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Strategy, Bureaucracy and the Development of US Political Warfare

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Strategy, Bureaucracy and the Development of US Political Warfare DISORDER OVER DESIGN: STRATEGY, BUREAUCRACY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. POLITICAL WARFARE IN EUROPE, 1945-1950 by STEPHEN JOHN KENNETH LONG A thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of American and Canadian Studies School of Historical Studies The University of Birmingham September 2008 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Access to Research Theses INFORMATION FOR ABSTRACTING AND INDEXING SERVICES The information on this form will be published. To minimize any risk of inaccuracy, use only a word-processor or typewriter to complete it. Please supply two copies. Full name (surname first): Long, Stephen John Kenneth School/Department: School of Historical Studies/ Department of American and Canadian Studies Full title of thesis/dissertation: Disorder over Design: Strategy, Bureaucracy and the Development of U.S. Political Warfare in Europe, 1945-1950 Degree: PhD Date of submission: 29 September 2008 Date of award of degree (leave blank): Abstract (not to exceed 200 words - any continuation sheets must contain the author's full name and full title of the thesis/dissertation): This study explores factors behind the development of a covert political warfare capability by the United States government from 1945-1950. Specifically, it examines the place of political warfare within U.S. policy and bureaucracy towards Europe and the Soviet Union. Political warfare was defined expansively to comprise psychological, political, economic and paramilitary actions. External factors are significant, above all the deterioration of relations between Washington and Moscow and the onset of the Cold War. But specific emphasis is given to internal aspects. In particular, strategic and bureaucratic factors are examined that shaped the inauguration of an unprecedented peacetime capability of subversive foreign intervention. The central hypothesis is that disorder prevailed over design as a political warfare programme was developed against the Soviet bloc. Institutional conflicts overshadowed a unified national approach, while coordination between departments and agencies hampered effective implementation. Furthermore, the position of political warfare within broader U.S. foreign policy remained ambiguous and problematic. Washington failed to formulate a workable, unified strategy towards the east integrating political warfare. This undermined the fundamental American objective in the early Cold War to retract Soviet power peacefully from Eastern Europe. A legacy of strategic incoherence beyond 1950 resulted. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My PhD supervisor Scott Lucas deserves my primary intellectual and personal thanks. Scott has been a constant and valued source of intellectual guidance and stimulation over the course of this project. While I am fully responsible for the contents, he has undoubtedly enhanced my work by tirelessly encouraging me to push boundaries further. I am extremely grateful to the Arts and Humanities Research Council for providing me with financial support, without which this study would not have been possible. The AHRC also funded a research trip to the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, as did the Hawgood Family who generously supported a separate trip to the Truman Library in Independence, Missouri. Many archivists in both installations helped me to navigate the vast collections of primary materials. Particular thanks go to Liz Safly and Randy Sowell at the Truman Library for all their help, while the scholarly advice of Anne Deighton and Nicholas Keegan among others was greatly appreciated. I would also like to thank the American and Canadian Studies Department at the University of Birmingham. Particular thanks go to Mags and Gaye who have cheerfully answered all my countless queries over the years. I owe the most gratitude to my family and friends for sustaining me during the course of my research. My mum, dad, brother and sister have unconditionally provided me with emotional support and reassurance. Finally, as a sign of my appreciation of her constant faith and love during this most testing journey for us both, I dedicate this work to Hui. TABLE OF CONTENTS Abbreviations i National Security Council Directives iii Introduction 1 1. The Origins of Political Warfare: The Development of Peacetime Intelligence and the National Security Act of 1947 27 Part 1: The Organisational Roots of Political Warfare: From OSS to CIG 