DOCSLIB.ORG

1 | Page Submission to the Senate Standing Committees on Foreign

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
1 | Page Submission to the Senate Standing Committees on Foreign Submission to the Senate Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade on the Issues facing diaspora communities in Australia by the Yazidi Australian Association Yazidi Australian Association welcomes the opportunity to provide a Submission to the Senate Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade on the Issues facing diaspora communities in Australia. Yazidi Australian Association represents the needs and issues of the newly arrived Yazidi community members in Australia. We are one of the most recently arrived small and emerging refugee communities in Australia. Majority of our community members have settled in rural and regional Australia including Coffs Harbour, Wagga Wagga, Armidale and Toowoomba with a smaller cohort settling in Western Sydney. Below is a brief outline of the persecution faced by Yazidi community members. Further cultural information can be provided upon request. The Yazidi (or Ezidi) are a people who originate from Iraq, Syria and Turkey. The population is estimated to be between 800, 000 and 1000, 0001 globally, although their population is difficult to estimate considering their dwindling numbers over the last century due to constant persecution. The Yazidis are located primarily in the Nineveh province of northern Iraq, and in the Al-Jazira and Kurd- Dagh areas of Syria. The sacred valley of Lalish is the centre of pilgrimage for Yazidis. Some also live in Armenia and Georgia and many have migrated to parts of Europe. Sweden has had a significant Yazidi population since 20082 and Germany since the 1970s3 Yazidis almost all speak Kurmanji, with the exception of some villages in northern Iraq where Arabic is spoken. Kurmanji is the language of almost all the orally transmitted religious traditions of the Yazidis4. Yazidis began to face persecution from the late 16th and early 17th centuries. Organised anti-Yazidi violence dates back to the Ottoman Empire. In the second half of the 19th century, Yazidis were targeted by both Ottoman and local Kurdish leaders and subjected to brutal campaigns of religious violence5. In the late 1970s, Saddam Hussein launched brutal Arabisation campaigns against people in the north of Iraq. He razed traditional Yazidi villages and forced the Yazidis to settle in urban centres, disrupting 1 Kizilhan, J. & Noll-Hussong, M. (2017). Individual, collective and transgenerational traumatization in the Yazidi. Retrieved from: https://bmcmedicine.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12916-017-0965-7 2 Asatryan, G. & Arakalova, V. (2002). The Ethnic Minorities of Armenia. Retrieved from: http://www.minorities-network.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/The-ethnic-minorities-of-Armenia.pdf 3 Allison, C. (2017). The Yazidis. Retrieved from: http://religion.oxfordre.com/oso/viewentry/10.1093$002facrefore$002f9780199340378.001.0001$002facref ore-9780199340378-e-254;jsessionid=259EAC77572CAA3907EC9130493559DC 4 Asatryan, G. & Arakalova, V. (2002). The Ethnic Minorities of Armenia. Retrieved from: http://www.minorities-network.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/The-ethnic-minorities-of-Armenia.pdf 5 Asher-Schapiro, A. (2014). Who are the Yazidis, the Ancient, Persecuted Religious Minority Struggling to Survive in Iraq? National Geographic. Retrieved from: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/08/140809-iraq-yazidis-minority-isil-religion-history/ 1 | Page their rural way of life. Saddam Hussein constructed the town of Sinjar and forced the Yazidis to abandon their mountain villages and relocate in the city. In 2014 Islamic State captured large areas of Iraq’s north. In August 2014 they seized the city of Sinjar. In the next few days ISIS militants carried out the Sinjar massacre, killing more than 2000 Yazidi men and taking Yazidi women and girls into slavery, leading to a mass exodus of Yazidi residents, 250,000 of whom fled to the Sinjar mountains and were forced to choose between surrendering to ISIS forces or dying of dehydration, thirst and starvation on the mountain. The majority were able to be rescued by both Kurdish PKK fighters who broke the ISIS siege on the mountains and by a multinational rescue operation in which planes dropped supplies and helicopters evacuated refugees6. The persecution of the Yazidi people has been viewed as qualifying as genocide