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AN ETHNOHISTORIC PERSPECTIVE ON IROQUOIS WARFARE DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (A.D. 1649-1701)

DISSERTAHON

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of the The Ohio State University

By

Craig S. Keener, M.A.

The Ohio State University 1998

Dissertation Committee: Approved by

Professor William Dancey, Advisor r N

Professor Kristen Gremillion idvisor / Professor Paul Sciulli Anthropology Graduate Program'

Professor Amy Zaharlick UMI Number: 9900855

Copyright 19 9 8 by Keener, Craig Scott

All rights reserved.

UMI Microform 9900855 Copyright 1998, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.

This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI 300 North Zeeh Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Copyright by Craig Scott Keener 1998 ABSTRACT

The primary objective of this dissertation is to evaluate the validity of the use of the fur trade premise as an explanation of Iroquois participation in the "Beaver Wars" which occurred from A.D. 1649 to 1701 in the Midwest and Northeast of North America. The fur trade model and other explanations for Iroquois warfare that have been offered by various scholars are discussed. In evaluating the fur trade premise and other questions of this thesis several multi-volume primary ethnohistoric texts were used as sources of information (e.g., the Jesuit Relations, The New York Colonial Documents, and Pennsylvania Colonial Documents). From these primary sources a total of 385 passages that described or reported causes of Iroquois warfare were identified and used to answer the research questions. All incidents of

Iroquois warfare found in the utilized texts were documented, ordered chronologically, and mapped so that regional occurrences of warfare could be better visualized and interpreted. No evidence was found to support the premise that Iroquois involvement in the so called "Beaver Wars" was economically motivated.

This thesis also addressed the importance of alternative explanations for Iroquois warfare such as defense of acquired territory, defense against the aggression of enemies, and the role of revenge and prestige as causal factors.

It was predicted and supported by ethnohistoric evidence that the majority of

ii the wars of the second half of the seventeenth century occurred because

Iroquois peace representatives had been captured or killed during negotiations with opponents. Iroquois battle tactics are described and analyzed to determine what impact new weapons had on indigenous warfare and to ascertain how their successful implementation in the "Beaver Wars" may have influenced motives for war. The results of this ethnohistoric study indicate that there is a significant amount of evidence suggesting that revenge and prestige were the primary causal factors of Iroquois warfare in the second half of the seventeenth century.

Ill Dedicated to my wife Erica, my daughter Kirsten, my parents Bob and Carol Keener, and to the Iroquois League of the past and present.

IV ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I especially wish to thank my advisor, William Dancey, for his

guidance, assistance, and encouragement, without which this dissertation would not have been possible. My appreciation for critical thinking, scientific

theory, and writing I owe to you.

I thank my dissertation committee members, Kristen Gremillion, Paul

Sciulli, and Amy Zaharlick, for their comments and advice throughout the

General Exams and development of my thesis.

1 also thank my wife Erica for her support, drawings (Figures 4 and 5),

and editorial skills which greatly facilitated the writing of my dissertation in a timely manner.

I am grateful to Brian Mollenkopf and Ryan Weller for letting me use the computer facilities at APPLIED Archaeological Services, Inc.

I would also like to thank Ronald Spielbauer, whose introductory class on the field of anthropology/archaeology at Miami University (Oxford) convinced me to become an archaeologist. VITA

November 20,1966 Bom - Dayton, Ohio

1989 B.A. Anthropology (with Honors), and B.A. History, Miami University (Oxford).

1991 M.A. Anthropology, The Ohio State University

1992 -1995 Graduate Teaching Associate (Course numbers: 200, 201, 202), The Ohio State University.

1993 -1995 Archaeological Co-op, the Ohio Department of Transportation.

1995 - present Principal Investigator, for APPLIED Archaeological Services, Inc.

PUBLICATIONS

Keener, C. S. 1997 The Impact of Iroquoian Populations on the Northern Distribution of Pawpaws in the Northeast. North American Archaeologist. 18(4): 327- 342.

1997 Weapons of the Iroquois. Ohio Archaeologist. 47(4): 36-41.

1994 Warfare as the Evolutionary Mechanism for Iroquoian Tribalization: A Selectionist View. 21st Proceedings of the Origins of the Longhouse Conference. A. Bekerman and C. Warrick (editors), Ontario Archaeological Society, North York. v i HELDS OF STUDY

M^orHelcL Anthropology

Vll TABLE OF CONTENTS

Eâg£ Abstract...... ii

Dedication ...... iv

Acknowledgements ...... v

Vita...... vi

List of Tables...... xi

List of Figures...... xii

Chapter 1; Introduction ...... 1

The Study Area ...... 4 An Introduction to Iroquois Culture ...... 5 The Time Frame: A.D. 1649 to 1701 ...... 9 Defining Warfare ...... 10 Tactics and Technology ...... 11

Chapter 2: Methodology and Theory ...... 14

Methodological Problems of Interpreting Ethnohistoric Sources.. 14 Primary Sources ...... 18 The Jesuit Relations (JR) ...... 18 The New York Colonial Documents (NYCD) ...... 21 The Pennsylvania Colonial Records ...... 24 Secondary Sources ...... 25 Data Retrieval and Organization ...... 28 Interpretation of Iroquois Warfare ...... 33 Prestige...... 34 Defensive Warfare...... 37

V lll Chapter 3: Iroquois Studies...... 38

Seventeenth Century Literature ...... 39 Eighteenth Century Literature ...... 40 Nineteenth Century Literature ...... 43 Twentieth Century Literature ...... 45 1900 to 1939...... 47 1940 to 1969...... 48 1970 to 1989...... 54 1990 to 1997...... 60

Chapter 4: Archaeological Perspectives on Iroquois W arfare...... 64

The Owasco T radition ...... 65 The Oak Hill (A.D. 1300-1400) and Chance (A.D. 1400-1500) Phase...... 72 The Garoga Phase and Proto Historic Period (A.D. 1500 to 1600).... 73 The Seventeenth Century ...... 74 Traditional Warfare versus Historic Period Warfare ...... 78 Traditional Warfare ...... 79 The Process of War...... 84 Historic Period Warfare ...... 90

Chapter 5: Anthropological and Historical Explanations for Iroquois W arfare...... 100

Traditional Explanations ...... 100 Revisionist Explanations ...... 107 Economic Explanations ...... 110 Ideological Approaches...... 114 Summary of Previous Explanations of Iroquois Warfare ...... 117

Chapter 6: Documentation of Iroquois Warfare: Between A.D. 1649 and 1701 ...... 120 A.D. 1649 to 1659 ...... 122 A.D. 1660 to 1669 ...... 132 A.D. 1670 to 1679 ...... 140 A.D. 1680 to 1701 ...... 146

Chapter 7: Documenting Ethnohistoric Accounts That Report Causes of the 'leaver Wars"...... 164 A.D. 1649 to 1659 ...... 166 A.D. 1660 to 1669 ...... 176 A.D. 1670 to 1679 ...... 180 A.D. 1680 to 1701 ...... 181 ix Euroamerican Accounts ...... 182 i. The Iroquois conflict with the Western Algonkians and French Traders, A.D. 1677 to 1684 ...... 182 ii. Denonville's Government and his Campaign against the Iroquois, A.D. 1685 to 1687 ...... 184 Iroquois Explanations ...... 186 i. The Iroquois conflict with the Illinois, Miami, Shawnee, and French Traders, A.D. 1677 to 1684 ...... 187 ii. The Causes of the Conflict with the O ttaw a and Fluron of Michilimackinac, A.D. 1681 to 1683 ...... 190 iii The Conflict with the French, A.D. 1684 to 1701.... 192

Chapter 8: Conclusions ...... 196 The Fur Trade Premise ...... 197 Prestige and Defensive Warfare ...... 208 Battle Tactics and New Technology ...... 214 Final Comments ...... 220

Bibliography...... 223

Appendix: Tables and Figures ...... 245 LIST OF TABLES

IA £ L £ Page

1 Number and percentage of recorded battles per sub-region between A.D. 1649 and 1701. Recorded battles are divided by designated time periods ...... 245

2 Data set categories, showing main and sub-catagories in which ethnohistoric information was placed for analysis ...... 247

3 Warfare database for AD. 1649 to 1701 ...... 248

4 Populations the Iroquois attacked and/or were attacked by between A.D. 1649 and 1701 ...... 282

5 List of the number of enemies the Iroquois attacked or were attacked by between A.D. 1649 and 1659 ...... 283

6 List of the number of enemies the Iroquois attacked or were attacked by between A.D. 1660 and 1669 ...... 284

7 List of the number of enemies the Iroquois attacked or were attacked by between A.D. 1670 and 1679 ...... 285

8 List of the number of enemies the Iroquois attacked or were attacked by between A.D. 1680 and 1701 ...... 286

9 Conflict resolution database for A.D. 1649 to 1701 ...... 287

10 List of who initiated combat, the Iroquois or their opponent(s), represented by the designated time periods ...... 308

11 List of the major conflicts of the "Beaver Wars" and the relationship of aggression toward Iroquois peace representatives...... 309

XI LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1 The study area showing the delineated sub-regions ...... 310

2 The traditional territory of the Iroquois ...... 311

3 Traditional portrayal of eighteenth century land claims of the Iroquois as advocated by the English. Modified from Jennings (1984) ...... 312

4 An artist's rendering of an Iroquois wooden mantlet ...... 313

5 Dramatization of an Iroquois direct assault upon an Erie fortification in A.D. 1655 ...... 314

6 Fortification styles of the seventeenth century ...... 315

7 Map of areas abandoned by indigenous occupants because of warfare with the Iroquois. The Iroquois laid claim to areas east of the Wabash River and Lake N'lichigan, but also utilized the Illinois area for hunting ______31 o

8 Map of where Iroquois attacks were focused, A.D. 1649-1659 ...... 317

9 The dispersal of the Huron and Erie in the 1650s. Note that wherever the Huron fled they were followed and attacked by the Iroquois. Little is known about the Erie dispersal except that part of this tribe fled south into the Appalachians ...... 318

10 Map of where Iroquois attacks were focused, A.D. 1660-1669 ...... 319

11 Approximate location of Northern Lake Ontario Iroquois villages in the late 1660s and 1670s, based on Konrad (1987). Many families of Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, and Oneida formed villages along the north shore for better protection from their enemies and better trade opportunities ...... 320 xii 12 Map of where Iroquois attacks were concentrated or directed, A.D. 1670-1679 ...... 321

13 Expansion of French trade and missionaries into the Great Lakes and Illinois and Mississippian regions led to the establishment of the following posts between A.D. 1670 and 1684 (Tanner 1987) ______322

14 Between A.D. 1660 to 1671 many Western Algonkian populations, that included the Potowatomie, Ottawa, Fox, Sac, Menominee, Illinois, Mascoutin, Kickapoo, Miami, Chippewa, the Iroquoian-speaking Huron and Tobacco, and Siouan- speaking Winnebago, lived in multi-tribal villages in Wisconsin and the Upper Michigan Peninsula, called the Refugee Zone (W hite 1991). After A.D. 1670, several of these tribes began to disperse out of this region ...... 323

15 Map of where Iroquois attacks were focused, A.D. 1680-1701 ...... 324

16 Year by year casualties for the Iroquois, and French and French allied Indians as reported by ethnohistoric sources, A.D. 1690-1701 ...... 325

17 In A.D. 1683 the Jesuits reported that the Shawnee were forced to abandon their country. Before this date some Shawnee had already left, fleeing to the Wabash and Illinois Rivers, and allying themselves with the Illinois and Miami. The map shows where different Shawnee groups dispersed ...... 326

18 French offensive invasions. La Barre's invasion of A.D. 1684 was stopped at La Famine by sickness (malaria) and because the Iroquois were well prepared. In contrast, Denonville's campaign in A.D. 1687 was successful, reaching its objective, the Seneca villages. Note the different routes used. Denonville purposely took a southern route so as to keep the Iroquois guessing about which tribe they were going to attack. As a result the Seneca were not aided by the other Iroquois in this specific battle ...... 327

X lll CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"It has become fashionable in recent years to view all sources as so biased that there is no objective reality to be discovered through them. We do not share the cynical view that all accounts of the past are but flawed constructions, or that any interpretation we might make of them will itself necessarily be a politically inspired construction. While admitting that all documents (even this one) are in some sense or at some level self-serving, we maintain that an objective view of the past can be approached if one reads the available sources with skeptical care and thoughtful criticism. There is an objective reality to the past, even though we may never know it with complete accuracy; to assume otherwise is ultimately self-defeating."

Dean R. Snow, Charles T. Gehring and William A. Starna (1996)

Throughout the seventeenth century the Iroquois of the eastern Great

Lakes of North America conducted warfare against at least 49 different indigenous tribes and three Euroamerican colonies (Dutch, English, and

French) stretching across a vast geographic area that included what are now two Canadian provinces (Ontario, and Quebec) and 24 American states. For over three centuries anthropologists (Abler 1992; Bradley 1987; M organ 1995 [1851]; Tooker 1963; Trigger 1976,1978) and historians (Colden 1922; D erosiers 1947; Eccles 1978 [1969], 1983; Fenton 1940; Goldstein 1969; Groulx 1976; H unt 1940; H unter 1978; Jennings 1984; Kellog 1968; Lanctot 1960; Lenig 1971; Norton 1974; Richter 1983, 1992; Parkm an 1983 [1865-1892]; W heeler-Voegelin

1974a) have been intrigued with this topic and have proposed various explanations for the cause of these conflicts. This century has seen a growing number of scholars contend that economics, specifically control of the fur trade, played a leading causal role in Iroquois warfare of the seventeenth century (Abler 1992; Bradley 1987; Derosiers 1947; Fenton 1940; H unt 1940;

Goldstein 1969; Groulx 1976; Jennings 1984; Lanctot 1960; Lenig 1971; Mcflwain

1915; Norton 1974; Richter 1983, 1992; Tanner 1987; Tooker 1963). This perspective has become so ingrained in our terminology that these conflicts are most commonly referred to by archaeologists and historians alike as the period of the "Beaver Wars" (e.g., Richter 1983). Challenges to this interpretation (Brandao 1997; Dennis 1993; N arroll 1968; Schlesier 1976) have been few in number and have primarily addressed Iroquois warfare predating the 1650s (except Brandao 1997). In addition, no diachronic studies have specifically concentrated on documenting individual incidents of hostility documented in the ethnohistoric literature.

The primary objective of this dissertation is to evaluate the validity of the use of the fur trade premise as an explanation of Iroquois participation in the "Beaver Wars" which occurred from A.D. 1649 to 1701 in the Midwest and

Northeast of North America. In order to address this question all cases of Iroquois warfare and battle tactics will be documented, chronologically and regionally, as well as ethnohistoric passages which describe causes of this warfare. The results of this research should determine whether economic explanations are valid or whether they should be discarded in favor of other interpretations. The consolidation of ethnohistoric passages explaining Iroquois warfare from the various primary texts can serve as a guide or comparison with future analyses on this topic by other Iroquoian scholars (refers to scholars who study the Iroquois rather than scholars who are

Iroquois).

While attention is given to prehistoric warfare, in general, this study focuses on Iroquois conflicts between A.D. 1649 and 1701. In addition to testing economic explanations, other motivating factors such as defense of acquired territory (for economic purposes), defense against the aggression of enemies, prestige and revenge are considered possible alternatives / explanations for warfare. Another goal of this thesis is to map chronologically where Iroquois attacks took place, and against whom, so that regional occurrences can be better visualized and interpreted. This cartographical information is important because a review of secondary sources has indicated a lack of regional maps illustrating where Iroquois warfare occurred through time.

Finally, recent hypotheses proposed in Snow's migration model

(discussed in Chapter 4) are addressed. Snow suggests that warfare by ma trilineal against patrilocal groups usually results in territorial expansion by the former. Even though Snow's theory was intended for Proto-Iroquoian populations (specifically Owasco) it is asserted that it is useful for interpreting how the Iroquois were able to defeat various tribes and incorporate large territories during the Historic Period. The Study Area

The study area encompasses several sub-regions within the Midwest and Northeast that include: the Canadian Interior, the Great Lakes, the

Illinois and Mississippi River Valleys, Iroquoia, New England, the Ohio

River Valley, the St. Lawrence River Valley, the Southern Ontario Peninsula, the Susquehanna and Delaware River Drainages, and Western New York.

Sub-regions located outside the study area, including Virginia and the

Southeast, and the South, are also included for Iroquois warfare analyses. A map of these sub-regions is shown in Figure 1. This delineation of sub- regions is used to plot incidences of warfare geographically through time and also to indicate the number of ethnohistoric citations associated with each specific region (Table 1).

Cultural populations in the study area include two generalized groups, the Western Algonkians and the Iroquois. The term Western Algonkian is used to represent several Algonkian speaking groups which include the

Miami, Potawatomie, Ottawa, Kickapoo, Chippewa, Sac, Fox, Illinois,

Mascoutin, Menominee, and Wyandot (an Iroquoian speaking group). All of these tribes formed tentative alliances with one another at various times in the seventeenth century in their conflicts with the Iroquois. Many of the Western Algonkians had been dispersed to Illinois, Wisconsin, and the

Upper Michigan Peninsula in the 1650s. In the late seventeenth and eighteenth century many of these tribes moved eastward into Indiana, western Ohio, the Lower Michigan Peninsula and the Southern Ontario Peninsula. An Introduction to Iroquois Culture

Originally, the name "Iroquois" or "Five Nations" referred to a defensive League of five allied tribes that included the Mohawk, Oneida,

Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca. In A.D. 1722 the Tuscarawas were accepted into the League and as a result during the eighteenth century the Iroquois were often collectively called the "Six Nations". At the time of European contact and throughout most of the Historic period the traditional territory of the Iroquois, called Iroquoia, encompassed the central New York region. This area was bounded in the east by Lake Champlain, Lake George and the Cats kill Mountains, to the north by the St. Lawrence River and Lake Ontario, to the west by the Genessee River and to the south by the upper drainages of the Susqueharma River (Figure 2).

Physiographically Iroquoia encompasses the glaciated flatlands between the Canadian Shield and the Appalachian highlands. This fertile region contains many glacial lakes (e.g., the Finger Lakes), rivers and small streams that contained rich aquatic resources such as salmon, eels, trout, pike, perch, bass, turtle, and other resident species. The region is dominated by elm, beech, maple and birch tree forests that are intermixed with pine and hemlock. In the northern part of Iroquoia, along the St. Lawrence River and Adirondack region, the forest is mainly composed of fir and spruce. These forests were populated by many edible animal and bird species that were utilized for food including: deer, bear, turkey, swans, ducks, geese and passenger pigeon (Fenton 1940,1978; Oswalt 1988; Snow 1994a). The individual territories and villages of the League members were aligned west to east in the following order: Seneca, Cayuga, the Onondaga, the Oneida (later the Tuscarawas built their villages in the Oneida's territory), and the Mohawk. Metaphorically this geographical alignment represented a large longhouse with the Seneca ("Keepers of the Western Door") and Mohawk

("Keepers of the Eastern Door") positioned at opposite ends. According to oral traditions the League was formed during the peak of endemic feuding between the tribes in the sixteenth century (Snow 1994a). The oral histories relate that the incessant warfare ceased through the efforts of a peacemaker named Deganawddah, who convinced the five Iroquois tribes to establish a lasting peace (Dennis 1993; H ew itt 1892a; Snow 1994a).

From these peace proceedings the League of the Iroquois was formed which established a non-aggression pact between the member tribes and which united them against any external enemies. The League became the legislative, executive and judicial authority over disputes and internal civil matters concerning the individual tribes. Decision making power was given to a council composed of representatives, called sachems, from the various tribes. The total number of sachems for the League was set at 50 and it was these representatives who decided League policy. The League council had the power to declare war and peace, receive embassies, regulate affairs with external tribes or Euroamerican colonies and establish treaties of peace or alliance. All decisions on League policy had to be unanimous (Morgan 1995 [1851]). While the League im posed a governm ental structure upon the member tribes, it was still essentially a confederacy, in which individual tribes retained their autonomy to make war or peace separately from other League members. For example at various times in the seventeenth century several

Iroquois tribes (particularly the Seneca and Cayuga) sought a separate peace with the French while other League members (e.g., the Mohawk) actively pursued warfare with New France (Richter 1992). This political autonomy in external affairs often caused factionalism within and between League members which sometimes helped w^eaken the League's military capabilities.

Linguistically, the Iroquois are categorized as an Iroquoian-speaking population. Iroquoian-speaking tribes in the Northeast that bordered

Iroquois territory in the seventeenth century included the Huron (later called the Wyandot in the Midwest), Tobacco (Tionantati), Neutral, Wenro, Erie and the Susquehannock. Other Iroquoian-speaking populations located to the south and southeast included the Cherokee, Tuscarawas, and Conoy (Fenton 1940,1978; Snow 1994a).

The Iroquois, like their Iroquoian-speaking neighbors, w^ere agriculturalists relying heavily on maize, beans, and squash for subsistence. Hunting and the use of abundant nearby aquatic resources supplemented the agricultural staples, particularly in the autumn and winter. Excess grain was stored in bark-lined subsurface pits located in the interior of villages and used throughout the winter months (Morgan 1995 [1851]; Snow 1994a; Trigger 1990).

Iroquois villages ranged in population from 200 to 2,000 individuals. It is estimated that by the historic period the Iroquois numbered 22,000 to 30,000 in total population (Snow 1992, Trigger 1990). During the seventeenth century villages became larger as the Iroquois amalgamated their populations

for defensive purposes. The historic villages were highly fortified and typically located on defensive positions such as hilltops away from major

trails or waterways. Villages contained several closely spaced longhouses

which were the principal and traditional residential structures for the

Iroquois family. These structures were of frame construction, consisting of

upright poles positioned in rectangular form with rounded comers. A second

set of upright poles bounded the inner set to hold fast the bark siding.

Longhouses ranged in size with lengths of 50 to 130 feet and an average width of 16 feet. The typical longhouse was occupied by 20 to 50 people or five to

twelve households (a household equals approximately four people: the

parents and two children [Snow 1994a]). Longhouses remained popular in

the seventeenth century but after A.D. 1700 these structures gradually began

to be superseded by the use of log cabins. Village patterns also changed. The

tightly packed centralized village that typified the seventeenth century was

replaced by irregular shaped settlements containing many single family dwellings that were often widely dispersed along river valleys (Fenton 1978;

M organ 1995 [1851]; Snow 1994a, 1997).

The Iroquois practiced a matrilineal and matrilocal kinship system, which means that males married into their wife's matriclan and relocated to

her mother's residence. Land use, property and political offices were

controlled by the matriclans. It was the matriclans within the individual tribes of the League that chose representative sachems (Morgan 1995 [1851]; Osw alt 1988; Snow 1994a).

8 The Time Frame: A.D. 1649 to 1701

Several factors were considered in the delineation of the time frame for

the present study. These included: (1) periods of warfare defined by previous research, (2) ability to detect change, 3) and existence of accessible ethnohistoric material. Review of available secondary literature indicated that several previous studies had focused on Iroquois warfare in the first half of the seventeenth century (e.g., Dennis 1993; Hunt 1940; Naroll 1968;

Otterbein 1994; Schlesier 1976; Tooker 1963). However, specific studies of

Iroquois warfare after A.D. 1650 are few in number and narrowly focus on particular conflicts or a specific behavior (e.g William and Mary's War [Eid

1979]; the fur trade [Goldstein 1969]; the mourning war complex [Richter 1992]). Iroquois studies that post-date A.D. 1650 generally do not analyze warfare but rather devote attention to political affairs and developing seventeenth and eighteenth century histories of the Iroquois population (e.g., Jennings 1984 [Iroquois land claims and the intricacies of the Iroquois

Covenant Chain]; Richter 1992 [Iroquois factionalism and history in the seventeenth and eighteenth century]).

The second half of the seventeenth century is a significant period characterized by extensive warfare over a large geographical area (in the Great Lakes, Midwest, and Northeast). Beginning in A.D. 1649 the Iroquois defeated and dispersed their Huron enemies and began successful engagements against other Iroquoian and Algonkian tribes to the west and south. The result of these wars was a dramatic expansion of their territorial claims particularly in the west (e.g., Ohio River Valley) and south (e.g., Susquehanna River Valley). It is these wars that have been labeled the "Beaver Wars" or "Iroquois Wars" on the assumption that the Iroquois were the primary aggressors acting on their wish to dominate and control access to materials (primarily furs) for the

fur trade. The warfare of this period is cited as evidence supporting economic premises. However, a regional and chronological documentation of Iroquois

warfare activities between A.D. 1649 and 1701 and the ethnohistoric passages

that explain them is notably lacking in the secondary literature. It was

decided that analysis and documentation of Iroquois warfare between A.D. 1649 to 1701 would be sufficient to test the validity of the fur trade premise as well as provide invaluable information on indigenous warfare. An extensive amount of ethnohistoric information from several primary sources (e.g., the Jesuit Relations, and New York Colonial Documents ) is available for this time frame.

Defining Warfare

Both anthropologists and historians have similarly defined warfare as the armed combat between distinct political communities (Otterbein 1968, 1970: 3). There is, however, some debate among anthropologists over how comprehensive the term should be. For example, certain types of aggression and violence such as murder or feuding might be excluded. Feuding is defined as fighting between culturally similar (related) political communities or within a community, with a common territory. This fighting is characterized by motivations of revenge, and aggression is directed by an individual or a family (Cameiro 1994; Otterbein 1968). For those who consider it to be warfare, feuding is defined the same way but labeled as

10 internal warfare, distinct from external warfare (Otterbein 1968, 1970: 3).

While feuding apparently was an important element of Proto-Iroquoian life (ie.. Snow 1994a), and to a lesser extent to the League of the Historic Period, it is not the focus of this thesis, but rather, emphasis is placed on the study and documentation of external warfare between neighboring tribes or colonies.

External warfare is defined as warfare between culturally different political communities, not of the same cultural unit (Otterbein 1968, 1970: 3). External warfare can develop from a variety of causal factors and motivations making its definition complex and problematic. In the case of the Iroquois there is often a distinction made between traditional warfare (before contact), and warfare that occurs after contact with Euromerican populations (historic warfare). The assumption made by anthropologists and historians is that after contact indigenous motivations for war changed radically to incorporate an Euroamerican economic perspective. The reasons for this interpretation and a definition of traditional Iroquois warfare are discussed in depth in Chapters 4 and 5.

Tactics and Technology

Otterbein has pointed out that both anthropologists and historians who study war have typically failed in describing specifics of battles and the actual weapons and tactics used in warfare (Otterbein 1994: xxüi). Otterbein's comments are reflective of how warfare has been addressed by Iroquoian scholars, although there are some exceptions (Abler 1989; Benn 1991;

Heidenreich 1971; Trigger 1976, 1990). While this study cannot possibly describe in detail every engagement that occurred for the time frame in

11 question a summary of the type of tactics and weapons used and how they changed over time is provided.

It has been argued that the Iroquois possession of firearms in the seventeenth century gave them a distinct advantage over their opponents and may have stimulated an imperialistic ambition to conquer other tribes

(Golden 1922; Morgan 1995 [1851]; Parkm an 1983 [1865-1892]). While imperialism has not been demonstrated, it is clear that the adoption of flintlocks and muskets created a revolutionary change in indigenous warfare

(Otterbein 1964). These early firearms were less accurate than bows (Given

1981) but they possessed several distinct advantages such as having a flatter trajectory, being less effected by wind and small overhanging branches, and having a greater range (striking distance) (Hamilton 1987: 20). When fired from behind cover or defensive works gun users were less exposed than archers. Guns also had greater penetrating power than arrows, being capable of piercing Euroamerican and indigenous armor, while the use of shot provided a greater target area. Abler (1992) has pointed out that the common defensive tactic of "dodging missiles" practiced by indigenous archers was ineffective against muskets. Guns also provided added shock value in surprise attacks and against tribes unacquainted with the weapon, causing confusion and panic. Firearms were not the only technological improvement; iron axes were also used in hand to hand combat and in cutting down palisade walls.

While Iroquoian scholars (Abler 1992) have stressed the fact that the

Iroquois technological superiority, conferred by the possession of guns and

12 metal axes, enabled them to defeat their enemies, they have not demonstrated how. Only Otterbein has attempted to address this issue. In two articles (Otterbein 1964, 1979) he has utilized ethnohistoric sources to describe Iroquois and Huron battle tactics during the Iroquois A.D. 1649 spring invasion of Huronia, and he has also outlined the general changes in

Iroquois battle tactics of the seventeenth century, focusing on how the

Iroquois used hit and run attacks during war. Beyond Otterbein's brief study little else is known about Iroquois battle tactics and how this effected their success and perhaps reasons for warfare. This dissertation will analyse the changes and success of Iroquois tactics in the seventeenth century and evaluate whether this motivated them to continue or initiate additional hostilities with other tribes.

13 CHAPTER 2 ÎVŒTHODOLOGY AND THEORY

"Faithfulness to the truth of history involves far more than a research, however patient and scrupulous, into special facts. Such facts may be detailed with the most minute exactness, and yet the narrative, taken as a whole, may be unmeaning or untrue. The narrator must seek to imbue himself with the life and spirit of the time. He must study events in their bearings near and remote; in the character, habits, and manners of those who took part in them. He must himself be, as it were, a sharer or a spectator of the action he describes."

Francis Parkm an (1983 [1865-1892])

Methodological Problems of Interpreting Ethnohistoric Sources

This study relies on ethnohistoric methodology as a guide in the research of the various past documents that are used to address goals of this

dissertation. Ethnohistory is defined as a method of study for the history of a

culture through the use of written and oral traditions (Langness 1987: 221; Galloway 1986; Snow and Lanphear 1989; Trigger 1982; Voegelin 1954).

Ethnohistoric studies that depend on written accounts utilize texts categorized

by how they were documented in the past. If a colonial text was drawn from

firsthand/eyewitness accounts of an historic event or events it is considered a primary source. Two examples of primary sources that were used for this study include the Jesuit Relations and the New York Colonial Documents.

14 Source material which is not based on eyewitness accounts is termed a secondary source. Many secondary sources contain a mixture of primary source material and historical narratives/interpretations of some event(s) or behavior(s) presented by a scholar not contemporary with the actual events described. Examples of secondary literature used in this study are Hanna's (1911) Wilderness Trail and Charlevoix's (1900) History of New France.

Primary sources are considered more reliable than secondary sources because they are firsthand accounts.

Snow and Lanphear (1989) have pointed out that the use and interpretation of ethnohistoric documents must consider that both types of texts can contain biases that skew or inaccurately depict past events. These biases can be associated with the former writers of the texts and/or misinterpretations made by scholars who interpret them. The European writers of the primary texts often exhibited biased descriptions of the indigenous cultures of the Midwest and Northeast who wrote no histories of themselves (Axtell 1981). Since Europeans are the only authors of the

Historic Period it is important to identify what biases were held by individual writers or collective works. This requires the application of several critical analyses in order to understand and evaluate the context of a past observation. These include investigating the history behind the situation; discovering the background of the observer; determining what the observers' standing was in their society; and finding out, if possible, the observers' interest and goals in presenting their particular view of the situation described (Galloway 1986). Temporal context of an account is also an important factor.

15 Once the context of a situation is attained and the background of an

author analyzed it may be possible to discern if biases exist. However, a researcher must also realize that some biases will not be recognized or simply

do not exist. Those ethnohistoric passages that were determined to contain biases were identified and discussed in the following chapters. The

identification of a bias did not necessarily mean the elimination of the

information potential of a source passage, which can still provide accurate

descriptions of an historical event. An identified bias may illuminate the goals of the writer of the passage and why he, she, or a group described a past event in such a manner.

Textual analysis must be applied to secondary sources in the same manner as primary sources (Snow and Lanphear 1989; Trigger 1982; Voegelin

1954). Secondary sources are essentially the interpretations of primary sources

by anthropologists/historians. Use of primary source material in the form of

partial quotes is often employed in secondary literature (e.g., Hanna 1911;

Jennings 1984; Richter 1992) and should be reexamined in the original sources

to see if these were accurately transcribed and/or reflect the meaning of the original passage it was extracted from.

While caution must be applied in using ethnohistoric texts, overall, these significant sources of information are invaluable as means to answering questions about the historic past (Lightfoot 1995; Snow et al. 1996). The principal primary texts available for the Midwest and Northeast were utilized to answer the questions of this project and included the following texts: The

Jesuit Relations (73 vols.) (Thwaites 1896-1901 [JR]); The New York Colonial

16 Documents (15 vols.) (O'Callaghan 1856 [NYCD]); and The Colonial Records of

Pennsylvania (15 vols.) (N-IPCP 1852 [MPCP]). Six secondary sources were also used to supplement missing data from the primary texts, and these included: History and General Description of New France, Vol. 1-6 (Charlevoix 1900);

France and England in North America, Vol. I and U (Parkm an 1983 [1865-

1892]); Letters From New France (Peyser 1992); Wilderness Trail, Vol. I and II

(Hanna 1911); Indians of Ohio and Indiana Prior to 1795 (Wheeler-Voegelin

1974a); and In Mohawk Country: Early Narratives about a Native People

(Snow et al. 1996). These primary and secondary documents contain missionary and military reports, travel narratives, trader letters and governmental papers from the early Dutch, English and French colonies. Current ethnohistoric studies use these sources exclusively when describing cultures in the Midwest and Northeast. However, surprisingly absent from the secondary literature are descriptions of the origin, content and purpose of the primary texts. It is perhaps assumed by ethnohistorians that anthropologists and archaeologists alike are familiar with or have read the major primary texts. The omission of summary descriptions of the primary sources prevents reviewers unfamiliar with these sources of being aware of potential biases associated with the material. In an attempt to remedy this problem, a brief summary of the content and background of each of the primary and secondary sources used in this study is provided below.

17 Primary Sources

The Tesuit Relations (TR)

Between A.D. 1896 and 1901 the Burrows Brothers Company of Cleveland, Ohio republished The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents (JR)

in English from the original French, Latin and Italian texts. The series, which

is composed of 73 volumes, was edited and organized by Reuben Gold

Thwaites, a prominent editor of seventeenth and eighteenth century primary

texts. While some mistranslations and errors did occur in the compilation of

the Relations, these have been identified and corrected by an addendum and errata book (Donnelly 1967). The errors that were made were relatively few

and surprisingly confined to the misinterpretation (because of unfamiliarity)

of Catholic practices (services/rituals). The Relations are composed of letters,

journals and formal Relations written by Jesuit priests and missionaries in New France between A.D. 1610 and 1791, although most of the Relations were

drafted between A.D. 1632 and 1673. Individual missionaries that were in the field sent their letters to the Jesuit superior in Quebec where they were edited

and then forwarded to France for dissemination to the public. In A.D. 1673

the Jesuits were forbidden by Pope Clementine X to publish any more

relations. As a result, after this date the Relations were only intermittingly written in the hopes they would eventually be published. In A.D. 1764 the

Jesuits were removed from France although a few missions continued in

Canada up to A.D. 1791 (Donnelly 1967).

18 What the Jesuits did manage to write is considered one of the largest

and most significant ethnohistoric resources of the seventeenth century

pertaining to the history and lifestyles of indigenous populations inhabiting the Midwest and Northeast. Because of their vivid descriptions of the native cultures and the daily ongoings of New^ France, the annually submitted

Relations became popular reading amongst the upper class and governmental officials in France (Donnelly 1967; Kenton 1925).

Throughout the seventeenth century Jesuit priests w ere sent out on many missions to distant Indian tribes in order to bring Christianity to the

Indians. They wTote prodigiously about their travels, adventures, missionary work, and explorations along the St. Lawrence River and in the interior (e.g..

Great Lakes). The Jesuits were well equipped for this task having been extensively trained in observation and the art of keeping meticulous records of their daily experiences. In order to be successful in converting the Indians, they learned their languages, habits, ideology, and strengths and weaknesses (Kenton 1925). This required the Jesuits to live and travel with a tribe or tribes for several years. As a result, the Relations contain many descriptions of the cultural behavior (e.g., religion/ mythology, linguistics, subsistence practices, warfare, political situations, etc.) they observed while living and interacting with various indigenous tribes. The close and long term contact with Indian tribes in the Northeast allowed the Jesuits to become experienced and adept in understanding Indian behavior, which gives their reports and relations credence as reliable descriptions. Another aspect that is unique to the Jesuits is that they lacked any economic incentives when doing their work with the Indians which often allowed them to present an alternative

19 perspective on political and historical events to those given by New France's governmental officials.

The Jesuits, however, were not without goals of their own, principal of which was the conversion of the indigenous inhabitants of the Midwest and

Northeast to Catholicism. Anything that got in the way of these plans was often portrayed in a negative light. Jesuit perspectives on the Iroquois were based on the impact the Iroquois had on their attempts to convert various tribes, which meant that their attitude towards the Iroquois changed at various times in the seventeenth century. For instance, in the 1620s and

1630s the Iroquois were characterized as God's punishment on the traditional

Huron who refused to convert to Catholicism and were undermining and preventing Jesuit conversion efforts in Huron villages. The characterization of the Iroquois changed in the 1640s to 1660s, when the Iroquois were successful in destroying or dispersing many of the tribes in which the Jesuits had missions. During this period the Iroquois were generally described as a ruthless enemy on the verge of destroying New France which only new settlers and military reinforcements could forestall. In reality, although the

Iroquois were eliminating or dispersing the allies of the French, they appear to have had no intention of wiping out the French colony. The Jesuits understood they were writing for an audience and sometimes dramatized historical events in heroic terms to stir emotions and action from governmental officials back in France in order to attain their goals. Their hope in the above mentioned situation was to have the French government send massive military reinforcements to New France so that the Iroquois could be driven out of the Southern Ontario Peninsula, allowing the

20 reestablishment of Jesuit missions to the Huron and other dispersed tribes.

While admittedly these type of biases are present throughout the Relations

this primary text is still considered a reliable source of information for

indigenous behavior (Otterbein 1994: xxiv).

The New York Colonial Documents (NYCD)

The Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New

York (NYCD) were compiled in the 1850s by E. B. O'Callaghan. The 15 volume set focuses on colonial documents related to the historical developm ent of N ew York betw een the dates of A.D. 1610 and 1778. The various texts placed in this multi-volume work were drawn from English and translated Dutch and French records. These records not only include historical information on New York (which includes the early Dutch government and the subsequent English administration) but also New

France, the surrounding Indian tribes (in particular the Iroquois, French allied Indians along the St. Lawrence River , and Hudson River tribes), and to a lesser extent Pennsylvania, Maryland, New England, Virginia and the interior (regions west of the Appalachians). The records contain letters, formal documents, and maps that have been written by governors, government officials, military personal, Indian agents (e.g., William

Johnson), traders, explorers, and missionaries who resided in New York, New

France, New Netherlands, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and New England. There are also a few letters from governmental officials residing in England, France and the Netherlands.

21 While there is a range of topics, in general ongoing political and economical events occurring within or outside colonial boundaries were described. Most of the documents relate to interactions and warfare that occurred between New York and New France in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. This includes information on the competition over trade, sociopolitical relations, and alliances with Indian tribes in the N^Iidwest and Northeast, land claims, and exploration. The NYCD provides extensive information on Iroquois warfare between the 1660s and A.D. 1700. Both English and French officials gave particular attention to recording who the

Iroquois were at war with, where Iroquois raids or attacks occurred, the number of casualties and deaths during battle, the number of warriors they possessed, and peace attempts or treaties. Village locations, hunting territories and political relations of the Iroquois and other tribes are also recorded.

Both Euroamerican colonies were concerned about Iroquois land claims because it affected their (the Euroamerican) own claims to the New World. It is in discussions and descriptions of Iroquois land claims where biases are present in English and French documents. Both the French and

English claimed the lands west of the Appalachian Mountains, including the

Great Lakes region. The English, who were an ally and "protectorate" of the

Iroquois and their land (with the A.D. 1684 treaty), viewed all of Iroquois territory as their (the English's) own. The English neglected and ignored diachronic changes in Iroquois land claims. As the Iroquois weakened militarily they (the Iroquois) were unable to prevent the reduction of their territory.

22 The French, on the other hand, were often at war with the Iroquois and

were worried about Iroquois successes against their (France's) Indian allies.

Victories in warfare had resulted in the expansion of Iroquois, and thus English, territorial claims. The French reaction to Iroquois claims changed

dramatically through time. During the seventeenth and early eighteenth

century the French denied English claims to the west by arguing that the

Iroquois claims to land in the west were separate from the English because the

Iroquois were an independent nation not subjugated by the English.

However, French opinions on Iroquois land claims changed with

expansionistic policies of the 1740s to A.D. 1754. During this period the

French, who were more powerful at this time, dismissed outright all Iroquois claims to lands in the west, specifically in areas where they had established

forts, such as in the Upper Ohio River Valley, the Niagara region and areas

north of Lake Ontario. These biased claims clearly run counter to the French

own descriptive comments in older documents, which had admitted to

Iroquois ownership to these areas.

Despite these biases both English and French texts are an invaluable primary source of information for Iroquois land claims and warfare that, in addition to Euroamerican comments, have numerous direct quotes of individual Iroquois who give the Iroquois point of view (if the interpreter and transcription of these quotes can be trusted). Like Euroamerican statements, the Iroquois had biases and were sometimes guilty of elaborating the actual extent of their land claims and/or victories in warfare.

23 The Pennsylvania Colonial Records

The Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania (MPCP) were compiled in the 1850s and contain ethnohistoric texts dating from A.D. 1692 to the 1780s. The geographical areas covered in these texts include

Pennsylvania, Western Maryland, Virginia, and the Middle and Upper Ohio

River Valley. Like the NYCD, the MPCP is composed of records written by governors, government officials, military officers, and trader records. These reports concern historic events occurring in Pennsylvania and the Ohio River

Valley, and to a lesser extent Virginia and Maryland. Much of the information is concerned with minutes of the Pennsylvania Assembly, which discussed a variety of colonial affairs that included governmental legislation, criminal affairs, economics, taxes and immigration. However, there is a substantial amount of information on relations with the neighboring tribes living along the Susquehanna and Upper Ohio Rivers. These tribes included the Susquehannock, Iroquois, Shawnee, Delaware, Mohican, and Conoys.

The interaction between the Indians and the Pennsylvanian government involved concerns over trade relations, land claims, land sales, warfare

(between Northern and Southern Indians, and between the Pennsylvanian government and French allied Indians) and peace treaties. The information about the Indians comes primarily from Pennsylvanian traders and Indian agents, such as Conrad Weiser and George Croghan, and government officials who attended treaties. Several prominent Indian leaders living along the

Susquehanna or Upper Ohio River also provided first hand accounts about ongoing historic events. Both the English traders and Indian leaders had few apparent biases, although it should be noted that both were either agents or

24 allies to the English. There are only a handful of French accounts in this series, so the French perspective of the Pennsylvanian government's viewpoints concerning the Upper Ohio River and western Pennsylvania are

limited to a few reports (in the NYCD) from military posts at Detroit and Ft.

Niagara betw een A.D. 1700 and 1759.

Secondary Sources

Most of the available secondary literature has biases associated with the

author's interpretation of the primary texts, which can limit their usefulness. However, at least six secondary sources were chosen because they contained

additional information not found in the primary texts or were used in lieu of

primary texts. Three sources (Hanna 1911; Peyser 1992; Wheeler-Voegelin

1974) contained an enormous amount of quoted primary textual material,

some of which was newly acquired and not discovered or included in the compilation of the original primary texts in the nineteenth century. One

source (Charlevoix 1900) was used to acquire information on a particular battle (the Iroquois attack on Ft. St. Louis) which was not described effectively

in the primary texts. Parkman's book was used because it exemplified a particular view or theme held by past scholars concerning Iroquois warfare

(Parkman 1983 [1865-1892]). Lastly, Snow, G ehring and Stam a's (1996)

compilation and copy of Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert original text was used in lieu of the original because it is an exact copy and was accessible.

A background of the six texts is provided below.

25 The History and General Description of New France (1900) was written by Father de Charlevoix in A.D. 1744. Charlevoix was a Jesuit and a devoted historian. In A.D. 1720 he traveled to New France in search of the elusive northwest passage and an opportunity to take historical notes about the

French colonies of North America. Charlevoix traversed all of the Great Lakes, then traveled down the Mississippi River to Louisiana. He took detailed notes of zoological and botanical species, geographical information, and political aspects of the colony. Charlevoix was very patriotic and opinionated about the history of New France and negatively characterizes the

English and Iroquois. Because biases were evident in Charlevoix's work it was only used to illuminate more details on the Iroquois and French conflict at Ft. St. Louis in the 1680s since the primary sources used for this dissertation contained few references concerning this event.

France and England in North America was written by Francis Parkman (1983 [1865-1892]), a noted historian of the nineteenth century. This text describes the colonial history of New France and England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Parkman was an opinionated author who often portrayed the Iroquois in heroic terms as having imperialistic agendas.

Parkman's work and explanations of Iroquois warfare were used to illustrate the "Traditional" perspective of Iroquois warfare.

The Wilderness Trail, written by Charles Hanna (1911) contains a narrative / history of historical events related to the frontier period in

Pennsylvania, Ohio, Maryland, and West Virginia, although other geographical regions (such as New York, the Midwest, Great Lakes and New

26 France) are discussed to a certain extent. The narrative/history includes

ethnohistoric material from the 1640s to the 1760s although the focus of the

book is on the time period of A.D. 1692 to 1752. Hanna concentrated on describing the expansion of the colonial frontier into Western Pennsylvania

and the Upper Ohio River. Specific topics discussed include the relations

between the colonies, the colonies and the Indians, activities of EngHsh and

French traders, Euroamerican and Indian land claims, Euroamerican explorations in the Ohio River Valley, Euroamerican forts and trade post locations, Indian settlement locations and population statistics, and violence and warfare between Euroamerican colonies and the Indians. Hanna included many quoted ethnohistoric passages from various sources as he documented the historical events. His ethnohistoric information comes from French Records (e.g., JR) the N-Iiddle English colonies (e.g., NYCD,

MPCP, the William Johnson papers, and Maryland archives) and southern colonial sources (e.g., Virginia and the Carolina archives). Hanna's book contains subjective comments on the many passages he presents. Most of his opinions relate to issues concerning land claims and sociopolitical relations between the colonies. While most of Hanna's evaluations or explanations of historical events are reasonable, some are not and are based on sketchy or no evidence.

Indians of Ohio and Indiana Prior to 1795 was compiled by E. W heeler-

Voegelin (1974a). This comprehensive book details land use, land claims and

Indian settlement locations in the Midwest during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Wheeler-Voegelin provides quoted ethnohistoric passages concerning the above topics from a variety of primary sources that

27 included French, English and American documents. Wheeler-Voegelin did not attempt to explain the causations of Iroquois warfare, but indicated that many claims of victories were probably exaggerations perpetuated by the

Iroquois and English.

Letters from New France, written by J. Peyser (1992), presents quoted late seventeenth and early eighteenth century ethnohistoric passages from the western French forts/posts. Many of these passages have been newly found and presented and are not in the JR or NYCD. Peyser's research was used to document Iroquois warfare and involvement in the west during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century.

In Mohawk Country: Early Narratives About a Native People, written by Snow, Gehring and Stama (1996) is a compilation of various narratives and observations of various Euroamericans who traveled through Mohawk territory or the eastern New York region in the seventeenth to early nineteenth centuries. These assorted narratives are exact copies of the originals that have been acquired from several primary texts. One particular narrative was used from this compilation, the Harmen Meyndertsz van den

Bogaert expedition into Mohawk territory. This book was used in lieu of the primary text because it was accessible.

Data Retrieval and Organization

Research was initiated with an analysis of the Jesuit Relations which contains a very large number of ethnohistoric passages that describe warfare

28 betw^een A.D. 1613 and 1759. This sizable source demonstrated the necessity for a computer assisted categorized data base for the storage and consistent organization of retrieved information that came from the various primary texts. Analysis of these texts resulted in the collection and categorization of various cultural behaviors associated with the Iroquois and placement of these behaviors in topical data set categories (see Table 2). The data set was prepared in a similar fashion as behavioral attribute categories were organized in the Human Relations Area Files [HRAF] (Murdock et al. 1950).

The FIRAF was created to assist in the documentation of observed behaviors of individual cultures. Behavioral categories were used to help facilitate cross cultural studies. The term behavior is defined as an observable interaction between an organism/population and its environment (Langness 1987).

Seven human behaviors were selected and designated as categories under which information was inserted in a chronological manner. Each category may have several subcategories representing related behavior. The main categories are those defined below:

(1) Demography: characteristics of human populations, such as size,

growth, density, distribution, and vital statistics associated with disease.

(2) Economics: the production, distribution and consumption of

commodities. For this study emphasis is placed on the recovery

of information associated with the fur trade.

29 (3) Geography: the identification of place names, regions, rivers territories, tribal names and references to locations and names of villages/territories, and land claims.

(4) History and Culture Change: this category denotes significant

historical events such as the discovery of the N^Iississippi River by LaSalle. Culture Change includes any information

concerning technological change or change in any behavior that relates to warfare (e.g., a change in battle tactics).

(5) Intergroup Relations: This category contains all passages that

indicate which tribes have alliances, friendships or are enemies of the Iroquois.

(6) Political Behavior: is a broad subject that refers to policies, goals, or

affairs of Iroquois external relations with other tribes and Euroamerican colonies or of the internal relations of tribes

within the League Confederacy. This category includes subject

matter related to the exploitation or control of other tribes,

internal factionalism, treaties with other tribes or Euroamerican colonies, and trade relations and alliances.

(7) Warfare: is defined as the armed combat between distinct political communities. This category includes ethnohistoric passages

referring to warfare (e.g., raids, battles, combat), strategy, tactics,

peacemaking, and statistics relating to casualties and deaths.

30 An eighth category, labeled as Miscellaneous, includes information

that did not fall under the denoted categories but was deemed important for future historic research. Information that could fit in the above delineated

categories but was not related to the thesis of the dissertation was not recorded (e.g., the political interaction between the Creeks and Seminoles).

