Bolivia's remote southeastern badlands, where a back- back- a where badlands, southeastern remote Bolivia's
pected. Here, in the unlikely, ravine-scarred jungle of of jungle ravine-scarred unlikely, the in Here, pected.
way along the Nancahuazu River stumbled into some- into stumbled River Nancahuazu the along way
military morning hour of 0700, the three officers and and officers three the 0700, of hour morning military
thing all had been trained for but none had really ex- really had none but for trained been had all thing
twenty-nine men of of men twenty-nine
ON MARCH 23, 1967, AT THE MISERABLE MISERABLE THE AT 1967, 23, MARCH ON
Even the romantic romantic the Even
Intelligence Agency didn't didn't Agency Intelligence
doing doing
line line seldom knew where he was or what he was was he what or was he where knew seldom
quently given to chasing shadows, the CIA CIA the shadows, chasing to given quently knew precisely where he was and how to help help to how and was he where precisely knew
run run
him him
to Che Guevara. Guevara. Che to
after he left Cuba. America's Central Central America's Cuba. left he after
How the CIA Got Che Che Got CIA the How
down at the very end. end. very the at down
BY ANDREW ST. GEORGE GEORGE ST. ANDREW BY
a a
Bolivian army patrol picking its its picking patrol army Bolivian
adventurer's adventurer's
But But
96 96
as as
always have have always
an an
apparatus fre- apparatus
close friends friends close
an open open an
peared now. A crack, no louder than a hard ping-pong ping-pong hard a than louder no crack, A now. peared
Lieutenant Ruben Amezaga had studied at military military at studied had Amezaga Ruben Lieutenant
academy, enemy fire from any sort of position was rep- was position of sort any from fire enemy academy,
Lieutenant Amezaga were killed before they could ex- could they before killed were Amezaga Lieutenant resented by neatly dotted arcs. But no such thing ap- thing such no But arcs. dotted neatly by resented
woods cocaine cooker is usually the only thing stirring, stirring, thing only the usually is cooker cocaine woods
the small infantry patrol ran into an enemy ambush. ambush. enemy an into ran patrol infantry small the ment's lead section. Six soldiers and the guide were were guide the and soldiers Six section. lead ment's
Lieutenant Amezaga, a local civilian named Epifano Epifano named civilian local a Amezaga, Lieutenant
Vargas, half-turned in surprise, his arm outfiung. Then Then outfiung. arm his surprise, in half-turned Vargas,
serve, snapped from high up among the boulders on on boulders the among up high from snapped serve,
rious attackers. attackers. rious HOW THE CIA GOT CHE CHE GOT CIA THE HOW
the steep river gorge, and the patrol guide in front of of front in guide patrol the and gorge, river steep the
loped on until they hit a narrow dirt road, where a a where road, dirt narrow a hit they until on loped killed, four wounded, fourteen captured by the myste- the by captured fourteen wounded, four killed,
came a splatter of short explosions; both the guide and and guide the both explosions; short of splatter a came they ran cross-jungle several miles until they dared dared they until miles several cross-jungle ran they change a word. With them died most of the detach- the of most died them With word. a change
form up again under a senior sergeant. Then they they Then sergeant. senior a under again up form
petroleum truck picked them up and took them to to them took and up them picked truck petroleum
Camiri, headquarters base of the Bolivian Fourth In- Fourth Bolivian the of base headquarters Camiri, Paz, Bolivia's cloud-top capital, via a surplus U.S. Sig- U.S. surplus a via capital, cloud-top Bolivia's Paz,
raffores, supreme headquarters of Bolivia's armed forces, forces, armed Bolivia's of headquarters supreme raffores,
presence not ever lightly dashed into. By then the news news the then By into. dashed lightly ever not presence nal Corps communications trailer parked in Fort Mi- Fort in parked trailer communications Corps nal
fantry Division. Division. fantry
General of the Forces Alfredo Ovando—a measured measured Ovando—a Alfredo Forces the of General Nancahuazu's hard-breathing survivors went to La La to went survivors hard-breathing Nancahuazu's
dashed into the presence of the commander-in-chief, commander-in-chief, the of presence the into dashed
pint-sized Bolivian chief of staff. General Torres Torres General staff. of chief Bolivian pint-sized
where, as if by remote kinetics, people started running, running, started people kinetics, remote by if as where, too. too.
was spreading in every direction. direction. every in spreading was
to Major General Juan Jose Torres, the tough, smooth, smooth, tough, the Torres, Jose Juan General Major to
In the tactical manuals that twenty-one-year-old twenty-one-year-old that manuals tactical the In
Eight soldiers got away. With terror-marbled eyes, eyes, terror-marbled With away. got soldiers Eight
The division had a radio. The word brought by the the by brought word The radio. a had division The
An officer carrying the decoded message galloped up up galloped message decoded the carrying officer An
97 97 98 THE SPIES HOW THE CIA GOT CHE 99 A copy of the signal sheet landed on the desk of Colo- warrior, personally leading his long-threatened show- nel Federico Arafia, the military intelligence chief, who down with "Yanqui imperialism." The ambush set in rose as he began reading it and trotted rapidly, still motion a conflict which brought about—but did not reading, across the Miraftores quadrangle toward the end with--Guevara's own violent death on October 9, back-of-the-base cluster of buildings that housed the 1967. U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, known as The conflict was to live on after Che in a worldwide MAAG. At about the same time, General Ovando got controversy about the true circumstances of the leg- on the direct telephone line to Bolivia's president, endary guerrilla general's downfall. Just exactly what Rene Barrientos. was the U.S. role in it? There have been accusations Within minutes, a call went out from the Presiden- that Che was captured and executed by the ubiquitous tial Palace for U.S. Ambassador Douglas Henderson, a Central Intelligence Agency; other versions blamed his tweedy, erect, gray-haired career foreign-service death on the Soviet Union and the old-line Communist officer, who happened to be driving home in his barge- Party leaders, others still on Cuban strong-man Fidel like limousine cluttered with special communications Castro—or on Che's own wrongheaded tactics. devices. At his desk President Barrientos—a heavy- To appreciate the difficulty of unraveling such tan- shouldered, florid man who had been an Air Force gled current events as Che's last adventure, one does general before he became president and a hot fighter not need a degree in modem history. The outcome pilot before that—and the ambassador in his car spoke must be pieced together from the contestants them- briefly. Even as they talked, the limousine wheeled selves—the men in the field. The day-to-day story pre- around and headed towards the U.S. Embassy and its sented here of Guevara's side of the showdown took rooftop radio. shape through months of travel in South America and In La Paz, intelligence chief Colonel Araila was still more months of poring over handwritten diaries, docu- deep in conference with the American military advisers ments, charts and logs. when a phone began ringing in Washington on the The U.S. role proved even more difficult to recon- desk of William Bowdler, President Johnson's senior struct. Putting it together involved long talks with peo- adviser for Latin American affair' s. Bowdier, a tall, in- ple who were hard to find and others hard to talk to. telligent, very quiet man, listened silently, then walked Some of them—intelligence people and Special Forces a few steps down the Executive Office Building corri- men—had moved on since 1967, and wanted the dor to the office of Walt Whitman Rostow, the White whole bad scene forgotten—the jungle hunt and the House troubleshooter for presidential-sized troubles killing. A few felt themselves still bound by official se- abroad. The balloon, as more than one harassed secre- crecy. tary was to observe in Washington during the remain- Yet in talkg with the men who had held the stakes in der of that day, was definitely up. what turned out to be Che Guevara's last gamble, the An isolated jungle skirmish has seldom been known story came to life for this writer with color and sharp to trigger such topside tensions. But the sudden shoot- 1% outline. I had known some of the Cuban guerrilla lead- out that killed Lieutenant Amezaga and practically de- ers from my years as a magazine correspondent in Ha- stroyed his troop was the curtain raiser in the drama vana during the Castro revolution, and I had known that brought back on stage the long-vanished Ernesto Che best of them all. I had marched with him through Che Guevara. The guerrilla expert had become the many moonless nights of the bitter jungle campaign in
club. In Washington the freshly-launched New Fron- Fron- New freshly-launched the Washington In club.