by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in a March 2015 report7. Cited were numerous atrocities such as forced religious conversion and sexual slavery as being part of an overall malicious campaign. In March 2016, the United States House of Representatives voted unanimously that violent actions performed against Yazidis, Christians, Shia and other groups by ISIL were acts of genocide and was confirmed a few days later by United States Secretary of State John Kerry, who declared that the violence initiated by ISIL against the Yazidis and others amounted to genocide. The Human Rights Council8 describes the Yazidi community of Sinjar as having been devastated by ISIS attacks, with no free Yazidis remaining in the Sinjar region. The once 400,000-strong community have all been displaced, captured or killed. While Yazidis are gradually returning to the retaken areas of Sinjar north of the mountain, the majority of the region’s Yazidis live difficult and impoverished existences in IDP camps scattered throughout the Duhok region of northern Iraq. The on-going ISIS attacks against the Yazidis were viewed by the community not as a stand-alone event but part of a long history of oppression and violence against them which has aggravated intergenerational trauma. According to the Human Rights Council, few Yazidis believed that international criminal justice was possible, citing centuries of impunity to attacks on their community9 Currently, there is another genocide of the Yazidis going on and the attempt to displace them in Syria, especially in the regions and villages of Afrin where a destructive campaign of harassment, kidnapping, rape and killing began in 2018 and continued till the present day. Some of Afrin Yazidis fled to Iraq, others to Lebanon and Turkey, but there is also persecution and deprivation of all their rights there as well. Within another year, according to studies and the threats that the Yazidi community keeps 6 Reuter, C. (2014). The drama of Sinjar: escaping the Islamic State in Iraq. Speigel Online. Retrieved from: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/pkk-assistance-for-yazidis-escaping-the-jihadists-of-the-islamic- state-a-986648.html 7 Human Rights Council. (2016). “They Came to Destroy”: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis.” Retrieved from: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A_HRC_32_CRP.2_en.pdf 8 Ibid. 9 Asher-Schapiro, A. (2014). Who are the Yazidis, the Ancient, Persecuted Religious Minority Struggling to Survive in Iraq?. National Geographic. Retrieved from: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/08/140809-iraq-yazidis-minority-isil-religion-history/ 2 | Page receiving in Afrin, they will end up murdered, deported, and the Yazidi civilization will be lost in all the regions of Syria101112 AHMAD IESSO President of the YAZIDI AUSTRALIAN ASSOCIATION w. www.yazidi.org.au Question 1 10 Ochab, A.U. (2020) Will The Yazidis Survive In The Middle East?, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2020/06/01/will-the-yazidis-survive-in-the-middle- east/#105e6e904d23 11 Cockburn, P. (2018), Yazidis who suffered under Isis face forced conversion to Islam amid fresh persecution in Afrin, Independent, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-yazidis-isis-islam- conversion-afrin-persecution-kurdish-a8310696.html 12 Ahmado, N. (2019), Hundreds of Yazidis Displaced Amid Turkey's Incursion in Northeast Syria, VOA News, https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/hundreds-yazidis-displaced-amid-turkeys-incursion-northeast- syria 3 | Page What do you think about the support offered to our community associations and similar organisations, including government grants and other funding? Did the organisations in Yazidi community receive enough support? Were the right things supported? If Yazidi community did not receive enough support and if the right projects were not supported, what should be supported? Yazidi Community is very new to Australia. The first organisation has just been incorporated and we have only received funding through our auspice arrangement with the NSW service for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture and Trauma Survivors (STARTTS). Our community members have received essential support from settlement agencies, torture and trauma services, education providers and others. We are grateful for the support we have received so far as individuals. Of course, there could be improvements but we feel that overall we were well supported on