Müitary Interaction witb Non-Govcmmentil Orginiutions (NGO)and otbcr Humaaiitariin Agcncies (HA) during Huminitariia Assistance Opcritions: Ikfining the Civilhn-Milm Rtiationsbip

Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Simrns

Subrnitted in partial ftlfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia September, 1999

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Strength from Family List of Tables Page vi Abstract vii ..* Abbreviations Used Vllt Acknowledgments Chapter 1 What are Hurnanitarian Assistance Operations? Chapter 2 Defining the Factors: An Analytical Framework Chapter 3 Focushg on the Interaction Chapter 4 Analysis and Findings Chapter 5 Conclusion Appendix 1 Levels of Operational Planning Appendix 2 Military Planning Process Appendix 3 Intemet Sites Applicable to Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Appendix 4 Example of a Humanitarian NGO (Catholic Relief Service) Appendix 5 Research Questionnaire Reference List Table 1 : Coordination with Non-Military Organizations Page 3 Table 2: Links To Emergency Sites 8 Table 3 : The Deadly Sins of Humanitarian Assistance 15 Table 4: The Big Eight 25 Table 5: Military Involvement in 30 Humanitarian Emergencies Table 6: Cornparison of Cultures Table 7: Lessons Leaned Table 8: Mission Anaiysis - Croatia Table 9: Leamhg tiom Past Experiences Table 10: Assessrnent of the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office Table 1 1 : Conditions for Successfiil Humanitarian Assistance Operation The scope of this thesis includes an examination of the interaction of militaxy forces and non-military forces in complex emergencies. While the goal of the thesis is to establish a balanced look at the issues, including fiom the non-govemental organi ation perspective, the overall study is meant to define the relationships in an effort to assist military actors in establishing normative relationships. Specific examples and lessons learned are focused on the interaction of NGOs with the military and on the mission areas of Rwanda (1994) and the former Yugodavia. After examining what are complex emergencies and who are the humanitarian assistance actors, the dissertation bases its analysis of case studies on four core factors; capabiiities, organi ational culture, planning processes and ethos. Throughout the work, observations and lessons learned are forwarded as a means to identi&ing the probtems in current relationships, to identiQ areas where cooperation can be enhanced and to suggest how that enhancement can be accomplished Among the findings include; the need to improve leaming fiom past experiences, the difficulty in sustaining workable cooperative relationships when there are military commitments in complex emergencies without the provision of the adequate military resources, the requirement for highly professional military forces to interact with NGOs and other humanitarian actors, the requirement for increased flexibility and a reduction in national restrictions in order for military forces to be more capable of dealing with a very flexible NGO cornmunity and, finally, the need for better coordination between the peacekeeping partners based on a specific concept for coordination (such as the United Nations Emergency Ofice in Rwanda). In the conclusion, the author posits that a civilian-military relations modet specifically designed for humanitarian assistance operations is required if past coordination difficulties are to be overcome and if there is going to be a more effective response to future humanitarian assistance requirements. It is Merrecommended that this mode1 should develop around three central themes; professional education, mission planning and structure. A final recommendation is that it is at the tactical and gras-roots level where the most success in coordination has been effected in the past and, therefore, this should be the focus of initial efforts of coordination enhancement.

vii Abbreviations Used

AOR Area of Operations CANBAT Canadian Battalion CF Canadian Forces CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation CONGO Conference of Non-Governrnental Organi ations in Consultative Status with the UN Economic and Socid Council COP Contingency Operations Plan CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe DART Disaster Assistance Response Team EC European Community ECHO European Community Humanitarian Office EU European Union FA0 Food and Agriculture Organi ation of the United Nations GAO Generai Accounting Office HA Humanitarian Agencies iASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross [CVA International Council of Voluntary Agencies lFOR Implementation Force IGO International Govemmental Organi ation JFC Joint Force Commander KLA Kosovo Liberation Army MSF Medicins sans Frontiers NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organi ation NGO Non-Govenimental Organi ations ODA Overseas Development Agency PVO Private Volunteer Organi ations (U.S. Term) SC Security Council SCR Security Council Resolutions SFOR Sustainment Force UN United Nations UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda UNCIVPOL United Nations Civilian Police UNDHA United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affain UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNEF United Nations Emergency Fund UNESCO United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organi ation UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children s Fund UNIKOM United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission UNMIH United Nations Mission in Haiti

viii UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force (in the former Yugoslavia) UNREO United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office USAID United States Agency for International Development WEU Western European Union WFP World Food Programme WHO World Health Organi ation 1 would like to take the opportunity to acknowledge and thank various individuals for contributing to this thesis and, additionally, to my academic and professional development. In the first instance, 1 would Iike to acknowledge the support and assistance of Lieutenant-General Ray Crabbe, former Depuîy Chief of Defence Staff for his support and encouragement of my academic endeavours. It was a privilege to work for such a fine oficer. 1 thank the Canadian Forces for authori ing my application for post-graduate study and the Department of National Defence for awarding me a strategic studies scholarship. In retum, 1 have attempted at every opportunity to provide my fellow students a snapshot of the military profession and our unique challenges and capabilities. I would also Iike to acknowledge Dr. Joel J. Sokolsky for his support and assistance in both the RMC war studies programme and in my efforts at Dalhousie University. Additionally 1 would like to thank the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada and, in particular, Ms. Alison Craig. During my two years of study at Dalhousie University 1 was fortunate to have exposure to outstanding professors including Dr. Jennifer Smith and Dr. Peter Aucoin. 1 wouid like to particuiady acknowiedge Dr. Denis Stairs - one has no choice but to learn in his esteemed presence. For his patience, assistance and advice, 1 note, and thank, Dr. Dan Middlerniss, my thesis supervisor and professor for three different courses. 1 would also iike to thank Peter Haydon of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies for agreeing to be a reader and for his valuable comments. In the end, this thesis was made better by those mentioned and others unmentioned. Any errors, omissions or perceived shortcomings are mine alone. Chanter 1 - What are Humanitarian Assistance Ooerations?

Introduction

Cornplex emergencies and disasters continue to be a real concem.'

Notwithstanding the optimism displayed by international statesmen and leaders in the

early 1990s. the fact remains that the decade has commenced and is about to end with

immense humanitarian s~ffering.~In fact, Canadian rnilitary forces are more apt to be

employed in hwmitarian assistance operations than in war fighting. Notwithstanding

this, Joel S . i. ' ky, in a recent paper titled Dangerous Places in a Safe World: The

Canadian Forces and Armed Responses to Security Risks, argues that, despite the present security situation affording Canada a world safer than it has known since perhaps the first world war, the 1994 Defence White Paper demands combat capable forces that have the capability to engage in high-intensity combat action oversees.' In essence, to be able to be employed in dangerous places in the world notwithstanding the fact that direct threats to Canada are virtually non-existent.

o or example see the latest emergency reports as detailed at the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). www.reliefweb.int/ocha-ol/index.html Other documentation of the currcnt humanitarian dangers include: United States. Global Humanitarian Emeraencies, 1996. New York: United States Mission to the United Nations, February 1996 and Watkins, Kevin. The Oxfam Povenv Rewrt. Oxford: Oxfam. 1995. 'For example the optimism of the United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Bouuos-Ghali in his & Agenda for Peace is indicative of the hope expressed by many with the end of the Cold War. 'From an unpublished paper prepared by Iwl J. Sokolsky, "Dangerous Places in a Safe World: The Canadian Forces and Armed Responses to Security Risks," presented to The Conference of Defence Associations 1998 Annual Seminar, 29 January 1998. 2 Additionally, recent international operations have required increased

cooperation between the military and civil components of peace support missions and

have included humanitarian tasks. But the military rarely provides relief on its own

throughout an operation. Civilian humanitarian relief organizations are often on the

ground when the military deploys to an area, or they follow soon afte~~This thesis

contends that there is a weakness in the policy and decision-making process of

interagency teams and in the communications between these elementss AI! govemment.

military, IGO and NGO efforts must be coordinated and hannonized to provide

humanitarian assistance in a focused, efficient and coordinated manner. The current

responsibility for this coordination remains unclear (as evidenced in Operation

ASSURANCE, the Canadian Force's deployment to support UN action in the Great

Lakes region of Africa) and is expected to Vary by ~ituation.~The comment in the

following table is indicative of the extent of the problem from a military perspective.

'For example, by December of 1995 there were 279 international NGOs operating in Bosnia. Reponed in David Bryer. "Lessons from Bosnia: The Role of NGOs," Seminar Paper Presented at Al1 Souls College. Oxford. 1 March 1996.8. 5This was perhaps identified by the Defence and Foreign Affairs Departments when they organized the symposium on international disaster assistance. This is also discussed in Dr. Isabelle Francois's research note for the Directorate of Strategic Analysis of Canada's Department of National Defence, "Civil-Military Cooperation in Humanitarian Ernergencies," dated May 1995 'See for example the after action report compiled by the Canadian Military and the references to lack of coordination with other organizations. Also this matter was discussed with the 1 Canadian Division Headquarter's G3 in 1997 and the sarne concems were expressed. Table 1 :Coordination with Non-Militaw 0rganizations7

Coordination with non military organizations in country was not apparent. In addition io the Military HQs there is also the requirement for coordination between DFAIT, CIDA and other Aid Agency HQs. This coordination was not visible to the DART or other subordinate units and as a result no intelligence on the situation in country nor the capabilities of other international humanitarian aid agencies in theatre was received.

This weakness in coordination in not new. Much has been written about it long

before the end to the Cold War and the resulting increased emphasis on reacting to the

dilernrnas of complex emergenciesO8Based on a premise that rnilitary forces are the

forces of "last resort" and that military forces support national objectives, it could be

argued that it is the military which must, ultimately, accept responsibility for the

leadership and coordination of combined efforts once committed by national authorities

at the strategic level. This, however, presupposes that senior political leadership accept

this premise and this is certainly not clear. However, one of the key conclusions of this

work could very well be that this premise should, or should not, be accepted by the key

'Quoted €rom the Amy Lessons Learned Centre, "Analysis Report Operation Assurance: CF Deployrnent to Central Africa Novernber 1996 - January 1997," 2 June 1997. paragraph 2.4. %ee for example the work of Randotph C. Kent, Anatomv of Disaster Relief: The International Network in Action (London: Pinter Pubtishers Limited, 1987). Kent was proposing a more responsive system which would include enhanced coordination, modem technology and preparedness. See chapter six (173-183). leadership of the civilian-military relations ~iad.~At the operationai leveV0. and

notwithstanding the fact that a military cornmitment will likely be for a fixed (often short)

duration necessitating a transition of the leadership role back to a civilian agency, this

dictates that military commanders and staff are committed and capable of integrating al1

agencies in the application of resources and efforts to a comrnon mission.

This thesis will be examine the interaction of military forces and non-military forces in complex emergencies. This is notwithstanding the recent major deployments of elements of the Canadian Forces in disaster assistance within Canada and abroad in the last three years. Domestic disaster assistance is clearly more developed, with overall responsibility for coordination by Ernergency Preparedness Canada well document4 and now well practiced. Therefore, domestic disaster assistance is not considered.

International disaster assistance as provided by Canada in the aftermath of Hurricane

Mitch is also not specifically studied. Suffice it to say that when a disaster or need is due to natural causes, the humanitarian response is more straight-forward and characterized by rescue operations, medical assistance, rehabilitation and reconstruction. In other words - reduce suffering and prevent further deaths. Military resources are likely to be employed for short durations in specific situations often utilizing unique capabilities.

4The civilian-military relations uiad refers to the interactions of three groups: the military, the civilian leadership con trolling the military and the nation's citizens acting either independently or through the elected government. For a good discussion of this relationship and the impact of its break-down (albeit in an American context) see, Gregory D. Foster, "Combating the Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," in Humanist, lanuary, February 1998,6- 1 1. 'OA~ operational-level plan provides direction to subordhate commanders, at the tactical level, to guide their planning. An operational level commander sets achievable, specific military objectives for tactical commanders. See Appendix I for further information on the levels of operations. While the goal will be to establish a balanced look at the issues, inc!uding from the NGO perspective, the overall study is meant to define the relationships in an effort to assist military actors in estabiishing normative relationships. Specific examples and lessons learned will be focused on the interaction of specific NGOs with the military and on the mission areas of Rwanda (1994) and the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR versus

NATO's IFOWSFOR). The study should show the strengths and limitations of each group and coordination problems among them. A better understanding of the international humanitarian relief system should assist in the creation of enduring relationships between military forces and other actors. The creation of enduring and effective relations will be dependent on the development of a civilian-military relations model or models. A model, it is accepted, is only the first step towards ensuring that coordination is enhanced and then maintained. As Seiple notes in his noteworthy work on this topic, NGOs and military forces have to "work hard at coordination, because you will never have complete agreement."" This suggests that full agreement may not be possible and should not be a bais for collaboration, but that intended colIaboration should be an acceptable modus operandi, especially in emergencies where time is paramount.

This issue is important not only to the key participants in humanitarian assistance operations but also to policy analysts including political scientists. A model will assist in

"Chris Seiple, The U.S. Militarv/NGO Relationshi~in Humanitarian Interventions (Carlisle Barrack, PA: Peacekeeping Institute, Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Amy War College, 1996), 9. This comment is attributed to Ambassador Robert B. Oakley (ret), in an interview at the National Defense University, 9 August 1995. 6

identifying how to avoid duplication of efforts/resources and how to create synergies of

effort and assist in predicting the probability of success of different policy options. It is

becorning increasingly obvious that huge military forces fighting set piece actions by

standard laws of war and rules of engagement is unlikely in the near future - at least as far

as Western nations are concerned. However, the likelihood that these forces will be

invoI ved in dangerous situations operating in partnership with other agencies is increased.

Acceptance of this reality will make the task of merging the practice of the practitioners

and the theory of the theorists easier."

Therefore, the key issue for this thesis to examine is how to overcome the cunent

ad hoc nature of the relationship between military forces and other humanitarian agencies,

especially NGOs.13 This study will demonstrate that this ad hoc nature is a result of four

factors: different capabilities, culture, planning process and ethos. Some obstacles - a

result of these four factors - may be easier to overcome that others. For example, ethos

may be the hardest to overcome especially as it pertains to military forces compelled to

retain a warfighting ethos. While this war-fighting ethos may lend itself to the preparation for some of the dangerous situations, peacekeepers and other military forces

involved in humanitarian operations find themselves, it continues to instill in the military forces the traditional concept of "force of last resort" and a preparation for war-fighting

12See Christopher Bellamy, Kniehts in White Amour: The New Art of War and Peace (London: Hutchinson, 1996) for an interesting discussion on the challenges facing military forces in the future. 13As an indication of the growing importance and des of NGOs the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development counted 2542 NGOs in its 24 member counuies in 1990 cornpared with 1 603 in 1 980. See Jon Bennett, Meeting Needs: NGO Coordination in Practice (London, Eartscan Publications, 1995), FN,xi. 7

mentality. Therefore any development of continuity of effort will, frcm the military's

perspective, likely have to be in military terms and based on a hierarchy of tasks dictated

by the military and dependent on, in the first instance, physical security. This is just one

exampIe of the obstacles to overcorne if military interactions with NGOs and

Humanitarian Agencies (HAs) are to be enhanced.

The Two Categories of Situations - Complex Emergencies and Disasters

What are humanitarian assistance operations? Al1 crisis are humanitarian - crises are such that they affect people. The issue is what is the cause and what is the effect?