An example of how ethnohistoric information was recovered is

demonstrated by an actual primary source passage concerning Iroquois

warfare found in a French passage from the New York Colonial Documents

(NYCD 9: 537):

"About the ZS"' of July [1692], Sieur de Lusignan, a reduced Captain, two other officers and thirty men were attacked, on their way from Three Rivers to Montreal, by thirty-nine of the enemy, called Mohawks and Mohegans (Loups), neighbors of the English of Orange, who fired on them unexpectedly about nine o' clock in the morning, whilst passing along the shore of the Richelieu islands, above Lake St. Peter; on this occasion Sieur de Lusignan and three soldiers were killed and two wounded."

This ethnohistoric information was inserted into the data base in the following way:

70 July 28, 1692 The French reported that a party of 33 French soldiers en route to Montreal from Three Rivers were attacked by 39 Mohawks and Mohicans along the shore of the Richelieu Islands above Lake St. Peter. Four French soldiers were killed, and two wounded. NYCD 9: 537

The above passage refers to warfare and was placed under

categorization number for warfare which is 70. The date of the passage (e.g., July 28, 1692), was included with the passage and then it was placed

chronologically within the category. At times, specific dates were not possible, 31 as, for example, an event may only be described as happening in the autumn,

so a day cannot be given. If no date was given, which was surprisingly rare,

then this was stated. Dates of events are the actual dates presented in the primary texts and have not been readjusted according to later changes made

in the Gregorian calender in the eighteenth century. In addition to

calendrical and chronological elements, the following information about an

entered passage was included if evident: a description of who was giving the report (whether it was French, English, Iroquois, etc.), identification of where

the event occurred (e.g., Richelieu Islands), and summary of the event (e.g., an Iroquois and Mohican attack on a French detachment). In summarizing

the event, essential details were described. For example, in the above account on warfare, the combatants were identified and number of killed and wounded were mentioned. If the number of attacking or defending force was given, it was recorded. The ethnohistoric source of each passage was referenced in abbreviated form (e.g., NYCD = New York Colonial Documents,

JR = Jesuit Relations) and the page number(s) it was found on.

If an inventoried passage was deemed very important in showing a viewpoint of the informant or situation that specifically addressed questions of the dissertation, then the passage was directly quoted. This was often done when a passage presented the Iroquois, other Indians, French, English, and

Dutch viewpoints on the reasons for warfare. For example, the following passage is a first-hand quote of Governor Denonville (of New France) that vividly expresses his personal feelings concerning the Iroquois which would be difficult to adequately paraphrase:

32 "The natural treachery of a people [Iroquois] without faith and without religion, require us to be so far distrustful of them that you ought not to blame me for using precaution against their restlessness and caprice."

Governor. Denonville, 1687 (NYCD 3: 459)

The analysis of the ethnohistoric sources resulted in the creation of a large data base (389 pp.) that includes 3,571 entries that date from A.D. 1628 to

1795. The division of the data base into categories allowed Iroquois behavior to be analyzed longitudinally. Incidences of warfare and the various locations where it occurred were regionally mapped based on the comprehensive data attained from the various primary texts. Tracking the number of recorded incidences of warfare per regional area helped clarify where battles were focused and which enemies or areas experienced the brunt of Iroquois attacks. Other researchers have successfully used similar demographical analyses of ethnohistoric material to address historical questions in a chronological manner (e.g.. Wood's [1989] diachronic study of sub-regional population sizes of Historic Indian tribes east of the Mississippi River).

Interpretation of Iroquois Warfare

Once Iroquoian warfare and its reported causes have been documented, an assessment of the results will examine whether the ethnohistoric evidence supports current economic interpretations which are defined in Chapter 5. It will be determined whether the proponents of these theories made their case or if other causes such as defensive reactions or prestige were more important or equally significant as causes of warfare. An evolutionary perspective, 33 described below, will be applied to interpret how prestige and status impacted

Iroquois warfare. The prestige and defensive premises are described below.

Prgstigg

Iroquoian researchers have always considered prestige an important variable for why the Iroquois and other Eastern Woodland Indians conducted warfare (e.g., N arroll 1968; Schlesier 1976; Trigger 1978, 1990). How ever, no historical studies have considered evolutionary perspectives for explaining prestige. Over the past 20 years two researchers, Amotz Zahavi and Avishag

Zahavi, have conducted extensive research on providing support for their ideas related to wasted energy (handicaps) and Darwinian fitness in species.

This research has resulted in a recent publication. The Handicap Principle

(1997). The Handicap Principle looks at the relationships between prey and predators and at sexual selection. Zahavi and Zahavi suggest that behavioral traits exist in species that actually handicap or appear to decrease the fitness of individuals, but in actuality enable the fittest individual to survive, or to gain an advantage in being selected as a mate, by increasing its standing within a group. One such behavioral handicap exhibited by both animals and humans is prestige. Prestige is defined as prominence or influential status achieved through success, renown, or wealth. Prestige is a handicap because an individual or population must put itself at greater risk and/or expend more effort to attain its benefits. While Zahavi and Zahavi concentrated on explaining prestige behavior in animals, they believed that prestige in humans, while complex, was similar in nature.

34 Indigenous tribal populations of the sixteenth century typically had a territory associated with their population which they inhabited and utilized for resources. This is similar to many animal species. Territories fluctuated in size over the history of a tribe and eventually disappeared if a culture became extinct or was dispersed. Zahavi and Zahavi (1997) point out that prestige is associated with territory and both animals and humans gain prestige by owning and protecting territories. Sometimes animals and humans gain territories that are larger than is needed for practical subsistence.

To hold on to such large territories requires greater amounts of energy and puts the owner at greater risk from attacks by competitors (because defenses are stretched thin). Logically this would not be beneficial to a species or group. However, Zahavi and Zahavi (1997) argue that successfully holding on to these larger territories, what they call "superterritories", provides an individual or a group with increased prestige among their peers/competitors which in turn provides increased benefits (e.g., increased opportunity with potential mates, greater respect or subordination of peers and competitors).

Zahavi and Zahavi's ideas on superterritories and prestige can be applied as an additional explanation for Iroquois warfare in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. It is evident from the ethnohistoric literature that between A.D. 1650 and 1684 the Iroquois attained a vast amount of new territory to the west and south of Iroquoia through successes in war. The

Iroquois claimed this land and actively tried to defend it from intrusions by the French and other tribes. This territory was much larger than the Iroquois needed for subsistence purposes, which begs the question of why they would handicap themselves by spending excessive time and energy to protect it,

35 putting their warriors and families at greater risk. It is argued, using the

Handicap Principle, that the Iroquois tried to maintain a hold on this vast territory because it allowed them to show off their authority and power

among their peers. The advantages of holding on to such a large territory

included trade and an alliance with the English. Other tribes in the

Northeast had no such incentives because they had not acquired such a large

tract of territory.

It is also suggested that importance and great prestige was associated with peace ambassadors in Iroquois culture, causing or intensifying warfare

when these individuals were killed by an enemy. The role of an Iroquois peace ambassador required bravery and courage, because unlike warriors who entered battle fully armed, peace ambassadors typically entered an enemy's territory unarmed and unconcealed. Putting themselves into the power of

their enemies (a strong handicap), peace ambassadors exposed themselves to injury and death. It is argued that the Iroquois viewed the role of peace ambassadors as prestigious because they faced increased risk and were representative figures of the League, and their death at the hands of another tribe or Euroamerican population was a loss of face. Warfare would be a solution to this loss of face, for prestige could be regained if the transgressor were successfully attacked or defeated. For this assertion to be supported, there should be ethnohistoric evidence showing that when Iroquois peace ambassadors were killed, the Iroquois responded with aggression against the perpetrator of the violence. If this is not the case then warfare did not occur or intensify after the death of an ambassador as a result of prestige being associated with this office.

36 Defensive Warfare

Except for a few individuals (e.g., Dennis 1993), Iroquoian scholars have argued that the "Beaver Wars" were initiated solely by the Iroquois. This depiction characterizes the Iroquois as excessively aggressive, warlike, and hostile to peace. These characterizations have reinforced the definition and labeling of Iroquois warfare in seventeenth century as the "Beaver Wars" or "Iroquois Wars". However, Iroquoian scholars have not provided documented evidence of events or battles that show the Iroquois were indeed the aggressors. Recently, Dennis (1993) challenged this notion of an aggressive Iroquois culture and through his studies suggested that the

Iroquois initiated few of the major conflicts between A.D. 1609 to 1660.

Analysis of the warfare that occurred during the "Beaver Wars" will attempt to discern who started each conflict. This is an important question since the fur trade premise implies that indigenous cultures participating in the

Euroamerican trade market had to be offensively oriented in order to replace their dwindling fur resources. If this is true the Iroquois should be starting the majority or all of the so called "Beaver Wars" as the fur trade premise im plies.

37 CHAPTERS IROQUOIS STUDIES

"Constraints on length have kept me from providing more than just a brief introduction to the vast literature on the Iroquois. I am unable even to provide a comprehensive list of references, for such a list would consume most of the volume" (Snow 1994a: xvi)."

Dean Snow, in his history The Iroquois, referring to the voluminous nature of Iroquois literature

The goal of this chapter is to provide a historical summary of previous research conducted on Iroquois culture by anthropologists and historians.

Since the first European set foot onto North America, the Iroquois have been the most studied and described indigenous culture east of the Mississippi

River. The over 300 years of observations and interest in the League and its individual tribes has resulted in the writing of several hundred books and articles by amateurs and professionals alike. However, for the purpose of this study it was decided to limit the summary to what this researcher considers the most significant works. The various works that are identified were divided into chronological periods to show how the focus and topic of

Iroquois research has changed through time and what ongoing ideas or controversies are currently shaping this field of study.

38 Seventeenth Century Literature

The first Euroamerican settlers of North America that settled along the eastern seaboard and the St. Lawrence River came into contact with many different indigenous tribes. The outcome of these contacts varied from being beneficial (e.g., trade and alliance) to disastrous (e.g., disease and warfare) for both groups. From the Euroamerican perspective the American Indian was at first a curiosity, something new, exotic, and untamed (Axtell 1992).

Euroamerican settlers, in particular governmental officials and missionaries, began to write about the customs of the Indians in order to provide entertainment and amusement for the "civilized" populace in Europe.

However, this attitude towards the Indians quickly changed when the various tribes helped achieve or interfered with Euroamerican economic, religious and political goals. Colonial governments (e.g., the Dutch, French, and

English), concerned with potential enemies, territorial claims, and the fur trade, began keeping informative records on tribal population, land claims, alliances and warfare. Religious missionaries, in particular the Jesuits, were committed to Christianizing the Indians, and provided a substantial amount of literature on their experiences. It is within the context of the goals of various individuals within the colonial governments and the missionaries that Iroquois culture was described during the seventeenth century. As a result there is a sizable amount of ethnohistoric material written by colonial governmental officials, explorers, fur traders and missionaries that describe tribal names, tribal territories, warfare with and between indigenous groups, tribal population estimates, alliances, peace treaties, trade, disease outbreaks, baptisms, and village locations. However, none of the writers of these

39 passages purposely set out to describe or study Iroquois culture, as would

occur in later centuries.

Several primary source materials were written in the seventeenth

century Dutch, English and French colonies that contain descriptive accounts or information concerning the Iroquois. These include the Jesuit Relations

(Thwaites 1896-1901), the New York Colonial Documents (O'Callaghan 1856),

the Pennsylvania Colonial Documents (N'IPCP 1852), the Champlain,

Lahontan and Sagard narratives (Champlain 1922-36; Lahontan 1905; Sagard

1939), and Narratives of New Netherlands (Jameson 1909). Several of these

texts were explicitly described in Chapter 2. The Champlain narratives are comprised of letters, notes and accounts given by Samuel de Champlain between A.D. 1604 and 1618 during his travels and exploration of the St. Lawrence River region. Lahontan's narratives concern his military experiences in New France between A.D. 1683 and 1694. Father Sagard's (a

Jesuit) narrative concerns his experiences while traveling to and living among the Huron. The Narratives of New Netherlands contain Dutch accounts betvv’^een A.D. 1609-1664, most of which are found in the NYCD.

These primary sources exclusively are used by anthropologists and historians when conducting research on seventeenth century Iroquois culture.

Eighteenth Century Literature

The eighteenth century saw a slight change in the type of literature written about the Iroquois. While governmental or missionary documents related to exploration, tribal land claims, land surveys, alliances, trade,

40 treaties, and warfare remain the primary sources of information for this century (e.g., Alvord and Bidgood 1912; Bailey 1947; Darlington 1893;

Hammond 1939; Kellogg 1916,1968; Kellogg and Thwaites 1905; LowTie and Clarke n.d.; Margry 1876-1886; N^Iichigan Pioneer and Historical Society 1916;

Murphy 1994; Sullivan et al. 1921-1957; Stevens et al. 1972; Thwaites and

Kellogg 1908, 1912), there w ere a few individuals who began to w rite m ore in depth analyses about the Indians and in particular the Iroquois (Bartram 1751;

Charlevoix 1900; Colden 1922; Heckwelder 1820; Lafitau 1974 [1727], 1977 [1727]). These writings elaborated on Iroquois culture, history, and their environment. They provide the first detailed descriptions of Iroquois oral legends, village patterns, subsistence, and religious beliefs.

Perhaps the most significant piece of secondary literature written in this period was The History of the Five Indian Nations of Canada by

Cadwallader Colden (1922). This was the first attempt at documenting a history of the Iroquois League. Colden, a prodigious writer in the natural sciences, was especially interested in the surrounding indigenous tribes of

New York, and in particular, the Iroquois. Colden befriended the Iroquois, and was even adopted by the Mohawks. He was also seriously involved in the governmental concerns of the Colony of New York (as lieutenant- governor) and as a result his relationship with the Iroquois allowed him to play an important role in the reaffirmation of political ties between the

English and Iroquois League in the first half of the eighteenth century. When Colden wrote his history the Iroquois were wavering in their alliance with the English (1720s to 1730s) and both the English and French were desperately trying to attract or secure the Iroquois to their colonial interests. With this in

41 mind there is no doubt that part of the reason Colden wrote this book was to

convince the King of the importance of the Iroquois. Colden demonstrated

how the Iroquois acted as a barrier to the French and hoped that once the

King realized this fact he would supply the American colonies with goods

and gifts for the Indians, which were in low supply. Colden, however, was a friend of the Iroquois, and was genuinely sincere and interested in providing

a history of their people. In writing his history, oral tales and descriptions

provided by the Iroquois were utilized, as well as English traditions and

accounts, and several French sources. Colden did not have access to all of the

primary texts (e.g., the Jesuit Relations) nor did he use all of the documentary

records available from English sources. However, as he indicated on the first page of his book, he was the first to provide a comprehensive history for the

Iroquois. The history concentrates on warfare, political events and relations

between the Iroquois and their tribal and Euroamerican neighbors during the seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth centuries. Colden also provided

descriptions of Iroquois culture based on their and his interpretations of

certain events or customs (e.g., adoption, hospitality, causes of warfare).

Colden and other eighteenth century historians and observers of

Iroquois culture (Charlevoix 1900; Lafitau 1974 [1727], 1977 [1727]) had a

pronounced impact on the next generation of Iroquois researchers in the nineteenth century (e.g., Morgan 1995 [1851]; Parkm an 1983 [1865-1892]). Several nineteenth century scholars (e.g., Morgan and Parkman) used and elaborated on many of Colden's explanations and interpretations of Iroquois warfare.

42 Nineteenth Century Literature

Nineteenth century literature on the Iroquois was dominated by studies devoted to the research of Iroquois culture and/or the development of chronological histories of the League in the seventeenth and/or eighteenth centuries. It is during this century that the first anthropological studies were conducted (e.g., Beauchamp 1885; Hale 1883,1885; Hewitt 1892a, 1892b, 1894;

Morgan 1995 [1851], Smith 1883). While several of these early anthropological studies were or contained a history about the Iroquois in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the focus of most were on general descriptions or particular elements of Iroquois culture. The first and foremost anthropological study of the Iroquois during this period was conducted by

Lewis Henry Morgan and presented in the book The League of the Iroquois.

Morgan's study of the Iroquois is often considered "the first scientific account" or ethnography of an Indian culture (Bohannon and Glazer 1988: 30). Like other scholars of his time he provided a history of the Iroquois during the seventeenth and eighteenth century but also supplied detailed descriptions of their customs, behef systems, kinship systems, subsistence practices, type of housing, values, language, form of government, travel methods, geography, games, festivities, hunting techniques, and warfare. Morgan also vividly described and provided drawings of many of the artifacts that the traditional

Iroquois used such as clothing, pottery, canoes and wampum. Morgan gathered most of his information by observing the Iroquois of his time period and recording oral histories from individuals of the League. From his studies on the Iroquois, Morgan began to make cross-cultural generalizations on the development of human populations as a whole. Morgan's ethnological

43 studies and thoughts on the evolution of human populations were introduced in his book Ancient Society (1977). From this work he outlined

his theory of cultural evolution, which advocates the development of human

culture in stages (this is elaborated on in Chapter 5). This theory influenced the next generation of anthropologists such as V. Gordon Childe, Leslie

White, and Marvin Harris (Bohannon and Glazer 1988).

Morgan's work motivated late nineteenth century

anthropologists/historians to devote individualistic studies on particular

aspects of Iroquois culture rather than the general culture histories. For

example several studies were conducted on the White Dog ceremony (Beauchamp 1885; Hale 1885), while other studies such as H ew itt's (1892a,

1894) and Smith's (1883) looked at myths of the Iroquois, in particular those

associated with the creation of the League. Morgan's legacy of recording

Iroquois culture and tradition would continue into the twentieth century where later scholars such as William Fenton conducted intensive

ethnographies about the past and present day Iroquois culture.

Several histories and biographies of the Iroquois (e.g., Joseph Brant)

were written by historians of the nineteenth century (e.g., Hubbard 1886; Parkman 1983 [1865-1892]; Schoolcraft 1847; Stone 1838). In the same spirit as

Colden, histories of the League were often devoted to the role the Iroquois

played in the conflict between the French and English colonies of the

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Schoolcraft (1847), like Colden,

provided the typical history of the Iroquois in the colonial period. However,

Schoolcraft's book. Notes on the Iroquois, also provided early archaeological

44 connections with the historic League and elaborated on ethnographic descriptions, subsistence practices, oral histories/tales, legends, and elements of Iroquois cosmology. Although his ethnographic observations were not as focused or complete as Morgan's, Schoolcraft proceeded him as the first researcher to use historical, ethnographical and archaeological information in studying Iroquois culture.

The most prominent historian of this time was Francis Parkman who gained recognition for his history of New France and the English colonies in North America. Throughout his histories the Iroquois were portrayed as important participants in the conflicts between the Euroamerican colonies.

Parkman provided subjective explanations for why the Iroquois went to war that paralleled several of Morgan's perspectives. Both scholars suggested that the Iroquois were innately superior to their Algonkian speaking neighbors in the art of war and that they possessed an "insensate fury" (Parkman 1907

[1867]: 336) and "universal spirit of aggression" (Morgan 1995 [1851]: 8) w hich drove them to it. This perspective became the basis for scholarly explanations

(discussed in Chapter 5) of Iroquois warfare, which remained unchallenged until the 1940s.

Twentieth Century Literature

This century has seen a substantial increase in the number of Iroquois studies conducted by archaeologists, cultural anthropologists, and historians.

Research has focused on a wide variety of topics such as mythology, subsistence practices, kinship, economics, government, relations with other

45 tribes (such as the Covenant Chain), histories, impact of disease, origins (e.g., in situ and migration theories), associated artifact assemblages, settlement patterns, linguistics, oral histories/tales, ideology and warfare (particularly its cause). For these type of studies, anthropologists and historians of this century have relied extensively on ethnohistoric texts in providing new analyses and interpretations of Iroquois culture. Some of these studies have used oral histories and archaeological information to supplement and assess ethnohistoric descriptions of Iroquois culture in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Cross cultural ethnologies and the progression of theories related to the origins and development of Iroquois culture have become increasingly common. The literature of this century has produced varying interpretations, resulting in debate and disagreements concerning the description and explanation of certain elements of prehistoric and historic Iroquois culture. Explanations of Iroquois culture have changed due to new evidence from and/or réévaluation of the archaeological and ethnohistoric record. This has resulted in a greater and more refined understanding of the

Iroquois than what was presented by scholars in the previous two centuries.

The literature/research conducted during this century is presented chronologically and broken up temporally in order to more easily summarize individual works and to better identify distinctive research trends of a particular period.

46 1900 to 1939

The early years of the twentieth century saw a continuation of the influence of Lewis Henry Morgan which was exemplified by the broadening of the type of research conducted. While seventeenth and eighteenth century histories stiU focused on Iroquois political/warfare interactions with the early

Euroam erican colonies (Beauchamp 1900, 1976 [1905]; Lydekker 1938; M organ

1926; Scott 1912), many additional studies were performed that concentrated on ethnographic and oral descriptions of Iroquois legends, cosmology/mythology, ritual ceremonies, subsistence practices, and governm ent (Converse 1908; C om planter 1938; H ew itt 1903, 1920,1928, 1933;

Parker 1909,1910,1913,1916a, 1916b, 1923).

Of the ethnographical studies from this period, Hewitt's and Parker's stand out as significant contributions that equal the effort placed on detailing cultural behavior instilled by Morgan. Hewitt continued his studies on

Iroquois culture, which had begun in the late nineteenth century, with contributions on Iroquois cosmology/religion (1903, 1928), the form and structure of Iroquois government (1920), and the role of women in Iroquois society (1933). A. C. Parker represented a new interest by individuals of the

Iroquois League to record and write about their own culture (also e.g., Complanter 1938). Parker, like Hewitt, expounded on many aspects of

Iroquois myths and legends (1923) and religious beliefs (1913). He also looked at medicine societies (1909), subsistence practices (in particular the use of maize [1910]), Iroquois government (1916b) and the results of the burgeoning field of archaeology at Iroquois sites (1916a). Archaeology of this period was

47 still in its infancy and was focused on site location and the development of

artifact typologies associated with the Iroquois. Although some work had

been conducted in the late nineteenth century, it was not until Parker (1916a) and Houghton's (1916) works that archaeological perspectives of Iroquois

culture came to the forefront. Parker in particular began to use archaeology to

explain Iroquois origins. Parker saw similarities between Iroquois material

culture and archaeological assemblages in the Ohio River Valley (e.g.,

similarities in ceramics). Tied into Parker's perceived archaeological

similarities were the Iroquois oral legends of their origins, which seem to

indicate that they came from the southwest or west (also see Houghton 1927)

and that they had moved eastward, displacing the mound builders. Archaeologists later came to realize that there were distinct stylistic differences between prehistoric Iroquoian assemblages and that of the Ohio

River Valley, which indicated no ancestral connection. Parker, however, was one of the first to suggest that the Iroquois had migrated from somewhere else. These early attempts to understand the prehistoric past stimulated subsequent archaeological endeavors to identify cultural phases, ceramic sériations, and settlement demography.

1940 to 1969

Between 1940 and 1969 the amount of Iroquois literature continued to grow. So much so that by 1969 the first published bibliography (Weinman

1969) of Iroquois studies was produced in an attempt to compile a list of the substantial amount of previous works. This bibliography would not be the last (Tooker 1985). Because of the extensive amount of literature produced

48 during this specific period it was divided topically into historical studies,

ethnographical studies, and archaeological studies.

Historical studies of this period began to focus on particular aspects of

Iroquois history rather than providing general histories of the Iroquois role in the colonial period. In 1940 George Hunt wrote a monumental work called

the Wars of the Iroquois which attempted to explain why the Iroquois went to war in the first half of the seventeenth century. He asserted that economics (the fur trade and a desire to be middlemen) had been the motivating factor for warfare. Hunt was the first to challenge previous explanations (ie.

Morgan and Parkman) that the Iroquois were genetically inclined to make war. Hunt's work is elaborated on in Chapter 5, but needless to say, his work changed the way subsequent Iroquoian scholars addressed Iroquois warfare.

Although the middle man status part of his theory has not been accepted, the notion that economics forced the Iroquois to make war on their neighbors continues to be the primary explanation among historians and anthropologists (Abler 1992; Bradley 1987; Derosiers 1947; Eccles 1978 [1969],

1983; Fenton 1940; G oldstein 1969; Groulx 1976; H unt 1940; Jennings 1984;

Lanctot 1960; Lenig 1977; McHwain 1915; Richter 1983, 1992; Tanner 1987; Tooker 1963).

There were, however, a few doubters who did not accept portions of Hunt's premise or did not consider it valid at all (Naroll 1968; Trelease 1962). Trelease pointed out the lack of proof for Hunt's middlemen status assertions and questioned the imminent importance given to economics at the expense of other causes, such as prestige- or revenge-motivated warfare and the

49 Iroquois technological advantage in weapons. Naroll suggested that the fur trade had no association to Iroquois warfare in the 1640s or 1650s and also proposed that prestige and revenge were the most significant causal factors.

Trelease and NaroITs sentiments would be echoed in a few later works

(Brandao 1997; Dennis 1993; Schlesier 1976; Trigger 1976, 1978) w hich also questioned Hunt's assumptions, but the vast majority of historians/anthropologists have chosen to overlook their concerns.

Additional historical topics were brought forward during this period by William Fenton, who wrote an outstanding historical article on the uniqueness of the geographical and cultural aspects of Iroquoian-speaking tribes as contrasted to the surrounding Algonkian-speaking tribes in his article "Problems Arising from the Historic Northeastern Position of the

Iroquois" (1940). Fenton challenged Iroquoian researchers to understand better the prehistoric origins of the Iroquois. Fenton also felt that more research was needed on linguistics, Iroquois warfare and its connection to the fur trade, and the reservation period. In summation he demanded "a new synthesis" (Fenton 1940: 17). In addition to the above concerns, both Fenton and Hunt questioned the accuracy of some of the conquest and territorial claims portrayed by previous historians. This skepticism of earlier histories would stimulate further questioning and has resulted in scholarly revisions that reevaluate the role the Iroquois played in land claims, political power, and warfare during the colonial period (e.g., Jennings 1976, 1984; Merrell and Richter 1987).

50 An example of an early revisionist writing was Jennings' 1965 article

on the Iroquois relationship with the Delaware. Jennings questioned the accuracy of traditional portrayals that the Iroquois had conquered the

Delaware and then gained control over their lands. Jennings argued that this was not the case and provided the first revision of the traditional histories of

Colden, Morgan, and Parkman which had been accepted wholesale as accurate depictions of the past. This would not be the last article/book that challenged the "Iroquois mystic" which had ascribed the confederacy superhuman qualities.

Other historic studies looked at specific aspects of Iroquois culture not addressed in previous histories. For example, A. F. Wallace (1957) analyzed the Iroquois policy of neutrality during the eighteenth century, Otterbein

(1964) looked at Iroquois battle tactics of the seventeenth century, and Trealease (1960) provide an in depth analysis of Indian relations with the

New York government in the seventeenth century.

Ethnographical or cultural studies continued to look at a variety of

Iroquois behaviors or customs. Some of the studies were additions to or new interpretations of cultural behaviors / beliefs of the Iroquois (Blau 1964;

Deardorff 1951; Fenton 1949; Snyderm an 1948; Tooker 1965, 1967; Wallace

1946; Wallace 1969). For example, P. A. Wallace (1946) readdresses the Legend of Deganawidah in his book The White Roots of Peace, in which he synthesizes several oral traditions of the epoch and the concept of the tree of peace. Other researchers provided descriptions or studies on aspects of Iroquois culture that had not been looked at before (Fenton 1941; 1950; 1953;

51 Reynolds 1957). Fenton's description of the false face societies, the Mnemonic

cane, and the Eagle dance is an example of the pursuit of new research topics.

Archaeological endeavors expanded rapidly and saw the introduction of prehistoric ceramic typologies, studies of settlement patterns, and theories on how the Iroquois developed over time. During the 1940s it was Griffin,

Ritchie and MacNeish who laid the interpretative foundations for these subjects. In 1943 James Griffin addressed the issue of Iroquois uniqueness and questions of their origins in his article "The Iroquois in American Prehistory"

(Griffin 1943a). Griffin used contemporary archaeological evidence to evaluate traditional viewpoints on Iroquois prehistory. At this time the popular opinion was that the Iroquois had migrated from somewhere else, such as the Ohio River Valley (e.g., Parker's premise). Much of the migration assumptions had been based on oral legends/ traditions and were not based on concrete archaeological evidence. Griffin, an expert on Midwestern archaeology, had just finished his lengthy and comprehensive work The Fort

Ancient Aspect (1943b). He pointed out the deficiencies in the current migration theories, citing the lack of any connection between Ft. Ancient and prehistoric Iroquois archaeological assemblages. Griffin suggested that the field of archaeology would resolve the issue of Iroquois ancestry and believed that an in situ development from earlier Woodland populations or migrations from the St. Lawrence River Valley and the Southeast were viable possibilities.

In 1952 Richard MacNeish conducted extensive studies on prehistoric Iroquoian ceramic assemblages. MacNeish concluded that Owasco ceramics

52 had evolved directly from older Late Woodland Point Peninsula types, and suggested that Iroquoian populations had developed in situ. This premise quickly permeated archaeological thought and interpretation of Iroquois prehistory. As archaeological evidence began to support MacNeish's argument, migration hypotheses were discarded as viable explanations for

Iroquois origins and would not be seriously considered as a possible alternative explanation until the 1990s (e.g.. Snow 1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b,

1996).

In 1944 William Ritchie picked up where A. C. Parker left off, presenting new and current archaeological information on prehistoric

Iroquoian sites in New York. Ritchie played a central role in systemizing the existing archaeological information with the development of artifact typologies, and defining changes in village layouts/ patterns (Ritchie 1952;

Ritchie and MacNeish 1949) Through the results of his work in New York,

Ritchie was able to define and outline the Owasco culture (which appeared around A. D. 900), establishing a chronology and general phases (Ritchie

1965). Because of his and other archaeological efforts (Lenig 1965; Wray and Schoff 1953), subsequent phases were defined (e.g.. O ak Hill, Chance, Garoga) and it was demonstrated that the Historic era Iroquois are direct descendants of these assemblages. Based on the archaeological evidence the archaeologists of this period agreed with MacNeish's in situ premise that the Owasco culture had evolved from the Point Peninsula assemblage.

Also during this period tw^o conferences/symposiums were held, at which Iroquoian scholars came and presented their ongoing research. The

53 proceedings of these events resulted in two publications (Fenton 1951; Tooker

1967). Paper topics included historical, ethnographical and archaeological

research. These types of meetings exhibited a desire by the professional

community to synthesize and share current knowledge and research results to others and to the public. Special conferences devoted to Iroquois studies

continue to be a popular forum for Iroquois researchers to both present and

encourage interest in the study of the Iroquois culture.

1970 to 1989

The 1970s and 1980s represented an era of innovative ideas and studies.

This period was characterized by histories that revised the role the Iroquois played in the colonial period, while ethnographies began to focus research on

Iroquois experiences and events during the reservation period and twentieth century. Linguistic studies continued to look at inter and intra-tribal language relationships. Glottochronology produced estimates on when individual tribal dialects diverged from a proto-lroquoian language. Although archaeological work was still done on a regional level, the large majority of the research conducted in this period began to focus on sites of the individual tribes of the confederacy. Conferences or joint publications were also continued in an attempt to help synthesize new and ongoing research within the professional and public communities (e.g., Bonvillain 1980; Foster et al. 1984). As in the previous section this period is summarized by topical category (historical, ethnographical, or archaeological studies).

54 A major focus of historical studies between 1970 and 1989 was the

writing of revised histories of the Iroquois role in the colonial period (Eid

1979, 1985; Jennings 1976, 1984, 1988; Merrell and Richter 1987; Richter 1983).

These histories questioned the accuracy of earlier nineteenth and eighteenth century anthropologists/historians, particularly how these scholars had

portrayed the Iroquois as the preeminent tribe who had subjugated all of their

opponents and had created an immense empire stretching from New York to

the Mississippi River (Figure 3). Francis Jennings (1976) was the first to

challenge Euroamerican portrayals of Indians in the Northeast as well as illuminating the ruthless nature in which Furoamericans "invaded" and conquered North America. In 1984 Jennings wrote his epic book The

Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, in which he challenged the long held belief that

the Iroquois had legitimate claims to lands stretching to the Mississippi River. Jennings argued that this so-called "empire" never existed but was a myth cultivated by the English and Iroquois and then perpetuated by eighteenth and nineteenth century scholars. Jennings also downplayed the effectiveness and success of Iroquois warfare during this period, suggesting that they were not as powerful as claimed by colonial sources or by the Iroquois themselves, whom Jenning suggests often stretched the truth of their abilities. By the end of the seventeenth century Jennings argued that the League was on the verge of destruction by their enemies.

This view of a beaten League was echoed in Leroy Fid's article (1979)

"The Ojibwa-Iroquois War: The War the Five Nations Did Not Win" in which he claims that in the 1690s the Iroquois were defeated by the Chippewa in a series of battles in which the Iroquois suffered enormous losses. Fid

55 relies totally on oral traditions of the Chippewa and is not deterred by the fact

that no archaeological or ethnohistoric information exists to support these

claims and in fact ethnohistoric information contradicts these assertions.

Jennings as well as other scholars (e.g., Aquila 1983; Merell and Richter

1987) also defined the role of the Iroquois Covenant Chain and/or studied

Iroquois diplomacy. They suggested that the Iroquois diplomatic abilities was

where their real strength lay. The Covenant Chain was a loose alliance of

various northeastern tribes organized by the Iroquois during the early

eighteenth century. Because of their close association with the English, the

Iroquois served as representatives for other tribes in negotiations with the

English and French. The Covenant Chain also served as a means to curb Euroamerican encroachments by allowing the Indians to present a united

front.

Histories were also written that incorporated ethnographical and

archaeological aspects of Iroquois culture (besides politics, land claims or warfare) such as subsistence practices, settlement patterns, religion, linguistics, demography, rituals, and effects of acculturation (Abler and

Tooker 1978; Cam pisi 1978; Fenton and Tooker 1978; Jaenen 1976; Landy 1978;

Lounsbury 1978; Tooker 1978; Trigger 1978; White et al. 1978). Many of these holistic histories were written for the Northeast volume (vol. 15) of the Handbook of North American Indians that was edited by Bruce Trigger (1978).

The handbook attempted to synthesize existing archaeological, cultural and historical information on all the Northeastern tribes. Many of these studies devoted their attention to the prehistory and history of individual tribes of

56 the League (e.g.. Abler and Tooker 1978, Campisi 1978; Fenton and Tooker

1978; Landy 1978; White et al. 1978). This was paralleled in contemporary archaeological research where studies shifted attention from the League as a whole to the development of focused studies of the individual tribes.

Individual historic studies were written on unique aspects of the

Iroquois (Aquila 1983; Haan 1980; Konrad 1981,1987) or on well known individuals such as Joseph Brant (Kelsay 1984). Haan's (1980) and Aquila's

(1983) articles looked at political aspects of the Iroquois, such as the use of

diplomacy or neutrality during the eighteenth century. Konrad (1981, 1987)

presented information on the Iroquois use of the north shore of Lake Ontario

during the second half of the seventeenth century.

Studies and analyses on Iroquois warfare focused on particular conflicts in one region or with one tribe (Aquila 1978; Day 1984; O tterbein 1979; Trigger

1971). Aquila (1978) wrote about the Iroquois conflict with the Southern and

Southeastern tribes, Day (1984) on the war with the New England Indians

(specifically the Ouragies [Penacooks]), while Otterbein (1979) concentrated on the war between the Huron and Iroquois. Daniel Richter (1983) wrote a noteworthy article on the cause of Iroquois warfare in which he defines warfare as an intregal and cyclic part of Iroquois life. Richter goes on to define the cyclic warfare of the Historic period as "mourning warfare" which he determines is based on revenge for the death of related family members. Richter argued that mourning warfare was the basis for the catastrophic wars of the seventeenth century and contends that disease and the fur trade helped intensify or initiate this process.

57 Richter portrayed the Iroquois as aggressors much the same as Jennings

and other Revisionist histories (e.g., Richter 1992). Several works on the

history of the fur trade during this period (Eccles 1983; Kuhn 1985; Lenig 1977; Norton 1974) also depicted the Iroquois as militant and bent on destroying

other competing tribes for dominance of the fur trade. These authors were

influenced by Hunt's premise and all cite him. The following statement by

Lenig (1977) exemplifies the general explanation accepted and used by

Iroquois scholars for Iroquois warfare in the seventeenth century.

"These early wars [in the first decades of the seventeenth century] were fought to gain and maintain access to sources of European goods while the wars which follow [A. D. 1620 to 1701] were fought to obtain fresh sources of beaver and other peltries but the underlying causes in both instances was economic" (Lenig 1977: 82).

There were some disagreements with this view (e.g., Schlesier 1976;

Trigger 1978), but such opinions were in the minority. Schlesier (1976) downplayed the importance of the fur trade, suggesting it was not a factor before A. D. 1670, and went on to argue that deaths from disease precipitated

the need for warfare, which assuaged grief and allowed the capture of prisoners to replace dead family members. While later scholars (e.g., Richter

1983) would elaborate upon the relationship between disease and warfare they included economic pressures as the prime mover that exacerbated traditional warfare.

Cultural studies continued to look at a variety of Iroquois customs/lifeways. Some of the studies (Fenton 1975; Wallace 1978) were new interpretations or a historical look at well studied topics such as the

58 Handsome Lake religion (Tooker 1989) or the False Face society (Fenton 1987).

Many studies on aspects of the Historic and reservation Iroquois have

contributed new information on Iroquois culture. For example, L. Hauptman

(1980,1981, 1985a, 1985b, 1988, 1993) has looked extensively at Iroquois experiences in the nineteenth and tu^entieth century. Other researchers have looked at current events (1980s and 1990s) and conflicts between the Iroquois and Canada and/or United States government (e.g., gambling issues, land claims) (Landsman 1988; Johansen 1993; Shattuck 1991). Some researchers have looked at how the political structure and concept of the League of the

Iroquois may have influenced the creation of the United States Constitution (Johanson 1982, 1990). E. Tooker (1988,1990) disagrees with this cormection and has written a counter argument refuting that any evidence exists to support Johanson's assertions.

Archaeological literature of this period either tried to synthesize available information on prehistoric Iroquoian settlement patterns and assemblages (Hayes 1979; Tuck 1978; Ritchie and Funk 1973) or focused on the archaeology of specific tribes of the League (Bradley 1987; Hayden 1979;

Niemczycki 1984, 1988; Pratt 1976; Snow 1984, 1985; W ray et al. 1987,1991).

These above studies have been quite comprehensive, providing new and extensive information on changes in settlement patterns, site size, dating of sites, population estimates and the impact of trade with Euroamericans on the material culture of Protohistoric and Ffistoric populations (e.g., Bradley

1987; Snow 1984, 1985). One study by Stam a, HameU, and Butts (1984) provided an informative analysis on Iroquois village removal. They determined that villages were generally abandoned after approximately 20 to

59 30 years of habitation because of insect infestations of village structures

(housing and palisades) and adjacent crop fields. Archaeological and ethnohistoric research has also provided information on the impact of disease in the Northeast during the Historic Period (Ramenofsky 1987; Snow and Lanpher 1988; Snow and Stama 1989). These studies have shown that northeastern tribes were not effected by introduced epidemic diseases until the seventeenth century. Snow and Starna's research on Mohawk village and population size have indicated that the Mohawk did not appear to suffer population declines until the 1630s (Snow and Stama 1989).

Iroquois studies related to understanding the prehistoric climate and its impact on past Iroquois populations or on how the Iroquois utilized their surrounding natural resources are examples of new directions and the diversity of recent Iroquois research (Herrick 1977; Wykoff 1989). Other studies have presented Iroquois perspectives on current land claims versus the State of New York. Several tribes, in particular the Mohawk and Oneida, are attempting to reclaim lands taken from them during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Vecsey and Starna 1988).

1990 to 1997

The 1990s has produced new perspectives in both historical and archaeological research that have questioned established theories and interpretations. Cultural studies have remained uncontroversial, focusing on Historic Iroquois customs, warfare and twentieth century land claim issues (e.g., Benn 1991; Lebman 1990; Shattuck 1991; Stam a and W atkins 1991).

60 Archaeological research continues to provide new information on prehistoric

and historic Iroquois sites (Wray et al. 1991). Iroquoian archaeology, however, has been recently challenged by the ideas of Dean Snow, who has proposed a

new interpretation of the origins of the Iroquois (Snow 1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b, 1996). Snow opposes the in situ hypothesis, arguing that there are

several "anomalies" (ceramic discontinuity between Owasco and Point

Peninsula, linguistic questions, and the argument that matrilineal systems

are typically intrusive) that preclude an in situ development but rather

indicate migration from somewhere else. Snow suggests that the Iroquois

migrated from the south, in particular from the Susquehanna River Valley

(the Clemson Island culture) sometime around A. D. 900. To say the least,

this "migration theory" has caused controversy among Iroquoian scholars,

who for the most part are not convinced of Snow's premises. Counter

arguments have been advanced, such as the recent findings of Crawford and Smith (1996) on the age of Princess Point sites, which they have dated to the

early sixth century. This supports an in situ interpretation. The debate still continues and Snow's ideas on the migration of prehistoric populations has

brought renewed interest on a perspective that has not been looked at seriously since the 1930s.

In historical studies, "Revisionist" writing has proceeded (e.g., Richter

1992), however, recent scholarship has questioned some of the revisions

made about Iroquois warfare, the fur trade, and political power (Brandao 1997; Brandao and Stama 1996; Dennis 1993; Given 1994). Brandao and Stama

(1996) have countered the portrayal of a militarily and politically weak League at the end of the seventeenth century and instead argue that the "Iroquois

61 Wars" concluded in a stalemate with both the Iroquois and French mutually agreeing to come to terms and a peaceful resolution. The fur trade theory was also seriously challenged (Dennis 1993; Brandao 1997; Given 1994). Given

(1994), while agreeing that the fur trade was economically motivated, argued that access to guns was not the primary motivation for warfare. Given provides an in depth analysis of native weaponry versus European firearms and suggests that guns were technologically inferior to traditional weapons.

Given proposes that indigenous populations used guns for prestige purposes and as psychological weapons against tribes unaware of their existence.

Dennis (1993) questions the application of the fur trade theory to the first half of the seventeenth century. Like Naroll (1968), Trelease (1962), and Schlesier

(1976), he found no evidence in the ethnohistoric evidence that indicated that the Iroquois made war on their enemies in order to attain furs. Dennis went on to propose that Iroquois warfare was waged for defensive reasons only and points out that in aH cases of reported warfare in the first half of the seventeenth century the Iroquois were provoked and were not the transgressors.

B randao's "Your fyre shall burn no more" (1997) is the m ost impressive rebuttal of the fur trade theory to date. Published in the winter of

1997 1 was not aware of his study until after the research and first draft of my dissertation were completed (in January of 1996). Brandao addresses the same concerns as my research on the legitimacy of the fur trade theory and surprisingly used the same type of methodology in retrieving and documenting all cases of warfare in the ethnohistoric literature of the seventeenth century for the Northeast. Brandao recorded evidence on the

62 number and results of Iroquois attacks against their enemies and demonstrates that only a minute percentage (5.6%) of all reported Iroquois incidents of war involved furs. Brandao goes on to suggest that the Iroquois major motive (but not the only one) was to wage war to attain adoptees (more on Brandao's arguments are presented in Chapter 4). Since Brandao's research is complementary to mine the results of both will be compared. We both looked at the same question in somewhat different ways and as a result have provided in depth perspectives/results that challenge the fur trade hypotheses. While Brandao relied heavily on numerical percentages of the type of attacks conducted (which was used in my study to a certain extent) and the adoption question, my study concentrated on providing a chronological presentation of actual ethnohistoric quotes/sources that addressed the reasons for the "Iroquois Wars". My study also maps where the warfare occurred, looks at the ties between prestige, territory and warfare, and describes the impact of Iroquois battle tactics on their opponents.

63 CHAPTER 4

ARCHAEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON IROQUOIS WARFARE

"Against Iroquois method of warfare the usual Huron palisade was probably reasonably effective. Its principal drawback was that it could be set on fire. Unless the village was attacked in a large force and by surprise, it could withstand an attack by any small, disorganized group of warriors of the size of the Huron and Iroquois w ar parties in the 1630s" (Heidenreich 1971: 142).

Conrad Heidenreich on traditional palisade defenses

To understand better historic Iroquoian warfare, archaeological evidence of warfare in Iroquoia during the prehistoric period is introduced.

In the past century extensive archaeological work on Late Woodland and

Protohistoric sites in New York has produced detailed descriptions of the internal aspects of Iroquoian settlements and the changes they have undergone since A.D. 900. This evidence indicates that prehistoric warfare in the Northeast was an important element in shaping settlement patterns and demography, and according to oral legends was the impetus to the formation of the League. It is suggested that warfare that occurred and developed during the Late Prehistoric period greatly influenced with whom and why the Iroquois warred during the Historic Period.

64 The Owasco Tradition

The earliest recognizable archaeological tradition that can be considered

ancestral to the later Historic Iroquois is the Owasco Tradition. Owasco sites range in age from A.D. 900 to A.D. 1300 and according to the majority of archaeologists, represent an in situ development of Iroquoian populations from the preceding Point Peninsula assemblages (MacNeish 1952; Hayden

1979; Ritchie 1965). Archaeology has discovered that Owasco populations practiced maize agriculture, possessed a matrilineal kinship and matrilocal residence system, lived in large compact villages, and practiced violent warfare that increased in intensity over time (Ritchie and Funk 1973; Snow 1994a; Tuck 1978).

Evidence of incessant warfare first appeared with the change from the Point Peninsula tradition to Owasco. Point Peninsula sites are typically small in size, representing a population that practiced a hunting and gathering subsistence strategy. This settlement pattern changed abruptly circa A.D. 900 with the onset of the Owasco Tradition. There was a shift to larger compact villages that were situated on hilltops or away from major river valleys.

While many of the early Owasco villages were unfortified (e.g.. Round top and Maxon-Derby sites), the change to more compact villages and défendable terrain away from major transportation routes has been interpreted to indicate a concern over external threats (Ritchie 1965; Ritchie and Funk 1973; Snow 1984,1994a, 1995a).

65 Most Iroquoian archaeologists argue that Ow^asco represents the onset of the internecine warfare that characterized later Historic Iroquois culture, how ever. Snow (1984,1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b, 1996) suggests that this early transition represents the intrusion of a new population. While Snow agrees that the Owasco Tradition is ancestral to the Iroquois, he argues that they migrated from the south, specifically from the central Pennsylvania region.

Snow's reinterpretation of Iroquoian prehistory directly challenges the in situ model, which he contends has controlled and oversimplified archaeological descriptions of demographic change in the Northeast by "outlawing" migration. Snow identifies several discontinuities between Point Peninsula and Owasco assemblages that support an intrusive replacement rather than an in situ development. The discontinuities identified by Snow are listed and discussed below:

1) Linguistic differences. One of the prominent differences between

Iroquoian speaking populations and the Algonkian cultures that surround them is the difference in language. There are also Iroquoian speaking populations to the south such as the Cherokee along the central Appalachian

Plateau, and the Nottoway and Tuscarawas in the Piedmont region of the Southeast. Linguists have recognized that the southern Iroquoian speaking tribes have older dialects, and it is estimated that they formed almost 2,000 to

3,000 years ago (Snow 1994b, 1995a). Recent analyses of Northeastern

Iroquoian languages have shown that their diversity can be explained by an approximately 1,000 year time depth. Snow suggests that northern Iroquoian speaking tribes moved out of the south or southeast, northward, approximately 1,000 years ago. The age of the divergence of Northern

6 6 Iroquoian language corresponds with the first appearance of Owasco sites. Snow argues that Point Peninsula sites that predate A.D. 900 were Algonkian speaking populations, while Owasco represents an Iroquoian speaking intrusion.

2) Matrilineal kinship/matrilocal systems ancLagriculture. Another unique trait which separates Iroquoian speaking tribes from the neighboring

Algonkian was their matrilineal kinship and matrilocal systems. The in situ model suggests this trait developed slowly over time. Snow argues that ma trilineality/ ma trilocality arises in dominant societies that expand into territories of hostile but subordinate societies (e.g., hunting and gathering groups) (Snow 1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b, 1996). Snow cites William Divale's

(1984) analysis of matrilineal/matrilocal societies which suggests that these type of groups are successful "predators" particularly when competing with hunting and gathering groups. A reason for this success is related to the ability of matrilineal/matrilocal systems to break up fraternal males which in turn suppresses feuding and internal warfare. This results in the concentration of large numbers of males for defense and offense which is not feasible among hunting and gathering societies putting them at a disadvantage.

Snow proposes that Iroquoian populations from the south were at war with the Point Peninsula Algonkian populations located in the New York area. The Iroquoian matrilineal organization helped facilitate the displacement of Point Peninsula populations. Agricultural based populations are typically larger than hunting and gathering groups which allows them to

67 expand into new territory more rapidly. Snow suggests that matrilineality

and ma trilocality appear suddenly with the Owasco Tradition because it is a feature of m igration (Snow 1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b, 1996).

3) Ceramic differences. There are differences between Point Peninsula

and Owasco ceramics. The in situ perspective depicts the differences between the two as slight and indicative of a slow shift in style and manufacture over

time (Hayes 1979; M acNeish 1952; Ritchie and M acNeish 1949). Snow,

however, disagrees, pointing out a significant difference in manufacture

between Point Peninsula and Owasco ceramics. Point Peninsula ceramics are

constructed by the coiling method while Owasco ceramics involve modeling.

Snows argues that these differences represent a sharp break between

assemblages (Snow 1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b, 1996).

4) Demography. There are significant differences between Point

Peninsula and Owasco site distribution. Point Peninsula sites are widely dispersed across the landscape. Sites are typified by small seasonal encampments usually situated along streams and rivers. These sites are considered representative of a hunting and gathering society. In contrast

Owasco sites are large and compact, permanent, and located on defensive terrain (e.g., hilltops) away from rivers. Owasco sites show evidence of conflict with defensive palisades, arrow riddled burials, and cannibaUsm. Snow argues that Owasco sites represent an intrusive population that expanded into a hostile territory whose inhabitants (Point Peninsula) fought back (Snow 1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b, 1996). The Owasco population was able to defeat or disperse the original inhabitants but then began to war among

68 themselves. The only problem with Snow's interpretation is that the

defensive orientation of Owasco sites can also be explained as the

development of internecine warfare within a population that developed in

place.