arrival. However, for our community to fully integrate in Australia, we will require a different type of support and on the community level including: - Access to funding that we can manage independently coupled with mentoring and guidance by the dedicated Government staff or an appropriate non-Government Agency. While we appreciate services being delivered to our community members, we feel that we need to develop independence and build on our community’s strengths and assets. This funding can be small at the start but we are willing to learn and grow. - Direct access to relevant Australian politicians and other Government officials to ensure we can raise issues faced by our community first hand rather than being represented by non-Yazidi service providers. We feel that
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Irak : Situation Sécuritaire Dans Le District De Sinjar
    Irak : situation sécuritaire dans le district de Sinjar Recherche rapide de l’analyse-pays Berne, 28 novembre 2018 Conformément aux standards COI, l’OSAR fonde ses recherches sur des sources accessibles publiquement. Lorsque les informations obtenues dans le temps imparti sont insuffisantes, elle fait appel à des expert -e-s. L’OSAR documente ses sources de manière transparente et traçable, mais peut toutefois décider de les anony- miser, afin de garantir la protection de ses contacts. Impressum Editeur Organisation suisse d’aide aux réfugiés (OSAR) Case postale, 3001 Berne Tél. 031 370 75 75 Fax 031 370 75 00 E-mail: [email protected] Internet: www.osar.ch CCP dons: 10-10000-5 Versions français, allemand COPYRIGHT © 2018 Organisation suisse d’aide aux réfugiés (OSAR), Berne Copies et impressions autorisées sous réserve de la mention de la source 1 Introduction Le présent document a été rédigé par l’analyse-pays de l’Organisation suisse d’aide aux réfugiés (OSAR) à la suite d’une demande qui lui a été adressée. Il se penche sur les ques- tions suivantes: Quelle est la situation sécuritaire dans le district de Sinjar (province de Ninawa) ? L’ « État islamique » (EI) autoproclamé /Daesh est-il encore présent ou représente-il encore une menace dans ce district ? 1. Quels sont les principaux obstacles au retour des personnes déplacées et à la recons- truction dans le district de Sinjar ? 2. Est-il concevable qu'un enfant mineur irakien d'origine kurde, qui a passé plusieurs mois dans un camp de l’EI/Daesh dans le district de Sinjar, puisse à son retour subir des me- sures de représailles de la part de la population locale ? Pour répondre à ces questions, l’analyse-pays de l’OSAR s’est fondée sur des sources ac- cessibles publiquement et disponibles dans les délais impartis (recherche rapide) ainsi que sur des renseignements d’expert-e-s.
    [Show full text]
  • Security Council Issue: the Situation Regarding the Islamic State of Iraq
    Forum: Security Council Issue: The Situation Regarding the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Student Officer: Ekaterina Kusaiko Introduction & Main Ideas The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) or the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, is a Salafi jihadist militant group that follows an Islamic fundamentalist, Wahhabi doctrine of Sunni Islam. The group has referred to itself as the Islamic State (IS) since it proclaimed a worldwide caliphate in June 2014 and named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as its caliph. As a caliphate, it claims religious, political, and military authority over all Muslims worldwide. As of December 2015, the group has control over vast landlocked territory in Iraq and Syria, with a population estimate ranging between 2.8 million and 8 million people and where it enforces its interpretation of sharia law. ISIL affiliates control over the small areas of Libya, Nigeria, and Afghanistan and operates in other parts of the world, including North Africa and South Asia. ISIL gained prominence, when in early 2014 it drove Iraqi government forces out of key cities in its Western Iraq offensive, followed by the capture of Mosul and the Sinjar massacre, almost causing a collapse of the Iraqi government and prompting a renewal of US military action in Iraq. In Syria, the group has conducted ground attacks on both government forces and rebel factions. The number of fighters the group commands in Iraq and Syria was estimated by the CIA at 31,000, with foreign fighters accounting for around two thirds, while ISIL leaders claim 40,000 fighters, with the majority being Iraqi and Syrian nationals.