Categorizations can be arbitrary and certainly subjective but for the purposes of this work humanitarian assistance operations will be separated and examined frorn two perspectives

- complex emergencies and disaster assistance.'* Complex emergencies are characterized by "economic collapse, the deterioration of civil Society, food shortages and mass flows of refugees. 'Complex ernergencies' are seldom confined to a single country as they affect entire reg ion^."'^ Often responses to complex emergencies will have to be conducted in a non-benign environment and, in fact, there appears to be an increasing

'There are those who choose not to clearly delineate between the two types of humanitanan emergencies and choose to include one of a combination of factors - natural disasters - as a mot cause of complcx emergencies. See for example, Dr. Isabelle Francois, "Civil-Military Cooperation in Humanitarian Emergencies," ORAE Research Note No. 95/08 (Ottawa: Directorate of Strategic Analysis, Department of National Defence, May 1995). 'SNicholas Hopkinson, Humanitarian Intervention?, Report based on Wilton Park Conferences of 1994 and 1995, (London: HMSO),1. 8 probability that the use of force will be required to sustain the effort. Andrew Natsios defines complex humanitarian emergencies on the basis of five characteristics which he suggests are displayed most of the time albeit in varying degrees of intensity. These are: civil conflict, decline of govemment authority, population displacement, macro-economic failure and food insecurity.16 Based on these criteria he compiled a listing of 23 countries experiencing cornplex humanitarian emergencies in 1996 affecting a total of almost 34 million people. l7 These numbers. while difficult or impossible to verify. are in line with other estimates of the magnitude of the problem in the pst-Cold War period." Of course responding to emergencies, like most current activity, has taken advantage of technology.

For exarnple listed below are some websites dedicated to this topic.19

Table 2: Links To Emerqency- Sites

Disaster assistance, on the other hand, at times may intersect with cornplex emergencies and then the assumptiow and operational caveats of complex emergencies

I6Andrew S. Natsios, U.S. Foreign Policv and the Four Horsemen of the Awcalvvse: Humanitarian Relief in Comdex Emernencies (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 19971.7- "m., 8. ''Se for example, Global Humanitarian Emeraencies 1995, a paper released by the United States Mission to the United Nations, New York. January 19%. p. 4 which 16 million refugees worldwide and between 20 and 25 mitlion people intemally displaced. Additionally, MSF reported in 1997 that the global growth in violence and conflict has swelled the world's refugees and displaced populations to over 50 million people. See. MSF, World in Crisis (London: Routledge, 1997). viii. I9Other more detailed virtuaI information possibilities is availabte in an attached appendix (Appendix 3). 9 will take precedence, will be characterized by natural disasters and traditionally quick responses led by international relief organizations or host governments. As noted by

Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF),

When the catastrophe is due to natural causes, the humanitarian response is

straightforward: rescue operations, triage, medical and surgical treatment,

rehabilitation and reconstruction. The initial goal is to reduce the suffering caused

by injury, illness and malnutrition - and to prevent further deaths, al1 in a marner

that helps restore the dignity and self-esteem of a community. In the case of

armed conflict, however, survival means prirnarily refuge and protection. Victims

need access to adequate food, shelter, water and essential services, such as

medical care and sanitation. The normal provision of basic needs, such as the

production of food by local famiers, the running of government or private heaith

centres, or the supply of electricity by power companies is usually disrupted by

the destruction caused by armed conflict and the associated mass population

displacement."

Humanitarian Assistance - Why is it Required?

Humanitarian assistance operations are required because generally there is a feeling that something must be done. As noted by Natsios, '[a] foreign policy either

'OMike Toole, "Frontline Medicine: The Role of International Medical Groups in Ernergency Relief," Medicins Sans Frontieres, World in Crisis: The Politics of Survival at the end of the Twentieth Centuw (London: Routledge, 1997). 16. 10 devoid of moral judgement on the one hand or driven by dangerous utopian dreams of a perfect world on the other will prove inadeq~ate."~'Equally important is the fact that the imperatives of the Cold War can no longer be used as a cloak to hide behind to justify inactivity. Coupled with this is the reality that many Western and other nations have military establishments that are not fully occupied with Cold War related training, prepositioning and readiness. Many countries are in a similar position where there are demands by govemment officiais, organized pressure groups and citizens in general to find viable roles and tasks to justify the costs of standing military forces.

It is useful to compare the situation of Canada with that of our principal ally, the

United States, which has its share of disagreement over the force structure and employment. During the early stages of the Bosnian conflict the U.S. Joint Chiefs of

Staff reported both to Congress and to the new president that 400,000 ground troops and a year-long bombing campaign would be required to defeat the Bosnian Serbs. The military advice to the Secretary of Defence and other politicians was that if force were to be used it mua be massive to avoid a long drawn out &air and, secondly, the military did not want to undennine its readiness for real combat by being diverted to peacekeeping or humanitarian operations. Generai Powell had overseen the restnicturing of the armed forces to fight two major regional contingencies simultaneously (the Powell oc tri ne)."

This was opposed by many civilian poiicy makers including the current Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, who, at one point, demanded the utility of having this

"Natsios, U.S. Foreinn Policv and the Four Honemen of the Amcaivs~e,29. " See the discussion in Lawrence J. Korb, "The Use of Force," The Brookinns Review (Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, Spring 1997). 11

superb military you re always talking about if we can t use it? She embraced what she

called a doability doctrine, that is, the United States should use its military power in

flexible ways to address practical if limited goals? While the situation of Canada cannot

be compared to that of the superpower, and it is doubted that there is any serious

contemplation in the United States of not maintaining a large fighting force, it is

interesting to note that not even the great powen are spared the requirement to rethink the

requirement for military forces with the end of the Cold War and a new readiness to use military resources for a wider range of missions. It is also interesting to note, for example, that the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission in the Persian Gulf (UNIKOM) saw for the first time since the advent of peacekeeping, the five permanent members of the Security Council, al1 conhibuting troops to a peacekeeping mission, a precedent which also, arguably, rnarked the decline of Canada s influence and individualism obtained through peacekeeping operations."

Certainly there are many issues conceming humanitarian assistance such as whether the intervention in the dornestic affairs of sovereign states is justified, what are the 'trigger' conditions which would prompt action and what are the guiding principles for the conduct of humanitarian assistance? Most of these questions are outside the scope of this work. Suffice it to Say that the current trends based on a willingness over the past ten years to selectively intervene justifies an examination of the topic of civilian-military

p. 2415. "Gregory Wirick, "Canada, Peacekeeping and the United Nations," in Fen Osier Hampson and Christopher Maule, Editors, Canada Among Nations 1992-93: A New World Order? (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992), 100. The govenunent agreed to participate in the mission sending observers and approximately 300 field engineen who assisted in clearing mines and dismantling fortifications. 12

interaction and, based on these trends and some of the past difficulties encountered and

lessons learned, and more specifically justifies an attempt to theorize on what a mode1 of

civilian-military interaction could, or should, be. A more detailed examination of the

trends of humanitarian assistance is provided in the next section.

Humanitarian Assistance - What Are the Trends?

The trends can be examined from two perspectives. Fint what are the trends of

incidents faliing within one of the categories of humanitarian assistance? Secondly whac

are the trends for countries to respond primarily with military forces, or to assist other

agencies who are responding to the humanitarian crises with military assets? Hopkinson

notes that the volume of global refugees contributing to the scale of humanitarian

suffering has been growing since the end of the Cold War - from 15 million refugees in

1988 to 20 million refugees in 1994.= Hopkinson further reports, on the bais of an

international conference, that in 1995 there were between five and six hundred ongoing separatist movements in the world and as he notes, "the tragedy of comptex emergencies

is likely to dominate the international scene in the future."=

What are the projected future requirements? Even without complex emergencies, which almost certainly dictate both military and NGO intervention, the growing complexity, deadliness and expense of natural disasters will challenge al1 humanitarian agencies if trends ~ontinue.~'There is considerable other documentation of the root causes of complex emergencies, such as The Oxfam Povertv Rewrt which discusses the widening gap between the rich and the poor and notes that "on present trends, the number of people living in poverty could rise to 1.5 billion by 2025."" Furthemore, the diverse causes of conflict, which invariably accompanies complex emergencies, is evident foremost in the increasing number of refugees and the rapid growth in intemally displaced people.2g For example, even as world attention was focused on the crisis in

Kosovo 50,000 people were reported killed or wounded in the border war between

Ethiopia and Eritrea over what arnounts to useless land.' Likewise even as the international community applauds itself on its successes in Kosovo the UNHCR is waming of a critical refugee problem in Serbia caused on the flip-side of the NATO success (Le. the minority Serbs who fled fearing the KLA and retuming Kosavars) coupled with the less publicized and previous cleansing of Serb areas of Croatia and

B~snia.~'

Considering, therefore. that responses to complex emergencies will be in cornpetition with resources and donor support to natural disasters, there is a growing requirement to make responses as efficient and effective as possible. This suggests first

"Sec for a detailed report the Red Cross Report World Disasters Remrt. 1999 by Red Cross secretary general George Weber. Available on-line at htt~://ww~v.ifrc.orelr,ul~~tvdr/. %Sec Kevin Watkins, The Oxfam Poverty Rermrt (Oxford, Oxfam, 1995). 1-41 and figure i.1 on page 4. -m.,43-44 and figure 2.1 on page 44. "'See for a rare report on this conflict Peter Goodspeed, "Border war puts Hom on verge of mass hunger," National Post, Wednesday, June 30, 1999, A14. "Se CNN Report "UNHCR wars of critical refugee problern in Srbia,"July 20, 1999 avaitable on-line at http:/lcnn.com/WORLD/europe/9907/20/BC-YUGOSLAVIA-KOSOVO-DISPLACED.reut/index.htmI. 14 and foremost - coordination. One has but to examine any number of synopses of the current state of conflict leading to complex emergencies or the threats of conflict to accept that there will remain many situations requiring an international response in the foreseeable future. As they pertain to cornplex humanitarian emergencies the objectives of this response is summed up by Natsios as the following: repatriation of refugees and resettlement of intemalty displaced persons, reestablishment of economic activity, restoration of food security, reduction of morbidity and mortality rates to their prewar level, and restoration of local security so that people will be relatively safe in their own homes and village^.'^ These objectives are easily stated but less easily achieved at the functional and tactical level as evidenced in Bosnia and elsewhere.

Responding to the Humanitarian Crisis - What is the Problem?

Why is the current relationship between the humanitarian assistance actors not adequate? John Prendergast discusses "The Seven Deadly Sins" in the context of the provision of aid in complex emergencies. They are summarized in the following chart and are indicative of much of the criticism about the effectiveness of the current method of providing humanitarian assistance."

3ZNat-ios,US. Foreinn Policv and the Four Horsemen of the A~ocaalv~se,151. 33 There is considerable Canadian and Foreign documentation of past issues in coordination and the requirement to ameliorate the situation. For example, one recent publication of the Canadian Amy Lessons Learned Centre in Kingston. Ontario (See "Lessons Learned in Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC),"Disoatches, Vol 5, No 3 (February, 1999, Kingston, Ontario: Amy Lessons Learned Centre) was dedicated to Lesson Learned in Civil-Military Cooperation. While a considerable amount of the observations and cornments deaIt with the recent military responses to domestic emergency response there were detailed and specific comments on international operations. Table 3: The Deadlv Siris of Humanitarian AssistanceU

Sin Description Pomying logistical targets as a result of competition between humanitarian agencies over donor money. High-Stakes Fund Raising There are often allegations that the need for publicity causes NGOs to distort the facts. For example to focus the media's attention on famines rather than on the social or political root causes of a cnsis. The reason is that famines are the biggest-ticket items for fund raising. The Law of the Tool In other words the nature of a response is in large pan dictated by the tools at hand - for example - the provision of surplus food and surplus drugs - even if these are not the fundamental requirements to finht the crisis. It is often charged that donor governments use Humanitarian Aid as a Cover humanitarian aid as a cover for not developing constructive poticy initiatives to counter the mot causes - i.e. using aid as a cover for a lack of political engagement.

-- - - The Primacy of Humanitarian Access As noted by Prendergast, "In the context of this substitution of humanitarianism for potitical engagement. the imperative to gain humanitarian access often takes precedence over advocacy for human rights, and international humanitarian law. This situation leads to the perverse reality that the more buming and killing is done against local populations, the more resources will be sent in to gpond. "'' With disaster assistance king a "boom industry" Exploiting Competition there has been increased competition between agencies for the resources available. Additionally, the rapid growth in the humanitarian response industry has led to an absence of a proper analysis of conflict and the lack of institutionalized mechanisms to capture, evaluate and disseminate the lessons learned of each humanitarian intervention.

UJohn Prendergast, Frontline Diplomacv: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa (Boulder. Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Inc., 19961, pp 3-15. ''M.,9-10. Lack of Accountability and Who are the agencies accountable to? And what Professionalism are their stated and actuai adherence to basic humanitarian principles? These are just some of the questions that are paramount. Certainly, in a more global context al1 of these assertions, if true, are important to the amelioration of the militarykivilian interface. It is particularly the last two perceived sins which this work will endeavour to analyze and assess in greater depth. Current civilian/military models can be traced back to Huntington and are based on war. the interaction of states and a clear war-fighting ethos. However, the current employment of military forces side-by-side with civilian agencies, often as equal partners or even supporting acton suggest that, while these models may still be situational appropriate, there is a requirement for a fresh look at how interactions take place and what are suitable frarneworks for analysis. Furthemore, it is proposed that each current action calls for the development of temporary relationships and arrangements. There is no current model.

Why is this an important issue for policy makers and political scientists? From a practitioner's perspective, the need for the relationship can be summed up in the following statement.

What's the relationship between a just arrived military force and the NGO

and PVO that might have been working in a crisis-tom area al1 along? matwe

have is a partnership. If you are successful, they are successful; and if they are

successful you are successful. We need each other.

General J.M. Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of StaffM

36 Joint Warfighting Centre, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Otxrations (Ft. Monroe, VA, 1997). 11-2. Partnerships are usualfy based on agreements, contracts and conventions. So why should partnerships between military forces and non-rnilitary actors in humanitarian assistance be any different? From a more political encompassing perspective there is a willingness to use military resources in disasters and in some humanitarian crises largely because of the ending of the Cold War and the resultant excess military capacity residual in the world and specificaily in Western nations. Thus it is imperative that relationships are developed between the different agencies that will be involved in the response process. As the United States Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff stated: "Achieving interagency and civil interoperability through the continuing development of our doctrine and interagency participation in our training exercises is important to the unity of effort upon which success in many missions depends. This must be considered in view of the well documented cultural differences between military forces and non-govenunental organizations and other humanitarian agencies.

Evolving military doctrine notes the requirement for unity of effort in humanitarian assistance operations. For example U.S. mil itary publication, Joint

Doctrine for Militarv Orerations Other Than War states that:

" Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy," htt~://www.dtic.mi~ics/nRIS/,(January 28, 1998), 13. 18

achieving unity of effort is often complicated by a variety of international foreign

and domestic military and non-rnilitary participants, the lack of definitive

command arrangements among them and varying views of the objective. This

requires that JFCs [Joint Force Commanders]. or other designated directors of the

operation rely heavily on consensus building to achieve unity of effort."

This is further elaborated on by Chris Seiple in The U.S. Military/NGO Relationshi~in

Humanitarian Intervention when he notes that:

In order for the NGO/miIitary relationship to work, there must be an exchange of

services: the relationship must be mutually beneficial ... There must be a clear

understanding that information and services operate on a two-way, transparent

Street. Otherwise, each acts as if the other did not exist: NGOs pursuing

exclusively humanitarian purposes and the military providing its own solution

according to i ts self -contained infrastr~cture.~~

Frorn a Canadian perspective, recent operations have increased the focus on how

important effective coordination with the broader response comrnunity cm, and must, be.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Militarv Omrations Other Than War (Joint Pub 3-07) (Washington, D.C.: June 16. 19951, il-3. 39 Chris Seiple, The U.S. Militarv/NGO Relationshi~in Humanitarian Interventions (US.Amy War Colfege, Centre for Strategic Leadership, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1996)- 10. For example, a review of the experiences of Canada's military contribution to

UNPROFOR, noted that

The tour presented a myriad of CIMIC challenges to CANBAT. The unit had to

productively cooperate with several UN and non-govemmental organizations

(NGOs) with the key to mission success king the winning of the "hearts and

minds" campaign?

