyptians and stand in contrast to the way someone above 18 years old. Sample size for the 12th month (June 2013) was increased to more than 6,000 to allow performance indicators on governorates level. like Nelson Mandela, ailing at the other Source: The Egyptian Center for Public Opinion Research end of the continent, came to power with a message of unity and forgiveness. SECURITY RISK A provincial engineering professor, Mursi was not a natural political leader. He had become the Muslim Brotherhood’s presi- dential candidate only when the party’s first choice was disqualified. Nevertheless, the novice president appeared decisive on tak- ing office, practising a winner-takes-all in- terpretation of power that alienated a wide swath of secular and Islamic opponents. Soon after he was elected in June 2012 with 51.7 percent of the vote, Mursi ordered Egypt’s two top generals to retire; one was Field Marshall Hussein Tantawi, a veteran who had served Mubarak for 20 years. It seemed a significant break with the past. Mursi’s choice as the new head of the army was General Sisi, 58, a career infan- try officer who had been groomed for a top OUTNUMBERED: Mursi poses with Egypt’s military leaders last October. To Mursi’s right stands role with spells as a field commander, stud- Defence Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and to Mursi’s left is General Sedky Sobhi, chief of staff to ies at a U.S. war college and a stint as a mili- Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. REUTERS/EGYPTIAN PRESIDENCY/HANDOUT tary attache in Saudi Arabia. Sisi was also a SPECIAL REPORT 3 EGYPT REVOLUTION 2.0 Forced out The Egyptian army overthrew Mohamed Mursi on July 3, slightly more than a year aer he became Egypt’s first freely elected president. February 11 June 24 July 3 President Hosni Mubarak Islamist Mohamed Mursi Army ousts Mursi steps down and a military is declared Egypt's first and announces council takes over. freely elected president. political transition. 2011 2012 2013 January 25 March 19 January 21 December 22 May 7 June 21 Anti-government In the first Islamist parties Egyptians vote Mursi Protests protests driven by post-Mubarak emerge as victors in referendum, reshules break out discontent over vote, Egyptians of drawn-out narrowly cabinet, in Egypt, poverty, corruption approve package parliamentary approving the brings in calling on and repression, of constitutional elections which constitution. more Mursi to erupt across Egypt. reforms. began on Nov. 28. Islamists. resign. Source: Reuters devout Muslim and seemed a good fit with worried about putting important national loan deal with the International Monetary Mursi and his Muslim Brotherhood spon- security reports in front of someone we Fund for fear of sparking unrest. Tourism sors, who wanted the military to take a back perceived as a threat to national security,” and investment had dried up because of po- seat after decades of being the real power. the security source said. litical instability. But relations between Mursi and his The generals became equally alarmed Mursi’s bumbling, do-little administra- new generals deteriorated within months about political and sectarian polarisation tion only made things worse. While the of his inauguration. Even Mursi’s appar- in Egypt, against a backdrop of a sharply Muslim Brotherhood remained the most ent success in brokering a ceasefire between worsening economy. They had secured powerful political force and ran a social Israel and the Hamas Islamist movement their own position in an Islamist-tinged welfare network that provided services to that runs the Gaza Strip irked the military. constitution rammed through by Mursi’s the poor and needy, millions of Egyptians “Mursi’s intervention in the Gaza war allies last December, ensuring they would felt no one was representing their interests. made Egypt guarantee that Hamas would remain a state within a state, with limited REFERENDUM REJECTION not carry out attacks on Israel. Which parliamentary scrutiny of their economic threatens Egyptian national security, because privileges, armaments contracts and control Youth activists of the Tamarud – Rebel! what if Hamas did? It could prompt Israel to of the vital Suez Canal. But they were in- movement launched a petition on May 1 retaliate against us,” the security source said. creasingly concerned by what they saw as a demanding Mursi’s resignation; it snow- Mursi also talked loosely about possible risk of civil war. balled, receiving what they say were more Egyptian participation in a jihad (holy war) to By the time Mursi took office, Egypt’s than 22 million signatures. They called for overthrow Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, economy, which had boomed for the rich nationwide protests on June 30, the first and raised the prospect of military action over with scant improvement for the poor in anniversary of his inauguration. a Nile River dam in Ethiopia. As a result, dis- the late Mubarak years, was already in deep Angered by the Muslim Brotherhood’s trust of him grew in Egypt’s high command, trouble. The military council which ruled in perceived power-grabbing and econom- which saw him as recklessly risking their in- the 16-month transition from Mubarak’s ic incompetence, Egyptians turned out volvement in conflicts without properly con- overthrow to Mursi’s inauguration had in their millions to shout “Erhal!” (Get sulting and respecting the generals.
