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256 Ahmadiyya, 99, 100, 106N11 Aksi Bela Index Note: Page numbers followed by “n” refer to endnotes. A April 2018 Indonesian Peoples Act of Killing, The (2012), 256 Movement Congress (KGRI), Ahmadiyya, 99, 100, 106n11 18, 19 Aksi Bela Islam, 93, 94, 101–3, 106n10 armed civilian group, 218 Alatas, Ali, 201, 206 armed criminal group, 218 Ali, Marzuki, 188 Article 15, election of the governor, aliran, 30 172 Alius, Suhardi, 94 Article 16, election of regents and Amany, Tsamara, 139 mayors, 172–173 Amien Rais, 8, 35 Article 18, Paragraph (4) of 1945 Amien Rais–Siswono Yudo Husodo Constitution, 173–74 (PAN), 35 Article 22 of the constitution, 90 Amnesty International Indonesia Article 28E of the constitution, 90 (AII), 223, 224, 226–27 Article 28I of the constitution, 90 Amrozi, 103 Article 29 of the constitution, 90 “Anatomy of Papuan Separatists”, Article 214 of Law No. 10/2008, 31 228 Asas Tunggal, 87, 105n6 Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Asian financial crisis, 1997, 3 Daerah (APBD), 187 Asmat health crisis, 216 Ansor Youth Movement, 251 Association for Elections and anti-Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, 102 Democracy, 162n6 anti-blasphemy law, 95, 100 asymmetrical decentralization, 151 Anti Corruption Commission, 38 Awom, Herman, 230 anti-dictatorship movement, 2, 3, 6 Azhar, Antasari, 188 anti-LGBT statement, 251 arrest of, 188, 192n16 anti-Pancasila, 102 anti-politics, 129, 142 B anti-regime resistance, 240–44 Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Anti-terrorism Assistance Program, Terorisme (BNPT), 17 205 Badan Urusan Logistik (Bulog), 184 263 12 ch12-Cont&Chg AfterInoReform-Index-1P.indd 263 12/3/19 11:17 am 264 Index Badan Usaha Milik Negara (BUMN), legacy of 1999–2013, 149–52 180, 184, 185 local entrepreneurs, 157–59 bad Muslims, 92 political space for initiatives, Bakrie, Aburizal, 52, 65 159–61 Banjarsari PKL, relocation, 119 provinces establishment, 162n2 Bank Umum Koperasi Indonesia restructuring, 152 (Bukopin), 184 structuring, 149 Bantuan Pendidikan Masyarakat transformation, 149 Kota Surakarta (BPMKS), 118 Chosiyah, Ratu Atut, 179 Bantuan Sosial, Bansos, 180–81 Cicak (Gecko) vs. Buaya (Crocodile), Basic Design of Regional Planning, 188 152 Civil Security Forces, 184 Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), 8, civil society, political middle class 12, 14, 37, 55, 138, 140–42 in, 129, 140–43 Baswedan, Anies, 14, 141 “cleansing” of the ministry, 201 Bengkulu Regional Police, 188 clicktivism, 239, 252 Berkarya Party, 66 clientelism, 251, 253 Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, 102 coalition, 30–31, 35–36 Bilangan pembagi pemilih (BPP), Cold War alignments, 196, 198, 136 203–5, 207 Bintara Pembina Desa (Babinsa), colonized Indonesia, 87 173 community leaders, 175 blusukan, 119, 120, 124 BPJS Kesehatan National Health conservatism, 136–38 Insurance Programme, 164n19 contemporary condition, 253–57 BPJS Kesehatan programme, 48 contestation Bukit Hambalang, 184 inter-class relations and, 16–19 bureaucratic elitism, 196, 200–202 social media, 10–11 business deregulation, 122 transactional politics without, 10–12 C Corps of Ministry of the Interior, cabinet formation, 30 148 caliphate, 84 corruption, 251, 258n1 candidacy process, 51–55 political. See political