Similarly. once the contribution changed to NATO's IFOWSFOR an even bigger need for coordination was noted,

Battle Group CIMIC liaison officers and personnel from the Combined Joint

Civil-Military Task Force have supported the mission in Bosnia by monitoring

displaced persons and refugee movements. conducting liaison with NGOs and UN

agencies, and managing humanitarian reconstmction projects. These activities

have been key "force multiplien" in accomplishing the SFOR mission?'

The challenge will be to learn from these recent operations and incorporate in some manner both the lessons learned from the military perspective with that of the other humanitarian assistance actors. Research for this thesis leads one to conclude that the

"Canada, "Lessons Learned in Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMTC)," Dimatches ,Vol. 5, NO. 3 (Kingston, Ontario: Amy LRssons Learned Centre. Febmary 1999). 4. "Ibid. 20 same sort of lesson capturing and analysis is not being done by the civilian community and therefore it is even more important that the military lead the way and not only identify the correct lessons and analyze these lessons but also disseminate to a wide audience outside the military to solicit comment and, hopefully, create dialogue. Cha~ter2 - Definine the Factors: An Analvtical Framework

Who are the actors?

Having ascertained that complex emergencies are, and will likely continue to be, a

threat that requires action through international response, it is necessary to identify who

those responden, or actors, will be. It is apparent that in order to combat the magnitude

and complexity of humanitarian emergency situations, the international response has had

to take a multifaceted (or multi-agency) fom. Dr. Isabelle Francois noted in her research

for the Canadian Department of National Defence that three groups of acton have had to

work closely together and to share responsibilities - multilateral organi ations (UNDHA,

UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, WHO and UNDP), the armed forces of UN member States as

recommended or directed by the Security Council, and executing agencies (NGOs,

national aid agencies, and PVOS)." Weiss and Collins in their work on the subject also

see three categories of actors: governments (including the military but which is worthy of

separate attention); intergovementai organi ations (and in particular the UN and

ECHO); and non-governmental organi ations (such as CARE, MSFd3and the ICRC)?

"Sec Francois, "Civil-Military Cooperation in Humanitarian Emergencies" and CARE Canada. "Systems and Structures for Effective International Development and Humanitarian Relief," A brief prepared for the Special Joint Cornmittee Reviewing Canada's Foreign Policy. June 1994, p. 8. "3Medecins sans Frontiers (MSF) is a private, non-profit, international organization, whose stated objective is to provide medical aid to populations in crisis, without discrimination. Established in 1971 by doctors determined to offer emergency assistance wherever wars and man-made disasters occur in the world, its guiding principles are laid down in a charter to which al1 members of the organization subscribe. UThomas G. Weiss and Cindy Collins. Humanitarian Challen~esand Intervention: World Politics and the Dilemmas of Helg (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996). pp. 40-41. 22

The United Nations Secretary-General when reviewing the situation in Africa commented on such multifaceted approaches by noting:

The multiplicity of humanitarian actors and mandates operating in any given crisis

is one of the stnking charactenstics in modem conflicts. This reflects a

commendable human desire to respond to suffering, but it often entails overlap

and duplication of activity that can sometimes arnount to cornpetition and rivalry.

The multiplicity of actors and the failure at times to achieve consensus on

operations or objectives has sometimes impeded rather than advanced

humanitarian goals. It is clear that for hurnanitarian assistance to be most

effective there must be cooperation and coordination among humanitarian

actor~.~'

This last point seems to be a crucial one and very pertinent to the issues prevalent in this thesis in that a multiplicity of actors, regardless of what altnristic goals they may have, cannot be considered a system, if, as Kent identified, a system means a set of parts coordinated to accomplish a set of goals in a consistent and regularised manner. " It is therefore suggested that a mode1 of interaction between military and non-govemmental organi ations in humanitarian assistance missions, and indeed between ail the actors in

"United Nations, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainabte Develovment in Africa, Report of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Security Council (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 16 ApnI 1998), 14. &Kent. 68. the response to a humanitarian crisis, must strive to create some sense of a system, possibly with the following characteristics:

identifiable organi ations separate but whose actions impact on other

organi ations,

a specific area or boundary of operations which would denote the extent of both

influence and interest,

a structure depicting the expected interaction and relationships between the

organi ations, and

a cornmon or compatible goals.47

Furthemore, and in line with the comments of the UN Secretary-General, Medicins Sans

Frontiers notes the importance of coordination within the system as,

Coordination of the work of the different aid agencies remains the principal

element regarding aid in an emergency system. The UNHCR plays the paramount

role in the coordination of often delicate situations, where political and diplornatic

questions are mixed with logistic and technical problems."

%ent also notes Pettman's four characteristics of systems which he promutgated in 1975 (Kent, 68). These were used as a basis of the development of the four characteristics noted above. Additionally il should be noted that the proposition of the requirernent of a systern does not in itself negate the benefits of a relief network where a certain arnount of coordination and certain positive expectations are achieved. "Medecins Sans Frontieres. Po~ulationsin Danger (London, John Libbey & Company Ltd.. 1992). 143. 24

While another crucial player in getting international resources to respond to humanitarian crises is the media, it should be noted that the media interaction with the other humanitarian assistance actors is not discussed in any depth in this work. This is not meant to marginali e either the contribution or coordination requirement but, for practical reasons, to make the scope and approach of this thesis manageable. The main actors considered in this study are rnilitary forces, such as national contingents and tactical formations under United Nations or NATO control, other multilateral lintergovernmental organi ations, such as UNHCR, and NGOs such as MSF, CARE and

Catholic Relief Services.

It should also be noted that coordination is not only an issue between military and civilian components of the international response effort but also among these groups of actors as well. Jon Bennett, for exarnple, writing on NGO coordination in practice notes the structural crisis and the quest for a new consensus among the various NGOs as a result of recent trends in relief aid." Certainly specific initiatives within the United

Nations have served, or attempted to serve, as greater coordination mesures and have thereby recogni ed the role of NGOs in the international response to complex emergencies. For example, the UN Generai Assembly Resolution 4611 82 of 199 1, which created the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, also gave new life to the role of NGOs in the actual ground level provision of relief programmes and humanitarian assistance.

'9Bennett, Introduction, xi - xxi. Throughout this publication Bennett and the other contributors discuss the coordination mechanisms and modalities cumntly in practice such as the International Council of Voluntary Agencies and its programme - Non-Govenmental Organisation (NGO)Coordination in Humanitarian Assistance and its production of a handbook - NGO Coordination at Field Level: A Hand book (ICVA. June 1994). As Bennett notes, the DHA restated the centrality of the NGOmrelationship by

inviting NGOs to sit on the Inter-Agency Standing Cornmittee (IASC) alongside heads of

UN operational agencies and the ICRC. The IASC provides a consultative forum for

determining, among other things, ways to enhance the international community s relief

capacity in general, and specifically in complex emergencies. 'O Complementing this

committee is the Conference of Non-Governmentd Organi ations in Consultative Status

with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (CONGO).*' The complexity of

the NGO cornrnunity is evidenced in the range of si e, budget and scope of the different

organi ations. Examples of the major NGOs pertaining to humanitarian operations are

included in the following table.

Table 4: The Bin ~inhp

CARE World Vision International Oxfam Federation Medecins Sans Frontiers Save the Children Federation Euros tep CIDSE (Cooperation internationale pour le developpement et la solidarite) APDOVE (Association of Protestant Development Organizations Europe)

"The CONGO is not an NGO but a voluntary membership organization of NGOs who have consultative status at the UN. It is an umbrella organizations and does not cake a position on substantive matters but under its auspices numerous NGO committees meet with meet with rnembers of the Secretariat and delegates of member States to introduce new ideas and contribute to closer cooperation and collaboration. See Miriam Friedmann. Get readv! Get set! Go! Makinn the United Nations User-Friendlv for NGOs (New York: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1995). 52P.~.Simmons, "Learning to Live with NGOs," Foreinn Policv, No. 112. Fali 1998, 92. The table lis& eight major families or federations of international NGOs with each controlling about U.S.$500 mitlion in the U.S. $8 billion relief market. 26 ICRC, while often listed as a NGO, has a special status based on treaty and convention

and must be considered a major and separate actor in the development of any interaction

model.

Factors for Consideration

It is now appropriate to identiQ the factors used for the case studies and andysis.

That is to Say what are the factors which will affect the greatest the interaction of military and non-military forces in humanitarian assistance responses? It is posited that the following are the core factors which must be considered in the development of a model of civilian-military interaction:

capabilities (including communications capabilities) and expectations;

cultures including how can the two or more cultures be accommodated;

planning processes; and

ethos.

These factors must be considered in conjunction with two other variables - the environment in which the humanitarian response in king undertaken and the interests of the actors involved in the response. For example, the strategic and operational environment created by the Davton Accord permitted a more streamlined approach to actor coordination in the former Yugoslavia than did the multiplicity of UN Security

Co unci 1 resolutions and statements resulting in the UNPROFOR mandates. Secondly, an 27

actor s interests will affect its behaviour and its ability to interact and cooperate with other actors in a humanitarian emergency. Actors may have very public and well stated

interests and motivations for involvement but it is ofien the concealed motivations and hidden agendas which will drive its decision or actions. For exarnple, as Weiss and

Collins note, one of Italy s largest contributions to the effort in the former Yugoslavia was the provision of airfields for the use of NATO aircraft. As they note, Italy threatened to discontinue open use of its landing strips if it was not made part of the multinational contact group mediating the peace agreement in Dayton, Ohio.

Humanitarian concem was mixed with a desire to play a larger diplomatic role, which

Italy perceived would increase its statu as a player in international affairs. 53 It will be useful to keep these two variables in mind when applying the other four core factors identified above.

What kind of military support is possibIe?

Why are military forces so often part of the response to complex humanitarian emergencies? Ramsbotham and Woodhouse in their work Humanitarian Intervention in

Contemporary Conflict discuss how humanitarianism is unavoidably politicized and, more often than not, militarized. " It is interesting to note their conclusion on this issue as it is indicative of much more work and discussion of the trend of humanitarianism. As they note:

"Weiss and Collins, Humanitarian Challennes and Intervention, 41. soliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Cantemwrarv Conflict: A Rcconce~tualization(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996). 219. 28 Politici ation follows fiom a combination of factors ... (i) that humanitarian aims

will ofien run counter to the deliberate policy goals of belligerent parties, such as

reduction of civilian centres by starvation or ethnic cleansing; (ii) that conflict

parties will use both aid and aid workers as political pawns in their struggle, and

that, once involved, interveners wil1 be caught up in a complex web of interest in

which antagonists will have reasons for both wanting them to stay and wanting

them to leave; (iii) that humanitarian interveners corne with their own agendas,

and humanitarian action is bound in some way or other to have a political effect

on the conflict; (iv) that whatever interveners may genuinely believe, confiict

parties will perceive them to be partisan, often in mutually incompatible ways,

there being no room for neutrality in international-sociaf conflicts; (v) that these

problems are compounded as we move fiom NGOACRC to UN agency

intervention, in so far as the latter is implicated in political action by the UN

Security Council .....'"

Likewise, and with this politici ation of the humanitarian response as a backdrop,

Ramsbotham and Woodhouse discuss two main facets of militari ation. The first invoives the environment of the response as in the worst cases of breakdown the conflict disintegrates into a chaos of indiscnminate violence in which warring factions prey on the civilian population and humanitarian aid, like al1 other assets, fuels continuing war. As 29

they note, al1 resources are sought after as they provide the means to sustain power and,

therefore, al! participants become involved intncately in the emergency. This can only

rnean that al1 military, NGO and other humanitarian participants are intertwined in their

response whether wanted or not.

The other aspect to militari ation is what Ramsbotham and Woodhouse describe as the humanitariani ation of the military. " This is a wide subject which will be discussed in more detail when the tensions of rnaintaining a specific ethos for military

forces are analy ed later in this work. Suffice it to Say here that there are many issues

invoived in taking soldiers trained, equipped and mentally prepared for war fighting and comrnitting these same soldiers, resources and their units to something lesddifferent such as humani tarian assistance.

On a more practical level what are the activities which lend themselves to military involvement in humanitarian assistance operations? Certainly the one activity which would readily corne to mind is the question of protection. The world continues to be a dangerous place and as Jean-Christophe Rufin notes,

..... the question of protection is becoming central for NGOs. It is at this point that

the tenacious myth concerning their total independence falls down - unable by

very nature to carry arms themselves - the NGOs must of necessity turn, in order

to ensure their own protection, to forces to which they are then beholden.*'

''Ibid.. 222. 58Jean-ChristopheRufin, tife. Death and Aid: MSF Remrt on World Crisis (London, 1993). 113. 30

Certainly there are limits to providing safe havens and secure environments for NGOs and other humanitarian agencies to conduct their work. In fact, it should not be accepted that the requirement for protection will always be provided by national military forces operating individually or in concert with other national forces or by an international military force such as a standing UN peacekeeping force. Aid agencies have resorted to hiring local security in past missions such as in Somalia. In the absence of the international will to respond to their satisfaction in the future altemate ways of securing the humanitarian space will have to be exa~nined.'~The issue of safe havens and secunng this humanitarian space will be exarnined doser when discussing coordination in the context of the former Yugoslavia and UNPROFOR. However, beyond this obvious role for military forces it is pmposed that the following list identifies the key elements of military involvement:

Table 5: Militam Involvement in Humanitarian Ememencies

Humanitarian Activity/Requirement Probable Military Task Access Provide Security and Protection to: Humanitarian Actors Vulnerable Groups Population-at-Large

Assistance Provide Logistics Intervention Repress Violations of international Humanitarian Law

59Foran interesting discussion of the realities facing humanitanan agencies in complex emergencies and of the discussion on whether NGOs should consider the privitization of security for humanitarian purposes see, Michael Bryans, Bruce Jones and lanice Gros Stein, Mean Times: Humanitarian Action in Com~lex Political Emernencies - Stark Choices. Cruel Dilemmas (Toronto: Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation, Centre for international Studies, University of Toronto, 1999). Preventive Action Information Gathering, Force Preparation and Training (Le. Continuous Capability) -

Certainly, and notwithstanding the fact military forces are instruments of

governrnents and their larger societies, military forces will have their own interests which

will affect the manner in which they approach humanitarian assistance operations. In a

more Machiavellian sense, for example, budgets and resowce allocations must be

defènded and the necessq public support garnered. This may lead the military to

support and even to market their humanitarian response capabilities to their national

authorities. From a more altniistic perspective military forces rnay have an interest in

being able to accomplish the missions assigned in the most effective and efficient manner

possible and this may drive them to leaming to work better and function with other

military forces and civilian organi ations involved in humanitanan assistance. In the end,

however, the four key factors, previously identified in this chapter, stand out as defining the interaction of the different actors in humanitarian assistance operations. Each of these will now be bnefly introduced.

Capabilities

The first factor to be discussed is the capabilities of the organi ation. Capability flows from numerous inputs including structure, resources, training and cornmitment.

Certainly in an environment where humanitarian crises result in competition for limited resources and attention there is reason for enhanceci coordination and institutional or ad hoc partnerships. However, on the flip-side competition between the actors for resources 32 from donors and providers may create competition and closed organi ations looking out for their own interests. From a structural perspective, Weiss and Collins note that organi ational structure can affect an actor s ability and will to cooperate with other actors toward a comrnon objective and its flexibility in adapting to unfamiliar cultures and rapid changes in the field. " This could conceivably lead to policies that are not rational and pro-active but that are consolidated and compromised outcornes rather than clear, focused decisions that wold provide the most efficient and effective responses to challenges. 6 I

Culture

A review of the general and specific cases, it is suggested, indicate the following cultural differences in macro terms:

Table 6: Com~arisonof Cultures

Military 1 NGO 1 Emphasis on structure, hierarchy, command and Characterized by informal, improvisational style control operating on consensus Self sufficient/ logistically independent Dependent on donations and material support

Capable of deployment with assets covering full Concern with being replaced by military range of requirements (security, logistical, medical, command/control and coordination) Y Focus on short term mission objectives with initial Focus of long tem needs of population and emphasis on security immediate survival needs. Independence is key to neutrality.