    [Show full text]
  • آشور القديمة Imperialist Networks
    Present Pasts, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2010, 142-168, doi:10.5334/pp.30 شبكات اﻻمبريالية : آشور القديمة :Imperialist Networks والوﻻيات المتحدة Ancient Assyria and the United States راينهارد بيرنبك REINHARD BERNBECK آجامعة برلني الحرة وجامعة بنغهامتون Freie Universität Berlin and Binghamton University على مدى العقد الماضي, قام العديد من المؤرخين والمحللين السياسيين Over the last decade many historians and بتسليط الضوء على أوج��ه التشابه بين اﻻمبراطوريات الرومانية political analysts have sought to highlight واﻷمريكية. وتعرض هذه الورقة بديﻻ لهذه المعادﻻت من خﻻل مقارنة -similarities between the American and Ro ﻷمريكا واﻹمبراطورية اﻵشورية ، على أساس اختﻻفي معهم بأن لديهم -man Empires. This paper presents an alter التشابه الهيكلي ,ﻻ تشاركهم به روما. native to these equations by comparing the American and the Assyrian empire, based on my contention that they have structural similarities not shared by Rome. Introduction “Not since Rome has one nation loomed so large above the others”. With this sentence, Jo- seph Nye opens his book The Paradox of American Power (2002: 1). After the end of the cold war, and especially since 9/11, the notion of an “American empire” and the comparison with Rome as the sole precursor of the U.S. empire have become a mainstay of historians and political commentators alike (e.g. Kagan, 2002; Golub, 2002). Rome also underwent a transformation from republic to an imperial golden age, and reference is made to opinion leaders such as Cato, who said of Rome’s enemies: “Let them hate us as long as they fear us.” This sentiment is echoed by Charles Krauthammer (2001) who asserts that America “is the dominant power in the world, more than any since Rome.
    [Show full text]
  • The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq
    The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq Julie Ahn—Maeve Campbell—Pete Knoetgen Client: Office of Iraq Affairs, U.S. Department of State Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Advisor: Meghan O’Sullivan Policy Analysis Exercise Seminar Leader: Matthew Bunn May 7, 2018 This Policy Analysis Exercise reflects the views of the authors and should not be viewed as representing the views of the US Government, nor those of Harvard University or any of its faculty. Acknowledgements We would like to express our gratitude to the many people who helped us throughout the development, research, and drafting of this report. Our field work in Iraq would not have been possible without the help of Sherzad Khidhir. His willingness to connect us with in-country stakeholders significantly contributed to the breadth of our interviews. Those interviews were made possible by our fantastic translators, Lezan, Ehsan, and Younis, who ensured that we could capture critical information and the nuance of discussions. We also greatly appreciated the willingness of U.S. State Department officials, the soldiers of Operation Inherent Resolve, and our many other interview participants to provide us with their time and insights. Thanks to their assistance, we were able to gain a better grasp of this immensely complex topic. Throughout our research, we benefitted from consultations with numerous Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) faculty, as well as with individuals from the larger Harvard community. We would especially like to thank Harvard Business School Professor Kristin Fabbe and Razzaq al-Saiedi from the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative who both provided critical support to our project.
    [Show full text]
  • Download This PDF File
    Journal of Ethnic and Cultural Studies Copyright 2019 2019, Vol. 6, No. 2, 68-82 ISSN: 2149-1291 https://doi.org/10.29333/ejecs/255 Yezidis in ancient India, or Indians in ancient Mesopotamia?: Re-imagining Ancient Yezidi Origins Mija Sanders1 University of Arizona, Tucson, USA Abstract: Members and leaders of the Kurdish speaking Yezidi diaspora in Phoenix, Arizona—and transnationally—are in dialogue with members of the Indian diaspora about their common historical connections. “Are Yezidis from ancient India, or are Indians from ancient Mesopotamia?” Both of these claims and hypotheses situate Yezidis on the outside of a historical Muslim world, and have material effects. They add validity to non-Muslim traditions, by imagining a historical cultural root structure between India and Mesopotamia. They also help both Hindu nationalists and Yezidis to displace historical Muslim culture and dominance to somewhere else while reinforcing tropes of Islam synonymous with the “war on terror.” By de-historicising Islam and its presence in the Middle East and in India, Hindu and Yezidi community leaders co-imagine a pan-polytheism with roots in ancient Persian (Kurdish) Yezidi culture and language. The symbols that can be recognized today that span both traditions— the peacock, the peacock statue (sanjak), and the use of fire in places of worship—give testament to that imagined past. The contradictions of that historical narrative point to the limits of this historical work in the two communities, and find limits in modern identity articulations of Yezidi identity and Hindu identity alike. Material effects of the historical narrative include Indian imagery on the wall of Lalish, online circulating images and articles equating Yezidis to Hindus, and common activism, fundraising, and humanitarianism between Yezidi and Hindu communities in Phoenix, India, and in the Middle East.