long essays on guerrilla warfare, one of which became became which of one warfare, guerrilla on essays long
an international best seller. seller. best international an
cruits from every country in the hemisphere, and for for and hemisphere, the in country every from cruits
he turned to the "national liberation" of other Latin Latin other of liberation" "national the to turned he
volunteers who could not make it to Cuba, he wrote wrote he Cuba, to it make not could who volunteers
republics. He organized special guerrilla schools for re- for schools guerrilla special organized He republics.
gence in 1961 as one of Cuba's ruling revolutionary revolutionary ruling Cuba's of one as 1961 in gence
secret. secret. restless. Having been a prime factor in winning Cuba, Cuba, winning in factor prime a been Having restless.
triumvirate. triumvirate.
cated guesswork than in Washington. There Che had had Che There Washington. in than guesswork cated
been a fascinating subject of study ever since his emer- his since ever study of subject fascinating a been
letter to Fidel Castro. For two years Che's where- Che's years two For Castro. Fidel to letter
1958, only to vanish from sight in the spring of 1965, 1965, of spring the in sight from vanish to only 1958,
abouts became the world's best-kept, most-guessed-at most-guessed-at best-kept, world's the became abouts
having renounced all his privileges in a handwritten handwritten a in privileges his all renounced having
man in the triumphant Cuban guerrilla insurrection of of insurrection guerrilla Cuban triumphant the in man
mystery. He had risen to fame as Castro's right-hand right-hand Castro's as fame to risen had He mystery.
puses. puses. action" was taking hold with the young, the reckless, reckless, the young, the with hold taking was action"
which flies over hundreds of insurgent college cam- college insurgent of hundreds over flies which
where; it is Che's bearded, burning-eyed poster image image poster burning-eyed bearded, Che's is it where; Che, the legendary guerrilla general, that he became an an became he that general, guerrilla legendary the Che,
international celebrity and hero of young people every- people young of hero and celebrity international
romantic rebel leader himself had become a man of of man a become had himself leader rebel romantic
Serna, M.D., Ph.D., had led a busy life as a govern- govern- a as life busy a led had Ph.D., M.D., Serna,
twice-married father of five children. But it was as as was it But children. five of father twice-married
mat, world traveler, author, public speaker and the the and speaker public author, traveler, world mat,
ment official of high rank, as a bank president, diplo- diplo- president, bank a as rank, high of official ment
sive, changed Che whose contradictory behavior per- behavior contradictory whose Che changed sive,
In postwar Cuba the Honorable Ernesto Guevara de la la de Guevara Ernesto Honorable the Cuba postwar In sisted at the heart of the puzzle. puzzle. the of heart the at sisted
1957-.58. But ten years later, it was an enigmatic, elu- enigmatic, an was it later, years ten But 1957-.58.
100 100
Inevitably not all of Che's readers joined his fan fan his joined readers Che's of all not Inevitably
Indifferent to pomp and power, Che had remained remained had Che power, and pomp to Indifferent
Nowhere did the Guevara mystery set off more edu- more off set mystery Guevara the did Nowhere
While Che's doctrine of "confrontation" and "direct "direct and "confrontation" of doctrine Che's While
THE SPIES SPIES THE
Che's theories, President John Kennedy and young At- young and Kennedy John President theories, Che's
HOW THE CIA GOT CHE CHE GOT CIA THE HOW
tier administration was alarmed. Largely in response to to response in Largely alarmed. was administration tier
torney General Robert Kennedy revived "special war- "special revived Kennedy Robert General torney
States ambassador going abroad was required to take a a take to required was abroad going ambassador States
fare" as a key U.S. military strategy. Every United United Every strategy. military U.S. key a as fare" largely around Che's textbook. It is a little-]mown but but little-]mown a is It textbook. Che's around largely course in guerrilla and antizuerrilla warfare designed designed warfare antizuerrilla and guerrilla in course
solid fact that this asthmatic, soft-faced medico who who medico soft-faced asthmatic, this that fact solid
never went to military school or owned a brass button button brass a owned or school military to went never
icies than any single man since the death of Josef Sta- Josef of death the since man single any than icies
had a greater influence on inter-American military pol- military inter-American on influence greater a had
were at each other's throats in a dozen countries. countries. dozen a in throats other's each at were lin. lin.
end of 1962 his alumni and America's Green Berets Berets Green America's and alumni his 1962 of end
paramilitary commands and guerrilla schools. By the the By schools. guerrilla and commands paramilitary
Thousands of anonymous combatants on both sides sides both on combatants anonymous of Thousands
tioned in official dispatches. Che himself in a coldly fe- coldly a in himself Che dispatches. official in tioned
Among them died quite a few few a quite died them Among were killed in far-flung, merciless guerrilla battles. battles. guerrilla merciless far-flung, in killed were
rocious speech before the U.N. General Assembly in in Assembly General U.N. the before speech rocious
December, 1964, hinted at American casualties the the casualties American at hinted 1964, December,
sault Che sounded before the world forum ("jackals ("jackals forum world the before sounded Che sault . . . hyenas . . ."), maintained a calm and ostenta- and calm a maintained ."), . . hyenas . . .
American public never knew about. about. knew never public American
cinating for us to sit back for a couple of years and and years of couple a for back sit to us for cinating
ever the guerrilla teams moved in—the Congo, Santo Santo Congo, in—the moved teams guerrilla the ever
our counterteams moved in, too. But we kept the fight- the kept we But too. in, moved counterteams our recalled. "Oh, there was fighting one place place one fighting was there "Oh, recalled.