60Weissand Collins, Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention, 54. 6'Ibid. There are a number of issues involved in understanding and accepting the

differences in cultures between military and non-military forces. One of the most obvious

issues apparent in the former Yugoslavia was the desire of military forces to revert to

peacekeeping pnnciples of neutrality and objectivity. This seems to be in direct conflict

with many international humanitarian agencies which doubt that current trends will

render it possible for humanitarian agencies to remain neutral." Notwithstanding this,

and in fact complicating the interaction of the cultures, is the mutual dependency issue.

As Hopkinson noted,

A variety of actors with very different cultures must be coordinated in order to

have an effective intervert,ion. Although the delivery of aid and its protection are

two different tasks, the military is essential to facilitate the delivery of aid whether

humanitarian agencies like it or not. Military cornmanden on the ground, and not

those in distant headquarters, must have the authonty to achieve stated

objective^.^^

As noted by many observers, one of the biggest cultural differences to overcome is the hierarchical decision-making structure of the military and the accompanying reality

%ee for example the conclusions of Hopkinson based on the Wilton Park Conference of February 1995. He notes that "humanitarian workers are often forced by events to aid one side raiher than another. (P.63)" 63Hopkinson,64. 34 that command and control is derived fiom a centrai point at the top." This leads to both a cultural desire and a legal requirement for a clear and concise mandate permitting accountability back to the highest level and ultimately to the political level. Additionally,

Francois notes that this is in contrast with civilian organi ations which devolve a great deal of decision-making authotity to staff members in the field, and there is no single focaI point for decision-rnakicg. Their operations are less geared towards a specific goal, than doing as much as possible with what they have. They are accountable to the international donor comrnwiity but in much looser terms. They are less constrained by long term planning and can be more tlexible. 65

If attention is not paid, culture can also lead to an us-versus-them attitude. One

Canadian Officer noted after his experiences in Bosnia that,

Many of the 10s go to great lengths to organi e meetings with IocaIs, and will

consider the group dynamics of the local personalities when deciding on seating.

When military members are invited, they tend by nature to want to sit next to and

cling to members fiom other military nations. Many 10s think this destroys the

dynamics of their meeting by creating an us against them appearance. Great

benefit cm be achieved by sitting next to the IO member !?om your AOR [area of

operations] rather than other military members?

blFrancois, "Civil-Military Cooperation in Humanitarian Emergencies," 12. 651bid. 66FromCaptain M Sullivan, Canadian Amy Officer depIoyed in Bosnia with SFOR in 1996 as a liaison officer. 35

Planning Processes

The stmctured planning process of the military is evidenced in the doctrine of military forces. Appendix 2, for example, is the current planning process of the Canadian military. Certain organi ations rarely can afTord the resources to adequately match the military effort. There have been some inroads with the work of WNHCR in the development of a Handbook of Operations. One of the clearest examples of the capabilities and limitations of the different organi ations as pertaining to planning processes is the UNPROFO R withdrawal planning in the summer of 1994.

Ethos

It is advantageous at this point to discuss one of the critical aspects of the interaction of military and non-military forces and that is ethos. In peace-support operations (and humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies is certainly the current dominant form) Canadian anny units and formations do not have an enemy as in war.

The success of the mission will depend upon the consent of the parties involved and the maintenance of impartiality by the peace-support forces.67 This is a clear and understandable statement but it needs to be compared with the traditional rofes of miiitary forces, for exarnple, the role of the infanûy which is to close with and destroy the enemy, by day or night, regardless of season, weather or terraid' Canada s militaq is an al1 volunteer force compnsing Regular and Reserve soldiers integrated to form a Total Force

''National Defence publication, Conduct of Land Omrations-Owrational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Amy, 1996, 10-13. *AS taught by the infantry School, Combat Training Centre, Gagetown, New Brunswick. 36

for service in peace and war. Canadian soldiers are members of the profession of arms by

virtue of the obligations and duties they assume, the military ethos which govems their

service, and the fiction they fûlfill. The military ethos is: a shared set of beliefs, values

and a moral code.69 It is implicit in the very nature of the profession of arms and in the

demands and expectations it makes upon military members.

Hence, the military ethos forms the basis of al1 aspects of service in the Canadian

Forces, setting forth the principles and ideals which men and women of the Canadian

Forces must subscribe to, both collectively and as individuals. Its fundamental values are

integrity, courage, loyalty, selflessness, and self-discipline. The ethos Merrequires

dedication to country, the honouring of Canadian values, and cornmitment to professional

excellence. The military ethos is in part a warrior s code; overall, it is an all-

encompassing military philosophy and moral culture derived fiom the imperatives of

military professionalism, the requirements of the battlefield and the demands war makes

on the human character. The centrepiece of the military ethos is unlimited Iiability.

Under a concept of unlimited liability Canadian Forces members are obliged to carry out

duties and tasks without regard to fear or danger, and ultimately, to be willing to risk and

even give up their lives if the situation requires." This liability is what most distinguishes the Canadian Forces institutionally, and its members individually, fiom the

rest of Canadian society. Therefore the concept of unlimited liability is inextricably

69Seefor example the definition of ethos in The Concise Oxford Dictionarv. One question which may need to be considered when applying the definition of an ethos is whether there can be subsidiaxy or contributing ethos subordinate to a main ethos. '@TheAmy, 24. 37

linked to, and at the same time sustained by, the military ethos. The question becomes

how different is this from the ethos sustained by other groups of humanitarian actors?

It would be obvious to most students of military behaviour, that there are basic

societal values which are abridged in military society. For example, at the top of the

Canadian list of values is the cornmitment to tolerance through democracy, equity and

hurnan rights. Military culture is not prone to accept these qualities if they adverseiy

affect the ability to fight and win wars. Furthemore, militaries are organi ed in

hierarchal fashion, with direction and decisions, not based on democratic discussion

and debate but on obedience, professionalism and du@. The individualism of democratic

liberal society is replaced in the military by the group, the team, the regiment, the country

- by a collective good versus a personal good." As Huntington states, the military ethic

is basically corporative in spirit. It is fündamentally anti-individualistic. Equity is only

viable as long as it does not impede the performance of the group.

Peter Kasurak, in a Canadian PubIic Administration article written in 1982, notes that as a minimum a military ethos should contain the following beliefs,

The group is valued over the individual.

Soldiering is a vocation, a calling, rather than an occupation.

Honour is more highly valued than material gain.

The military community is paternalistic.

7'Note Huntington, 63. Huntington goes farther than focusing on the military and states that, "success in any activity requires the subordination of the will of the individual to the will of the group-" 721bid,64. Symbols, ritual and myth are valued.

The military cornrnunity is separate fiom the civilian cornmunity it protects?

War-fighting, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance have different foci. That is not to say that there will not be overlap in required capabilities and skills. In fact, in today s environment combat capability seems to be an inherent requirement for peacekeeping. However, the overall focus of the military will drive design, equipment choices and, most of dl, training requirements, especially the intensity. How much peacekeeping is enough? And is preparïng for, and participating in, peacekeeping operations compatible with being prepared for war-fighting? These are largely issues which must be resolved by military forces in concert with their national govenunents. It is suggested that by not resolving these issues, as is the current trend, unnecessary pressure and stress is placed on relationships between the military and non-military actors in humanitarian assistance operations. Certainly the largest danger with respect to ethos is when there is an absence of transparency between organi ations which will contribute to not understanding the other organi ations ethos.

'3Peter C. Kasurak, "Civilianization and the Military Ethos: Civil-Military Relations in Canada," in Canadian Public Administration Vol. 25, No. 1 (Spring 1982)- 124. Chanter 3 - Focusine on the Interaction

Recent Trends

If one thing is apparent it is that notwithstanding the necessary cooperation and

the frequent overlapping of their mandates, military and non-military actors often do not

know their respective mandates let alone the way in which they are to be implemented.

One of the key ways to overcome this obstacle is to review past experiences to identiQ

problems, trends and lessons learned so that corrective action for future endeavours can be taken. There have been a nurnber of international conferences which have had this as their goal. One of these conferences, looking at missions in Northern Iraq, the former

Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda, came up with five key lessons. They are surnmari ed in the following table.

Table 7: Lessons Leaned7'

Lesson Description

1 The rnilitary is capabIe of rendering humanitarian assistance without the aid of the CMHCR or NGOs. An imporiant policy question is the extent to which it should be expected to do this and conditions under which it should be demanded. The key contribution of rniliw forces is the creation of stable conditions which permit civilians including the WCRto cany on with their normal functions. 2 The concept of "service packages" streamlined receipt of aid. This is vital if the UN is to deal effectively with large-scale disasters Packages such as water-purification plants, 1 airports, sewage treatment centres, etc. can be solicited wholesale fom donor countries.

ïJLessons taken from a conference repon on an internationaf conference held 18-20 October 1994 and sponsored by the United States College Peacekeeping Institute with the theme of interagency cooperation. See, Major D. M. Last and Mr. Don Vought, "Interagency Cooperation in Peace Operations." In situations calhg for a military presence, it is essential to combine military and I 1 humanitarian efforts. Mititary forces must establish the conditions of security and 1 1 1 stability which permit the UNHCR and other aid organizations to fùnction effectively. 1 4 The military effort must be sustained, and extended to areas in which humanitarian efforts are necessary but at risk. 5 Both military security and humanitarian efforts should be linked to political initiatives to reduce the tensions and hostilities which keep refùgees and displaced persons away fiorn home, permitting early resettlement and a tehini to normal economic activity. Humanitarian assistance alone wiIl not produce long term solutions.

Key concepts keep showing up in these compilations of lessons, requirement of combined

efforts, the necessity of linking security and humanitarian efforts to political initiatives

and the requirement for coordination, to name but a few. This is al1 fine, but it may be

prernature to cal1 these observations lessons until they are anaiy ed, improved

procedures developed and agreed upon and these procedures actually put into action.

One of the biggest observation any focus on interaction must acknowledge is the

requirement for increased training and professional development. The United States, for

example, has studied the issue of how peace operations (including humanitarian assistance in complex emetgencies) affect unit capability.'* One of the particular areas noted for enhancement to close existing gaps in preparation for these new types of missions includes staff and interagency training? Specifically, the report of the GAO notes the recornmendation of a peace and humanitarian conference held by the Marine

Corps and the Department of State as noted below.

"See for example, United States General Accounting Office, Peace Ooerations: Effect of Training, E~ui~ment.and Other Factors on Unit Ca~abilitv, A report to Congressional Requesters, October 1995. ï61bid., 11. 41 Humanitarian assistance and peace operations require new ways of thinking and

planning. Ident-g an enemy, finding centers ofgravity, and applying

ovenuhelming force do not translate directly, and so, do not necessady fit neatly

into traditional operational planning. There may not be a direct military threat. in

order to prepare miiitary officers for fùture humanitarian operations, professional

military education should increase emphasis on

operations other than wu,

humanitarian assistance operation war-garning and situational exercises,

and

role-playing scenarios.

Within the U.S. context this has been a theme of ali the services includig those who have now experienced humanitarian assistance missions."

Another general observation consistent in the reporting by Canadian units on cornpletion of peacekeeping tours is the success of tow level (Le. tactical level) humanitarian projects. For example, one infantry battalion on return 6om a NATO SFOR mission in Bosnia noted that,

%id, 15. '~~~e.sam~lc.the ConunuiPr of25" Infaniry Division (L) baYd upon his evperienœs in Hpiti took rneasures t* dedicate sonr operations other than war training for leaden in tbe foiiowïng areas penincat to humanitarian assidance: intctligence, coalition logistics, meamms of eflectiveness, aegotiation skills, country tcam relations, non-govcmmental organizations. U.N. agcncies, media nianagxnent, and pq-chologiçal operations. Sçc GAO Report, 2 1. 42

.... the sub-units completed Civil Action Projects that resulted in the constmction

of several parks, sports facilities and playgrounds. AI1 of the above activities were

very well received by the local population and did much to garner their favour and

CO-operationthus contributing to the success of operations."

This type of report is consistent with many other der-action and post-operation reports.

One specialist officer (chaplain) making recommendations after a six-month deployment to Haiti noted that low level humanitarian initiatives are a necessity for various reasons fiom the moral (i.e. Canadians are being deployed in war ravaged and economically depressed regions of the worid), to their value as a therapeutic tool for the soldiers, or just to contnbute to mission success in other areas." Certainly, this type of action could be seen as a threat to other agencies who may be providing a similar type of humanitarian assistance as their pnmary mission. For example, the Canadian National Support

Element reported after a Bosnia rotation that,

The NSE medical section conducted a weekly medical chic at Todorovo. In

addition humanitarian aid was distributed and playgrounds constnicted at four

local schools. It resulted in CCSFOR being more readily approached in those

comrn~nities.~'

'PQuoted from an internal Canadian Forces document. BoUnpublishedpaper by Captain Steve Moore. "Recommendationsfor Humanitarian Aid in UN Operations,"provided by Amy Lessons Leamed Centre, Kingston. Ontario, If June 1999. ''Quoted from an internal Canadian Forces document. 43

One could assume that this type of activity would best suit the ovemll provision of humanitarian assistance if coordinated with other agencies who provide similar assistance in the area, such as MSF. Also at issue is the concern that any goodwill or humanitarian assistance does not detract fiom the pnmary militay mission. For instance, Canadian engineers in Haiti were successfÙ1 in doing what they could and not necessarily what was required of them. They did this, however, keeping in mind that their priority was to provide support to the depioyed Canadian contingent." An additional concem or difficuIty of military forces when trying to render humanitarian assistance at the lower levels individually or in conjunction with other humanitarian agencies is the fact that the lower level militaly organi ations often do not have financial control of resources so issues have to be passed up the chain-of-command for the allocation of resour~es.~~This has the potential of stifling initiative or sei ing opportunities to coordinate. This is equally mie of a slow and bureaucratic UN system of approval for assistance projects?

Former Yugoslavia

It should be remembered that the United Nations Protection Force in the fonner

Yugoslavia was the largest, most complex and costliest peacekeeping operation in the

United Nations history. Its annual budget was close to $2 billion, which was about twice the si e of the United Nations regular budget at the time. Its actual personnel, both

"Interview (8 July 99) with Major Steve Kelly, G3 Operations and Plans, LFAA HQ and Enginecr *'m.Squadron Commander in Haiti dunng Spring/Summer 1996. mExamples provided by Kelly in interview and from author's personal experience in the fonner Yugoslavia during the 1994/95 period. 44 military and civilian, numbered 45,000 (aithough its authori ed strength was 49,000) or more than one-half of the total peacekeeping personnel engaged in the 17 peacekeeping operations of that period. UNPROFOR worked in five of the six republics of the former

Yugoslavia, namely Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Her egovina, and the

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, UNPROFOR was, and still is, engaged in the preventive deployment of peacekeepers, unprecedented in the United

Nations history. This UN mission is endeavouring to prevent the ethnic conflict fiom spilling over the borders of its northern neighbours. It bas so far been successful in attaining this objective. Notwithstanding this, however, it should be noted that

Macedonia s stability can be threatened fiom within fiom two quarters: the extreme economic depnvation and high unemployment, and the discontent of the Albanian minority who constitute over 20 percent of the total population.

One of the most complex challenges for UNPROFOR was those existing in its mission in Bosnia and Her egovina. The primary roIe of the United Nations in Bosnia was to assist and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to over 2.7 million people in need. its other tasks included detemng attacks on the so called safe areas

(there were six such areas), monitoring cease fires, separating medforces of the parties, and generally contributing to the peace process. UNPROFOR also helped in repairing schools, hospitals, roads, in providing electricity, gas and water to Sarajevo as well as operating the airport in Sarajevo. Despite the severity of the war fighting as depicted on

CNN and elsewhere, the UN operation in Bosnia was mainly traditional peacekeeping, 45 based on Chapter 6 of the Charter, while enforcernent action under Chapter 7 was allowed under very specific circumstances.