Snow suspects that the Clemson Island assemblage in central

Pennsylvania is probably where the Owasco Tradition originated. Clemson Island predates Owasco, appearing around A.D. 775 and has similar site

patterns and ceramics. Snow suggests that a portion of the Clemson Island

population expanded northward into New York sometime around A.D. 900

(Snow 1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b, 1996).

Snow's migration theory has caught the attention of all Iroquoian

archaeologists, causing us to take a second look at the in situ evidence and at

the possibilities of migration as explaining some of the demographic change of the prehistoric past. However, most Iroquoian scholars have remained

unconvinced of Snow's arguments, particularly with the recent findings by

Crawford and Smith (1996) at Princess Point sites in the Southern Ontario

Peninsula. Princess Point sites possess Iroquoian traits such as maize agriculture, modeled ceramics, and compact and permanent village sites.

Crawford and Smith's investigations at several of these sites discovered they are older than previously thought, dating back to the sixth century A.D. Com was found associated with these early sites, which pushes back the introduction of maize into the Northeast by two centuries. Their findings predate Snow's Clemson Island assemblage by 200 to 300 years, making his postiilation of an A.D. 900 migration of Iroquoian peoples too late in time.

69 Snow (1996) admits that Crawford and Smith's findings have caused him to

rethink the timetable of his migration theory. Snow still feels that an

Iroquoian migration occurred but now believes it must have occurred at

some earlier date, before the sixth century A.D.

While the validity of Snow's theory is still in question, his concern

about the discontinuities present in the Point Peninsula and Owasco

transition still need to be addressed. He is also largely responsible for sparking a renewed interest in the application of migration in interpreting

change in prehistoric settlement patterns. Snow's viewpoint on how

matrilineal kinship systems influence and effect warfare in the prehistoric past may also be useful in interpreting Historic Period warfare. The adaptive advantages matrilineal societies possess in warfare versus hunting and gathering societies may have given the Iroquois an additional advantage during the seventeenth century. As Snow indicates, matrilineal societies can usually field a large contingent of men because of larger population sizes

(Snow 1995a). Since the Iroquois practiced agriculture they did not rely as heavily upon hunting as foraging groups, allowing warriors to stay in the field of war for much longer periods of time. Women took over the responsibility of tending and harvesting crops, which also provided additional time for men to hunt or make war. In hunting and gathering societies of the Northeast, men played a more significant role in providing subsistence, since hunting provided most of the food for the year. As a result, men could not spend excessive time in warfare activities or their families faced starvation. This comparison suggests that differences in subsistence strategy gave the Iroquois a distinct advantage in warfare, particularly in

70 prolonged conflicts. This advantage was increased by the alliance of several tribal groups/villages into a defensive and/ or offensive coalition.

W hile in situ development or migration can be debated, there is no doubt that warfare was an important element of the Owasco period. By A.D.

1100 to 1300 most of the Owasco villages were protected by circular or oval palisades, some with exterior ditches (e.g.. Bates, Chamberlain, and Sackett sites). A few of the villages possessed portions of a double walled palisade

(Ritchie and Funk 1973). A double walled palisade contains two palisade lines positioned adjacent to one another, usually 2' to 2.5' apart. Based on ethnohistoric descriptions of historic Iroquois palisades it is presumed that branches were interwoven between upright posts while bark was used on the interior of the walls to strengthen them. Large logs were also laid along the base of the interior walls to provide additional support. The double walled palisades are described during the Historic Period as possessing platforms from which bowmen could fire upon any would be attackers (Heidenreich 1971). Generally, Ow asco sites had a portion of their palisades double walled adjacent to areas most exposed to attack (flat approaches). Single wall palisades were placed along slopes or edges of ravines that were easier to defend. Other evidence of war at Owasco sites includes ritual cannibalism. The Sackett site has hearths and refuse pits which contain burned human bone. There are also several arrow riddled burials at this site. All of this evidence reveals a period in which conflict became an increasing threat.

71 The Oak Hill (A.D. 1300-1400) and Chance (A.D. 1400-1500) Phases

During the Oak Hill and Chance Phases (A.D. 1300-1500) double walled

palisaded villages became the norm at Iroquoian village sites (e.g.. Furnace Brook, Getman, and Kelso sites) (Ritchie and Funk 1973; Snow 1984). The

palisade lines were placed in a circular or oval shaped pattern like the

previous period. Several sites possessed triple walled palisades and in one case a four line palisade. The additional line(s) provided added thickness and

strength to the wall and appear to represent an adaptational change in

response to attacks. In the case of the Burke site, the four palisade lines

represent tw'o distinct double walled palisades. Two double walled palisades are a substantial defensive improvement that requires a significant amount of human energy and time to construct. Throughout the Oak Hill and

Chance Phases, villages began to amalgamate, and as a result grew in size.

This change in demography appears to be a reaction to warfare with clan/family groups uniting for defensive purposes (Tuck 1978). Evidence of ritual cannibalism is also evident at several sites (Bloody Hill, Kelso, and

Schoff sites) and suggests that the cyclic "mourning warfare" (Richter 1983) exhibited in the Historic period was probably well established at this time.

Ritual cannabalism, a common trait exhibited in Northeastern Indian warfare, involved the consumption of a human victims flesh or organs and was considered a way to acquire the strength and courage of an enemy warrior (Trigger 1976,1990).

72 The Garoga Phase and Proto Historic Period (A.D. 1500 to 1600)

During this time frame Iroquois villages were larger in size and well fortified, situated on easily defended terrain (Snow 1984, 1994a). While most villages were stül protected by double walled palisades (e.g., Atwell,

Cayadutta, Garoga, and Olcott sites), fortifications continued to improve. For example, the diameter of the upright palisade poles increased considerably.

Pole diameters were generally 2.5 to 3 inches at Owasco sites (e.g.. Bates site), while the Oak Hill Phase sites had 2.5 to 6 inch pole diameters (e.g., Kelso site). Diameters of palisade poles at Garoga or Proto Historic Iroquois sites increased to 6 to 24 inches and in some cases up to 30 inches (e.g., the Olcott site) (Ritchie and Funk 1973). The larger poles provided increased strength to a double walled palisade, making them formidable obstacles to any type of assault. The change and enhancement of palisades over time indicates a gradual evolution towards better made defensive structures capable of resisting assaults. In A.D. 1535 Jacques Cartier provided the first

Euroamerican description of an Iroquoian palisade when he described the defensive wall around the village of Hochelaga at Montreal. Cartier relates;

"The village is circular and is completely enclosed by a wooden palisade in three tiers like a pyramid. The top one is built crosswise, the middle one perpendicular, and the lowest one of strips of wood placed lengthwise. The whole is well joined and lashed after their manner, and is some two lances in height. There is only one gate and entrance to this village, and that can be barred up. Over this gate and in many places about the enclosure are species of galleries [platforms] with ladders for mounting them, which galleries are provided with rocks and stones for the defense and protection of the place" (Cook 1993: 61).

73 The fortification that is described at Hochelaga is a triple walled

palisade. The Hochelagans told Cartier that they were at war with several of

their neighbors and in particular the Agojuda (whose identity remains unknown). This brief ethnohistoric glimpse of the sixteenth century

demonstrates the threat warfare posed to Iroquoian villages.

Besides the St. Lawrence and New York Iroquois, other Iroquoian

speaking peoples such as the Erie, Huron, Tobacco, and Susquehannock had extensive fortifications associated with their villages (e.g., Simmons site)

(Ritchie and Funk 1973; Wright 1966). Oral legends of the Huron and

Iroquois suggest that wars in their prehistoric past were bloody and intense.

The possible results of these wars, tribal extinction or dispersal, were just as

real in the prehistoric past as they were in the Historic Period. A case in point

is the fate of the St. Lawrence Iroquois. When the French returned to Quebec

and Montreal in the seventeenth century they found both places vacant of

settlements. The St. Lawrence Iroquois had disappeared and the local tribes

reported only that they had been destroyed by their enemies (Pendergast 1990).

The Seventeenth Century

Archaeological evidence of indigenous villages and warfare of this period are supplemented by ethnohistoric descriptions. New defensive innovations appeared, some of which were introduced by contact with

Euroamericans. Warfare in the seventeenth century Northeast was common among the indigenous tribes, and often involved numerous participants.

Village defenses generally relied on the traditional circular/oval double

74 walled palisade. However, several sites have evidence of three to five walled lines. Some sites had two separate multi-walled palisades, while a few sites had more than two distinct palisade walls protecting a village. Early seventeenth century descriptions by Champlain and the Jesuits describe the villages of the Huron and Iroquois, which were similarly constructed, and provides internal aspects of the palisade defense that are not evident in the archaeological record.

Huron villages were " fortified by wooden palisades in three tiers, interlaced into one another, on top of which, they had galleries which they furnish with stones for hurling, and water to extinguish the fire that their enemies might lay against their palisades" (Champlain 1922-36 [3]: 122).

Some of these [Huron villages] are not shut in, while the others are fortified by strong wooden palisades in three rows, interlaced into one another and reinforced within by large sheets of bark to a height of eight or nine feet, and at the bottom there are great trunks of trees placed lengthwise, resting on short forks made from tree trunks. Then above these palisades there are galleries or watchtowers, which they call Ondaqua, and these they stock with stones in war time to hurl upon the enemy, and water to put out the fire that might be laid against their palisades. The Hurons mount up to them by means of a ladder, very ill made and difficult to climb, and defend their ramparts w ith great courage and skill" (Sagard 1939 [1632]).

"their village [the Onondaga?] was enclosed by four good palisades which were made of great pieces of wood, interlaced with each other, with an opening of not more than half a foot between two which were thirty feet high, with galleries after the manner of a parapet, which they had furnished with double pieces of wood that were proof against our arquebus shots. Morever it was near a pond where the water was abundant, and was weU supplied with gutters, placed between each pair of palisades, to throw out water, which they had also under cover inside, in order to extinguish fire. Now this is the character of their fortifications and defenses, which are stronger than the villages of Attigouautan [tribe of the Huron] and others" (Champlain 1967 [1907]: 292-293). 75 French accounts describe the palisades at several of the Huron villages as ranging from 15 to 35 feet in height (Champlain 1922-36 [3]: 48; JR 34:123- 125). Entrances were also well defended and are described as blocked v\hth heavy barriers during an attack. Gate entrances were designed in a zigzag pattern, forcing any warriors that happened to breach the gate to enter "turning sideways" (Sagard 1939 [1632]: 92). The ethnohistoric passages indicate that defending warriors stood on platforms built into the double palisade walls to fire arrows and hurl stones onto attackers. The platforms were furnished with containers of water, in case of fire. Defenders could also position themselves within the double walled palisade, on the ground level, and fire arrows out of holes or openings in the exterior wall. All of the descriptions and archaeological evidence point to a structure in which an active defense could be brought to bear on an attacking force. If these structures were well manned and defended, they could inflict heavy casualties on any enemy assault and prevent a village from being destroyed. Based on ethnohistoric evidence, traditional defenses were susceptible to fire since they were constructed of wood and bark. If attackers could initiate a conflagration, the whole village could be destroyed within minutes. Attackers could also opt to scale the outer walls, force openings in the gate or palisade, and/or fire range weapons (bows) at defenders from a distance. The increase in palisade thickness and pole diameter and appearance of a second defensive wall at Late Prehistoric sites suggest that defensive changes had occurred in reaction to these types of assaults through the selective process of trial and error.

76 Besides the main village fortifications, there were smaller temporary

fortifications built for war parties while encamped in an enemy's territory.

These fortifications were used as a place of refuge in case they were attacked or pursued by the enemy. Champlain describes two of these temporary

fortifications during his campaigns against the Iroquois in A.D. 1609 and 1610

(Cham plain 1922-36 [2]: 96, 128). The fortified bases were circular or oval in

shape and usually composed of one palisade wall.

By the 1640s several of the Iroquoian speaking tribes began to

incorporate European fortification styles in some of their villages. In A.D.

1636 the French had advised the Huron to "make their forts square and arrange their stakes in straight lines; and that, by means of four little towers at the four comers, four Frenchmen might easily with their arquebuses or muskets defend a whole village" (JR 10: 53). Ethnohistoric and archaeological evidence indicates that the Huron began to incorporate a square / diamond shaped palisade design at a few of their villages. One village, Ossossane, contained tw^o bastions (Abler 1989). A bastion is an angular projection from a fortification, allowing defenders a clear line of fire. The Susquehannock were reported building rectangular fortifications in the 1640s. In the 1660s their main village (the Strickler site), while still oval shaped, contained two

European style square bastions armed with cannon (JR 68: 77; Kent 1984).

Iroquois villages also began to adopt European style fortifications. In the 1660s the Mohawk village of Gandaouague possessed a double walled palisade built in the shape of a trapezoid. One gate had an interior baffle

(Ritchie and Funk 1973). In A.D. 1666 the French destroyed several Mohawk

77 villages (which had been abandoned) and described one as highly fortified and well prepared for a siege. "It was evident enough — from the triple

palisade, twenty feet high, with which their place was surrounded; from the

four bastions flanking it; from their prodigious hoard of provisions; and from

the abundant supply of water they had provided, in bark receptacles, for

extinguishing fires" (JR 50: 145). In A.D. 1685 the French Iroquois at the Sault

protected their village with a pentagonal palisade with five bastions, one arm ed w ith an eight p o u n d er cannon (JR 63: 245). In A.D. 1693 the village of

Onondaga is described as defended by three separate palisade walls with eight bastions (NYCD 9: 567). When Frontenac attacked this village in the summer of A.D. 1696 he described the outer wall as positioned six feet outside the inner two. The outer wall was composed of smaller sized palisade poles that were 40 to 50 feet high. The inner palisades were constructed of poles the size of ship masts. The entire fortification was described as oblong in shape and flanked by four bastions (not eight as indicated in the earlier report) (NYCD 9:

653). It is clear that contact with the Euroamerican colonies influenced fortification designs, as did new warfare tactics and weapon technology that tested the limits of traditional fortifications.

Traditional Warfare versus Historic Period Warfare

Archaeology has revealed that conflict was pervasive throughout the prehistoric development of Iroquoian speaking populations in the Northeast.

The evidence of this is represented by ritual cannibalism, arrow riddled burials, fortifications, and continued aggregation of villages and the coalescence of tribes into alliances or confederacies. Archaeologists cannot,

78 however, tell us how warfare was conducted, the reasons for it, nor where or when villages of Iroquoian speaking populations were attacked.

Archaeologists have turned to ethnohistoric descriptions of Historic warfare and to anthropological studies of other tribal societies to describe prehistoric/ traditional warfare in the Northeast Contact brought disease, new technologies and perhaps new goals in warfare, which must be considered possible factors that created change in indigenous lifeways.

Traditional Warfare

Anthropological and historical descriptions of traditional Iroquois warfare have relied extensively on ethnohistoric literature and studies of other past and contemporary tribal societies. Since much of the early literature of the Jesuits is on the Huron, an Iroquoian speaking group, descriptions of traditional warfare in their society (during the 1630s and 1640s) is often used as an example for other Iroquoian groups such as the Iroquois,

Neutral and/or Susqueharmock (e.g.. Trigger 1976, 1990). All Iroquoian scholars agree that warfare was an intregal and complex part of Iroquoian culture.

In Iroquois society men played a prominent role in warfare. Since warfare was endemic in the Northeast, males had to be ready to defend their villages or territory as weU as be capable of striking back at an attacker. Warriors were expected to be fearless in battle, self reliant, uncomplaining, and unyielding in revenge. Although warfare was a danger to Iroquois society it provided their culture a chance for glory, honor, and revenge

79 (Brandao 1997; Golden 1922; Trigger 1990). Iroquoian scholars have suggested that traditional warfare served several goals related to prestige, psychological needs, religion, adoption, and defensive and offensive needs. Each of these motives are discussed below.

Warfare was the principal means for young warriors to acquire prestige and status in their tribe. To participate in a raid on an enemy and/or demonstrate prowess in fighting was considered a valued way to attain prestige. This could be accomplished by killing an enemy or taking prisoners during combat. A young warrior who was successful in battle was viewed as a excellent protector and a prized asset of a community. Based on his past success, a warrior would be given larger roles to play such as becoming the leader of an organized war party. Since many raids involved related family members (i.e. clans) and were formed for revenge purposes, prestige could be a powerful motivation to induce unrelated individuals from other clans or allied tribes to participate. While most raids for revenge or prestige were launched against traditional enemies, sometimes small groups of warriors would attack tribes who were not an enemy (Brandao 1997; Trigger 1990).

These attacks were usually against distant tribes and were not common.

Another significant motivation for warfare was revenge. The "war they wage against one another is not to conquer lands, nor to become great Lords, not even for gain, but purely vengeance" (Boucher 1964 [1664]: 117).

Revenge warfare was primarily based on the need to avenge the killing of a family member by an enemy. However, raids of this type could also be initiated by a tribe/Euroamerican colony insulting or provoking the Iroquois

80 (e.g., public insults, taking Iroquois members prisoners/hostage,

trespassing/hunting on Iroquois territory). If an Iroquois was killed/captured

by an enemy the family of the deceased/captive demanded a retaliatory raid in order to kill or capture members of the opposing tribe. This was not only

done to assuage grief but also enabled the family and tribe to regain honor

that was lost by an enemy's success. A revenge raid typically involved

family/clan members of the deceased. However, if an important personage or

several people were killed, then plans of retaliation would involve the entire

tribe or possibly the whole League. There were several periods of warfare in

the seventeenth century that appear to have been started by the killing of a beloved warrior or the killing of several families while hunting (e.g., the wars

with the Ottawa and Illinois in the late 1670s to early 1680s). The killing or

capture of several enemies during a raid was considered a success and means

to satisfy revenge. Any captured prisoners could be adopted by the family who had lost a loved one, or rejected and tortured to death (Brandao 1997;

Trigger 1990). Both of these options served an emotional need to alleviate grief, and once an enemy was successfully attacked they (the enemy) were then obliged to regain their honor by retaliating and thus this cyclic process continued over time (Richter 1983). Archaeologists feel that this type of warfare developed during the &Iiddle Owasco phase (e.g., evidence of ritual cannibalism at Owasco and later phase sites) and eventually became entrenched within Iroquoian societies by the Historic Period (Ritchie and Funk 1973; Snow 1994a).

The volatile nature of revenge raids was aggravated by the fact that a family or individual could initiate a revenge raid without the tribal or League

81 council approval. If a warrior was insulted by a tribe the Iroquois were at peace with, he was within his individual rights to kül a member of this tribe even if it meant the dissolution of peace (Brandao 1997). While peace could be established with a long-time enemy, the Iroquois remembered every past transgression and the slightest insult or misunderstanding could result in the renewal of hostilities (Lafitau 1974 [1727], 1977 [1727]). The Iroquois, however, should not be viewed as a bloodthirsty group of tribes (as portrayed by

Parkman 1983 [1865-1892]) that could never restrain themselves, for there are several Historic examples where they showed restraint in order to maintain peace even after being attacked (e.g., the O ttaw a raid in A.D. 1704 [NYCD 9:

761]; the Miami attack in A.D. 1770 [NYCD 8: 203-204, 231, 233, 235, 244]).

Trigger (1976, 1990) has pointed out that religious beliefs may have played an important role in warfare. "Prisoner sacrifice was interpreted as reinforcing and ensuring the continuation of the natural world upon which all life depended" (Trigger 1990: 52). For the Huron war was a means to capture prisoners to be sacrificed by ritual torture to the war god, the sun and other benevolent cosmic forces. Prisoners were killed at dawn on platforms which appears to signify a connection with the sun. Less is known about the association between religion and torture in Iroquois society. However, it is known that the Iroquois generally killed tortured prisoners at dawn, which may indicate a connection with the sun. Another ritualistic aspect of torture was the consumption of body parts. The consumption of flesh or organs (e.g., heart, liver, etc.) of victims was considered a way to acquire the strength and courage of an enemy warrior and was practiced by both Iroquoian and

Algonkian speaking cultures in the Northeast.

82 Brandao (1997) has recently argued that warfare was waged by the

Iroquois in order to attain prisoners to adopt and incorporate into the League.

"Insofar as warfare was an expression of cultural, political, and military

dictates, no goal of warring was as crucial to the Iroquois as the capture of people" (Brandao 1997: 44). Captives were given to families who had lost

family members to war or disease. The family and village council decided the

fate of the prisoner. If the prisoner was deemed suitable for adoption he/she

was adopted, if not, then he/she was tortured to death or killed. Adoption was a very important custom of the Iroquois, for it allowed them to replace

population losses suffered from war or disease. During the Historic Period

the ritual torture of captives declined when Iroquoian population totals

dropped which indicated that captives were being used to replace losses (Brandao 1997).

Brandao suggests that adoption was also used by the Iroquois for

ulterior purposes. He argues that some attacks were purposely planned so as

to take many enemy warriors captive in order to increase the Iroquois military capabilities (offensively and defensively). Taking prisoners insured fewer reprisals, because there would be less of an enemy to take revenge.

Warfare w^hich resulted in the capture or killing of large numbers of an

enemy could ensure their demoralization or defeat. While other Iroquoian

and Algonkians took captives and practiced adoption it was not to the same

extent as the Iroquois. The Iroquois were unique in the Historic Period in that the number of reported captives taken during warfare in the seventeenth

century totaled between 12,000 and 15,000 (Brandao 1997: 73). What is surprising that of this number few ever tried to escape or return to their

83 former tribes. Perhaps because of the great numbers captured at one time

(e.g., whole villages), few chose to escape and leave their relatives behind. There is no indication in the archaeological record that the numbers of

captives taken in the Historic Period imitated the prehistoric period. The exceedingly high number of captives taken in the Historic Period appears to be a result of the military success the Iroquois enjoyed throughout this century.

The Process of War

If the Iroquois were attacked or insulted by an enemy a request could be made of the clan, tribal, or League council to declare war. Women played an important role in these decisions. Clan matrons, as representatives of their clans could request war if their members had been killed or insulted by an enemy. The matrons could also forestall an attack or request that no attack be made in cases where the war was detrimental to the tribe or League.

However, because of the egalitarian nature of the Iroquois and other tribes in the Northeast, if an individual, family, and sometimes tribe of the League wished to ignore the clan matron's or League council's decision, it could and occasionally did, particularly in the case of a revenge raid (Brandao 1997; Trigger 1990).

When Iroquois warriors decided to attack an enemy they typically went in small groups of five to twenty men. In more significant attacks 100 to 500 men could be involved and in rare cases 1000 or more (Benn 1991; Brandao

1997; Trigger 1990). Surprise attacks (ambushes) were an im portant strategy of

84 both small and large war parties during the Historic Period. Generally, a

smaller sized enemy group was attacked to give the attacker an advantage in

numbers. Warriors were primarily armed with bows, war clubs, and knives, and often wore wooden body armor. When attacking an enemy the Iroquois

typically used their range weapons (bows) first, then closed in to engage in

hand to hand fighting. As many of the enemy were killed or taken prisoner

as possible until one group fled the field or surrendered.

Iroquoian scholars have argued that when larger groups (100+ warriors

on either side) met in battle or a village was attacked, warfare turned into a

ritualized event (see Trigger 1976,1990). In these contests both sides lined up

at set distances to engage in formal battles. Arrows would be fired at long range and after a few deaths or injuries opponents would retreat satisfied.

Trigger sums up this perspective of traditional warfare in his description of

how Iroquoian villages were attacked.

"The siege of a community might last a week or more. Fires were set along the base of the palisade in order to challenge the enemy to come out and fight. When they did, the opposing sides lined up and engaged in a pitched battle. After a few deaths or injuries on either side the enemy retreated into their settlement, taking with them any prisoners they might have captured" (Trigger 1990: 54).

Trigger cites evidence of this in French descriptions and drawings of the Iroquois which depict their opponents as lining up in formal groups that

exchange volleys of arrows (Champlain 1922-36). It is not certain if these drawings accurately reflect indigenous battle tactics since they were drawn by Europeans who often portrayed indigenous peoples in European fashion.

European battle tactics of the time involved the Lining up of opposing groups 85 out in the open. Trigger's assessment is also congruent with anthropological descriptions of contemporary tribal warfare, in particular. New Guinea tribal warfare (Heider 1970, 1979) which is often cited as an classic example of formal combat. This is exemplified in the popular classroom film Dead Birds in which the Dani tribe is shown fighting an enemy in a formal battle. These interpretations indicate that the primary objective of traditional warfare was revenge, which, once attained, ended the battle. This perspective precludes any warfare objective based on territorial gain or the wish to defeat totally and extinguish an enemy.

There is however, little ethnohistoric evidence to support the argument that ritual battles characterize traditional Iroquoian warfare.

Evidence from archaeology and accounts from Historic Period warfare suggest the opposite, that territory (both the aquisition and defense of) and the utter defeat of an enemy were real objectives/ concerns of pre-contact Iroquoian populations. In fact. Historic Period indigenous warfare may have been no more violent than that of the prehistoric period (Abler 1989; Brandao 1997).

The extensiveness and continued improvement of village fortifications over time indicate that defenses were tested and/or there was a real threat of attack.

Reports from the early contact period also support this and the following are a few examples. In A.D. 1533 a St. Lawrence Iroquois fortification was attacked by the Toudamans who breached the palisade and killed 200 of its defenders

(Cook 1993: 67-68). In A.D. 1615 Champlain recorded that the Huron had been forced to move their villages 40 to 50 leagues (presumably from the east, although the exact location is not known) in retreat from successful

Onondaga attacks (Champlain 1922-36 [3]: 125). This may explain why the

86 Huron had Champlain attack an Onondaga village this same year. In A.D.

1626 a Mohawk village was destroyed by the Mahican (Abler 1989; 279). In

A.D. 1642 the Neutral attacked a palisaded village of the Fire Nation. The Neutral laid siege to the village for ten days before they were able to finally take it. Seventy Fire Nation warriors were burnt at the stake and 800 people were taken captive (JR 27: 25-27).

All of the above attacks indicate violent warfare, where the goal was the destruction of a village or a population and/or to drive a population from its territory. This interpretation is also supported by the comments made by

Iroquois warriors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries concerning their views on war. The Iroquois often termed their warfare as an all or nothing struggle which either resulted in their enemy's total destruction or their own. Iroquois military strategy is plainly stated in the following examples:

1) In A.D. 1683 Father Beschefer reported,

"...the Iroquois, —irritated still further by the death of a captain of sonnontouan [Seneca], killed among the Kiskakons [Ottawa] by some Illinois who were there, —have gone to continue the war with more ardor. Their purpose is, to avenge that death, and, if possible, to exterm inate that nation..." (JR 62: 213).

2) In A.D. 1684 Hateouati, an Iroquois stated,

"Regarding the Illinois, I am at war with him, we shall both of us die fighting" (NYCD 9: 238).

87 3) On November 9, 1684 M. de Callieres reported,

that "...the Onnontagues [Onondagas] have declared to M. de la Barre that the entire Iroquois nation reserved unto itself the power of waging w’^ar against the Illinois as long as a single one of them would remain on earth" (NYCD 9: 249).

4) In A.D. 1711 Teganissorens, an Onondaga leader stated,

we "are not like you Christians for when you have taken prisoners of one another you send them home, by such means you can never rout one another. We are not of that Nature, When we have war against any nation Wee endeavor to destroy them utterly" (NYCD 5: 274).

These historic passages indicate a clear objective which is in sharp contrast to the goals of ritualized combat. If the objectives of the Historic

Period accurately reflect prehistoric warfare, this explains why so much effort was put into village defenses.

As indicated earlier, attacks against villages were attempted and sometimes successful. Based on the early contact descriptions, the weakest element of these fortifications was the wooden material they were constructed of, which made them vulnerable to fire. Attempts to scale the wall, cut or punch holes in the gate or walls, or kill defenders with range weapons would have been difficult and probably costly to the attackers, who would have had to expose themselves to return fire. Stone axes would not have been efficient in cutting down palisades, as opposed to later Historic iron axes which were very effective and quick. Changes in defenses to larger and stronger walls seems to have nullified attempts to cut through walls. However, if a conflagration was started the walls could be burned down and the inhabitants forced out into the open. This is what occurred at the 88 Stadocona Iroquois fort that was attacked by the Toudamans in A.D. 1533.

The Toudamans surprised the St. Lawrence Iroquois while they slept and "set fire round about [the palisade] and slew them all as they rushed out, except for five who made their escape" (Cook 1993: 68). Efforts to counter fire threats included an adequate water supply. Descriptions of Iroquois and Huron defenses always include comments on the prodigious amount of storage vessels full of water positioned on the platforms of the outer palisade. It appears that villages were successful most of the time in combating fire attacks. Archaeological literature has not indicated any evidence of fire damage associated with village palisades (such as any extensive ash layers) at

Iroquoian sites. Because of the strength of village defenses, an indigenous tribe was able to resist most concerted attempts by enemies to disperse or defeat them.

To conclude, traditional warfare was very complex and based on many intertwined goals and motives. All of these motivating factors reinforced and complemented one another. For example, a warrior could gain prestige by participating in a revenge attack, in which he captured an enemy who was then either adopted or ritually tortured. Although the goal of warfare may have been to eliminate and totally defeat an enemy, indigenous tribes were largely unsuccessful in this undertaking (except, possibly, in the case of the St.

Lawrence Iroquois) because of the strength of village defenses and creation of alUances/ confederacies. This stalemate helped to intensify the cyclic nature of revenge warfare because enemies were unlikely to be eliminated.

89 Historic Period Warfare

With contact traditional motivations for war continued, but the indigenous tribes were introduced to new technologies (iron weapons and guns), foreign diseases, and the fur trade. Iroquoian scholars have suggested that the need for European trade goods became an overpowering drive that superseded traditional reasons for warfare (e.g.. Hunt 1940). While traditional motives were not entirely replaced, scholars argue that the goal of w^arfare changed to an ambition to eliminate other tribes because they were competitors for furs. If a tribe could be defeated, then new territory could be absorbed along with any accompanying fur resources. The particulars concerning the fur trade premise and its advocates are presented in Chapter

Five, however, this section looks at how warfare tactics changed during the seventeenth century and addresses whether contact changed the motivational goals of the Iroquois, or rather, brought their traditional goals to fruition.

One of the most important trade items attained by the Iroquois for warfare purposes may not have been the gun but rather the iron hatchet.

The sharp edged hatchets gave the Iroquois an ability in warfare they had not possessed before, that being the capacity to hack down palisade walls quickly. The use of hatchets also complimented new assault tactics that were being utilized by the Iroquois against indigenous villages or French forts. During the 1640s the Iroquois were recorded as utilizing large numbers of warriors

(200 to 1000+ in number) in concerted and massed attacks on village fortifications. The goal of these assaults was to attain the outer wall as quickly as possible so as to reduce casualties in the "field of fire" in front of the

90 fortification. The "field of fire" is the cleared area in front of a fortified village which allows defenders a clear shot at attackers (Bradford 1988:166). Once the

outer wall was reached, warriors fired through loopholes into the interior of a

village, while others used hatchets at the base of the palisade. Once a wall was breached then warriors rushed inside to kill or capture the defenders. This assault tactic was used with great success against the Huron. In A.D. 1648 the

Iroquois captured and destroyed two Huron towns and approximately 700

Hurons were killed or taken captive. In A.D. 1649 the Iroquois again invaded

Huronia, intentionally targeting several Huron villages with assaults involving 1,000 to 1,200 warriors. Two Huron villages, St. Ignace and St. Louis, were successfully attacked and captured because iron hatchets were employed to hack holes in the palisade walls (JR 34: 15, 25-27, 123-125). The

Jesuits described the effectiveness of this new technology at the village of St.

Louis, "the Iroquois having undermined with blows of their hatchets the palisades of stakes, and having made passage for themselves through considerable breaches" (JR 34: 127). In this attack the H uron suffered 380 killed or captured (JR 34: 123-137, 217). The crushing defeat the Huron suffered in this battle disheartened them so much that they fragmented and dispersed, many even requesting the Iroquois to adopt them.

The use of the gun offered additional advantages to Iroquois attacks on their enemies. Some scholars have debated the effectiveness of muskets (e.g.,

Givens 1994) pointing out that guns were not as effective as the traditional range weapon, the bow. The Iroquois, however, preferred the use of guns and quickly replaced their bows with them. By the late 1640s the Mohawk were well armed with muskets (NYCD 1:140,154, 182), although other tribes of the

91 League had not attained them in great quantities. By the 1660s it appears that all of the Iroquois tribes were armed with muskets. While guns did have drawbacks, the Indians recognized two advantages that guns provided over bows: their shock value and penetrating power. Psychologically, a gun exuded power because of the noise, smoke and damage it could inflict, which could raise the confidence and morale of the warrior using it (Givens 1994).

When used as shock weapons against tribes unacquainted with its existence it could have a devastating impact on the morale of a defender. The sound of

50 or more muskets going off during a surprise attack would be quite intimidating to the uninitiated, causing panic and confusion. The Illinois, for example, were reported by the Jesuits as using guns solely as shock weapons against tribes unfam iliar w ith it to send them into panic (JR 59: 127, JR 60:

161). Otherwise the Illinois preferred using their bows.

Muskets provided another advantage during combat, penetrating power. Native wooden armor, while proof against arrows, could be pierced by musket balls. Muskets also nullified the technique of "dodging the arrows"

(Abler 1989: 274-275). In traditional warfare warriors could attempt to dodge arrows by timing the release of the bow or watching the arrows in flight. Bullets could not be dodged once they were fired. Muskets also had a chance to penetrate the outer walls of village palisades, particularly the upper portion that protected the platform area, which probably possessed only one line of palisade stakes. Bowmen firing from the platforms would have to expose themselves to fire their arrows, giving any Iroquois warrior armed with a musket an easy target.

92 The Iroquois excelled at using their muskets in surprise attacks on the canoe fleets of the Huron and Algonkians that traveled along the Ottawa and

St. Lawrence Rivers (Otterbein 1964). Iroquois warriors hid undetected along shorelines, firing at unsuspecting groups of Huron or Algonkians who were virtually helpless in their canoes. The Huron and Algonkians also provided easy, and most importantly, predictable targets because they regularly sent groups to trade or visit the French. Small raiding groups stationed themselves all along transportation routes and inside an enemy's territory, attacking from ambush, killing and taking captive as many of an enemy group as possible. This became a key strategy utilized by the Iroquois throughout the seventeenth century and began to take a severe toll on the warrior strength of the Iroquois enemies. The Iroquois also intentionally destroyed crops, outbuildings, and in the case of the French, cattle were killed

(JR 36:135; JR 37:101-103,113-115; JR 38: 57,171, 193; JR 40:109-113; JR 65: 12,

29; NYCD 9: 391, 516). These types of attacks put a foe into a constant state of defense, limiting their offensive capabilities. Targeting crops and cattle was a deliberate strategy to destroy an enemies' food supply in order to promote starvation. Unlike traditional warfare, where raids typically occurred in the summer or early fall, the Iroquois intensified their attacks during the Historic

Period, continually harassing their enemies year round. Hit and run attacks by small numbers of warriors were also supplemented by direct attacks against villages using large detachments involving 500 to 1,000 warriors. This strategy put the Iroquois enemies under constant stress, resulting in the successful dispersion or destruction of many (e.g., Huron, Neutral, Tobacco, Erie, and Susquehannock).

93 The Iroquois, unlike other Iroquoian communities, were able to effectively organize and coordinate large groups of warriors from all five tribes for offensive campaigns year round. Trigger (1976, 1990) points out that the Huron were unable to do this by the 1640s because of divisions in the tribe caused by the Jesuits. Disease also crippled many of the Iroquois enemies.

The Iroquois were hit with epidemics too, but because they were so successful in war and captured so many prisoners that were adopted, they were able to recoup their losses. Thus the Iroquois hit and run raids continued to reduce their enemies while stabilizing or allowing their own population to grow. They [Iroquois] "strengthened themselves as much as they could with other nations" (JR 41: 49).

Since most of the Iroquois opponents lived in fortified villages, if they were to be defeated or dispersed their villages had to attacked and captured, which could and did result in high casualties for the attacker. Befw een A.D.

1649 and 1652, the Iroquois suffered a high number of casualties (a total of at least 576 killed or captured [JR 34: 25, 55, 123-137, 217; JR 36:119, 123,133, 177,

181-189; JR 37; 99,105,107-111, 113; JR 38: 49-51, 53-55; see Table 3) which was directly related to their attacks on enemy villages. Most of the casualties suffered by an attacking force occurred during the approach to the defensive wall of the village, was in the "field of fire" (Brice 1984). In response to these heavy casualties the Iroquois developed new tactics that helped reduce casualties during assaults on fortifications. In the 1650s the Iroquois constructed movable barriers/walls and protective shields (mantlets) to protect warriors on the approach to the outer wall. These walls or shields were made of thick pieces of wood capable of withstanding musket fire

94 (Figure 4). The use of mantlets was first described by the Jesuits between A.D.

1654 and 1656, during the Iroquois w ar with the Erie (JR 42:113, 179-183; JR 45:

209). The Jesuits relate that during an assault on a major fortification of the Erie, the Iroquois constructed a "mobile counter-palisade" (a large portable

wooden wall) that protected several warriors at one time and was used to scale the outer palisade after it was leaned at an angle against the waU (JR 45;

209) (Figure 5). Canoes were also used as make-shift shields and as scaling ladders in this battle. The shields allowed the Iroquois to reach the defensive wall which was breached and scaled, resulting in the destruction of the fortification.

Protective shields continued to be used into the 1660s. The following account of an Iroquois assault on a French detachment entrapped in a circular palisade in A.D. 1660 demonstrates the success attained with the implementation of shields. "To shelter themselves from most of this hail [of bullets], they [the Iroquois] made themselves mantlets of three pieces of wood lashed side by side, which covered them from the crown of the head to the middle of the thigh; by this means they seized the curtains under the cannoneers, and as these defenses were not flanked, carried on their mining in considerable security" (JR 45: 253-255). Once the Iroquois gained command of the loopholes, they fired into the fort and used their hatchets to hack down the palisade walls, allowing them to capture or kill all of the defenders.

The use of protective shields was successful for the Iroquois because their indigenous opponents were relying on defenses that had circular or oval walls with no flanking bastions (Figure 6). Direct assault tactics that used

95 shields did not work well against fortified positions that possessed flanking

walls or bastions. A flanking wall is defined as a wall that projects at an angle

from the main wall of a fortification, allowing defenders a clear line of fire at

the flank of potential attackers (Hogg 1975; Mahan 1968). A bastion is an

angular projection from a fortification (along a wall or at the comers), affording crossfire on the flanks of attackers (Bradford 1988; Brice 1984; Hogg

1975; Mahan 1968) (Figure 6). Shielded attackers that reach the base of a

fortification with flanking walls or bastions become vulnerable to defensive fire from the side or the rear, which negates any advantage protective shields

may have provided. The Huron were the first to begin incorporating bastions

in some of their towns. However, the Huron designs did not possess true flanked wall designs as shown on the flanked fort in Figure 6, nor did these

designs anticipate the ferocity of Iroquois assaults that employed large

numbers of attacking warriors and the use of new and effective offensive

weapons (e.g., iron axes, muskets, counter palisades, and shields). However,

by the 1660s many of the Iroquois enemies began incorporating flanked

designs into their village defenses. For example, m A.D. 1664 an Iroquois

force was confronted by a Susquehannock village protected by a double walled palisade that had tw^o square bastions armed with cannons (JR 68: 77). The

Iroquois did not attempt to assault this village probably because shields would have been ineffective against the flanked defenses and cannon fire. As a

result of increased defenses the Iroquois changed their warfare tactics, relying more on indirect attacks which included encirclement of an enemy outside a fortification; siege; raiding (hit and run); destruction of unprotected buildings, settlements, crops and/or cattle; the disruption of supply lines; and ambush of reinforcements of a besieged fort/ village.

96 When Iroquois warfare is analyzed diachronically there is a clear

evolution in the change of warfare tactics used between A.D. 1640 and 1700.

Out of the 237 reported attacks made by the Iroquois during this period, 100

(42%) were hit and run attacks on enemies along waterw'ays/ trade routes or at

unspecified locales. The remaining 137 (58%) attacks were made on or in the

vicinity of enemy villages. Of these attacks, 86% were indirect assaults on

people, outbuildings, cattle, etc., outside of the villages defenses. The

remaining 14% represented direct attempts to take a fort/village by force. When the direct assaults against forts/ villages were analyzed separately, the

number of attacks against fortified indigenous villages (16 total) was

proportionally higher than those against Euroamerican villages/forts (3 total).

The majority of the direct assaults against indigenous villages (75%) occurred

between A.D. 1640 and 1660, of which all were against the fortified villages of

the Iroquoian speaking neighbors of the Iroquois. It is during this period the Iroquois used their new technology and new battle tactics with deadly

efficiency. The traditional village defenses of the neighboring indigenous

populations were not adequate to survive the new strategies employed by the

Iroquois. As the Iroquois captured and destroyed one enemy village after

another and had enormous success with their hit and run raids, the morale of

their enem ies plum m eted (JR 33: 69, 81, 119). C onsequently the confidence of

the Iroquois increased, as did their attacks, resulting in the successful dispersal and/destruction of their enemies. However, by the 1680s the Iroquois opponents became armed with muskets and had incorporated new fortification designs, enabling them to withstand Iroquois attacks.

97 It is clear from the ethnohistoric evidence that the period betw^een A.D.

1640 and 1660 was a critical time for Northeastern tribal warfare. Traditional

defenses, weapons, and warfare strategies were effected by new technology and ideas. In the case of the Iroquois, the ethnohistoric record indicates they chose to become well armed with guns (Givens 1994; Otterbein 1964). They obviously felt that the gun was superior to their traditional weapons and that it gave them a tactical edge against their opponents. The Iroquois also had an advantage over their enemies in their ability to attain weapons (e.g., iron axes and muskets). Access to trade items was safer and close, allowing them to attain weapons unhindered. Givens (1994) documents that by A.D. 1640 the

Mohawk were fully armed with muskets while the Iroquois enemies reportedly possessed few (excluding the Susquehannock). It is also clear that throughout the 1640s the Iroquois began to enjoy increasing success in their attacks against traditional enemies. As their enemies weakened, the Iroquois confidence rose and they increased their attacks, employing unique assault tactics specifically designed to capture and destroy indigenous villages. During the period that the Iroquois had a decided advantage in weapons and tactics, their enemies suffered enormous losses, resulting in their destruction or dispersal (e.g., the Huron, Neutral, and Erie). Those enemies, however, that were armed with muskets and who employed flanked village designs were better able to maintain the status quo and resist Iroquois attacks (e.g., the

Susquehannock). By the 1680s most of the Iroquois enemies had attained muskets and were able to defeat the Iroquois more frequently and regain some of the lands the Iroquois had formally conquered.

98 The ethnohistoric record indicates that the Historic Period was similar to the prehistoric period in that warfare was a significant part of Iroquoian culture. However, unlike the prehistoric period, the Iroquois attained new weapons and set themselves apart from other Iroquoian groups in how they conducted warfare by developing unique battle tactics that their enemies did not emulate. It would appear that the new weapons and tactics enabled the

Iroquois to actually destroy their enemies, an opportunity the Iroquois could not resist since it fulfilled their long time ambitions for revenge, as well as providing increased prestige and respect.

In summary, this study has accumulated and combined the sparse amount of available literature uTitten on Iroquois warfare tactics by other

Iroquoian scholars and included additional information and commentary from my own research. It is clear that more studies are needed on the evolution of Iroquois warfare in the prehistoric and Historic periods. This study suggests that new technology and battle tactics enabled the Iroquois to achieve their goals of defeating their long time foes in the Historic Period.

However, the next chapter shows that offensive and defensive tactics of the

Iroquois and their enemies are ignored in current explanations of Iroquois motivations for warfare. Perhaps they should not be.

99 CHAPTERS

ANTHROPOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL EXPLANAHONS FOR IROQUOIS WARFARE

"Writer William Brandon enthroned the Iroquois as "king of the hill...... In the paramount area of conflict between rival European invaders, the Great [Iroquois] League now stood alone, the ruling power, holding the key to the entire interior of the continent." Iroquois depredations roUed on, "toppling ancient societies, uprooting peoples, tumbling together fugitives and invaders ...... The land was filled with Ishmaels.""

Francis Jennings (1984: 20)

Explanations of Iroquois warfare proposed over the past three centuries

can be categorized into two basic approaches: Traditional and Revisionist.

Traditional views represent ideas promoted by anthropologists and historians

in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. Revisionist explanations are anthropological/historical reactions to traditional explanations since 1940 and represent new ideas and theories.

Traditional Explanations

Traditional explanations of Iroquois warfare were proposed as early as the eighteenth century, although it was not until the nineteenth century that they became well established. These explanations were defined by

100 anthropologists and historians who suggested the Iroquois possessed a superior culture and ideology to other Indian tribes because they had

agriculture, sedentary villages, and a confederacy/league (oligarchy). These cultural traits placed the Iroquois into a higher evolutionary stage according

to the standards of cultural evolution, a popular nineteenth century scientific

theory used to explain how human populations had developed over time.

One of the leading proponents of cultural evolution was Lewis Henry

Morgan, who along with Edward Tylor developed the concept of unilinear evolution. The concept of unilinear evolution assumes that all cultures go through the same predictable stages of development. The cultural traits which indicate a different stage were advances in ideology, social structure, subsistence and technology. For example, societies with agriculture were superior to hunting and gathering groups, and a society that used iron implements was more evolved than one that used stone tools (Langness 1987;

M organ 1877).

The concept of cultural evolution, and in particular unilinear evolution, was challenged and refuted by several anthropologists and historians in the early twentieth century, most notably by Franz Boas. Boas successfully argued that evolution was not deterministic and that cultures developed along their own particular paths (Bohannan and Glazer 1988).

However, based on the prevalent acceptance of cultural evolution in the nineteenth century, the Iroquois were viewed by the scholars of this period as more evolved than other Indian tribes of the Northeast (e.g., Morgan 1995 [1851]; Parkman 1983 [1865-1892]). This view is ironic since most of the enemies (both Algonkian and Iroquoian) of the Iroquois possessed the same

101 subsistence practices, technology, and/or social structure as the Iroquois.

Nonetheless the Iroquois were described by eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth century Iroquoian scholars as possessing a superior government and an innate ability to prosecute warfare better then their enemies.

Influential literature that reinforced these ideas was written by Cadwalladar

Colden (1922) and Francis Parkm an (1983 [1865-1892]), both historians, and

Lewis Henry Morgan (1995 [1851]), an anthropologist. This passage by

Parkman demonstrates the view of Iroquois superiority.

"Among all the barbarous nations of the continent, the Iroquois of New York stand paramount. Elements which among others were crude, confused, and embryotic, were among them systemized and concreted into an established polity. The Iroquois was the Indian of Indians. A thorough savage, yet a finished and developed savage, he is perhaps an example of the highest elevation which man can reach without emerging from his primitive condition of the hunter. A geographical position, commanding on one hand the portal of the Great Lakes, and on the other the sources of the streams flowing both to the Atlantic and the &Iississippi, gave the ambitious and aggressive confederates advantages which they perfectly understood, and by which they profited to the utmost. Patient and politic as they were ferocious, they were not only conquerors of their own race, but the powerful allies and dreaded foes of the French and English colonies ...... Their organization and history evince their intrinsic superiority^ Even their traditionary lore, amid its wild puerilities, shows at times the stamp of an energy and force in striking contrast with the flimsy creations of Algonkian fancy" (Parkm an 1983 [1865-1892]: 367-368).

In addition to innate behavior, ideology was considered an important element of Iroquois warfare in traditional explanations. Colden (1922), Morgan (1995 [1851]), and Parkm an (1983 [1865-1892]) suggested that Iroquois warfare was motivated by an imperialistic ideology to attain a territorial empire and the subjugation of other tribes, which these authors feel they

102 achieved in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In conjunction with

these goals, the pursuit of war allowed the Iroquois to attain prestige and

glory. The following passages provide examples of these views.

"It is not for the sake of tribute however, that they [the Iroquois] make war but from the notions of glory, which they have ever most strongly inspirited in their minds; and the farther they go to seek an enemy, the greater glory they think they gain " (Colden 1922: xix).

"For three quarters of a century, from the year 1625 to the year 1700, the Iroquois were involved in an almost uninterrupted warfare. At the close of this period, they had subdued and held in nominal subjection all the principal Indian nations occupying the territories which are now embraced in the states of New York, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, the northern and western parts of Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky, Northern Tennessee, part of Illinois, Indiana and Michigan, a portion of the New England states, and the principal part of Upper Canada. Over many of these nations, the haughty and imperious Iroquois exercised a constant supervision. If any of them became involved in domestic difficulties, a delegation of chiefs went among them and restored tranquility, prescribing at the same time their future conduct" (Morgan 1995 [1851]: 13-14).

Bolstering the belief of an imperial agenda and the existence of an

empire were the vast land claims the English asserted the Iroquois owned

during the seventeenth and eighteenth century (Figure 3). The Iroquois experienced significant gains in territory during the mid and late seventeenth century with their success in warfare against traditional enemies. The

Iroquois were able to defeat and disperse all of the tribes in the Southern

Ontario Peninsula. The success of the Iroquois in the Midwest is less clear, although it appears that by A.D. 1684 they were able to destroy or disperse all of the tribes in the Lower Michigan Peninsula, lands east of the Wabash

103 River, and along the Middle and Upper Ohio Rivers (Figure 7). Iroquois war parties traveled as far west as the Mississippi River, north almost to James Bay, east to the Gaspe Peninsula, and south into Georgia, Alabama and possibly Florida. These distant raids did not result in the acquirement of new territory, for tribes in these areas were not destroyed, although the British and Iroquoian scholars saw these long distant attacks as demarcating the boundary of a supposed empire.