tiously pacific stance. "Truth to tell, it was kind of fas- of kind was it tell, to "Truth stance. pacific tiously
practically all the time between 1961 and 1966. Wher- 1966. and 1961 between time the all practically
ing on a strictly limited basis. basis. limited strictly a on ing
Domingo, Tanzania, Peru, Venezuela, Guatemala— Venezuela, Peru, Tanzania, Domingo,
just watch Che operate," one special warfare adviser adviser warfare special one operate," Che watch just
keeps—winner take all. Che found it in Bolivia, poor poor Bolivia, in it found Che all. take keeps—winner
Mouse action. He tried to goad us into a real game, for for game, real a into us goad to tried He action. Mouse
Che enjoyed the role of big bad wolf. He organized organized He wolf. bad big of role the enjoyed Che
Washington, ignoring the contemptuous verbal as- verbal contemptuous the ignoring Washington,
"Of course, Che got impatient with all the Mickey Mickey the all with impatient got Che course, "Of
yanquis yanquis
never men- never
or or
another another
101 101
49/ 49/ rs rs 102 THE SPIES BOW THE CIA GOT CHE 103 guy. But back in '63, '64, when Che began talking like student's rugby game for a sports paper and signed it a man looking for a showdown with the United States 'El Chancho,' The Pig. The editor said he would print —and sounding like a man who meant it—we decided it if Che changed that stinky by-line. But Che hung on we needed to do some studying before we tackled he loved role-playing the outcast, the loner, the him." rebel, the pig. Finally he did something typical of a Making a study of people like Che Guevara is a certain neurotic type---he ialieni7ed' the name. He full-time job of the Central Intelligence Agency. It signed the story 'Chang-cho.' " does so through a PPS file, sometimes called the BP The psychiatrist, with his government colleagues file. "PPS" stands for "Psychiatric Personality Study," quietly reconstructing Che's childhood years, devel- "BP" for "Behavior Profile," and both mean essen- oped a revealing emotional profile of the angry rebel. tially the same thing—a top-secret, inductive, psychia- "Che was an asthmatic; this is what some social psy- tric case study of someone about whom the U.S. must chologists have come to call a 'blemished identity,' " do some serious thinking. he said. "Children like that tend to have difficult rela- Having a PPS project of one's own is usually a mark tions with their parents, often—as seems to have been of distinction. Neither Hitler nor Stalin ever had one the case with Che—with their fathers. In adulthood, (both died before the PPS was perfected), but by the the difficulties carry over to society at large. Accep- mid-'50's several U.S. intelligence outfits, including the tance, ego management—lots of psychic hang-ups are Army's experimental 515th M.I. Detachment, were at involved. It's definitely a neurotic pattern." work on the basic intelligence problem of trying to predict what foreign leaders might do in certain situa- Intelligence analysts, even when they have come to tions. think of someone as a neurotic personality, cannot Che Guevara attracted a great deal of secret psy- predict what he will do. But they can "project" some- chiatric attention from the moment he emerged on the thing about the way he will do things, because neurotic world scene in 1959. By 1965 his case study contained people tend to act in certain repetitive patterns. By the enough carefully pieced-together behavioral data for end of 1964 Che had furnished U.S. intelligence with a some educated guesses about what made Che run. great deal of insight into the modus operandi of his "Did you know that all through his teens and early personal strategy. Washington even knew where its twenties, Che called himself 'Chanchol That means basic outline came from: the CIA had discovered that 'Pig.' Not 'Fats' or 'Porky' it means plain Pig." A Che's bible, his favorite guerrilla manual, was a Soviet government psychiatrist connected with a research book on special warfare called The Clandestine Re- project jointly sponsored by the U.S. Air Force and gional Committee in Action. the CIA was talking. "That's what his schoolmates and "In 1963-64 Che staged a big guerrilla operation in friends called him, you see, because Guevara put on a the northern provinces of Argentina—not very far big show of being 'disgusting.' He wore messy clothes, from where he was born," a State Department intelli- three-day-old shirts, black fingernails. He'd slurp his gence analyst recalled. "It was led by military and ci- food. Of course, what Guevara was trying to do was vilian members of Che's personal Havana staff: Jorge play the outlaw, even then. When the other kids Ricardo Masetti, who was Che's press aide, and his started calling him 'Pig,' he adopted the name with rel- longtime adjutant, Captain Hermes Pena. These people ish. When he was eighteen he wrote an account of a were stand-ins for Che. Masetti, who was the leader of
dent which revealed something to U.S. intelligence intelligence U.S. to something revealed which dent
vessel off Havana harbor. This ship monitors every every monitors ship This harbor. Havana off vessel
word of radio traffic in and out of Cuba. The first inci- first The Cuba. of out and in traffic radio of word
in part because the U.S. Navy and the National Secu- National the and Navy U.S. the because part in
rity Agency jointly maintain a huge communications communications huge a maintain jointly Agency rity
whereabouts during this period than it ever admitted, admitted, ever it than period this during whereabouts
poseful deception. Washington knew more about Che's Che's about more knew Washington deception. poseful
of Che's death were probably true. true. probably were death Che's of government agencies—off-the-record that the rumors rumors the that agencies—off-the-record government
telling people—even journalists and people from other other from people and journalists people—even telling
bad disappeared or died. Washington reciprocated by by reciprocated Washington died. or disappeared bad
Havana planted clues and rumors indicating that Che Che that indicating rumors and clues planted Havana
out by an espionage organization to mislead another another mislead to organization espionage an by out
espionage organization. During most of 1965 and 1966 1966 and 1965 of most During organization. espionage
with their opposition in Havana. Havana. in opposition their with
largely in a curious pastime: they exchanged "smoke" "smoke" exchanged they pastime: curious a in largely
telligence and special warfare agencies spent this time time this spent agencies warfare special and telligence
Most of the Che specialists in Washington's various in- various Washington's in specialists Che the of Most
Congo where—as we now know from his own diaries diaries own his from know now we where—as Congo
—he did make several short visits in 1966. 1966. in visits short several make did —he
happened. There were frequent reports spotting Che in in Che spotting reports frequent were There happened. Guatemala, in Vietnam, in Argentina, even in the the in even Argentina, in Vietnam, in Guatemala,
rious, guilt-tormented, vengeful Che." Che." vengeful guilt-tormented, rious,
have given you a strong projection of what was likely likely was what of projection strong a you given have
to happen next: an operation led in person by a fu- a by person in led operation an next: happen to
Che vanished from public sight in Havana shortly af- shortly Havana in sight public from vanished Che
terward, in March, 1965, any intelligence analyst could could analyst intelligence any 1965, March, in terward,
other other
later identified as Raul Davila, were killed. Also ten ten Also killed. were Davila, Raul as identified later
friends, Masetti, Pena, and a Cuban Cuban a and Pena, Masetti, friends,
running it. It was a failure. Three of Che's closest closest Che's of Three failure. a was It it. running
eration a success, except for going to Argentina and and Argentina to going for except success, a eration
Che himself. Guevara did everything to make this op- this make to everything did Guevara himself. Che
gundo,' because the First Commander was, of course, course, of was, Commander First the because gundo,'
the operation, took the pseudonym, `Comandante Se- `Comandante pseudonym, the took operation, the
It can now be told that this was a long-range, pur- long-range, a was this that told be now can It
104 104
"Smoke" is the slang term for false information put put information false for term slang the is "Smoke"
But for the next sixteen months nothing decisive decisive nothing months sixteen next the for But
guevaristas, guevaristas,
mostly young Argentinians. When When Argentinians. young mostly
cotnandante cotnandante
THE SPIES SPIES THE
we we
its its
weeks exploring the countryside and recruiting a small small a recruiting and countryside the exploring weeks confirmation. confirmation.
serious crisis. crisis. serious
lowed by seventeen senior Cuban army leaders—among leaders—among army Cuban senior seventeen by lowed
Cuba. Cuba.
States, Vietnam itself was proving a quagmire; a sec- a quagmire; a proving was itself Vietnam States, agencies, each of which had come to think of Che as as Che of think to come had which of each agencies,
altogether. Washington prepared the defense of its own own its of defense the prepared Washington altogether. Bolivian and United States intelligence finally got the the got finally intelligence States United and Bolivian
out of public sight—quiet, brooding, surely planning. planning. surely brooding, sight—quiet, public of out odd agencies, departments, services and international international and services departments, agencies, odd Setting up headquarters, he spent the next nineteen nineteen next the spent he headquarters, up Setting them eleven flag officers of general rank—he arrived at at arrived rank—he general of officers flag eleven them first solid clue about Che's movements from these re- these from movements Che's about clue solid first down. The Cuban propaganda line called for guerrilla guerrilla for called line propaganda Cuban The down. weeks later when, on March 23, the lightning-quick at- lightning-quick the 23, March on when, later weeks a small jungle-edge base camp in southeastern Bolivia. Bolivia. southeastern in camp base jungle-edge small a
ington, where it set off a major battle among a dozen- a among battle major a off set it where ington,
March 11 and ran straight to the nearest Bolivian Bolivian nearest the to straight ran and 11 March
where near America's land frontiers. For the United United the For frontiers. land America's near where
tack on Lieutenant Amezaga's patrol produced the the produced patrol Amezaga's Lieutenant on tack
the aim was the creation of a "second Vietnam" some- Vietnam" "second a of creation the was aim the activities in Latin America on the Viet Cong pattern; pattern; Cong Viet the on America Latin in activities
cruits. Three of them deserted the guerrilla camp on on camp guerrilla the deserted them of Three cruits.
hemisphere with the tense, secretive concentration of a a of concentration secretive tense, the with hemisphere ond Vietnam might upset traditional American politics politics American traditional upset might Vietnam ond May, 1965. Che, the United States learned, was holed holed was learned, States United the Che, 1965. May, long-distance exchanges occasioned by the fatal illness illness fatal the by occasioned exchanges long-distance
During this period both sides edged toward a show- a toward edged sides both period this During
army post. Their story was still under evaluation two two evaluation under still was story Their post. army HOW THE CIA GOT CHE CHE GOT CIA THE HOW cadre of Bolivian guerrilla trainees. trainees. guerrilla Bolivian of cadre up in an isolated base camp on the eastern coast of of coast eastern the on camp base isolated an in up
about Che's real whereabouts was a series of emotional emotional of series a was whereabouts real Che's about and sudden death of Che's mother in Buenos Aires in in Aires Buenos in mother Che's of death sudden and
Che began making his move November 7, 1966. Fol- 1966. 7, November move his making began Che
The gunfire gunfire The
For nearly a year and a half thereafter Che stayed stayed Che thereafter half a and year a nearly For
responsibility. responsibility.