Recommended publications
  • Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance
    SSR PAPER 2 Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance Derek Lutterbeck DCAF DCAF a centre for security, development and the rule of law SSR PAPER 2 Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces Between Openness and Resistance Derek Lutterbeck DCAF The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is an international foundation whose mission is to assist the international community in pursuing good governance and reform of the security sector. The Centre develops and promotes norms and standards, conducts tailored policy research, identifies good practices and recommendations to promote democratic security sector governance, and provides in‐country advisory support and practical assistance programmes. SSR Papers is a flagship DCAF publication series intended to contribute innovative thinking on important themes and approaches relating to security sector reform (SSR) in the broader context of security sector governance (SSG). Papers provide original and provocative analysis on topics that are directly linked to the challenges of a governance‐driven security sector reform agenda. SSR Papers are intended for researchers, policy‐makers and practitioners involved in this field. ISBN 978‐92‐9222‐180‐5 © 2011 The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces EDITORS Alan Bryden & Heiner Hänggi PRODUCTION Yury Korobovsky COPY EDITOR Cherry Ekins COVER IMAGE © Suhaib Salem/Reuters The views expressed are those of the author(s) alone and do not in any way reflect the views of the institutions referred to or
    [Show full text]
  • ARRESTS of MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD MEMBERS and SUPPORTERS Amnesty International Publications
    EGYPT ARRESTS OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS Amnesty International Publications First published in 2013 by Amnesty International Publications International Secretariat Peter Benenson House 1 Easton Street London WC1X 0DW United Kingdom www.amnesty.org © Amnesty International Publications 2013 Index: MDE 12/035/2013 Original Language: English Printed by Amnesty International, International Secretariat, United Kingdom All rights reserved. This publication is copyright, but may be reproduced by any method without fee for advocacy, campaigning and teaching purposes, but not for resale. The copyright holders request that all such use be registered with them for impact assessment purposes. For copying in any other circumstances, or for reuse in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, prior written permission must be obtained from the publishers, and a fee may be payable. To request permission, or for any other inquiries, please contact [email protected] Amnesty International is a global movement of more than 3 million supporters, members and activists in more than 150 countries and territories who campaign to end grave abuses of human rights. Our vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards. We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion and are funded mainly by our membership and public donations. CONTENTS Introduction .............................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • NCTC Annex of the Country Reports on Terrorism 2008
    Country Reports on Terrorism 2008 April 2009 ________________________________ United States Department of State Publication Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism Released April 2009 Page | 1 Country Reports on Terrorism 2008 is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the ―Act‖), which requires the Department of State to provide to Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act. COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2008 Table of Contents Chapter 1. Strategic Assessment Chapter 2. Country Reports Africa Overview Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership The African Union Angola Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Comoros Democratic Republic of the Congo Cote D‘Ivoire Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Ghana Kenya Liberia Madagascar Mali Mauritania Mauritius Namibia Nigeria Rwanda Senegal Somalia South Africa Tanzania Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe Page | 2 East Asia and Pacific Overview Australia Burma Cambodia China o Hong Kong o Macau Indonesia Japan Republic of Korea (South Korea) Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea (North Korea) Laos Malaysia Micronesia, Federated States of Mongolia New Zealand Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, or Vanaatu Philippines Singapore Taiwan Thailand Europe Overview Albania Armenia Austria Azerbaijan Belgium Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Georgia Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Kosovo Latvia Page | 3 Lithuania Macedonia Malta Moldova Montenegro