UNPROFOR also had a substantial operation in Croatia. This more traditional peacekeeping operation, in its tinal stages, encompassed the supervision and control of the 29 March 1994 cease-fire agreement. Additionally a related task was the implementation of the economic agreement reached between the Croatian government and the Krajina Serbs. UNPROFOR promoted military stability and attempted to prepare the conditions for a more durable peace, but it could not impose politicai solutions on the reluctant parties. In fact by sponsoring cease-fires, the peacekeepers were cntici ed for perpetuating a perceived unjust or immoral status quo. They were even accused of prolonging a conflict by their inter-positioning, thus shielding the weaker party.

The Environment of the Interaction - The Mandates

It is striking to see the multiplicity of Security Council resolutions and

Presidential Statements, numbering more than 100, adopted in the first three years of UN involvement in the former Yugoslavia. It is suggested that this indicates the patchwork nature of the mandates given to the mission. Ambiguity and contradictions existed among some of the resolutions as evident in Resolutions 824" and 836". The readiness

85Resolution824 (1 993) 6 May 1993: "...3. Declares that the capital city of the RepubIic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo. and other such threatened areas, in panicular the towns of Tuzta, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, as well as Srebrenica, and their surroundings should be treated as safe areas by al1 parties concerned and should be free from armed attacks and from any other hostile act;" 86Resolution836 (1993) 4 June 1993: "...IO. Decides that ...... Mernber States acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, may take ..... al1 necessary rneasures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate ...... " 46 of the Security Council to give new tasks to the operation and its unwillingness to approve the resources needec! to carry out these tasks made the work of peacekeepers on the ground difficult to carry out. Additionally, it quickly became obvious that not aII tasks explicit or implied in a mandate could be achieved. The following chart is a surnmary of UNPROFOR tasks in Croatia and an assessrnent on whether the tasks were being achieved.

Table 8: Mission Analvsis - Croatia8'

Serial SCR Date Synopsis of Security Council Tasks (Assigned and Success Number of Resolution Implied) SCR

1 72 1 27 Full cornpliance with Geneva Planning only. Nov Agreement of 23 Nov 9 1 before 9 1 deployment of UN forces. Among other things the agreement (S/23239) provides for the Yugoslav parties to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to persons affected by the conflict.

"This mission analysis culminating in the Security Council's concurrence with the 29 March 1994 Cease Fire Agreement, was completed using source documents (Security Council Resolutions and Presidential Statements) and the United Nations Reference Paper dated 23 January 1995, The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yuaoslavia, compiled and published by the Department of Public Information. Only those SCRs are included which assign a new task or provide amplification on the tasks already assigned. - - -- 2 1 Establishment of UNPROFOR for 1. Verify the withdrawal Yes Feb an initial period of 12 months. of al1 INA and irregular 92 forces fiom Croatia. Partial 2. Ensure the UNPAs were dem ilitarized. Partial 3. To Monitor the functioning of the local police. 4. To facilitate the retum of displaced persons to their homes in the - üNPAs. 30 The first expansion of 1. To verify the Partial Jun UNPROFOR'S mandate in immediate withdrawal of 92 Croatia in which the force is territorial defence forces tasked '-0 monitor the (TDF) and any irregular reintroduction of Croatian units fiom the "pink No Government authority in areas zones.'' controlled by Serb forces and with 2. To supervise the substantial Serb populations." - restoration of authority by the so called "pink zones." These the Croatian police and Partial zones were areas contiguous to the re-establishment of but lying outside the UNPAS, and the Iocal police. Yes under Serb control. 3. To maintain custody of the heavy equipment of .NA forces. No 4. To deploy along the lines of confrontation and within the "pink zones." 5. To establish and chair a joint commission to oversee and monitor the process of the restoration ~f authority by the Croatian Government in - die "pink zones." 7 A fùrther expansion of 1. Control of entry of Partial Aug UNPROFOR's mandate to :ivilians into the UNPAs. 92 establish stable conditions in the 2. Immigration and No UNPAs. :ustoms functions on the international borders of ireas in Croatia where the LJNPA boundaries ;oincided with - international fiontiers. - -- - 6 Expansion of mandate. 1. Control of the Peruca No Oct Dam situated in a "pink Yes 92 zone." Partial 2. Monitoring of the withdrawal of the JNA from Croatia. 3. Monitoring of the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula and the removal of heavy weapons from neighbouring areas of Croatia and Montenegro.

25 Strongly condemns the January Jan 2Zd Croatian Amy offensive, 93 demands cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Croatian forces from the United Nations protected areas. Extends the mandate of UNPROFOR for an additional pendteminating on 3 1 Mar 94. Following passage the military structure of UNPROFOR reorganized into three subordinate comrnands. Reaffirms crucial importance of demilitarization of the üNPAs. Stresses the importance it attaches to the process of restoration of the authority of the Republic of Croatia in the 'pink zones' and in this context calls for the revival of the joint commission established under the chairrnanship of UNPROFOR Authorizes LMPROFOR, in carrying out its mandate in the Republic of Croatia, acting in self- defence, to take the necessary measures, includhg the use of force, to ensure its security and its fieedom of movement. Directs UNPROFOR to review urgently the extension of close air support to UNPROFOR in the temtocy of the Republic of Croatia. Extends UNPROFOR'S mandate for an additional period terminating on 30 Sep 94. Initial increase of 3500 troops for Croatia authorized. Urges compiiance with 29 Mar 94 Cease Füe Agreement.

Of the 14 specific tasks Iisted here only 3, it is suggested, could be considered achieved, 6 partially achieved and 5 not achieved at dl. From this it could be understandable why a sense of uneasiness and fhstration seemed to be prevalent within the international comrnunity, the troop contributing nations, the warring parties,

UNPROFOR and the other humanitarian assistance actors. More importantly for this study, it could be deemed by the many other actors involved in the humanitarian response that military forces were not successfùl and therefore were detrimental to the overall effort. This was a result of very slow progress or no progress towards an overall resolution of the problems within the former Yugoslavia. It should be noted that certain resoiutions or parts of resolutions could not be fulfilled. It is suggested that the most important of these is SCR 769 (customs and border control) which, lacking the will and cooperation of the Serbs, required a peace enforcing mandate. It should also be noted that this resolution was most often referred to by the Croatian authorities as an example of UNPROFOR s inability to fulfil its mandate. Others, such as facilitating the remof the displaced persons to their homes in the UNPAs, and the supervision of the remof

Croatian authority in the pink ones, were also impossible to achieve given the lack of will of the parties invoived. 50

Disagreement among members of the Security Council created impasses in which, for example, the Secretary General s two reports on safe areas issued in May and

November 1 994 did not receive Security Council approval. These safe areas reports cornrnented on issues such as force and resource requirements, task definitions, area delineation and the desired end state. Safe Areas were crucial to the humanitarian effort as the fa11 of Srebrenica showed only too clearly in 1995. The reports also pointed out inconsistencies in the reporting of violations. For example, the incidents of Bosnian Serb aggressions into the safe areas were well publici ed and condernned. However, the actions of Bosnian Govemment forces such as using safe areas to arnass forces and from which to mount operations - thereby making them legitimate military targets - were not as well known. This is not to Say that condemnation and action against Serb forces was not appropriate but rather to indicate the complicated nature of the situation on the ground which the military and humanitarian forces must contend with even if the political levet did not want to acknowledge it. Additionally, the attitudes taken by troop contributing countries, on the one hand, and major powers without troops on the ground, on the other, on the lifting of the amis embargo for the Bosnian Government or on the use of air power have led to the view that the international cornrnunity was sharply divided on the former Yugodavia. This as a minimum affected the morale of the peacekeepers and quite likely afTected their ability to put pressure on the belligerents to bargain in good faith.

This strategic levei complication of mandates is in contrast with some of the efforts at the lower tactical leve1 to make important contributions to the peace effort and 5 1 the amelioration of the humanitarian situation. Graham Day, a civil affairs oficer with

UNPROFOR, notes practical examples of cornrnunity level peacekeeping in Eastern

Bosnia including: local anti-sniping agreements, local harvest agreements, exchange of bodies, exchange of prisoners of war, family reunification, and negotiation of the passage of aid convoys." These community level activities are important to this study because of the more general conclusions that can be drawn fiom them. Militaq forces, notwithstanding any mandated or agreed support to humanitarian agencies, often, and on their own initiative, are fully engaged in the humanitarian effort - regardless of whether the aim is of a peacemaking or humanitarian nature."

It is apparent that the coordination of efforts between and amongst al1 partners in the former Yugoslavia improved from UNPROFOR to IFOR/SFOR. Notwithstanding, many of the military oficers still note the dificulty of dealing with NGOs and other

Humanitarian Agencies. For example, a Canadian Forces Captain who deployed on the

SFOR mission as a Liaison Officer in 1996 noted that,

An alphabet soup of 10s and NGOs is present on operations. They range fiom the

United Nations High Representative for Refugees to Doctors Without Borders.

Time spent getting to know these people is well invested. Several people you will

"'Graham Day. "Missed Opportunities in the Balkans? Lessons for Peacernaking and Preventive Diplomacy from the Former Yugoslavia." in David R. Black and Susan J. Rolston, Peacemakine and Preventive Di~lornacvin the New World (DidOrder (Halifax, NS: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1995). 85. 89Forexample Day notes that under the Harvest Agreement of July 1994, a local harvest agreement was reached whereby Bosnian Serbs would harvest fields open to sniper fire in the zone of confrontation and hand over 50 percent of the crop to the Muslim side. This resulted in 9,500 kgs of wheat king handed over by the local Serbs to the Muslims. 52

meet have spent considerable time in theatre. As such, they are able to explain the

history and background to many of the problems. They will aiso be able to

explain the unwritten power stnictures, rules and goings on. It is also worth

maintaining communication with them in order to remain infonned of their future

intentions. Their actions can sometimes rapidly destabili e the military

sit~ation.~

This officer was one of many who noted that it is worth learning who the major

International Organi ations and NGOs are for a particular operation and in the particular area of activity. However, it is eye-opening that even at the tactical level the rationale for

NGO action is being identified. One officer commented that, [elven more important, it is worth deterrnining the major fùnders and lead agencies for the NGOs and their policies.

This will determine the activities of most of the NGOs in your particular area. It is aiso interesting to note that at the tactical level military forces are understanding that there are things that can be done to arneliorate interactions. Note the following excerpt fiom cornments made by liaison officer:

Many of the 10s and NGOs are intimidated by the military. This can be easily

overcome. The value of a smile when speaking with them cannot be

overestimated. Several organizations such as the International Committee of the

*From notes provided by Captain Mike Sullivan, Canadian Forces, August 1999. 9'Siillivan. 53

Red Cross are uncornfortable around military people with weapons. This can be

overcorne by wearing your p pistol on your combat belt under your combat shirt

..... This small act makes thern more comfortable. It might be worth noting that

many people are less receptive to people wearing hatsherets. U.S. Psychological

Operations trains their soldiers to remove their hats when handing out PsyOps

material. It seems that people are less intimidated when military mernben are not

wearing hat~.~'

If there was one area where success in coordinating efforts between the actors took precedence in UNPROFOR it was at the lower tactical levels. In fact, each of the

Canadian military contingents on completion of their operational rotation noted the cooperation with UNHCR, UN Civil Affairs, UN Civilian Police and with other aid organi ati~ns?~Additionally, there were a number of reports of ad hoc arrangements between tactical peacekeeping units and in situ aid agencies and UN agencies to support humanitarian goals. One report indicated how, in early 1993, in Sector West of Croatia, the local UN Civilian Affairs coordinator with UN rnilitary support and NGO involvement instituted a fming project across the confrontation line between the Serbs and the Croats. From a military and political perspective this was seen at the tactical

92Sullivan 93Seefor exarnple Canadian Forces document 3120-12-7(SLO) dated 31 March 1995 titled "CANBAT 1 End of Tour CIMIC Operations Summary" compiIed by Captain B. Gray. This document lists examples of the humanitarian activities the 1* Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment conducted during their peacekeeping tour - such as monthly distribution of UNHCR food aid. medical and dental treatrnents. construction of children's play equipment. school support, clothing distribution of clothing provided by private citizens and groups in Canada (14,000 kgs). level as a confidence building initiative which would contribute to the overali mission.

Of course, fiom a humanitarian perspective food would be harvested and available for

distribution. In the end the programme was teminated by the UN operational level

headquarters largely, it was speculated, because the local UN civilian and rnilitary authonties had been seen to overstep their mandate." This would appear to be one more exampte of inflexibility by bureaucratic institutions when srnall step progress was king made and could have contributed to enhanced coordination between al1 the humanitarian actors and, equally important, amelioration of the situation brought on by a complex emergency .

Rwanda

Rwanda and the international response to the crisis in 1994 stands out fiom the other complex emergencies of the post Cold War period because of the massive genocide, ethnic cleansing and other humanitarian suffering inflicted upon the people of the country and region. Military personnel were not sent to the area in any traditional peace support role but rather in a new and undefined role as humanitarian - sent to the aid of the civilian population?5 As Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot note, the Rwanda crisis of 1994 took place at a time in the early post-Cold War period when humanitarian crises were on

"Interview with Captain Patrick Rechner (Canadian Liaison Offïcer Sector West Croatia FebMar 93) on 25 June 99. Substantiated with other confidential interviews. "In fact the UN Secretary-General had recornmended the creation of a peacekeeping force with a mandate of "contributing to the establishment and maintenance of a climate cor,ducive to the secure installation and subsequent operation of the transitional government." The United Nations Advisory Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established by SCR 872 of 5 October 1993. (See, United Nations Peacekeeping, Information Notes, May 1994, 158.) Canadian Major-General Romeo Dallaire was the first commander. 55

the rise, traditional aid agencies overstretched, and international rnilitary forces

increasingly used in responding. % Brown and Guillot highlight seven key policy issues

with using military forces/assets in humanitarian crisis such as that posed by Rwanda in

1994. These are largely complementary to the factors previously identified for

consideration in this study and are:

the terms of engagement of the military in the humanitarian sphere,

their (military) comparative advantage vis-a-vis humanitarian organi ations,

the cost of utili ing military assets,

cultural differences between military and humanitarian institutions,

the possibiiities of minimising the ofien negative efSects of military assets,

the effectiveness of military assets, and

the emerging view that committing troops is a necessary element in responsi ble

global stewardship."

Therefore, and notwithstanding the fac t that the UN mission and manda.te for Rwanda

(UNAMIR) intersected with two stand-alone bilateral initiatives - the French-led

Operation Turquoise and the U.S.-led Operation Support Hope, there are a nurnber of

% Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot, Sotdiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda (Pans: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996). 13. It should be noted that this excellent study of the Rwandan crisis was completed by OECD in collaboration with the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies of Brown University. 97Minearand Guillot, Chapter 2 (33-52)and Chapter 8 (147-166) 56

lessons pertinent to the interaction of military forces with NGOs and other Humanitarian

Agencies which can be gleaned fiom this case study?'

In their report on a conference of interagency cooperation in peace operations Last and Vought note that:

In Rwanda, the military forces again anived before the UNHCR had established a

presence. Those who did arrive before the violence erupted were forced to pull

out of Rwanda until the worst of the crisis passed; only the International

Cornmittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) remained in country throughout. As the

UNHCR and NGOs returned to Rwanda in the wake of victorious RPF forces,

they created an impression of bias which was to hamper subsequent aid efforts. In

the absence of humanitarian assistance organi ations, the military was able to do

only a little for refugees?