of of
Che's attack echoed sharply in Wash- in sharply echoed attack Che's
105 105 rr rr 106 THE SPIES HOW THE CIA GOT CHE 107 High government leaders flocked hurriedly during the the Star sent veteran correspondent Jeremiah O'Leary last week of March and the first half of April for short, there to make a quick cross-continental exploration. secretive palavers at a quick succession of locations. O'Leary, given the full treatment, reported from Lima, Some were held at Army Chief of Staff General Harold Peru: "U.S. officials throughoUt Latin America are vir- K. Johnson's conference chamber, some at Walt Ros- tually unanimous in their belief that Che Guevara . . . tow's office, some at a conference hall adjoining what is dead. They believe Guevara was executed in Cuba was once the ExComm (Executive Committee of the because of policy clashes with Castro. . . . The most National Security Council) suite in the Executive Of- reliable information available is that the guerrilla band fice Building. The purpose of the hopping about was to [spotted in Bolivia] is made up almost entirely of Bo- make sure the meetings did not alert the Washington livians." press corps. Air-tight secrecy was the one essential pol- To make sure readers realized this was the outcome icy all conferees concurred in. Even minor State De- of a thorough investigation, O'Leary noted that al- partment officials and military officers assigned to such though a man named Guevara had been rumored key areas as Bolivia, or to the special interagency among the guerrilla chiefs, evidence showed this Gue- board set up to deal with Cuban emergencies, were vara was simply a local bushwhacker: "Guevara is a kept in the dark. common name in Bolivia." A quick State Department survey confirmed that- It was true enough that "dependable sources" had luckily—only a single foreign correspondent, Murray revealed the identity of a Bolivian guerrilla as Moises. Sayle of the London Times, happened to be in Bolivia Guevara, a communist mine-union organizer. But the the day Che struck. Sayle, however, accidentally dis- same dependable sources—which consisted of a cache covered, before the curtain came clown, that there were of secret guerrilla documents unearthed in a hidden daily scrambled radiotelephone conversations between jungle cave—revealed much more not disclosed to the White House and the U.S. Embassy in Bolivia on O'Leary: that high-ranking Cuban military leaders, and after March 23. A seasoned reporter, Sayle de- rather than Bolivians, were in charge of the insur- cided to check out the scene by accompanying a Boliv- gency. ian army company on a patrol of the Nanca.huazu. Harking back to the situation at that time, a high area. Nothing happened to Sayle, but stories were cir- Washington intelligence reminisced: "None of this culating now of a guerrilla band in action. story is apt to sound very creditable or sensible unless When Sayre returned to La Paz on April 10, he was it is remembered that the government acted as if it smothered under a barrage of amiable reassurances were under attack because it was under attack, and from U.S. officials. "What the whole flap really dangerously so. Che Guevara's strategy called for set- means," the British correspondent was told by a high ting up a guerrilla stronghold, starting a small jungle U.S. diplomat in La Paz, "is that the Bolivians are war, and then internationalizing the conflict. The key trying to put the squeeze on us again for more aid." to Che's plan turned on involving other Latin Ameri- can countries and, above all, the United States. Once An even more thorough snake-oil job was done on the foreign intervention had been loosed in Bolivia, Che Washington Evening Star. Intrigued by vague rumors had the makings of his primary objective—a second that "something big" was brewing in South America, Vietnam." "Argentina had decided to use force." His warning was
one hundred fifty miles from the guerrilla zone. Gen- was mobilized and moved to staging areas less than suade. They were determined to settle the score with
na's only strategic combat-ready ground forces unit— Mendez bluntly told the U.S. State Department that whole ball game would have been gone before we had General Alejandro Lanusse's Third Arm y—Argenti- gentina to the status of leading military power in South Collier reported from Buenos Aires that Argentina was nials when New York
Constabulary, an elite mobile strike force, also set up backed by large-scale troop movements all across intelligence analyst recalled in Washington re- cently, "they would have attacked. That would northern Argentina. During the first half of April, eral Arturo Aguirre, commander of the Argentinian America. of international proportions would have elevated Ar- guerrilla uprising. And a major antiguerrilla campaign
keep it at manageable temperature resulted in loud de- have immediately pulled us in, of course—and the preparing to move troops into Bolivia for joint coun- a turn at bat." tier.
actly what we knew at that point," a State Department
its field headquarters within sight of the Bolivian fron- the Castro regime for the 1963-'64 Cuban-backed
who now administer Argentina proved hard to dis- tion in Bolivia, the hard-bitten, hard-charging generals guerrilla outbreak on Argentina's vulnerable northern
military intervention the moment it learned of the
border. Convinced of the need for a "preventive" ac- eral Juan Carlos Ongania began to prepare for open far from stupid. The Argentinian government of Gen-
Washington knew that Guevara's guerrilla strategy was
108
Argentinian Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa
"We felt sure that if the Argentinians found out ex-
Washington's determination to cool the crisis and
Times
correspondent Barnard
THE SPIES
HOW THE CIA GOT CHE
scoop, one unconfirmed detail—that Bolivian Presi- front-page report contained, along with its major terguerrilla operations with Bolivian units. Collier's
dent Rene Barrientos had
fice to join the State Department in knocking down the
vention—and this provoked the Bolivian Foreign Of-
story.
said that a confidential, high-level warning invoking
the national security interest found its way from the
White House to
ping's desk. In any case, veteran Latin America re-
guerrilla story, which was reassigned to Paul Montgom- porter Collier was suddenly called off the Bolivian
ery, a quiet young staffer from the Rio bureau.
launched a private intervention campaign of his own
via Bolivia's ambassador to Washington. Julio San-
mand of Pentagonese, was an able and efficient chief
of mission. Wealthy and charming, he had been a
warm befriender of many southern senators and gover-
nors. In his special objective, the ambassador could jines-Goytia, a West Point graduate with a fluent com-
count on the strategic support of Colonel Edward Fox,
the U.S. air attache and aviation adviser in Bolivia.
Colonel Fox, who had struck up a warm friendship
with ex-pilot President Barrientos, had become an in- fluential advocate for the president's views in U.S.
official circles. Secure in his backing, therefore, Am-
bassador Sanjines-Goytia put forth an idea that seemed
to have some advantages. He proposed to Secretary of
State Dean Rusk that the United States do nothing for
creasing the military and financial aid to President Bar-
the time being about the Guevara crisis beyond in-
vara's first target," argued the ambassador, "the logical rientos.
