UDC: 355.48:94](497.11:497.2)“1214/1215“:930.2(497.2) DOI: 10.34298/9788677431396.12

Ivelin IVANOV St. Cyril and St. Methodius University Bulgaria

BULGARIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY ON THE MILITARY CAMPAIGNS AGAINST SERBIA IN 1214–1215: A RECONSIDERATION

Abstract: The Bulgarian-Serbian conflict of 1214 is related to the rule of Tsar Boril (1207-1218), traditionally regarded as a weak and unsuccessful ruler. The author summarizes the positions on this conflict among the most prominent Bulgarian medievalists in several aspects: the reasons and the cause of the conflict, the course of the campaigns of 1214 and 1215, and its consequences. In conclusion, the author formulated several major trends in the positions of Bulgarian historians on the issue in question, stressing that the conflict and the campaigns of 1214 and 1215 require further and deeper analytical research. Keywords: middle ages, Bulgarian-Serbian relations, Tsar Boril, Stefan the First- Crowned, Strez.

The Bulgaria–Serbia relations at the beginning of the 13th century are not among the leading topics in Bulgarian historiography1. Rather, the bilateral

1 The Bulgarian–Serbian conflict in the 13–14th centuries spread in two directions: to , Branichevo and Vidin regions, and to . The conflict in the southwest territory was exacerbated by the separatist actions of local rulers, the strongest of whom was Strez. After the death of Tsar Kaloyan in 1207, Strez lost his positions in the struggle for the throne, but succeeded in establishing political control over territories in the southwest, centered on the fortress of Prosek. As a result of an active policy, Stres established close relations with Great Prince Stefan Nemanjić (1165–1228) and acted openly against Bulgarian Tsar Boril. The Strez’s role and his activities in the events in question in Bulgarian historiography are presented below,

251 Ivelin Ivanov relations in the 9–10th centuries, during the period of the re-establishment of the Bulgarian Tsardom at the end of the 12th century, as well as the Bulgaria– Serbia relations in the 14th century, are much more popular and disputed. The first Bulgarian academic historian to analyze the reign of Tsar Boril (1207–1218) was prof. Marin Drinov. In the study Имали ли са сърбите някои колонии и някоя тайна власт в Македония преди XIII век? Как са се наричали славяните, които населявали Македония, преди тая епоха, prof. Drinov presents, in particular, the local ruler Sebastokrator Strez and his complicated relations with Serbian Grand Prince Stefan Nemanjić (Stephen the First-Crowned), but without any comment on the military campaigns against Serbia from 1214–1215.2 Therefore, the true beginning of the present historiographical review should be associated with the name and research of Czech mediaevalist Konstantin Josef Jireček. Although he was not a Bulgarian by birth, K. Jireček was a significant figure among the founders of Bulgarian academic historiography and his research strongly influenced the first generation of Bulgarian professional historians. In his work Историjа Срба Jireček notes that the reasons that gave rise to the Bulgaria–Serbia conflict of 1214 were related to border disputes and territorial claims by both Bulgaria and Hungary. As a cause for the beginning of the military conflict, K. Jireček pointed out the demand by Bulgarian Tsar Boril for the surrender of Sebastokrator Strez, which Serbian ruler Stefan Nemanjić did not agree to.3 Although Konstantin Jireček analyzed this clash only in brief, his position on this issue had a far-reaching effect on the following generation of Bulgarian professional historians. The next Bulgarian medievalist to discuss the events in question was Professor Vasil Zlatarski. In the third volume of his general study История на българската държава през средните векове, he analyses the rule of Tsar Boril, his conflict with the separatist local ruler Strez, and the orientation but I would like to outline a new and interesting thesis about the relations between Sevastokrator Strez, Tsar Boril and Serbian ruler Stefan the First-Crowned. According to Serbian medievalist Ivana Komatina, the alliance between Strez and Stephen the First-Crowned should be dated not in 1208, but after 1211, and the end of this alliance – with the Bulgarian–Latin campaign against Serbia from 1213–1214. И. Коматина, Историјска подлога чудâ Св. Симеона у Житију Симеоновом од Стефана Првовенчаног, Зборник радова Византолошког института LI (2014) 111–134. 2 М. Дринов, Имали ли са сърбите някои колонии и някоя тайна власт в Македония преди XIII век? Как са се наричали славяните, които населявали Македония,преди тая епоха, Избрани съчинения, том. II, София 1971, 314–328. 3 К. Иречек, История на българите, София 1978, 289; К. Jиречек, Историjа Срба, т. I, Београд 1978, 214. “Когато Борилъ и Хенрихъ не могли да изпросятъ у великия жупанъ да имъ предаде (sic) Стрѣза, тѣ предприели съвмѣстенъ воененъ походъ противъ Сърбия.”