Following fiom this, one of the key iessons to be learned fiorn the humanitarian response in Rwanda is that military force and rnilitary professionalism are no substitute for political will. Going back to the brief discussion of the actors in the international humanitarian response, it should be remernbered that military forces, while often considered a classification of humanitarian actor on their own, in the final instance, are an

980perationTurquoise was primarily a security initiative lune to August of 1994 in Rwanda and the Goma region of Zaire with a Chapter VI1 UN Security Council mandate. Operation Support Hope, July to Septernber 1994 was a purely humanitarian effort of about 3000 U.S. troops. *Major D. M. Last and Mr. Don Vought, "Interagency Cooperation in Peace Operations: A Conference Report." United States Amy Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Kansas, 7. This report was based on an International Conference on Peace Operations held on October 18-20, 1994. 57

extension of state involvement. As Comaughton notes in his work on militas. support

and protection for humanitarian assistance in Rwanda in 1994, the military will only

perform to the level of ability that their government will allow. lm The mind-set of some

organi ations is apparent when Comaughton notes that a senior representative of one of

the important NGOs recently complained that the mi2itur-y were not entirely comrnitted

to humanitarian assistance, responding instead to the dictates of govemments. 'O'

However, contrary to this sentiment is the one that more not less military support

is needed. One article in the New York Times noted that,

Relief officiais are taking a lesson tiom the tragedy of the Hutu and Tutsi

refugees. What the world s relief agencies need, they now believe, is more

logistical support from the world s mies. Relief experts have in mind not so

much the high-profile, and risky French military presence in Rwanda ... Rather,

the experts are more encouraged by the successes of the discreet non-combat

support provided here by the Americans, Irish, lsraelis and Dut~h.'~'

Of al1 the policy issues raised by Minear and Guillot in their report, the culture

issues, coming to tems with the difierences between military and humanitarian

institutions, are most pertinent to this study. First of all, and perhaps not suitably

'O0R.M. Connaughton, Militarv Suurmrt and Protection for Humanitarian Assistance: Rwanda Avril - Decernber 1994 (Camberly, U.K.: The Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1995). 15. 'OIIbid., 16. '02Jane Perlez. " Aid Agencies Are Grateful to Amies," New York Times, August 21, 1994 (dateline Goma, Zaire) as noted in Minear and Guillot, 142. 58 highlighted previously in this study, is the acknowledgment that there will be institutional cultural differences. Contrary to the viewpoint that there will be inevitable clashes based on lack of familiarity and attitudinal abyss between military and non-military forces,

Minear and Guillot note that this was not a major problem in the Rwandan crisis. They note a public health professional as stating, we liked and respected the military people -

US, French, Dutch. Israelis, and others - that we dealt with, but what we struggled with were not personality or even operational problems but rather stnictural ones. 'O3 These structural differences are real and, in this particular case, there were three areas dificult to resolve - planning and coordination, continuity of presence, and approach to security concems. Notwithstanding the efforts of the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office

(UNREO) - a mission specific structure - that will be cornmented upon Merin Chapter

4, the conclusion of Minear and Guillot is noteworthy:

The military approach to the planning task - bureaucratic, top-down, personnel-

intensive - was foreign CO humanitarians and minimised possible contributions in

the area of disaster prevention and preparedness. Problems were compounded by

the lack of CO-ordinationamong humanitarian organizations and between the

UN'S humanitarian and military arrns. While improvements can and should be

made based on the Rwanda experience, the difficulties encountered involve

fundamental differences in institutional c~lture.'~

'03Minearand Guiliot, 155. Ia'Minear and Guillot, 155. Another difference which was apparent in Rwanda and is noteworthy elsewhere is

the issue of continuity. Canadian troops to the area were assigned duties for six months

or one year depending on the position and these durations were, by and large, the longest

with Irish, French and U.S. military personnel in the area ofien for only two or three

months. At the other extreme Israeli and German troops stayed for periods of less than one month. This is in stark contrast with humanitarian or& ations which stress continuity.

Finafly, as it relates to institutional cultures, there was the issue of security and force protection. Minear and Guillot note that, humanitarian personnel, themselves often more willing than the military to take nsks, believed that the utility to the aid effort of US troops was reduced in both Goma and Kigali, by the preoccupation for their safety. 'OS It is suggested that this desire for protection is part of a military culture not likely to change and other means of overcoming any cultural or institutional dificulty and conflict will have to be developed. However, the issue of whether al1 differences can be overcome and the effort required to be expended to do so raises an interesting and broader question as noted by Minear and Guillot: whether the Iimited resources and energies of the international community should go into improving the cost-effectiveness and humanitarian-friendly aspects of the military, or into enhancing the capacity and responsiveness of humanitarian organi ations themsel~es?'~

'OsJb-., 156. '"Minear and Guillot raise this question without answer in Chapter 8 (156). 60

In the end, this question may be moot because of the reality that military and non- military forces will continue to be thrown together in international responses to complex emergencies. Therefore some form of accepted interaction must be sought. A lot has to do with the leadership of ail actors. There has to be, it is suggested, a more global view of success and mission than just the exact sphere of influence of the actor involved.

While discussing the humanitarian issue Gened Dallaire noted his aim,

was to crack the humanitarian problem in Kigali and help the NGOs in the

country, even though we were not so authori ed. The NGOs should be self-

suficient, but they were often a burden and under-resourced. We did what we

could to help them and made no charge.'''

One troubling, but consistent, observation has to do with the sharing of information. In fact, a Canadian officer who was well placed in the UN headquarters commented,

The problem 1 have encountered is that during the period before the war they

[NGO and other HA] refused to provide info to us, cooperate or coordinate with

us or even attend our weekly security briefings which were established for their

benefit. Then when the war began they abandoned the country, their equipment,

staff and material. The few who stayed then flooded to us after they lost their 61

equipment, staff and material and expected us to support them. Before the war

they treated us as belligerents because we were in uniform. Most of the

international staff are anti-military and this attitude prevented them fiom

coordinating their actions with us until it was too late. AAer the situation

stabili ed during the war they retùsed to coordinate or subordinate themselves to

UN humanitarian organi ations. 'O8

'%xerview (30 July 1999) with Major Brent Beardsley, Executive Assistance to the UNAMIR 1 UN Military Commander (Major-General DaIIaire, Canada) from November 1993 to May 1994 inclusive. Chabter- 4 - Analvsis and Findingg

Analysis

It is apparent when studying the international response to humanitarian emergencies that the actors involved suffer fiom a number of dilemmas including conflicts of goals, constraints as a result of structure, organi ation and si e, and the varying leveis of expertise in responding to the cnsis. Coordination and the modalities for effecting this coordination at the different levels of involvement and among the different participants continues to be the major obstacle to overcome. Lessons are king learned, however, and the successes, failures and past experiences must be built upon.

Table 9: Leamine from Past Exneriences'@'

Involvement of CIDA and the NGO community in military planning from the outset would have demonstrated good faith, willingness to coordinate, and may have enabled a more timely, coordinated. and effective use of the DART and other military assets. The addition of a liaison officer from UNHCR, the lead humanitarian agency in the deployment area, as part of the DART HQ would have provided valuable contacts once in theatre.

The unwillingness of NGOs to discuss their perspective on humanitarian assistance, besides hindering a more balanced analysis, suggests institutional hesitancy in opening themselves up for criticism: criticism which is necessary for more effective interaction

IwQuoted from the Amy Lessons Learned Centre. "Analysis Report Operation Assurance: CF Deployrnent to Central Africa November 1996 - January 1997," 2 June 1997, paragraph 2.4. 63

with other humanitarian actors. In any case more specific findings are detailed in the

following sections.

Commitments without Resources (as evidenced in the former Yugoslavia in the UNPROFOR mandate)

The military component of UNPROFOR was comprised of those units which the

troop contributing nations chose to provide. The fact that the Force Commander s

number one priority for reinforcement may well be engineer units is of Meworth unless

some nation chooses to provide such troops. The result may well be, as was the case in

UNPROFOR, an unbalançed force which lacks certain key elements, such as logistics or

engineea, which were a higher priority to support the mission and to share

responsibilities with the other humanitarian partners. The fact is that the Force

Commander must use the force slhe is given and has little influence over its composition.

Further complicating this was a quota-based system for UN forces and key staffpositions.

For political imperatives the nght penon was not always chosen for critical jobs. It is only too easy for a Security Council Resolution to be promulgated or a Presidential

Staternent to be issued; however translating these into an achievable mission cm be complicated or impossible. One of the key elements to success will be the provision of the right resources and enough of them. WROFOR was the victim of expectations created by the United Nations and the other actors of the international response which could not be met because of a lack of the appropriate resources. The safe area concept is a prime example of this. 64

A related problem is the situation when too many resources are available which

cannot be used because they are either the wrong resources or face insurmountabIe

restrictions on their use. There were forces that could have been retwned to their troop

contributing nations because no viable tasks could be provided them. The Muslim

Malaysian battalion in Bosnia which would not be accepted by the orthodox Christian

Serbs under any situation would be one of many examples.

Professionalism of Assigned Forces

Military forces which do not have the sarne ethos and leadership as the traditional

Western nations create situations where credibility and neutrality can not be assumed. In

UNPROFOR this manifested itself in such activities as bIack-marketeering and other illegal activities (Note the Force Inspector General s Report) and in certain contingents being neither trained nor equipped to fulfill their assigned peacekeeping missions.

Specifics in this particular case are sensitive; suffice it to Say that the problem was severe enough for the Force Commander to request a Force Inspector General to oversee a solution to the problems. A Swiss General was provided for a one-year period to act as the Force Inspector General. Additionally, a combined team of UNCIVPOL, Military

Police and special investigators were fonned under the Deputy Commander s direction to investigate and take action against wrong-doing by United Nations soldiers and civilians.

Once again these manifestations of the lack of military professionalism would not have been possible in such organi ations as NATO or in the Eurocorps of the WEU. 65

Limitations on the Use of Force

As noted by General de Lapresle of France, the Force Commander, peacekeepers

plus air power do not equate to a peace enforcing ~apability."~He was very cogni ant of

the fact that nations had provided forces for peacekeeping which was deemed to be

employment under the traditional principles of peacekeeping. Failure to adhere to the

traditional principles brought with it the liability of an escalation of the use of force and

invoIvement of peacekeeping forces to the point of them becoming participants in the

conflict. These facts seemed to have been lost on some at the higher political levels.

These would have been the same people who would have condemned UNPROFOR and

its leaders had soldiers been killed in a peace enforcement scenario while prepared,

equipped and mandated for a peacekeeping mission. General Rose used his consent

mode1 at every opportunity to illustrate the impact of peacekeepers conducting action against one side, Of course he was proved nght time and again after NATO air stnkes against the Bosnian Serbs and Krajina Serbs afTected UNPROFOR freedom of movement to the point of the taking of UN hostages.

National Agendas and Restrictions

Following on from earlier cornrnents that peacekeepers were provided for a mission of peacekeeping, al1 36 troop contributing nations would have to agree individually for a different focus for the mandate. This sort of limitation on flexibility,

"'As noted by General de Lapresle both in a meeting with the CINC South of NATO (Suly 1994) and at a subsequent NATO MCC. See confidential notes of Military Assistant to Deputy Force Commander (Book 2) 66

which is not as apparent in the NGO community, does not contribute to flexible

relationships between military and non-military forces. It was essential that national

approvd be obtained for al1 operational taskings, and the delays in obtaining these

approvals often inhibited the flexibility of the Force Commander to respond to situations

on the ground as they developed. Had he been afforded the operational capability to

respond to actions of the beiiigerent parties decisively and with speed, the smus quo unte

could have been protected in different situations.

One of the biggest ctitics of the United Nations infiexibility was the United States.

Yet, as it pertained to national restrictions, the United States was at the top of the list.

U.S. patrolling at night in Macedonia was one issue that took national political approval

to resolve while the movement of U.S. medical personnel fiorn the outstanding field

hospital in Zagreb to the United Nations Protected Areas for medical evacuations of

injured United Nations personnel was never resolved despite many demarches to

Washington by Admira1 Smith (CMC South). This is not to single out the U.S. as the

only restricting nation - Canadian troops, for example, aiso needed national approval

before accepting new operational level tasks or change in task locations. The Deputy

Commander of the UN Forces might, on the one hand, be planning a contingency operation - the rescue of peacekeepers in an enclave as an exarnple - and at the same time the Canadian Contingent Commander is reverting to National Defence Headquarters for authority to use Canadian units and forces. Furthermore, this authority would be unlikely in many situations. These types of restrictions are less likely with a NATO force, where 67

NATO cornmanden would expect to have more direct and collective operational control

over al1 assigned forces with al1 national restrictions identified in advance.

Need for Coordination between Peacekeeping Partners

At al1 levels, the need for coordination between the peacekeeping partners is an

essentid requirement. Hopkinson noted that close coordination can only be achieved if

the objectives and mandates are clear; the roles and responsibilities of the actors are clear; the leadership is weIl defined; and if there are clear command and control structures. Il I

At the strategic level, an example of why the efforts of the peacekeeping partners have to be coordinated and synchroni ed was evident in the changing nature of the peacekeeping efforts after July 1994 when the Contact Group (at that time consisting of the US., U-K.,

France, the Russian Federation and Germany) made a proposal which was accepted by one party and rejected by the other in the ~onflict."~The Bosnian Serbs felt that the international mediators were biased against them and tmed to an extremely rigid and defiant stand towards the international cornrnunity and to the Security Council. They recogni ed UNPROFOR s efforts for impartiality, but, at times, refused to CO-operate with UNPROFOR in assuring its fieedom of movement or in the despatch of its convoys.

This seriously affected UNPROFOR s support of and contribution to the humanitarian assistance effort. On the other hand, the Muslim-dominated Government felt that it

"'Hopkinson, 41. "'For background on the Contact Group see, for example, Helen Leigh-Phippard, "The Contact Group on (and in) Bosnia: An exercise in conflict mediation?" in International Journal, Spring 1998, pp. 306-324. 68

deserved the unconditional support of the peacekeepers since it had accepted the Contact

Group s proposal.

UNPROFOR, was remarkable regarding the great number of reg ional bodies it

had to work with. These included the European Community, whose involvement in the

former Yugoslavia preceded that of the United Nations. The EU monitoring mission was

an important complement to the work of the United Nations. The Organi ation for

Security and Cooperation in Europe also had a major interest in democratic governance

and human rights in the area. Additionally, the International Conference on the Former

Yugoslavia, an umbrella body, bringing together a large number of states concerned with

finding a diplornatic solution to the Bosnian conflict, was intricately involved.

The Requirement for Funding Profile as Shown from the Rwanda Mission

Connaughton, in his work on Rwanda, notes how there was an influx of NGOs to

Rwanda post-July 1994 when media African analysts attention turned fiom South Africa to R~anda."~As he states, One NGO representative explained their position simply as

be there or die , a situation which infIated the number of NGOs on the ground in

Rwanda to 230. Il4 The results of this are two-fold. First, as evidenced in the Rwandan situation this leads to a requirement to revisit ad hoc and formali ed coordination and decision-making regimes. As Connaughton notes, Significantly, the newly-arrived

NGOs brought with them attitudes towards the military which had been largely dispelled 69 earlier, in the heat of the crisis. Il5 Secondly, the marner in which some NGOs arrive to seek the spotlight and not necessarily with needed or the best resources creates tensions in acceptance of an overall cultural mode1 of participation. The World Disasters Report commented on the crisis by noting that,

Everyone rushes for the pot at the end of the rainbow but, having participated,

they wonder what to do with their piece of it. It s al1 a bit donor-driven. People

run for the emergency. It s where the money and the glory are.lI6

A Concept for Coordination

One of the key initiatives to be taken out of the Rwandan case was the development of the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO). The UNREO acted as an intermediary to coordinate humanitarian support. The following sumrnari es its contributions and difficulties.

' ISIbid. This was also noted in the Lessons Learned sumrnary of France for Operation Turquoise where it was recommended that balance in approach for military forces was required so as not to be seen to be in competition with NGOs. The French military identified a problern in relationships which at times made coordination difficult, These difficulties amse because of the nurnber and variety of organizations, 'a certain dogmahk anfi-miIitanSm tht they demomtm&e' and the competition existing among the NGOs. (See Connaughton, 76.) 'I6World Disasters Report, Soecial Focus on the Rwandan Refunee Crisis, 1994, 20. Table 10: Assessrnent of the United Nations Rwanda Emereency Office'''

Provided one central information centre. No administrator, budget and no proper tracking of fun& which led to serious administrative complications.