first response is to buttress Barrientos. Given the
What happened next is not yet fully known. It is
Behind the scenes, however, President Barrientos
"Since the Barrientos government is obviously Gue-
Times
Foreign Editor Seymour Top-
requested
Argentinian inter-
109 •
110 THE SPIES 110W THE CIA GOT CIE 111 means, the Bolivian armed forces can handle Che Gue- made sad showing of Bolivian accounting customs. vara." Previous U.S. funds, directly destined to keep up to The ambassador's approach was not unattractive. It date the civil service payrolls (including those of the required no military intervention; it limited rather than all-important national police force), had plainly gone "internationalized" the crisis; and it was not scandal- astray, for government employees had been unpaid for ously expensive. Barrientos' first request was for six months. A special appropriation for the purchase of million dollars, two-thirds in military supplies and cross-country vehicles, essential for swift counterinsur- one-third in dollar funds, with a follow-up program gency operations, had been invested by the Bolivians aimed at bringing some stability to the Bolivian na- in a fleet of Mini-Mokes, cute little beetles which, how- tional budget (estimated to be one hundred fifty mil- ever, tended to bog down in mud and could not hope lion dollars in the red in 1967) and some benefits to to get within shooting distance of Che Guevara's oper- Bolivia's grumbling tin miners. Rusk liked the package ational area. "A payoff was reportedly involved in the well enough to toss it up at the next secret Guevara acquisition of these unsuitable transport craft," re- crisis conference, on April 9, where it was promptly marked one of the case officers at the meeting, and in shot down. the ensuing silence the Bolivian proposal sank out of sight. This was a top-IeveI meeting, crackling with urgency, in the Pentagon's Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff conference General Johnson's aides had another presentation, em- room. It was attended by Army Chief of Staff General bodying long-prepared Army plans for just such an Johnson; General Robert W. Porter, Jr., four-star boss emergency. They dealt with the setting up of a test of SouthComm (Southern Command), the joint U.S. force, called a Regional Assistance Command, made up of counterinsurgency units with special capability to .■• Defense Headquarters for Latin America, based in the 2, Canal Zone; Major General James D. Alger, South- isolate and crush guerrilla cadres as quickly as they Comm's field forces commander, lean and hawk-faced; were spotted. "One of the most important lessons we Air Force Brigadier General William K. Skaer, the J-2 have learned in Viet Nam," General Johnson said, "is (joint intelligence chief) of SouthComm; Secretary that guerrilla flare-ups must be smothered immediately, Rusk; Assistant Secretary of State (for Latin America) without a moment's delay. A Regional Assistance Covey T. Oliver, a patient, portly troubleshooter; CIA Command is being organized under SouthComm right Director Richard Helms, flanked by two assistant dep- now, and it is ready to be committed in planned stages 47 uty directors and several case officers; Presidential Se- —command and technical advisory staffs, mobile curity Assistant Walt W. Rostow and White House training teams and schools, and light combat support Hemisphere Adviser William Bowdler. elements—if absolutely necessary." 11, Rusk opened the meeting with a brief description of Rusk interrupted, noting that State had strongly the Bolivian proposal. He had hardly finished when urged a no-intervention policy on the White House. CIA Director Helms took the floor to point out that, in "Ambassador Henderson, who is standing by at the effect, the Bolivians could not be trusted with large radio room in La Paz, has been instructed to order the sums, and he had some convincing evidence. The CIA withdrawal of all MAAG military advisory personnel presentation included a formidable area study accom- from the Bolivian provinces contiguous to the guerrilla panied by charts and bar graphs on an easel, and it zone. I believe this has already been done. Has it?" 112 THE SPIES HOW THE CIA GOT CHE 113 An aide to General Porter confirmed carrying out been a formal meeting of the Security Council, it the order. "Six infantry, artillery and signals advisers would have amounted to a National Intelligence Esti- have been temporarily reassigned from the affected mate. Then two colonels from the Defense Intelligence areas to La Paz," he read from an information sheet. Agency's Foreign Liaison and Area Analysis Branch "Well, we urge that this hands-off policy be main- gave a shorter briefing. At one point they showed tained as far as humanly possible," said Rusk. "I know blowups of some photographs we'd seen twenty min- that something must be done about this problem, but utes earlier, in the CIA presentation. They were photo- fielding even the first elements of a Regional Assis- graphs brought back by Bolivian patrols from the first tance Command would mean the fat's in the fire. Per- abandoned guerrilla campsite they reconnoitered near haps something less obvious . . ." Nancahuazu. And you know, the second time around The Great Guevara Policy Dispute was on. Arthur everyone spotted it almost simultaneously. It was like a Schlesinger, Jr., the Kennedy historian, may have jolt of electricity all around the table. There it was, turned up something basic when, badgered by friends right in the picture, the thing we needed, the thing Che about U.S. policy zigzags in Cuba and Vietnam he had overlooked: a familiar, fat old Dien Bien Phu said: "Government is not the monolith it seems. In oven. reality, government is internal conflict." It is popular "We just looked at each other," the government fallacy to think that such internal conflicts are resolved man recalled. "And someone said, sounding loud be- along sharp departmental lines. What almost invariably cause the room had turned quiet: 'Do we have any- emerges is a compromise; the action finally adopted thing positive on their mess schedule? Day chow or usually means there is something for every disputant, When, at this meeting, Helms remarked, "The first night chow?' One of the briefing officers said, quick- need seems to be for more hard information on the like, as if he'd expected the question, 'Yes, we have it scope and the short-range targets of Guevara's opera- from defector debriefings. Positive evaluation. It's tion," no one offered a serious argument. Several of night chow, sir.' For a minute or so we just looked at the agencies involved—notably the Defense Depart- each other, because that was it. We were all thinking, ment, the CIA and the Air Force—had conducted `God, now we can find him. No matter what sort of joint research projects into the problem of acquiring jungle, no matter how fast he's moving—now we can just this sort of hard information. During 1965 and really find Che Guevara.' " 1966, Fidel Castro had made several mocking The Dien Bien Phu oven, as the name suggests, is a speeches demanding, "If the yanquis are so anxious to large, round-bellied cooking contraption developed by find Che, why don't they send up a U-2 to take a pic- the Vietnamese guerrillas in the early '60s. Its main. ture of him?" The Cuban leader was unaware that advantage is that it gives off virtually no smoke—the what he offered as a sarcasm had turned into a serious combustion gases can be funneled off—and this must suggestion: taking an aerial picture of the elusive Che have been why it caught Che Guevara's fancy when he was exactly what Washington was working on, secretly visited North Vietnam in 1965. In 1967, how- ever, Che was apparently unaware that the United An official who attended the crisis deliberations re- States had developed heat-seeking and image-ampli- membered this particular meeting well. "Dick Helms' fying aerial reconnaissance techniques which converted people made a long, impressive presentation. If it had high-temperature devices, such as camouflaged cooking
group" is a time-tested CIA management system for for system management CIA time-tested a is group" Aerial Survey Detachment. A "numbered project project "numbered A Detachment. Survey Aerial
keeping tight control of the clandestine project person- person- project clandestine the of control tight keeping
bered project group," the other other the group," project bered
comprised two separate groups. One was was One groups. separate two comprised
for gathering field intelligence. intelligence. field gathering for
tos) with skill, and was steeped in the latest methods methods latest the in steeped was and skill, with tos) America and and America
and pilots (including the air-minded President Barrien- President air-minded the (including pilots and
Skaer, a soft-spoken, graying, utterly unflappable pillar pillar unflappable utterly graying, soft-spoken, a Skaer,
of strength. Ken Skaer spoke Spanish, knew Latin Latin knew Spanish, spoke Skaer Ken strength. of
oil-company airstrips near Camiri. The group was was group The Camiri. near airstrips oil-company
placed under the operational command of General General of command operational the under placed
Bolivia, its "safehouses" and camouflaged operational operational camouflaged and "safehouses" its Bolivia,
buildings scattered all the way from La Paz to some some to Paz La from way the all scattered buildings
White House in less than seventy-two hours. hours. seventy-two than less in House White
tions. The situationer was read and approved at the the at approved and read was situationer The tions.
tion, and a "C&R," the conclusions and recommenda- and conclusions the "C&R," a and tion,
and opinion apart: an "SOI," the summary of informa- of summary the "SOI," an apart: opinion and
tablished intelligence analysis forms always submitted submitted always forms analysis intelligence tablished
jointly, but separated by main headings to keep fact fact keep to headings main by separated but jointly,
President Johnson's eyes. It comprised the two long-es- two the comprised It eyes. Johnson's President
crisis conference was the traditional "situationer" for for "situationer" traditional the was conference crisis
What ultimately emerged from the decisive Guevara Guevara decisive the from emerged ultimately What
been shaved. shaved. been
teen hundred feet altitude, will give the photo-evalua- the give will altitude, feet hundred teen
tor a good guess about how recently the man's face has has face man's the recently how about guess good a tor
pitch-black jungle clearing, taken from as high as fif- as high as from taken clearing, jungle pitch-black
ture of a man chewing on a warm cigar stub in a a in stub cigar warm a on chewing man a of ture
convert heat into visible light so efficiently that a pic- a that efficiently so light visible into heat convert
these infrared image devices stretch the spectrum and and spectrum the stretch devices image infrared these
high-speed emulsion and multiple special-focus lenses, lenses, special-focus multiple and emulsion high-speed
tive the new spy cameras are. Using a miraculously miraculously a Using are. cameras spy new the tive
liabilities. liabilities.