252 Bulgarian historiography on the military campaigns against Serbia in 1214–1215: a reconsideration of the latter to Stefan Nemanjić’s side. Professor Zlatarski studied the deepening of the Bulgaria–Serbia conflict, stressing the fact that Strez and his political maneuvering were both the general cause of, and the main factor in, the outbreak of the conflict of 1214. Next, V. Zlatarski dates the death of Sebastokrator Strez in the year 1215 and presumes that the killing was instigated by the Serbian ruler, but the killers belonged to the inner circle of vassals and companions of Strez.4 Also, Professor Zlatarski disagrees with Konstantin Jireček’s thesis about the cause of the conflict in Историjа Срба and assumes that the final goals of the war in 1214 were the destruction of Serbia and the deposition of Stefan the First-Crowned.5 Vasil Zlatarski is also of the opinion that the initiator of the war was the Bulgarian ruler and indicates three main objectives: 1) returning of occupied lands; 2) strengthening of domestic political positions; and 3) destroying the alliance between the Serbian ruler and Strez, and recruiting the latter as an ally. As far as the course of the military campaign is concerned, prof. Zlatarski points out that the planned march in 1214 was not actually realized. He backs his thesis not with a military defeat, but with reconciliation between Stefan the First-Crowned and Boril, as the latter had already achieved some of the initial goals mentioned above.6 Further on, analyzing the Hungarian–Latin campaign against the Serbian ruler in the spring of 1215, Vasil Zlatarski supports the view that Boril’s involvement is uncertain, but that the Bulgarian ruler gave the Latins a free pass through his realm. According to Zlatarski, after the unsuccessful march of 1214 and the death of Sebastokrator Strez, Tsar Boril was unable to take military action in 1215.7 The above positions were accepted (thoroughly or almost without criticism) by the next generations of Bulgarian medievalists. Among the founders and leading authorities in the Bulgarian medieval research is also Professor Petar Mutafchiev, with his works Сръбското разширение в Македония през средните векове and История на българския народ. A more detailed and well-argumented position on the events in question could also be found in his study Владетелите на Просек. Страници из

4 В. Златарски, История на българската държава през Средните векове, Т. ІІІ, Второ българско царство. България при Асеневци (1187–1280), София 1940 (2007) 317; В. Златарски, Българо-сръбските политически отношения в миналото, Българска историческа библиотека, година трета, том втори, София 1930, 83. 5 В. Златарски, История на българската държава през Средните векове, т. ІІІ, 310. 6 В. Златарски, Българо-сръбските политически отношения в миналото, 82–83. 7 В. Златарски, История на българската държава презъ Средните векове, т. ІІІ, 319–320.