corruption capitalist-developmental doctrine Corruption Eradication Commission, of foreign policy, 196, 198–200, 2, 36, 37, 60, 142, 176, 178, 180, 203, 206 182, 186–90 Catur Dharma Eka Karma (CADEK), as an ad-hoc institution, 188 198 arrest of political candidates by, centralism, 8 189–90 centralization, 148, 172–74 Cicak (Gecko) vs. Buaya (Crocodile), centre–local relations, 147–48 188 decentralization, 153–56 dissolution, 188–89 formal government authority, revision of law, 189 151 weakening, 188–89 interregional gap, 156 council of leadership, 148 12 ch12-Cont&Chg AfterInoReform-Index-1P.indd 264 12/3/19 11:17 am Index 265 Counterterrorism Fellowship dynamic equilibrium doctrine, 200, Program, 205 205, 206 Criminal Code, 189 Criminal Investigation Unit, 188 E crisis recovery, 200 East Timor case, 201–2, 204 critical institutionalism, 196–97 Echelon price, in Klaten District, culture of violence, 228–30 178 economic justice, 149 D economic turmoil, 97 dakwah, 35 election results, 1999–2014, 26 Darmono, Bambang, 230 electoral funding, 182–83 decentralization, 117 electoral laws, 26, 31–32, 60 national prioritization of projects, electoral legitimacy, 115 154–56 electoral threshold, 28 policy, 2 electronic ID card, 183, 187 villages, 153–54 Electronic Information and decline of parties, 25 Transaction (ITE), 249 democracy election, 174 elektronik-Kartu Tanda Penduduk democratic institutions, 89, 90, 101 (e-KTP), 183, 192n11 democratic Islam, 99 elite betrayal, 244 democratic legitimacy, 115 elites party, 184, 185 Democratic Party, 184, 185, 191n8 Emergency Situation Law, 82 democratic reform, 95, 98, 99 enemies of Islam, 99 democratic rules, 97, 101 Energi Sumber Daya Mineral (ESDM), democratic transition, 98, 195, 196 186 democratization, 117 of foreign policy-making F processes, 195 factional frictions, in parties, 29 limits of, 205–8 fall of Soeharto, 1–2, 6 Democrat Party, 9 Falsafah Dasar Perjuangan, 51 Demokrat, 50, 60 Fathul Muin Foundation, 87 developmental approach, 199 “favoured Muslim discourse”, 97 developmentalism, 50 Federasi Mahasiswa Kerakaytan Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah (FMK), 247 Indonesia, 85, 99 figure-based politics, 114 Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Fikih Kebhinekaan, 93 (DPRD), 172–73, 186 Fiqh [Law] of Diversity, The, 93 dictatorship, 1, 2 foreign direct investment (FDI), 129 direct elections Foreign Investment Law, 204 demand for, 174 Foreign Military Financing, 205 money politics, 174–77 Foreign Ministry, 199–202, 206, 207 reformasi for local leaders, foreign policy reform, 195–96 173–74 bureaucratic elitism, 200–2 District Military Command, 173 cold war alignments, 203–5 domestic bourgeoisie, 16, 19 critical institutionalism, 196–97 dwifungsi doctrine, 198–99, 201 democratization, 205–8 12 ch12-Cont&Chg AfterInoReform-Index-1P.indd 265 12/3/19 11:17 am 266 Index security-developmentalist doctrine, No. 78/2007, 151, 162n4 198–200 No. 129/2000, 151 Forum for Democracy, 89 Government Regulation on Forum Umat Islam (FUI), 88, 100 Community Organization, freedom of religion, 80, 89–97 Perpu Ormas, 97–98 freedom of worship, 90 grants, 180–81 Free Papua Movement (OPM), 228 Gross National Product (GNP) Front Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia growth, 3 (FAMI), 242 guided democracy, 25, 200 Front Mahasiswa Nasional (FMN), Gus Dur, 184 247 Front Pembela Islam (FPI), 12, 82–83, H 99–103 Habibie, B.J., 2–4, 17, 89, 97–99, 199, and democracy, 83 200, 206 mission of, 82 Habib Riziek, 12, 15 Front Perjuangan Pemuda Indonesia half-hearted rebellions, 147 (FPPI), 247 Hambalang project, 184–85 Fuad, Munawar, 191n10 Hanura, 8, 35, 184 Harahap, Chairuman, 184 G “haram” fatwa, 100 Ganesha, Giring, 139 Hartanto, Airlangga, 55 Garuda Party, 65, 66 Hartini, Sri, 178 geopolitical framework, 197 Haryani, Miryam S., 184 Geovani, Jeffrie, 139 health crisis in Asmat, 219 Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa- Hernawan, Budi, 224, 228 MUI (GNPF-MUI), 101–3 Hibah, 180–81 Gerindra, 4, 8–14, 17, 35–38, 49, high cost politics, 174–77 54–65 Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), 37, Giay, Benny, 226, 230 60, 83–85, 96, 99, 100, 102, 103, Golkar, 8, 11, 13, 25, 29, 50, 52, 55, 57, 249 58, 60, 62, 65, 184, 243, 245 caliphate concept, 84–85 good Muslims, 92 democracy and, 85 governance of religion, 94–95 goal, 84 Government Regulation Law growth, 84 No. 1/1945, 190n1 nationalism, 85 No. 1/1957, 190n1 training, 84 No. 1/2014, 59 holistic welfare approach, 221 No. 2/2017, 60 Human Development Index, 214 No. 5/1974, 172, 191n1 human rights, 90, 99, 220–1 No. 6/1959, 191n1 Human Rights Council, 222 No. 18/1965, 191n1 No. 19/1965, 191n1 I No. 22/1948, 190n1 ideational framework, 197 No. 22/1999, 173 identity politics, 13, 14, 18, 20 No. 32/2004, 173 ideology No. 39/1999, 90 candidacy process, 51–55 12 ch12-Cont&Chg AfterInoReform-Index-1P.indd 266 12/3/19 11:17 am Index 267 in Indonesia, 62–66 International Labour Organization Nawa Cita, 55–62 (ILO), 17 of political parties, 44–45 International Military Education and presidential candidates, 46–51 Training, 204–5 vice-presidential candidates, 48 International People’s Tribunal 1965, Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim 257 Indonesia, 89 international trade, 130–31 indirect local election, 174–75 intra-elite transactional politics, 10, Indonesian Association of Muslim 11, 17, 18 Intellectuals (ICMI), 89, 97 Ishaaq, Luthfi Hasan, 182 Indonesian Committee for Solidarity Islam with the Islamic World, 98 and nationalism, 85 Indonesian Democratic Party of political. See political Islam Struggle. See Partai Demokrasi Islamic law, 82, 83 Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP) Islamic party coalition, 35 Indonesian economy, 3, 129–32 Islamic state, establishment of, 82 Indonesian National Police, 188 Islamic teachings, 80, 82–83, 85, 87, Indonesian politics 88, 98, 103 fall of Soeharto, 1–2, 6 Islamic unity, 102 New Order, 4–8, 12, 16, 17, 20 Islam Nusantara, 96 1998–2002, 2 “Islam yang terindegenisasi”, 96 policy reform, 14–16 issue-based coalition, 36 poverty, 20 social media contestation, 10–11 J socio-economic development, 7 Jakarta Charter, 83, 98–99 transactional politics, 6–14 Jakarta Declaration, 88 2014, 3–6 Jakarta Globe, 216 Indonesian security forces, 82 Jakarta gubernatorial elections, 2017, Indonesian state budget, 130 8, 12, 14 Indonesia Pintar Program, 164n19 Jakarta Post, The, 119, 214, 216 Indonesia Sehat Program, 164n19 Jalan Sehat, 6 Indonesia’s Proclamator, 49 Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), 91 Information Centre of the Ministry Java Promo, 160
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