UDC: 355.48:94](497.11:497.2)“1214/1215“:930.2(497.2) DOI: 10.34298/9788677431396.12 Ivelin IVANOV St. Cyril and St. Methodius University Veliko Tarnovo Bulgaria BULGARIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY ON THE MILITARY CAMPAIGNS AGAINST SERBIA IN 1214–1215: A RECONSIDERATION Abstract: The Bulgarian-Serbian conflict of 1214 is related to the rule of Tsar Boril (1207-1218), traditionally regarded as a weak and unsuccessful ruler. The author summarizes the positions on this conflict among the most prominent Bulgarian medievalists in several aspects: the reasons and the cause of the conflict, the course of the campaigns of 1214 and 1215, and its consequences. In conclusion, the author formulated several major trends in the positions of Bulgarian historians on the issue in question, stressing that the conflict and the campaigns of 1214 and 1215 require further and deeper analytical research. Keywords: middle ages, Bulgarian-Serbian relations, Tsar Boril, Stefan the First- Crowned, Sebastokrator Strez. The Bulgaria–Serbia relations at the beginning of the 13th century are not among the leading topics in Bulgarian historiography1. Rather, the bilateral 1 The Bulgarian–Serbian conflict in the 13–14th centuries spread in two directions: to Belgrade, Branichevo and Vidin regions, and to Macedonia. The conflict in the southwest territory was exacerbated by the separatist actions of local rulers, the strongest of whom was Strez. After the death of Tsar Kaloyan in 1207, Strez lost his positions in the struggle for the throne, but succeeded in establishing political control over territories in the southwest, centered on the fortress of Prosek. As a result of an active policy, Stres established close relations with Great Prince Stefan Nemanjić (1165–1228) and acted openly against Bulgarian Tsar Boril. The Strez’s role and his activities in the events in question in Bulgarian historiography are presented below, 251 Ivelin Ivanov relations in the 9–10th centuries, during the period of the re-establishment of the Bulgarian Tsardom at the end of the 12th century, as well as the Bulgaria– Serbia relations in the 14th century, are much more popular and disputed. The first Bulgarian academic historian to analyze the reign of Tsar Boril (1207–1218) was prof. Marin Drinov. In the study Имали ли са сърбите някои колонии и някоя тайна власт в Македония преди XIII век? Как са се наричали славяните, които населявали Македония, преди тая епоха, prof. Drinov presents, in particular, the local ruler Sebastokrator Strez and his complicated relations with Serbian Grand Prince Stefan Nemanjić (Stephen the First-Crowned), but without any comment on the military campaigns against Serbia from 1214–1215.2 Therefore, the true beginning of the present historiographical review should be associated with the name and research of Czech mediaevalist Konstantin Josef Jireček. Although he was not a Bulgarian by birth, K. Jireček was a significant figure among the founders of Bulgarian academic historiography and his research strongly influenced the first generation of Bulgarian professional historians. In his work Историjа Срба Jireček notes that the reasons that gave rise to the Bulgaria–Serbia conflict of 1214 were related to border disputes and territorial claims by both Bulgaria and Hungary. As a cause for the beginning of the military conflict, K. Jireček pointed out the demand by Bulgarian Tsar Boril for the surrender of Sebastokrator Strez, which Serbian ruler Stefan Nemanjić did not agree to.3 Although Konstantin Jireček analyzed this clash only in brief, his position on this issue had a far-reaching effect on the following generation of Bulgarian professional historians. The next Bulgarian medievalist to discuss the events in question was Professor Vasil Zlatarski. In the third volume of his general study История на българската държава през средните векове, he analyses the rule of Tsar Boril, his conflict with the separatist local ruler Strez, and the orientation but I would like to outline a new and interesting thesis about the relations between Sevastokrator Strez, Tsar Boril and Serbian ruler Stefan the First-Crowned. According to Serbian medievalist Ivana Komatina, the alliance between Strez and Stephen the First-Crowned should be dated not in 1208, but after 1211, and the end of this alliance – with the Bulgarian–Latin campaign against Serbia from 1213–1214. И. Коматина, Историјска подлога чудâ Св. Симеона у Житију Симеоновом од Стефана Првовенчаног, Зборник радова Византолошког института LI (2014) 111–134. 2 М. Дринов, Имали ли са сърбите някои колонии и някоя тайна власт в Македония преди XIII век? Как са се наричали славяните, които населявали Македония,преди тая епоха, Избрани съчинения, том. II, София 1971, 314–328. 3 К. Иречек, История на българите, София 1978, 289; К. Jиречек, Историjа Срба, т. I, Београд 1978, 214. “Когато Борилъ и Хенрихъ не могли да изпросятъ у великия жупанъ да имъ предаде (sic) Стрѣза, тѣ предприели съвмѣстенъ воененъ походъ противъ Сърбия.” 