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историята на българите в края на XII и началото на XIII в.8 In this work, P. Mutafchiev defends the thesis that Strez was the real leader of the military campaign against Grand Prince Stefan Nemanjić in 1214. Mutafchiev dates Strez’s death in 1214, believing the conspiracy was initiated by Serbian agents.9 According to Petar Mufafchiev, the leading motives of Tsar Boril in this war were a revenge for Stefan II’s hostility and, secondly, a punishment for the Serbian support for Sebastokrator Strez, which resulted in separating Macedonia from the Bulgarian Tsardom after 1208.10 Another goal of the 1214 campaign was Boril’s desire for an easy military success aimed at strengthening his position on the throne, according to Professor Mutafchiev.11 Also, Mutafchiev dates the subsequent Hungarian–Latin campaign against the Serbian Kingdom to 1215, but without noticing the Bulgarian ruler Boril in this event. The final conclusion of the author is that the Serbian ruler pursued both direct and further political interventions in Bulgaria. It can be summarized that in his studies Professor Mutafchiev stresses the leading position of Sebastokrator Strez, while Tsar Boril is qualified as a weak and minor political figure. Thus, Petar Mutafchiev agrees with Jireček’s and Zlatarski’s negative view of Tsar Boril as a political usurper and a weak tsar. Another Bulgarian medievalist – professor Petar Nikov, also describes Tsar Boril as a helpless ruler who failed to stop the expansion of Serbian influence in the southwestern Bulgarian lands. In his article Цар Борил под светлината на един нов паметник, prof. Nikov admits that the anti-Serbian coalition was a consequence of the domestic political instability of usurper Boril, who succeeded in keeping the crown thanks to Hungarian and Latin support.12 Petar Nikov mentions the Serbian politics and Serbian Grand Prince Stefan only with regard to the second military campaign in 1215, assuming that Tsar

8 П. Мутафчиев, Изток и Запад в европейското Средновековие, Владетелите на Просек. Страници из историята на българите в края на XII и началото на XIII в., IV (Стрез и Стефан Неман, Сава), Сборник на Българската академия на науките 1 (София 1913) 82–107. 9 П. Мутафчиев, Изток и Запад в европейското Средновековие, с. 104. The author points out that Strez’s campaign against Serbia and his death probably occurred in 1214. According to Prof. Mutafchiev, since Strez’s death preceded that of Michael I Komnenos Doukas, it could not happen after 1214. Also, P. Mutafchiev was of the opinion that the miltary campaign of Latins and Hungarians against Serbia took place in the spring of 1215. 10 П. Мутафчиев, История на българския народ, Т. II, София 1943, 93. Writing about the motives behind the military campaign against Serbia in 1214, Petar Mutafchiev brings a lot of political emotion. According to the author, first of all, Boril wanted to avenge Stephen. 11 П. Мутафчиев, История на българския народ, Т. II, 93. 12 П. Ников, Цар Борил под светлината на един нов паметник, Списание на БАН (СпБАН) 3 (1912) 121–134.

254 Bulgarian historiography on the military campaigns against Serbia in 1214–1215: a reconsideration Boril acted as a Hungarian and Latin ally against the Serbs.13 To summarize, Professor Petar Nikov sets the Bulgaria–Hungary relations at the forefront, while Bulgaria–Latin relations come second, and the Bulgaria–Serbia relations in the period 1211–1215 are considered less important. A different view of the reasons for the events of 1214–1215 can be found in the works of Prof. Petar Angelov. Firstly, he outlines the main political goals of both countries and the intersection of their interests, which originated the conflict.14 He insists that the cause of the military campaign against Serbia in 1214 was that the Serbs claimed the Belgrade and Branichevo region. According to the author, Tsar Boril had hopes for a successful campaign against Serbia not only for the purpose of territorial expansion, but also as a moral and political compensation for the losses in the war against the Latins in the period 1208–1211. According to Professor Angelov, the anti-Serbian coalition’s failure was due to the skillful policy of Stefan the First-Crowned, who managed to cope adequately with his enemies and opponents.15 The thesis about Serbian claims to the Belgrade and Branichevo regions as the cause of the military conflict of 1214–1215 is also discussed by Acad. Vasil Gyuzelev. He concedes that the hostilities arose from the Serbian pursuit of territorial expansion at the expense of the Bulgarian northwest (Belgrade, Branichevo and Vidin areas). Another neuralgic point in their relationship, according to V. Gyuzelev, was the growing Serbian influence in the lands of Macedonia.16 We can also note a similar disposition in the research of Prof. Yordan Andreev. In fact, Prof. Andreev does not give a detailed account of the military campaigns from 1214–1215, but points out that the death of Sebastokrator Strez in 1214 was a real breakthrough in the plans to counter the Serbian influence in Macedonia.17 Assoc. Prof. Hristo Kolarov is another medievalist who deals with the Bulgaria–Serbia relations in the early 13th century. Similarly to Prof. Yordan Andreev, he shares the positions of the historians defining Boril’s policy as weak and fruitless. According to Hristo Kolarov, the Bulgarian Tsar initiated and commenced a war against Serbia, as the military plans warned the entire

