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The Theory of the Triangle of Conflict and the Geo-Strategic Justification for the Turkish Military Incursion in SINJAR and QANDIL to Pursue the PKK

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Journal of Political Science and Leadership Research ISSN 2504-8821 Vol. 4 No. 3 2018 www.iiardpub.org The Theory of the Triangle of Conflict and the Geo-Strategic Justification for the Turkish Military Incursion in SINJAR and QANDIL to Pursue the PKK Assistant Professor Dr. Mohamed Aziz Abdel-Hassan Al-Bayati College of Political Science Baghdad University Baghdad Al - Jadiriyah Complex [email protected] Abstract Conflict is a natural state of affairs, so that we merely observe the behavior of the parties without trying to resolve it, i.e, managing the conflict. Therefore, the conflict "is a competitive situation in which the parties are aware of the inconsistencies and inconsistencies of positions and visions." John GALTHUNG (conflict triangle): The conflict is seen as an equilateral triangle, and it is called the three corners of its sides: angle of contradiction, angle of perception, angle of behavior. A - Contradiction: The situation that crystallizes the incompatibility of goals and interests between the parties. B) Perception: refers to the process of conceptualizing misconceptions about themselves (vision), and perception of each other. Behavior refers to the crystallization of contradiction and narration into behavior on the ground, usually embodied in the form of threat or oppression and the use of armed violence (war). The strategic location of SINJAR and QANDIL is a triangle of equal footing because of the nature of the conflicting powers. The question of the existence of major conflict-driven states such as the United States of America and Russia or regional countries, including competition and conflict such as Israel, Turkey, Iran and Iraq or the presence of non-state actors, The PKK and the People's Protection Units and the YAZIDI SINJAR resistance units, - In addition to the entry of the Popular Forces and the PESHMERGA of the Kurdistan region on the crisis line -: So we are in front of a triangle of equal conflict conflicts of interest and in the conduct of conflict management and in the understanding and perception of each party's tactical and strategic interests in SINJAR The strategic geo-strategic reality of SINJAR and QANDIL forced the Turkish armed forces to consider the possibility of accepting the idea of BASHIKA against SINJAR is not a part of the Turkish military deficit to resolve this battle, but there are motives and calculations Turkish accurate far-reaching region of SINJAR is: First: SINJAR for the PKK is much closer to RUGAJA, which allows the PKK to have excellent lines of communication and logistics with the territory under the control of the People's Protection Units. Second: To block the PKK from forming military bases and command and control headquarters and infrastructure in SINJAR Cutting off lines of communication, support, logistical coordination and exchange of intelligence between the PKK and the People's Protection Units in northern Syria, on the other IIARD – International Institute of Academic Research and Development Page 82 Journal of Political Science and Leadership Research ISSN 2504-8821 Vol. 4 No. 3 2018 www.iiardpub.org GHALTONG stresses the need for three components of the triangle to be available simultaneously in case of full conflict and only if the first and second components are available without the emergence of behavior that considers the conflict to be inherent or structural. It is possible through the theory of the triangle of conflict to understand the Turkish military strategy regarding the strategic location of SINJAR and QANDIL, and the motivation and willingness of the Turkish withdrawal from BASHIKA in exchange for the immediate withdrawal of the PKK and the people protection units from SINJAR? - Is it possible to consider the idea of BAASIKA against SINJAR , Iranian mediation and American pressure as a tactical, strategic or political step by Turkey? The Kurdish political situation is divided and its challenges differ in different countries In the east, the Islamic Republic of Iran is a huge burden to the emergence of a Kurdish political discourse, In the north, the balance of power is not so ambiguous with Turkey, especially with Turkey's positive relations with the Kurdistan region of Iraq It seems that the most confused situation today is the share of the Kurdistan of Syria, which is in particular what can be called the triangle of conflict in SINJAR and QANDIL, which was formed after the fall of Mosul in 2014 and the control of the preacher and still form, even after the liberation of Mosul a threat to Turkish national security ،Keywords: Theory of the Triangle of Conflict ، Geo- Strategic Justification ، Turkish Military Incursion in SINJAR ، QANDIL ، Pursue