Territorial gains accomplished by the Iroquois during the 1650s to the

1680s began to shrink in the 1690s because of the military success of the

French and various Western Algonkian tribes (more detailed accounts on seventeenth century warfare are provided in Chapter 6). Because of the diminishing military strength of the Iroquois, several Algonkian and

Iroquoian groups began to move back into territories from which they had formerly been driven. In A.D. 1701 the Iroquois realized they were no longer able to hold on to much of their western territories and asked the English for help. In a meeting, the Iroquois deeded their lands to the west and northwest to the English in hopes that they would stop the French from building a fort at Detroit (NYCD 4: 905, 908). The Iroquois stressed that they ceded only their protectorate rights, meaning that they still retained legal ownership to these lands. The English, wishing to validate their own claims to the interior of

North America, gladly accepted and not only laid claim to Iroquois territories in this treaty but to all of the Iroquois lands (to the south) and anywhere the

Iroquois may have sent war parties. This included many regions the Iroquois readily admitted they had never conquered (e.g., the Mississippi River area).

104 Although many of the Iroquois claims to the lands in the northwest and west were legitimate for much of the seventeenth century, by the eighteenth century the Iroquois had lost control of many of their former holdings. However, the English and some of the Iroquois ignored the changes that occurred in tribal territories and continued to perpetuate the myth of Iroquois ownership of a great extent of land (Jennings 1984). Along with the land claims, the English asserted that the Iroquois had subjugated most of the tribes in the Midwest and Northeast based on their past successes in war. While the Iroquois did hold great power and prestige over other tribes for a period of time, this too began to erode in the eighteenth century.

Based on the myth of Iroquois superiority and a supposed empire and the acceptance of cultural evolution by scientists of this time, it is understandable why Iroquoian scholars of the eighteenth and nineteenth century portrayed the Iroquois as they did. Because Colden, Morgan and

Parkman were such prominent figures in Iroquoian studies, their works were the primary resources cited by their peers and remained unchallenged until the 1940s. There are, however, several obvious critiques of Traditional explanations which much of the Revisionist literature has identified (e.g..

Hunt 1940; Jennings 1984; Merrell and Richter 1987). For example, there is no evidence to support the premise that the Iroquois possessed some type of innate superiority in the art of making war. If the Iroquois did have some type of innate superiority it would have been lost by the diluting process of adoption. It is well established that the Iroquois had a liberal adoption practice which was utilized to offset the amount of casualties they suffered from disease and w arfare (Brandao 1997). For exam ple, in A.D. 1658, the

105 Jesuits noted the effect of adoption and warfare on the Iroquois population,

stating "that the Iroquois have depopulated their own villages to such an

extent, that they now contain more foreigners than natives of the country"

(JR 43: 265). As a result of intermarriage between the Iroquois and various adopted tribal groups (that included Iroquoian, Algonkian, Siouan, and

Muskogean speaking tribes), innate superiority would not have existed.

Explanations based on cultural evolution are also not supported. As

mentioned earlier, the Iroquois were not unique. Other Iroquoian and Algonkian speaking populations possessed agriculture, sedentary villages and

confederated tribes/villages. The Iroquois did have an advantage in weapons

technology, but this was for a limited tiihe, by the 1680s all of the Iroquois

enemies were well armed with muskets- Revisionists have pointed out that

the Iroquois were much less successful hi war as had been portrayed by

Traditional scholars. They also argue that the Iroquois did not possess an empire and downplay Iroquois territorial gains (Jennings 1984).

Although much of the Traditional explanations for Iroquois warfare have been challenged and discredited by recent Revisionist literature, they should not be dismissed out of hand. Traditional scholars did provide accurate descriptions of Iroquois success in warfare for certain periods of history, and did indicate the importance of glory and prestige in Iroquois society. A few present-day scholars, such as Keith Otterbein (1964, 1979), have continued to argue for Iroquois superiority in warfare against seventeenth century opponents, but instead of genetic explanations he noted the Iroquois utilized better and more flexible warfare strategies than their foes (e.g.,

106 organized hit and run raids and coordination of large numbers of men).

Otterbein's diachronic analysis of Iroquois warfare techniques provides unique functional explanation of how the Iroquois won engagements with new battlefield strategies. Battle tactics were rarely discussed in Traditional literature and are almost nonexistent in Revisionist studies (except for Abler

1989; Benn 1991; Trigger 1990)

Revisionist Explanations

Revisionist literature has challenged Traditional premises on Iroquois land claims and warfare and has provided alternative histories to those developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Critiquing the history of the Iroquois, particularly the myth of the Iroquois Empire and their power over other tribes, is a popular topic among Revisionists, as are alternative explanations for the cause of w arfare (Abler 1992; Brandao 1997; Dennis 1993;

Hid 1979; H aan 1980; Jennings 1984, 1988; McConnell 1992; McUwain 1915; Merrell and Richter 1987; N aroll 1968; Richter 1992; Schlesier 1976; Tanner

1987; Wheeler-Voegelin 1974a). In their critiques the Revisionists hold the

English historians and Iroquois responsible for perpetuating myths about Iroquois land claims and superiority in war. Francis Jennings, one of the most notable Revisionist historians, explicitly attacked Morgan and

Parkman's so-called "Iroquois Empire" myth in his book The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire (1984).

"More to the present point, Morgan reported as historical fact a considerable amount of nonsense that became embalmed in

107 history after being embroidered and passed on by Francis Parkman. Morgan created an empire for the Iroquois that never existed" (Jennings 1984: xvii).

In addition to down playing territorial claims, the Revisionists have disputed English and Iroquois claims of their [Iroquois] superiority in warfare. The Revisionists give little credit to reports of Iroquois prowess in battle except in their early victories over other Iroquoian speaking tribes (e.g.,

Huron, Tobacco, etc.) during the 1640s and 1650s. After this time. Revisionists question the significance of reported Iroquois successes and by A.D. 1684 the

Iroquois are depicted as on the defensive, suffering severe losses to the French and their allies, and eventually were defeated by them (Bid 1979; Jennings 1984, 1988; Richter 1992; Tanner 1987). The following are a few examples of

Revisionist descriptions of Iroquois warfare abilities in the seventeenth century:

"The internal consistency of Indian oral traditions as they have been preserved by 19th century Indian writers strongly support these ancient traditions of a cataclysmic defeat suffered by the Iroquois" (Bid 1979: 297). Bid (in his opinion) refers to the validity of Ojibwas (Chippewa) oral traditions over ethnohistoric evidence.

"In general, historians studying Indians in Ontario are forced to accept the idea that the Iroquois had been stunned by a monstrous defeat or series of defeats inflicted on them by the Ojibwas and their allies" (Bid 1979: 297).

"....the French learned how to cope with Indian warfare and forced even the Iroquois to their knees by 1700" (Jennings 1984: 79).

"The Onondagas' bloodless triumph of 1684 may justly be called the zenith of Iroquois glory" (Jennings 1984: 186).

108 "ITiere can be no reasonable doubt that the Five Nations Iroquois had been beaten by the French and their Indian allies, and badly beaten" (Jennings 1984: 208). In reference to Iroquois battles w ith the French in the 1690s.

"As the year 1700 approached, the Iroquois perhaps at last deserved their reputation as the 'the Romans of this Western World'—if the reference was to the besieged and disintegrating empire of the fifth century A.D." (Richter 1992:190).

"More than a decade of war had proven that economically and militarily, the Five Nations indeed had become almost powerless 'to resist a Christian enemy,' whether French or English" (Richter 1992: 213).

While some of the reinterpretation of Iroquois warfare is valid, it is highly opinionated and reactionary in reference to Traditional descriptions.

Some of the Revisionists' characterization of Iroquois military abilities appear to be based on unreliable evidence or are simply assumptions. For example,

Francis Jennings (1968, 1984) reinterpreted the traditionally held belief that the Iroquois were responsible for the defeat/dispersal of the Susquehannock in A.D. 1675. Jennings suggests that this is a myth and that in reality it was the Colony of Maryland that attacked and dispersed the Susquehannock. looker (1984) questioned Jennings' assumptions, pointing out that he did not provide any conclusive passage indicating a Maryland attack on the

Susquehannock main village. In addition, Jennings ignored five ethnohistoric accounts (from English [one from the Maryland Archives] and

French sources) which indicate that the Iroquois had defeated the

Susquehannock and had driven them from their lands. These are the only passages that identify the demise of the Susquehannock. Based on the existing evidence, Tooker argues that the Traditional interpretations were probably correct.

109 As demonstrated above, some of the Revisionistic writing has been extreme, and in some cases over-reactionary, resulting in revisions that should not occur. A few authors have written revisions of some the

Revisionist interpretations. For example, Brandao and Stama (1996) have indicated in a recent article that many Revisionists went too far in portraying the Iroquois as a defeated people by A.D. 1700, the end of the "Beaver Wars"

(e.g., Jennings 1984; Richter 1992). They (Brandao and Stam a) argue that the ethnohistoric evidence suggests that the "Beaver Wars" ended in stalemate.

While Revisionist literature has rewritten much of the history of

Iroquois warfare it has also provided new explanations for its cause. These explanations are categorized into two general themes: economics and ideology.

Economic Explanations

In A.D. 1940 George Hunt was the first to seriously challenge

Traditional explanations with the publication of his book. The Wars of the

Iroquois. Hunt not only questioned the authenticity of historic portrayals of Iroquois successes in warfare, but also dismissed the genetic arguments as untenable. Hunt proposed a new alternative, economics, specifically the fur trade, which he strongly felt was the overriding reason for the wars fought by the Iroquois in the seventeenth century. While other previous historians (e.g., McHwain 1915, and Parkman 1983 [1865-1892]) had recognized the importance of the fur trade as a mitigating factor for Iroquois warfare, none had defined its impact and overwhelming influence as Hunt had. Hunt

110 suggested that the need for European goods became an irresistible drive among the tribes which had to rely on an ever diminishing beaver supply to attain their needs. Once beaver supplies ran out (which he believes occurred in A.D. 1640), the Iroquois were forced to either assert themselves as middlemen or take pelts from the territories of other tribes. The importance Hunt appUes to this economic issue is clearly stated in several passages from his book, provided below.

The Indians divided into groups, "those who had fur and those who had none." The Indian "who had fur, or could get it, survived; he who could not get it died or moved away" (Hunt 1940: 5).

"It is quite likely that if the white trade had become a social and economic necessity to them, their position had life and death as alternatives. That position would have permitted neither compromise nor inactivity, and would explain why their wars were the first truly national intertribal wars on the continent, there being now for the first time a truly national motive" (Hunt 1940: 11).

"The European trade instantly divided the tribes into highly competitive groups, and the competition for trade was, or soon became, a struggle for survival" (Hunt 1940: 19).

"The Hurons had the furs, they refused to give them up peaceably, therefore they were destroyed" (Hunt 1940: 54).

"The fall of the Hurons, the rise to affluence and power of the Ottawa, the depopulation of western Ontario and Michigan and the repopulation of Wisconsin, the conquest of Pennsylvania and Ohio— all these were the results of the efforts of the Five Nations to get furs and assume the position held by the Hurons before 1649" (H unt 1940: 54).

"They [Iroquois] wished to eliminate all the tribes of the Illinois country as comm ercial factors,..." (H unt 1940: 155).

I l l Hunt saw the introduction of the European fur-trade as transforming

"almost overnight, the fundamental conditions of aboriginal economy"

(Hunt 1940; 4), and alludes that the fur trade became a national policy among the tribes. Essentially the Iroquois acquired the same economic attitudes and motivations as the Euroamerican colonies with whom they came in contact. The influence of H unt's idea was immediate (e.g., Derosiers 1947; Fenton

1940; Goldstein 1969; Tooker 1963), and contemporary Iroquoian scholars accepted his economic explanation wholeheartedly. Perhaps the reason

HunPs theory was adopted so readily was that Iroquoian scholars of the time

(e.g., Fenton 1940) were beginning to question the Traditional depictions and explanations of warfare that had dominated the field for so long. Hunt's explanation was monocausal and easy to understand since it was based on Euroamerican precepts of economics, the experiences and values of which were ingrained into all nineteenth and twentieth century Euroamerican scholars. As Brandao has recently pointed out. Hunt's explanation is so convincing that "[hjistorians of the Iroquois, other native groups, and

European colonies have come to rely almost exclusively on Hunt's work for their assessments of Iroquois motives [for warfare]" (Brandao 1997: 14). The effect of Hunt's premise can be seen in the following passages from the work of other twentieth century Iroquoian scholars.

"It was George T. Hunt (1940) who in a remarkable publication called attention to the depletion of beaver in the Iroquois country and its impact on Iroquois warfare he was correct that the depletion of beavers in their own territories brought the Iroquois into conflict with their neighbors" (Abler 1992:158).

"Control of the fur trade of the Northwest seemed to be the only alternative for the Iroquois" (G oldstein 1969: 47).

112 "The basic consideration or motivation of Iroquois hostility against the French was economic a hostility which left little room for compromise" (Goldstein 1969: 47).

"This would enable the Five Nations to realize their cherished ambition of being the middlemen in the western fur trade" (Goldstein 1969:168). Goldstein is describing peace attempts with the Western Algonkians (in the 1690s), which he believed the Iroquois were forcing upon them for economical reasons.

"As the trade bound tribe and colony together, it divided tribe from tribe and colony from colony. In that fact lies a tragedy of epic proportions. In their competition to gain advantage in the trade, tribes rejected the impulse to unite against invading colonials, and their strivings were incited further by competing colonials. No feasible way existed in the conditions of that era to prevent the competition from heightening to bloodshed. Even in Europe the larger scale nation­ states solved their problems by repeated wars, as they do today" (Jennings 1984: 85).

"These early wars [in the first decades of the seventeenth century] were fought to gain and maintain access to sources of European goods w hile the wars which follow [A. D. 1620 to 1701] were fought to obtain fresh sources of beaver and other peltries but the underlying causes in both instances was economic" (Lenig 1977: 82).

"Trade with Europeans made economic motives central to American Indian conflicts for the first time" (Richter 1983: 539).

"By about 1640 the Five Nations perhaps had exhausted the beaver stock of their home territory A long, far flung series of beaver wars' ensued, in which the Five Nations battled the Algonquian nations of the Saint Lawrence River Region, the Huron, the Khionontateronon, the Neutral, the Erie, and other western and northern peoples in a constant struggle over fur supplies" (Richter 1983: 539).

"By the 1640's the beaver supply in Iroquois territory was exhausted, or insufficient for their needs. They went to war to obtain furs from the Huron and other nations trading with the French, and to harvest furs in the hunting grounds of neighboring tribes" (Tanner 1987: 29). 113 The above passages represent the ideas of just a few of the many

scholars who have accepted Hunt's explanation. Other scholars who have advocated Hunt's premise, or a version of it, include; Bradley (1987);

Derosiers (1947); Eccles (1978 [1969], 1983); Groulx (1976); H unter (1978);

Jennings (1984, 1988); Kellogg (1968); Lanctot (1960); Lenig (1971); Merrell and

Richter (1987); Norton 1974; Richter (1992); Wheeler-VoegeHn (1974a and b).

The use of economic explanations by leading authorities in Iroquoian studies

has reinforced its acceptance as an underlying cause for Iroquois warfare of the seventeenth century.

IdgQlPgjçal AppLQ^Çllgs,

In addition to the economic motives. Revisionist literature has

elaborated on Traditional ideological explanations for warfare such as glory, prestige, and revenge. Jennings (1984) has argued that the Iroquois were

driven to war by ideological beliefs that were based on the creating of the "Great Peace" of the League. According to Jennings, the principles of the

Great Peace (of nonaggression) were perceived by the Iroquois as applying to

all Indian tribes, and those that refused to accept the Great Peace were

considered enemies. Jennings felt that the Iroquois considered themselves a

"Chosen People," whom were destined to bring the word and establishment of the Great Peace to all Indians either amicably or through conquest if

necessary. Jennings suggests this theme or doctrine of the seventeenth century Iroquois has lasted until the present-day.

"Even after total military defeat, the Iroquois Grand Council still meets—the oldest governmental institution still maintaining its original form in eastern North America—and 114 it still keeps the dream [emphasis added] although most Iroquois prefer other governments. I think it likely that the Mohawks in 1645 were motivated by more than material interests. Theirs was a dream of empire" (Jennings 1984: 94).

Although Jennings stated that the Iroquois concept of empire

contrasted with the way it is conceived by Europeans, his portrayal of the

Iroquois is similar to the imperialism proposed by Colden, Morgan and

Parkman, without the genetic connotations. To Jennings, the fur trade

complemented ideological notions of glory, and both were part of a

formulated design of aggression against neighboring cultures. The picture

that Jennings paints of an aggressive Iroquois culture bent on conquering all

opposition is a key element of both Traditional and Revisionist explanations.

Traditional explanations may have used genetic reasons to explain the Iroquois quest for empire the Revisionist simply replaced this with the

overpowering drive of economics (Abler 1992; Bradley 1987; Derosiers 1947;

Eccles 1978 [1969], 1983; Groulx 1976; H unter 1978; Jennings 1984,1988;Kellogg

1968; Lanctot 1960; Lenig 1971; Merrell and Richter 1987; N orton 1974; Richter 1983, 1992; Tanner 1987; Wheeler-Voegelin 1974a and 1974b).

Matthew Dennis, in a recent publication. Cultivating a Landscape of Peace: Iroquois-European Encounters in 17th-Century America (1993), has criticized this viewpoint and has suggested that this perspective may more appropriately describe the Iroquois enemies rather than the Iroquois. Dennis also feels that ideology was an important aspect of Iroquois culture but that it played a significant role in circumventing warfare through peaceful resolutions. Contrary to Jennings, Dennis suggests that the epic of the Great

Peace (the Deganawidah Epic) became ingrained within the ideological 115 precepts of Iroquois society, stopping warfare not only betw een the tribes of the League, but also with neighboring enemies. Dennis researched the ethnohistoric record for the first half of the seventeenth century, looking at who initiated combat and who broke peace treaties betw^een the Iroquois and their enemies. The results of his research were strikingly different from the interpretations of Traditional and Revisionist scholars. During this period,

Dennis discovered that the Iroquois rarely initiated a war and usually were not the first to break peace treaties once they were established. He also noted that even after an enemy broke the peace or started a war the Iroquois continually initiated peace attempts to stop the hostilities (Dennis 1993). This behavior does not suggest an aggressive culture bent on destroying all of its opponents, and has been echoed by other scholars (e.g., Naroll 1968; Schlesier 1976). If Dennis is right then the Iroquois were mainly on the defensive in the first half of the seventeenth century and perhaps have been wrongly labeled aggressors simply because they were victorious in the outcomes of the warfare of this period.

Another ideological explanation utilized to interpret Iroquois warfare is Daniel Richter's m ourning w ar explanation (1983, 1992). This type of warfare is based on the gratification of revenge needs and has been addressed in Chapter 4. Richter argued, however, that during the seventeenth century the cyclic nature of mourning warfare was intensified by the fur trade and disease. For example, in A.D. 1679 the Iroquois suffered a severe smallpox epidemic which caused high casualties. Richter believed that "the epidemic had inspired a massive mourning war" that sparked the Iroquois to make several attacks against the Illinois that same year (Richter 1992: 24). While

116 Richter's analysis is informative in explaining traditional motives for Iroquoian warfare its use as an explanation for the large scale warfare of the

seventeenth and eighteenth century is largely hypothetical. Much like

Jennings, Richter implies that the Iroquois were aggressors, compelled to make war because of the fur trade or disease. However, he provides no documentary proof of these assertions from the ethnohistorical record.

Richter also does not address why other tribes of the Northeast did not become aggressive like the Iroquois since they were similarly impacted by disease and the fur trade.

Summary of Previous Explanations of Iroquois Warfare

Both Traditional and Revisionist explanations have one thing in common: they have attempted to provide all encompassing explanations for

Iroquois warfare in the seventeenth century. For the Traditional scholars warfare was an innate process intensified by the Iroquois acquisition of firearms. Revisionists have justly refuted the genetic arguments and in its place have substituted economic ones. One would expect with the acceptance of economic premises contemporary Iroquoian scholars must have ample evidence for their explanation, yet they do not. Extensive analysis of the secondary literature revealed that current scholars have provided no ethnohistoric passages from the primary sources to support their argument.

Instead, broad statements (opinions?) are made (as exampled on pp. 112-114) without any tie to specific passages. The evidence that Iroquoian scholars do cite as proof for economic warfare are the following: 1) vague references to

Iroquois attacks on Algonkian/Huron canoe fleets during the 1640s and 1650s,

2) Hunt's book is cited as providing proof, and 3) the date, A.D. 1640 is 117 specified as the year the beaver supply supposedly ran out in Iroquoia, forcing the Iroquois to attack their neighbors. There are several problems inherent in these explanations. There is no attempt by Revisionists to identify which attacks on Algonkian/Huron canoe fleets are economically related, so we are left to assume that all attacks on these groups were economically motivated which is simply not the case. Many attacks made on the Huron and

Algokians occurred during their return trips when they possessed no furs. Brandao also points out that only 5.6% of all recorded Iroquois incidents of war involved fur trade items, and the presence of furs could be incidental to the true reasons for an attack. References to Hunt (1940) typically cite his book rather than any particular passage within it. This may be because Hunt himself does not provide any explicit ethnohistoric passages in his explanation. We are left to take him at his word. Brandao also interpreted

Hunt in a similar fashion; "Unfortunately, in order to support the hypothesis that the Iroquois were middlemen. Hunt assumed that his views about culture change and economic self-interest were self-evident" (Brandao 1997:

14). If a particular passage in Hunt is cited it is his date of A.D. 1640 in which he believes the beaver supply ran out in Iroquoia, forcing the Iroquois to attain their supply from neighboring tribes. However, neither Hunt, or subsequent subscribers of his explanation, have provided any documentation of this assertion (Brandao 1997).

It would appear that the fur trade explanation for the so called "Beaver

Wars" has gone largely unproven. In an attempt to remedy this deficiency one of the goals of this dissertation was to find and list any ethnohistoric passage that provided an explanation for Iroquois warfare. Ethnohistoric

118 passages that provide explanations for this warfare are then identified in Chapter 7. If Hunt's premise is correct, ethnohistoric explanations concerning the "Beaver Wars" should reflect economic motivations.

119 CHAPTER 6 DOCUMENTATION OF IROQUOIS WARFARE

BETWEEN A.D. 1649 AND 1701

"The Iroquois have so spread themselves along the great stream of St. Lawrence, and along the River des Prairies, that there is no security from the lake of St. Pierre, which is little above the three Rivers, even to very far beyond Mon-Real" OR 25: 25).

Father Vimont (1643)

"I pretend to be able to demonstrate that if the Five Nations at any time in conjunction with the Eastern Indians and those that live within these plantations, revolt from the English to the French, they would in a short time drive us out of this Continent;" (NYCD 4: 169).

Governor Bellomont of New York (1700)

The goal of this chapter is to document all reported cases of Iroquois warfare between A.D. 1649 and 1701. During this period, intense fighting amongst indigenous tribes and between indigenous tribes and European colonies occurred throughout the Great Lakes, Midwest, and Northeast. The Iroquois were associated with a total of 332 reported incidents of warfare against 49 opponents. Table 4 lists those indigenous tribes and European colonies with whom the Iroquois came into conflict during this time frame.

Most of the attacks made by the Iroquois (88%) were against Iroquoian and

Algonkian speaking tribes located in the west (Southern Ontario Peninsula, 120 ^✓lidwest, and Great Lakes), and north (along the St. Lawrence River ), and

against the French. Because so many cases of warfare occurred during the time frame in question, it was divided into four temporal periods of conflict (A.D. 1649 to 1659; A.D. 1660 to 1669; A.D. 1670 to 1679; and A.D. 1680 to 1701),

which allowed a narrower assessment and focus of particular historical

events. Tables 5-8 list the number of Iroquois opponents during each of these

four delineated periods. These tables also indicate the number of reported

engagements associated with each particular opponent.

The documentation process involved placing individual accounts of warfare into a specially designed database (Table 3). The database was organized to maximize the retrieval of descriptive data from each particular passage of warfare identified in the ethnohistoric sources. Each warfare account was distinguished by a date (estimation of when the battle or event took place), participants, the initiator of the battle, casualties (captured, killed, and wounded for both sides), and where the battle took place. A similar type of database (Table 9) was established for recording accounts of conflict resolution between the Iroquois and their opponents. This database identified the date the peace negotiation occurred, whether it succeeded or failed, and its duration. Peace negotiations were analyzed in order to address the issue of prestige associated with peace representatives and the peace process (mentioned in Chapter 2). With the information developed from these databases a table was created that listed who initiated engagements for each designated temporal period (Table 10).

121 Besides documenting cases of warfare, regional maps were created to show where battles were focused during the designated temporal periods. In association with these maps and the designated time frames. Table 1 shows the number of reported cases of warfare diachronically per sub-regional area

(see Figure 1 as a base map for the sub-regional areas). The information drawn from the documentation, maps, and tables was then used to provide a summary of the warfare that occurred during the specific periods of time and to help determine if any goals/patterns were evident. Although some causes of the various conflicts are described in this chapter, explanations for warfare are discussed in detail in Chapter 7.

A.D. 1649 to 1659

Between A.D. 1649 and 1659 the Iroquois were reported as participants in 119 incidents of warfare with at least 27 opponents (Figures 8-9; Table 5).

Although the Iroquois initiated 100 of these battles, they did not necessarily cause or start the conflicts. Most of the recorded cases of warfare (60%) were between the Iroquois and their Iroquoian and Algonkian speaking neighbors located along the St. Lawrence River, in the Southern Ontario Peninsula, and in Western New York (Tables 1 and 5). During this ten year period the

Iroquois experienced their most notable successes in war against other indigenous tribes. Both the French and Iroquois reported that the Iroquois defeated the following tribes: the Assistaronon (Fire Nation?), Huron,

Tobacco, Michilimackinac Island tribe. Neutral, Erie, and various Algonkian speaking tribes (Alumette Island Algonkians, Nippissings, Petite Algonkians) located in the Canadian Interior (JR 34, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 55).

122 The ferocity of the battles associated with these conflicts was well noted by the Jesuits, who reported that the Iroquois suffered 609 killed or captured, while their opponents had 1,809 killed or captured. These numbers do not accurately reflect the actual number of killed or captured, since there are 28 battles (including several large battles between the Iroquois and the Neutral and Erie) that have partial or no statistics on casualties. Other statements made by the Jesuits (e.g., JR 43: 265) indicate that the Iroquois lost more than half of their population in these wars. However, since the Iroquois were successful and captured thousands of prisoners, they were able to recoup their losses w ith liberal adoption policies (Brandao 1997).

Another cause of death related to the warfare and dispersals of this time frame, particularly in the Southern Ontario Peninsula, was famine. The

Jesuits reported in A.D. 1650 and 1651 that Huron groups which had fled to the Georgian Bay Islands suffered greatly from starvation. The casualties were so high that more Huron were "dying of hunger" than from warfare (JR

36:183; also see 179-181, and 189 in same Relation). Other tribes were similarly impacted. For example, the Jesuits reported in the A.D. 1650-1651

Jesuit Relation that the Neutral had abandoned their villages and suffered heavily from famine (JR 36: 177). Populations weakened by famine were vulnerable to disease, although there is no ethnohistoric information on whether epidemics struck populations in the Southern Ontario Peninsula during this period. The impact of disease on indigenous populations has been well noted by historians an d anthropologists (Axtell 1981, 1992; Crosby 1976,1986; Dobyns 1983; Ram enofsky 1987; Saunders et al. 1992; Snow 1992;

123 Snow and Lanphear 1989), but between A.D. 1649 and 1659 it probably took a

subordinate role to the effects of war.

The series of successes that the Iroquois experienced between A.D. 1649 and 1659 began with the defeat and dispersal of their long time enemies, the

Huron, in A.D. 1649. War between the Huron and Iroquois centered around

the breakdown of peace agreements with the Seneca in A.D. 1635 and with the Mohawk in A.D. 1645-1646 . Peace attempts by the Huron with the middle

Iroquois tribes (Onondaga, Cayuga, Oneida) also failed in A.D. 1648 (JR 33: 12,

71, 73,119-125). The dispersion of the Huron entangled the Iroquois in war

with other neighboring tribes such as the Neutral, Tobacco, Erie, and various Great Lakes Algonkian speaking tribes, who accepted most of the Huron

refugees into their villages. These Huron were still at war with the Iroquois,

and the Iroquois continued their attacks in areas wherever the Huron refugees relocated or with whomever the Huron allied themselves. Figure 9

shows the dispersion of the Huron and the dates the Iroquois attacked them.

In A.D. 1650 the Iroquois attempted to stop the hostilities with some of

the Huron refugees that had fled to Christian Island and offered to negotiate a peace (JR 36:181-189; Steckley 1981). The Huron agreed to meet with Iroquois representatives, but either out of mistrust or a chance at vengeance, decided to kill the 27 Iroquois peace ambassadors after they entered the Huron village. As a result, Iroquois attacks on Huron refugees at Christian Island and along the St. Lawrence River increased in intensity. Shortly aifter the murders by the Huron the Iroquois launched a major assault against a Neutral village which also contained Huron refugees. The village was destroyed (JR 36:13,

124 119,177). This same year the Iroquois also attacked the Tobacco, an ally of the

Huron. Although no specific explanations were found for the Iroquois conflict with the Neutral and Tobacco, it probably occurred because these two tribes were either allies of and/or had taken in Huron refugees. Unlike the Huron, the Neutral and Tobacco had no experience with the type of warfare tactics the Iroquois unleashed on them (e.g., hit and run and direct assault tactics involving 600 to 1000+ warriors), and several Neutral and Tobacco villages were destroyed over a period of two years (JR 36:119-121,141-143,177;

JR 40:15-19). Although the Neutral were able to inflict heavy casualties on their attackers at times (JR 36: 119,177), both they and Tobacco were defeated and dispersed from their territories by A.D. 1652.

In A.D. 1652, the Iroquois turned their attention to the Algonkians,

Huron, and French at Three Rivers along the St. Lawrence River Valley. After several attacks against the French and allied Indians, the Iroquois offered to stop the hostilities and resolve the conflict. After the Algonkians,

Huron, and French gave the Iroquois the indication they were willing to parley, three important Mohawk leaders (peace ambassadors) went to meet with them. A group of Huron received the Iroquois peace ambassadors and then promptly killed them (JR 37: 107-111; JR 38: 53-55). Although the

Iroquois chiefly blamed the Huron, the Algonkians and French were all held responsible, and Iroquois attacks along the St. Lawrence River, particularly at Three Rivers, increased dramatically (see Table 3 for years of A.D. 1652 to

1653). The feelings of revenge, indicative of traditional Iroquois warfare, can not be better evidenced than in the letter of a frightened French inhabitant of Three Rivers:

125 "They [Iroquois] issued an edict throughout their whole country that no one should thenceforth spare the life of any Huron taken in war; and this order they afterward executed upon some wretched victims who fell into their hands. But all this seemed a small matter to them; in their opinion, it was necessary, in order to console them for the loss of so great a man [one of the Mohawk ambassadors], to take the Village of three Rivers and put to fire and sword all the French and all the Savages they might find there" (JR 40: 97).

Throughout the autumn of A.D. 1652 and the winter and spring of

A.D. 1653, the Iroquois continued their attacks on the Algonkian, Huron, and French settlements. However, even though they had been betrayed twice before, the Iroquois offered to negotiate a peace again in the summer of A.D.

1653. This time, perhaps because of the losses they had sustained, the

Algonkians, Huron, and French accepted a tentative peace. The peace with the Algonkians and Huron living along the St. Lawrence River Valley only lasted two years before hostilities began again (JR 38: 13; JR 40: 11). The

French, not wishing to become embroiled in the continuing conflict, separated themselves from their allies and did not intercede (see JR 36, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43,44).

During the years of peace with the Algonkian, Huron and French

(between A.D. 1653 and 1656), the Iroquois were reported to be at war with the Erie and several Great Lakes tribes. Of these the Erie War was the more serious because of their close proximity as a neighbor and the reported numbers of warriors they could field, 2,500, which more than equaled

Iroquois warrior estimates. The Erie/Iroquois conflict appears to have originated from a failed peace negotiation, which started as a consequence of an Erie warrior killing a Seneca during negotiations (in A.D. 1654?) betw'een

126 the Erie and Iroquois at a Seneca village (Sonnontouan). The Seneca, furious at this action, killed 25 of the remaining Erie peace ambassadors in revenge

(JR 42:177-183). Matters were not helped when trwo Onondaga warriors were captured by the Erie shortly afterward (one escaped). Some Erie felt that releasing the Iroquois would avert any further hostilities, however, the family which received the prisoner had lost a family member at the Seneca village and decided to put the Onondaga to death. This Onondaga was well known in his tribe and during his torture vowed that the Iroquois would avenge his death and destroy the Erie. The word of this Onondaga's death and his vow reportedly got back to the Onondaga. In addition, the Jesuits reported that the Erie had accepted many Huron refugees into their villages and that these Huron were urging the Erie to attack the Iroquois.

Evidently the Erie took the Huron advice, or perhaps they realized an

Iroquois retaliatory attack was imminent after killing a well known

Onondaga warrior. In either case, they struck first by attacking and destroying a Seneca village and then attacking an Iroquois raiding party that had just returned from the G reat Lakes region (JR 41: 10, 81-83, 113). The Erie actively pursued the w ar inside Iroquoia (JR 41; 15, 217; JR 42: 10, 49-53, 57). However, shortly after the Erie offensive (in the late summer of A.D. 1654), the Iroquois, led by the Onondaga, organized a large detachment of warriors (1,800 warriors) to attack the Erie villages. This attack resulted in the destruction of one of the Erie's main villages, Rique (JR 41: 121; JR 42: 75, 187). In the following year (A.D. 1655) the Iroquois, emboldened by their previous success, sent out a force of 1,200 warriors, determined to annihilate the rest of the tribe. At the approach of this army, the Erie reportedly abandoned their

127 remaining villages and tried to flee. However, unable to escape the Iroquois,

the Erie built a fortified enclosure and decided to fight. In the dramatic battle that ensued, the Jesuits described (through second hand accounts) the

Iroquois as using counter-palisades (large mantlets), and their canoes as shields in order to attain the outer wall, which was successfully breached and scaled (Figure 5). The Erie defense collapsed and they were routed (JR 42:113,

179-183; JR 45: 209).

According to many Iroquoian scholars the Erie were totally destroyed in this war (e.g., M organ 1995 [1851]; Parkm an 1983 [1865-1892] ) however, it appears they were dispersed in a fashion similar to the Huron (Figure 9). It is probable that some of the Erie and possibly a few Huron fled to the

Appalachians (perhaps the Upper Ohio River Valley/Western Pennsylvania and West Virginia region), where they encountered several Virginian tribes

(such as the Pamunkey) who defeated the Erie in an engagement in A.D. 1656.

In A.D. 1670 John Lederer, an English explorer, reported meeting an Erie while traveling in the Appalachians (Alvord and Bidgood 1912). These transient Erie may have been the Black Minquas, whom the Swedes and

Dutch reported (in the 1660s) were located west of the Susquehanna River and were allies of the Susquehannock. The Erie apparently survived up to A.D. 1681. At this date the Iroquois reported that 600 Erie asked the Iroquois

(Seneca) to allow them to resettle in Iroquoia, which was permitted (Hanna 1911, Vol. 1:16, 69; JR 62: 71).

Just before and immediately after the Erie War, the Iroquois were recorded attacking several tribes in the Great Lakes and tribes in unknown

128 "far distant land[s]" (JR 42: 191). Explanations for these attacks are not stated

in the ethnohistoric record. However by pursuing the fleeing remnants of

the Huron and other dispersed Iroquoian speaking tribes, Iroquois warriors crossed into the territories of new tribes of the Great Lakes, The Ohio River

Valley, and Illinois and Mississippi River Valley sub-regions who were

probably considered potential enemies, particularly if they had taken in

refugees of the Erie, Huron, Neutral and/or Tobacco. In these cases,

opportunistic raids may have arisen to gain prestige. As a result. Ft. Ancient,

Monongahela, and Western Lake Erie tribal populations may have

experienced a mourning war relationship with the Iroquois that soon

escalated from one of small conflicts to full scale war. This probably occurred with the Fire Nation, located along the southwestern Lake Erie shoreline and

Lower Michigan Peninsula (Brose 1988), who after the Erie defeat were

recorded at war with the Iroquois in A.D. 1658 (JR 42: 109-115). Poorly known

tribes located to the south or southwest of the Erie (along the Upper and

Middle Ohio River), such as the Honniasonterkerronons, Black Minquas

(possibly dispersed Erie or affiliated with either the Erie or Susquehannock), Ontoagahanna (Chaouanons, Shawnee), and Mosepelea (possibly the

Shawnee), experienced an increase in warfare with the Iroquois in the following decades, eventually culminating in their destruction/dispersal in the 1670s and early 1680s.

Bruce Trigger (1976) has suggested that Algonkian speaking tribes living in the west considered the Iroquois enemies when they first met them because they spoke the same language as the Neutrals. The Neutrals as well as the Erie were the traditional enemies of several Western Algonkian tribes,

129 in particular the Fire Nation. Trigger pointed out that in the early 1640s the

Neutral had begun the depopulation of Lower Wchigan and southwest Lake

Erie with successful attacks against these Algonkian tribes. The Algonkian tribes probably did not distinguish an Iroquois from a Neutral, calling them

both "Naudoway" which means "enemy" (Trigger 1976: 625), and it is even

possible that Algonkian tribes initiated attacks against the Iroquois because

they believed they were the Neutral. Another aspect that must be considered

in explaining Western Algonkian and Iroquois warfare is that newly adopted

Erie and Neutral members would not have lost their former hatreds for their

Algonkian neighbors. With adoption, Erie and Neutral members had the

right to request and form war parties to attack their enemies.

In the autumn of A.D. 1657 hostilities between the Iroquois and French

once again came to the forefront when for unknown reasons a party of

O neida killed three Frenchmen (JR 43: 67; JR 44: 193-195). The m ost probable

explanation is prestige (Narroll 1968). The other Iroquois tribes were not

involved and did not condone the act, but the French held all the Iroquois

tribes responsible and several Iroquois (mostly Mohawks and some

Onondaga) present in the French settlements at the time of the incident were

taken prisoner. The following month the St. Lawrence Algonkians openly attacked two Onondaga, killing one and capturing the other, whom they gave to the French (JR 43: 69; JR 44: 197, 201). The French returned this prisoner with the message that they were now openly siding with the Algonkians and Huron, and abruptly abandoned their mission in Onondaga in the early spring of A.D. 1658. To the Iroquois this was probably perceived as an act of war (Narroll 1968) and they (the Onondaga, Oneida, Mohawk) responded by

130 capturing several Frenchman and holding them prisoners (JR 44: 13, 163). They also attacked the Huron and Algonkians along the St. Lawrence River (JR 44: 101-103). The Mohawks, Onondaga and Oneida collectively tried six times to negotiate peaceful resolutions to the conflict during the year of A.D. 1658, which resulted in the French taking prisoner most of the Iroquois ambassadors (25 all together), and killing five of them (JR 44:14, 85-91, 109,

121, 203, 233). After these attempts the French threatened to kill any more Iroquois coming to negotiate peace.

Nonetheless, in November of A.D. 1658, the Mohawks brought seven

French prisoners to Quebec to exchange for the Iroquois prisoners and to attempt peace negotiations. The French allowed negotiations to occur and released some of the Iroquois prisoners; however, they continued to demand that the murderers of the three Frenchmen in A.D. 1657 be brought in and that the Iroquois stop all attacks on the French Indian allies. For seven months a tentative peace was established during which no attacks were reported. Two more negotiations occurred between the Iroquois and French in the spring and summer of A.D. 1659 and several more Iroquois prisoners were released, but not all. As part of the peace, the Mohawks wanted the Tadoussac Algonkians to be included since they were aggressively attacking the Mohawks, but they (the Tadoussac Algonkians) sent no representatives

(JR 45: 11, 99-101). In the summer of A.D. 1659 the tentative peace broke down as the Algonkians and Iroquois continued hostilities. The French and Huron, as allies of the Algonkians, became involved, and warfare continued into the next decade.

131 A.D. 1660 to 1669

Betw’^een A.D. 1660 and 1669 the Iroquois were reported as participants

in 65 incidents of warfare with at least 31 opponents (Table 6). The Iroquois initiated 46 of these engagements. Most of the reported engagements (80%)

were against the Algonkians, Huron, and French along the St. Lawrence

River, the Susquehannock and their allies to the south, and several New England tribes (e.g., Abenaki, Loups, Mahican, Sokokis, etc.) to the east (Figure

10; Table 6). The French reported that the Iroquois defeated or dispersed the

Illinois and Squirrel Tribe during this period (JR 46:19, 285, 289; NYCD 9: 162).

Casualties from warfare were again high, with approximately 155 Iroquois reported killed or captured, while their opponents suffered 400 killed or captured. Much like the previous period, statistics on casualties were often incomplete or not recorded at all. At least 24 engagements (including several large battles) had only partial or no information on the number of killed or captured (see Table 3), making it highly probable that several hundred additional casualties resulted from these conflicts.

This period began with the continuation of hostilities between the

Iroquois and the French, Huron, and Algonkians along the St. Lawrence River. Hostilities had begun in the autumn of A.D. 1657 with the murder of three Frenchmen by an Oneida war party. Attempts to resolve the conflict over the next two years failed and by A.D. 1660 the conflict had escalated from a few isolated attacks to the renewal of hostilities. Small (20 to 30 warriors) and large (100 to 500 warriors) war parties were sent out against French,

Huron, and Algonkian settlements, and along transportation routes on the

132 Ottawa and St. Lawrence Rivers. However, this was not an unified Iroquois

effort. The Cayuga and Seneca did not participate in this conflict probably because they were engaged in a serious war with the Susquehannock (and their allies) to the south. In fact, between the spring of A.D. 1660 and spring of

A.D. 1664 the Cayuga and/or Seneca attempted three times to negotiate a separate peace with the French. In the late summer of A.D. 1664 the Cayuga,

Seneca, and also some Onondaga were successful in reestablishing a peace with the French and St. Lawrence tribes. The disunity exhibited by the League during this period exemplifies the fact that the five tribes did not always agree on or participate in certain conflicts (Richter 1992).

Even without support from the western Iroquois, the Onondaga, Oneida, and Mohawks were successful in several engagements with the

French and their Indian allies (see Table 3). Settlements and canoe fleets were the focus of these attacks, and except for one assault on a French fortified position at the Long Sault (JR 12: 276; JR 45: 14,18,157, 199, 245-259; JR 46: 53), few serious attempts were made to destroy the French settlements. These attacks appear to be motivated by the loss of prestige and honor the Iroquois peace representatives had experienced at the hands of the French (JR 47: 73). By the end of A.D. 1664 the eastern Iroquois had stopped their attacks on the

French and most of the St. Lawrence Indians. It is probable that the Iroquois tried to resolve this conflict because serious threats had arisen to the south with the Susquehannock and to the east from various New England tribes. In

A.D. 1664 the Mahican became involved in a major war with the Iroquois, w ho reportedly suffered several setbacks in various battles (JR 48: 279; JR 49: 139-141).

133 The Iroquois had also become aware of the arrival of French

reinforcements and of their plans to attack the Iroquois in their villages. At various times in A.D. 1664 and 1665 representatives of all five tribes

negotiated with the French for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. All of the tribes, except the Mohawk, were able to officialize a peace with the French and

St. Lawrence tribes. Although the Mohawks had ceased attacks on the French

they had continued to attack Algonkian nations in the Canadian Interior, and

because of this the French mistrusted them and continued with their plans to

attack the Mohawk villages. In January/February of A.D. 1666 the first French

expedition failed because of poor w eather conditions (JR 50: 11,13, 135, 181-

182; NYCD 3: 118-119). Later this same year (in the autumn) the French tried again and this time reached their objective. Four Mohawk villages were

destroyed, but there were few casualties since the Mohawk were able to

evacuate their villages safely (JR 50: 11, 14, 141-143, 203). The French satisfied

with the results of the expedition, agreed to a peace with the Mohawk the

following year.

To the south, both the French and Dutch reported that the Iroquois, in particular the Seneca, Cayuga, and Onondaga, were at war with the

Susquehannock. There are few ethnohistoric reports describing this war. The French, as far back as Champlain, had recorded that the Iroquois and

Susquehannock were long time enemies. In the 1650s, attacks between the

two appeared to escalate from the traditional occasional hit and run attack to consistent attacks and major assaults on villages as evidenced by the Iroquois destruction of a large Susquehannock town (Atrakwae) in the summer of

A.D. 1652 (JR 37: 111). Between A.D. 1661 and 1664 the Dutch and French

134 reported several expeditions sent out by both tribes against one another. One of these was a large army of Seneca, Cayuga, and Onondaga (approximately

800 warriors) which set out to attack the main town of the Susquehannock in the spring of 1663 (JR 48: 79). The Iroquois, however, found the village well defended by a double palisade that possessed two Euroamerican style bastions, armed with cannon (the Strickier site) (see Kent 1984). The Iroquois requested a parley in order to negotiate an end to the conflict. The Susquehannock agreed and allowed 25 unarmed Iroquois representatives to enter their village. Once inside the Iroquois were seized and bound, and then placed on scaffolds on the outer walls where they were burnt and tortured to death.

Although the Iroquois were furious, they retreated to Iroquoia.

Hostilities continued between the two groups into the early 1670s (see

Table 3). Unfortunately, information is lacking on particular aspects of this war. The French reported at several times that the Iroquois were at war with this tribe, but gave few particulars on specific battles or casualties, except that the Iroquois were not faring well in the outcomes (JR 50: 205, 231; JR 51: 243; JR 52: 147, 197, 203; JR 54: 111). Demographically, the w arfare w ith the

Susquehannock and New England tribes distressed the Iroquois so much that many families moved to the north shore of Lake Ontario to start new villages and place themselves at a greater distance from their enemies (Figure 11) (JR 51: 257; Konrad 1987).

It is interesting to note that although the Susquehannock w^ere much smaller in population size as compared to the Huron, Neutral or Erie, they were able to resist Iroquois attacks for a much longer period of time. Another

135 striking difference between the Susquehannock and other enemies of the Iroquois was the fact that they were better armed with muskets and incorporated more advanced fortification designs into their main village defenses, making it impregnable to Iroquois direct assault tactics, which typically worked against traditional indigenous defenses. These differences may explain why the Susquehannock were able to survive into the 1670s.

While hostilities occurred with the Susquehaimock to the south, and with the Algonkians, Huron and French to the north, another conflict began to develop with tribes to the east in New England. Warfare between the

Iroquois, in particular the Mohawk, and New England tribes was not a new event but rather had been going on intermittently throughout the first half of the seventeenth century. The Dutch reported at various times between A.D.

1610 and 1640 of serious wars between the Mohawk and one or several New England tribes. During the 1640s and 1650s only one attack on a New England tribe (the Abenaki) was recorded, although the French reported that the

Iroquois were at war with the Mahican. This situation changed in A.D. 1661 when a group of 30 Mohawk peace representatives were killed by the Abenaki during a m eeting (JR 47: 107, 139, 141-143). The Iroquois vowed revenge and sent several expeditions against this tribe over the following years, resulting in the destruction of one Abenaki village. Relations apparently became strained with other New England tribes because of this conflict and the

Mohawks sent peace representatives to the Mahican and the Sokokis in A.D.

1664. The Mahican killed all of the Mohawk representatives, while the Sokokis captured and held the Mohawk that visited them for ransom (NYCD

2: 371; NYCD 13; 379-381). The result of these incidents was a full scale war

136 between the Iroquois and several New England tribes. Since New England colonial sources were not consulted for this study, the full context of these wars cannot be addressed. However, what little secondary literature exists on the topic (Day 1984) indicates that the Iroquois and New England tribes suffered devastating casualties. In A.D. 1664 the Jesuits reported that the

Mohawks (with a few other Iroquois) sent out 600 warriors to attack a

Mahican village, presumably the one at which the peace representatives had been killed (JR 49:139-141). Approximately 100 Mahicans ambushed the

Mohawks, causing heavy casualties, but the Mohawks recovered and forced the Mahicans back into their village. The Mohawks, furious at the Mahicans audacity, immediately assaulted the village "without taking the precaution to cover them selves [with mantlets]" (JR 49: 141). The M ohawks reportedly suffered a great loss in men and were forced to retreat. After this attack, general warfare ensued, with as many as nine New England and/or Hudson

River tribes participating. Both sides sent small and large war parties against one another and both groups attacked each others villages. In A.D. 1667

Mahican war parties had penetrated deep into Iroquoia, and the Onondaga related that some of their people had been killed (JR 51: 243). Warfare continued between the two groups until the summer of A.D. 1669, when peace negotiations brought the war with the New England Indians to a close.

While no clear victory was achieved by the Iroquois, the New England

Indians that participated in the conflict appeared to have suffered heavier casualties (Day 1984). The memory of this war carried over into the next decade, and when the English of New England called for the assistance of the Mohawk against King Phillip's forces, the Mohawk needed no encouragement in providing military support (Jennings 1976).

137 Besides the three major conflicts described above, there were several

long distant raids and attacks recorded on tribes living in the Ohio River Valley, Great Lakes, the Illinois and Mississippi River Valley region, and to

the south (Figure 10; Table 3). These attacks were not common and appear to be aimed mainly at Huron/Tobacco refugees and the Ottawa. Some of the

attacks were against unknown tribes. In the Ohio River Valley, three attacks

were targeted against the Shawnee. Information on the incidents to the west is scant and typically does not relate the size of the war parties involved. It is suggested that these raids were minor forays motivated by prestige and carried out by adventurous groups of warriors. Perhaps the reason why no serious engagements were occurring in the west was because most of the Iroquois opponents in this region had been defeated, dispersed, or had fled the area voluntarily (like the Potawatomie and Sacs [JR 23: 325; JR 55: 103, 183; JR 60:

215]). However, any interpretation of events in the regions to the west during this decade are clearly speculative because of the lack of ethnohistoric information.