pots or blacked-out shortwave radio sets, into telltale telltale into sets, radio shortwave blacked-out or pots
114 114
SOG/Bolivia's field operating element actually actually element operating field SOG/Bolivia's
A top-secret Special Operations Group was set up in in up set was Group Operations Special top-secret A
Few people, in fact, have any idea how supersensi- how idea any have fact, in people, Few
Latinos Latinos
intimately, handled both planes planes both handled intimately,
a a
hush-hush Special Special hush-hush
a a
CIA "num- CIA
THE SPIES SPIES THE
110W THE CIA GOT ME ME GOT CIA THE 110W
code designations, usually a single letter and a three- a and letter single a usually designations, code
or four-digit number, with the senior case officers in in officers case senior the with number, four-digit or
cret operatives assigned to a project receive sequential sequential receive project a to assigned operatives cret
nel scattered all over their "target areas." Under it, se- it, Under areas." "target their over all scattered nel
charge (known as the "field control officers") given given officers") control "field the as (known charge
the lowest numbers. numbers. lowest the
Force element of SOG/Bolivia, and the night birds birds night the and SOG/Bolivia, of element Force went to work with wondrous speed. The guerrilla-in- The speed. wondrous with work to went
fested zone—a three-hundred-mile corridor estimated estimated corridor three-hundred-mile zone—a fested
border—was mapped in small, precise grids. Night sur- Night grids. precise small, in mapped border—was
to stretch from Santa Cruz south toward the Argentine Argentine the toward south Cruz Santa from stretch to vey missions began immediately at two altitudes. altitudes. two at immediately began missions vey
ama Canal Zone, Lieutenant Colonel Redmond E. E. Redmond Colonel Lieutenant Zone, Canal ama Wide-winged, high-ranging giant RB-57's flew over over flew RB-57's giant high-ranging Wide-winged, Bolivia out of Howard Air Force base in the Canal Canal the in base Force Air Howard of out Bolivia
local folk were long accustomed—put-putted back and and back accustomed—put-putted long were folk local
SOG/Bolivia—in fact, they preceded it by about about by it preceded they fact, SOG/Bolivia—in
forth, pinpointing every single beat source on miles miles on source beat single every pinpointing forth,
Zone, while miles underneath dusty little bush planes planes bush little dusty underneath miles while Zone,
—resembling the civilian oil-company craft to which which to craft oil-company civilian the —resembling
three weeks. On March 27, the commanding officer of of officer commanding the 27, March On weeks. three
"Red" Weber, arrived aboard a military flight which which flight military a aboard arrived Weber, "Red"
nized counterguerrilla force. What it did have was one one was have did it What force. counterguerrilla nized and miles of winding infrared superfilm. superfilm. infrared winding of miles and
the Eighth Special Forces Group stationed in the Pan- the in stationed Group Forces Special Eighth the fare. Bolivia had no semblance of a trained or orga- or trained a of semblance no had Bolivia fare.
Forces officer from the Eighth Group: Major Ralph Ralph Major Group: Eighth the from officer Forces took him directly to Santa Cruz, near the guerrilla zone. zone. guerrilla the near Cruz, Santa to directly him took
arrive in Bolivia, however, did not belong to to belong not did however, Bolivia, in arrive
MAAG's mission concerned only conventional war- conventional only concerned mission MAAG's
W. "Poppy" Shelton. It was to be Shelton's duty even- duty Shelton's be to was It Shelton. "Poppy" W. With Colonel Weber came a single senior Special Special senior single a came Weber Colonel With
tually to set up an emergency counterguerrilla training training counterguerrilla emergency an up set to tually
base. base. gent, the Military Assistance Advisory Group. But But Group. Advisory Assistance Military the gent,
The top-priority assignment belonged to the Air Air the to belonged assignment top-priority The
The first pair of U.S. counterguerrilla specialists to to specialists counterguerrilla U.S. of pair first The
Bolivia already had a sizable U.S. uniformed contin- uniformed U.S. sizable a had already Bolivia
115 115 - - 116 hemisphere. of the smallest, poorest, slowest armies in the western
what to do about the Guevara unpleasantness. As the the Bolivian army chiefs wanted more U.S. aid of every description—except training The Bolivians did two Eighth Group advance men quickly discovered,
Special Forces. Rebuffed, the two Special Forces men felt discouraged, until an experienced U.S. Embassy not want to be told how to do things, even by the U.S. good way yet to sell training in the black market" official explained: "The trouble is, no one has found a
one-sentence guideline to hold down the big-thinking Bolivian brass: "The United States will undertake no
son's calm approach had all the weight of the U.S. could be interpreted as 'intervention.' " Since Hender- action, not even abrupt increases in military aid, that
government behind it, the Bolivians decided to accept
training as a fact of life.
On April 29 four officers and twelve enlisted men
consisted of highly rated Special Forces veterans. All emplaned for Bolivia at Howard AFB. This tiny group MTT—a Mobile Training Team. By 1700 hours, they had been handpicked by Colonel Weber and Major were in Santa Cruz and had set up an overnight biv- Shelton. As a group, they formed what is known as an
ouac. As quietly and unobtrusively as a big-game
hunter raising his rifle toward a crouching jaguar, the
United States had drawn a bead on Che Guevara.
had nothing of the big-game hunter about him. Shelton ture. Pappy Shelton, setting about his job in Bolivia,
is a throwaway talk style, with only the faintest twang with him from Laos to the Panama Canal Zone to Bo- of a distant Tennessee boyhood; a guitar that has gone is cool. He has no bad vibrations. What he does have
Yet the Bolivian High Command had firm ideas on
U.S. Ambassador Henderson, however, had a steely
To talk of a hunt, however, calls up the wrong pic-
THE SPIES
HOW THE CIA GOT CHE
face. livia, and shows it; a smile that lights up his whole
ther large nor small; his face is neither pale nor ruddy, but a neutral olive tone, the color of Tennessee sorghum sod. Enemy agents would despair of writing
eight, lifelong soldier (ten years an enlisted man, then an identifiable description of Pappy Shelton, thirty- an officer), combat infantryman, ranger, sky diver, Special Forces team leader, who comes on like a through Officer Candidate School, and now ten years youngish country doctor on a people-to-people sanita-
tion mission. written out on half a page of SouthComm's contin- gency directive:
Quechua Indian recruits for nineteen weeks of training weeks' Advanced Infantry Training; three weeks' Basic ing team were to take in charge six-hundred odd green —specifically, six weeks' Basic Infantry Training; three
Unit Training; five weeks' Advanced Unit Training;
ion ever seen in Bolivia. and two weeks in a Field Training Exercise—thereby turning the recruits into the first crack Ranger Battal-
The plan also included refresher infantry training for Bolivian infantry companies at a time for a four-week other army complements. By enrolling three selected
Pappy's posture is disarming. His body seems nei-
He brought with him a very simple "prescription,"
1 Rg. Bn.
Inf. Comp.
The cryptic symbols meant that Pappy and his train-
"A"
"B"
MISSION: MISSION:
.
Off !
71'
;;!,;.
AUT 5
BUT 3
FTX 2
AIT 3
BIT 6 RIT 4
11
7
118 group could then send out nine retrained rifle compa-
course, and repeating the course three times, Pappy's nies to tone up the cadres of the line regiments.
To give them a home, the U.S. team took over an whose airport became the airborne support point for abandoned sugar mill sixty miles north of Santa Cruz,
stant Christmas," recalled one of the former team ser- the entire Special Forces program. special job. Usually a Special Forces team goes into
geants. "That's how we first knew we were on a real
we had it as often as we called it. One of the first the field with its footlockers and a C-46 for air supply
himself but to get in good with a local bush pilot perhaps twice a month. But here we had a C-130, and whose help we needed. I was sure all we'd get back
things Pappy requisitioned was a refrigerator, not for what for? To bring us the icebox! We just hung there here's this big bird coasting in on the treetops, and would be the word 'Cool it: But in twenty-four hours
lows, now pick it up!' " gaping, until the pilot says, 'Well, you wanted it, fel-
recruits. other things. for no more kitchen commodities. He was thinking of
asked Bolivian Captain Julio Cruz, who brought in the
man's training?"
thorized for a recruit." utilitarian Spanish, "does your army issue for each
teach them anything that way?"