30 CIG’s Expansion: The Non-Strategic Development of a Political Warfare Capability 34 The Onset of the Cold War: Wartime Psychological Warfare Planning 39 Part 2: The Pursuit of Intelligence Legislation and Creation of the CIA 46 The Drafting of an Intelligence Bill 49 The Unification of the Armed Services and the Merger Bill 54 Endnotes 61 2. Holding the Line: ERP, the Communist Challenge, and the Bureaucratic Struggle over Psychological Warfare 72 The Marshall Plan and the Cominform 75 The Long March to Psychological Warfare Begins 82 The Convergence of SANACC and Peacetime Psychological Warfare 87 Interim Measures and the Bureaucratic Quagmire 92 The Final Phase: Bridging the Bureaucratic Divide 99 The End of the Beginning: The Adoption of NSC 4-A 107 Endnotes 111 3. Cold Wars in Europe and Washington: Administrative Conflict and the Inauguration of Political Warfare 117 SPG and the Initiation of Covert Psychological Warfare 119 The Cold War in Europe, Italy and the Historical Narrative 123 The Debate Begins over the Organisation of Political Warfare 130 PPS and the Origins of Peacetime Political Warfare 132 The PPS-CIA Feud 141 The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare 145 Administrative Differences Widen-The Director of Special Studies 149 NSC 10 155 Allen Dulles and the ISG’s Interim Report 157 Hillenkoetter’s Compromise Proposal 164 The Lovett-Forrestal-Dulles Meeting: An Alternative to NSC 10 166 The Special Services Unit 168 From The Office of Special Services to the Office of Special Projects 173 The Final Phase- The Redrafting of NSC 10/1 179 An Uneasy Compromise: Approval of NSC 10/2 181 Endnotes 187 4. The Strategic Dilemma: The Pursuit of a Soviet Bloc Policy, Titoism, and Program A 195 The Debates over Soviet Bloc Policy in 1948 198 The Adoption of NSC 20/4 209 Germany, Program A and the Ramifications for the Cold War 213 U.S. Policy and the Moscow-Belgrade Dispute 221 The Spring 1949 Policy Debates 230 The Development of Soviet Bloc Policy, June-December 1949 237 The London Conference of U.S. Ministers to Eastern Europe 245 The Adoption of NSC 58/2 255 The Transition of Policy in 1950 259 Endnotes 271 5. Systemic Disorder: The Divergence of Policy and Operations before the Korean War 279 The Administration of Political Warfare Post-NSC 10/2 282 The Activation of OPC 296 Sanctioning a Broad Operational Mandate 301 OPC’s Autonomy and the Futility of Policy Guidance 307 The Launch of Operations by OPC 317 Albania: Operation Valuable 319 A Misplaced Action against Yugoslavia 324 Poland: Support of WIN 326 The Ukraine: Operation ZRELOPE 328 Endnotes 332 6. A Legacy of Disorder over Design: The Strategic and Operational Failure of U.S. Political Warfare after 1950 339 The Impact of NSC 68 on Strategy and Operations 341 The Organisation of Operations under the CIA 358 The Rise and Fall of PSB 361 The Persistence of Strategic Flaws beyond the Truman Administration 372 Endnotes 375 Conclusion 381 Bibliography 386 ABBREVIATIONS ADPC Assistant Director for Policy Coordination ADSO Assistant Director for Special Operations AFL American Federation of Labor ASG Advanced Study Group CFM Council of Foreign Ministers CIA Central Intelligence Agency CIG Central Intelligence Group CIO Congress of Industrial Organizations Cominform Communist Information Bureau Comintern Communist International DCI Director of Central Intelligence DDCI Deputy Director of Central Intelligence DDP Deputy Director of Plans [Central Intelligence Agency] DP Displaced Person ECA Economic Cooperation Administration ERP European Recovery Program FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation IAB Intelligence Advisory Board ICD Information Control Division ISG Intelligence Survey Group JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff JSPC Joint Subsidiary Plans Committee MGB Soviet Ministry of State Security NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NCFE National Committee for a Free Europe NIA National Intelligence Authority NIAD National Intelligence Authority Directive NME National Military Establishment NSC National Security Council NSRB National Security Resources Board OCB Operations Coordinating Board OIR Office of Intelligence and Research [State Department] OMGUS Office of Military Government, United States OPC Office of Policy Coordination OSO Office of Special Operations [Central Intelligence Group/Agency] OSP Office of Special Projects OSS Office of Strategic Services OUN Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists PCI Italian Communist Party PDF Popular Democratic Front [Italian] PPS Policy Planning Staff [State Department] PSB Psychological Strategy
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