13 П. Ников, Цар Борил под светлината на един нов паметник, 130. 14 П. Ангелов, Средновековна България и нейните съседи (дипломация и взаимни представи), София 2017; П. Ангелов, Военните договори на Втората българска държава, Военноисторически сборник (ВИСб) 6 (1985) 87–105. 15 П. Ангелов, Средновековната българска дипломация, София 2011, 88–89. 16 В. Гюзелев, Българското царство през XIII век: насоки и фактори във външната му политика, Зборник радова Византолошког института XLVI (2009) 124–125. 17 Й. Андреев, Българските ханове и царе (VІІ–ХІV в.), София 1988, 128–129.

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Bulgarian–Latin army to attack north, while Sebastokrator Strez directed his troops against Stefan the First-Crowned from the south. According to the same author, the unsuccessful military operation of 1214 marked the end of Boril’s ambitions against Serbia. Hristo Kolarov does not comment on the military campaign in the following 1215 year.18 Similar laconism in the presentation and analysis of the military actions against the Serbs of 1214–1215 can be found in Българска военна история през Средновековието X–XV в. written by Acad. Dimitar Angelov and Dr Angel Cholpanov. The military campaign of 1214 is described in brief, and the authors adhere properly to the already imposed theses. The role that the bustle in the Bulgarian–Latin camp near Niš played in the end of the campaign, as well as the murder of Sebastokrator Strez (probably organized by Stefan Nemanjić), are highlighted as reasons for stopping the campaign far before achieving its final goals.19 The political changes in the Balkans in the context of Bulgarian–Latin relations are also a subject of study by Prof. Anni Dancheva–Vassileva in her monograph България и Латинската империя (1204–1261). According to the author, the initiator of the anti-Serbian coalition and of the military campaign of 1214 was Boril, who managed to win over the as an ally.20 A. Dancheva–Vassileva tries to deviate from the traditional views, seeking additional motives behind the military coalition against Grand Prince Stefan Nemanjić. Thus, the author concludes that the pope’s aspiration to attract Serbia to the circle of allies in the Balkans could also be regarded as a likely cause of the war of 1214.21 According to prof. Dancheva–Vasileva, the fast-paced and unsuccessful end of the Bulgarian–Latin expedition of 2014 can be explained by the effectiveness of Serbian diplomacy. Like the above mediaevalists, she is of the opinion that the murder of Strez and the Epirus’ ruler Michael I Komnenos, was inspired by Serbian diplomacy.22 Also, A. Dancheva–Vassileva highlights the lack of clear written information about likely Bulgarian participation in the campaign against Serbia in 1215.23

18 Хр. Коларов, Средновековната българска държава (уредба, характеристика, отношения със съседните народи), Велико Търново 1977, 54–55. 19 Д. Ангелов, Б. Чолпанов, Българска военна история през Средновековието X–XV век, София 1994, 134. 20 А. Данчева–Василева, България и Латинската империя (1204–1261), София 1985, 108. 21 Ibidem, 108. 22 Ibidem, 109. 23 Ibidem.