    [Show full text]
  • The Unspoken Power: Civil-Military Relations and the Prospects for Reform
    THE BROOKINGS PROJECT ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE ISLAMIC WORLD ANALYSIS PAPER ANALYSIS Number 7, September 2004 THE UNSPOKEN POWER: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR REFORM STEVEN A. COOK T HE S ABAN C ENTER FOR M IDDLE E AST P OLICY AT T HE B ROOKINGS I NSTITUTION THE BROOKINGS PROJECT ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE ISLAMIC WORLD ANALYSIS PAPER ANALYSIS Number 7, September 2004 THE UNSPOKEN POWER: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR REFORM STEVEN A. COOK T HE S ABAN C ENTER FOR M IDDLE E AST P OLICY AT T HE B ROOKINGS I NSTITUTION NOTE FROM THE PROJECT CONVENORS The Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World is designed to respond to some of the most difficult challenges that the United States will face in the coming years, most particularly how to prosecute the continuing war on global terrorism while still promoting positive relations with Muslim states and communities. A key part of the Project is the production of Analysis Papers that investigate critical, but under-explored, issues in American policy towards the Islamic world. The new U.S. agenda towards the Muslim world claims to be centered on how best it can support change in pre- vailing political structures, as a means towards undercutting the causes of and support for violent radicalism. However, little strategy has been developed for how this U.S. policy of change plans to deal with a key bulwark of the status quo, the present imbalance in civil-military relations in much of the region.
    [Show full text]
  • "Egyptian Soldiers Protect the Republican Guard Headquarter in Cairo, 5 July, 2013." by Pierre Terdjman/Agence Cosmos
    "Egyptian soldiers protect the Republican guard headquarter in Cairo, 5 July, 2013." by Pierre Terdjman/Agence Cosmos EGYPT PRESENTATION Freedom of assembly in the Euro‑Mediterranean region I‑ Legislative review II‑ Practice of This country review is part of a larger study on freedom of assembly in the present time, presented in two parts: , and . Part I of the regional study was published in November 2013, and Part II will be published in 2014. The full Regional study on Freedom of Assembly in the Euro‑Mediterranean Region is available here . It presents international standards protecting this fundamental right, and proceeds to analyzing the legal frameworks and their compliance to international human rights standards in 13 countries of the Mediterranean and the European Union: the EU as region, Spain, the United Kingdom, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. In order to develop the assessment of national legislations in comparison to international standards and the practical implications of legal provisions concerning freedom of assembly, objective indicators were used as a reference throughout this study, together with a gender‑sensitive approach to detect whether women enjoy freedom of assembly to the same extent as men, or if they are more specifically affected by restrictions. LEGISLATION REVIEW LEGISLATION This study is based on a process of consultation and participation involving members of the Euro‑Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), which includes 80 organizations and institutions of human rights defense based in 30 countries as well as individual members. It thus reflects the efforts of a researcher recruited in the country, assisted by members of the EMHRN Working Group on Freedom of Association, Assembly and Movement, and the active involvement of other civil society organizations and experts.