In summary, the period between A.D. 1660 and 1669 is characterized by three major conflicts (Figure 10), 1) warfare with the French, Algonkians and

Huron along the St. Lawrence River, 2) warfare with the Susquehannock to the south, and 3) warfare with several New England tribes. The warfare between the Iroquois and French, Algonkians, and Huron appeared to be based on the loss of prestige and honor associated with isolated murders and the mistreatment of peace representatives. Both sides typically attacked one another with small hit and run raiding parties, resulting in a few casualties on either side. The goal of these engagements seemed to be centered on

138 regaining status and punishing/ taking revenge on an enemy (see Chapter 7). There were few serious attempts by either side to form large organized

expeditions of colonists/warriors to destroy villages.

The warfare with the Susquehannock and New England tribes, on the

other hand, was different. Both the Susquehannock and the various New

England tribes were long time enemies, and serious attempts were made by the Iroquois and the Susquehannock and New England tribes to target

villages for destruction or inflict heavy casualties. Iroquois efforts to assault

major villages of their opponents were thwarted by effective fortification designs at the main village of the Susquehannock. The Iroquois experienced only limited success and heavy casualties against the villages of the New

England tribes that they attacked. The desperate nature of the warfare with

the Susquehannock and New England tribes is made clear by the movement of many Iroquois to the north shore of Lake Ontario for greater security and their attempts to stop hostilities with the French and Indians along the St.

Lawrence River so that their efforts could be focused against more dangerous foes. Peace with the French and their Indian allies was reestablished and the

Iroquois were able to withstand attacks by the Susquehannock and New

England tribes inside Iroquoia. Unsuccessful in their endeavors to defeat the Mohawk, the New England tribes reestablished a tentative peace. The

Susquehannock War, however, continued into the next decade.

139 A.D. 1670 to 1679

Betw^een A.D. 1670 and 1679 the Iroquois were reported as participants in 16 incidents of warfare with at least 15 opponents (Table 7). Most of the reported engagements (48%) were against the Susquehannock in the first half of this decade (Figure 12). The Iroquois also attacked various New England tribes (during King Phillip's War) in A.D. 1676 and 1677, at the request of the New England colonies and Governor of New York (Jennings 1976). Another conflict developed in the late 1670s with several Western Algonkian tribes, in particular the Illinois and the Shawnee, which escalated into a major war in the 1680s and 1690s. Reported casualties from warfare were infrequent since few ethnohistoric passages provided details. What information was available indicated that approximately 14 Iroquois were killed or captured while their enemies suffered 155 killed or captured.

The fewer number of incidents of war recorded for this period may not be an accurate reflection since the Iroquois were reported to be at war with several tribes (such as the Shawnee) with no accompanying accounts of battles. Nonetheless, the lack of reported hostilities with the French and tribes along the St. Lawrence River and in the Upper Great Lakes indicates that the peace negotiated between the Iroquois and the French and their

Indian allies in the mid 1660s had held and was successful. Tensions, however, still remained and in A.D. 1669 and 1670 isolated attacks occurred between the Seneca and Ottawa. These raids involved the capture of individuals of opposing tribes and involved a few deaths. The Ottawa had initiated the situation by capturing several Seneca. The Seneca retaliated and

140 took captive approximately 100 Ottawa. In A.D. 1670 the Seneca also launched a raid on several Western Algonkian tribes (the Fox, N^Iiami, and Potawatomie) whom they felt had attacked several of their people inside

Iroquoia. The French who, considered the Great Lakes tribes their allies, threatened the Iroquois with war if they did not cease their attacks. Although the peace was tested, both the Ottawa and Seneca were able to patch up their differences with several diplomatic meetings. By A.D. 1671 peace was established with the Great Lakes tribes and this was reaffirmed in A.D. 1673 when the Seneca sent presents (reparations) to tribes in the Michilimackinac area to secure peaceful relations.

The peace between the Iroquois and the French and their Indian allies was a mixed blessing for the Iroquois. It allowed the Iroquois to concentrate their warrior strength against powerful enemies to the east (New England tribes) and south (Susquehannock). However, with a peace in place, French explorers and fur traders were encouraged to travel further west and develop relations with Western Algonkian tribes not only in the Great Lakes but also in the Illinois and Indiana regions. In negotiating the peace with the French in the mid 1660s, the Iroquois had only agreed to establish peaceful relations with St. Lawrence tribes allied with the French. However, because of new explorations by the Jesuits (e.g., Marquette) and fur traders (La Salle) in the

1670s, the French had come into contact with distant tribes in the Upper

Michigan Peninsula and Wisconsin, many of which were at war with the

Iroquois (e.g., refugee Huron/Tobacco). The French immediately began trading with these tribes, who they considered allies and subjects of the French colony, which meant they also received the protection of any current

141 treaties. Forts, trade posts and missions were established at several locations in the west to further secure economic and political ties (Figure 13). In A.D.

1670, in conjunction with the Ottawa affair, the French requested the Iroquois to stop attacking other tribes to the west. The Iroquois were perplexed at this situation (see Chapter 7, p. 180-181) since tribes in this region were not part of the original agreement and were currently attacking the Iroquois inside

Iroquoia. The Iroquois warned the French that they could only refrain from striking back for so long, and if Western Algonkian attacks persisted, French protection would not deter the Iroquois from taking their revenge (JR 54: 263-

265). The French continued their policy of allying themselves with any new tribe they met, including the Illinois and Shawnee, which was a recipe for disaster. Both of these tribes were actively engaged in war with the Iroquois.

While peaceful relations characterized Iroquois interactions to the north, to the south it was a far different story. The Iroquois and

Susquehannock war continued, and between A.D. 1670 and 1673 several raids by both tribes were reported (see Table 3). The war, however, appeared to be going badly for the Susquehannock. Most of the attacks were initiated by the Iroquois, who were raiding deep into Susquehannock territory, and particularly around their main village. In A.D. 1672 the Jesuits wTOte that the Iroquois sent two large raiding parties against the Susquehannock, both of which were confronted and engaged by approximately 60 Susquehannock boys in two separate engagements. Each of the Iroquois groups were ambushed and suffered several casualties before withdrawing (JR 56: 56-57, 67- 68). The Jesuits hailed these battles as Susquehannock victories (even though the Susquehannock had higher casualties; 16 dead) and that this was a sign

142 that God was favoring the Susquehannock over the Iroquois in their war,

"God preserves the Andastogues [Susquehannock], who count but three hundred warriors, and favors their arms, in order to humble the Iroquois and

maintain the peace and our Missions" (JR 56: 67-68). However, a more critical

assessment of these engagements suggests that the Susquehannock were not

doing so well particularly if they were relying on "boys" to defend their

territory. Attacks continued between the two groups in the following years,

but by A.D. 1675 the Jesuits announced that the Seneca had defeated the

Susquehannock (JR 59: 20, 251; also see JR 60:173) (contrary to Jennings' [1968]

opinions). Many Susquehaimock were not killed or captured, but fled to the

south, into Maryland, where they were attacked by the English. Hostilities continued between the Iroquois and these refugee Susquehannock (Hanna

1911 [Vol. 1]: 16), b u t the refugees w ith the assistance of the E nglish/D utch

(NYCD 12: 553; NYCD 13: 497) of New York were able to establish peaceful

relations with the Iroquois and were adopted into Iroquois culture.

To the east Iroquois relations with New England tribes, while strained, remained peaceful during the first half of the decade. The Mohawks

reaffirmed peace with the Mahicans at least twice and also secured peaceful relations with the English who had taken over the Dutch colony in A.D. 1664. However, in A.D. 1675, the situation would change with the onset of King

Philip's War. In A.D. 1675, what started as a limited conflict between the

Colony of Massachusetts and the Wampanoags quickly escalated to an all out war between most of the New England tribes and all of the English colonies in New England. The Iroquois were not involved in the opening phases of this conflict, however, in A.D. 1676, with the war going badly, English leaders

143 in New England pleaded for Iroquois support. The Governor of New York,

Edmund Andros, agreed to help the New England colonies and solicited aid from the Iroquois, in particular, the Mohawk. The Mohawks quickly agreed to honor the request to attack the New England tribes (Bourne 1990; Jennings

1976). Although the Mohawk and other Iroquois had concluded a peace with the New England Indians in A.D. 1669 and the early 1670s, they still remembered the fierce war they had suffered with these tribes in the late

1660s, and the English request provided an opportunity for revenge. In the winter of A.D. 1676 Phillip had gathered his forces at an encampment near the Mahicans along the Hoosic River and was on the verge of expanding his alliance of tribes when 300 Mohawk attacked his encampment by surprise and completely routed the Algonkians, and only 40 out of 400 to 500 New England

Indians survived. This was the most important battle of the war and in effect ended any hopes of the New England Indians to defeat the English. The noted historian Russel Bourne sums up this perspective, "this was the key battle that prevented Phillip either from becoming the chief commander of the warring Algonkians or from widening the alliance so the fight for freedom might be won" (Bourne 1990: 161). Between A.D. 1676 and 1681 the

Iroquois, particularly the Mohawk, continued to periodically send small raiding parties against various New England tribes, even after peace had been concluded between the New England tribes and English in A.D. 1678. It appears that the goals of the Mohawk were to gain revenge and prestige against a weakened enemy.

By the end of the 1670s the Iroquois reported that they were engaged in warfare with the Illinois and Shawnee. The Iroquois stated their attacks were

144 provoked because of attacks initiated by these tribes on Iroquois hunters in the west (NYCD 9:162-163). Difficulties had also arisen with refugee tribes that were living in the Wisconsin area. Because of the peace many of the refugee tribes such as the Illinois, Miami, Ottawa, and Tobacco/Huron had moved back to their former territories in the Illinois region, along southern

Lake N'lichigan, on the Wabash River, and at Michilimackinac (Figure 14).

These tribes began competing with Iroquois hunters in the Lower Michigan

Peninsula, the Illinois region, and Ohio River Valley. The Illinois also began to ally themselves and support the Shawnee, an active enemy of the Iroquois. With the defeat of the Susquehannock and New England tribes, the Iroquois no longer had any dangerous enemies on their borders and could focus their attention on more distant enemies such as the Illinois and Shawnee. In A.D.

1677 the first major attack by the Iroquois against the Illinois occurred, and ended with an Iroquois defeat. Escalation of the war continued with the opening of large scale attacks by the Iroquois in A.D. 1680. This war grew in size and magnitude as French fur traders (LaSalle in particular) allied themselves with the Illinois and Shawnee, eventually drawing the French and Michilimackinac Indians into the conflict.

In summary, the period of A.D. 1670 to 1679 was characterized by intensive warfare between the Iroquois and Susquehannock to the south and the New England Indians to the east (Figure 12). These wars resulted in the total defeat of the Susquehannock and elimination of the New England Indians as a threat. Iroquois relations with the French and their allied

Indians to the north and west, while tense early on, stabilized, and remained relatively peaceful. However, difficulties and outright warfare was initiated

145 at the end of this period with the Illinois and Shawnee, who had begun to infringe on Iroquois hunting territories and had killed Iroquois hunters. The

French had also deeply entangled themselves into the politics of these Western Algonkian tribes, becoming their allies and trade partners, even though these tribes were at war with the Iroquois. This was a harbinger for disaster.

A-i> .i m - m i

Between A.D. 1680 and 1701 the Iroquois were reported as participants in 132 incidents of w arfare with at least 29 opponents (Figure 15; Table 8).

Most of the reported cases of warfare (94%) were between the Iroquois and the

French and their Indian allies located along the St. Lawrence River, the Great

Lakes, and in the Illinois region (Table 1). The long and protracted war fought between the Iroquois and the French and their Indian allies (lasting tw^enty- three years [from A.D. 1677 to 1701]) was mainly fought along the St. Lawrence

River and inside Iroquoia.

During this war the Iroquois experienced stunning victories against the

French and their Indian allies in the 1680s and early 1690s. A fter A.D. 1692 the Iroquois began to suffer severe losses in various engagements and were forced to defend their homeland, Iroquoia, from small and large raiding parties. By A.D. 1696 the Iroquois were unable to launch long range attacks against the Western Algonkians because of their diminished warrior strength and constant threat of attack on their villages. The ferocity of the battles associated with these conflicts was well noted in the colonial manuscripts

146 which indicated that the Iroquois suffered 985 killed or captured while their opponents had 4,110 killed or captured. These numbers represent tentative estimates since many battles had conflicting numbers of casualties or did not record the actual number of killed or captured. The Iroquois experienced a sharp increase in casualties in the 1690s as the French and their Indian allies changed their tactics by actively attacking Iroquoian settlements and vigorously counter-attacking Iroquois raiding parties (Figure 16). The losses the Iroquois experienced did not go unnoticed, as they informed the English that they had become a "small people" and in A.D. 1696 admitted for the first time that they could no longer defeat the French on their own (NYCD 4: 237-

238). The French and their Indian allies also sustained extensive casualties. In A.D. 1691, the French reported that 2,000 of their men had been killed since

A.D. 1687 and that more than half of the 1,300 regular troops from New

France had died in battle or from disease since A.D. 1690. The Illinois lost over 2,500 people killed or captured in the opening stages of this war and the St. Lawrence Indians also reported heavy casualties. For example, in A.D.

1692 the Jesuits reported that the French Iroquois "are weary of the war" (JR

64: 65) as a result of losing 60 warriors in combat, representing one half of their men (NYCD 9: 540).

Another cause of death was disease, which had a certain but undetermined impact on Iroquois warrior strength. In A.D. 1690 the Abenaki reported that the Iroquois had been hit hard with smallpox and that 500

Iroquois warriors had died (NYCD 9: 490). While the number of deaths was probably exaggerated, Iroquois warrior numbers dropped significantly, from a high of 2,500 warriors in the 1680s, to a low of 1,100 to 1,200 in A.D. 1700

147 (NYCT) 4: 305, 337, 701). Most of these casualties can be accounted for in military engagements, so the impact of disease was probably negligible compared to combat losses. The French probably lost the most people to disease, particularly at their distant forts of Niagara and Frontenac. Between A.D. 1687 and 1689 the Iroquois placed these posts under a state of siege and blockaded all supply routes. The French reported over 293 soldiers dying from disease and scurvy because reinforcements and supplies could not get through, resulting in the abandonment of the two forts. It is not certain how

Iroquois attacks on French settlements along the St. Lawrence River affected their ability to produce food. In many battles the Iroquois killed cattle, burned outbuildings and agricultural fields, which appears to have been a deliberate attempt to destroy food supplies and cause famine.

The warfare that occurred between the Iroquois and the French and

Indians developed out of the Iroquois conflict with the Illinois and Shawnee in the Ohio River Valley and Illinois region in the early 1680s. Warfare between these two groups escalated in A.D. 1680 and 1681 when the Iroquois attacked the Illinois with large detachments of warriors numbering 500 or more. In two attacks the Iroquois killed or captured over 2,500 Illinois and dispersed the rest of the Illinois northw ard (JR 62: 11, 71, 73, 79, 83, 161, 185;

NYCD 9: 163). The Vliami were brought into the conflict after several of their people were mistakenly identified as Illinois and killed by the returning Iroquois. The Iroquois regretted this action and tried to make reparations but the Miami joined the Illinois (NYCD 9: 163). The Iroquois also attacked the Shawnee, who were allied with the Illinois and Miami.

148 The warfare in this region became complicated by the interference of

French missionaries and fur traders. LaSalle and other French traders had

begun to actively trade and build forts in the Illinois region in the 1670s

(Figure 13). Rather then staying neutral during the conflict between the Iroquois and the Western Algonkians, the French established alliances with

the Illinois and Miami and by A.D. 1681 with the Shawnee. The French

openly traded arms to these tribes and LaSalle actively urged the Illinois,

Miami, and Shawnee to unite and attack the Iroquois. LaSalle was ultimately

responsible for requesting Illinois, Miami, and Shawnee refugees to seek sanctuary at Ft. N'liamis and Ft. St. Louis so they could better defend themselves (JR 62: 209; H anna 1911 [1]: 124; NYCD 9: 799; Par km an 1983 [1865-

1892]: 913). The Iroquois were well aware of the role the French were taking in arming and assisting their enemies and they were not happy with the situation (NYCD 9:163).

Making matters worse, in A.D. 1681 a notable Seneca captain (Annehac) was killed at an Ottawa village at Michilimackinac by a visiting Illinois. Annehac was at Michilimackinac serving as a hostage for the

Michilimackinac tribes (Ottawa, and Huron/Tobacco) until their peace envoys safely returned from the Iroquois. A visiting Illinois, noticing the Iroquois, killed him and then fled. At the time of the murder the Ottawa and

Huron/Tobacco were on friendly terms with the Iroquois, although Annehac's death changed that. When the Iroquois heard the news of the death of their beloved leader they were furious at not only the Illinois, but also the Ottawa and Huron/Tobacco for allowing the murder to take place in their village, and letting the murderer flee unpunished. The Iroquois openly

149 expressed to the Jesuits living in their villages that they would use all their vigor to "exterminate" the Illinois for this action (JR 62: 213). The Iroquois also demanded satisfaction from the Ottawa in the form of reparations, but the Ottawa refused stating it was the Illinois that were at fault (JR 62: 93-95,

213; NYCD 9:171, 177,184). By the end of A.D. 1682, negotiations between the

Iroquois and Michilimackinac tribes broke down and in the spring of A.D.

1683 the Iroquois attacked this group, capturing five Huron. This attack changed the minds of the Ottawa, who the following year gave the Iroquois presents for the death of the murdered Seneca, which the Iroquois accepted

(NYCD 9: 197, 201-202). The Annehac incident would mark the beginning of intermittent fighting between the Michilimackinac tribes and the Iroquois during this broadening war. For the most part the Michilimackinac Indians did not want to participate in warfare with the Iroquois (see Table 9), but did so at various times because of French pressure or because war factions within the tribes periodically gained control.

In the spring of A.D. 1683 approximately 700-800 Iroquois attacked the

Michilimackinac Indians, and then went south and attacked the Illinois and Miami. The Iroquois also evidently attacked the Shawnee along the Ohio

River, although no specific battles were described. The French reported that by A.D. 1683 most of the Shawnee had fled or where driven from their traditional territory, with many relocating to the Miami for greater security

(JR 62: 209). In A.D. 1684 several of the refugee Shawnee were living at Fort

St. Louis under the protection of the French. Some of the Shawnee had fled or migrated to the southeast along the Savannah River or south along the

Tennessee and/or Cumberland Rivers, perhaps as early as the 1670s, where

150 they established close ties with the Cherokee and Creek (Callender 1978;

Howard 1981; Swanton 1922). Figure 17 shows the areas to which the

Shawnees migrated to in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Tensions continued to grow between the French traders and Iroquois as warfare continued with the Western Algonkians. In the spring of A.D. 1682 an Iroquois war party intercepted a group of French traders carrying arms and ammunition intended for trade with the Illinois. The Iroquois were enraged and forcibly took the trade items and released the traders unharmed (NYCD 3: 444-445). The French, however, felt this was an act of war and began to suggest that the Iroquois warfare with the western tribes was a deliberate plan designed by the Iroquois and English to destroy all of New France's Indian allies in order to monopolize the fur trade (see Chapter 7). By the end of A.D.

1683 the French governor. La Barre, began to formulate an attack against the Iroquois, in particular the Seneca.

In the spring of A.D. 1684 the Iroquois attacked Fort St. Louis because the French were protecting the Illinois, Vliami, and Shawnee (Brandao 1997).

After hearing of the attack. Governor La Barre prepared an army with which he planned to attack the villages of the Seneca. In June of the same year, the Iroquois, aware that the French were serious about war, sent 12 peace representatives to try to resolve the conflict, but all were taken prisoner by the

French. La Barre organized an army composed of French colonists and regulars and St. Lawrence Indians, and set out to attack the Seneca villages in the middle of the summer. The first French offensive was a dismal failure.

Soon after the French army reached Ft. Frontenac, the French troops came

151 down with malaria, forcing them to stop their advance at La Famine (Figure

18). The sickness infected most of La Barrels troops, making them worthless for battle. At the time of this disaster La Barre learned that the Iroquois had

gathered all their warriors together to confront his army and that they were

supported by the English. Worse yet was the news that the Iroquois were well

informed about the condition of his army. Fortunately for the French the

Iroquois were willing to negotiate a peace, although dictated by their terms. During the peace proceedings the Iroquois agreed to repay the French traders

the cost of the goods stolen from them. They also promised to resolve their

problems with the Michilimackinac Indians and the Miami and Mascoutin,

but refused to stop their war with the Illinois or Shawnee. The French, not in a position to argue, agreed with these terms and reaffirmed a tentative peace

with the Iroquois (NYCD 9: 237-239; Thwaites 1905: 81-84).

Charlevoix (1900) reported that the Iroquois kept their promise and did

not send any raiding parties against any tribes during the year of A.D. 1685.

However, the Iroquois reported to the French that despite their peaceful actions the Miami and Mascoutin continued to attack them during the year.

As a result, in June of A.D. 1686 the Iroquois renewed their war with the

Western Algonkians and they also attacked the Michilimackinac Indians (NYCD 9: 296, 319).

In A.D. 1685 La Barre was replaced by Denonville, who was given orders by the King of France (Louis XIV) to make war on the Iroquois if they persisted in attacking the Illinois and Miami. Denonville was determined to make war on the Iroquois and was not interested in attempting peaceful

152 resolutions, except to use peace negotiations to lull the Iroquois into a false

sense of security, making them easier to attack (NYCD 9: 282-284). In A.D. 1686 the French were also threatened by the news that the Iroquois were

successfully negotiating a peace with the Michilimackinac Indians and that

they had introduced these Indians to a group of English traders from Albany

(NYCD 9: 287-288). With this news Denonville, decided to attack the Iroquois

in the summer of A.D. 1687 and ordered French forces in the west to attack and/or capture any English traders traveling to Michilimackinac. At the

same time Denonville was organizing his army he sent messages to the

Iroquois via the Jesuits, indicating he wanted to remain at peace and

requested all of the five Iroquois tribes to send their peace representatives to Ft. Frontenac to negotiate a lasting peace. The Jesuits, not realizing they were

being duped, convinced the Iroquois that Denonville's offers of peace were

sincere, and they agreed to send peace representatives.

In June of A.D. 1687 Denonville, with an army of 2,062 French and

Indians, began to move down the St. Lawrence River to Ft. Frontenac (Figure 18). Along the way several Iroquois hunting in the vicinity, not aware of the

French intentions to start a war, approached them and were promptly taken prisoner. Not long after the army reached Ft. Frontenac, Father Lamberville arrived from Iroquoia with 40 Iroquois peace ambassadors, who were prepared to reaffirm peace with the French. To Lamberville's dismay, Denonville took all the Iroquois representatives prisoner even though

Lamberville had given them his and the governor's word that they would be safe (JR 64: 243, 245). Denonville also ordered an attack on several Iroquois villages along the north shore of Lake Ontario. Taken by surprise, many

153 Iroquois were killed and captured (Thwaites 1905:122-125). In all a total of 201

Iroquois were captured by Denonville in the opening phase of the invasion.

The majority of the prisoners were sent to France to serve on war galleys.

Encouraged by his success, Denonville continued with his plans.

Unlike La Barre, Denonville traveled along the south shore of Lake Ontario to keep the five tribes guessing as to which villages he was going to attack

(Figure 18). In July Denonville landed his army at the mouth of the Genessee

River where they rendezvoused with a group of Western Algonkian Indians led by Tonty. This combined force proceeded south to attack the villages of the Seneca. There was a brief engagement with several casualties on both sides, but the outnumbered Seneca retreated. Denonville burned four Seneca villages unhindered and then withdrew to the Niagara River where he established Ft. Niagara, which he hoped would encourage the Western Algonkians to raid Iroquoia (JR 63: 269; NYCD 3: 431-432, 434; NYCD 9: 334,

337-338, 365-368).

The Iroquois reaction to the French treachery and invasion was swift and unified. As soon as Denonville's army left the environs of Ft. Frontenac the fort was attacked, and along with Ft. Niagara, placed under siege. The

Iroquois also immediately sent small raiding parties into the Montreal area to bum outlying buildings and kill and capture as many French as possible. Denonville, who was trained in the European manner of war, had no experience with the hit and run nature of Indian warfare and was helpless in formulating an effective counter strategy. Upon his arrival to New France he had been overconfident and expressed his contempt for the Iroquois and his

154 predecessors, declaring, "the Iroquois would not beat him...that he knew how to make war, and how to reduce them [the Iroquois] to their duty;...." (JR 64:

243, 245). Denonville reacted to Iroquois attacks by going on the defensive,

scattering his troops throughout the colony in order to help protect isolated

settlements. Iroquois attacks continued and the French did not attempt to pursue raiding parties or to attack the Iroquois in Iroquoia.

As casualties mounted for the French, the Iroquois increased the pressure. In July of A.D. 1688 1,200 Iroquois encamped next to Montreal. The

Iroquois declared to the French that they were willing to negotiate a

resolution to the conflict. With 1,200 Iroquois warriors nearby, Denonville

chose to receive the Iroquois diplomats. The Iroquois proposed a cease to the

hostilities and the negotiation of a peace between the Iroquois and French only, excluding the French Indian allies. The Iroquois indicated there was no room for debate on their proposal and warned if the French did not accept

their demands within four days the Iroquois army would commence with attacking the French settlements. Denonville agreed to a temporary truce until the end of summer or early autumn, at which time a formal peace would be ratified (NYCD 9: 390, 402). The Iroquois approved and stopped all of their attacks against the French.

The peace process, however, would fail when Iroquois peace representatives attempted to return to Montreal in late September and were attacked by the Michilimackinac Huron. A group of Huron, led by the Rat, the leading proponent for war in his tribe, became aware of the ongoing negotiations between the French and Iroquois, and fearing that the French

155 would abandon them decided to intercept the Iroquois peace representatives before they finalized the peace. The Huron were successful, ambushing the

Iroquois peace envoys, killing and capturing several. The Huron let several go telling them that the French had explicitly told them to attack (NYCD 9: 384,391, 402).

The Huron achieved their goal of shattering the tentative peace and no serious consideration of peace would occur again until A.D. 1693. The Iroquois held the French responsible and again saturated the St. Lawrence

River valley with small raiding parties, which conducted hit and run attacks that resulted in many French deaths, the cutting off of supply lines between

French forts and villages, and the destruction of crops and livestock. Both forts Niagara and Frontenac were abandoned because of effective Iroquois siege tactics. The Iroquois also intermittently supplemented the small scale attacks with major assaults by large numbers of warriors (400 to 1,500 warriors). The most devastating assault came in August of 1689 when the

Iroquois launched a surprise attack at the French settlement of La Chine on the Isle of Montreal. Although accounts vary, approximately 1,000 to 1,500

Iroquois warriors "burnt all the settlements from the Point of the Island of

Montreal to within a league of Ville marie [Montreal]" (NYCD 9: 429). The raid resulted in heavy loss of life, with 320 to 600 French killed or captured, and caused panic among the French and their Indian allies. No Iroquois casualties were reported. The Michilimackinac Ottawa and Huron who were witness to the attack returned home disheartened and described what had happened to their families. Convinced that the Iroquois were winning the war against the French, the Michilimackinac tribes decided to send peace

156 representatives to Onondaga to make a separate peace with the Iroquois (JR

64:13, 25-27, 31). War factions still remained in these tribes and when

fortunes favored the French in the late 1690s, many individuals from the Ottawa and Huron participated in intermittent attacks on the Iroquois.

The Iroquois victory at La Chine and their continued success against

the French up until A.D. 1692 had paralyzed the colony's economy and put them in a state of fear that they may lose the war. The following passages

illuminate state of affairs in New France in the late 1680s and early 1690s.

"The principal affair at present is the security of this colony which is in evident danger of perishing if the Iroquois be let alone, and we make war and have not a decided advantage over them;" (NYCD 9: 301). Governor Denonville (November 8, 1686)

"The appearance of a small number of those Indians [the Iroquois] is sufficient to make them [the French settlers] abandon every thing; that it is to be feared the country must be abandoned if it not be powerfully reinforced and if this war be not terminated..." (NYCD 9: 435). A French bishop commented on the second Iroquois invasion of the Isle of Montreal in the autumn of 1689.

"I am reduced to the necessity of having the leaden gutters and weights melted in order to be run into bullets" (NYCD 9: 503). M. de Champigny described the impact the Iroquois were having on Montreal (on May 12, 1691), which was running out of supplies.

The situation only got worse for the French in A.D. 1690 when they

learned that the English had entered the war and were providing the Iroquois with men to support them during their raids. As it turned out, the English aid to the Iroquois was minimal except to keep them adequately provided with arms and ammunition. The good news for the French colony was that

157 Frontenac had returned to replace Denonville as governor. Unlike

Denonville, Frontenac was experienced with Indian warfare and knew how

to effectively use the French Indian allies and Canadian militia in hit and run attacks against both the English and Iroquois. By A.D. 1692 the French colony had also begun to adapt to Iroquois hit and run raids by keeping scouts out in the field to provide an early warning when Iroquois raiding parties were nearby. The French also learned how to organize men swiftly to actively and aggressively pursue Iroquois raiding parties once they had attacked.

The first task that Frontenac did when he returned to New France in

A.D. 1690 was release several Iroquois prisoners that had been serving on the galleys in France. He then tried to negotiate a peace with the Iroquois (NYCD

9: 439). The French, however, wanted a peace that excluded the English.

Flush from their recent victories and loyal to their English allies, the Iroquois refused. Warfare continued, but between A.D. 1691 and A.D. 1692 the French and French Indians began to experience some success against Iroquois raiding parties. The French and French Indians also began to initiate limited offensive attacks against Iroquois hunting parties north of Lake Ontario and along the Ottawa River. The most significant victory, however, came in

February of A.D. 1693 when 625 French and French allied Indians attacked the Mohawk villages along the Mohawk River. Almost all of the Mohawk were captured. Since most of the French and French Indian army was composed of Christianized Iroquois, the Mohawks were spared but forced to march northward in an attempt to take them to Montreal. The English and Iroquois reacted swiftly, attacking the retreating army and recovered most of the

Mohawk safely (NYCD 4: 6-7,14-20, 41, 183; NYCD 9: 550-552, 558-560, 572).

158 However, this attack set a precedent, and from this point on Frontenac's

strategy was to focus attacks on the Iroquois inside their own territory.

Within this same year two other attacks by French Indians were reported as

occurring in Iroquoia (see Table 3).

In July of A.D. 1693 Frontenac invited the Iroquois to negotiate a peace

at Quebec. Feeling more confident because of the recent successes, he even

threatened the Iroquois, declaring that he would destroy them if they did not

show. Not surprisingly, the Iroquois did not appear. In October of A.D. 1693 a

few Iroquois representatives went to talk to Frontenac and requested that he

meet at the village of Onondaga and make a general peace with the Iroquois

and English. Frontenac rejected this and demanded that the Iroquois make a

separate peace that excluded the English. He again threatened to attack if they

did not send representatives from all the five tribes by the next spring (of A.D.

1694). This exchange of demands between Frontenac and the Iroquois

continued until A.D. 1698. They could not compromise on critical issues,

such as where the negotiations would take place and who would be included

in the peace (see Table 9). Both sides wanted the negotiations to occur in their

home territories. The French wanted the English excluded from a peace so

that they could continue the war with them alone, while the Iroquois wanted

the French Indians to be excluded from the peace for the same reasoning. Both sides wanted the other to release prisoners first. An actual truce did occur between both groups in A.D. 1694, and while the Iroquois refrained from attacking the French and their Indian allies, the Miami attacked the

Iroquois inside of Iroquoia. By the end of A.D. 1694 the Iroquois, although willing to negotiate a peace, refused to do so in the terms that Frontenac had

159 demanded. As a result, warfare resumed between the tv\^o groups in A.D. 1695 and continued until A.D. 1697 when negotiations between the Iroquois and

French and French Indians resulted in a tentative truce.

Frontenac, angered at Iroquois refusals to meet his demands invaded

Iroquoia in the summer of A.D. 1696 with an army of 2,060 to 3,000 French and French Indians. His objective was to attack the Onondaga and Oneida, however, much like previous French invasions, the Iroquois were well prepared and forewarned of his army's progress. Frontenac found Onondaga abandoned and was able to capture only 35 Oneida at their main village before he was forced to return to Montreal. Although attacks continued betw^een the

Iroquois and French and their aUied Indians along the St. Lawrence River, casualties from these attacks were slight in comparison to the earlier stages of the war. The Iroquois casualties were higher in general, however, because they suffered several significant defeats at the hands of Western Algonkian tribes in engagements in the Great Lakes region and the Southern Ontario Peninsula (particularly north of Lake Ontario).

In the summer of A.D. 1697 Frontenac tried to initiate peace talks again with the Iroquois, requesting that they send their ambassadors to Quebec. The Iroquois again reiterated that they wanted the French to come to Onondaga because they mistrusted him. Several informal meetings occurred between both groups over the following year, ending with both sides unable to compromise. In the summer of A.D. 1698 the Iroquois sent a few representatives to meet with Frontenac and stated that they were sincere in negotiating a peace but that they wanted three things: the peace held at

160 Onondaga, the French to release Iroquois prisoners, and the Western

Algonkian nations excluded from the peace. Frontenac was again angry at the

Iroquois proposal and declared that the war would continue until the

Iroquois met his demands, which included a peace udth the Western Algonkians. Frontenac did not follow through with his threat of renewed

war, and died shortly afterwards.

Frontenac's successor, Callieres, was more open to compromise and in

the spring of A.D. 1699 he sent French representatives to Onondaga to begin

peace negotiations. Both sides agreed on mutually releasing prisoners at subsequent more formal meetings (NYCD 4: 558-559). As a sign of good faith

the French released all of their Iroquois prisoners in the summer. Both the

French and Iroquois agreed on a more formal meeting on peace to occur the following summer. While peace negotiations occurred with the French, sporadic warfare characterized Iroquois relations with the Western Algonkian tribes. However, in the spring and summer of A.D. 1700 several Western

Algonkian tribes informed the Iroquois of their willingness to secure a peace (see Table 9). The Ottawa and several Ivlissisauga tribes even asked the Seneca for permission to resettle near the Seneca in Iroquois lands along the north shore of Lake Ontario. The Iroquois granted these tribes permission. In the summer of A.D. 1700 peace was officially recognized by the French and

Iroquois and included the Western Algonkians. Both groups agreed to meet the following year to bring in any remaining prisoners on both sides to finalize the peace. On August 4, A.D. 1701 the Grand Peace Settlement of 1701 was finalized with the release of prisoners. Representatives were present from all of the tribes of both groups, and both groups agreed to mutually

161 address any future problems with negotiations rather than warfare. During this peace process, which also included the English when meetings occurred at Onondaga, the Iroquois also agreed to be neutral in any future conflicts between the French and English. The Grand Peace Settlement of 1701 marked the end of the so-called "Beaver Wars".

While warfare to the north and west with the French and French allied Indians dominated the period of A.D. 1680 to 1701, there were reports of

Iroquois attacks against Indian and English settlements in Maryland and

Virginia. The apparent increase in battles in this region, compared to previous decades (Table 1), was probably the result of the adoption of

Susqueharmock and Erie refugees in late 1670s and early 1680s. These

Susquehannock and Erie were traditional enemies of tribes and English living to the south (Hanna 1911, Vol. 1; Jennings 1984). Once adopted, they continued traditional hostilities against their former enemies, and brought the Iroquois into these conflicts. After A.D. 1684 no more battles were reported to the south because of the threat posed by the Western Algonkians and the French.

In summary, the war fought with the French and French allied Indians betu^een A.D. 1680 and 1701 represented the most intense and broadest fought war the Iroquois had experienced in the seventeenth century. What began as a war between several tribes in the Illinois region quickly expanded to include the Michilimackinac Indians, the French, the French Indians along the St.

Lawrence River, and the English. The Iroquois experienced significant victories against the Western Algonkians and French in the 1680s by using

162 their patented hit and run raids complimented with assaults by large

numbers of warriors. However, the Iroquois enemies outnumbered them and the French and French allied Indians began to use the Iroquois own

strategy against them by attacking the Iroquois in Iroquoia. In addition the

Iroquois no longer possessed a technological edge as their indigenous

opponents were well armed with muskets, unlike previous decades. Both

sides suffered extensive casualties and although the French and French allied

Indians were able to put the Iroquois on the defensive in the late 1690s, they

were unable to defeat them. As a result the "Beaver Wars" ended in stalemate (Brandao and Stama 1996), which ironically resulted in a peace settlement that would last for over forty years.

163 CHAPTER 7:

DOCUMENTING ETHNOHISTORIC ACCOUNTS THAT REPORT CAUSES OF THE "BEAVER WARS"

"It is true we had war against this or that nation but never have [we] been the first agressors all who have made war with us have felt the weight of it..." (NYCD 5: 864).

Unnamed Iroquois at conference w ith English at Albany (October 4, 1726)

"We look upon ourselves to be a warlike people and never entered into a war with any nation, but in the end we have gott the better of them, but yet we are inclined to Peace,..." (NYCD 6: 265).

U nnam ed Iroquois (June 20, 1744)

Although many have championed the fur trade premise, very little, if any effort has been made to actually document the ethnohistoric records that reported the causes of the "Beaver Wars" (e.g.. Abler 1992; Bradley 1987;

Derosiers 1947; Fenton 1940; H unt 1940; Goldstein 1969; Groulx 1976; Jennings

1984; Lanctot 1960; Lenig 1971; Mcllwain 1915; N orton 1974; Richter 1983, 1992; Tooker 1963). Even Hunt, the founder of the fur trade premise, refers to no specific ethnohistoric passages to support his view. Hunt and his subscribers describe historically documented warfare and legends of warfare according to their own interpretations based on modern (western) economic assumptions. This is similar to the anthropological approach, ethnoarchaeology, which use

164 modem human behavior to describe past human behavior, often in a universal fashion (Dunnell 1982). To support their economic assumptions Hunt and others allude to economic explanations given by the French ruling class for the cause of Iroquois warfare. The French ruling class which was deeply involved in the economic welfare of their country viewed the Iroquois as an enemy and competitor in the fur trade. The French administrators

(mainly Governors La Barre and Denonville) thought the Iroquois viewed economics in the same way they did, and so felt that their wars with Western

Algonkian tribes were motivated to expand their fur resource base. The French administration, particularly in the 1680s, often overlooked the traditional reasons (revenge and prestige) tribes went to war. They suggested these were excuses for underlying economic motives. It is these particular

French assumptions that have been accepted by supporters of the fur trade premise.

The key problem with revisionist interpretations is that they have not supported their arguments by documenting the French accounts that report the causes of conflicts. In addition there is no mention in the pro economic literature that dissenting French opinions exist or that the Iroquois themselves may give their own explanations for the wars that occurred in the seventeenth century. Only a few authors that have been critical of Hunt's premise have identified some passages (not all) that give the Iroquois opinion for particular conflicts (e.g., Dennis 1993; N arroll 1968; Schlesier 1976;

Trealease 1962). The goal of this chapter is to document ethnohistoric passages that report causes of Iroquois warfare (both Euroamerican and indigenous explanations) between A.D. 1649 and 1701. Every ethnohistoric

165 passage that relates to an explanation given by the Iroquois is copied and listed within the designated time periods that were created in Chapter 6. This list and commentary on reported causes of Iroquois warfare is the first comprehensive compilation of ethnohistoric passages that may explain the cause of the "Beaver Wars" and help better evaluate the fur trade premise. In all a total of 54 ethnohistoric passages were discovered and are listed and / or discussed below.

A.D. 1649 to 1659

Between A.D. 1649 and 1659 there were 12 ethnohistoric accounts that reported possible reasons for Iroquois warfare. All of these passages come from French sources m the Jesuit Relations (volum es 36, 37, 38, 42, 44, 45) except for one English account recorded in the NYCD (volume 13). The warfare that occurred in this period entailed fighting between the Iroquois and the French, Hurons, Neutral, Erie, Algonkians and numerous other

Great Lake and St. Lawrence River tribes (see Chpt. 6; Figure 8; Tables 1 and 5).

The warfare that raged in the 1640s between the Iroquois and the

Huron, French and Algonkians can best be described as a continuation of traditional mourning war and prestige needs that developed over the previous centuries against established enemies. Research conducted by Dennis (1993), Narroll (1968) and Schlesier (1976) has indicated that the fur trade played no role in the Iroquois warfare for the period previous to A.D.

1660 (contrary to Hunt's perspective). This was also the same interpretation this researcher [Keener] developed after reading ethnohistoric accounts in the

166 Jesuit Relations of Iroquois warfare before A.D. 1649 (JR 5-9, 12-28, 31, 33, 34, 39). Not one report, by the French or English, refers to the fur trade as a motivating cause for Iroquois warfare. Instead they point to revenge or prestige.

Many tribes that did not have a mourning war relationship with the

Iroquois during this period were drawm into the conflict by the Huron dispersal. After the A.D. 1649 defeat of the Huron, many Huron fled to their Iroquoian speaking neighbors or to the French. These refugees were not a defeated people but continued to strike back at the Iroquois and to encourage the tribes they had joined to fight (e.g., the Erie). By taking in Huron refugees and supporting and assisting them, the Neutral, Tobacco, Erie, and the French became enemies by association.

Besides traditional enmities with established enemies, the warfare that occurred in the early 1650s was intensified and broadened by the killing of

Iroquois peace representatives. The first example of this occurred in the autumn of A.D. 1650 when the Iroquois sent Huron refugees on Christian Island an offer to negotiate an end to the conflict, "they [Iroquois] had not come to to do any harm, but that their thoughts were all of peace; and that they brought rich presents to invite the remnants of the Hurons, who were dying of hunger, to take refuge among them, so that in future they might be bu t one people" (JR 36: 183). The H uron m istrusted the Iroquois and believed they were only trying to get them to abandon their fortified encampment in order to more easily attack. The Huron decided to mislead the Iroquois, telling them they were willing to resolve the conflict, although in actuality

167 they planned to kill all of the Iroquois representatives that entered their village. The Iroquois sent 30 (three would escape) unarmed peace representatives to the Huron encampment. The following passage describes what happened.

"There were many embassies on both sides, with as much confidence as if there never had been war between them, until our Hurons had attracted in their fort over thirty Iroquois, when they seized and killed the treacherous enemies who were biding their time to carry out the same plan, but were forestalled" (JR 36:187).

The Jesuit interpretation of this event is highly biased, since the

Iroquois were an enemy which had recently ruined their dreams of

Christianizing the tribes in the Southern Ontario Peninsula. The Jesuits considered the Iroquois treacherous, ruthless barbarians that "...are worse than the Devils of Hell" (JR 36: 191). With this kind of attitude it is understandable why the Jesuits viewed the Iroquois peace attempts as less than genuine. While the true motivations of the Iroquois in this situation are not known, their offer of a peaceful resolution to the conflict was not an unique occurrence. As Table 9 indicates, the Iroquois demonstrated a pattern of attempting to resolve conflicts with the Huron and other enemies during the 1650s. It should be noted that no evidence exists in the ethnohistoric record of the Iroquois using peace negotiations to set up a tribe or colony for a surprise attack (contrary to Jesuit presumptions). If the Iroquois are given the benefit of the doubt and the actions of this event are taken at face value, the

Huron committed a serious offense and act of treachery against the Iroquois.

Another indicator that the Iroquois were sincere in the peace effort and felt betrayed by the Huron is the fact that Iroquois attacks intensified against

168 Huron refugees in the Southern Ontario Peninsula immediately after this

event (see Table 3). The war escalated by also including tribes that had taken

in Huron refugees or were allies to the Huron, such as the Neutral and

Tobacco. In the spring of A.D. 1651 the Iroquois focused attacks on the Huron

at Christian Island, defeating two bands and killing 100 Huron in apparent

retaliation for the murder of the Iroquois ambassadors the previous autumn

(JR 36:13,15-16,119; JR 37:105).

In the summer of A.D. 1652 the Iroquois suffered another assault against their peace representatives by Huron refugees and Algonkians along the St. Lawrence River. After indicating to the Huron, Algonkians, and

French at Three Rivers that they [Iroquois] wished to negotiate an end to the continuing hostilities, these groups agreed to a parley. Three Mohawk representatives who went to negotiate were met by a group of Huron who took the Iroquois captive and then tortured them to death. The following passage describes this event:

The Mohawk indicated to the Huron that "Aontarisati [a Mohawk leader] was coming with the intention of making peace, etc. But, every one [French, Huron, and Algonkians] having concluded that this was nothing but deception, the plan was adopted of deceiving them in turn. There was a canoe, with three men, at the edge of the water, two Iroquois, and a Huron [that had been adopted by the Iroquois] named Aimenharitak,... Armaotaha [a Huron] comes near, and others [Hurons]; and while giving bread, he lays hands on the Iroquois...The one who Annaotaha had seized proved to be Aontarisati, chief of the band [Mohawk], the other, named Taakenrat, was not a man of importance" (JR 37:109).

The French did not beheve the sincerity of the Iroquois peace offer and encouraged the Huron to take this action. The Huron needed little

169 convincing and shortly after the Iroquois were taken prisoner they were burnt at the stake [the Algonkians received and killed one of these Iroquois]. The Iroquois response was the same as that at Christian Island; they intensified

and focused their attacks against the Huron, Algonkians, and French at Three

Rivers (see Table 3). The French were targeted because they were allies of the Huron whom the Iroquois considered accomplices to the murder of their

peace ambassadors. The Huron and Algonkian treachery demanded that the

Iroquois take revenge and is a classic example of traditional mourning

warfare (see p. 126). One year later, in the summer of A.D. 1653, the Iroquois again initiated a peace attempt tliat was successful in bringing a temporary

cessation to hostilities (JR 38:13; JR 40: 11). This again demonstrates that the

Iroquois were serious in their peace attempts (at Christian Island and Three

Rivers), while their enemies, the Huron, in both cases were not ready to end the war.

Breakdown in peace negotiations also precipitated the Erie-Iroquois

War of A.D. 1654 to 1656. As the following passage relates, it was the murder of an Iroquois by an Erie that resulted in the start of hostilities between the two groups.

"The Cat Nation had sent thirty ambassadors to Sonnontouan [the main village of the Seneca], to confirm the peace betw’^een them; but it happened, by some unexpected accident, that a Sonnontouahrounon [a Seneca] was killed by a man of the Cat Nation. This murder so incensed the Sonnontouahronnons, that they put to death the Ambassadors in their hands, except five who escaped. Hence, war was kindled between these two Nations, and each strove to capture and bum more prisoners than its opponent" (JR 42:177).

170 The retaliation by the Iroquois only reinforced a mourning war

relationship with the Erie, who struck back by capturing an Onondaga and torturing him to death (JR 42: 177, 179). The w ar continued to escalate, w ith

both sides attempting to exterminate the other, ultimately ending with the

defeat of the Erie.

Besides difficulties with traditional indigenous enemies, there are several ethnohistoric passages that report the causes of the breakdown of

relations between the French and Iroquois in the late 1650s. The French and

Iroquois had established peaceful relations in the summer of A.D. 1653, but in the autumn of A.D. 1657 this peace was threatened when a party of Oneida

killed three Frenchm en near M ontreal for no apparent reason (JR 43: 67; JR

44:193-195). Most historians that describe this specific event cite this as an example of the Iroquois provoking a war (Hunt 1940; Jennings 1984; Richter 1992). However, the fact that the murders were an isolated incident committed by only one tribe and not condoned by other tribes of the League is overlooked. While it is true that an Iroquois war party initiated hostilities, the French exacerbated the situation by rejecting mediation attempts and holding all of the tribes in the League responsible. Immediately after the murders, the French imprisoned 12 Onondaga and Mohawks who happened to be visiting the colony at the time, even though they were not involved.

The French were unaware of the individualistic nature of the tribes in the League, whom they wrongly assumed acted as one. Naturally the French thought the murders were planned by all the Iroquois, but by taking prisoners without attempting mediation first they sharpened the potential for a mourning war. The situation was made worse when the French made

171 threats and rejected offers by Iroquois peace representatives to resolve the conflict even taking several of them prisoner. In the early spring of A.D. 1658 the French abruptly abandoned their Jesuit mission in the village of Onondaga and openly allied themselves with the Algonkians and the Huron refugees living along the St. Lawrence River, who were actively warring against the Iroquois.

The actions the French displayed during this incident seem to indicate that they wanted a war and that they had no intention to seek a mediation to the conflict. However, as Naroll points out in the following passages, the inability of the French and Iroquois to resolve this dispute was a result of cultural biases and misunderstandings by both groups. The murders had caused the French to lose face and they wanted satisfaction. Naroll (1968) summarizes French motivations in the following passages.

"The French did not want to fight the war. Peace with the Iroquois was to their advantage at the time. They had little to gain and much to lose from fighting. Yet, paradoxically enough, it was they rather than the Iroquois who seemed more determined to do battle. It was the Iroquois who time and again sent messengers to talk of peace; time and again the French responded half-heartedly and allowed the talks to come to nothing. The French felt driven to the conflict; they saw^ no way to avoid it. They felt resentment and indignation at Iroquois conduct, which they usually misunderstood; they felt deceived and humiliated where neither deception nor humiliation had been intended. The root of their difficulty was that they did not yet understand the Iroquois and had not yet learned how to deal with them" (p. 52).

"The conviction of the French that the Iroquois were unpredictable and treacherous was no idle prejudice, but arose from the fact that the French understood clearly neither Iroquois social structure nor Iroquois patterns of conduct. Whenever the Iroquois acted in a manner inconsistent with the conduct the French had learned to expect from their own people and from members of other European nations, 172 they could only explain the event by calling the Indians fickle and treacherous" (p. 68).

"They [the French] fought them because they did not trust them and did not understand them. They fought them because they felt injured, cheated, imposed upon, insulted, and mocked. They fought them because they did not know how else to redress these wrongs" (p. 72).

The Iroquois thoughts on the cause of this conflict were primarily based on the French reactions to Iroquois attempts at mediation. The following passages report the Iroquois perspective on the causes of this war.

