GW-3 The Forces Engaged October 15, 1994 Page 124 Chapter Three: The Forces Engaged - Opposing Military Cultures and The Human Element The Gulf War involved complex mixes of forces from two very different military "cultures". The first such "culture" was the military culture of Iraq: A Third World military force whose military history and combat experience was limited to civil war, ethnic struggles, and a prolonged war against Iran. Like many of the military cultures of the Third World, Iraq was authoritarian in nature and dependent on developed nations for virtually all of its military technology, tactics, and supply. While many aspects of its military culture were unique, other aspects are typical of the severe qualitative weaknesses of Third World forces, and provide important lessons as to how such forces are likely to behave in the future. The forces of the Arab states in the Coalition shared some of these weaknesses, but Saudi Arabia and Egypt had assimilated many transfers of technology and tactics that Iraq had not. The other Arab states were not aggressors or authoritarian regimes, had different styles of government, and different military histories. At the same time, the Saudi Air Force was the only Third World force to engage in the conflict approaching Western levels of technology and effectiveness. Their experience of the other Coalition Arab forces reinforce several of the lessons that Iraq's military reveals about the strengths and weaknesses of Third World forces. The second military "culture" was that of the West, led by the United States. Western military culture emphasized technology, tactical innovation, high tempos of war, maneuver, and deep strikes. It had developed and produced the technology it used. Its political base was democratic in character, and it had a different process of command and motivation. It was also a military culture shaped by two European World Wars, Korea, and by America's experience in Vietnam. At the same time, it was already in transformation from a four decade long focus on a Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat to a new focus on regional contingencies. The US forces -- which dominated the UN Coalition in size, technology, and combat power -- were engaged in an additional transformation. US forces had steadily reorganized and restructured after the American defeat in Vietnam. They had become a professional all-volunteer force -- the first such force in American history. They had adopted fundamentally different methods of training, and had spent nearly two decades Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved GW-3 The Forces Engaged October 15, 1994 Page 125 developing a new emphasis on maneuver, combined arms, and combined operations. While the British, French and other Western forces committed to Desert Storm were the product of a considerable continuity, the US forces were the product of change and experiment. Because of the critical role played by US air power and armor, many aspects of the war reflected the resulting differences between Iraqi and US forces. At the same time, the West had the great advantage of being able to cooperate with Arab forces inside and outside of the region. The Coalition blended two military cultures, while Iraq fought in isolation. The West was able to use the advanced infrastructure and support of Saudi Arabia and the other southern Gulf states. The US had also learned a great deal about desert warfare from a long series of exercises with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. As a result, the West was able to borrow far more effectively from its Arab allies than Iraq was able to borrow from the West and Soviet Union. The West had massive support from regional allies, and benefited from cooperative security, while Iraq was effectively isolated from the nations that had supplied most of its previous military build-up. Iraq also gave the West the gift of five critical months in which to adapt its forces to the special conditions of warfare in the upper Gulf. Table 3.1 shows an estimate of the total forces that the two opposing military cultures could draw upon in mobilizing for Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and the approximate peak size of the forces actually engaged in the theater. War does not occur, however, between force ratios. It occurs between broad mixes of forces under conditions where only limited portions are fully engaged and where force quality is as important as force quantity. While the data in Table 3.1 illustrate the approximate quantitative ratios of the involved, they tell little about force quality, the number of forces each side could commit to combat, and the relative ability to sustain those forces. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved GW-3 The Forces Engaged October 15, 1994 Page 126 Table 3.1 Iraqi vs. UN Coalition Forces at the Start of the Gulf War Total National Orders of Battle Iraq US Other UN (1 January, 1991) (1 December 1990) Total Active Personnel 1,140,000 2,038,300 1,110,000 Active Ground Force Personnel 1,100,000 930,358 831,500 Divisions 66 21 21 Maneuver Brigades 270 - 123 Tanks 5,800-7,000 15,075 8,600 Armored Vehicles 11,200 27,972 15,000 Artillery (100mm+) 3,8500 6,988 3,750 (Self Propelled) - 3,720 550 (Towed) - 3,268 3,200 Multiple Rocket Launchers 340 400 800 SSM Launchers 110 65 80 Active Air Force Personnel 18,000* 527,069** 105,100 Bombers 15 366 ? Fighter/fighter bombers 728 3,879 1,386 Combat Capable Trainers 400 - 514 Reconnaissance 12 346 ? Transports 70 824 257 Tankers 2 555 ? Helicopters 511 9,762 849 (Attack) - - 220 (Other) - - 527 Civil Aviation Transports 60 - 256 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved GW-3 The Forces Engaged October 15, 1994 Page 127 Table 3.1 Iraqi vs. UN Coalition Theater Forces at the Start of the Gulf War Total Forces in Theater Iraq US 1 Britain France Saudi Egypt Syria Arabia Ground Force Personnel 336,000 334,000 35,000 9,500 50,000 30,200 14,000 Division Equivalents 43 9 2/3 1 1 1 2/3 2 1 Maneuver Brigades - 32 2 1-2 6 7 4 Tanks 3,475 2,000+ 180 40 280 350 240 Armored Vehicles 3,080+ 2,425+ 215 120 950 750 250 Artillery (100mm+) 2,475 784 24 18 115 145 100 (Self Propelled) - - 84 - - - - (Towed) - - - 18 - - - Multiple Rocket Launchers - - 12 - 30 - - SSM Launchers - - 0 - - - - Air Force Personnel 18,000* 48,680 7,000 1,200 16,000 None None Fighter/fighter bombers 819 1,215 84 58 245 Combat Capable Trainers - - - - 71 Transports 400 - - - 81 Helicopters 511 1,500+ - 120-130 74 (Attack/Armed) 70 343 48 60-85 20 (Other) 441 - 39 60-70 74 Civil Aviation Transports 60 - - - - Note: The data reported are not comparable in many ways, and the data on other armored vehicles are particularly unreliable. The Saudi ground forces include all regular army and active National Guard personnel and equipment and the entire Saudi Air Force. The Iraqi air force manning would total 35,000, and the Saudi Air Force would total 22,00o, if air defense personnel were counted. US totals only include US Air Force personnel for the air force manpower total. All Marine manpower and equipment are counted in ground force total. Naval aviation personnel not included. Totals for US air combat strength include aircraft in all services, except for helicopters which only include US Army and USMC. Estimates of US ground strength are very difficult because so many forces finished deployment during the final days before Desert Storm, and build-ups of manpower continued throughout the conflict. Total US Army forces rose from 247,637 on January 16 to a peak of 304,648 on February 27; US Marine Corps forces rose from 85,447 on January 16 to a peak of 92,538 on February 27; US Air Force forces rose from 48,679 on January 16 to a peak of 54,364 on February 27; and US Navy forces rose from 67,851 on January 16 to a peak of 83,278 on February 27. Sources: Adapted from data in Dr. Eliot A. Cohen, Director, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume V, Washington, GPO, 1993, pp. 15,18-19, 44 and Volume I, pp. 203-207; John M. Collins and Dina E. Rennack, "US/Soviet Military Balance: Statistical Trends, 1980-1989 (as of 1 January, 1990, Congressional Research Service, 1990; Department of Defense press release dated January 26, 1991; Steven R. Bowman, "Persian Gulf War: Summary of U.S. and Non-U.S. Forces," Congressional Research Service 91-167F, February 11, 1991, pp. 1-2; IISS, Military Balance, 1991-1992; JCSS Military Balance in the Middle East, 1990, and the author's data files. Some data are taken from Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report, Department of Defense, April, 1992, p. 321, 353; David Miller, U.K. Forces in the Gulf War," Military Technology, July, 1991, pp. 39-50. Some Arab Coalition Forces data are taken from Saudi MODA briefing aids of March, 1991. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved GW-3 The Forces Engaged October 15, 1994 Page 128 Preparing for the Past: Iraqi Military Forces At the Beginning of Gulf War When Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, Iraq was the dominant military power in the Gulf region and the Iraqi army was the fourth largest army in the world. Its active regular strength had increased from 180,000 men in early 1980 -- before the start of the Iran-Iraq war, to over 800,000 men in early 1990 -- before Saddam Hussein took his decision to invade Kuwait.