Canadian Army Redux: How to Achieve Better Outcomes Without Additional Resources

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Canadian Army Redux: How to Achieve Better Outcomes Without Additional Resources CANADIAN ARMY REDUX: HOW TO ACHIEVE BETTER OUTCOMES WITHOUT ADDITIONAL RESOURCES Maj R.A. Cooper JCSP 44 PCEMI 44 Master of Defence Studies Maîtrise en études de la défense Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs do not represent Department of National Defence or et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces without written permission. canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2018. le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2018. CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 44 – PCEMI 44 2017 – 2018 MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES – MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE CANADIAN ARMY REDUX: HOW TO ACHIEVE BETTER OUTCOMES WITHOUT ADDITIONAL RESOURCES Maj R.A. Cooper “This paper was written by a student “La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College stagiaire du Collège des Forces in fulfilment of one of the requirements canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des of the Course of Studies. The paper is a exigences du cours. L'étude est un scholastic document, and thus contains document qui se rapporte au cours et facts and opinions, which the author contient donc des faits et des opinions alone considered appropriate and que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et correct for the subject. It does not convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas necessarily reflect the policy or the nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion opinion of any agency, including the d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le Government of Canada and the gouvernement du Canada et le ministère Canadian Department of National de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est Defence. This paper may not be défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de released, quoted or copied, except with reproduire cette étude sans la permission the express permission of the Canadian expresse du ministère de la Défense Department of National Defence.” nationale.” Word Count: 16,419 Compte de mots: 16,419 1 Table of Contents 1 List of Figures 2 Abstract 3 Chapter 1. Introduction 4 2. A Primer on Department of National Defence Terminology 8 3. The Current Structure of the Canadian Army 13 4. The Pigeau/McCann Model of Command 17 5. Australian Army Structure 28 6. The Structure of the United States Army 37 7. The Structure of the British Army 43 8. Best Practices 47 9. Optimizing Canada’s Army for Operations 51 10. The Fix 55 Bibliography 71 2 List of Figures Figure 3.1: The Current Structure of the Canadian Army 13 Figure 4.1: Balanced Command Envelope 23 Figure 4.2: Authority/Responsibility Surface 25 Figure 4.3: Adding Competency 26 Figure 5.1: The Structure of the Australian Army 28 Figure 6.1: The Structure of the United States Army 37 Figure 7.1: The Structure of the British Army 43 Figure 10.1: The Optimized Structure of the Canadian Army 55 3 Abstract The Canadian Army has a long and proud martial history, and has always answered the nation’s call when asked. However, it has not always had the best forces for the tasks the government has laid before it, and frequently the army is unable to deploy with a suitable amount of rapidity for political needs. Indeed, Canadian Special Operations Forces Command soldiers are frequently called upon to conduct jobs that are rightly the purview of the regular army due to their extremely high levels of readiness and the perceived inability of the army to get out the door in a timely manner. This paper asserts that the Canadian Army must re-organize its structure in order to optimize the way it both trains and fights in order to meet the demands of the modern security environment. After discussing Department of National Defence terminology, it will outline the current structure of the Canadian Army in order to set the stage for additional analysis of the problem set. A thorough dissection of the Competency, Authority, Responsibility model of command, originally authored by Professors Pigeau and McCann will then be furnished to the reader in an attempt to underline areas where command in the Canadian Army are left wanting. In order to uncover best practices for an operationally-focussed force, an examination of the structures of three of Canada’s closest allies will then occur, namely Australia, The United States of America, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Once this examination is complete, it will become clear that there are a number of best practices that Canada is currently not party to and that should be adopted, though it will become equally clear that none of our closest allies have gotten their structure exactly right. Finally, a simplified and much-improved command structure will be proposed for Canada’s Army. 4 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION Canada’s Army has enjoyed a long history of success on the battlefields of the world. From humble beginnings as garrison artillery in Quebec and Kingston along with schools of infantry and cavalry, the Army has grown into a world renowned, professional, combat-tested force that is the envy of many. From the Northwest Rebellion of 1885, to the Boer War, the two cataclysmic world wars, Korea, peacekeeping, Afghanistan, Libya, and now Iraq, the Canadian Army has consistently provided the government and people of Canada the forces that were asked for, but not always the forces that were needed. When one looks at the current structure of the Canadian Army, on the surface there appear to be a number of inefficiencies and a large number of headquarters for a fairly small deployable element, potentially depriving the Government of Canada of the ability to conduct meaningful action at a time and place of its choosing. For this reason, the Canadian Army must re-organize the way that it trains and fights, with a view to improving outcomes where it counts: with victory on the battlefield. Today, of the roughly 22,500 personnel in the Regular Force Canadian Army structure, just under 15,000 are in the field force, which includes the three Canadian Mechanized Brigade Groups (1, 2, and 5 CMBG) and the Canadian Combat Support Brigade.1 On its face, having the remaining 7,500 uniformed personnel in the army organization seems relatively balanced from a tooth to tail ratio.2 However, this does not expose the issue of where the Army’s leadership is and what functions it is dedicated to. There are four Colonels in charge of the four brigades, and 3 25 Colonels who perform other functions in the Canadian Army. Of the nine General Officers 1 Defence Human Resource Information System. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 5 in the Army’s structure,4 none of them are wholly dedicated to the force generation and employment of the deployable army, which is both illogical and incongruent with the best practices of the armies of our closest allies. While it can be argued that the one-star commanders of 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Canadian Divisions are champions for their respective brigades, in the current structure, they are actually all saddled with many conflicting priorities. Each division has 2-3 Primary Reserve Brigades (commanded by Primary Reserve Colonels with Regular Force Lieutenant-Colonel Chiefs of Staff), a division support group commanded by a Colonel, a division training centre commanded by a Lieutenant-Colonel, a Canadian Ranger Patrol Group under a Lieutenant-Colonel (3rd Canadian Division has two of these), and an intelligence company under a Major as direct reports. Additionally, 4th Canadian Division has Canadian Armed Forces Base Kingston (commanded by a Colonel) under command. In total, this gives each division commander 8-9 direct report units and formations, only one of which is a Regular Army Brigade. This problem is compounded by the fact that regular brigades tend to be seen as “being able to look after themselves” and so are not given the same amount of attention on a day-to-day basis as other direct-reports. Additionally, almost every Division Commander has many other military organizations to whom they are responsible to provide support, but over whom they command no authority. In some cases, this is unavoidable, such as in Ontario where the one-star commander 4th Canadian Division has a support relationship with the two-star Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre, and 1st Canadian Division in Kingston, and the one-star Royal Military College of Canada (also in Kingston) and Canadian Forces College in Toronto. 4 Ibid. 6 In other cases, it is the Canadian Army’s Structure that imposes this burden on the division commanders. In the west, the Colonel in charge of the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre relies on support from 3rd Canadian Division and competes for training area usage with the Division’s training centre, but reports to the two-star commander of the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre in Kingston, who receives support from 4th Canadian Division. Most interestingly, the Combat Training Centre in Gagetown is the primary user of all the land in the area as the individual training centre of excellence, but an entire separate formation, the 5th Canadian Division Support Group (also run by a full Colonel), working for a headquarters in Halifax, exists essentially to support the Combat Training Centre. Though there are technically other users of the Gagetown training area, such as Reservists and the other lodger units like the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Canadian Regiment (2 RCR), C Squadron, The Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD), 4th Regiment (General Support), Royal Canadian Artillery (4 Regt (GS) RCA), and 4 Engineer Support Regiment (4 ESR), in practice they all de-conflict their training with the Combat Training Centre, and are frequently in direct support of individual training tasks.
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