256 Bulgarian historiography on the military campaigns against Serbia in 1214–1215: a reconsideration In the remarkable study Фамилията на Асеневци (1186–1460). Генеалогия и просопография, notable Bulgarian medievalist Ivan Bozhilov also pays attention to the military campaign against Stefan the First-Crowned in 1214 and 1215. He assumes that Boril’s motivation for the war of 1214 was somewhere in the middle between aspirations for conquest and the restoration of Bulgarian power in territories previously occupied by the Serbs. In line with the above views, Prof. Bozhilov maintains the opinion that Boril’s personality and rule marked a period of a deep crisis. In this context, Prof. Bozhilov believes that with the campaign of 1214, Tsar Boril sought a victory against his weakest opponent – the Serbian ruler.24 Much more moderate and balanced in the assessment of the events in question is Prof. Genoveva Tsankova–Petkova. She assumes that from the Latin point of view, the Bulgarian–Latin Union was firstly aimed at preventing the possibility of a Bulgarian–Nicean alliance, and, secondly, it was directed against the Serbs in 1214. According to prof. Tsankova–Petkova, the Bulgarian–Latin campaign of 1214 was obviously frustrated because of a skillful maneuver of the Serbs, and that most likely Stefan the First-Crowned managed to stop the advance of enemy troops by causing panic in their camp with the help of spies.25 In addition, Prof. Tsankova–Petkova assumes that Tsar Boril did not join the Latin–Hungarian march against the Serbs in 1215, but gave a free pass to the Latin troops through the Bulgarian lands.26 In his monograph Средновековните Балкани, Professor Hristo Matanov paid particular attention to the Serbian lands in the 13th century.27 The author points at 1207 as the time when the Serbian ruler was actively involved in political clashes and dramatic changes in the Balkan status quo. According to Prof. Matanov, Tsar Kaloyan’s death enabled Stefan the First-Crowned to intervene in the struggle for the southwestern Bulgarian territories.28 Hristo Matanov comments on the short-lasting political friendship between Strez and the Serbian ruler, as well as the subsequent alliance between the Sebastokrator and Epirus ruler Michail Duka Komnin. Prof. Matanov does not specify the year of this political reorientation, but believes that it took place at the beginning of the second decade of the 13th century. Also, the author assumes that it was at the same time when Strez joined an alliance with Bulgarian Tsar

24 И. Божилов, Фамилията на Асеневци (1186–1460). Генеалогия и просопография, София 1985 (1995) 72. 25 Г. Цанкова–Петкова, България при Асеневци, София 1978, 100. 26 Ibidem, 101. 27 Хр. Матанов, Средновековните Балкани. Исторически очерци, София 2002. 28 Ibidem, 257.

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Boril.29 Hristo Matanov supports the view that Sebastokrator Strez was killed in 1214, but does not support the thesis that the Bulgarian–Latin alliance broke up as a result of Serbian diplomatic activity. The author evaluates the end of the 1214 campaign not as a military defeat, but as a reorientation and fast march of the Bulgarian troops to central and northern Macedonia after Strez’s death.30 According to Prof. Matanov, the real reason for the withdrawal of the Bulgarian–Latin army from Niš was the possibility for the Bulgarian Tsar to occupy the Strez’s possessions after his death.31 Thus, it can be summed up that Christo Matanov concentrated all the decisive events and the campaign in 1214, without discussing them in the following 1215 year. Also, he holds the view that the Bulgarian–Latin campaign against Serbia was practically unrealized, and does not accept its premature end as a Serbian military success. In a study devoted to the autonomous and semi-autonomous feudal dominions at the end of the 12th century, Assoc. Prof. Georgi Nikolov analyzes the personality of Sebastokartor Strez and his policy.32 According to the author, Bulgarian Tsar Boril made an alliance with Strez in 1210 or in early 1211. Thus, G. Nikolov diverges substantially from the positions of most of the above Bulgarian medievalists.33 Assoc. Prof. Nikolov maintains Günter Prinzing’s opinion that Strez’s death must be dated in 1211, and that it followed shortly after the Battle of Pelagonia. The author believes that Sebastokrator Strez became too vulnerable after the defeat at Pelagonia, and it helped the conspirators to organize his murder.34 Thus, according to Georgi Nikolov, the anti-Serbian actions led by Boril in 1213–1214 were aimed at preserving territories that had been previously occupied in Macedonia after the death of Strez in 1211. Another author examining the Bulgarian-Serbian relations in 1214–1215 is Prof. Plamen Pavlov. Like most of the above medievalists, he believes that with the 1214 campaign, Boril turned against his weakest enemy, and that the general goal was to destroy Serbia. Plamen Pavlov believes that there were two Bulgarian–Latin military campaigns against the Serbs – in 1214 and in 1215. According to Prof. Pavlov, the military campaigns and the alliance with Strez

29 Ibidem, 258. 30 Ibidem, 258–259. 31 Ibidem, 259. 32 Г. Николов, Самостоятелни и полусамостоятелни владения във възобновеното Българско царство (края на XII–средата на XIII в.), София 2011. 33 Ibidem, 109. 34 Ibidem, 110. Georgi Nikolov points out that as far as the Battle of Pelagonia could be dated between April and July 1211, it can be assumed that Strez was killed after July 1211 or, in general, in the second half of 1211.