    [Show full text]
  • Egypt: Background and U.S
    Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations Updated March 12, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RL33003 SUMMARY RL33003 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations March 12, 2019 Historically, Egypt has been an important country for U.S. national security interests based on its geography, demography, and diplomatic posture. Egypt controls the Suez Jeremy M. Sharp Canal, which is one of the world’s most well-known maritime chokepoints, linking the Specialist in Middle Mediterranean and Red Seas. Egypt, with its population of more than 100 million Eastern Affairs people, is by far the most populous Arabic-speaking country. Although it may not play the same type of leading political or military role in the Arab world as it has in the past, Egypt may retain some “soft power” by virtue of its history, media, and culture. Cairo plays host both to the 22-member Arab League and Al Azhar University, which claims to be the oldest continuously operating university in the world and has symbolic importance as a leading source of Islamic scholarship. Additionally, Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel remains one of the most significant diplomatic achievements for the promotion of Arab-Israeli peace. While people-to-people relations remain cold, the Israeli and Egyptian governments have increased their cooperation against Islamist militants and instability in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip. Personnel moves and possible amendments to the Egyptian constitution highlight apparent efforts by President Sisi to consolidate power with the help of political allies, including colleagues from Egypt’s security establishment. President Sisi has come under repeated international criticism for an ongoing government crackdown against various forms of political dissent and freedom of expression.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rab'a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt
    H U M A N R I G H T S ALL ACCORDING TO PLAN The Rab’a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt WATCH All According to Plan The Rab’a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt Copyright © 2014 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-62313-1661 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org AUGUST 2014 978-1-62313-1661 All According to Plan The Rab’a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt Map .............................................................................................................................................. I Summary and Key Recommendations ........................................................................................... 1 Methodology ............................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Explaining Military Responses During the Arab Uprisings
    Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 2016 Defect Or Defend? Explaining Military Responses During the Arab Uprisings Timothy Hazen Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Hazen, Timothy, "Defect Or Defend? Explaining Military Responses During the Arab Uprisings" (2016). Dissertations. 2284. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/2284 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 2016 Timothy Hazen LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO DEFECT OR DEFEND? EXPLAINING MILITARY RESPONSES DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY PROGRAM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE BY TIMOTHY A. HAZEN CHICAGO, IL DECEMBER, 2016 Copyright by Timothy A. Hazen, 2016 All rights reserved. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Even though writing this dissertation was a solitary adventure it would not have been possible without the assistance and encouragement of numerous individuals. First and foremost, I would like to acknowledge my parents, Alan and Darlene, for their limitless support during my graduate studies. They have always encouraged me during this process and they have consistently been my strongest cheerleaders and advocates in all of my endeavors. Second, I would like to thank my dissertation director, Dr. Peter J.
    [Show full text]
  • 2012-12-18 Restructuring Yemen's Military Leadership
    Restructuring Yemen’s Military Leadership Lucas Winter Foreign Military Studies Office Synopsis: This article seeks to contextualize the main challenges in reunifying and restructuring Yemen’s military leadership in the post-Ali Abdullah Saleh era. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. RESTRUCTURING YEMEN’S MILITARY LEADERSHIP INTRO A recent article explaining differences in the first phase of ‘Arab Spring’ outcomes divides countries into three groups, based on the actions of the national military. On one end of the spectrum are Tunisia and Egypt, where the military brass refused to suppress popular protests by force; on the other are Syria and Bahrain, where the military largely remained loyal to the regime; in between are Libya and Yemen, where the army split.1 There are many reasons for these divergences; one influential interpretation focuses on level of popular mobilization and degree of military institutionalization as the two factors explaining the behavior of the militaries.2 More institutionalized armies, such as the Egyptian and Tunisian, are considered more likely to defect from the regime when faced with a popular uprising. Highly patrimonial armies, ultimately loyal to the ruling family or clique, are on the other hand less likely to defect under such circumstances. Somewhere in the middle of this continuum we find Yemen’s security and military services, precariously leading the country into the new and uncertain post-Saleh era. Yemen’s political class has suffered a deep and public split but the dreaded civil war has not materialized.