1) In November of A.D. 1657 one of the Onondaga hostages was released by the French with a message. The French told the Onondaga to inform the Iroquois they had taken several Iroquois prisoners, and that they held all of the Iroquois accountable for the recent murders. They also threatened to kill the hostages if any more French were killed, and stated that they had allied themselves with the Algonkians, an active enemy of the Iroquois.

"The Ormontagueronon [Onondaga] sent by Monsieur de Maisonneufve did still worse; for he told the chief men of his nation that the French had principally allied themselves with the Algonquins, in order to make war upon them, and that they had killed his companion" (JR 44: 201)

2) In the early months of A.D. 1658 Mohawk ambassadors brought presents to the French for the release of Mohawk prisoners. The Mohawk told the French that they did not know who murdered the Frenchmen in the autumn although they had heard it might be an Oneida or Cayuga. Governor Ailleboust responded by blaming all the Iroquois for the incident, stating "make reparation, or name the murderer,". No Mohawk prisoners were released (JR 44: 85-91, 203).

3) In March of A.D. 1658 "[t]he mission of onnontage was broken up [abandoned]" (JR 44: 95) and the Iroquois were given no explanation for this action. With French threats increasing in intensity and their men and priests leaving Iroquoia the Iroquois probably assumed that French aggression was imminent. 173 4) In May of A.D. 1658 an embassy of three Mohawks went to Quebec to address the French about the tense situation. An unnamed Mohawk stated:

"Thou seekest a quarrel; and say not that it is I. I brought Marguery [Father Le Moyne] back to thee, and Thou didst tell the Onontagherronon [unnamed Algonkian tribe] to kill me." "1 have nothing crooked in my thoughts. 1 wish to be thy Brother. We who are men of wisdom say to thee, 'Take heed of what thou hast done.'" "That the Algonkians, on whose account our nephews are being detained, may let them go." "Thou shalt not put me in irons. If on another occasion thou be killed, how can 1 help it?"

"Do like the dutchman, who interferes not in the wars of the Wolves [M ohawks],.." (JR 44: 97).

The Mohawk were angry at the French behavior since they [the Mohawk] had nothing to do with the murders. In their minds the French were purposely picking a fight with them by taking their people prisoner and by allying themselves with the Algonkians.

5) In August of A.D. 1658 ten Mohawks went to Quebec on a peace embassy and to seek the release of Iroquois prisoners. These Mohawks were taken prisoner by the French.

"they [Mohawks] came as ambassadors, they divided, and only ten presented themselves. But they fell into the pit which they were digging for others, and, wishing to deceive us, were themselves deceived; for he who was in command at Three Rivers adroitly effected their capture,..." (JR 44: 233).

6) On April 3, 1659 an Oneida peace embassy arrived in Quebec to seek the release of Iroquois prisoners. The Oneida gave the French presents (reparations) for the prisoners, but only a few were released. The French chastised the Iroquois ambassadors, warning them to stop their attacks against the French and Algonkians. The Oneida gave the following statement as representatives of the League:

"The Onondaga reminds thee that you had clasped each other by the arm; that you had bound yourselves with iron bonds. It is thou. Frenchman, who hast broken the bond by departing from my country 174 without my knowledge, and by abandoning thy dwelling." "Open thy eyes and thy ears, frenchman; see how our people have given thee back thy prisoners all together without doing it two separate times. Imitate them, to show that thou desirest peace as much as we do " (JR 45: 81-91).

The Iroquois still wished peace but felt that the French refusal to release the remaining prisoners meant they were inclined to remain hostile. The Oneida warned that if the remaining prisoners were not released that "there would be no peace."

7) On September 24, 1659 the Mohawks told the Dutch of additional causes for the renewed hostilities with the French. An unnamed Mohawk stated:

"...because the French do not keep the peace made with them, but French savages attack them [the Iroquois], whenever they are out hunting and thrash them, because parties of disguised Frenchmen are always among them,..." (NYCD 13:113).

8) In the peace proceedings of December A.D. 1665, the Iroquois explained why war began between A.D. 1657 and 1659. An unnamed Iroquois stated:

"...that with the dead of their [the Iroquois] nation they have interred the memory of the injuries and wrongs perpetrated against them, for allowing the Algonquins and the Hurons to massacre them; and generally all the wrongs they have received either by violation of the treaty [made in A.D. 1653] or bad treatment experienced by their ambassadors, or by the retention of their presents without replying to them; in a word forgetting generally the whole of the past, so as not to retain any resentment about it... "(NYCD 9: 37-38).

"...he no longer proposes peace like that of times past... promising the observance of this peace, not only in the name of the old men but also of the young, who often disturb it mal-a-propos, contrary to the opinion of the ancients; therefore he demands, in the name of those same young men, that the Algonquins and the Hurons do not trouble them on their side, nor get up any war parties against them, nor obstruct their hunting" (NYCD 9: 37-38).

175 The Iroquois, much like the French, did not understand the other's

culture and their response to the murders. The Iroquois did not understand why the French took the reparations they gave them but continued to insult

their representatives, and demand that the murderers be brought in if their

was to be peace. This went against traditional indigenous customs which

considered hostilities at an end when reparations were accepted by the tribe

that had been wronged (NaroU 1968; Trigger 1990). As the passages indicated

above, neither the French nor the Iroquois make any mention of the fur

trade. In the end, both sides had insulted one another and taken captives, and consequently war resulted as a means to regain prestige and take revenge.

There was one additional ethnohistoric passage that reported a cause

for Iroquois attacks against the Shawnee. The Iroquois stated to the Jesuits

that in the 1650s the Shawnee had killed several Iroquois near or in their (Shawnee) territory.

"...against those peoples [the Shawnee] the Onnontagherronnon Iroquois have turned their arms, to appease (as they say) the souls of those of their number who were killed there eight or nine years ago. Those souls will find no resting-place in the other world until they have been atoned for, as it were, by fires of burnt captives,..." (JR 47: 147, 149).

A.D. 1660 to 1669

Between A.D. 1660 and 1669 there were five ethnohistoric accounts that reported possible causes for Iroquois warfare during this period. These passages come from French, Dutch and English sources in the Jesuit Relations

(volumes 36, 37, 38, 42, 44, 45), and NYCD (volumes 2 and 3) and address the 176 fighting between the Iroquois and the New England Indians and the

Susquehannock (see Chpt. 6; Figure 10; Tables 1 and 6).

The warfare that occurred betw^een the Iroquois and various New

England tribes ("people of the East" [JR 47: 107]) in the 1660s developed from a series of failed peace negotiations. There are three Jesuit accounts that describe the murder or taking prisoner of Iroquois peace representatives, which resulted in retaliation by the Iroquois and warfare. The passages that describe these incidents are listed below.

1) In late A.D. 1661 the Mohawk sent 30 peace representatives to the Abenaki to either negotiate or reaffirm peaceful relations. The negotiations were a failure, with the Abenaki killing all but one of the M ohawk.

"Into that peaceful and delightful region [Abenaki territory] a band of armed Agnieeronnons [Mohawk] is about to carry disturbance, in order to avenge an insult offered to thirty of their number who, wishing to exact a sum of tribute from those people, were themselves all slain by them, with a single exception. This man, after having his upper lip cut off and losing half his scalp, was sent back in that phght to carry the tidings of what had befallen his Compatriots, being ordered to tell his countrymen that like ignominy was in store for them if they undertook a sim ilar act of m olestation" (JR 47: 141).

The only explanation given for the start of hostilities with the Abenaki is related by the Jesuits, who claimed that the Iroquois were not actually there for peace but to demand tribute from the Abenaki. The truthfulness of the

Jesuit assessment can not be confirmed since they were not eyewitnesses to the event and the passage appears to be providing their own rationalization for the Abenaki behavior. Since the French were actively engaged in a war with the Iroquois at the time this passage was written, the Jesuit's opinion of

177 the Iroquois is highly biased, and not unexpected. Even if the Jesuit depiction is accurate, as a long time enemy of the Iroquois, the Abenaki would have been well aware of the Iroquois response to their actions (e.g., the Huron at

Christian Island and Three Rivers, and the Erie). When the Mohawk heard of the Abenaki treachery they felt extremely insulted and vowed to take vengeance on them for the next two years (JR 47: 141).

The resulting war with the Abenaki raised tensions between the Mohawk and other New England tribes, and in A.D. 1664 they sent peace representatives to the Mahicans and several other New England tribes

(Ondiakes, Pacamtekooks, and Pinnekooks) to reaffirm peaceful relations.

However, the New England tribes, traditional enemies of the Mohawk, apparently had already formulated a general alliance to make war on them.

As the following passages reveal the Mohawk delegates were either killed or taken captive.

2) The Dutch wrote, "Mohawk Chief, Saheda, came before us with some of his nation to go thither [to meet with the Mahicans] with a present for the ratification of the peace, who then departed with that design and have been massacred and killed there" (NYCD 2: 371).

3) In another Dutch account "The Pacamtekocks answered, we have had no war for 36 years and have not troubled ourselves about our neighbors, the Soquackicks [Sokokis], when the Maquaes [Mohawks] were at war with them last year. Let them [the Mohawks] send us a present, then we will release their prisoners [three total] and bring a present to their country, thus to renew our old friendship" (NYCD 13: 381).

In reaction to the above events the Mohawk and other Iroquois attacked New England Indian villages. 178 Besides warfare with New England tribes, to the south the Iroquois were actively at war with the Susquehannock. Unlike some of the other

conflicts, the origins of the Susquehannock War is unknown except that they

were traditional enemies of the Iroquois. There were attempts by both the

Iroquois and Susquehannock to put a stop to the conflict, but all resulted in

failure. The one serious effort at peace initiated by the Iroquois occurred in

A.D. 1663 when they sent an army against the main village of the

Susquehannock. Finding the village well defended, the Iroquois decided to

try to resolve the conflict and asked the Susquehannock if they would be

interested in negotiating an end to the war. The Susquehannock agreed and allowed 25 peace representatives of the Iroquois to enter their village. The

following passage describes what happened to these ambassadors.

"Making, then, overtures for a parley, they offered to enter the besieged town to the number of twenty-five, partly to treat for peace, as they declared, and partly to buy provisions for their return journey. The gates were opened to them and they went in, but were immediately seized and, without further delay, made to mount on scaffolds where, in sight of their own army, they were burned alive. The Andastogueronnons [Susquehannocks], by thus declaring war more hotly than ever, gave the Iroquois to understand that this was merely the prelude to what they were going to do in the latter's country; and that the Iroquois had only to go back home as speedily as possible and prepare for a siege, or at least make ready to see their fields laid waste" (JR 48: 79).

The Susquehannock made some attempts of their owm to resolve the

conflict, sending peace representatives to individual tribes of the League twice in the 1660s (JR 54: 75; NYCD 12: 439). These efforts failed, and in one case (JR

54: 75) the Iroquois showed themselves just as capable of cruelty as their enemies when they executed a Susquehannock peace representative who had

179 come to negotiate a peace with the Cayuga. It is clear that the killing of peace representatives by both groups strongly reinforced their mourning war relationship.

One additional passage from a Frenchman, Boucher, states his view on why the Iroquois make war in the year A.D. 1664.

The "war they [Iroquois] wage against one another is not to conquer lands, nor to become great Lords, not even for gain, but purely vengeance" (Boucher 1964 [1664]: 117).

A.D. 1670 to 1679

Betw’^een A.D. 1670 and 1679 there was only one ethnohistoric account that reported possible causes for Iroquois warfare. This passage comes from the Jesuit Relations (volume 54), and it addresses the tensions betw^een the

Iroquois and the Ottawa and other Western Algonkians tribes that occurred between A.D. 1669 and 1670 (see Chpt. 6; Figure 12; Tables 1 and 7). This small outbreak in hostilities was brought to quick conclusion with French intercession. The French threatened the Iroquois with war if they did not come to terms. The Iroquois grudgingly accepted the peace, but told the

French their reasons for the warfare and their dislike of French interference in intertribal relations.

"For whom does Onnontio take us?" "He is vexed because we go to war, and wishes us to lower our hatchets and leave his allies undisturbed. Who are his allies? How would he have us recognize them when he claims to take under his protection aU the peoples discovered by the bearers of God's word through all these regions, and when everyday, as we leam from our people who escape from the 180 cruelty of the stake, they make new discoveries, and enter nations which have ever been hostile to us, — which, even while receiving notification of peace from Onnontio, set out from their own country to make war upon us, and to come and slay us under our very palisades? Let Onnontio check their hatchet if he wishs us to stay our own. He threatens to bring destruction on our Land; let us see whether his arms will be long enough to remove the scalps from our heads, as we have done in times past with those of the French" (JR 54: 263-265).

Unnamed Seneca ambassador (A.D. 1670)

The Seneca's statement illuminates the frustration the Iroquois had with French meddling in the Iroquois affairs with tribes not included in the original peace treaty established in the 1660s. Although the French had promised to attack any tribe that first broke the peace, this did not occur and when the Iroquois responded with a counterattack the French held them responsible. This confounded the Iroquois who believed they had a right to defend themselves. The Iroquois also were confused by the French efforts to ally themselves with all the western tribes, even those that were active enemies of the Iroquois. The Iroquois distrust of French motives with western tribes grew over the next fourteen years as the French association and trade with these western tribes expanded, threatening Iroquois security.

A.D. 1680 to 1701

Between A.D. 1680 and 1701 there were 36 ethnohistoric accounts that reported possible causes for Iroquois warfare. These passages come from the Jesuit Relations (volumes 62, 64), the New York Colonial Documents

(volumes 3, 4, and 9), G olden (1922), Parkm an (1983 [1865-1892]), and Thwaites

(1905) and address the warfare that developed between the Iroquois and the 181 French and French allied Indians living in the Great Lakes, Illinois region, and St. Lawnrence River Valley (see Chpt. 6; Figure 15; Tables 1 and 8). The reported causes for this war have been broken up into European and

Iroquoian accounts in order to better understand cultural perspectives.

Euroamerican Accounts

There were a total of 13 Euroamerican accounts that specifically report or illuminate the causes of Iroquois warfare that occurred with the French and French allied Indians between A.D. 1680 and 1701. All of these accounts are from the French. The French accounts are separated into two groups; i) those that describe the Iroquois conflict with Western Algonkian tribes and French traders, A.D. 1677 to 1684; and ii) those associated with Denonville's government and his campaign against the Iroquois, A.D. 1685 to 1687.

i. The Iroquois conflict with the Western Algonkians and French Traders, A.D. 1677 to 1684.

1) Du Chesneau wrote in September, A.D. 1681,

The Iroquois' "...true motive, however, was to gratify the English at Mannatte and Orange, of whom they are too near neighbors, and whom, by means of presents, engaged the Iroquois in this expedition, the object of which was to force the Illinois to bring their beaver to them, so that they may go and trade it afterwards with the English; also to intimidate the other nations and constrain them to do the same thing" (NYCD 9:163).

2) Governor La Barre, of New France, October 10, 1682,

"...it is easy to judge that the inclination of these peoples [Iroquois] is to pursue their enterprise. That undertaking is, to destroy, one after the other, all the nations allied to us, while they keep us in 182 uncertainty, with folded arms, —in order that, after they have taken from us all the trade in peltries, which they wish to carry on alone with the English and Dutch settled at Manatte and Orange, they may attack us alone" (JR 62: 157).

3) Governor La Barre, of New France, A.D. 1683

"It will be easy for the first named [Iroquois] to destroy, in detail, all those who will oppose the design they entertain to become masters of North America, and, assisted by the English and Dutch, to oblige the French to quit the colony. Is necessitated to make preparations to resist them and to prevent them attacking the Illinois, without which the revenue from the beaver would be destroyed" (NYCD 9; 199).

4) Governor La Barre, of New France, November A.D. 1683

The Iroquois "...turned their attention to the trade with the English of New York, Orange and Manatte, and finding this much more profitable than ours, because the beaver is much higher there than with us, they sought every means to increase it, and as they perceived that they could not succeed better in that than by destroying the Ottawa," (NYCD 9: 201).

5) Governor La Barre, of New France, November 1683,

"...the subject which we have discussed is to determine who will be master of the beaver trade to the south and southwest; and that the Iroquois, who alone supply the English with considerable beaver, have a deep interest in despoiling us of that advantage by applying it to their own benefit;" (NYCD 9: 202).

As is demonstrated with the above statements, the New France colonial government viewed the fur trade, and Iroquois ambition to dominate it (imperialism), as the primary cause for warfare. Do note that there is a sharp contrast between their view and the Iroquois (see Iroquois

183 explanation section). There are, however, deferring views from other individuals within the New France colony.

6) De Meulles wrote on July 12,1684,

"The General [Governor La Barre] has undertaken the war without consulting anyone in the country but the merchants," (NYCD 9: 232).

7) Father Lamberville reported in A.D. 1695 of La Barre's attempted invasion of Iroquoia in A.D. 1684,

"After many years of peace with the Iroquois, who were beginning to become Christians, some people desired war, although the Iroquois offered to give satisfaction, if they were wrong. There was a pretense of desiring to continue the peace, and then the french came to surprise them. In vain; the savages were found to be ready;" (JR 64: 241).

8) The King of France, Louis XTV wrote on July 31, 1684,

"It also appears to me that one of the principle causes of the war proceeds the man named Du Lhut having two Iroquois killed, who had assassinated two Frenchmen on Lake Superior;" (NYCD 9: 233). The King felt that too many French traders had been allowed to trade in the interior (to the west), which he believed was the cause of the renewed tensions with the Iroquois.

ii. Denonville's Government and his Campaign against the Iroquois, A.D. 1685 to 1687.

9) Governor M. de Denonville, of New France, wrote in late summer A.D. 1685,

"War with the Iroquois is inevitable, and if we do not make it against them, they will declare it after they will have done all in their power to rid themselves of the Indians who are friends of the French" (NYCD 9: 274). Denonville also indicated he would send 300 muskets to the Illinois, enemies of the Iroquois (NYCD 9: 275).

184 10) Governor M. de Denonville, of New France on November 12, 1685, "Neither will we neglect any negotiations that may present themselves to lull the Senecas, who are the most insolent, and from whom we are not to expect any assured peace, still less its observance with our allies, whom they are determined to exterminate" (NYCD 9: 284). Denonville planned to continue peace negotiations with the Iroquois, even though he planned to attack them the following year.

Like the previous tensions with the Iroquois under Governor La Barre the French under Denonville's administration believed that the fur trade was the dominant motive for Iroquois warfare. Unlike La Barre, Denonville successfully engaged the Iroquois. There are again other French viewpoints about the reasoning of Denonville's government to wage war.

11) Father Lamberville reported in A.D. 1695 of Denonville's attack on the Iroquois in A.D. 1687,

"In 1686, a new governor, full of ideas of such war as is carried on in Europe, undertook to ruin and annihilate, if he could, the Iroquois,— to make, said he, Christianity and colonization flourish in the country...he told me that the Iroquois would not beat him as they had his predcessors; that he knew how to make war, and how to reduce them to their duty;...I replied that I saw clearly that interested people were influencing him to extreme measures, which would be prejudicial to them and to the french colony, and even to religion. The governor,.., deputed me to go to the Iroquois and invite them all, in the person of their chiefs, to be present in the spring at the rendezvous that he designated, to talk there about the continuation of the peace, and the means of properly maintaining it with them, and they with him. I was told to pledge his faith and word that they would be given safety and liberty to come to this rendezvous, and to return thence to their people. I execute my orders; I assemble 40 of the principle chiefs, from all the Iroquois villages. I give them the word of the governor. I protest to them that, as he is a Christian, and chosen by the King to be his lieutenant-general in this country, they ought to believe that he was a man incapable of breaking his word, or violating the law of nations. Upon that, they yielded to my urgency. They were at the rendezvous, where they were deceived; they were put in irons and in 185 prisons. They were plundered of a quantity of peltries, which they had brought in order to show the french by this traffic that they had confidence in them. They were carried away to france. They were taken to Aix, where they died from destitution,—except 13," (JR 64: 243, 245).

12) In the summer of A.D. 1687 Baron de Lahontan wrote his perspective on Denonville's motivation for war,

"Time w^ill discover the Consequences of this Expedition; and perhaps we may come to repent, tho' too late, of our complying with the Advice of some Disturbers of the Public Peace, who project to enlarge their private Fortunes in a general Commotion. I lay this down for an uncontested Truth, that we are not able to destroy the Iroquese by our selves: besides, what occasion have we to trouble'em, since they give us no Provocation?" (Thwaites 1905: 120).

13) Father Lamberville wrote of the Iroquois peace attempt of A.D. 1688 and their attitudes about the treachery of Denonville the year before,

"They [the Iroquois] reproached us with our bad faith, and said that, if we again failed to keep a promise to them when they placed themselves in our power, as they were now doing, their people would know very well how to avenge it...Two months after this parley, which procured us a truce, the Iroquois did really send back four of their people to let the French know the satisfactory result of their negotiation; but those men unfortunately were assassinated, while on the way, by some of our allied savages who did not wish us to make peace with the Iroquois, in order that the brunt of the war should fall upon us rather than upon them. This wicked action—which these perfidious people [a Huron war party] imputed to us; and which, they informed the Iroquois, was done only at our solicitation—rekindled the war;" (JR 64: 257).

kQ^-U-Qi? ExplanafiQQS.

There were a total of 23 accounts that specifically report or illuminate causes of Iroquois w arfare betw een A.D. 1680 and 1701 from the Iroquois

186 perspective. These accounts are from both French and English sources. The accounts are separated into three groups; i) those that describe the Iroquois conflict with the Illinois, Miami, Shawnee and French traders, A.D. 1677 to

1684; ii) those associated with the conflict with the Ottawa and Huron of

Michilimackinac, A.D. 1681 to 1683; and 3) those that describe the conflict with the French, A.D. 1684 to 1701.

i. The Iroquois conflict with the Illinois, Miami, Shawnee, and French Traders, A.D. 1677 to 1684.

1) Du Chesneau reported in September of A.D. 1681 why the Iroquois attacked the Illinois.

"...the Illinois returned to their country [in the 1670s], and the Iroquois complained that they [the Illinois] had killed nearly 40 of their people who were on their way to hunt beaver in the Illinois country. To obtain satisfaction the Iroquois resolved to make war on them" (NYCD 9: 162-163).

There are several French and English accounts which reported Iroquois attitudes about the French traders that were supplying the Illinois and Miami with weapons and supplies. The result of one of these French trade expeditions in A.D. 1681 was an attack by a Seneca war party, who confiscated the French goods. Although no French were killed, it was this incident, along with the Iroquois attack on Ft. St. Louis, that resulted in the planned expedition of La Barre against the Iroquois in A.D. 1684.

2) Du Chesneau reported La Salle's activities in Illinois and Miami country in A.D. 1681. La Salle openly indicated his willingness to support the Illinois and Miami in front of several Iroquois.

187 "He ill treated them [the Iroquois present], and avowed that he would convey arms and ammunition to the Illinois, and would die assisting them" (NYCD 9:163).

3) Sindachsegie, a Mohawk chief, informed the English of the reason for the Seneca attack on the French trade party in A.D. 1681.

"Wee must acknowledge that a party of Senecas and Onondaga have plundered some French, that they found in their enemies country, supplying them with ammunition" (NYCD 3: 442).

4) Three Senecas, Adondaraheerha, Unedachseno and Awitharoa, told the English on August 6, 1687 about the raid on the French trade party six years ago, which they felt had caused the French to attack them in A.D. 1684 and 1687.

"...about three years agoe [actually six] near to a castle of our enemy's called Kichtages [Illinois], we met with a company of French agoing to supply them with powder, lead and guns by way of trade, which the Sinnakes thought was very ill done for them, to strengthen their enemies at that rate; whereupon we took the ammunition and other goods from them, some whereof we carryed away along with us, and the lead which was too heavy and could not carry wee threw into the water" (NYCD 3: 444-445).

5) At the peace proceedings of La Famine in the sum m er of A.D. 1684 an Onondaga, Grangula, stated reason for the taking of goods from French traders whom they considered outlaws.

"You must know, Onnontio, we have robb'd no French-Men, but those who supplied the Illinese and Oumamis [Miami] (our Enemies) with Fusees, with Powder, and with Ball: These indeed we took care of because such Arms might have cost our life" (Thwaites 1905: 81).

The following accounts reported causes for warfare with the Miami and Shawnee. Father Beschefer and La Salle wrote that the Shawnee, enemies of the Iroquois, had taken refuge with the Miami and Illinois at Ft.

St. Louis. By taking in enemies of the Iroquois, the Miami would have been 188 considered an enemy, much like those nations that had accepted Huron refugees in the 1650s.

5) In A.D. 1681 La Salle wrote that a band of Shawnee living along the Ohio asked and received promises of French protection from the Iroquois. This band of Shawnee agreed to move to Ft. N^Iiamis and ally themselves with the Illinois and French in the fall of A.D. 1681 (Parkman 1983 [1865-1892]: 913).

6) Father Beschefer wrote in A.D. 1683,

"Many Chaouanons [Shawnee] whom he found among the Miamis (these are tribes who live much farther away toward the south, whom the Iroquois war has compelled to abandon their own country)..." (JR 62: 209).

7) La Salle reported in Novem ber of A.D. 1683,

"That the Chouenons [Shawnee], Chaskpe' and Ouabans have, at his solicitation, abandoned the Spanish trade and also nine or ten villages they occuppied for the purpose of becoming French and settling near Ft. St. Louis, which he was about to have built" (NYCD 9: 799).

8) In A.D. 1684 the Onondaga told La Honton why they attacked the Miami and Illinois,

"We fell upon the Illinese and the Oumamis, because they cut down the trees of Peace that served for limits or boundaries to our Frontiers. They came to hunt Beavers upon our Lands; and contrary to the custom of all the Savages, have carried of whole Stocks, both Male and Female. They have ingaged the Chaouanons [Shawnee] in their interest, and entertain'd 'em in their Country. They supply'd 'em with Fire-Arms, after the concerting of ill designs against us" (Thwaites 1905: 82).

1 8 9 9) In A.D. 1684 the Onondaga informed the French,

"A party of 40 warriors [Onondaga] will leave here in six days to attack the Illinois whom they may find among the Chaouennons" (NYCD 9: 260).

10) Hateouati, an Onondaga, told the French at the conference of La Famine of A.D. 1684 why the Iroquois wished to attack the Miami.

"He has killed some of my people this spring, in diverse rencounters; but as you bound my arms I allowed myself to be struck, without defending myself" (NYCD 9: 238).

ii. The Causes of the Conflict with the Ottawa and Huron of Michilimackinac, A.D. 1681 to 1683.

The cause of this conflict originated in A.D. 1681 with the murder of a greatly beloved captain of the Seneca, called Annahac, by an Illinois in an Ottawa village at Michilimackinac.

10) Father Lamberville wrote in A.D. 1681 about the results of the Annahac incident among the Iroquois,

"Last winter, they brought to tonnontouant [a Seneca village] the bones of a captain of renown, who, while returning from the war with the Illinois, had wandered from the main body of the Iroquois army, and had been killed among the Kiskakons [Ottawa] by some Illinois who found him there. The tormontouans [Senecas] brought his head here with great ceremony. They spoke very eloquently about avenging his death upon the Kiskakons, our allies. The Onnontagues [Onondaga], the Agnies [Mohawks], the Onneiouts [Oneida], and the Goiogouens [Cayugas] cast the blame upon the Illinois, for they were the authors of the murder" (JR 62: 93-95).

"...the Iroquois,—irritated still further by the death of a captain of sonnontouan, killed among the Kiskakons by some Ilinois who were there,—have gone to continue the war with more ardor. Their purpose is, to avenge that death, and, if possible, to exterminate that nation [the Illinois]—over whom they have already obtained great

190 advantages, although the latter were formerly the terror of the more remote tribes toward the west" (JR 62: 213).

11) Du Chesneau w rote in March A.D. 1682,

"the Iroquois are seeking an opportunity to destroy both these tribes, and thus gratify their resentment against the French, saying that one of their chiefs having been killed by an Illinois in the village of the said Kiskakons [Ottawa], in presence of Tionontatez [Tobacco/Huron] and of Frenchmen, they must, according to their custom on like occasions, avenge that murder on them as accomplices, for not having killed the murderer" (NYCD 9:171).

12) G overnor Frontenac, of New France, w rote in A ugust of A.D. 1682 that he had been informed by the Iroquois about their feelings about the Annahac incident.

The Iroquois felt that "it was difficult to believe that the murder of Annahac had not been committed with the participation of all the Kiskakons [Ottawa], they not having broken the head of the murderer, nor arrested him" (NYCD 9: 177).

Frontenac went on to write that he encouraged the Ottawa to send the Seneca retribution if they wanted to avert hostilities. However, the Ottawa refused to do so, feeling that it was the Illinois and Tobacco/Huron's fault. The Ottawa felt that the Tobacco/Huron were to blame because they had introduced the Seneca to the Illinois who then subsequently killed him. The Tobacco/Hurons at Michilimackinac further aggravated the situation by telling the Iroquois that the Ottawa were to blame for not apprehending the murderer. The Tobacco/Huron were apparently successful in shifting the blame, for future Iroquois attacks at Michilimackinac were primarily targeted at the Ottawa.

13) On A.D. Septem ber 11, 1682, Tegannisorens, an O nondaga leader told Governor Frontenac,

"That they do not wish to make war on the Kiskakons [Ottawa] nor on the Hurons, neither on the Miami, but will defend themselves if they strike first" (NYCD 9: 184).

191 iii. The Conflict with the French, A.D. 1684 to 1701

14) In A.D. 1684 at a meeting with Governor Dongan (of New York) the Seneca stated their anger at Governor La Barre's (of New France) actions in trading weapons to their enemies but then forbidding them (the Iroquois) to attack any tribe with whom the French traded. The Seneca were also upset over the interference of their hunting by these tribes.

"He often forbids us to make War on any of the Nations with whom he [La Barre] Trades." "...and at the same time furnishes them with all sorts of ammunition, to enable them to destroy us." "We cannot live without free Bever-hunting" (Golden 1922: 48).

15) Governor of New France, M. de Denonville, reported in September of A.D. 1686,

"1 have given him [Tonty] twenty good Canadians with eight canoes loaded with one hundred and fifty muskets; all 1 could collect in the country. He carries some powder and lead and other articles of trade [for the Illinois]" (NYCD 9: 300).

16) In September of A.D. 1686, Governor Denonville ordered that the fortified posts of Detroit and Toronto be built. Both were built in areas considered hunting territories of the Iroquois (NYCD 9: 300, 306).

17) A.D. July 13 to 24, 1687, a French army led by Governor Denonville attacked and destroyed four Seneca villages. On their way to the Seneca villages, over 200 Iroquois, unaware of the French army's intentions, were captured along the St. Lawrence River or near Ft. Frontenac. Forty Iroquois peace ambassadors brought by Father Lamberville to renew peace ties with the French were also captured at Ft. Frontenac and imprisoned (JR 63, 64; NYCD 9). The following accounts reveal the attitude of some of the 200 Iroquois who had been captured.

"They complain'd, 'That they were betray'd without any ground; that in compensation for the care they had took ever since the Peace to furnish the Garrison [at Ft. Frontenac] with Fish and Venison, they were bound and tied to Posts,...' (Thwaites 1905: 122)

192 Another captured Iroquois charged, "Are these the French [Denonville's army], said they, that the Jesuits cry'd up so much for Men of Probity and Honour? Even the cruellest sort of Death that Imagination it self can reach, would be nothing to us in comparison with the odious and horrible Spectacle of the Blood of our Ancestors, that is shed so inhumanely before our eyes. Assuredly, the five Villages [the Five Nations] will revenge our Quarrel, and entertain an everlasting and just Resentment of the tryrannical Usage we now meet w ith" (Thwaites 1905: 123).

18) On A.D. September 9,1687 an unnamed Mohawk informed the English of the Iroquois' sentiments about the French attack,

"the Governor of Canada hath begun an illegal war upon us without provocation or cause" (NYCD 9: 483).

19) The French reported on A.D. September 29,1688 that two Onondaga peace ambassadors were killed by a Western Algonkian war party while returning from negotiations with the French (NYCD 9: 392).

20) In March A.D. 1690 De Monseignat recorded his hopes that the release of Orehaoue', one of the Iroquois ambassadors captured and enslaved by the French during Denonville's campaign in A.D. 1687, would bring about peace with the Iroquois. De Monseignat felt that Denonville's actions were the primary Iroquois reason of the war.

"The disposition manifested by Orehaoue', on our arrival here, was such as to encourage us to hope for peace with his nation [the Iroquois], in as war was waged solely on his account;..." (NYCD 9: 464).

21) In March A.D. 1690 the Iroquois showed displeasure at Governor Frontenac's (of New France) attempt to negotiate a peace at Ft. Frontenac. The Iroquois saw this as a place of betrayal because of the actions of Denonville in A.D. 1687. Gagniogoton, an Onondaga, responded to the French messengers request,

"Know you not that the Fire of peace no longer bum s in that fort; that it is extinguished by the blood which has been spilt there; the place where the council was held is aU red; it has been desecrated by the treachery perpetrated there; the soil of Ganneyout— a village ten leagues above the fort— has been polluted by the treacherous seizure of 193 prisoners there; the Seneca country has been defiled by the ravages the French committed there. Repair all this, you will then be at liberty to build up the fire of peace and friendship in some other place than that in which you have located it, for it has been cast out thence" (NYCD 9: 465).

22) In a meeting at Onondaga, on A.D. February 4, 1695, Kaqueendara told French messengers why the Iroquois would not send peace ambassadors to Montreal or Quebec,

"Onontio [Frontenac] you call us children you have begotten. What Father are you. You deale with us whom you call Children as with hogg's which are called home from the woods by Indian Com & then put in Prisons untill they are killed thus you have dealt by us whom you call children you have sent for us often to Canida' & Cadaracqui & in our return our Indian's were either killed or taken Prisoner's. O Onontio you say wee must keep the firme covenant chaine which you have broake many times in time of Peace' how did Ogquese endeavour with his Armey to fall upon our Brethren the Mohaqs twenty six years ago. Afterwards in time of peace you sent for our Sachims who wente and you by yor Indians in the way feU upon them & killed Eighte. Some year's after you sent for us againe & in our return' your Indians the Dionondades fell upon us in the Lake' & killed many. Wee threw all this into a deep Pit of oblivion, how have you dealt by our People at Cadaracqui [Ft. Frontenac], Oh yet smarts still. Remember what you did to our brethren in Schenectady [English village on the Mohawk River], so soon you heard of Warr over the broad lake' you murthered & burnt all what was there both man & beast notwithstanding about a month before..." (NYCD 9:121).

The above passages indicate that the Iroquois had a long memory of French betrayals, which they felt were the reasons for the current war. The

Iroquois were also upset that the French were offering them peace but at the same time attacking the English, the Iroquois ally. The Iroquois, loyal to this alliance, could not consider peace unless their ally was included.

There was one additional account that had no connection with the French and French allied Indian conflict. This account gave an explanation 194 for why the Seneca had killed several Minisink Delaware in A.D. 1694. The

English stated the reason was that the "Mennissink Indians have not been with ye Sinneques as usiall to pay their Duty,..." (NYCD 4: 99). This passage appears to refer to the Delaware's tributary status which required them to give the Iroquois a certain amount of furs or other items as payment. Evidently the Delawares had been late in payment or had refused to pay the tribute and the result was an Iroquois attack.

195 CHAPTER 8:

CONCLUSIONS

"if the inhabitants of the back parts of Virginia have no more truth and honesty than some of ours, I should make no scruple to prefer an Iroquois' testimony to theirs" (MPCP 4: 653).

George Thomas, Governor of Pennsylvania (June 6, 1743)

The goal of this dissertation is to document and present a clearer

understanding of the "Beaver Wars" that occurred bebveen A.D. 1649 and 1701. In achieving this goal several specific questions were addressed that

were related to the explanation of the cause or causes of Iroquois warfare

during this period. The primary research question was to evaluate the

validity of the fur trade premise by documenting supporting or contradictory

evidence from the ethnohistoric record. This entailed collecting all passages that reported the cause of Iroquois warfare. Additional questions related to

warfare were also addressed regarding the association of prestige with peace representatives and territory, the use of new technology, the evolution of battle tactics, and the question of defensive warfare. Through the analysis of three primary resources and various secondary sources a total of 386 passages were identified that addressed the specific questions presented in this dissertation. Final comments and assessments of the questions and findings of this investigation follows. 196 The Fur Trade Premise

George Hunt (1940) equated the fur trade as the single most important

factor promoting Iroquois attacks against neighboring tribes and Euroamerican colonies during the seventeenth century. Hunt stressed that

the depletion of beaver in Iroquoia in A.D. 1640 was the impetus of these

conflicts, forcing the Iroquois to aggressively and strategically initiate warfare against indigenous opponents to attain beaver pelts in order to acquire

European trade goods. Hunt's premise was evaluated by an analysis of the warfare that occurred during this period and involved documenting against whom and where Iroquois warfare occurred (Chapter 6) and explanations of the causes of the various conflicts (Chapter 7). It was assumed that if Hunt's premise was correct, there would be clear evidence from the Euroamerican and Iroquois reports that the fur trade was the prime mover for war and that Iroquois attacks were aimed at economic targets (e.g., fur trade fleets or enemy hunters).

The results of this investigation, however, indicated that Hunt's premise is not supported by the etfmohistoric record. For example, of the 54 total ethnohistoric passages that reported causes for the various conflicts during the "Beaver Wars", only eight referred to the fur trade or beaver hunting as a cause of warfare. Of these eight passages, five were made by

French administrators (primarily the governors of New France), while the other three were statements made by Iroquois. The French reports clearly stated that it was their opinion that Iroquois warfare with Western Algonkian tribes was motived solely to expand their fur resource base (see pp. 182-183). It

197 is these statements that Hunt and fur trade supporters mimic with their current fur trade premise. The Iroquois statements contrast sharply with the

French in that they do not indicate a premeditated plan to make war to enlarge their fur resources, but instead indicate their concern over Western Algonkian attacks on their hunters within Iroquois territory. It is these attacks and intrusions on areas the Iroquois considered their territory, ie.,

"[t]hey came to hunt Beavers upon our [emphasis added] Lands" (Thwaites

1905: 82), that provoked the Iroquois to counter Western Algonkian aggression.

The most striking contradiction to Hunt's premise is that 46 ethnohistoric passages from A.D. 1649 to 1701 do not cite the fur trade as a cause for Iroquois warfare, but rather point to traditional motives for war such as revenge, prestige, and defensive reactions to aggression. Of the 23 accounts given by the Iroquois, including the three that refer to beaver hunting, none indicated that warfare was made to attain beavers or to enlarge a fur resource base. All of the causes reported by the Iroquois refer to making war on enemies for the purpose of revenge in response to having been attacked or having their peace representatives killed or captured. Another significant fact is that a total of seven French accounts, representing the largest percentage of French passages that report a specific cause, indicate the same explanations as the Iroquois for the various conflicts. These French passages were made by the Jesuits and lower ranking officers or soldiers of

New France. It was these individuals who were more representative of the common public's perception of the war, and in the case of the Jesuits, actually lived or had close contact with the Iroquois. In these dissenting French views

198 the Iroquois are depicted as waging war for revenge or defensive reasons,

while the French ruling class and merchants (the fur traders), was described as

wanting war in order to eliminate the Iroquois as a fur trade competitor.

The first ethnohistoric passage that refers to the fur trade as a cause for

Iroquois warfare does not appear until A.D. 1681 and was made by a French government official. This date is significant, for it was a time in which the

Iroquois were heavily involved in a war with the Illinois, Miami, and Shawnee. These tribes had only recently become engaged in trade with the

French, during the 1670s. In fact, the growth of the French fur trade did not reach its peak until the 1670s and 1680s, when they expanded westward and made contact with Western Algonkian tribes in the Illinois region. The participation of these Western Algonkian tribes in the fur trade may explain why the Iroquois began to complain of these tribes invading Iroquois territory to hunt beavers and kill their (Iroquois) hunters. Since the French relied heavily upon the Western Algonkians for furs, Iroquois counterattacks on these tribes endangered the French fur economy. To the French administration and merchant class the Iroquois became a serious threat and were considered a competitor. The French ruling class of the 1670s and 1680s suggest that the Iroquois thought and waged war like Europeans. It is interesting to note that before the 1670s the French cited traditional motives for Iroquois warfare and only changed their reasoning for Iroquois warfare when it threatened French fur resources. Iroquois explanations for warfare, however, did not change throughout the seventeenth century.

199 In addition to analyzing passages that reported causes of Iroquois

warfare, battles with the various enemies were studied to see what the

Iroquois targeted during combat. This was to determine if Iroquois attacks

focused on economic objects such as fur trade fleets or enemy hunters. If most of the Iroquois attacks were aimed at fur related targets, this would

support Hunt's premise and question the accuracy of the Iroquois and

dissenting French passages which advocated traditional motives for war. The

ethnohistoric evidence, however, does not point to an Iroquois warfare strategy based on economics. Out of 332 reported battles, only four were attacks on enemy groups with fur trade items. This represents only 1% of all reported battles, an extremely small percentage. Brandao (1997), who looked at the same question in a larger time frame (A.D. 1603 to 1701), found similar results, with only 20 out of 465 reported battles involved furs or trade items, or only 2.5% of aU engagements. As Brandao points out, when these specific battles are analyzed further it is found that although furs or trade items were present in the enemy group, there could have been various other reasons for the Iroquois attack. In the four cases identified in this dissertation, three were against large Ottawa trade fleets that were returning from Montreal and one was against a French trading group bringing trade goods and arms to the

Illinois and Miami. The Iroquois attacks on the Ottawa were probably not trade related since they were minor skirmishes resulting in the deaths and capture of only a few Ottawa and no trade goods were reported captured.

Although the Ottawa possessed trade items, these attacks could easily be interpreted as attacks on an enemy for revenge and prestige, or as Brandao suggests, to attain adoptees. Only the attack on the French trading party in

A.D. 1682 (NYCD 9:171) can be clearly interpreted as a deliberate action to take

200 trade goods. However, this event did not involve furs and the Iroquois readily explained that their reasons for seizing the French trade items was because the French were openly conveying arms to Iroquois enemies (see p.

188) Tliis attack also was not plaimed, being a fortuitous encounter by an

Iroquois raiding part}- on their way to attack the Illinois and Miami. The

Iroquois discover)/^ of French traders and their reaction was not surprising, but exhibits a concern over security rather than an economic objective.

Who the Iroquois attacked was also considered in evaluating the role of economic factors. As Hunt (194Ü) and his followers stress, the fur trade turned indigenous tribes into competitors for a limited resource. If economics was an important factor there should be evidence of the Iroquois attacking tribes actively engaged in the fur trade. While it is clear that the

Huron and St. Lawrence Algonkians were heavily involved in the fur trade, most of the recorded enemies of the Iroquois between A.D. 1649 and 1701 were not significant participants. For example, the Neutral, Erie, and Tobacco did not actively trade with Euroamericans. To the south and east there were limited fur resources, yet serious wars occurred against the Susquehannock and New England Indians. Even if the Huron and St. Lawrence Algonkians were economic competitors, by the 1640s they had probably run out of beaver in their own territory (Trigger 1976), much like the Iroquois, eliminating their dispersal or defeat as economically motivated. This is an interesting paradox to the fur trade premise and brings me to the important question of when or if beaver supplies ran out in Iroquoia.

201 The year A.D. 1640 is significant for the fur trade premise because Hunt indicated this was the year in which the Iroquois ran out of beaver in

Iroquoia, forcing them to attain furs elsewhere. The problem with this date is that Hunt and liis followers have furnished no documentation or statistics on how many beaver were being hunted in Iroquoia in the first half of the seventeenth cenfur}\ He also neglects to document the amount of furs traded to the Dutch by the Iroquois or any citations to passages by the Dutch, English or French that might indicate that the Iroquois had run out of furs at this point. After carefully reading the primary ethnohistoric sources. Hunt's book, and the texts of subsequent followers of the the fur trade premise (Abler 1992;

Bradley 1987; Derosiers 1947; Fenton 1940; H unt 1940; Goldstein 1969; Groulx

1976; Jennings 1984; Lanctot 1960; Lenig 1971; McDwain 1915; N orton 1974; Richter 1983, 1992; Tanner 1987; Tooker 1963), I found that no evidence exists that the Iroquois over hunted and ran out of furs by A.D. 1640. Brandao, who has also looked at this question, came to a similar conclusion.

"It seems incredible that the question of whether the Iroquois had furs or not, so crucial to the Beaver Wars interpretation, rests on such spurious reasoning and 'evidence.' Admittedly, the wealth of the Iroquois fur supply is difficult to estabUsh. The Iroquois kept no records, and detailed statistics on the early Dutch fur trade do not exist. However, that no Dutch authority' on record complained about lack of Iroquois furs, and that the French made this claim only after 1670—and even then it is suspect— speaks volumes about the inadequacy of this as a goal of Iroquois warfare before 1670" (Brandao 1997: 85).

What records do exist on the intake of furs at Fort Orange were analyzed by Brandao, who also provided a table demonstrating the actual number of furs accepted annually (Brandao 1997: 86). This limited amount of information exliibits no anomalies that would indicate the Iroquois

202 exhausted their fur resource base. In fact, since the Dutch, and later English

sources did not record what proportion of furs individual tribes brought in,

they can be of little value in determining beaver populations in sub regions of the Northeast. It appears that Hunt did not rely on arcliival passages related

to the fur trade to support his assertion, but rather relied on the increased

number of Iroquois attacks against the Huron and Algonkians in the 1640s as an indicator that the Iroquois had run out of furs in their own territory.

Another problem with the fur trade premise is that neither Hunt nor

the ethnohistoric record related how many furs the Iroquois needed annually

to satisfy their trade needs. Whether this question can ever be answered is

unknown, but determining the number of beavers the Iroquois needed in a year would help to estimate how long it took beaver populations to become

exhausted in a certain sized terri to r)'^. This line of questioning may also help

determine how much territory was needed to meet the demands of a group of

tribes with the population size of the Iroquois (approximately 10,000 people).

It is too often assumed that the Iroquois and other tribes over-hunted areas

and took little notice or care in conserving their fur resources. Yet there are passages that indicate that the Iroquois were concerned about preserving their beaver supply. For example, in A.D. 1684 the Iroquois reported that the

Illinois and Miami had trespassed on their lands and "came to hunt Beavers

upon our Lands; and contrary to the custom of all the Savages, have carried of whole Stocks, both Male and Female" (Thwaites 1905: 82). This statem ent implies that the Iroquois and possibly other tribes did practice some type of conservation strategy during hunting, presumably killing male beavers only

203 so as not to exhaust their beaver supply. Hunt and his followers do not consider this possibility.

Another consideration related to the fur trade question is that due to the military success the Iroquois experienced in the 1650s and lôôüs, they were able to greatly enlarge their territorial claims. The acquisition of lands in the

Southern Ontario Peninsula, the area north of Lake Ontario, the Lower

Michigan Peninsula, and areas along the southern coasts of Lake Erie and

Lake Michigan more than quadrupled the previous hunting resource base the

Iroquois had traditionally utilized. Although at this time there is no guide to know how many furs the Iroquois population needed to satisfy their trade needs, it is tempting to suggest this vast amount of land more than met their hunting needs. It is important to note that after the Iroquois acquired access to this large resource base there are no ethnohistoric passages which indicate that the Iroquois complained of not having enough land to hunt on. In all likelihood the Iroquois could not utilize all of tliis area and there are indications that they focused their hunting at specific locales. For example,

French and English sources (JR 53: 11; JR 54: 117; NYCD 4: 597; NYCD 9: 80, 299, 464) cite the Southern Ontario Peninsula and lands north of T ake Ontario as the "usual hunting ground of the Iroquois" (NYCD 9: 641). Another favored Iroquois hunting area was the Lower Michigan Peninsula, particularly around Detroit (NYCD 4: 900; NYCD 9: 646). With lands available in the Illinois region and Upper Ohio River Valley, it is unlikely that the

Iroquois had to continue to expand their fur resource base because of a shortage of furs. Wars with the Susquehannock and New England Indians, tribes living in areas not noted for quality fur bearing animals and/or over

204 hunted, would not have been a wise economic objective. However, according

to fur trade advocates and French officials in the 1680s, the Iroquois needed to

expand their fur resource base. This supposed need for more fur resources has not been demonstrated with any evidence and contradicts existing

ethnohistoric evidence. Both the French and Iroquois readily admitted that the war that developed between the Illinois, Miami, and Shawnee, and the

Iroquois was a result of the Illinois and Miami encroaching on Iroquois

hunting territories and killing Iroquois hunters (see p. 189-191). These

passages indicated that beaver populations were doing well in Iroquois

territory, particularly since the Iroquois enemies were coming on Iroquois

lands to hunt.

The documentary evidence of a connection between economics and the

start of warfare for indigenous populations is tenuous at best. In fact, in the case of the Iroquois, the only time that economics played a role in warfare was as a means to help negotiate peace with potential enemies. For example, in

the 1670s, 1680s and 1690s the Iroquois initiated peace negotiations with the

Michilimackinac tribes, and as an incentive promised to allow the Ottawa, Huron and later even the Miami free access to trade at Albany (NYCD 5: 76;

NYCD 9: 84, 95,117, 275, 465, 672, 793). This type of behavior, using economics to establish ties of friendship with competitors, runs directly counter to the assumptions of the fur trade premise, which stipulates that economics served to motivate aggression, not peace. 1 he act of war itself was a detriment to the fur trade. Both the Dutch and English complained that when the Iroquois went to war the trade in furs plummeted (Brandao 1997; 54).