    [Show full text]
  • Nineveh 2020-2
    CULTURAL EDUCATIONAL SOCIAL Established 1964 Ancient Assyrian New Year Wish in Cuneiform “I write for your well-being on the occasion of the New Year –– May you be happy, May you remain in good health May the god who looks after you provide you with good things” Publication of the Assyrian Foundation of America Volume 45, Number 2, 2020 From the President Contents Dear Nineveh Magazine Readers and AFA members, 4 Gilgamesh Performance 23 Their Story Will Soon Drown: A Christian Professionals and Assyrian Children Family of Middle East Survivors For those of you who don’t know me, I am the new- Nuri Kino ly elected president of the Assyrian Foundation of America 7 Nineveh Magazine The Assyrian Foundation (AFA). Before I provide you with more information regard- 24 Dr. Emmanuel Ramsin ing my background, I would like to thank our previous In Memoriam president Jackie Yelda for the many years of hard work and 8 AKITU 1670 achievements that she provided to the AFA. I think I can Elizabeth Mickaily-Huber, Ph.D. speak for all of us when I say that we are sad to see her go. 25 Nineveh Donations Nevertheless, I look forward to taking on the torch and to June 2019 through November 2019 serving the AFA, as I have done previously in a variety of 10 ‘Extremely rare’ Assyrian functions. carvings discovered in Iraq 26 Ferdinand Badal Andrew Lawler In Memoriam I was born in Baghdad, Iraq at the Kamp Alghei- lani, also known as the Armenian Camp. I grew up in 12 For Iraq’s Christians, 30 AFA Fourth Quarter Member Meeting Habanniya and later lived in Baghdad.
    [Show full text]
  • COI QUERY Disclaimer
    COI QUERY Country of Origin/Topic Iraq Question(s) What is the security context and treatment of Yazidis in Iraq? 1. Background 1.1. Post-ISIL security context of Yazidi community - Targeted destruction of infrastructure and habitat - Armed actors and targeting of Yazidis 1.2. Ninewa governorate and ability to secure livelihoods, law and order 1.3. Post-ISIL transitional justice 1.4. Sexual and gender-based violence 1.5. Missing, IDPs and returnees Date of completion 30 September 2020 Query Code Q 22 Contributing EU+ COI units This query response was sent to the EASO COI Specialists Network (if applicable) on Iraq1 for contributions on the security context and treatment of Yazidis. From the EU+ countries, the feedback was received from the Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre (Landinfo). Disclaimer This response to a COI query has been elaborated according to the Common EU Guidelines for Processing COI and EASO COI Report Methodology. The information provided in this response has been researched, evaluated and processed with utmost care within a limited time frame. All sources used are referenced. A quality review has been performed in line with the above mentioned methodology. This document does not claim to be exhaustive neither conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to international protection. If a certain event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position. The information in the response does not necessarily reflect the opinion of EASO and makes no political statement whatsoever.
    [Show full text]
  • Milete Min Êzîd. the Uniqueness of the Yezidi Concept of the Nation*
    Securitologia No 1/2018 Artur Rodziewicz Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland Milete min Êzîd. The Uniqueness of the Yezidi Concept of the Nation* Abstract Both the current increasing nationalistic discourse of the Yezidis and the discussion about their “Kurdishness” result from the growing political significance of the Kurds and the inclusion of the Yezidis into the geopolitical game in the Iraqi Kurdistan re- gion. The paper concerns the traditional Yezidi understanding of their millet, still valid, but starting to change, which is based on the mystical and metaphysical ideas incompatible with the approach preferred by contemporary political science. Keywords: Yezidis, Kurds, nationalism, millet, Sunna, Quraysh, Umayyads Creating the English-language version of the journal “Securitologia” is financed under contract No. 724/P- DUN/2018 from the funds allocated by the Minister of Science and Higher Education for dissemination of science. * Work on this article was supported by the Polish National Science Centre, grant: DEC-2016/20/S/HS1/00055. Its main theses were presented at the conference The Role of the Kurds in the Middle East (Warsaw 14 May 2018). The threads I am discussing here, I also develop, more extensively, in the article The Nation of the Sur. The Yezidi Identity Between Modern and Ancient Myth (Rodziewicz 2018a). DOI: 10.4467/24497436SCU.18.006.9929 ISSN: 1898-4509 e-ISSN: 2449-7436 online pdf E-mail contact to the Author: [email protected] 67 Artur Rodziewicz A pawn in the game We are witnessing a discussion, or even a sharp dispute, whether the Yezidis should be regarded as Kurds or not (Rodziewicz 2016, pp.