Pappy's preferred trainees were the Ranger recruits.
Supplies began to flood in. "They came in like in-
Once the pipeline had been primed, Pappy used it
"How many live bullets," Pappy enunciated in his
"How many "How many rounds per rifleman for the course?" he
Captain Cruz thought. "I
"Ten rounds?" Pappy was shocked. "How can you
Captain Cruz had the patient look of a man explain-
what?"
think
ten bullets are au-
THE SPIES
HOW THE CIA GOT CHE
ing ancient verities: "First we tell them. Then we kick
them."
training rounds. allot each (unkicked) rifleman three thousand live
"internationalizing" the conflict, and to shorten Pappy It wanted to announce Che's presence to the world, Shelton's nienteen-week curriculum. The United States
training camp by hand: an obstacle course, confidence
vetoed both suggestions. On Sundays we had a good sing." are rigged with pop-up cut-outs of enemy figures—a Shelton explains now. "We built a full-scale Ranger course, quick-reaction course—where jungle footpaths washtub with a string; the heavy weapons sergeant confront two officers and two senior sergeants playing
taciturn Indian draftees found themselves assembled to lots more guys like Pappy." more Vietnams,' but what these sergeants clacked a pair of spoons. The Indian troop- river course, a target range. We even used Sundays. Mitchell, the tall, husky Negro team exec, twanged a music whether they understood them or not. Down in the played the washboard, and one of the communications isced Captain Harvey Wallender, who, then a first lieu- tionship with the whole battalion. The men worshipped ers were stunned, puzzled, then wildly enthusiastic. early fall, "Pappy Shelton had built up a terrific rela- their loyalty. On at least one occasion he fought the him, followed him around. They laughed at his jokes tenant, took over the team's intelligence section in the jungle Che Guevara kept offering Two, three, many Pappy fought for his Indian constituency in return for
In the end, Pappy planed in enough ammunition to
Meanwhile the Bolivian high command was restless. "We needed every day of that training schedule,"
"By the time I came down from Panama," remin- The first Sunday morning, six hundred stone-faced,
for them. Shelton had his guitar, Captain Leroy
soldaditos
wanted was
119
1. HOW THE CIA GOT CITE 121 120 THE SPIES longer soldaditos but Rangers, they were ready to entire U.S. Embassy. The hassle arose when the U.S. graduate. With Colonel Alberto Gallardo, the battal- aid mission appeared in Santa Cruz to help settle some ion's Bolivian CO., Shelton walked down the line, pin- newly immigrated Japanese truck farmers. Wherever ning a silver condor—the Ranger emblem—on each Japanese have been settled in Bolivia, they have man's chest. Within twenty-four hours Shelton watched boosted food production. But the Japanese resettle- the battalion, on its own completely under Bolivian di- ment plan required, of course, that thousands of In- rection for the first time, head for Eighth Division at dian squatters be evicted from the lands. The Quechua Vallegrande, to take over a ten-mile sector infiltrated squatters complained to the Quechua soldiers; the sol- by guerrillas. diers complained to Pappy. Pappy told USAID the project was off. In the months since his high point, things had gone far The USAID officers argued with Pappy; Pappy said, from well for Che. The aging ?tamer° uno was on the "No." Lieutenant Colonel. foe Rice, senior U.S. infan- defensive. The ring drawn around the guerrillas' "Red try adviser in Bolivia, came to Santa Cruz and spoke Zone" had choked off Che's supply and communica- soothing words; Pappy said, "No." Finally the deep tions routes, and the rebel column was taking heavy voice of Ambassador Henderson was heard on the casualties in fire fights with Bolivian detachments. The team's radio. The wordless Indian soldaditos squatting guerrillas were desperate for civilian support and intel- in a circle round the communications shack heard ligence information. Their first-phase strategy had been Pappy use the single word they understood: "No." dislocated by the loss of two key agents, the French- Pappy and his soldaditos won that first joint skir- man Regis Debray and the mysterious girl guerrilla mish in part because Douglas Henderson was an able known as "Tania." diplomat who knew when to yield. But they won it Debray, a wealthy, well-born young Parisian intel- partly because of sweating together under the tropical lectual, author of Revolution in the Revolution?, which sun, exchanging hundreds of Ranger skills—how to se- expounds the Castroite revolutionary line, was smug- cure jungle paths with warning devices made from gled into guerrilla territory by the ubiquitous Tania in coffee cans and string; how to fire the 3.5 recoilless early March for a vital strategy conference with Che rocket; how to counterattack in an ambush; how to about "internationalizing" the Bolivian campaign. But cross a river; how to read maps; how to survive in the though Debray had written movingly enough about jungle on monkey meat smoked under parachute cloth. guerrilla warfare to be called its "young eagle" by phi- All the weeks of the training Pappy and his men were losopher Jean-Paul Sartre, face to face with the jungle under the watchful eye of high authority. Seven cas- he metamorphosed into a diminishing succession of ual-appearing U.S. generals, seldom seen in attendance lesser birds: chicken, canary, finally a deadweight al- at backwoods encampments, found reason to inspect batross around Che's burdened neck. Pappy's project at one time or another. And when After his first fortnight's taste of the wilderness, De- Pappy flew up to SouthComm Headquarters in the bray was bursting to get back to civilization. Ills return Canal Zone on some matter, he often found himself trip was a hurried cop-out. But a few hours after his discussing it in person with SouthComm's top boss, parting handshake with Che, poor Debray was inter- Robert W. Porter, Jr., a four-star general. cepted by Bolivian plainclothesmen the moment he en- On September 17 Pappy's pupils formed up before tered the first village on his "escape to freedom." A him in the sugar mill's quadrangle for the last time. No 122
few hours after that, Debray was reeling under the fists himself in a small plane where, time and again, his Bo- and boots of raging Bolivian officers. Next he found livian escort opened the door in midair and kicked and wrestled him halfway out into the sky, to demonstrate live air-drop. would return to the Red Zone as the guerrillas' first that unless he talked rapidly and convincingly, he lectual confronting the most vital issue of the day—his level strategy. And whatever Bolivian intelligence Shelton set up shop in Santa Cruz, Bolivian military own survival—can talk. Thus, just about when Pappy
checked, largely through the CIA's field operatives.
intelligence picked up a panoramic view of Che's top- picked up, U.S. intelligence received—and double-
the As it turned out for Debray, the CIA was nothing like life," Debray told this writer in a day-long conversa- in public.
a V.I.P. jail. "One of the Bolivian officers had taken to tion at Camiri, where he now serves a thirty-year sen- tence in a former Bolivian military casino converted to
emptylhg his .45 into the dirt floor between my legs. The CIA agents never beat me. But neither did they ever stop asking questions—or taking notes."
