JOURNEY to JUSTICE Continued from Page 145 a Continual Anxiety Over Her Personal Safety
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The International Response to Conflict and Genocide:Lessom from the Rwanda Experience
The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience March 1996 Published by: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda Editor: David Millwood Cover illustrations: Kiure F. Msangi Graphic design: Designgrafik, Copenhagen Prepress: Dansk Klich‚, Copenhagen Printing: Strandberg Grafisk, Odense ISBN: 87-7265-335-3 (Synthesis Report) ISBN: 87-7265-331-0 (1. Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors) ISBN: 87-7265-332-9 (2. Early Warning and Conflict Management) ISBN: 87-7265-333-7 (3. Humanitarian Aid and Effects) ISBN: 87-7265-334-5 (4. Rebuilding Post-War Rwanda) This publication may be reproduced for free distribution and may be quoted provided the source - Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda - is mentioned. The report is printed on G-print Matt, a wood-free, medium-coated paper. G-print is manufactured without the use of chlorine and marked with the Nordic Swan, licence-no. 304 022. 2 The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience Study 2 Early Warning and Conflict Management by Howard Adelman York University Toronto, Canada Astri Suhrke Chr. Michelsen Institute Bergen, Norway with contributions by Bruce Jones London School of Economics, U.K. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 3 Contents Preface 5 Executive Summary 8 Acknowledgements 11 Introduction 12 Chapter 1: The Festering Refugee Problem 17 Chapter 2: Civil War, Civil Violence and International Response 20 (1 October 1990 - 4 August -
EYEWITNESS Dilemmas of Protection
EYEWITNESS Dilemmas of Protection: The Log of the Kigali Battalion ASTRI SUHRKE The shooting down of President Habyarimana's plane over the Rwandan capital Kigali on 6 April 1994 set off multiple crises. There was the genocide itself - the systematic hunting down and killing of several hundred thousand persons - and a smaller civil war which unfolded alongside it. The events produced something akin to a crisis as well in the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda. Deployed half a year earlier to help implement the peace agreement, UNAMIR was suddenly in the midst of a situation that was totally different from what it had been prepared and equipped for. It was soon to become a classic in the annals of UN peacekeeping gone awry. As a general failure of UN peacekeeping, the Rwanda case has been well documented.' Although this article does not focus on the political and diplomatic dimensions of the crisis, it is obvious that the mandate and configuration of the peacekeeping forces reflected the political attitudes of the permanent members of the Security Council. Effective UN action was obstructed by the major powers who had their own priorities.2 From the perspective of the forces on the ground, however, much has remained unexplored and unknown. What did the transformed situation mean to the UN contingent in operational, policy and moral terms? At the outset of the crisis, ten Belgian blue berets stationed in Kigali were killed by Rwandan soldiers. Rumours of force evacuation followed. Systematic 'cleansing' and killings took place all around them. This article presents the consequent dilemmas of protection as they appeared to the Belgian battalion in Kigali (KIBAT), which by virtue of its location and strength in UNAMIR as a whole took the brunt of the question of how to respond. -
Dead Men Tell No Tales: Rule 92
NOTES "DEAD MEN TELL NO TALES": RULE 92 BIS-HOW THE AD HOC INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS UNNECESSARILY SILENCE THE DEAD ARI S. BASSIN* The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Interna- tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda adopted Rule 92 bis-Proofof Facts Other than by Oral Evidence-as a good faith attempt to hone the rules of evidentiary admissibility and provide a better balance between fairness and efficiency. While Rule 92 bis provides certain benefits, this Note argues that because of the unique nature and purpose of the Tribunals, this Rule is not the optimal framework within which to determine the admissibility of deceased witness statements. Applying Rule 92 bis to priorstatements of deceased witnesses needlessly reinforces existing incen- tives to kill important witnesses before they can testify in person at the Tribunals and unnecessarily limits the admissibility of testimony of classes of victims that sur- vived the initial crimes but did not live long enough to testify in person in front of the Tribunals. This Note presents two ways that the Tribunals could admit written statements of deceased witnesses while maintaining many of the important benefits of Rule 92 bis, and consequently, provide a better balance between fairness and efficiency than is currently achieved under Rule 92 bis. INTRODUCTION Over the past sixty years the international community has made extraordinary progress in developing an internationalized system designed to prosecute and document war crimes and crimes against humanity. This trend began with the Nuremberg trials after World * Copyright © 2006 by Ari S. Bassin. J.D., 2006, New York University School of Law; M.P.P., 2001, University of Sydney, Australia; B.A., 1998, Duke University. -
Cour Pénale Internationale International Criminal Court
