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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report Operation IRAQI FREEDOM For Official Use Only Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Table of Contents Chapter 1 Continuous Offensive Operations Over Extended 1 Distances Chapter 2 Full Spectrum Operations 11 Chapter 3 Mechanized Operations in Military Operations on Urban 21 Terrain (MOUT) Chapter 4 Fire Support in Offensive Operations 29 Chapter 5 Helicopter Operations in the Offense 35 Chapter 6 Embedded Media 41 Chapter 7 Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration 45 (RSOI) and Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) Chapter 8 Force Modernization/Modification Table of Organization 51 and Equipment (MTOE) Chapter 9 Intelligence 63 Chapter 10 Maneuver 83 Chapter 11 Battle Staff Planning 93 Chapter 12 Fire Support 99 Chapter 13 Aviation Operations 131 Chapter 14 Close Air Support (CAS) 137 Chapter 15 Engineer 143 Chapter 16 Air Defense 169 Chapter 17 Communications 183 Chapter 18 Logistics 197 For Official Use Only i For Official Use Only Chapter 19 Personnel Service Support (PSS) 213 Chapter 20 Combat Health Support (CHS) 221 Chapter 21 Equal Opportunity (EO) 231 Chapter 22 Unit Ministry Team (UMT) 235 Chapter 23 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) 239 Chapter 24 Provost Marshal (PM) 251 Chapter 25 Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2) 259 Chapter 26 Command and Control (C2) 265 Chapter 27 Information Operations (IO) 269 Chapter 28 Civil Affairs (CA) 271 Chapter 29 Marne Visitors Bureau (MVB) 275 Chapter 30 Inspector General (IG) 279 Chapter 31 Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) 281 ii For Official Use Only For Official Use Only Chapter 1 Continuous Offensive Operations Over Extended Distances Chapter Contents Introduction Topic A - Training for Combat Topic B - Command, Control, Communication, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Topic C - Task Organization Topic D - Battlespace Management Topic E - Logistics Introduction Operating considerably beyond existing doctrine, the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID [M]) proved that a lethal, flexible, and disciplined mechanized force could conduct continuous offensive operations over extended distances for twenty-one days. At its largest point, the division owned and influenced a 16,100 square kilometer (km) battlespace (230 km deep and 70 km wide). The division’s training, utilization of command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I), consideration and implementation of its task organization, adherence to battlespace management, and logistics all provided invaluable lessons for the force. The lessons learned about offensive operations during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) will enable the Army to grow and further develop its existing capabilities. Chapter 1 Continuous Offensive Operations Over Extended Distances Topic A - Training for Combat The roots of the division’s successful attack to Baghdad are found on the training fields of Fort Stewart, Fort Irwin, and Kuwait. The division crossed the line of departure with a mature and trained group of staff officers, commanders, and soldiers. The ability of the division to stabilize company commanders and field grade officers after conducting multiple CONUS contingency response force (CCRF) and National Training Center (NTC) rotations produced a seasoned fighting force that was trained and ready to fight and win on any battlefield. A direct correlation can be drawn between the division’s training cycle prior to crossing the line of departure and the division’s successful attack into Iraq. The division conducted multiple integrated live fire maneuver operations on urban terrain and detailed command and control exercises at the task force through the division level to prepare for combat. For Official Use Only 1 For Official Use Only All maneuver battalions conducted externally evaluated force-on-force and live fire training events focused on offensive operations at the company team level through the battalion task force level. Every rifle squad conducted combined arms training focused on entering and clearing a complex trench system and a multiple room structure. These training events focused every maneuver unit in the division on the exact missions soldiers would execute weeks later against the Iraqi Regular Army and Fedayeen death squads. The division artillery conducted live fire training events prior to crossing the line of departure that massed every firing system in the division at a single point and ensured every firing battery was trained and ready to mass fires anywhere on the modern day battlefield. The 4th Brigade (BDE) trained both close combat attacks in support of the ground maneuver commander and shaping operations under the brigade commander’s control while in Kuwait. This served to not only synchronize the brigade’s internal aviation assets, but to also synchronize the division’s aviation assets with the ground maneuver forces. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) established between 4th BDE and the maneuver brigades facilitated the rapid and safe employment of attack aviation in combat. The division fought to train under realistic conditions in preparation for combat. The priorities were clear and subordinate leaders executed training that produced a disciplined, lethal, and flexible force capable of accomplishing any tactical task. The requirement for tough realistic training has not changed in the past 227 years. The division lived under the “train as you fight” motto for the 12 months preceding the war. The training proficiency, lethality, and maturity of the division serve as an example for the Army to follow. Lessons Learned • Key leader and soldier stabilization produced a mature fighting force. • Combined arms force on force and live fire exercises prepared units of all levels for combat. • Command and control training under offensive conditions at task force through division level was essential to the division's success. Chapter 1 Continuous Offensive Operations Over Extended Distances Topic B - Command, Control, Communication, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) The division succeeded in its tenacious attack over 600 kilometers (km) from Kuwait to Baghdad, through storms of biblical proportion and constant enemy resistance, specifically because of its bold and decisive maneuver and the ability to command and control on the move. Brigade combat team (BCT) and division command posts (CPs) 2 For Official Use Only For Official Use Only separated and formed smaller more mobile command posts in preparation for the continuous attack. An example of these smaller CPs was the division's use of an assault command post (ACP). Doctrinally the ACP is created to provide a jump capability to a tactical command post (TAC). The ACP is a temporary organization that moves forward to allow for continuity in command and control while the remainder of the CP begins to move forward. The 3ID (M) did not follow this doctrine during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The division's ACP was a permanent C2 node that provided the commanding general the flexibility to freely move on the battlefield with a separate security and communications package. The ACP enabled the Division Commander to gain a different view of the battlefield than the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) (ADC[(M]) and command the division from a vantage point of the commander’s choice. BCT and division CPs became more mobile and responsive by adapting the level to which they set up during stops. Most CPs had at least two levels of set-up in order to maximize capabilities for the duration of the halt. These smaller and more mobile CPs had several enablers that greatly enhanced the command and control of the division including: Force XXI battle command brigade and below – Blue Force tracker (FBCB2 - BFT), wide band tactical satellite (TACSAT), and Iridium phones. Maneuver units enjoyed huge success commanding and controlling on the move; however other battlefield operating systems (BOS) struggled with on-the-move capabilities, mainly centered on communications platforms. All future development in the command and control (C2) arena must be focused on a mobile structure with long haul communications for voice and data. The Army must recognize the requirement for smaller and mobile CPs for future doctrine. At the division and brigade level, rapid and decisive offensive maneuver over extended distances cannot be executed without the ability to C2 from multiple C2 nodes on the battlefield, each of which must be capable of executing C2 of its subordinate elements while it is on the move. To address this problem the division’s modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) must be changed to provide additional equipment and personnel to enable divisions and brigades to command and control on the move. The mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) network is an antiquated system that must be replaced as quickly as possible. As the division’s primary MTOE means of communications over extended distances, its components must be stationary in order to function. With such limitations, there is no way that this type of system can provide reliable, responsive communications over the extended distances and at the extreme pace of operations seen during the offensive operations of OIF. As long as any of the subordinate elements is on the move, the echelon exercising C2 must use on-the-move communications systems to do so. During the entire period from line of departure (LD) to the 101st relief in place (RIP) at An Najaf (21 March through 29 March) and again from continuation of offensive operations through seizure of the presidential palace
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