Assisted newly arrived NGOs with registration, Personnel were CO-optedinto UNREO from orientation and guidance. wherever - a process which netted both the good and the indifferent.

1 Provided New York and Geneva with wide- Until November 1994 there was no managerial ranging and unbiased situation reports. direction Provided communications assistance to al1 who Communications was dependent of outside were registered including satellite support. facsimilelphone, radio and security

Provided a link as the go-between for military Having to fight al1 the time to be heard and to be sensitive NGOs and UNAMIR accepted as the coordinating agency. I - Provided CMAMIR with a Iink to the The turnover of personnel within UNREO was not humanitarian world - UNREO was represented at commensurate with effïciency and continuity. UNAMIR's daily coordination and orders meeting Many representatives were on three month - the only civilian agency granted access for a long contracts, some on no contracts at ail. period. The UNREO representative bridged the hvo different cultures by providing the military with the humanitarian perspective and was also able to nip in the bud any misunderstandings.

The key lesson here is not on the prognosis of UNREO as an exact mode1 for future but rather that there remains a need for a willingness to provide structure, form and resources for some coordinator of the humanitarian effort and communications medium and not necessarily another bureaucratie institution to compete with UN agencies and NGOs.

Certainly, the formation of UNREO was only one of the successes with additional agreement on,

'"Summary of Achievements and Problems compiled from Connaughton, 34-35 and 74-75. 71

the security of relief efforts; joint identification of distribution sites by responsible

authorities and UN humanitarian organi ations; clear identification of

interlocutors to represent the authonties for discussion of humanitarian

operations; acceptance by authonties of the monitoring and reporting

responsibilities of the UN organisations regarding the distribution and use of

relief materials; and an understanding that aid should be based on need, regardless

of race, ethnic group, religion or political affiliation.'"

"'From United Nations Peacekee~ina.Udate, December 1994,217 as quoted in Connaughton, 34. Chanter 5 - Conclusion

A Civilian-Military Relations Model for Humanitarian Assistance Operations

Michael Pugh, in The UN. Peace and Force, speaks of mission cringe,

restricting operations according to the means, and finance, at its disposa1 (example

UNPROFOR) and mission creep, the consensus for military forces to do more. Within

mission creep there are two aspects: hon ontal, or the unintended engagement of forces

in non-military activities such as police work, humanitarian relief and refugee protection;

and vertical, or unintended escalation in the scale of force used.'lg These accurately

summari e much of the dilemma of the intervention in complex emergencies currently

encountered. However, Pugh also flags two important conclusions. The first is that the

less coercive the military presence, the easier it is to integrate with political and civilian

programmes. "O This is certainly true fkom the perspective that military forces such as

SFOR in Bosnia and NGOs often do not want to get involved in each others activities for

fear of adversely affecting their own missions or goals.

However his second conclusion is more important - it is not necessarily desirable or feasible to prevent peacekeepers fkom engaging in humanitarian activities; the main

challenge is to manage the military-humanitarian link, not to ban it. "' This appears to

be in line with cornmon trends such as the New Peacekeeping Partnership, etc.. A

"%fichael Pugh, "Frorn Mission Cringe to Mission Creep?" in Michael Pugh, editor, The UN. Peace and Force (London: Frank Cass. 1997). 191-193. 'ZOIbid.,192. l2'U. 73 critical component of managing this link must be the interaction between military and civilians. If so, then the central argument of this study that first of al1 there is a requirement for a mode1 is vaiid. That is not to Say there are no dissenters to this opinion.

MSF in a 1997 Report, World in Crisis, notes,

Given the increasing complexity of providing humanitarian assistance and the risk

of it being used as a political instrument, it is al1 the more crucial that

humanitarian organi ations remain totally independent of al1 political interference

by govements. ... The international community at large, and western

governments in particular, have to accept that it is not the role of humanitarian

organisations to provide the solutions to a problem. Our role it to help the people

in danger survive beyond the crisis and to pressure governments to assume greater

political responsibility in searching for short and long term solutions.'"

Certainly, in the extreme, this would lead one to assume that some of the key humanitarian organi ations do not want to develop any intimate relationships and interaction models.

What is an appropriate civilian-military relations model for humanitarian assistance operations? Furthemore who should lead both in the construction of the model and in determining the mechanisms for coordination in the response to the

'=Medecins Sans Frontieres, World in Crisis: The wlitics of sumival at the end of the 20* centurv (London: Rotledge, 1997). preface, ix. 74

humanitarian crisis problems of complex emergencies? Who are the supporting acton?

These are al1 key questions which have yet to be answered by the key institutions let alone

this study. It is interesting that the Report of the Canadian Standing Senate Cornmittee on

Foreign Affairs did not address the coordination issue in its detailed report on

peacekeeping in 1993 .'=

However, a model mut be developed if the past difficulties are to be overcome and preparation for a more effective response to future requirements are to be made. The development of Principles of Action to supplement the military Principles of War would be a good starting place. This falls to the policy makers and not the academic cornmunity. And it must be accomplished with the coxmnitted input of the tactical level piayers. In fact, one of the key conclusions of this dissertation is that the tacticd levet has been isolated as the Ievel providing the most promise for enhanced coordination and thereby ripe for the development of a model for relations. Why the tactical level? Well it is here that the practitioners in the pure sense get the job done. Whether military or civilian, success can be more easily measured by the successful accomplishment of given tasks. There is the Ieast bureaucratic interference at this level, although interference is certainly not absent. Additionally, it is here where the institutionali ed differences are minimi ed and therefore, most importantly, the effects of politics are minimi ed.

The follow-on question must relate to the scope of the model. What should the mode1 entail? It is recommended, based on an analysis of the interactions in the two

'%ce Canada, Meeting New Challennes: Canada's Remonse to a New Generation of Peacekee~inq (Ottawa: Report of the Standing Senate Cornmittee on Foreign Affah, Febniary 1993). 75 mission areas of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and by a larger review of humanitarian response to complex emergencies, that the mode1 should, as a minimum- develop around three central themes - professional education, mission planning and structure. It is essential that professional education consider al1 the imperatives entailed in humanitarian emergency intervention inherent in the current environment of the post-

Cold War period and, unfortunately, likely to rernain dominant in the environment of the new millennium. One of the key areas here to develop would be an understanding of the capabilities, culture, planning processes and ethos of the other categories of acton. This can only be achieved if, firstly, differences are accepted and, secondly, there is a concerted effort of cross-familiari ation. The second theme would be planning. Beyond understanding the planning processes of al1 the actors, a complementaxy joint planning process is essential. Out of necessity this planning process would likely be broader than that of the individual actors such as the military (with the exarnple of that used by the

Canadian Forces) but it should identiQ how intelligence on future crisis areas are shared, at what stage different levels of coordination is effected, and who should lead the coordination at the different stages of planning. The final theme would focus on structure. There is a requirement to be able to provide exchange personnel to the different key players to assist in organi ation interface and to facilitate the resolution of the issues raised previously. The other part of structure deals with the attempt to reduce or eliminate duplication of effort and to encourage organi ations to develop their own strengths in a complementary fashion. 76

Through al1 of this, the dependent variable or the acid test of success becomes

mission accomplishrnent in the alleviating of suffering ancilor more involvement because

it is easier or fewer resources providing the same or increased amelioration of the

situation. There is a growing acceptance of the use of military forces in conjunction with other agencies in combating humanitarian suRering in complex emergencies. Recent efforts in Kosovo seem to be a case in point. Certainly many would ask the question why such a rapid and overwhelming response in Kosovo and not an earlier and more effective response in the other states of the former Yugoslavia. Accepting that there is likely to be more rather than less interaction of military forces with other involved humanitarian agencies, how can this new forced or voluntary partnership grow in a positive and constructive manner? There seems to be on the academic and analytical side a cal1 for principles of intervention and action. For exampte, Minear and Weiss propose eight

Providence Prhciples of Humanitarian Action in Armed Conflict, and Ramsbotharn and Woodhouse propose isvelve Framework Principles for Humanitarian

Intervention. "" The challenge will be to convince dl, or a majority of the key players, to accept these or a similiar set of principles of action and intervention. If it is accepted that there are various actors with different roles, the question then becomes how to coordinate these diRering organi ations in a complex emergency? Hopkinson states it clearly when

'"Sec Larry Minear and Thomas Weiss, Humanitarianism Action in Times of War (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993). 19 and Oliver Ramsbotharn and Tom Woodhouse. Humanitarian Intervention in Contemrnrarv Conflict (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996). 226. It should be noted that Minear and Weiss in their work focus on non-military intervention. 77

he notes that the purpose of CO-ordinationin to increase complementarity of the actors

and to arrive at the most eficient use of resources. 125

One observation which can be made based on a review of the general and specific cases is that there needs to be developed a detailed list of the conditions which will lead to a successful humanitarian assistance operation. The following list would provide those conditions if a clear and mutually agreed understanding of the tenns could be obtained and key measurement indicators identified.

Table 11: Conditions for Successful Humanitarian Assistance O~eration

1 Adequate Warning Agreement on MissiodPlanlEnd-State (for each of the different actors contributing to the humanitaian assistance operation) Resource Identification Preparation and Deployment Procedures Conduct of Operation 1 Redeployment

In the end, even a realist mode1 of international relations must accept a changing environment which has given credence to the participation of other than state agents in the crisis management, crisis response and crisis prevention. To deny this would prevent a more detailed analysis of how a growing number of actors can be coordinated in 78 international response efforts. Military forces have unique and dificult challenges ahead.

They must stay ready for war-fghting roles even if it is to, as Joel Sokolslcy has stated, to participate in dangerous situations in a safe world. At the same time they have to be prepared to be a supporting, supported or equai participant in hurnanitarian assistance in complex emergencies. As pnmarily the state s forces of last resort it is suggested that military forces mut ais0 take the initiative in the development of new modalities of coordination - and specifically in the development of a mode1 for civilian - military relations in humanitarian assistance operations. Appendix 1 Levels of Operational Planning

Appendix 2 Military Planning Process

Appendix 3 Intemet Sites Applicable to Humanitarian Assistance Coordination

Appendix 4 Example of a Humanitarian NGO (Catholic Relief Service)

Appendix 5 Research Questionnaire Apnendix 1- Levels of Ooerational Planning

The Canadian Forces, like many militaries, break up the planning and conduct of operations into three categories; strategic, operational and tactical. These three separate but related levels of planning correspond to the three levels of war.

Levels of O~erations(Planninn and C~nduct)'*~

Level Key Elements Suategic As the principle military advisor to Defines Strategic Objectives the govemrnent, the CDS provides Identifies the Mission the link between the development Size and Structure of national policies and objectives Concept for Employment by the governrnent and the Budget Pressures translation of such policies and Changing Security Environment objectives into military strategy and More Accountability of Senior plans. Leadership Rules of Engagement Operational An operational-level plan provides Training direction to subordinate Force Employment and commanders, at the tactical level, to Sustainment guide their planning. An Interface with other Organizations operational level commander sets achievable, specific rnilitary objectives for tactical commanders. Tactical-level plans govern the Force of Last Resort deployrnent and employment of Range of Intensities forces and the conduct of battles Train for and Conduct Operations and engagements. Trend for Increased Use in Varying Environments

Iz6Theconcepts and definitions of the different levels of war are well documented in nurnerous Canadian Forces publications. For the purposes of this essay, National Defence Publication Joint Doctrine for Canadian Forces Joint and Combined Owrations, 1996 has been used and expanded upon with personal comments. 81

There have ken major changes at the operational level with the requirement for

increased planning of operations other than those associated with NATO and the Cold

War. There is an increasing focus on the interface with nonmilitary organi ations such as humanitarian aid agencies. This was clearly evident during the planned, Canadian-led, international intervention operation to the Great Lakes region of Afica. Likewise, at the strategic level priorities have changed and are potentially confûsed with a Canadian security poIicy that has been defined in very broad terms. Changes at îhe tactical level have focused on increased emphasis on rules of engagement and international law, on the use of technology and on strengthening the ability to conduct joint and combined operations. The tactical level is the essence of a military fighting force and if anything these changes have ameliorated the Canadian military s abilities as a fighting force.

It is here at the formation and unit level where the combat fùnctions are brought together to provide combat power. In the Canadian Forces, at this level, there is a focus on training and preparation for al1 potential missions, war fighting or not. From the

Medak Operation to the recently completed deployment of CF- 18 aircraft to operational duty over Bosnia, Canadian Forces have demonstrated the capability of performing in a war-fighting role. War-fighting is the focus because it is not only the most dificult mission but also because preparation for it provides the inherent flexibility and confidence in formation and unit security necessary for any commitment. For example, the British Army believes that the deployment of troops trained, organi ed and equipped for high-intensity combat has been bdamental to the success of the NATO-led peace 82 support operation in Bosnia. 12' War-fighting weapons, such as main battle tanks and self-propelled gus, have provided the escalation dominance that has deterred the factions in Bosnia fiom threatening the peacekeepers. The absence of this capability, the capability to fight and win, severely hampers the flexibility of response of deployed military forces.

"'"British Amy Balances on a Thin Green Line" by Ian Kemp and Christopher Foss in Janes Defence Weeklw, Volume 28, Number 9,3 September 1997, p. 48 and 5 1. A~~endix2 - The Militarv Planning Process

Excerpts from Canadian Forces Publication JOINT DOCTRINE FOR CF JOINT & COMBiNED FORCES dated April 1995

40 1. NTRODUCTION

I. Using the principles of war as a guide, planning for the employment of military forces is an inherent responsibility of al1 levels of command. The two broad categories of planning are force planning and operational planning.

2. Force planning is associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities and is largely the responsibility of the Department of National

Defence @ND) through such mechanisms as the Defence Program Management System

(DPMS). Operational planning is military planning directed toward the employment of military forces in the context of a military strategy to attain specified objectives. This is the responsibility of the CDS, assisted by the DCDS and the commanders of commands. This chapter deals with concepts and doctrine relating to operational planning only. 402. JOINT-OPERATIONPLANNING

1. The JOPP is a coordinated joint staff process used by a commander to

determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the

action necessary to accomplish the mission.

2. Joint-operation planning, which may be initiated by the CDS or by any authori ed subordinate commander, such as a JFC designated for a specific joint operation, is a top-down activity that enables senior commanders to communicate their purpose, requirements, objectives and concept of operations to subordinate cornmanders and joint forces so that they, in tum, cm make the necessary preparations as part of a concerted effort.

3. Joint-operation plans are prepared for a variety of contingencies and operations ranging fiom isolated regional incidents to general war. Sometimes, alternative plans may need to be prepared for the sarne contingency or operation using different sets of forces and resources to preserve execution flexibility.

4. An operation plan should be brief and contain mission-type guidance and direction; however, the plan must be complete enough to convey clearly the commander's intent to subordinates. 5. To ensure that joint-operation planning and joint operations are

successful, CF officers who are part of joint staffs and joint comrnands must have

expertise in the methods, organi ations and capabilities of their own

Environment.