252 Bulgarian historiography on the military campaigns against Serbia in 1214–1215: a reconsideration of the latter to Stefan Nemanjić’s side. Professor Zlatarski studied the deepening of the Bulgaria–Serbia conflict, stressing the fact that Strez and his political maneuvering were both the general cause of, and the main factor in, the outbreak of the conflict of 1214. Next, V. Zlatarski dates the death of Sebastokrator Strez in the year 1215 and presumes that the killing was instigated by the Serbian ruler, but the killers belonged to the inner circle of vassals and companions of Strez.4 Also, Professor Zlatarski disagrees with Konstantin Jireček’s thesis about the cause of the conflict in Историjа Срба and assumes that the final goals of the war in 1214 were the destruction of Serbia and the deposition of Stefan the First-Crowned.5 Vasil Zlatarski is also of the opinion that the initiator of the war was the Bulgarian ruler and indicates three main objectives: 1) returning of occupied lands; 2) strengthening of domestic political positions; and 3) destroying the alliance between the Serbian ruler and Strez, and recruiting the latter as an ally. As far as the course of the military campaign is concerned, prof. Zlatarski points out that the planned march in 1214 was not actually realized. He backs his thesis not with a military defeat, but with reconciliation between Stefan the First-Crowned and Boril, as the latter had already achieved some of the initial goals mentioned above.6 Further on, analyzing the Hungarian–Latin campaign against the Serbian ruler in the spring of 1215, Vasil Zlatarski supports the view that Boril’s involvement is uncertain, but that the Bulgarian ruler gave the Latins a free pass through his realm. According to Zlatarski, after the unsuccessful march of 1214 and the death of Sebastokrator Strez, Tsar Boril was unable to take military action in 1215.7 The above positions were accepted (thoroughly or almost without criticism) by the next generations of Bulgarian medievalists. Among the founders and leading authorities in the Bulgarian medieval research is also Professor Petar Mutafchiev, with his works Сръбското разширение в Македония през средните векове and История на българския народ. A more detailed and well-argumented position on the events in question could also be found in his study Владетелите на Просек. Страници из 4 В. Златарски, История на българската държава през Средните векове, Т. ІІІ, Второ българско царство. България при Асеневци (1187–1280), София 1940 (2007) 317; В. Златарски, Българо-сръбските политически отношения в миналото, Българска историческа библиотека, година трета, том втори, София 1930, 83. 5 В. Златарски, История на българската държава през Средните векове, т. ІІІ, 310. 6 В. Златарски, Българо-сръбските политически отношения в миналото, 82–83. 7 В. Златарски, История на българската държава презъ Средните векове, т. ІІІ, 319–320. 253 Ivelin Ivanov историята на българите в края на XII и началото на XIII в.8 In this work, P. Mutafchiev defends the thesis that Strez was the real leader of the military campaign against Grand Prince Stefan Nemanjić in 1214. Mutafchiev dates Strez’s death in 1214, believing the conspiracy was initiated by Serbian agents.9 According to Petar Mufafchiev, the leading motives of Tsar Boril in this war were a revenge for Stefan II’s hostility and, secondly, a punishment for the Serbian support for Sebastokrator Strez, which resulted in separating Macedonia from the Bulgarian Tsardom after 1208.10 Another goal of the 1214 campaign was Boril’s desire for an easy military success aimed at strengthening his position on the throne, according to Professor Mutafchiev.11 Also, Mutafchiev dates the subsequent Hungarian–Latin campaign against the Serbian Kingdom to 1215, but without noticing the Bulgarian ruler Boril in this event. The final conclusion of the author is that the Serbian ruler pursued both direct and further political interventions in Bulgaria. It can be summarized that in his studies Professor Mutafchiev stresses the leading position of Sebastokrator Strez, while Tsar Boril is qualified as a weak and minor political figure. Thus, Petar Mutafchiev agrees with Jireček’s and Zlatarski’s negative view of Tsar Boril as a political usurper and a weak tsar. Another Bulgarian medievalist – professor Petar Nikov, also describes Tsar Boril as a helpless ruler who failed to stop the expansion of Serbian influence in the southwestern Bulgarian lands. In his article Цар Борил под светлината на един нов паметник, prof. Nikov admits that the anti-Serbian coalition was a consequence of the domestic political instability of usurper Boril, who succeeded in keeping the crown thanks to Hungarian and Latin support.12 Petar Nikov mentions the Serbian politics and Serbian Grand Prince Stefan only with regard to the second military campaign in 1215, assuming that Tsar 8 П. Мутафчиев, Изток и Запад в европейското Средновековие, Владетелите на Просек. Страници из историята на българите в края на XII и началото на XIII в., IV (Стрез и Стефан Неман, Сава), Сборник на Българската академия на науките 1 (София 1913) 82–107.