the PKK Introduction Turkish President RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN believes in the importance of anticipating events to achieve the objectives of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and the Balkans Turkey is adopting a foreign policy that precedes the events and extends from the Balkans to the Middle East, North Africa and the Caucasus region, and this geographical advantage constitutes the historical and cultural background of Turkey. Accordingly, Turkey's regional role is based on objective, subjective and not ideological considerations It is understood that Turkey plays a regional role to promote its interests and protect its national security. Therefore, Turkey has forced and calculated strategic geo-factors to intervene in Syria, Iraq and Qatar... As fighting intensifies in the northern provinces of IDLIB and Aleppo, many refugees flee to Turkey. South Turkey is the usual destination for these refugees, many of whom have ties to Arab Turks in HATAY province (between Syria and the Mediterranean coast) and other areas 1 . 1 The problem of research stems from the following legitimate questions: Is it possible, through the theory of the conflict triangle, to understand the Turkish military strategy regarding the strategic location of SINJAR and QANDIL, and the motivation and willingness of the Turkish withdrawal from BAASIKA in return for the immediate withdrawal of the PKK and the People's Protection Units from SINJAR ? - Is it possible to consider the idea of BAASIKA against SINJAR, Iranian mediation and American pressure as a tactical, strategic or political step by Turkey? - Will it be a condition of Turkey on Iraq, Iran and the United States of America to be a "joint security mechanism" quadripartite between the United States of America represented by the International Coalition and a representative of the Kurdistan region of Iraq and a representative of YEZIDIN, under the direct supervision of the Iraqi government and Iran, The quartet set up IIARD – International Institute of Academic Research and Development Page 83 Journal of Political Science and Leadership Research ISSN 2504-8821 Vol. 4 No. 3 2018 www.iiardpub.org a command and control center led by the United States of America on the identification of checkpoints and control of this strategic area of SINJAR. 1 . 2 . First: the deterioration of the security situation on the Iraqi-Syrian and Iraqi-Turkish borders after the fall of Mosul in 2014 The Turks suffer once again from the clashes from Syria to Turkish cities across the 900- kilometer-long border, as well as the deteriorating security situation on the Iraqi-Syrian and Iraqi-Turkish border after the fall of Mosul in 2014. Turkish National. Even after the liberation of Mosul, the Kurdish political situation has become a question of Iraqi or Syrian, which is a burden imposed on the Turkish armed forces, especially with regard to protecting the borders and preventing the infiltration of terrorist groups from the KANDIL mountains to SINJAR The Kurdish political situation is divided and its challenges differ in different countries In the east, the Islamic Republic of Iran is a huge burden to the emergence of a Kurdish political discourse, In the north, the balance of power is not so ambiguous with Turkey, especially with Turkey's positive relations with the Kurdistan region of Iraq It seems that the most confused situation today is the share of the Kurdistan region of Syria, which is particularly what can be called the triangle of conflict in SINJAR and KANDIL, which was formed after the fall of Mosul in 2014 and the control of them and even after the liberation of Mosul is a threat to Turkish national security. 1 . 3 . Second: the theory of the triangle of conflict and the importance of geo-strategy for SINJAR and KANDIL Several factors have helped to make the strategic location of SINJAR and KANDIL a threat to Turkey's national security First: What is the triangle of conflict and the author of this theory in the literature of international relations is John GALTHUNG (triangle of conflict): Which views the conflict as an equilateral triangle, and is called on the three angles of its sides: angle of contradiction, angle of perception, angle of behavior. A - Contradiction: The situation that crystallizes the incompatibility of goals and interests between the parties. B) Perception: refers to the process of conceptualizing misconceptions about themselves (vision), and perception of each other. BEHAIVIOUR refers to the crystallization of contradiction and narration into behavior on the ground, usually embodied in the form of threat or oppression and the use of armed violence (war). GALTUNG emphasizes that the three components of the triangle must be available simultaneously in case of full conflict If only the first and second components are available without the emergence of
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