Bolivian courier, Jorge Vasquez Viana; his Argenti-
Tania's jeep; then he lost Tania. nian liaison agent, Ciro Bustos; and in the end, the one human being who was emotionally and physically close
"Tania" for her Last assignment in Bolivia, that emi- surround Tamara H. Bunke, the slim, sexy, superactive to him in the jungle—Tania. To be precise, first he lost
intelligence officer who adopted the code name
nent observers have gestured in despair. From the
Regis Debray talked as only a young Parisian intel-
"Under the circumstances, I think they saved my
After Che lost Debray, he also lost in succession his
So much secrecy, sensationalism and speculation
bete noire—black
beast—he had so often pilloried
THE SPIES
HOW TAE CIA GOT CIIE
professional espionage viewpoint, Tania was, of
agent. Born in Argentina and raised in East Germany,
course, simply a hardworking, academy-trained career
KGB, the Soviet intelligence directorate, keeping watch she spent the last years of her life in the service of
on the volatile, unpredictable, trouble-prone guerrilla government in Cuba. Cuba troubles, the United States and the Soviet Union
recently at a Washington dinner. "I imagine Washing- have a lot in common," mused a senior U.S. diplomat Soviets in Havana, and kept on doing it to the very quirements in their Cuba file. And to fill such high- parking it where the Bolivian level EBI's—that is, Essential Elements of Information ton and Moscow have a lot of similar intelligence re- vara." —takes trained, disciplined, professional agents. Tania fredo Ovando, to examine all of Tania's original dos- was such an agent. She did a professional job for the end, even though she sorts of incriminating documents in her jeep, then to Che's downfall heavily by sloppily forgetting all President Rene Barrientos and High Commander Al-
sier in Bolivia, this writer can report that there is no
son chief was initially compromised by the three guer-
evidence for this rumor. Tania's role as the rebels' liai- rilla deserters who provided, in early March, the first decisive intelligence breakthrough for the Bolivian gov-
barrassing, but provided no new clues of importance ernment. When her garaged jeep was located in Cam- iri, the police found documents in it which were em-
gle, months later, she died in the crossfire of a Bolivian
army ambush without uttering a word. about Che Guevara. When Tania was killed in the jun-
"Not many people realize that when it comes to
Having been permitted, by personal dispensation of It has been widely rumored that Tania contributed
did
fall in love with Che Gue-
gendarmes
,g1
could find it.
123 124 Trapped in a guerrilla camp by the deserters' betrayal, with her small rear-guard unit separated from Che's column by a day's march of impenetrable jungle, she died unaware that Moscow had decided to throw its
Che himself was shot to death exactly one month, one political weight
aware that his last close companion and collaborator week and one day after Tania's death, apparently un- him. had been a covert KGB agent, reporting to Moscow on
which Tania perished, was one of the last fire fights be-
tween the guerrillas and Bolivian infantry troopers. By Shelton were taking charge of the chase for Che. mid-September, the crack Rangers trained by Pappy
garito Cruz, a cinnamon-colored Puerto Rican spymas- platoons trained by Pappy's S-2 officer, Captain Mar-
was the most intense and secretive section within the ter. His mission, the battalion's intelligence training,
spooks learned how to perform intelligence missions whole secret program. operatives for every Ranger company. These novice single-handed, in civilian clothes, mixing with the local
population. They fanned out quietly through the guer- between Che Guevara's small troop and the govern-
rilla sector, decisively tipping the balance of potential
ment forces.
"But when it came to combat intelligence, we attacked yet acknowledge publicly SOG/Bolivia's existence, Wallender, who, like many other military men, cannot time we did have a whole lot of—uh, well,
the problem all over again from the point of tactical
requirements. I think this was really the big difference
between Che and us. Che had become a V.I.P. and a big executive in Cuba, formation
The deadly riverbank ambush of August 30, in
First to go into action were the special intelligence
Captain Cruz trained a full platoon of intelligence
"It wasn't just a question of information. By this
on Guevara's whole setup," says Captain
against
Che's Bolivian venture. And
a
world celebrity. He thought
THE SPIES
special in-
ideology, propaganda, history. Che had no time for lit- like a four-star general, like a theater commander. He tle problems like camp perimeter security, or patrol thought of flanking alliances, vast territories, politics, HOW 1HE CIA GOT CHE
schedule, or morale among the lowly guerrilla recruits.
That was Washington's scenario, and I guess they But we thought of nothing else. Our whole plan was
built on limiting things, on keeping things managed to convince everybody, even the Argentinian general staff and the Bolivian government, to give the
work, and work fast." history's judgment may be on the indomitable guerrilla quiet tactical approach a chance. Of course, it had to
radio silent, he circled his jungle killing ground without combat gear to sweep a long, narrow, wooded ravine gence scouts had picked up his trail. general, he was a man. His small force exhausted, his early Sunday—Ranger Company A, acting on guid- ance from its intelligence platoon, moved out in full with the next-best thing—the Shelton-trained Rangers. movements had been reported the previous night. Hav- would never realize his dream of engaging in direct.. small-arms fire within minutes. ale Guevara, who the canyon shortly before noon, and ran into enemy had posted Staff Sergeant Huanca with a flanking fire short semicircle and attempted to break out of the trap known as the Quebrada del Yuro, where suspicious attempting to escape. Within days, the Ranger intelli-
Hurt and cornered, Che swung across the ravine in a ing sealed off every exit, the Rangers began combing team. Now Sergeant Huanca began taking the brunt of across the high ground to the rear. This was where the Ranger Company's young C.O., Captain Gary Prado, combat with the hated
a
furious attack by Che Guevara's desperate column.
Che was in trouble and on the run. But whatever
In the morning of October 8—a hot, sun-seared
"Che and his column came down on Huanca's posi-
yanquis,
was finally face-to-face
tactical.
125
F. 126 THE SPIES HOW THE CIA GOT CBE 127 Lion like a fire storm," Major Shelton recalled. up in Bolivia every bit as secretively as they had "Huanca took Che's charge full blast, and he took cas- begun. The only visible results were some revealing of- ualties, too, right and left—lots of them. Huanca must ficial promotions. White House adviser Rowdier found have been scared as hell. But you know, he held that himself elevated to career ambassador—the only high position. He kept Che from escaping until the rest of appointment made by President Johnson after an- the company moved up and someone took aim and nouncing his own retirement. General Alger, the Army with a single bullet knocked the carbine from Che's field forces commander whose hand was directly on hand. Then . . . oh, hell, I don't have to tell you what the switch in Panama during the entire Guevara crisis, happened after that. Let me tell you simply that my moved up to become Chairman of the Inter-American Rangers delivered the captured Che alive into the Defense Board. But General Skaer, who had long be- bands of higher authority, and after that had no say— fore decided to retire in 1968, saw no reason to change or part—in what happened to him." his plans after SOG/Bolivia was phased out, and Che, who had several noncritical wounds at the time these days he wears a bow tie whenever he lunches in of his capture, was shot to death a day afterward on Washington. the personal directive of Bolivian Commander-in-Chief Whatever the exact contribution of Pappy Shelton Alfredo Ovando. The decision to kill him—and thus and his team to ending the guerrilla invasion, the Boli- convert him into a legend—ran counter to all the U.S. vian government made no attempt to acknowledge it in advice to General Ovando. Ironically, the CIA—one public. It is the official position of Bolivia that U.S. of whose field agents was permitted to talk to Cho help amounted only to "a few shipments of dry ra- shortly before his execution—was most urgently inter- tions." Washington has, as of this writing, shown no ested in keeping Che alive, if only for professional rea- wish to argue. sons. But Bolivia has no death penalty—more pre- Privately, Shelton was granted a special Diploma de cisely, no legal death penalty—and the high com- Honor by the Bolivian High Command and, a year mander faced a harsh choice: to have Che killed in- later, he was given the U.S. Joint Forces Commenda- stantly, or never. tion Medal—about as high an award as the warriors of The fact is that in Bolivia, where more than a hun- undeclared wars ever get. dred government men died in the campaign against "Well, Che was dead," Shelton says slowly. "And it Che and his sharpshooters, the unwritten law for cop occurred to me right afterward that there was only one killers is as starkly straightforward as in, say, Cook thing I really wanted—I wanted everyone in the team County, Illinois. Besides, the Bolivian high command home for the holidays. I went up to Panama and spoke was seething with memories of the Debray trial with its to the boss, and on the 19th of December we had our hundred-headed foreign press section and its pitiless last breakfast in Santa Cruz. We were all home—every publicity for the Bolivian military, who became known one of us was home the night before Christmas." as "gorillas" everywhere from Bangkok to Berlin. Thus what looked like a crowning credit for the U.S. counterinsurgency corps turned into a political liability. There were no trumpets, no banners, not even the usual self-congratulatory press leaks in Washington. Special Operations Group found its activities winding