205 With the above facts in mind. Hunt's fur trade premise clearly has little

or no supporting evidence, leading one to ask why it has gained such

prominence as an explanatory model for Iroquois warfare. The answer lies perhaps in the fact that the fur trade premise is grounded within an

Euroamerican perception, which projects European economic goals and

values upon an indigenous population. Even though the Iroquois had their own perspective on how warfare was caused during the seventeenth century,

their explanations have been ignored or considered deceptive and replaced

with functional European economic explanations. While it is possible that

some of the Iroquois explanations may have been exaggerated or misleading,

there is no reason why the Iroquois should have lied about the causes of their

conflicts in order to hide their true economic motives. The arrogance and

confidence that the Iroquois exliibited in many of their wars of the second

half of the seventeenth centuiy makes it highly unlikely that they would be

ashamed to admit that they were simply attacking their neighbors because they needed furs, were this the case. It is more probable that the Iroquois

actually did describe their own reasons for the wars they fought. The French,

in the same manner, used their own cultural values to interpret warfare with the Iroquois. The French, like the Iroquois, recognized when warfare was

fought for prestige, revenge or honor, wfvich were causal factors that often characterized European conflicts of the time. However, the French view of economics was not similar to the Iroquois. To them the fur trade provided a chance for an increase in profits, as opposed to the Iroquois, who saw furs as a means to attain desired trade goods for utilitarian purposes. Hunt's fur trade premise ignores these distinctions and the opposing viewpoints and as

Trelease (1962) pointed out, he expected us to accept the notion that

206 traditional indigenous motivations and patterns of war were instantly transformed to economic goals with contact. It was clear throughout the ethnohistoric resources that this was not the case.

In evaluating the fur trade premise as an explanatory model for the cause of the "Beaver Wars", 1 found many contradictions and many answers. The majority of Hunt's assertions are not corroborated by ethnohistoric evidence and are essentially unproven assumptions. Wliile a few biased

French passages, made by the French ruling class, seem to support Hunt's opinions, the overwhelming majority of ethnohistoric passages that reported causes of Iroquois warfare point to traditional indigenous motives for war.

Analysis of who and what the Iroquois attacked during the "Beaver Wars" also exhibited a traditional pattern of warfare, not one based on economic objectives. In fact, the only participants in the "Beaver Wars" who appeared to fit Hunt's expectations were the French, during the 168Us and 1690s, whose motives were clearly related to their own economic concerns. To conclude, the fur trade premise was found untenable and not based on atiy concrete evidence nor is it considered helpful in interpreting Iroquois motives for war during the second half of the seventeenth century. Unfortunately, the continued unverified acceptance of fur trade explanations for Iroquois warfare by Iroquoian scholars has done a disservice to understanding an indigenous people's history. Perhaps, as the ethnohistoric record reflects, we should take another look at traditional indigenous motives for why the Iroquois went war.

207 Prestige and Defensive Warfare

It was argued using the ideas of the Handicap Principle (Zahavi and

Zahavi 1997) as a guide that some of the warfare the Iroquois participated in during the "Beaver Wars” was motivated by prestige associated with super­ territories or because of the capture or killing of peace representatives.

Iroquois warfare was also analyzed to ascertain if any of the "Beaver Wars" were defensive reactions. Each of these subjects is addressed below.

Zahavi and Zahavi suggest that territories are defended not just to protect food resources but also because of the prestige is associated with territory. When humans attain more land than is needed for subsistence purposes, it was argued for the purposes of tliis dissertation that humans would fight to hold on to this land because of the additional prestige associated with this super-territory. In the case of the Iroquois their territorial claims were greatly enlarged between A.D. 1650 and 1684 because of the military victories they experienced (Figure 7). The ethnohistoric record is very clear on the Iroquois attitude toward this land, which they believed was exclusively owned by them through their conquest of the previous occupants

(e.g., NYCL) 4; 908, 909). The Iroquois view ed this territory as com m unally owned by all members of their tribes, as opposed to the Euroamerican concept of ownerslup characterized by individual property owners. However, both the Iroquois and Euroamericans recognized clear boundaries to their territories and exclusive rights to that land unless persmission for its use was granted to another.

208 As commented on previously, the territory the Iroquois claimed in the late seventeenth century was more than adequate to serve the subsistence needs of their small population (approximately 10,000 people). This area also apparently provided enough beaver for the fur trade, since the Iroquois had no complaints of being short of furs and were practicing conservation techniques. In fact, beaver were doing so well in Iroquois territor}' that other tribes were drawn to this area to hunt. Many of these tribes were former enemies of the Iroquois and trespassing provided an opportunity to kill any

Iroquois hunters that were met along the way. Because of the great distance from supplies and reinforcements, Iroquois hunters and families were at risk of attack from Western Algonkian tribes, who had formed alliances and were trading for weapons with the French.

Even though it may have been safer to let go of some of their vast holdings the Iroquois continued to lay claim to these lands and took action to resist the continued encroachments. However, the Iroquois response differed from tribe to tribe. For example, with the N^Iiclrilimackinac tribes (the Ottawa and Huron), the Iroquois tried to settle difficulties through peaceful charme Is. The Michilimackinac tribes had been at peace with the Iroquois for over nine years and had not killed any Iroquois hunters. A joint use of hunting areas could have been possible since the Iroquois had not lost any prestige.

However, in the case of the Illinois and later the Miami, this was not possible, since these tribes had actively killed Iroquois hunters, which was considered a severe loss in prestige in Iroquois culture and demanded retaliation in order to regain the lost status. This need for revenge was emphasized in Iroquois remarks on the cause of warfare with the Illinois and Miami (see pp. 189-191).

209 Another consideration, although impossible to confirm, is that the Iroquois probably realized that if they did not retaliate but relinquished some of their

lands to the west, the Illinois may view them as weak and would only be

encouraged to advance farther eastward to hunt and/or kill more Iroquois.

The question of whether prestige was associated with Iroquois land

claims is confirmed. 1 he Iroquois tried to defend tfiis large super-territory and for a time were successful. This gave them great prestige and elevated

their status among other tribes and the Euroamerican colonies. Because of

their perceived power, the English made the Iroquois one of their most

important indigenous allies, and promised and regularly sent them gifts of ammunition, arms, and trade goods (NYGD 3: 774, 842; NYCD 9: .320). The

downside of this last conflict of the "Beaver Wars" is that the French, St.

Lawrence Indians, and Michilimackinac tribes were brought into the war

against the Iroquois. Heavily outnumbered, the Iroquois continued to try to defend their vast land claims but suffered several setbacks and in the end

were forced to relinquish control of many of their western lands to the

Western Algonkians. However, because the Iroquois did not lose this war, rather it ended in a stalemate, the Iroquois were able to retain the right to hunt in their former territories, even though other tribes resided in them.

The second question related to prestige was its association with

Iroquois peace representatives. Peace representatives possess high prestige because they acted as a representative of the Iroquois and because they went

unprotected into the hands of the enemy. As evidenced in the ethnolristoric record, it was typically important leaders within the League who took on the

210 role of a peace ambassador. This was partly because of the prestige, respect

and danger involved with the role, but also if an enemy was to believe the

sincerity of a peace attempt they would expect important leaders to be

involved in the process. It was predicted tliat because of the importance

associated with this office that the killing of peace representatives was an

offense serious enough to start a war, or if the warfare was ongoing, it would

result in the intensification of Iroquois attacks against the transgressors. Table

11 shows the major conflicts that occurred during the "Beaver Wars" and

indicates whether Iroquois peace representatives were killed. The impact that

aggression towards Iroquois peace representatives had during the various

conflicts of the "Beaver Wars" should not be overlooked, since every major conflict during this period (100%) was either started or intensified by the

capture or killing of Iroquois peace ambassadors.

The results of killing Iroquois peace representatives begs the question of why various tribes and the f rench risked starting or intensif^'ing warfare with the Iroquois. For example, the Huron killed Iroquois peace ambassadors

twice in the early 1650s, even though they were losing the war with the Iroquois and knew what the result of their actions might entail. One obvious explanation for the Huron's actions is that unarmed Iroquois provided easy targets, and by killing these representatives the Huron could attain revenge and make the Iroquois lose face, something they had not been able to do in battle. Tribes that had not experienced recent warfare with the Iroquois (e.g., the Abenaki and New England Indians) or were holding their own against the Iroquois (e.g., the Susquehannock) had no incentives for peace and may, for prestige purposes, have wished to provoke a war or mock the Iroquois.

211 The Jesuits often reported in the 1650s and 1660s that the Iroquois had become overconfident, considering themselves superior fighters than other tribes, if the Jesuits knew this, the Iroquois enemies certainly did and killing peace representatives was an opportunity to humble them.

In any case, when Iroquois peace representatives were captured and/or killed, the Iroquois not only lost face but also suffered the loss of some of their well respected leaders. This accentuated the need for revenge since only through striking back could the Iroquois regain respect. This need to revenge the attacks on their peace representatives was stressed in the reported explanations the Iroquois gave for many of the conflicts of the "Beaver Wars" and was echoed by many European observers (see Chapter 7). The attacks on Iroquois peace representatives also challenges the Traditional and Revisionist claims that the Iroquois were the sole aggressors in the so-called "Beaver

Wars". It is interesting to note that in contrast to the Iroquois enemies' treatment of Iroquois peace embassies, the Iroquois rarely mistreated peace representatives from other tribes. Only two cases were found in which the Iroquois killed or captured enemy peace representatives (JR 54: 75; NYCD 4:

214) and this occurred only after the particular groups (Susquehannock and

French) had done likewise to Iroquois embassies.

The impact of prestige on Iroquois warfare during the various conflicts of the "Beaver Wars" took on an important role in uniting an entire tribe or the League against an enemy. Although it was the capture or killing of Iroquois peace ambassadors that often precipitated or intensified wars and resulted in aggressive counterattacks (e.g., the La Chine attack), large scale

212 warfare could also be initiated by the killing of a single individual, particularly if he/she was a well known leader of one of the League tribes.

There are at least two conflicts in which this either contributed to or was the primary cause of hostilities. One of these conflicts was the Micltilimackiiiac affair (A.D. 1681 to 1683), where a greatly beloved Seneca war captain was killed by an Illinois in an Ottawa village. The entire League rallied together over his death and launched a major attack against the offending tribes. The second example was the Erie capture and torture of a well respected

Onondaga. This action, according to the Jesuits, sealed the Erie's fate, unifying the Iroquois against them in an all or nothing war of revenge.

Prestige and/or revenge were important elements of every major conflict of the "Beaver Wars". The majority of these wars were with traditional enemies who likewise used prestige and revenge as important motivators (Table 11). The most significant conflicts of the "Beaver Wars" were those characterized by traditional motives and ancient enmities. There is no evidence to suggest that Iroquois aggression or reaction to aggression during the early Historic Period changed from traditional motives to ones influenced by economics.

The ethnohistoric record also revealed that the majority of the conflicts in the "Beaver Wars" were initiated by the Iroquois opponents. Of the nine major conflicts fought during the "Beaver Wars", only one, the French,

Algonkian, and Huron War of A.D. 1657 to 1666 was precipitated by an initial

Iroquois attack. This evidence does not support the notion that the Iroquois were desperate to start combat with their neighbors. It appears that Iroquois

213 warfare was based on defensive reactions to the aggression of their enemies. However, once a conflict was started the Iroquois aggressively implemented an offensive warfare strategy. As Table 10 denotes, the Iroquois initiated far more individual engagements than their opponents. Tire disproportional numbers indicated on this table have nothing to do with who started various conflicts of the "Beaver Wars" but has everything to do with efficient and planned battle tactics. It is the large numbers of Iroquois initiated engagements during these wars that has probably led Revisionists to wrongly assume that the Iroquois were always the aggressors.

Battle Tactics and New Technology

Another goal of this dissertation was to analyze and describe how the

Iroquois used and incorporated new technology in their battle tactics and how their warfare strategy evolved over time. While it has been demonstrated that traditional Iroquois motives for warfare did not change, the weapons and strategies they used in war did. The Iroquois possessed a decided advantage over most other tribes in the Northeast with their relative easy access to F.uroamerican trade items. They were located within close proximity to the

Dutch with whom they traded for large quantities of guns. When it came to guns, other colonies (e.g., the French and English), were much less lenient to neighboring tribes and forbade the trade or selling of muskets to them, most of whom were the enemies of the Iroquois. However, the acquisition of guns and iron implements of war did not assure victory, particularly against such powerful opponents as the Huron, Erie or Neutral. Tlie dramatic victories the Iroquois achieved over many of their traditional enemies was based on

214 the combined use of innovative battle strategies, new weapons, and the use of adoption. I his success invigorated the Iroquois confidence and allowed them to envision the possibility of defeating their old enemies. When Champlain described the Iroquois in tire 1600s and 1610s he depicted a population on the defensive, which had suffered a series of devastating defeats and an invasion and attack on one of their main villages. The Iroquois of the 1640s and 1650s were a far different story. They bore new weapons, used various battle tactics in attacking their foes and were on the offensive, launching an ever increasing barrage of effective attacks on their enemies' home territories.

There were several key factors to the Iroquois good fortune in war during the second half of the seventeenth century. 1 hese factors included their possession of new technological weapons, the use of battle tactics that highlighted the strengths of these new weapons, and enemies that had become predictable and slow to counter the new offensive tactics the Iroquois used against them. Guns gave the Iroquois a distinct advantage during surprise attacks, causing panic or confusion at the onset of an attack even against tribes knowledgeable of its use. Guns severely curtailed the ability of an enemy to dodge the projectile and increased the ability of the Iroquois to inflict death or injury. The Iroquois could still attempt to "dodge the arrow" or use armor/sfiields since most of their enemies still used traditional weapons. Guns were also probably effective against indigenous palisades, particularly in penetrating the upper portions of the wall where defenders were stationed, which presumably was only protected by a single palisade curtain. Champlain mentions that the Iroquois specifically reinforced their platform areas against gunfire; however, the Jesuits made no mention of the

215 Huron doing so to their village defenses, leaving their defenders more vulnerable to attack. Champlain also pointed out that the Huron villages, although fortified, were not as well constructed as Iroquois fortifications, and as Heidenreich (1971) indicated, they were not constructed to anticipate the ferocity’ and overwhelming numbers the Iroquois suddenly unleashed upon them in A.D. 1648 and 1649.

One battle tactic that increased dramatically in use throughout the

"Beaver Wars" was the hit and run raid. I'hese type of raids typically reüed on small numbers of warriors (from 2 to 50), but sometimes could involve several hundred men. Tlie Iroquois concentrated on surprising their enemies in ambushes outside of their villages or particularly along transportation routes. A significant factor in the success of this tactic was the predictability of their enemies, and in this the fur trade and the presence of the French played a major role. Both the Huron and St. Lawrence

Algonkians actively traded or visited the French settlements (Quebec,

Montreal, and Three Rivers) and some encamped or removed their villages adjacent to the French. The French settlements became a magnet for various tribes who relied exclusively on the canoe for transportation. In this fact the

Iroquois enemies became predictable, for there were only two major river routes that could be utilized, the Ottawa River and St. Lawrence River. The vulnerabilit}' of canoe travel was certainly recognized by the Iroquois, providing them opportunities to fire from protective cover in ambushes set along river banks while defenders in canoes were in the open and unprotected. In these situations, a small attacking force could successfully defeat much larger forces. Guns, loaded with shot or even chain, were used

216 to injure/kill several opponents at once and were also used to sink canoes, effectively causing a defender to be completely helpless (Benn 1991; Otterbein

1964).

The Iroquois were successful in killing/capturing a large number of their enemies through the use of hit and run raids, which they employed during their wars with the French, Huron, St. Lawrence Indians, and Western

Algonkians. During these wars, the Iroquois saturated areas surrounding their enemies' villages with raiding parties and effectively blockaded transportation routes, restricting the flow of supplies between the French and their Indian allies. Hit and rtm raids were an efficient strategy because they typically had a high potential to result in heavy casualties for the defender and had a low risk of casualties for the attacker. The Iroquois used these raids year round and put most of their enemies on the defensive. The constant threat of attack may explain why most of the Iroquois enemies did not attempt to organize a similar strategy. Those that did, such as the

Susquehannock, New England Indians, and the French and French Indian allies in the 1690s, were effective in countering Iroquois attacks.

Another tactic that was paramount in the Iroquois victories over their Iroquoian speaking neighbors in the 1650s was the use of direct assaults against fortified villages. In these attacks large numbers of warriors (500 to

1,500 warriors) were focused against an enemy village in an attempt to destroy it and/or capture its occupants. In these tactics the Iroquois used their new weapons: guns and iron hatchets. The iron hatchet greatly accelerated the time to make a breach in a palisade wall. The Iroquois assaults on

217 fortifications incorporated the innovative use of protective shields, which

allowed the Iroquois to gain access to the base of the palisades in order to

employ their hatchets. No longer did the Iroquois have to rely on the

traditional tactic of placing fire along tlie defensive walls of villages, wlûch

typically were well defended against such tactics. The success the Iroquois

experienced using these tjpe of assault tactics in .A..D. 1648 and 1649 was phenomenal, resulting in the destruction of four Huron villages and high

numbers of casualties and captives. The use of direct assaults against villages was continued against other opponents, and for a decade the indigenous

enemies of the Iroquois had no defensive response. Iroquois enemies such as

the Neutral, l obacco, and brie had no conception of flanked defenses and as a

result their fortifications were obsolete when confronted with the new

offensive tactics. Tlie Iroquois enemies were also unable or chose not to

launch similar ty pe assaults against Iroquois villages. While these assault

tactics often resulted in hea\^' casualties for both sides, the Iroquois offset this with lenient adoption policies, allowing them to recoup their losses (Rrandao

1997). The Iroquois enemies, however, did not recover their losses because

they did not or rarely tried to attack and capture Iroquois individuals or

villages inside Iroquoia, and had no or few adoptees flowing into their

populations (two exceptions are the Susquehannock War and French and French allied Indian War during the 1690s). This meant that the Iroquois

maintained or increased their warrior strength throughout the "Beaver

Wars" while their enemies saw their populations weaken.

An important reason for the Iroquois success in attacks against villages and/or enemy groups was their use of large numbers of warriors in major

218 attacks. In every significant conflict of the "Beaver Wars" the Iroquois

organized at least one attack in which 5ÜÜ to 1,500 warriors were involved.

Generally at least one large scale attack was used annually against an enemy wliile the rest of the attacks were liit and run raids. In all, the Iroquois used a

total of 500+ warriors 16 times in the various conflicts (representing 7% of

their attacks) of the "Beaver Wars". For this time period and regional area, an organized contingent of 500+ men was considered a very large attacking force

and termed an army by European writers of the time. The French who had a

similar population size as the Iroquois could only rarely and with great effort

and expense raise a like number of men for offensive campaigns. For

comparison the French were only able to send 500+ men in expeditions

against the Iroquois four times. The French, unlike the Iroquois (e.g., A.D.

1649 invasion of Huronia, and La Cliine) were rarely able to use such large

numbers of men in surprise attacks (one exception was the A.D. 1693 attack on the Mohawk villages).

The ability to organize such large numbers of warriors was not imitated

by the Iroquois indigenous enemies. I here were no accounts indicating that

any indigenous opponents successfully organized 500+ warriors in an attack

on the Iroquois during the "Beaver Wars". Although the Western

Algonkian tribes and St. Lawrence tribes often united and as a result outnumbered the Iroquois, they were not able to efficiently organize large numbers of warriors for joint offensive campaigns. In fact, the Western

Algonkians were not successful in organizing 500+ numbers of men for offensive engagements until the 1750s to 1790s (e.g., the French Indian War,

Lord Dunmore's War, and the Indian Wars [e.g., St. Clair's defeat]). The

219 ability of five independent tribes to organize such a large number of men in collective operations has led some scholars to suggest that the formation of the League was not just a "peaceful" defensive mechanism (as Dennis [1993] stipulates), but may have helped facilitate the abUity to formulate and conduct offensive objectives (Brandao 1997). Unfortunately, since military tactics have largely been ignored by Iroquoian scholars as a topic of study, how the Iroquois were able to organize such a large number of men for arranged attacks over large geographical regions has yet to be addressed. There is little doubt that the Iroquois ability to organize large numbers of men coupled with new weapons and innovative battle tactics is what enabled them to achieve their victories.

Finally, another mitigating factor of Iroquois successes in war was the prestige and respect they attained when defeating and/or dispersing an enemy

(e.g., the Huron, Neutral or Erie). As Golden (1922) and the Jesuits pointed out in their writings, as enemy after enemy was defeated the confidence and arrogance of the Iroquois grew. As military' strategists can attest (Brice 1984;

Mahan 1968) any attacking or defending force that has confidence during a war increases their chances of winning an engagement or conflict.

Final Comments

The results of this dissertation differ from the prevalent interpretations on why the Iroquois conducted warfare during the so called "Beaver Wars" of the second half of the seventeenth century. This research revealed that the motives for Iroquois warfare were intricate and exliibited variation

220 preventing the application of universal explanatory models as prime movers, i his study agrees with the recent findings of Brandao (1997) that very little evidence exists to support the validity of the fur trade premise. Contrary to

Hunt's and Revisioiiist expectations the Iroquois did not at the onset of A.D.

1640 attack surrounding tribes and the French all at once in order to attain fur resources. The "Beaver Wars" was not one long war involving a multitude of enemies, but rather it represents a series of distinct conflicts, each with its own unique cause(s). The term "Beaver Wars" is a misnomer that wrongly implies, despite the lack of proof, the wars fought by the Iroquois between

A.D. 1649 and 1701 were collectively fought over fur resources. This term should be dropped from use for it inaccurately implies a motive for the indigenous populations that participated in these conflicts. In addition to the lack of evidence for the use of this term, it is made even more spurious by the fact that its introduction was done without including interpretations of the

Iroquois, Jesuits, and ordinary: French citizens. Their perspectives suggest that the Iroquois fought wars for traditional motives, such as prestige or revenge, and that these wars were founded on ancient hatreds that were ingrained into their culture. The Iroquois desire to destroy their enemies was realized with their attainment of Euroamerican weapons, their ability to organize large numbers of men for defense and offense, lenient adoption practices, and the implementation of newly invented battle tactics. We can depict and contribute to indigenous liistory fairly oiüy if we consider all these perspectives and alternate explanations that are offered in the ethnohistoric record.

221 Unlike other histories and studies on Iroquois warfare (except Brandao

1997), this investigation imparted actual counts, statistics, maps, and tables concerning the location and number of recorded battles and casualties. This dissertation is the first study to gather and present ethnohistoric passages that report causes of Iroquois warfare during the second half of the seventeenth centur}'. Comparable studies may be conducted on the same topic to see if similar interpretations can be found. Passages concerning warfare that were overlooked, and relevant primary or secondary sources that were not used in this study may result in the refutation, confirmation, or refining of portions of the conclusions presented in this dissertation. This study can provide an interesting contrast for studies on causes of Iroquois warfare in the eighteenth century. It is hoped that the new ideas that were presented have broadened our understanding of the wars the Iroquois fought during the seventeenth century and inspirit further research by anthropologists and historians on this little understood topic.

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244 Sub-Region 1649 to 1659 1660.toJL669 1670101679 1680 to 1701 K !k N.

Canadian Interior 4 (3%) 7 (11%) 1 (6%) 2 (2%)

Great Lakes 2 (2%) 2 (3%) 4 (25%) 12 (10%)

Illinois and Mississippi 0 0 1 (6%) 9 (7%) River Valley X Iroquoia 4 8 (12%) 1 20 (3%) (6%) (16%) H > g New England ______:0 ______:3 ___(5%) 1 :z:(6%) ___ :2 ____(2%) g Saint Lawrence River Valley 80 (67%) 27 (42%) 1 (6%) 55 (45%)

Southern Ontario Peninsula 13 (11%) 0 0 8 (6.5%) »nHH Susquehanna and 3 (2.5%) 7 (11%) 4 (25%) 4 (3%) O Delaware River C

The Ohio River Valley 0 3 (5%) 0 5 (4%)

The South 0 0 0 1 (1%)

continued on next page

Table 1. Number and percentage of recorded battles per sub-region between A.D. 1649 and 1701. Recorded battles are divided by designated time periods. Table 1 (continued)

Sub-Region 1649 to 1659 1660 to 1669 1670 to 1679 1680 to 1701 K %. H %. K %. K %.

Virginia and Southeast 0 2 (3%) 0 4 (3%)

Western New York 2 (2%) 0 0 0

Unknown (location not given, 9 6 3 10 not totaled in regional %)

ON Category Catagory No.

D em oeraphv 10 Population 11 Composition of Population 12 M ortality 13 D isease 14 Immigration or Emigration 15

Economics 20 Trade 21 Competition for Resources 22

G eography 30 Location of Villages 31 Location of Hunting Territory 32 Land Claims 33

History and Culture Change 40 Traditional History of a Behayior (Oral Legends) 41 •Acculturation and Culture Contact 42

Intergroup Relations 50 Friendships 51 Enemies 52

Political Behavior 60 E xploitation 61 Factionalism 62 Treaties 63 Leadership and Control over other Ethnic Groups 64

W arfare 70 Strategy 71 T actics 72 Logistics 73 Aftermath of Conflict 74 Peacemaking 75

Miscellaneous 80

Table 2. Data set categories, showing main and sub-catagories in which ethnohistoric information was placed for analysis.

247 Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

3/16/1649 1000-1200 Iroq. 2 Huron villages destroyed, 200 Iroq. S. Ontario Peninsula JR 34:9,13, 25, 123- vs. Huron killed, 380 Huron killed/captured 137, 213, 217; JR 70: 205

5/30/1649 Iroq. vs. French 1 French captured St. Lawrence (Montreal) JR34:54

6/11/1649 Iroq. vs. Algonkian 14 Algonkians captured St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR34.55

6 /1 1 / 1649 Iroq. vs. Petite Alg. 7 Iroq. killed St. Lawrence JR 34:55

Sum. 1650 Iroq. vs. Huron 8 Huron captured S. Ontario Penin. JR36:119 (Christian Island)

Sum. 1650 30 Iroq. vs. Huron several Huron killed/captured S. Ontario Penin. JR 36:181 (St. Maria Island)

Lt. Sum. 300 Iroq. vs. Huron several Huron captured S. Ontario Penin. JR36:181 1650

Lt. Sum. 300 Iroq. vs. Tobacco 50 Tobacco killed/captured S. Ontario Penin. JR36:181 1650

Fall 1650 1500 or 1600 Iroq. vs. 1 Neutral village destroyed, 200 Iroq. killed S. Ontario Penin. JR36: 13,119, 177 Neutral and Huron

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Table 3. Warfare database for A.D. 1649 to 1701. Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

Fall 1650 Iroq. vs. Huron 27 Iroq. peace am bassadors killed S. Ontario Penin. JR36: 181-189 (St. Maria Island)

Wi 1651 Iroq. vs. Christian 2 Christian Indians captured St. Lawrence JR 36:123 Indians

3/1/1651 40 Iroq. vs. French unknown St. Lawrence (Montreal) JR36; 119

4/1651 Onondaga vs. Huron 100 Huron killed S. Ontario Penin. JR36: 13, 15-16; JR (Christian Island) 37: 105

4/5/1651 Iroq. vs. Huron 2 bands of Huron defeated and captured S. Ontario Penin. JR36: 119 (Christian Island)

4/7/1651 Iroq. vs. Neutral unknown S. Ontario Penin. JR36; 13, 15, 119- 121, 177

4/27/1651 Iroq. vs. French none St. Lawrence JR 36:121

4/1651 3 Iroq. vs. Christian 1 Christ. Indian killed, 1 captured St. Lawrence JR 36:123 Indians

5/6/1651 50 Iroq. vs. French 2 French captured St. Lawrence (Montreal) JR36:125

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

5/10/1651 50 Iroq. vs. French none St. Lawrence (Montreal) JR36: 125

5/11/1651 2 Iroq. vs. French none St. Lawrence (Montreal) |R36: 125

5/14/1651 2 Iroq. vs. Algonkian 2 Mohawks captured St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR36; 123

5/24/1651 10 Iroq. vs. French, 1 French and 1 Huron killed St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR36: 123 and Huron

6/18/1651 50-60 Iroq. vs. French 1 French killed, 1 Iroq. killed St. Lawrence (Montreal) JR36: 133

6/29/1651 5 Iroq. vs. Algonkian 2 Algonkian captured St. Lawrence (Sillery) )R36; 131

6/30/1651 5 Iroq. vs. Algonkian 1 Algonkian captured St. Lawrence JR 36:131

7/4/1651 30 Iroq. vs. unknown unknown JR36: 131 Tangwaonronnons

7/15/1651 Iroq. vs. French and I Huron killed, 1 Huron captured St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR 36:135 Huron

1651 Iroq. vs. Abenaki unknown unknown NYCD 9: 5-6

1651 Iroq. vs. Sokokis unknown unknown NYCD 9: 5-6

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

7/26/1651 60 Iroq. vs. French 1 French killed St. Lawrence (Montreal) JR 36:137

8/16/1651 Iroq. vs. French none St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR36; 137

9/16/1651 Iroq. vs. French 1 French killed St. Lawrence (Quebec) JR36:139

9/1651 Iroq. vs. Neutral 2 Neutral villages destroyed S. Ontario Penin. JR36: 13, 15,141- 143 M 10/25/1651 Iroq. vs. Attlkamegues 20 Attik. captured Canadian Interior JR36; 147; jR 37: 11,67-71

12/4/1651 Iroq. vs. French none St. Lawrence (Quebec) JR36: 149

12/7/1651 Iroq. vs. Tobacco 1 Tobacco village destroyed, many S. Ontario Penin. JR40: 15-19 Tobacco captured

2/17/1652 8 Iroq. vs. Algonkian 1 Algonkian captured, 3 Huron captured St. Lawrence (Montreal) JR37:97 and Huron

2/17/1652 Iroq. vs. Neutral unknown unknown |R 37:97

Early 1652 M ohawk vs. unknown Susquehanna and Delaware JR 37:105 Susquehannock River

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

Early 1652 Iroq. vs. Algonkian 25 Algonkian captured St. Lawrence JR37:93

3/2/1652 Iroq. vs. Algonkian 4 Algonkian and Huron captured St. Lawrence JR37:93 and Huron

3/6/1652 Iroq. vs. Huron Huron squad defeated St. Lawrence JR38:49

5/10/1652 14 Iroq. vs. French 2 French killed or captured St. Lawrence JR37: 99,135,143 NJ ' j i 5/13/1652 14 Iroq. vs. Algonkian I Iroq. killed Canadian Interior JR37:99;JR38: 45- 51

5/15/1652 Iroq. vs. Huron 3 Huron captured St. Lawrence (Montreal) JR38: 51

5/15/1652 50-60 Iroq. vs Algon. Algonkians defeated, casualties unknown St. Lawrence JR37:101

5/16/1652 Iroq. vs. Algon. Algonkians defeated, casualties unknown St. Lawrence JR38: 51

5/21/1652 7-8 Iroq. vs. Algon. 1 Algonkian killed St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR37.101 and French

5/26/1652 30 Iroq. vs. French 1 French killed St. Lawrence (Montreal) JR37: 101-103; JR 38:53

6/3/1652 7 Iroq. vs. French none St. Lawrence JR37: 103

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

6/8/1652 Iroq. vs. Huron 2 Huron killed, 2 Iroq. killed St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR 37:105

6/19/1652 Iroq. vs. Attlkamegues Attlkamegues defeated, casualties unknown Canadian Interior JR38:53

7/2/1652 Mohawks vs. French, 3 Iroq. killed St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR 37:107-111;JR Huron, and Algon. 38: 53-55

7/3/1652 Iroq. vs. 1 Susquehannock village destroyed, Susquehanna and JR37: 111 Susquehannock 1000 Susquehannock captured, 130 Iroq. killed Delaware River? NJ w 7/25/1652 Iroq. vs. 100 Christ. 2 Christ. Indians killed St. Lawrence JR 38: 57 Indians

7/29/1652 2 Iroq. vs. French none St. Lawrence (Montreal) JR 37:115

1652 Iroq. vs. Unknown several of the Unknown tribe are taken S. Ontario Penin. JR37: 113 tribe cap tive

8/7/1652 100-200 Iroq. vs. 1 Huron killed, 1 Algon. killed, and 3 Iroq. unknown JR37: 113 80 Huron and Algon. k illed

8/18/1652 Iroq. vs. 4 French 2 French killed and 2 captured St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR37: 113;JR38:57

8/19/1652 120 Iroq. vs. 40-50 12 French killed and 3 captured St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR37:113-115;JR French 38: 57-59

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

8/19/1652 Iroq. vs. Huron 2 Huron killed St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR37: 113-115; JR 38: 57-59

8/30/1652 Iroq. vs. French, and 1 French and 1 Huron captured St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR37; 115;JR38;61 Huron

9/16/1652 Iroq. vs. French 1 French killed St. Lawrence (Montreal) JR37:119

10/12/1652 Iroq. vs. French and 1 Huron and 2 French killed St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR37:117 Huron

10/14/1652 Iroq. vs. French 1 French killed St. Lawrence (Montreal) JR37:117

11/1/1652 Iroq. vs. French, 2 French killed, and 2 Algonkian captured St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR38:61 and Algonkian

12/17/1652 Iroq. vs. Huron 2 Huron captured St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR38: 169

3/29/1653 20 Iroq. vs. 1 Huron 1 Huron captive St. Lawrence (Quebec) JR38: 171

1653 1,800 Iroq. vs. 120 Iroq. killed and many others probably Great Lakes Kellogg 1968: 98 Potawat., Ottawa, k illed (highly quest, Huron, and Tobacco account)

4 /21/1653 Iroq. vs. 5 Huron 5 Huron captured St. Lawrence JR 38:171

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

5/13/1653 Iroq. vs. French 2 French killed St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR40:101

5/28/1653 20 Iroq. vs. French 1 French killed St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR 38:177: JR 40: 101

5/31/1653 4 Iroq. vs. Huron 3 Iroq. killed and 1 captured St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR 38:177; JR 40: 103

K 6/2/1653 Iroq. vs. French 1 French killed St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR 38: 177 en ______6 /9 /1653 20-30 Iroq. vs. Huron none St. Lawrence JR 38: 177

6/10/1653 Iroq. vs. French 1 French killed and 2 captured St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR 38:175

6/21/1653 Iroq. vs. Christ. Ind. 2 Christ. Indians captured St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR 38:179

7/16/1653 Iroq. vs. Huron 2 Huron captured St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR 38: 191

7/20/1653 Iroq. vs. French 1 French killed St. Lawrence (M ontreal) JR 38: 183

8/20/1653 Iroq. vs. French 2 French captured St. Lawrence (Quebec) JR 38: 191; JR 40: 119

8/21/1653 17 Iroq. vs. 30 Huron 1 Iroq. killed and 4 captured, 4 Huron capt. St. Lawrence (M ontreal) JR38: 12-13, 189- 191

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

8/22/1653 500-600 Mohawk vs. 2 Iroq. killed St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR38: 13, 191-193; French and Huron JR40:10-11,97, 103-117, 257

Spring 1654 Iroq. vs. Unknown Ind. Iroquois defeat the unknown tribe Great Lakes JR41:10,81-83, 113

6/1654 Iroq. vs. Erie 1 Seneca village destroyed, and 80 Iroquoia JR41: 10,81-83, 113 uiNJ o\ Seneca warriors defeated

8/1654 3 Iroq. vs. Erie 3 Iroq. killed Iroquoia JR 41:107

8/14/1654 1,800 Iroq. vs. Erie 1 Erie village destroyed, many Erie Western New York JR41: 10,81-83, 113 killed and captured

1654 Iroq. vs. Algon. several Algonkian killed St. Lawrence ]R41; 14

5/29/1655 Iroq. vs. French 1 French killed St. Lawrence JR42:15

Sum. 1655 1,200 Iroq. vs. Erie fortification destroyed, Erie suffer Western New York JR42: 113, 177-183 2,000 to 3,000 Erie heavy losses, Iroq. losses prob. high

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

9/1655 Iroq., Mahican, 1 Dutch killed Susquehanna and Delaware NYCD 12: 98-99 River Ind. vs. Dutch River

10/30/1655 60 Oneida vs. unknown unknown JR42:75 Neds Perces (Ottawa)

Early 1656 Iroq. vs. Algon. 3 Iroq. killed Iroquoia JR42: 45

2/1656 Iroq. vs. Unknown 3 of Unknown tribe killed unknown JR42:191 VI tribe

4/25/1656 2 Iroq. vs. Huron 1 Iroq. and 1 Huron killed St. Lawrence (Quebec) jR43: 105

5/20/1656 Iroq. vs. Huron 71 Huron killed or captured St. Lawrence (Quebec) JR42: 3 3 ;)R 4 3 :14, 117

6/29/1656 Iroq. vs. Ottawa 4 Ottawa killed and 3 captured St. Lawrence JR 43:145

8/30/1656 120 Iroq. vs. 250 several Huron killed St. Lawrence JR 42: 33, 229-235; Ottawa and Huron JR43:211

1657 Iroq. vs. Unknown unknown unknown JR43: 263 Algonkian tribe

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

1657 Iroq. vs. Unknown unknown unknown JR44:49 Algonkian tribe

4/1657 50 Iroq. vs. Huron 1 Huron killed St. Lawrence (Sillery) JR 43; 9, 35-37

10/25/1657 Oneida vs. French 3 French killed St. Lawrence (M ontreal) JR 43: 67; JR 44: 193-195

K) 11/3/1657 Iroq. vs. 9 Algon. 1 Iroq. killed and 1 captured St. Lawrence JR43:69: JR44: a 197, 201

5/20/1658 Iroq. vs. Algon. 1 Iroq. killed unknown JR44: 95

6/1658 Iroq. vs. French 3 French captured St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR44:16

6/1658 6 Oneida vs. French 3 French killed unknown JR 44:101

7/13/1658 Iroq. vs. Montagnois 1 Montagnois killed St. Lawrence (Quebec) JR44: 100-103, 227 and Algonkian

8/14/1658 20 Iroq. vs. French 2 French captured St. Lawrence (Quebec) JR44: 231

8 /30/1658 4 Iroq. vs. Huron 1 Huron captured St. Lawrence JR44: 107

10/20/1658 Iroq. vs. French 3 Iroq. captured St. Lawrence (Quebec) JR44: 119

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

11/5/1658 12 Iroq. vs. French 8 French captured St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR44: 13, 119-121

6/4 /1 6 5 9 Iroq. vs. French none St. Lawrence )R 45:97

6/27/1659 Iroq. vs. French 1 French killed and 1 captured St. Lawrence JR45: 35,99

8/10/1659 Iroq. vs. Montagnois 1 Montagnois killed, 1 Iroq. killed St. Lawrence JR 45:107

8 /21/1659 Iroq. vs. Unknown 9 Iroq. killed St. Lawrence (Montreal) JR45:107 tribe

8/25/1659 100 Iroq. vs. French 8 French captured St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR45: 11,33,109

9/12/1659 Iroq. vs. French 1 French St. Lawrence (Quebec) JR45:35,113

9/1659 Iroq. vs French 1 French killed St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR 45:115

11/1/1659 Iroq. vs. Algon. 1 Iroq. captured Iroquoia JR45:11, 117

5/6/1660 Iroq. vs. Algon. 4 Iroq. killed Iroquoia JR45:14, 153

5/1660 500-700 Iroq. vs. 20 Iroq. killed, 10 Huron, 6 Algon. and St. Lawrence ]R12;276;JR45; 18 French, 40 Huron, 18 French killed 14,18,157,199, and 6 Algon. 245-259; JR 46: 53

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

7/10/1660 Iroq. vs. Algon. 2 A lgon. killed St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR45: 14,159

7/10/1660 Iroq. vs. 100 French none St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) JR45: 14,159

9/1660 100 Iroq. vs. 300 3 Ottawa captured Canadian Interior ]R46: 75,121 O ttaw a

1661 80 Iroq. vs. 30 Attik. 30 Attik. and 2 French killed Canadian Interior JR46; 16,209 ro and 2 French S 1661 iroq. vs. French 13 French casualties St. Lawrence (Montreal) ]R 4 6 :16, 207

5/1661 Iroq. vs. Huron 4 Huron killed Great Lakes JR46: 12,143

6/1661 Iroq. vs. Swedes unknown Susquehanna and Delaware NYCD 12: 345 R iver

6/6/1661 60-70 Iroq. vs. French 3 French killed St. Lawrence JR46: 15, 173-175

6/18/1661 60-70 Iroq. vs. French 15 French and Christ. Indians captured St. Lawrence (Quebec) JR46: 179 and Christ. Indians

6/22/1661 60-70 Iroq. vs. French 8 French killed St. Lawrence (Quebec) JR46:179

6/29/1661 Iroq. vs. French none St. Lawrence JR46: 181

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

7/1661 Iroq. vs. 3 Iroq. killed Iroquoia JR47: 71,97 Susquehannock

Sum. 1661 40 Iroq. vs. 8 French 7 French killed, 1 captured St. Lawrence (Quebec) JR46: 211-215

9/1661 50 Iroq. vs. 3 French 3 French killed St. Lawrence (Montreal) JR46:189,217;JR 47: 95

10/1661 Iroq. vs. Delaware 12 River Indians killed Susquehanna and Delaware NYCD 12: 357 ON River Indians R iver

10/25/1661 Iroq. vs. French 7 French casualties St. Lawrence (Montreal) JR46:189;JR47: 157

Late 1661 Iroq. vs. Abenaki 1 Abenaki village destroyed N ew England JR47: 107, 139, 141- 143

1662 Iroq. vs. Shawnee unknown Ohio Valley JR47: 12-13, 143- 147,151-153

1662 Iroq. vs. Algon. unknown Canadian Interior JR47: 12-13, 143- 147, 151-153

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

1662 Iroq. vs. Ottawa unknown Great Lakes JR47: 12-13, 143- 147, 151-153

2/1662 200 Iroq. vs. 26 French 1 French killed St. Lawrence (Montreal) JR 47:155

S p .1662 Iroq. vs. French several French slain St. Lawrence (Montreal) JR47; 18, 277

8/25/1662 35 Iroq. vs. 14 French 2 French killed and 3 captured, 1 Iroq. killed St. Lawrence (Montreal) JR50:57

R 9/5/1662 Iroq. vs Delaware 1 Dutch killed, 1 Delaware River Indian Susquehanna and Delaware NYCD 12: 409-410, River Indians killed River 412

9/10/1662 Iroq. vs. French 2 French killed St. Lawrence (Quebec) JR47: 287

9/30/1662 Iroq. vs. 3 Huron 3 Huron captured St. Lawrence (Quebec) JR47: 284

10/6/1662 Iroq. vs. 2 French 2 French killed St. Lawrence JR47: 291

10/6/1662 Iroq. vs. Huron 2 Huron captured St. Lawrence (Quebec) JR47;291

4/1663 800 Iroq. vs. 35 Iroq. killed Susquehanna and Delaware JR48:79 Susquehannock River

5/1663 Iroq. vs. French several French captured St. Lawrence (M ontreal) JR 48: 99

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

5/1663 40 Algon. vs 13 Iroq. 10 Iroq. killed and 3 captured Iroquoia JR47: 19,303;JR 48: 25, 99-103, 107

6/24/1663 Iroq. vs. several Iroquois captured unknown NYCD 12: 433 Susquehannock

7/25/1663 Iroq. vs. English 2 English killed Susquehanna and Delaware NYCD 12: 436 River

S Fall 1663 Iroq. vs. French 2 French captured St. Lawrence JR 49:119

S p 1664 30 Iroq. vs Algon. several Iroq. casualties St. Lawrence JR48: 14,235;JR 49:11, 145

1664 Iroq. vs. French several French killed and 2 captured St. Lawrence JR48: 119

1664 600 Iroq. vs. severe casualties by both sides, one New England JR49: 139-141 100 Mahican Mahican village attacked

10/13/1664 Iroq. vs. Dutch and unknown Susquehanna and Delaware NYCD 3: 74 Delaware River Ind. River

Early 1665 1(X) Iroq. vs Algon. 18 Iroq. killed, 13 Algon. killed Canadian Interior JR 50: 41

5/5/1665 Iroq. vs. Algon. unknown unknown JR49: 159

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

8/1665 Iroq. vs. Ottawa none Canadian Interior jR49: 241,245-249; JR50; 279

8/1665 30 Iroq. vs. several Ottawa killed Canadian Interior JR 49: 241, 245-249; 300 O ttaw a JR 50; 279

10/28/1665 iroq. vs. 7 Nippissings killed and 12 captured C anadian Interior JR49; 173 20 Nippissings NJ 1/1666 Iroq. vs. French 3 Iroq. killed, 66 French killed Iroquoia JR50: 11,13,135, 181-182; NYCD 9: 46

6/1666 Mohawk vs. French 2 French killed St. Lawrence JR50: 189

Sum. 1666 Iroq. vs. unknown unknown JR50: 205 Susquehannock

Sum. 1666 Iroq. vs. New England 9 to 10 New England Indians killed unknown NYCD 3: 121 tribes

10/1666 Iroq. vs. French 4 Mohawk villages destroyed Iroquoia NYCD 4: 352, 405; NYCD 9: 56

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

1667 Iroq. vs. 4 Susquehannock killed Susquehanna and Delaware JR50: 231 Susquehannock River

1668 Iroq. vs. Loups several Iroq. w ounded Iroquoia JR52; 123, 129-131

Sp 1669 Iroq. vs. Loups 5 Iroq. killed Iroquoia JR 53:137-145

Sp 1669 Iroq. vs. Loups 13 Iroq. killed, 50 Loups killed Iroquoia JR 53: 137-145

Sp 1669 400 Iroq. vs. Loups unknown N ew England JR53: 157

1669 20 Iroq. vs. 100 Algon. 100 Algon. captured St. Lawrence? JR53:9

1669 Iroq. vs. 2 Susquehannock killed Susquehanna and Delaware JR54:103 Susquehannock River

1669 Iroq. vs. Algon. unknown St. Lawrence JR53

9/9/1669 8 Iroq. vs. unknown Susquehanna and Delaware JR53:247 Susquehannock River

9/20/1669 180 Iroq. vs. unknown unknown unknown JR53: 247 tribe

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

1/27/1670 Onondaga vs. 9 Susquehannock captured unknown (probably Penn.) )R53:253;)R54: 23 9 Susquehannock

2 /5/1670 14 Oneida vs. Loups unknown St. Lawrence (unknown) JR53: 255

2/1670 600 Seneca and Cayuga unknown Great Lakes JR53: 255 vs. O ttaw a

3/1670 18 Seneca vs. Fox 30 Fox captured, many killed, 1 Fox village Great Lakes JR54: 15,219-221 I destroyed

1670 Iroq. vs. Potawatomie 25-30 Potawatomie captured Great Lakes JR 54: 265

4/1670 Iroq. vs. Miami 3 Iroq. killed Great Lakes JR54: 227

7/1672 20 Seneca vs. 1 Iroq. killed, 1 Iroq. captured Susquehanna and Delaware ]R 56:10, 56-57, 67- 60 Susquehannock River 68

7/1672 40 Cayuga vs. 60 8 Iroq. killed, 16Susquehannock killed Susquehanna and Delaware JR 56:10, 56-57, 67- Susquehannock River 68

1672 Susquehannock vs. 2 Iroq. killed Iroquoia JR56:37 Iroq.

8/1669 Iroq. vs. French several Iroq. killed St. Lawrence JR53:241;JR54:11

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

9/1669 500 Iroq. vs. unknown Ohio Valley JR53:11;JR54:117 Shaw nee

9/8 /1 6 6 9 5 Iroq. vs. Shawnee 2 Shawnee captured Ohio Valley JR53:245;JR54: 115

9/8/1669 Iroq. vs. Ottawa several Iroq. captured unknown JR 53: 245; JR 54: 115 NJ o\ 1673 Cayuga vs. 3 Susquehannock captured JR58: 227 • v j Susquehanna River Susquehannock

1673 Iroq. vs. 2 Susquehannock captured unknown JR57: 169 Susquehannock

2/1674 Iroq. vs. Algon. unknown Canadian Interior JR 59:11,39-41

2/1676 300 Mohawk vs. New England Indian suffer heavy casualties New England JR 60:15, 133,231- 500 New England Ind. (360 New England Indians killed?) 233; NYCD 3: 255; Bourne 1990:161

6/1676 lrcK|. vs. Unknown 50 unidentified Indians captured unknown J R 6 0 :1 8 ,185

1677 Iroq. vs. Illinois unknown Illinois region J R 6 0 :1 7 ,167

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

1/22/1677 Seneca vs. unknown unknown Hanna Vol. 1; 16 Susquehannock

4/1680 500-600 Iroq. vs. 30 Iroq. killed, 1,200 Illinois killed or Illinois region NYCD 9:163 Illinois captured

4/1680 Iroq. vs Miami 1 Miami killed, 2 captured Ohio Valley NYCD 9: 163

S p l6 8 0 Iroq. vs. Green Bay 3 Green Bay Indians captured? to Great Lakes NYCD 9:163 ON Indians 00

Sum. 1680 Iroq. vs. Illinois unknown Illinois region NYCD 9:163

1681 Iroq. vs. Illinois 1,300 killed or captured Illinois region JR62: 11,71,73,79, 83, 161, 185; NYCD 9:148

1681 Iroq. vs Abenaki unknown New England NYCD 9:148

Sum. 1681 Onon. and Oneida vs. unknown Susquehanna and Delaware NYCD 3: 323-324 P iscataw ay River

Sum. 1681 Onon. and Oneida vs. several English killed Susquehanna and Delaware JR 62:11,67 English

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

9/19/1681 Iroq. vs. Green Bay 1 Iroq. captured Great Lakes? NYCD 9: 163-164 Indians

10/1681 Iroq. vs. Illinois 1 Iroq. killed Great Lakes NYCD 9: 163-164

F a ll/1681 Iroq. vs. Illinois 40 Iroq. killed Illinois region? NYCD 9: 162-163

5/1682 Seneca vs. French none, Iroq. seize trade goods French had Great Lakes? NYCD 9:171 NJ w ith them . o\ Sum. 1682 Iroq. vs. Miami 4 Miami killed unknown NYCD 9: 182

Sum. 1682 Iroq. vs. Illinois unknown Illinois region NYCD 9; 184

5/1683 700-800 Iroq. vs. 5 Huron captured Great Lakes NYCD 9:197, 201- Ottawa and Huron 202

5/1683 700-800 Iroq. vs. unknown Great Lakes NYCD 9: 197: 201- M iami 202

5/1683 700-800 Iroq. vs. unknown Great Lakes NYCD 9: 197 Illin ois

Fall/1683 Iroq. vs English 1 English killed V irginia NYCD 9: 228

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

11/1683 Iroq. vs. Unknown 150 unidentified Indians captured unknown NYCD 9: 208

Early 1684 Iroq. vs. English 26 English killed Susquehanna and Delaware NYCD 3: 450; River NYCD 9: 238

1684? Iroq. vs. French 2 Iroq. killed Great Lakes NYCD 9: 233

3/1684 200 Iroq. vs. French unknown Illinois region Brandao 1997: Table D .l s 8/1684 Iroq. vs. French and none French army stopped by sickness Southern Ontario Penin. JR63: 11-12, 57 St. Lawrence Indians

9/1684 Cayuga vs. English 3 Iroq. killed, 5 English killed V irginia NYCD 9: 259, 261

10/1684 40 Iroq. vs. Illinois unknown Illinois region? NYCD9; 296,319 and Shawnee

Early 1685 Iroq. vs. Miami several Iroq. casualties unknown Charlevoix 1900: 257

Early 1685 Iroq. vs. Mascoutin several Iroq. casualties unknown Charlevoix 1900: 257

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

6/1686 iroq. vs. Huron, and 75 Ottawa and Huron captured Great Lakes NYCD 9: 296,319 O ttaw a

6/1686 Iroq. vs. Illinois and unknown Ohio Valley NYCD 9: 296, 319 M iam i

9/1686 500 Iroq. vs. Miami 2 Iroq. killed, 500 Miami captured Ohio Valley? NYCD 3; 489

M 9/1686 Iroq. vs. Illinois and 27 Iroq. killed Ohio Valley? NYCD 3: 489 VI Toulac

11/1686 Iroq. vs. Unknown unknown unknown NYCD 3

6/7/1687 Iroq. vs. 2,062 201 Irocj. captured St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 331 French and Indians

7/1687 Iroq. vs. 2,062 45 Iroq. killed, 25 French and Indians killed Iroquoia JR 63: 269; NYCD French and Indians 3: 431-432, 434; NYCD 9: 334, 337- 338, 365-368

8/1687 Iroq. vs. French 8 French killed, 1 French captured St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 352

8/1687 280 Iroq. vs. French 5 French captured Southern Ontario Penin. NYCD 3: 480

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

8/1687 Iroq. vs. French 20 French killed, 4 French captured St. Lawrence NYCD 3: 480

9/7/1687 Iroq. vs. French 3 Iroq. killed St. Lawrence (Montreal) JR63;279

10/1687 Iroq. vs. French 3 Iroq. killed, 5 French killed St. Lawrence (Montreal) JR 63: 287-289; NYCD 9: 353

10/1687 Iroq. vs. French 6 Iroq. killed, 1 Christian Ind. killed and St. Lawrence NYCD 9 1 captured NJ

Fall 1687 Iroq. vs. Ottawa several Iroq. killed Iroquoia NYCD 3; 442-445

Fall 1687 Iroq. vs. Miami several Iroq. killed unknown NYCD 3: 442-445

S p l6 8 8 30 Iroq. vs. French 2 French killed St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 390

Sp 1688 Iroq. vs. French several French killed and captured St. Lawrence (Ft. Chambly) NYCD 9: 390

7/1688 Iroq. vs. French 3 French captured St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 391

7/1688 Iroq., Mahican vs. extensive property damage St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 391 French

9/29/1688 Iroq. vs. Huron 2 Iroq. killed Southern Ontario Penin. NYCD 9: 391

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

Fall 1688 Iroq. vs French Iroq. suffer several casualties St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 395

10/1688 Iroq., Mahican vs. 7 iroq. and Mahican killed St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 392 Abenaki

10/30/1688 40 Iroq. vs French 4 French captured Southern Ontario Penin. NYCD 9: 389 (Ft. Frontenac)

1689 Iroq. vs. French several French killed Southern Ontario Penin. JR64: 251-253 a (Ft. Frontenac)

8/5 /1 6 8 9 1,500 Iroq. vs. 120-400 French killed, 200 captured St. Lawrence (Montreal) JR12: 273;JR64: French 89, 273; NYCD 3: 621

Fall 1689 22 Iroq. vs. French 22 Iroq. killed St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 435

11/13/1689 150 Iroq. vs. French several French killed, settlements burned St. Lawrence (Montreal) NYCD 9: 431,435

2/1690 200 French and Christ. 25 to 17 French and Christ. Ind. killed or Iroquoia NYCD 3: 700; Ind. vs. Iroq. captured. NYCD 9; 467-469, 716

Sp.1690 Iroq. vs. French 16 French killed St. Lawrence (Three Rivers) NYCD 9: 474

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

S p .1690 Iroq. vs. French 4 Iroq. killed, 1 French killed St. Lawrence NYCD 9; 473

6/1690 Iroq. vs. French 25 Iroq. killed, 12 French killed St. Lawrence (R. de Prairies) NYCD 9: 474

6/1690 iroq. vs. French 30 Iroq. killed and 4 captured, 4 French killed Canadian Interior NYCD 9; 470-471

Sum. 1690 Iroq. vs. French 2 French killed St. Lawrence (R. des Prairies) NYCD 9:478

8/1690 140 Iroq. and English 6 Iroq. killed, 25 French killed or captured SI. Lawrence (R. des Prairies) NYCD 9: 480-481 g vs. French

9/1690 Iroq. vs. 34 French 17 French killed or captured St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 482

1691 Iroq. and English vs. 10 French Iroq. captured St. Lawrence NYCD 9:515-516 French Iroq.

S p .1691 Iroq. vs. French 43 Iroq. killed, 5 French killed St. Lawrence (Montreal) NYCD 9; 517-518

5/1691 800 Iroq. vs. French 3 French killed St. Lawrence (Montreal) NYCD 9: 502-503

6/8/1691 Iroq. vs. French 5 Iroq. killed, 1 French killed St. Lawrence (Montreal) NYCD 3: 782

Sum. 1691 French Iroq. vs. 3 Iroq. killed and 2 captured Iroquoia NYCD 9: 524 Iroq.