1. In planning a joint operation, particular regard should be paid to the

fo 110 wing fundamental principtes:

a. Aim. The aim of a particular operation must be consistent with defence objectives and achievable within available resources. The aims of subordinate commanders must be consistent with the aim of the superior commander.

b. Security. Security presents a constant problem. Compromise of the plan, or even knowledge of its existence, could prejudice the success of the operation.

c Timeliness. The plan must be completed in time to allow commanders subject to its direction time to implement it. d. Ciarity. The plan must be prepared and presented in such a rnanner

that there can be no misunderstanding by those subject to its

direction.

e. Flexibility. Plans need to be flexible so that they can be adapted

to meet changing circumstances and doreseen events.

f. Economy in Resources. A plan must provide for maximum economy in the

use of resources. Over-control of resources and waste of scarce

commodities and sewices must be avoided.

g. Validity. Every plan must be reviewed and tested for its effect on

the achievement of the aim.

h. Supportability. Every plan must be supportable in tems of logistic

capabilities and financial and other resources.

j- Distribution. Plans should have a wide enough distribution to ensure

that al1 assigned and supporting force comrnanders are aware of their

responsibilities. A balance must be stnick between this requirement

and that for security. 404. OPERATION-PLANNINGFACTORS

1. A number of factors must be considered when planning a joint operation.

Among the more significant are:

a. Control. Planning is controlled at the highest practical level using the best and Iatest information. Control includes establishing tirnetables to ensure that the best possible plan is produced in the tirne available.

b. Lateral Planning. Sea, land and air aspects of a plan should be developed concurrently.

c. Planning Staff. The level of knowledge and experience of the planning staff should be recogni ed. If the staff is fonned on an ad hoc basis, the commander's direction and the availability of a clear and well-understood plamkg process become vital.

d. Cornmand and Staff Liaison. Liaison should be established and maintained with higher, lateral and subordinate cornmanders and staffs. e. Development Time. The probable complexity of a joint operation may

lengthen the time needed to develop plans to the extent that the

time required for planning may become a planning factor in itself.

The use of standing operating procedures (SOPs) may be of relevance,

particularly for crisis planning.

f. Intelligence. The availability of relevant and timely intelligence

is essential to successfùl operations. Intelligence staff must be

advised of intelligence requirements early in the planning process.

In tum, they must make intelligence available promptly to the planning staff. Like the planning process, the intelligence process

(direct, collect, collate, analyses evaluate and disseminate updated intelligence) is constant and continuous.

g. Sensitive Parameters. Planning assumptions that are sensitive to change and that would affect significantly the outcome of the plan must be identified, the nature of their sensitivity described, and the possible range of outcornes stated. These parameters must be rnonitored continuously for indications of change.

h. Logistic Requirements. Logistic support of a joint operation is complex. Forces will be dependent for resupply on the Canadian Forces Supply System (CFSS) through the IF logistics-support agency.

Logistic dependencies must be identified and the responsible agency advised as soon as possible.

J Geographic Requirements. The requirement for and availability of g eographic data should be defined during the initial-planning phase to permit the timely acquisition or production of this data.

k. Rules of Engagement (ROE). ROE for an operation must be agreed upon at the highest political and military levels. Doctrine for the promulgation and application of ROE is contained in chapter 5.

405. LEVELS OF JOMT PLANNING

1. There are three separate levels of joint planning:

a. strategic; b. operational; and c. tactical.

2. Strategic-Level Planning. A strategic joint-operation plan outlines the strategic commander's objectives, concepts and intent for an operation. It

provides the operational-level commander with initial guidance and direction for the operation by taking the following steps:

identi fjr ing the enemy ;

defining strategic objectives;

assigning the task or mission;

establishing command and control arrangements;

defining sustainment policies and plans;

defining strategic-movement policies and plans;

speciQing the operational commander's level of command authority;

allocating forces to the operational-level commander;

defining the logistic and other support available to the operational-level commander; k. defining the scope and timing of the mission; m. defining the geographic area of responsibility; n. identifjring military and political asswnptions; p. authori ing ROE; and q. identifjring constraints on the mission.

3. The CDS is responsible for joint-operation planning at the strategic level.

As the principal military advisor to the government, the CDS provides the link 91 between the development of national policies and objectives by govemment and the translation of such policies and objectives into military strategy and plans. The

CDS is assisted in the application of military strategy and the development of strategic plans by the DCDS and the staff at NDHQ. Commanders of commands provide the CDS with operational and technical advice.

4. Operationai-Level Planning. An operational-level plan generally requires the strategic-level commander's approval. An operational-level commander sets achievable, specific military objectives for tactical cornmanden in the context of the strategic commander's operation plan by perfonning the following steps:

defining the mission;

defining operational-level tasks and objectives;

assigning subordinate tasks;

organi ing forces;

describing the concept of operations;

setting priorities for and coordinating the use of logistic and other resources; g. determining the sequence of operations; and h. synchroni ing sea, land and air operations.

5. When the CDS establishes a JF and appoints a JFC for a specific operation, the JFC is responsible for operational-level planning. If operational-level

planning is required in advance of a HF being established, the CDS tasks a

standing CF JFHQ or some other appropriate planning agency with the

responsibility.

6. Tactical-Level Planning. Tactical-level plans govem the conduct of battles and engagements. They are prepared by the JTFC, if one is designated, and by subordinate component commanders of the IF and are based on the operational commander's plan.

406. THE JOINT-OPERATION-PLANNINGSEQUENCE

1. At the operational level, there are six sequential steps in planning a joint operation:

a. initiation; b. orientation; c. concept development; d. decision; e. plan development; and f. plan review. 2. The initiation step begins with a waming order, in the fonn of an initiating directive, issued by the CDS. During this step, political requirernents are identified, the task is assigned or assurned, major combat and logistic resources and strategic transportation assets are identified for planning purposes, the intelligence process is initiated, and the groundwork is laid for planning to begin.

3. Orientation involves the analysis and definition of the mission, the preparation and issuance of the commander's planning guidance, and a description of the end states of the operation.

4. In the concept-development step, staff estimates are conducted, an information bnef is prepared for the commander, and the commander's estimate is produced. The information brief includes tentative courses of action, and the commander's estimate describes the courses of action which best achieve the mission.

5. The decision step produces a decision brief. During this step, the courses of action developed by the commander's estimate are exarnined and a best course of action selected for development into a concept of operations. The concept of operations outlines the commander's intent in the deployment, employment and support of joint forces. It promotes a clear understanding of the commander's view of the conduct of the overall operation. The concept of operations is

approved by the strategic-level commander (i.e., the CDS) and issued to

comrnanders of the subordinate components of the JF.

6. Plan development consists of developing, approving and issuing the main and

supporting plans. Al1 CF plans will describe execution of an operation in five

phases:

a. warning;

b. preparation; c. deployment; d. employment; and e. redeployment.

7. The main and supporting plans will describe operations and activities for each phase. They will also define objectives, identi& forces needed to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander's concept of operations, identiQ requirements for administrative and logistic support, identiQ strategic-transportation requirements, and identifjr shortfalls.

8. Plan review is the final step in the operation-planning process. This step involves an analysis of the final plans and a process of regular review and revision to ensure that the plans remain valid.

9. The six steps involve the following general activities, some of which may

be undertaken concurrently:

a. assume or receive the task to be accomplished; b. analyse the task; c. define the aim; d. examine the factors and make assurnptions and deductions; e. review the enemy situation, assess existing intelligence, define intelligence-collection requirements, and begin to collect necessary intelligence;

conduct staff estimates;

develop and compare alternative courses of action;

develop the commander's preliminary concept of operations;

conduct staff checks;

select the best course of action;

develop the final concept of operations;

prepare the plan; and

prepare and issue orders.

10. An operation plan is implemented when a decision is taken to initiate the operation. Implementation involves the translation of the plans into orders

(e-g., the written operation order). Execution of the operation is in accordance

with the plans and orders. Operations need to be comrnanded, controlled and

monitored to ensure that they remain directed at achievement of the commander's

mission. The ability to monitor JF operations effectively depends on the timely

flow of accurate and relevant information at dl levels.

407. METHODS OF JOINT-OPERATION PLANNING

1. Joint-operation planning is described in tenns of the requirement for and the availability of resources.

2. Cornmitment-based planning focuses on an analysis of the enemy threat, or an assigned task. The planned response determines the level of forces and the support needed to overcome the threat or to accomplish the task. These required forces and supplies may exceed the levels available to an operational commander.

3. In cornparison, capability-based planning attempts to meet the potential or actual threat, or to respond to a contingency, based on actual force structures and strengths. Options for the use of military force are described in terms of operational and sustainment capabilities. The capability-based planning process focuses on what can be done with the level of forces, equipment and supplies actually available, or expected to be available during an operation. A product of this process is a national library of generic planning documents which describe the CF'S capabilities in a variety of operational and operational support areas. These documents are often used in the production of detailed, scenario-specific operation plans.

4. The CF normally uses the capability-based planning process, and available generic planning documents, to develop joint operation plans. Amendix 3 - Internet Sites Ap~IicabIeto Humanitarian Assistance Coordination

1 Organi ation Comments 1 International Crisis Croup 1 Medecins Sans Frontiers UN Oftice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Humanitarian Assistance Training Inventory

CNN Special Reports Christian Science Monitor Oxfam Catholic Relief Services International Committee of the Red Cross

Lutheran World Relief

HTML -- - ~ The Humanitarianism and httm/.Avww.brown .edu/De~artrnen&;W War Project of the Watson atçon Institutr/H Wf Institute of Brown University

1 International Rescue Founded in 1933, the international Rescue Committee is the leading non-profit, nonsectarian voluntary organization providing relief, protection, and resettlement services for retùgees and victims of oppression or violent conflict. -- - Founded in 1979 in response to the forced repatriation of thousands of Cambodian and Vietnamese refitgees, Refugees International provides early waming in crises of mass exodus. RAND Policy and decision making research and analysis. Arroyo Army Research Division of RAND- Journal of the Centre for Spring 98 Edition - Review Conflict Studies UNB of Humanitarian Assistance During War and Conflict Centre for Conflict Studies 1 WB 1 World Vision The Forced Migration Projects seek to encourage early humanitarian responses to migration emergencies, advocate humane ueatment and protection of the rights of those unable to retum, and promote measures aimed at averting people's need to flee. British Foreign Background briefs on a CommonweaIth Ofice variety of issues such as emergency assistance. World Disasters Report 1999 Prepared by International Federation of Red Cross Canadian International Conduct Iocal search NGOs Developmen t Agency for numerous background articlestbriefs on support to partners in humanitarian assistance. The Soros Foundation h~tp:,.hvn~\.-~)ros.orc, Network b~endix4 - Catholic Relief Services and Reswndinn to Ememenciesl~

Complex humanitarian emergencies, a tem coined in the pst-Cold War era, describes

today's violent conflicts often involving intra-state conflicts with regional implications.

These types of emergencies result in massive numbers of refugees and intemally

displaced persons, gross violations of human rights and large-scale dismption of people's

livelihoods. As of 1992, there were approximately 17.5 million war refugees and 24

million internally displaced persons throughout the world. CRS' cornplex humanitarian

emergency programs are currently taking place in countries such as Burundi, Sudan,

Sierra Leone and Kosovo, a province in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. CRS is

present in these countnes, providing humanitarian relief to the civilians caught in the

crossfire of violent conflict. Agencies like Catholic Relief Services provide emergency

relief to those most severely impacted by violent confiict within an operational

framework of saving lives, sustaining livelihoods and strengthening civil society.

Natural disastei-s include phenomena such as earthquakes, flooding, typhoons, drought and hurricanes. CRS natural disaster programs are currently implemented in places like

Central America in response to the devastation wrought by Hunicane Mitch. It should be noted that complex emergencies are often exacerbated by natural disasters. For example,

'ZBInformationtaken from CRS website at htt~:l/~~~~~.~ütholicreIief.c~r~!~~h~t/i~v~'~~~~~dem~'r~~e.~fm

101 102

in Indonesia, a severe drought in the eastem islands was further complicated by the

economic and subsequent political crisis affecting the country.

In addition to increased natural disastes, due in part to the El Nifio weather phenomenon,

complex emergencies over the past decade have resulted in an increasing need for

humanitarian assistance worldwide.

Emergency Responses Through the Following Activities

As a major humanitarian relief organization, Catholic Relief Services has a strong and

diverse background with the capacity to implement a wide variety of emergency response

programrning.

Food and Nutrition

CRS addresses immediate food needs for the general population and malnourished individuals. These programs address immediate food security needs while promoting activities that support sustainable livelihoods.

Healt h

CRS implements a wide variety of emergency health programming such as supporting local health institutions to meet basic health needs; for example: access to emergency medicines. 1O3

Agricultural Recovery

CRS emergency programs often include activities such as distribution of seeds and tools and provision of technical assistance to farmers to facilitate a retum to agricultural production as soon as possible.

Shelter

CRS programs meet the immediate needs of displaced populations with temporary shelter while assisting in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of permanent housing as soon as conditions allow.

Non-food Items

CRS implements large-scale distributions of items such as essential household supplies

(e.g. cooking pots. water buckets, blankets) and hygienic materials (e.g. soap).

Rehabilitation

CRS implements community-level rehabilitation activities (e.g. infrastructure reconstruction, roads and bridges repair) via various mechanisms such as food-for-work. cash for work and direct distribution of inputs. Pcacebuilding and Strengthening Civil Society

CRS endeavon

Introduction

This questionnaire is presented to support primary source research as part of a thesis project by a graduate student (International Relations) of Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia. Canada. The thesis is titIed Military Interaction with Non-Governmcntal Organi ations (NCO)and otber Humanitarian Agencies (HA) during Humaaitarian Assistance Opcrations: Defining the Civilian- Military Relationsbip. The author of this thesis is Lieutenant-colonel Jim Sirnms, a Canadian army offker currently completing full-the academic studies. All responses to this questionnaire are deemed confidential untess the interviewee/responder agrees to be quoted ancilor acknowledged.

Aim and Scove

The aim of this research questionnaire is to identify similarities and/or differences in the manner of organizational approach to humanitarian assistance operations. This research will be used to supplement other primary and secondary level research. The scope of this questionnaire invoives the assessrnent of four factors with input from two categorical groupings - military versus non-govemmental organizations and orher humanitarian agencies. It is recognized that within each of these groupings there will be differences of approaches. The four factors considered are: capabilities, organizational cultures, planning processes and ethos.

Gencral lntewiewee Information

Name: RankPosition Organization: Date Questionnaire Completed: Teiephone Number: E-Mail: Humanitarian Experiences and Dates: 1. 2. 3. Do you authorize the thesis author to quote or attribute specific comments to you? Yes No Signature: Ouestions

Capabilities

Do you feei that your organization has capabilities which could be used for humanitarian assistance opentions?

What are the capabilities?

In your opinion should these capabilities be used for humanitarian assistance operations? Why?

Organi ational Cultures

Com~arisonof Cultures

- -- Military NGO Emphasis on structure, hierarchy, command and Characterized by informal, improvisational style control operating on consensus Self sufficient/ logistically independent Dependent on donations and material support Capable of deptoyment with assets covering fùll Concem with king replaced by rnilitary range of requirements (security, logistical, medical, cornmand/control and coordination)

Focus on short tenn mission objectives with initial Focus of long term needs of population and emphasis on security immediate survival needs. Independence is key to neutrality. Do you agree with the general depiction of organizational cultures as presented above? (Feel fiee to rnake comments on the chart should you disagree or agree.)

Planning Processes

How would you characterize your organization's planning process?

--

1s your organization's planning process adequate to support humanitarian operations?

Ethos

Does your organization have a distinctive ethos?

------

How would you describe that ethos?

1s this ethos supponive of humanitarian assistance operations? For non-military tesponders - Do you feel a military ethos is conducive to responding to humanitarian assistance missions?

General Comments

You are invited to make any additional comments either in support of the answers provided to the questions or on any related topidissue.

Questionnaire Administration

Your assistance in this academic endeavour is greatly appreciated. You are requested to kindly fonvard the completed questionnaire to the undersigned:

Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Simms, CD., MA. War Studies) ch 59 Diana Gmce A venue Dartmouth, Nowa Scotia B2 W 6A2 Canada

Telephone: (902) 488-71 47 Electronic Mail: jbsimmsCfiist.dal.cn Additional Ouestions for Tactical Level Coordination

What organizations (other than military) do your unit/formation have to coordinate with on a regular and structured basis?

O What ad hoc or informal coordination takes place between your unit and other humanitarian assistance organizations (Le. Non-Govemmental Organization, UN Agencies, etc.)?

O How would you characterize the relationships described above?

O What coordination measures work well and which need to be ameliorated?

How would you characterize the dedication, professional and success of those non-military organizations? Reference List

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