    [Show full text]
  • Abraham and the Chronology of Ancient Mesopotamia
    Answers Research Journal 5 (2012):141–150. www.answersingenesis.org/arj/v5/abraham-chronology-ancient-mesopotamia.pdf Abraham and the Chronology of Ancient Mesopotamia Matt McClellan, [email protected] Abstract Mesopotamia, the land that is today part of Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, is home to one of the oldest civilizations to have ever been discovered. It is here that the civilizations of Sumer, Babylon, and Assyria existed. This land is noteworthy in the Bible because it was here that the exiles were taken captive after the destruction of Jerusalem. It was also here that Abraham had lived before he set out to the Promised Land. For many years, Abraham was believed to have lived at the same time as Hammurabi, king of Babylon. Later scholars would date Abraham to the period shortly before the reign of Hammurabi. However, the result of recent research is that the chronology of the ancient world is being redated. Hammurabi now appears to be a near contemporary of Moses instead of Abraham. In Egyptian chronological studies, the patriarchs are dated earlier than ever before. In spite of this, there has been little research conducted on the relationship between Abraham and Mesopotamia in this new chronological revolution. This article will look at the current trends in chronological studies and how they relate to the life of Abraham. It will come to the conclusion that Abraham lived much earlier in Mesopotamian history than what most have realized. Keywords: Abraham, Mesopotamia, Ebla, Ancient Chronology, Sodom and Gomorrah Introduction overlap considerably. A Bible-believing Christian will, Mesopotamia was one of the earliest regions to of course, reject the dating of the oldest periods but, be inhabited after the great Flood, and it was here as mentioned in the introduction, this paper will not that Abraham lived his early life.
    [Show full text]
  • Report on the Yazidi Genocide: Mapping Atrocity in Iraq and Syria
    REPORT ON THE YAZIDI GENOCIDE: MAPPING ATROCITY IN IRAQ AND SYRIA Abstract: This report outlines ISIS’ transgressions against the Yazidi Community in Iraq and Syria. The report recounts a brief history of the Yazidi people and their culture. The report also provides documentation of existing evidence SAP compiled. The report asserts ISIS’ actions are properly considered genocide. At its conclusion, the report calls on the international community to prioritize holding ISIS fighters responsible for the heinous actions perpetrated against the Yazidi Community in the summer of 2014. Authors: Kelsea Carbajal Cynthia Cline Edmond Gichuru Zachary Lucas Margaret Mabie Shelby Mann Joseph Railey Ashley Repp Syrian Accountability Project 2017-18 Leadership: Project Leader: Professor David M. Crane, Former Chief Prosecutor, Special Court of Sierra Leone Executive Director: Joseph Railey Chief Registrar: Conor Sullivan Chief Investigator: Jasmine Greenfield Senior Editor: Shelby Mann Yazidi Project Team Lead: Margaret Mabie SAP 2017-18 Members: Mohammad Almania, Nate Bosiak, Sam Bubauer, William Bucha, Kelsea Carbajal, Nick Carter, William Cleeton-Grandino, Kristina Cervi, Jordan Charnetsky, John Cronin, Emma Coppola, Brandon DeJesus, Britany Dierken, Michael Flessa, Steven Foss, Cintia Garcia, Kari Gibson, Brandon Golfman, Courtney Griffin, Kseniia Guliaeva, Christian Heneka, Jennifer Hicks, Justin Huber, Paige Ingram, Briannie Kraft, Breanna Leonard, Maggie Mabie, Nicole Macris, Aaron Maher, Natalie Maier, Shelby Mann, Molly McDermid, Alex Mena, Charlotte Munday, Samantha Netzband, Juhyung Oh, Lydia Parenteau, Clara Putnam, Aaron Records, Jade Rodriquez, Jose Estaban Rodriguez, Jenna Romine, Nichole Sands, Ethan Snyder, Zacharia Sonallah, Robert Strum, Lester Taylor, Elliot Vanier, Amit Vyas Special Contributions from: Jodi Upton, Joe Bloss, Amanda Caffey, Ying Chen, Ankur Dang, Kathryn Krawczyk, Baiyu Gao, C.B.