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

Sum. 1691 Iroq. vs. French 2 Iroq. killed, 1 French killed and 3 captured St. Lawrence (R. des Prairies) NYCD 9: 524

Sum. 1691 266 Iroq., English and 30 Iroq. killed, 100 French killed St. Lawrence (R. des Prairies) NYCD 3: 803-805, Mahican vs. French NYCD 9: 504, 520- 524

8/1691 5 Iroq. vs. French and 2 Iroq. captured unknown NYCD 9: 525 French Iroq.

8/1691 Iroq. vs. French and 2 Iroq. killed unknown NYCD 9: 525 Ln Christian Ind.

12/1691 34 Iroq. vs. French Iroq. 16 Iroq. killed and 14 capture, 4 French Iroq. St. Lawrence NYCD 3: 815, k illed NYCD 9: 531, 534

2/1692 50 Iroq. vs. 329 French 24 Iroq. killed and 16 captured, 6 French and St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 531,535 and Christ. Ind. Indian killed

4/1692 Iroq. vs. French 1 French killed St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 535

5/29/1692 Iroq. vs. 36 French and 21 French captured, 3 Algonkian captured St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 536 Algon.

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

Sum. 1692 Iroq. vs. unidentified unknown V irginia MPCP 1:372 Maryland Ind. and V irginia

7/1692 Iroq. vs. French 13 French captured St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 536

7/1692 150 Iroq. vs. 500 20 Iroq. killed and 14 captured, 7 French killed St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 536 French and Christ. and 4 Christ. Ind. killed Ind.

§ 7/1692 39 Iroq. and Mahicans 4 French killed St. Lawrence NYCD 9:537 vs. 33 French

7/1692 Iroq. and Mahican vs. 1 French captured St. Lawrence NYCD 9; 537 French

11/1692 400 Iroq. vs. French none St. Lawrence (R. des Prairies) NYCD 9: 538, 556 Iroq.

11/1692 40-50 Iroq. vs. French 6 French killed or captured St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 538, 556

2/1693 Mohawk vs. 625 20 Iroq. killed and 13 captured, 40 French Iroquoia NYCD 4: 6-7,14- French and French Ind. killed 20,41, 183

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

5/1693 Iroq. vs. French and 4 French killed, 1 French Iroq. captured St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 553, 562 French Iroq.

6/1693 Iroq. vs. Ottawa several Iroq. killed Iroquoia NYCD 9: 554

6/21/1693 Mohawk vs. French 3 French killed St. Lawrence NYCD 4: 39

6/25/1693 Iroq. vs. 60 Amicois 1 Iroq. captured St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 566 w and Nippissings

8/14/1693 Iroq. vs. French Iroq. 3 Iroq. killed and 1 captured Iroquoia NYCD 4: 61

8/1693 Iroq. vs. French 1 French killed and 1 captured St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 554-555

8/1693 Iroq. vs. French 2 French captured St. Lawrence NYCD 4: 66

2/10/1694 Seneca vs. Delaware several Delaware killed Susquehanna and Delaware NYCD 4: 99 River

Sum. 1694 Miami vs. Iroq.? Miami raiding party reported inside of Iroquoia MPCP 1:448 Iroquoia. It attacks a group of Indians (Kyannisse) who are allies of Iroq. and are defeated by the Iroq. allies.

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

Early 1695 iroq. vs. French and 7 Iroq. killed and 4 captured Southern Ontario Penin. NYCD 9: 641-642 French Indians

Sp. 1695 200-300 Iroq. vs. 7 Miami captured Ohio Valley NYCD 9:601,603 M iami

Sp. 1695 Iroq. vs. French several Iroq. killed Great Lakes NYCD 9; 601,603

^ Sp. 1695 Iroq. vs. Huron 5 Huron captured Great Lakes NYCD 9:604-605

œ * ■ " * ' ' ■ " " " " * ■ " ■ 4/1695 Iroq. vs. French Iroq. 3 Iroq. captured Iroquoia NYCD 9:600

5/1695 Iroq. vs. French Iroq. 2 Iroq. captured St. Lawrence NYCD 9:642

5/1695 Iroq. vs. French 2 French captured St. Lawrence (Montreal) NYCD 9; 642

5/29/1695 Iroq. and English vs. 1 Iroq. killed New England NYCD4:118; French and French Ind. NYCD 9: 642

1695 Seneca vs. English I English captured Virginia NYCD 4:691

6/13/1695 2 Iroq. vs. 5 French 1 Iroq. killed St. Lawrence NYCD 9:601-602 and Christian Ind.

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties W here Source(s)

6/1695 Iroq. vs. French and 6 Iroq. killed, 1 French killed St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 602 French Indians

7/1695 Iroq. vs. French 4 French killed St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 602

8/1695 Iroq. vs. French 2 French killed and 4 captured St. Lawrence (R. des Prairies) NYCD 9: 622

8/1695 Iroq. vs. French 1 French killed St. Lawrence NYCD 9; 622

§ 8/1695 Iroq. vs. French 3 French captured St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 622

9/16/1695 Iroq. vs. French and 6 Iroq. killed, 2 French killed St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 628-629 French Ind.

9/1695 Iroq. vs. French Iroq. 2 Iroq. killed and 2 captured St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 629

9/1695 Iroq. vs. French Iroq. 2 French Iroq. captured Iroquoia NYCD 9: 629

9/1695 Iroq. vs. 8 French Iroq. 3 Iroq. killed, 7 French Iroq. killed Iroquoia NYCD 9: 646

Early 1696 100? Iroq. vs 200 Ott., 30 to 70 Iroq. killed, 30 captured Great Lakes NYCD 9: 646 and Potawatomie

Sum. 1696 Iroq. vs. 10 Ottawa none Iroquoia NYCD 9; 649

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

8/2/16% Iroq. vs. 2,060 to 3,000 2 iroq. killed and 35 captured Iroquoia (Onondaga) JR 65:11, 20-29; French and French Ind. NYCD 4:173-175, 180, 242; NYCD 9: 639-640, 650-656

8/19/16% Iroq. vs. 2,060 to 3,000 3 Iroq. killed, 2 French casualties, 3 French Iroquoia NYCD 4: 198; French and French Ind. Indians killed NYCD 9: 656

^ 8/16% Iroq. vs. 13 Algon. 2 Iroq. killed and 3 captured Iroquoia NYCD 9:656-658 CO ------... o 8/16% Iroq. vs. French Iroq. 1 Iroq. killed Iroquoia NYCD 9:656-658

1696 Iroq. vs. French 20 to 30 French captured over year St. Lawrence JR 65; 12, 29

9/16% Iroq. vs. French 1 French captured Southern Ontario Penin. NYCD 9:666

Fall 1696 Iroq. vs. French and 1 Iroq. captured Iroquoia NYCD 9:666 French Iroq.

Sp. 1697 80? Seneca vs. 80? 40 Iroq. killed and 14 captured, 6 Western Great Lakes NYCD 9:672 Ott., Potawa., Sac, Algon. killed Peyser 1992:65 and Huron

1697 Iroq. vs. French 2 Iroq. killed, 2 French killed St. Lawrence NYCD 9:671

continued on next page Table 3 (continued)

Date Combatants Results/Casualties Where Source(s)

7/1697 6 Iroq. vs. French 3 French killed St. Lawrence NYCD 9: 669

9/1697 Seneca vs. Miami several Iroq. and Miami killed Iroquoia? NYCD 4: 294

1698 Iroq. vs. Algon. and 24 Iroq. killed and 5 captured, 10 Ott. and unknown NYCD 4:403 O ttaw a Algon. killed

Early 1698 40 Iroq. vs. 34 Algon. 5 Iroq. killed and 6 captured, 6 Algon. killed Southern Ontario Penin. NYCD 9; 681

1699 Iroq. vs. French 1 French killed unknown NYCD 9: 707

9/1699 Iroq. vs. Chippewa 5 Iroq. killed Iroquoia NYCD 4: 590, 596- 597

Sp.1700 Iroq. vs. Chippewa several Iroq. killed Great Lakes NYCD 4: 691

9/23/1700 Iroq. vs. Flatheads unknown South or Southeast NYCD 4: 802

10/5/1700 Western Algon. vs. 5 Seneca killed Iroquoia NYCD 4: 800a Iroq. Euroamerican Indigenous Opponents O pponent

1. Abenaki 40. Squirrel Tribe 1. Dutch 2. Algonkian 41. Susquehannock 2. English 3. -Amicois 42. Tangwaonronnons 3. French 4. -Assiniboins 43. Tobacco 4. Swedes 5. .Atikamegues 44. Toulac 6. Black M inqua 45. Trakvvaehronnons 7. Chippewa S. Christian Indians 9. Conoys 10. Delaware 11. Delaware River Indians 12. Erie 13. Fire Nation (Assisterronen) 14. Flatheads 15. French Iroquois 16. Fox (Outagami) 17. Gentaguetehronnons 18. Green Bay Indians 19. Huron 20. Illinois 21. Loups 22. -Vlahicans 23. Maryland Indians 24. Mascoutin 25. Miami 26. Michilimackinac Tribe 27. Montagnois 28. Neutral 29. New England Indians (Peoples ot the East) 30. -Nippissings 31. Onnontioga 32. Ottawa 33. Petite .Algonkian 34. Piscataway 35. Potawatomie 36. Sac 37. Shawnee (Ontoagahanna) 38. Sioux 39. Sokokis

Table 4. Populations the Iroquois attacked and/or were attacked by between A.D. 1649 and 1701.

282 Indigenous Opponents European Opponents

Abenaki (1) D utch (1) Ahondihronnons (?) French (46) Algonkian (19) A tiaonrek (?) A tikam egues (2) C hristian Indians (4) Erie (4) Fire Nation (?) Centaguetelironnons (?) H uron (34) Illinois (?) M ahican (?) M iam i (?) Michilimackinac Island tribe (?) Montagnois (2) N eutral (4) O nnontioga (?) Ottawa (4) Petite A lgonkian (1) Potaw atom ie (1) Sokokis (1) Susquehannock (2) Tangwaonronnons (1) Tobacco (3) T radw aehronnons (?) unnamed tribes (6)

t = equals number of battles recorded with this colony/tribe ? = Iroquois recorded at war with this tribe but no particular battles are recorded

Table 5. List of the number of enemies the Iroquois attacked or were attacked by between A.D. 1649 and 1659.

283 Indigenous Opponents European Opponents

Abenaki (1) Dutch (2) A lgonkian (9) English (1) unnamed Algonkian groups French (21) from Great Lakes region (?) Swedes (1) A ssiniboins (?) Atikamegues (1) Christian Indians (1) Delaware River Indians (3) H uron (4) Illinois (?) Loups (4) M ahican (1) New England Indians (1) N ippissings (1) Ottawa (5) Fox (Outagmis) (?) "People of the East" (?) Shawnee (Ontoagahanna) (3) Sioux (?) Squirrel Tribe (?) Susquehannock (8) Tobacco (?) unnam ed tribes (6)*

* refers to several unnamed tribes living in the Upper Great Lakes area. Gulf of Mexico region, Mississippi and Missouri River area, and tow ards H udson Bay. # = equals number of battles recorded with this colony/tribe ? = Iroquois recorded at war with this tribe but no particular battles are recorded

Table 6. List of the number of enemies the Iroquois attacked or were attacked by between A.D. 1660 and 1669.

284 Indigenous Opponents European Opponents

Algonkian (1) English (?) Fox (1) Illinois (1) Loups (1) M ahican (?) M ascoutin (?) Miami (1) New England Indians (1) Ottawa (1) Potawatom ie (1) Shawnee (?) Sioux (?) Susquehannock (7) unnam ed tribe (1)

# = equals number of battles recorded with this colony/tribe ? = Iroquois recorded at war with this tribe but no particular battles are recorded

Table 7. List of the number of enemies the Iroquois attacked or were attacked by between A.D. 1670 and 1679.

285 Indigenous Opponents European Opponents

Abenaki (4) English (Maryland and Algonkians (2) Virginia) (4) Amicois (1) French (71) Chippewa (2) Christian Indians (5) Conoy (?) Delaware (1) Flatheads (1) French Indians (7) French Iroquois (16) H uron (6) niinois (10) Maryland Indians (1) M ascoutin (1) M iami (12) Nippissing (1) Ottaw a (9) Piscataway (1) Potawatomie (2) Sac (1) Shawnee (1) Toulac (1) unnam ed G reen Bay Indians (2) unnam ed W estern A lgonkian (1) unnam ed tribe (3)

# = equals number of battles recorded with this colony/tribe

Table 8. List of the number of enemies the Iroquois attacked or were attacked by between A.D. 1680 and 1701.

286 Date Initiator of Negotiation Duration Fails or Succeeds? Source(s)

Fall 1650 Iroq. to Huron none Fails. Huron kill 27 Iroquois peace JR36: 181-189 ambassadors

7/2/1652 Mohawk to Huron, Algon., none Fails. Huron and Algonkians kill 2 JR 37:107-111; JR 38: 53-55 and French Iroq. peace ambassadors

7/15/1653 Onondaga to French 4 yrs. Succeeds. JR 38:179; JR 40:89-91

7/21/1653 Oneida to French 4 yrs. Succeeds. JR38: 183;JR40: 91

8/1653 Mohawk to French 4 yrs. Succeeds. JR38:13;JR40;11

1/1654 Onondaga to Huron at 1.5 yrs. Succeeds. Huron must resettle with JR 41: 9-10, 19-21 Quebec Onondaga as part of peace condition

1654? Erie and Iroquois none Erie kill a Seneca, in retaliation the JR42: 177-183 Iroquois kill 25 Erie peace ambassadors

8/1655 Onondaga and Seneca to 8 months Succeeds. Huron must resettle with JR41: 15, 217; JR 42: 10,49- Huron and Algonkian Onondaga and Seneca as part of peace 53, 57 condition

Fall 1655 French to Onondaga lyr. French succeed in negotiating an end to JR42: 11, 123; JR 43: 99-101 conflict between Onondaga, Cayuga, and Oneida, and the Huron and Algon. living along the St. Lawrence.

continued on next page

Table 9. Conflict resolution database for A.D. 1649 to 1701. Table 9 (continued)

Date Initiator of Negotiation Duration Fails or Succeeds? Source(s)

1/1656 Seneca to French 1.5 yrs Confirmation of peace. JR43:13

4/1656 Mohawk to French 1.5 yrs Confirmation of peace. JR43: 187

Sum. 1656 Huron to Mohawk until Sum of Succeeds. Stops hostilities temporally. JR43:187 1658

5/1657 Onondaga and French until Fall of reaffirmation of peace. )R 4 3 :10,41 to 1657 8§ 5/1657 Onondaga and Huron of until Fall of reaffirmation of peace, under condition JR43: 10,41 Quebec 1658 that Huron remove to Onondaga.

10/1657 Onondaga to French and 1 month Onondaga make reparation for murder of JR 43:61 Huron several Huron, and damages to French settlements

2/1658 Mohawk to French none Fails. Mohawks bring reparations for JR44: 85-91,203 for murder of 3 French by Oneida. French are not satisfied, they demand the murderers be brought in.

8/1658 Mohawk to French none Fails. 10 Mohawk ambassadors taken JR44: 233 prisoner.

continued on next page Table 9 (continued)

Date Initiator of Negotiation Duration Fails or Succeeds? Source(s)

9/1658 Mohawk to French none Fails. 7 Mohawk ambassadors taken JR44: 107-109,233 prisoner.

9/1638 Onondaga to French none Fails. 2 Onondaga ambassadors killed and JR44: 117 11 taken prisoners.

9/1658 French to Oneida none French renege on a parley with a group of JR44: 111 Oneida. They kill 3 and capture 6.

§ 10/28/1658 Iroq. to French none Several Iroquois ask the French to consider JR44: 119 peace negotiation. The French threaten to kill the ambassadors.

11/1658 Mohawk to French, Huron 8 months Succeeds. Iroquois bring in several captives JR 44:14, 121 and Algonkian and French release a few of theirs but not all.

4/3 /1 6 5 9 Oneida to French 2 months Succeeds. Iroq. give up the rest of their JR 45:11, 81-91 captives and French release a few more Iroq., but not all.

7/3/1659 French and Algonkian 1 month Succeeds. French and Algonkians release JR 45: 11,99-101 to M ohawk several Iroq. prisoners. Mohawk want Tadousac Algonkians to be part of peace.

continued on next page Table 9 (continued)

Date Initiator of Negotiation Duration Fails or Succeeds? Source(s)

5/1660 Iroq. to French none Fails. Iroq. try to stop battle at Long Sault. JR 12: 276;JR45: 14, 18, 157, They sent in several ambassadors but they 199, 245-259; JR 46; 53 were killed as they approached.

8/4/1660 Cayuga to French none Fails. 12 Cayuga peace representatives were J R 45:161; JR 46:11,117- taken prisoner by the French. 119

NJ 1/22/1661 Mohawk to Susquehannock none Fails. Mohawk try to negotiation a peace NYCD13: 191-192 \o o between western Iroq. and Susqu.

1661 Onondaga to French none Tentative. Fremcj. release several Iroq. JR 46:17 prisoners, but Onon. demand that French reastablish their Jesuit mission at village of Onondaga or they will kill their French captives.

1661 iroq. to French none Tentative. Iroq. bring in 20 French captives. JR46:15 Western tribes and French interested in pursuing peace interests.

6/1661 Cayuga to French none Tentative. Cayuga bring in 4 French JR46: 181,225 captives.

continued on next page Table 9 (continued)

Date Initiator of Negotiation Duration Fails or Succeeds? Source(s)

7/1661 French to Onon. and Mohawk none Tentative. Father Le Moyne reports that JR46:14, 155, 181;jR47: 10, Mohawks are inclined to peace and they 67, 79,97, 105 release 9 French captives.

10/20/1661 Onondaga to French none Tentative. Onon. bring in 9 French captives. JR 46:13 They promise to bring in more in spring.

Late 1661 Mohawk to Abenaki none Fails. Abenaki kill 30 Mohawk peace JR47: 107, 139, 141-143 representatives.

none9/1662 Onondaga to French none9/1662 Tentative. Onondaga release last of their JR 47:14,18,191 193, 289 French captives.

9/1/1663 Susquehannock to Mohawk none Fails. Mohawk state will support the other NYCD 12: 439 Iroquois in their war on the Susquehannock.

1664 Mohawk to Mahican none Fails. Mahicans kill all of the Mohawk NYCD 2: 371 peace representatives.

Sp. 1664 Mohawk to French none unknown, although the attempt must of JR 49: 139 failed, since they continue hostilities.

Sp.1664 Iroq. to French none Fails. Algonkians attack and disperse Iroq. JR 49: 11, 137,145 peace representatives in en route to French.

continued on next page Table 9 (continued)

Date Initiator of Negotiation Duration Fails or Succeeds? Source(s)

4/1664 Upper Iroq. (Sen., Cay., Onon.) 20 years Succeeds. Oneida and Mohawk JR 48: 233-235 to French are excluded.

6/21/1664 Mohawk to Sokokis, New none Fails. Mohawk peace representatives NYCD 2; 371; NYCD 13: England Indians, and English are taken prisoner and held for ransom. 379-381

9/18/1664 Cayuga and French peace reaffirmed JR 48: 239

6/1665 Mohawk, and New England none unknown, stop in hostilities was only NYCD 3:117 K) and Mahicans temporary

12/2/1665 Upper Iroq. and French peace reaffirmed JR49: 12, 179;JR50: 11; NYCD 3:125-126,131,133

5/1666 All Iroq. tribes and French peace reaffirmed with Upper Iroq., Oneida JR50: 137-140; NYCD 3: are also included, but the French mistrust 125-126, 1131, 133 the Mohawk and exclude them from peace.

7/7/1666 Oneida and French 18 years peace confirmed with Oneida. NYCD 9: 45

8/1666 All Iroq tribes and French peace reaffirmed with all iroq. except the JR50: 199 Mohawk, who the French continue to exclude. Other Iroq. try to persuade the French from attacking th Mohawk but fail.

continued on next page Table 9 (continued)

Date Initiator of Negotiation Duration Fails or Succeeds? Source(s)

Lt. Sum. 1666 Mohawk to French none Fails. Mohawk try again to convince the NYCD 9; 54 French of their sincerity for peace.

7/1667 Mohawk and French 17 years Succeeds. The French satisfied with their JR 50; 15 attacks on the Mohawk villages agree to peace.

1669 Iroq. and French, Algon. Tentative. Peace is threatened by JR 53; 9-10,41-47 and O ttaw a raids occurring between the Ottawa and w Seneca. Ottawa give up their Iroq. captives.

1669 Ottawa and Iroq. until 1683 Ottawa return more captives and Iroq. JR 52: 197, 203 promise to return Ottawa captives.

7/1669 Mohawk and Esopus permanent Succeeds. No other warfare reported with NYCD 13: 427 and Catskill tribes with these tribes.

8/1669 Iroq. and Staten Island permanent Succeeds. No other warfare reported with NYCD 13: 428 tribe this tribe.

8/20/1669 Loup to Oneida none Loup peace representative is scared away JR53: 243 because Oneida are drunk.

9/8/1669 Iroq. and Ottawa until 1683 peace is reaffirmed JR53: 247

continued on next page Table 9 (continued)

Date Initiator of Negotiation Duration Fails or Succeeds? Source(s)

Win. 1669 Susquehannock to 3 months Susquehannock are able to establish a JR54:75 Cayuga temporary peace with the Cayuga. However, the Onondaga convince the Cayuga to continue the war.

1670 Onondaga, and Algon. Tentative. Tensions remain high with Seneca JR54: 47, 253 and O ttawa attacks. Peace not confirmed until 1671.

NJ 1670 Fox to Iroq. Fox send word to the Iroquois they wish JR 54: 225-227 to establish peaceful relations.

1671 French, West. Algon., until 1683 French threaten Seneca with war if they JR 54: 263-265, 269 and Seneca do not make peace with Western Algon. the Seneca grudgingly accept.

1672 Iroq. and Ottawa until 1683 reaffirmation of peace JR 56: 43-45

1673 Mohawk and Mahican until 1676 reaffirmation of peace JR 57:12

1673 Seneca to Michilimackinac until 1683 reaffirmation of peace JR 57: 23 Indians

7/13/1673 French to Iroq. until 1684 reaffirmation of peace. French also request NYCD 9: 109-111 permission to build Ft. Frontenac, which they receive.

continued on next page Table 9 (continued)

Date Initiator of Negotiation Duration Fails or Succeeds? Source(s)

1674 French and iroq. until 1684 reaffirmation of peace NYCD 9: 117

5/22/1674 Mohawk and English peace reaffirmed with English. Mohawk NYCD 13; 479 agree to provide English military support if they are attacked by the French.

4/1675 Mohawk, Mahican and peace reaffirmed. NYCD 12: 520 English NJ ^ 6/24/1675 Mohawk and Mahican 1 year peace reaffirmed temporarily NYCD 13: 491

6/3/1676 Susquehannock to Iroq. Susquehannock ask English to intercede on NYCD 13: 497 their behalf with the Iroq.

8 / 1676 Susquehannock to Iroi]. Susquehannock ask Dutch of New York to NYCD 12: 553 help establish peace with Iroquois

5/1677 Piscataway to Iroq. Piscataway request English to intercede in Hanna (Vol. I): 67 their behalf to establish peace with Iroq. Peace apparently does not occur.

7/21/1677 Iroq. and Maryland until 1680s temporary peace established. NYCD 13: 510

continued on next page Table 9 (continued)

Date Initiator of Negotiation Duration Fails or Succeeds? Source(s)

4/1680 Iroq. and Miami Iroq. try to appease the Miami for killing NYCD 9; 163 two of their tribe. Hostilities only temporarily averted.

4/1680 Iroq. and Green Bay Indian Unclear whether these Green Bay Indians NYCD 9: 163 were forced into or volunteered to negotiate with Iroq, Results of meetings not stated.

5/1682 Iroq. and Conoy, Colony of Succeeds. Peace with Conoy and Piscataway Hanna 1911 (2); 69 Maryland, and Piscataway is permanent with both tribes eventually adopted into League. Hostilities with English in Maryland resumed in 1700s.

8/4/1682 Iroq. and Maryland, and Iroq. until 1700s Succeeds. Hostilities resume in 1700s. NYCD 3: 323-325

8/13/1682 Huron to Iroq. until 1683 Tentative peace. NYCD 9: 176-177, 180-182

9/11/1682 Iroq. to French until 1684 Iroq. reaffirm peaceful intentions. But NYCD 9:184 tensions are high between both groups.

7-8/1683 Iroq. and French until 1684 Iroq. reassure French they do not plan to NYCD 9: 203-204 attack them.

continued on next page Table 9 (continued)

Date Initiator of Negotiation Duration Fails or Succeeds? Source(s)

Sum 1683 French to Iroq. until 1684 French renew peace with Iroq. and request NYCD 9: 203-204 the Seneca to make peace with the Michilimackinac Indians

6 /5 /1684 Seneca to French none Fails. Seneca try to stop La Barre s army with NYCD 9: 226, 239 peace representatives. La Barre takes the ambassadors prisoner.

7/1684 Iroq. to French until 1687 Succeeds. La Barre s army is stopped because Thwaites 1905: 81-84; of sickness and he is forced to accept peace NYCD 9: 237-239 terms presented by the Iroquois.

9/17/1684 Huron to Iroq. until 1686 Huron renew friendship with Iroq. NYCD 9: 260

Fail 1685 Iroq. and Ottawa peace talks occur between these two NYCD 9: 295 groups, result unknown and relations break down in 1686

1686 Iroq. and Ottawa Iroq. capture 136 Huron and Ottawa. They NYCD 9; 296, 319 state to Ott. and Huron they can have their people back if they agree to allie themselves with the Iroq. and English

continued on next page Table 9 (continued)

Date Initiator of Negotiation Duration Fails or Succeeds? Source(s)

1687 Iroq., Mahican to none Iroq. and Mahican attempt to negotiate peace NYCD 3: 436 O ttaw a with Ottawa. However, the Iroq. and Mah. are captured by French. Peace negotiation stopped.

Sum 1687 French to Iroq. none Failed. French invite Iroquois peace jR 64: 241-243, 257; NYCD representatives to discus peace reaffirmation 9; 332, 360-363 but instead taken all of the Iroq. representatives prisoner. oo 6/15/1688 Iroq. to French 3 months Iroq. and French negotiate a tentative peace 6/15/1688

7/1688 Iroq. to French 2 months Iroq. and French continue negotiations and NYCD 9: 390, 402 agree to meet one more time for a final peace which will be dictated by the Iroq.

9/1688 Iroq. to French none Fails. Iroq. peace representative are NYCD 9; 391, 402 attacked by Huron on way to meet the French. Several Iroq. are killed and Iroq. break off negotiations.

10/30/1688 French to Iroq. none French attempt renegotiate peace, but NYCD 9; 389 Iroq. state the French must return all Iroq. taken prisoner during Denonville's cam paign.

continued on next page Table 9 (continued)

Date Initiator of Negotiation Duration Fails or Succeeds? Source(s)

1689 Ottawa and Huron to Tentative peace. Both Ottawa and Huron JR64; 13, 25-27, 31 Iroq. feel the French are too weak to fight Iroq. They decide to make their own negotiation with Iroq.

Early 1690 Iroq. and Ottawa and Huron Tentative peace. Both Ottawa and Huron NYCD 9: 450-451 continue negotiating with Iroq. even though French are angry and call them cowards.

Early 1690 \o French to Iroq. none French release some of the iroq. prisoners NYCD 9: 439 that had been sent to France to work on the galleys. Frontenac wants a separate peace with iroq., excluding the English.

3/1690 Ottawa to iroq. tenative peace continues with renewed NYCD 9: 465, 480 negotiations. Both Ottawa and Iroq. are sincere, however, Iroq. are worried about French meddling and about the pro war faction still present in the Ottawa.

Sum. 1690 Ottawa and Iroq. peace negotiations between the Iroq. and NYCD 9: 480 Ottawa are jeopardized by the death of a prominent Ottawa who was the leader of the peace faction in his tribe.

continued on next page Table 9 (continued)

Date Initiator of Negotiation Duration Fails or Succeeds? Source(s)

6/1690 French to Iroq. none Iroq. reject French offer of peace that excluded NYCD 4; 214 the English (the Iroq.' allie). The French representatives are taken captive.

4/5/1691 Mohawk to French Mohawk attempt to establish a peace JR 64: 13, 57, 63, 777-778 iroq. with the French Iroq. who also want peace. Both sides agree to continue talks.

5/26/1691 French Iroq. to Mohawk none French Iroq. continue efforts to establish a NYCD 3: 771, 780 o o and English peace between the French and the Iroq. and English. However, both the Iroq. and English do not trust the French and their Indian allies and decide to renew the war.

1692 Huron to Seneca A Huron releases two Iroq. captives and NYCD 3: 842, 844 indicates that a significant peace faction has formed within the Huron at Michiii.

5/10/1693 Maryland and Virgina Ind. until 1700s Peace is established with both Maryland MPCP 1:372 to Iroq. and Virginia Ind. However, conflict resumes with Virginia Indians when warfare with the French ended.

continued on next page Table 9 (continued)

Date Initiator of Negotiation Duration Fails or Succeeds? Source(s)

6/1693 Oneida to French An Oneida leader, not representing his NYCD 9: 553-554, 565 tribe or the League individually offers to initiate and mediate peace between the French and Iroq. Frontenac if peace is to be estab. all Iroq. tribes must come to negot.

7 /4/1693 Huron and Seneca until 1696 Apparently the peace faction in the Michiii. NYCD 4: 45 Huron have gained prominence in their tribe and a tentative peace is secured with the Iroq.

7/31/1693 French and iroq. none Frontenac invites represent, from all the Iroq. NYCD 4; 49,61 tribes to negotiate a peace at Quebec. Frontenac threatens to destroy the Iroq if they dont come. The Iroq. mistrust French and do not show up.

10/31/1693 Iroq. to French Sp. 1693 Tentative cease in hostilities. Iroq. ask NYCD 4: 74-75, 79-80, 84- French to come to meet at Onondaga to neg. 87, 90-91,-NYCD 9: 9: 572, peace that also includes the English. 577 Frontenac rejects this, wants separate peace excluding English. Gives Iroq. to Spring to send their represent, to Quebec or he will attack them.

continued on next page Table 9 (continued)

Date Initiator of Negotiation Duration Fails or Succeeds? Source(s)

4/1694 Mohawk to French Iroq. 45 days Mohawk request to resolve conflict. NYCD 9; 578-579 and French Frontenac believes they are lying but grants temporary truce and asks that Deganissoren (an Onondaga leader) to represent the Iroq. in the future.

5/23/1694 Iroq. to French to Early 1695 Iroq. and French agree on negotiating NYCD 9: 579-581 a temporary truce. Frontenac demands that all prisoners held by Iroq. be to released and that future peace negotiations exclude the English.

9/20/1694 Seneca, Cayuga to French Frontenac declines to negotiate with JR 64:15, 143 separate tribes, all Iroq. tribes must be present.

Sp. 1695 Iroq. to Huron until 1696 Iroq. reaffirm peace with Huron, but French NYCD 9: 604-606 continue to harass and pressure the Huron to renew their war with the Iroq.

Jan.-Feb. 1695 French to Iroq. none French again request the Iroq. to send ambass. NYCD 4:120-122 and their prisoners to Quebec. The Iroquois refuse stating they mistrust the French particularly after they regarrison Ft. Frontenac.

continued on next page Table 9 (continued)

Date Initiator of Negotiation Duration Fails or Succeeds? Source(s)

March/April Iroq. to French none Iroq. ask French to come to Onondaga to neg. NYCD 9: 598 1695 peace. Iroq. demand that French release their Iroq. prisoners first. Frontenac becomes furious and again reiterates that the Iroq. must come to Quebec with their prisoners or the war will be continued.

Sp. 1695 Fox to Iroq. into 18th cent. Fox release Iroq. prisoners they acquire from NYCD 9; 619-621 w West. Algon. tribes. They wish peace with S Iroq. No attacks more attacks are reported between these tribes in the ethno. sources after this date.

Sum. 1695 Huron to Iroq. until 1696 Peace faction of Iroq. continues to negot. NYCD 9: 619-621 and reaffirm peace with Iroq.

8/1695 Miami to Iroq. Miami force the Wea to give them their NYCD 9:621 Iroq. prisoners. The Miami spare their live which indicates they probably are planning to negotiate a trade of captives with the Iroq. However, no meeting between the Miami and Iroq. takes place until Sp. 1697.

Fall 1695 Iroq. and Huron until 1696 Iroq. and Huron reaffirm peace. Iroq. rep. NYCD 9: 631 try to include the French and other tribes at Michiii. to take part but they refuse.

continued on next page Table 9 (continued)

Date Initiator of Negotiation Duration Fails or Succeeds? Source(s)

2/1697 Mohawk to French none Mohawk send back 2 French captives in order NYCD: 665-666 to gain the release of one Mohawk captive. Frontenac threatens to kill the Mohawks and releases no prisoners. He release no prisoners not until all French captives are released.

Sp. 1697 Iroq. to Miami none Iroq. peace delegation is attacked by the NYCD 9: 672 Michiii. tribes while on Lake Erie and are U) d efeated . g 6/9/1697 French to Iroq. none French inform the Iroq. they desire peace, but NYCD 4: 280-281, 295 want them to come Canada to negotiate it. Iroq. want peace also but want French to come to Onondaga. Warfare diminishes between both groups but official end to conflict still not resolved.

9/1697 Oneida to French Oneida bring in a French prisoner. They inform NYCD 9: 670 the French the Iroq. desire peace. They also indicate that many of the Oneida may relocate to New France.

8/1697 Iroq. and Huron and Miami Tentative peace negotiations occur. Both Hur. NYCD: 672 and Miami interested in gaining access to Eng. trade and want hostilities with Iroq. to end.

continued on next page Table 9 (continued)

Date Initiator of Negotiation Duration Fails or Succeeds? Source(s)

11/1697 Onondaga and Oneida to none Onon. and Oneida inform iroq. that Upper NYCD 9; 679-680 French Iroq. nations wish peace. Frontenac states that peace cannot be estab. until all French and Ind. are released. Iroq. promise to return in spring.

4 /6/1698 Onon. and Oneida to French none Iroq. try again to negot. a peace. Frotenac NYCD 4: 336, 342 sends the represent, away stating that the Cayuga and Seneca must be present. w One of the ambassadors is taken hostage. aio Sum. 1698 Iroq. to French none Iroq. request the French to meet at village of NYCD 9: 685 Onondaga to negot. peace. Prisoners from both sides could be exchanged there. Iroq. state they only want peace with French and wish to continue war with Western Algonkians. Frontenac rejects offer. Any peace must include the W. Algon. and abide by his terms. He orders the war to continue.

March-April French and French Ind., and truce With new governor, Callieres, the French send NYCD 4: 558-559 1699 Iroq. send peace represent, to Onondaga to begin peace negotiations and a time table for the release of prisoners. French still want all Iroq. tribes to send represent, to meet in Canada.

continued on next page Table 9 (continued)

Date Initiator of Negotiation Duration Fails or Succeeds? Source(s)

7/22/1699 French to Iroq. truce French as a sign of good faith release all of NYCD 4; 532 their Iroq. prisoners.

Early 1700 Iroq. and Algon. truce Algon. give the Iroq. present indicating their NYCD 9; 717 sincerity in negotiating a permanent peace.

6/16/1700 Ottawa, Stiagigroone, until 1750s Ottawa and several Missauga tribes? neg. NYCD 4: 690,694, 732, 737 Assissagigroone, and Odsid- a peace with the Iroq. and request permission danw e and the Iroq. to settle near the Seneca in the S. Ontario Penin. ON along the N. shore of Lake Ontario.

7/18/1700 Seneca to French until 1740s Seneca promis peace and French agree as NYCD 9: 710 long as all the Iroq. represent, show up at a peace council planned in two months. Prisoners must be brought in.

9/3-8/1700 Iroq. and French until 1740s Peace is officially recognized. It is agreed by NYCD 9: 715-720, 798-799, both sides that all prisoners still held will be 803-804 brought in and exchanged at a meeting the following year. Peace will be confirmed with West. Algon. at this time.

6/19/1701 Iroq., English and French until 1740s French and English meet with Iroq. at NYCD 4:690,694, 732, 737 Onondaga and peace is reaffirmed.

continued on next page Table 9 (continued)

Date Initiator of Negotiation Duration Fails or Succeeds? Source(s)

6/23/1701 4 West. Algon. tribes and until 1750s peace is reaffirmed NYCD 4; 894, 899 Ottawa, and Iroq.

8/4/1701 French, West. Algon., and until 1740s or Grand Peace Settlement of 1701. Peace is NYCD 9; 722-724 French Ind., and Irotp 1730s made official and prisoners are exchanged.

8/27/1701 French and Iroq. until 1740s French go to Onondaga to retrieve Miami NYCD 4:918 prisoners and to reaffirm peace. OJ ovj Time Period Iroquois Initiated Opponent Initiated Attacks Attacks K %. K &

A.D. 1649 to 1659 100 (88%) 14 (12%) A.D. 1660 to 1669 46 (73%) 17 (17%) A.D. 1670 to 1679 12 (92%) 1 (8%) A.D. 1680 to 1701 79 (63%) 47 (47% )

Table 10. List of who initiated combat, the Iroquois or their opponent(s), represented by the designated time periods.

308 Peace Representatives Specific Conflict Captured/Killed Precipitates War Intensifies War

French, Algonkian and Huron War (A.D. 1649 to 1653) X(2) X

Neutral and Tobacco War

Erie War X X

French, Algonkian and Huron War (A.D. 1657 to 1666) X(6) XX o Abenaki War X X

Susquehannock War X X

New England Indian War (A.D. 1664 to 1669) X X

Illinois, Miami, and Shawnee War (A.D. 1677 to 1701)

French and French allied Indian War (A.D. 1687 to 1701) X(2) X X

(#) = number of reported incidents

Table 11. List of the major conflicts of the "Beaver Wars" and the relationship of aggression toward Iroquois peace representatives. miles

Canadian Interior SL Lawrence River Valley W. New New England York

Iroquoia OJ H-» Great O Lakes Susquehanna and Delaware River

Illinois andjMissiffiippi RivedValldV Ohio River Valley

Viiginia and SoutheasJ le S o u th

Figure 1. The study area showing the delineated sub-regions. P . . . . 2^0 N miles T

Iroquoia

OJ

Figure 2. The traditional territory of the Iroquois. 2ÿO miles

^ New England Tribes are Western Aigonkians I Tributaries to the Iroquois Subjugated/Tributary

►—>w NJ

The Iroquois Empire'

Maximum Boundary of Iroquois Territory

Figure 3. Traditional portrayal of eighteenth century land claims of the Iroquois as advocated by the English. Modified from Jennings (1984). Figure 4. An artist's rendering of an Iroquois wooden mantlet.

313 //.' 'Av r,

V/V

Figure 5. Dramatization of an Iroquois direct assault upon an Erie fortification in A.D. 1655.

314 Unflanked Fortifications

O

Flanked Fortification

O = individual with shield

Figure 6. Fortification styles of the seventeenth century.

315 N ew France Nuzpiwiag

Refugee Zone Iroquois OJt-J /Fi raNatigj o\ ''^''^Susaueh* ? (1650s) Area that between A.D. 1649 and 1680 was vacated by original occupants because m m m of warfare with the Iroquois = Area apparently temporally vacated by Illinois 7:*;- indigenous tribes in the 165(« and 1660s (1650s) because of warfare with the Iroquois and Sioux. This area was retKcupied by the Illinois and Miami in the late 1660s and 1670s, although still utilized by the Iroquois for hunting a tribe that was attacked and dispersed by warfare with the Iroquois

a dispersal route of a tribe or portion of the tribe

Figure 7. Map of areas abandoned by indigenous occupants because of warfare with the Iroquois. The Iroquois laid claim to areas east of the Wabash River and Lake Michigan, but also utilized the Illinois area for hunting. miles

Quebec Three Rivers Montreal

iroquoia ÜJ N = 20 to 30 attacks

= 10 to 19 attacks

= 5 to 9 attacks

- an area where significant Iroquois attacks were directed

= an area where Iroquois attacks probably occurred

Figure 8. Map of where Iroquois attacks were focused, A.D. 1649-1659. miles

Quebec

1650s yThree Rivers Montreal

Iroquoia w 1651 H-» 00 ? 1650s = Huron Dispersal Route

= Erie Dispersal Route

1650 = Date(s) of Iroquois attacks in this region

Figure 9. The dispersal of the Huron and Erie in the 1650s. Note that wherever the Huron fled they were followed and attacked by the Iroquois. Little is known about the Erie dispersal except that part of this tribe fled south into the Appalachians. 2p0 miles

Hurgo/Tobacco' Montreal Ottawa'

Iroquoia

= an area where extensive warfare occurred

= specific group on Shawnee which attack or attacks directed

Figure 10. Map of where Iroquois attacks were focused, A.D. 1660-1669. Quintio Ganneious

Quinte Ganestiquiagon Ganaraske

o AjOuinaouatoua

i = an Iroquois fishing village À = an Iroquois village

Figure 11. Approximate location of Northern Lake Ontario Iroquois villages in the late 1660s and 1670s, based on Konrad (1987). Many families of Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, and Oneida formed villages along the north shore for better protection from their enemies and better trade opportunities. miles

Iroquoia

Potawatomie V Fox V □ = an area where extensive warfare occurred

Illinois = specific group upon Shawnee' which an attack or attacks were directed

Figure 12. Map of where Iroquois attacks were focused, A.D. 1670-1679. miles

Ft. Chambly Ft. Michilimackinac' Ft. Frontenai

La Baye

ÜJ lamis Chicacc

Ft. St. Louis ■ = French Fort Ft. de CreveciHîur

Figure 13. Expansion of French trade and missionaries into the Great Lakes and Illinois and Mississippi regions led to the establishment of the following posts between A.D. 1670 and 1684 (based on Tanner 1687). miles

Ottawa :hippewa

1670

uroj Iroquoia g Miami

1670-1671

after 1671? = immigration route and date

Figure 14. Between A.D. 1660 and 1671 many Western Algonkian populations, that included the Potawatomie, Ottawa, Fox, Sac, Menominee, Illinois, Mascoutin, Kickapoo, Miami, Chippewa, the Iroquoian-speaking Huron and Tobacco, and Siouan-speaking Winnebago, lived in multi-tribal villages in Wisconsin and the Upper Michigan Peninsula, called the Refugee Zone (White 1991). After A.D. 1670, several of these tribes began to disperse out of this region. P . . . . 5 mi es

La C hine M ontrca

Ft. Michilimackinac^,^ ^ Ft. Frontunac

Ft. N ia ea o q u o i

Ft. S t.X ou = an area where extensive warfare occurred

X = a significant battle(s)

Figure 15. Map of where Iroquois attacks were focused, A.D. 1680-1701. Casualties

= Iroquois Casualties

= French and Indian Casualties

w K) Ol

Year 1690 1691 1692 1693 1694 1695 1696 1697 1698 1699 1700

Figure 16. Year by year casualties for the Iroquois, and French and French allied Indians as reported by ethnohistoric sources. Iroquoia w Probable ancestral homeland area of Shawnee migration route (and Shawnee date) of Shawnee

1670 to 1700

Figure 17. In A.D. 1683 the Jesuits reported that the Shawnee were forced to abandon their country. Before this date some Shawnee had already left, fleeing to the Wabash and Illinois Rivers, and allying themselves with the Illinois and Miami. The map shows where different Shawnee groups dispersed. Ft. Frontenac (est. 1674) La Barre s 1684 invasion = Derionviile's 1687 invasion route

f Km I = a French Fort

Ft. Niagara (est. 16 X = an engagement

# = an Iroquois fishing village ^ = an Iroquois village

Figure 18. French offensive invasions. La Barre's invasion of A.D. 1684 was stopped at La Famine by sickness (malaria) and because the Iroquois were well prepared. In contrast, DenonvUle's campaign in A.D. 1687 was successful, reaching its objective, the Seneca villages. Note the different routes used. Denonville purposely took a southern route so as to keep the Iroquois guessing about which tribe they were going to attack. As a result the Seneca were not aided by the other Iroquois in this specific battle. IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (Q A -3 ) /

/

%

1.0 23 2.2

12.0 l.l 1.8

1.25 1.4 1.6

150mm

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