258 Bulgarian historiography on the military campaigns against Serbia in 1214–1215: a reconsideration against Serbia were planned earlier, and the rebellion in Vidin against Boril in 1213, which was supported by Stefan the First-Crowned, was a preemptive action that aimed to precede the already planned campaign against Serbia.35 Thus, Plamen Pavlov rejects some already established positions on the events under question. First, he suggests close relations between the Cumans and the Serbs, which indirectly leads to the assumption of two military coalitions in the Balkans in 1213–1215. Also, Prof. Pavlov disagrees with the thesis that Tsar Boril was a weak and unsuccessful ruler. A possible connection between the rebellion against Boril in Vidin and the Bulgaria–Serbia conflict of 1214–1215 was also studied by Dr. Neven Iliev.36 He defends the position that the Vidin revolt broke out in the spring and summer of 1213.37 Thus, Neven Iliev supports the opinion that the rebellion was an essential part of the Bulgarian–Serbian conflict. The logical and argumentative analysis of Dr Iliev supports the thesis of Prof. Plamen Pavlov that the war of 1214–1215 was only the culminating point of a collision, which had started earlier – in 1213. The problem of the rebellion in Vidin and possible connection with the Bulgarian–Serbian conflict is also discussed by young Bulgarian historian Vasil Ninov.38 The author consults some Hungarian royal charters from the middle of the 13th century, concluding that they cannot be a reliable source for determining the year of the rebellion against Boril – in 1210, 1211 or 1213. However, the interference of Serbian ruler Stefan the First-Crowned in these events remains highly probable, according to Vasil Ninov.39 Bulgarian–Serbian relations at the end of the 12th and the first decades of the 13th century are also present in the works of Prof. Alexander Nikolov from

35 Пл. Павлов, “Слаб” владетел ли е цар Борил? [https://literaturensviat.com/?p=69254, 07/10/2018]. According to the author, in 1213 a rebellion against Boril broke out in Vidin, led by “four relatives” whose names still remain unknown. In this situation, Boril did not have enough resources to deal with the rebels and sought help from Hungary. See also: Пл. Павлов, Забравени и неразбрани, София 2010, 146–149. 36 Н. Илиев, Относно времето на потушаването на бунта срещу цар Борил във Видин, Известия на музеите в Северозападна България, (ИМСБ) 9 (1984) 90, 85–94. 37 According to the author, it is not clear for how long this rebellion lasted, but considering the Cumans’ participation in it, it could be assumed that it broke out after King Boril’s negotiations with the . Neven Iliev is of the opinion that this put an end to the Cumans’ raids in Thrace and led some Cuman chieftains to rebel against Boril. As the Bulgarian–Latin negotiations started in the spring or summer of 1213, the outbreak of the rebellion in Vidin may be dated at the same time, according to Neven Iliev. 38 В. Нинов, Сведения за бунта във Видин срещу цар Борил (1207–218) в унгарски кралски грамоти, Bulgaria Medievalis 4/5 (2013–2014) 131–141. 39 В. Нинов, Сведения за бунта във Видин, 139.