    [Show full text]
  • Contrasting the Challenges of Liberating Fallujah and Mosul by Zana Gulmohamad
    OCTOBER 2016 CTC SENTINEL 1 Unseating the Caliphate: Contrasting the Challenges of Liberating Fallujah and Mosul By Zana Gulmohamad This article draws on interviews1 with key Iraqi political and mil- The successful liberation of Fallujah from the Islamic itary players, including in Anbar and Nineveh, to outline and assess State by a constellation of Iraqi forces in June provides the operation that recaptured Fallujah in June and to compare and pointers for the more challenging mission of liberating contrast the challenges faced there with those of the just launched the much larger city of Mosul. Relatively efective co- Mosul ofensive. It analyses the constellation of forces set to march ordination of Iraqi forces, coalition airpower, and vital on the northern Iraqi city, the Islamic State’s ability to defend the intelligence from Sunni tribes and townspeople led to city, and the political and military dynamics that will determine the ultimate success and failure of the war in Iraq against the Islamic the Islamic State being driven out more quickly than ex- State. pected, despite the fact that an unauthorized incursion by Shi`a militias risked compromising the ofensive, as Part 1: The Fallujah Operation well as attempts to secure and rebuild the town. Mosul will be harder to take because Islamic State fighters are Why Fallujah Was First less likely to flee in large numbers. It may be possible to Fallujah, 37 miles west of Baghdad, is the second-largest city in make significant progress in the coming weeks because of Anbar governorate and was the second most symbolic territorial weakening Islamic State capabilities and morale and the prize in Iraq for the Islamic State.2 The Iraqi government’s deci- emergence of resistance forces in the city providing key sion to liberate Fallujah first, despite U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Theory of the Triangle of Conflict and the Geo-Strategic Justification for the Turkish Military Incursion in SINJAR and QANDIL to Pursue the PKK
    Journal of Political Science and Leadership Research ISSN 2504-8821 Vol. 4 No. 3 2018 www.iiardpub.org The Theory of the Triangle of Conflict and the Geo-Strategic Justification for the Turkish Military Incursion in SINJAR and QANDIL to Pursue the PKK Assistant Professor Dr. Mohamed Aziz Abdel-Hassan Al-Bayati College of Political Science Baghdad University Baghdad Al - Jadiriyah Complex [email protected] Abstract Conflict is a natural state of affairs, so that we merely observe the behavior of the parties without trying to resolve it, i.e, managing the conflict. Therefore, the conflict "is a competitive situation in which the parties are aware of the inconsistencies and inconsistencies of positions and visions." John GALTHUNG (conflict triangle): The conflict is seen as an equilateral triangle, and it is called the three corners of its sides: angle of contradiction, angle of perception, angle of behavior. A - Contradiction: The situation that crystallizes the incompatibility of goals and interests between the parties. B) Perception: refers to the process of conceptualizing misconceptions about themselves (vision), and perception of each other. Behavior refers to the crystallization of contradiction and narration into behavior on the ground, usually embodied in the form of threat or oppression and the use of armed violence (war). The strategic location of SINJAR and QANDIL is a triangle of equal footing because of the nature of the conflicting powers. The question of the existence of major conflict-driven states such as the United
    [Show full text]