    [Show full text]
  • The Politics of Security Sector Reform in Egypt
    UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org SPECIAL REPORT 2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063 ABOUT THE REPORT Daniel Brumberg and Hesham Sallam The U.S. Institute of Peace Security Sector Governance Center is engaged in a funded study of the prospects for security sector reform in North Africa. This report on Egypt is part of a series of country-focused reports on this topic. ABOUT THE AUTHORS The Politics of Security Daniel Brumberg is senior adviser to the U.S. Institute of Peace, where he focuses on issues of democratization and political reform in the Middle East and wider Islamic world. He is also an associate professor of government and codirector Sector Reform in Egypt of the Democracy and Governance Program at Georgetown University. Hesham Sallam is a PhD candidate in government at Georgetown University and a former Peace Scholar at the U.S. Institute of Peace. His dissertation research covers Summary Islamist movements and the politics of economic reform in the • In Egypt, security sector reform (SSR) hinges on achieving democratic reforms, particularly Arab world. The views expressed in this report are solely those the reconstitution of an elected parliament and preparation of a new constitution that of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of USIP, which does not advocate specific policy positions. defines the roles and responsibilities of military and security institutions based on transpar- ency, accountability, and respect for civilian authorities. • In this highly political process, arranging the disengagement of Egypt’s military from government and the economy will be essential.
    [Show full text]
  • Saddam's War: an Iraqi Military Perspective of the Iran-Iraq
    K E V I N M . W O O D S , WOODS, MURRAY, MURRAY, WOODS, WILLIAMSON MURRAY, a n d T H O M A S H O L A D A Y with MOUNIR ELKHAMRI and H O L aday About the Authors NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY President: LtGen Frances C. Wilson, USMC Kevin M. Woods is a member of the research staff at the Institute for Vice President: Ambassador Richard A. Roth Defense Analyses (IDA) and since 2003 has been the task leader of the Iraqi Perspectives Project. Recent publications include The Iraqi Perspectives Report: Saddam’s Senior Leadership on Operation Iraqi INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES Freedom, and The Mother of all Battles: Saddam Hussein’s Strategic Director: Dr. Patrick M. Cronin Plan for the Persian Gulf War. Research Director: Dr. James A. Schear Williamson Murray is professor emeritus at The Ohio State University and senior fellow at IDA. He is the author of numerous books and arti- NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PRESS cles. His recent works include The Iraq War: A Military History, The Past Director and Editor, JFQ: Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) is Prologue (ed.), and A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War. Executive Editor: Dr. Jeffrey D. Smotherman Thomas Holaday has a degree in Philosophy and a minor in Arabic from Managing Editor, NDU Press: LTC Robert E. Henstrand, USA Georgetown University. Since joining IDA, he has researched the military- strategic history of Iraq while working on the Iraqi Perspectives Project. Mounir Elkhamri is a Middle East military analyst and linguist for the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Comparing the Arab Revolts Marc F
    October 2011, Volume 22, Number 4 $12.00 Comparing the Arab Revolts Marc F. Plattner Lucan Way John Carey & Andrew Reynolds Zoltan Barany Stéphane Lacroix Peru’s 2011 Elections Martín Tanaka Steven Levitsky Peter M. Lewis on Nigeria Sheri Berman on Francis Fukuyama Stephan Ortmann on Singapore Do New Democracies Support Democracy? Pratap Mehta Ted Piccone Rizal Sukma Soli Özel & Gencer Özcan Comparing the Arab Revolts the role of the military Zoltan Barany Zoltan Barany is Frank C. Erwin, Jr. Centennial Professor of Gov- ernment at the University of Texas–Austin. He is the author of Build- ing Democratic Armies: Lessons from Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas (forthcoming) and the coeditor of Is Democracy Exportable? (2009), which is to be published in Arabic next year. No institution matters more to a state’s survival than its military, and no revolution within a state can succeed without the support or at least the ac- quiescence of its armed forces. This is not to say that the army’s backing is sufficient to make a successful revolution; indeed, revolutions require so many political, social, and economic forces to line up just right, and at just the right moment, that revolutions rarely succeed. But support from a preponderance of the armed forces is surely a necessary condition for revolutionary success. Thus, close scrutiny of what determines that sup- port (or its lack) is in order. Like any other large organization, a military and security establishment has institutional interests to safeguard and ad- vance. Its decision—whether to back the regime, support its foes, or stay neutral until the dust settles—will depend on several factors.
    [Show full text]