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Sofia University.40 Professor Nikolov marks the positions in the historiography of the events in question, accepting some information in Historia expeditione Frederici imperatores and Historia Peregrinorum as the evidence of joint Bulgarian–Serbian actions at the end of the 12th century. The author also summarizes that the Serbian–Byzantine conflict of 1183–1190 helped the success of the Bulgarian rebellion and the rejection of Byzantine power. According to Alexander Nikolov, this period of friendly Bulgarian–Serbian relations ended at the end of the 13th century as a result of the Golden Horde’s influence on the Bulgarian Tsardom. Although indirectly, the author implies that the crisis of 1213–1214 did not seriously impair the Bulgarian–Serbian relations. The above review reveals a few discussion topics. First of all, almost all of the mentioned medievalists consider Boril an unsuccessful ruler. Quite obviously, this position predetermines the analysis of the Bulgarian–Serbian conflict of 1214–1215. Exceptions to and criticism of this thesis have been expressed only in the last decade. Also, most researchers highlight the collapse of the anti-Serbian coalition and share the opinion that in 1214 there was no real military clash between the Bulgarian–Latin coalition and the Serbs. Also, most of the above historians assume that the clashes in the Bulgarian– Latin military camp near Niš were triggered by Serbian spies. The only author who believes that the premature end of the Bulgarian–Latin campaign in 1214 was not a defeat, but a reorientation of Bulgarian activity to Macedonia, is Prof. Christo Matanov. Next, two further discussions can be outlined: about the year of Sebastokrator Strez’s death, and the years of the military campaigns against the Serbs. As far as the second one is concerned, opinions vary from 1213 to 1215, but the views concerning 1214 and 1215 prevail. Concerning the first one, which debates the death of Strez, the positions are divided between 1211 and 1213. However, attributing the death of Sebastokrator Strez to 1211 contradicts the opinion that he joined an alliance with Boril only in 1213 (or in 1214). Obviously, if Strez died in 1211, he could not have been part of the anti-Serbian coalition. Also, there is no single opinion on the military campaign against Serbia in 1215. Some of the above presented Bulgarian medievalists do not discuss the 1215 events, others believe that Boril supported Latins and Hungarians, but without any direct involvement, while some historians admit the participation of Bulgarian troops not only in 1214, but also in 1215.

40 Al. Nikolov, Stephen Nemanja and the Foundation of the 1183– 1190, Стефан Немања и Топлица (тематски зборник), Ниш 2011, 59–69.

260 Bulgarian historiography on the military campaigns against Serbia in 1214–1215: a reconsideration Furthermore, there is no thorough analysis of the role of other factors such as the Cumans in the events in question. Their role is sporadically discussed only in connection with the rebellion in Vidin. A few authors like Petar Nikov, Plamen Pavlov and Neven Iliev consider a possible connection between Serbian Grand Prince Stefan the First-Crowned and the Cumans’ actions against Bulgarian Tsar Boril. This issue deserves more attention and analysis as the Teutonic presence in Burzenland and the Hungarian–Bulgarian–Latin coalition seriously threatened the Cumans’ positions between the Southeastern Carpathians and the Lower Danube. To sum up, the Bulgaria–Serbia conflict of 1214–1215 has been studied by generations of Bulgarian mediaevalists, but entails a new approach and critical research. Since it is part of a larger subject – the activities of the anti-Serbian coalition of 1214–1215, a research breakthrough could be achieved through a comparative analysis of the above views and the non-Bulgarian historiography about this issue.

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Ивелин Иванов

БУГАРСКА ИСТОРИОГРАФИЈА О ВОЈНИМ ПОХОДИМА НА СРБИЈУ 1214–1215. ГОДИНЕ: ЈЕДНО ПРЕИСПИТИВАЊЕ

Тема бугарско-српских односа на почетку 13. века није у главном фокусу бугарске историографије. Тежиште истраживања је усмерено више на бугарско-српске односе у периоду од 9. до 10, као и током 14. века. Истраживања војних конфликата између Срба и Бугара у средњем веку усмерена су пре свега на ратове из периода владавине Бориса I (852−889), Симеона Великог (893−927) и на протусрпски споразум цара Михајла II Асена са Дубровачком републиком из 1253. године. Чланак се бави бугарско-српским конфликтом из периода 1214/1215. године, који не припада склопу популарних и често дискутованих тема у бугарској историографији. Представљени су различити ставови водећих бугарских медиевиста огледом овог питања и то са акцентом на следеће аспекте: Узрок и повод конфликта, развој из њега проистеклих војних операција од 1214. до 1215. године и њихове последице. Следи сажетак представљених ставова научника те апел на хитност и неопходност за дубинским истраживањем овог ратног сукоба уз узимање у обзир нових археолошких и писаних извора. Кључне речи: средњи век, бугарско-српски односи, цар Борил, Велики жупан Стефан Првовенчани, севастократор Стрез.

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