ICC-01/04-01/07-176-AnxA 01-02-2008 1/196 SL PT OA2 Cour Pénale Internationale International Criminal Court Original : English N° : ICC-01/04-01/07 Date: 1 February 2008 THE APPEALS CHAMBER Before : Judge Philippe Kirsch, Presiding Judge Judge Georghios M. Pikis Judge Navanethem Pillay Judge Sang-Hyun Song Judge Erkki Kourula Registrar : Mr Bruno Cathala SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO IN THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTOR v. GERMAIN KATANGA Public ANNEX A to the Defense Document Providing Additional Details on the "Defense Appeal Brief concerning the First Decision on the Prosecution request for Authorisation to redact Witness Statements" The Office of the Prosecutor Defence Counsel Mr Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor Mr David Hooper Ms Fatou Bensouda, Deputy Prosecutor Ms Caroline Buisman Mr Eric MacDonald, Trial Lawyer Mrs. Florence Darques-Lane, Legal Adviser n° ICC-01/04-01/07 1/5 1 February 2008 ICC-01/04-01/07-176-AnxA 01-02-2008 2/196 SL PT OA2 2/5 Authorities 1. In the present filing the Defence, pursuant to authorisation of the Appeals Chamber,1 submits a number of authorities which supports the issue raised in the Defence Application to Request Leave to Provide Additional Details and Authorities on the "Public Defence Appeal Brief concerning the First Decision on the Prosecution Request for Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements "." 2. A brief survey of the jurisprudence of international criminal jurisdictions demonstrates that the Single Judge erroneously enlarged the scope of application of rule 81(2) of the Rules by considering as Prosecution sources those individuals - whose identity and identifying information could be redacted pursuant to the said rule - who, despite not being Prosecution witnesses for the purpose of the confirmation hearing, have been or are about to be interviewed by the Prosecution: (ICC) The Prosecution v. -
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH TRIAL CHAMBER I Before: Judge Erik Møse
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda ORIGINAL: ENGLISH TRIAL CHAMBER I Before: Judge Erik Møse, presiding Judge Jai Ram Reddy Judge Sergei Alekseevich Egorov Registrar: Adama Dieng Date: 18 December 2008 THE PROSECUTOR v. Théoneste BAGOSORA Gratien KABILIGI Aloys NTABAKUZE Anatole NSENGIYUMVA Case No. ICTR-98-41-T JUDGEMENT AND SENTENCE Office of the Prosecutor: Counsel for the Defence: Barbara Mulvaney Raphaël Constant Christine Graham Allison Turner Kartik Murukutla Paul Skolnik Rashid Rashid Frédéric Hivon Gregory Townsend Peter Erlinder Drew White Kennedy Ogetto Gershom Otachi Bw’Omanwa The Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION........................................................................................ 1 1. Overview ................................................................................................................... 1 2. The Accused ............................................................................................................. 8 2.1 Théoneste Bagosora ................................................................................................... 8 2.2 Gratien Kabiligi ....................................................................................................... 10 2.3 Aloys Ntabakuze ...................................................................................................... 10 2.4 Anatole Nsengiyumva ............................................................................................. -
Press Clippings
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE OUTREACH AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE PRESS CLIPPINGS Enclosed are clippings of local and international press on the Special Court and related issues obtained by the Outreach and Public Affairs Office as at: Friday, 9 December 2011 Press clips are produced Monday through Friday. Any omission, comment or suggestion, please contact Martin Royston-Wright Ext 7217 2 Local News Photographers Conclude Workshop on War Relics / Concord Times Page 3 AdvocAid and GIZ Conduct Training for Female Prison Officers… / Standard Times Page 4 International News The Still-unconvincing ICC / Business World Online Pages 5-6 Prosecution Requests Life Imprisonment for Captain Nizeyimana / Hirondelle News Agency Page 7 Rwanda Genocide Tribunal to Intensify Hunt for Nine Remaining Fugitives / AP Page 8 Kabila, Tshisekedi, Congo and the International Criminal Court / San Francisco Bay View Pages 9-12 3 Concord Times Friday, 9 December 2011 4 Standard Times Friday, 9 December 2011 Note: Sabrina Mahtani worked at the Defence Office. 5 Business World Online Friday, 9 December 2011 The still-unconvincing ICC By Jemy Gatdula Opinion Thursday last week I had the honor of being invited to talk as reactor at the Regional Forum on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court organized by LAWASIA Philippines and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. There I again raised my doubts -- not as to the need for the ICC (which is a different issue all its own) but on the wisdom of the Philippines joining it at this time. To reiterate, the ICC is a permanent institution, exercising jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern. -
Chapter 8 the Genocide Fax and the Prohibition From
CHAPTER 8 THE GENOCIDE FAX AND THE PROHIBITION FROM U.N. HEADQUARTERS TO ACT 8.1 MARCHAL MEETS INFORMANT JEAN PIERRE January 10, 1994, was the date on which UNAMIR received the most impor tant warning about the unfolding genocide. Faustin Twagiramungu, the Prime Minister-designate, had insisted on a pri vate meeting with General Romeo Dallaire, Canadian Force Commander of UNAMIR, for the afternoon ofMonday, January 10. He told Dallaire about an informant from inside the Interahamwe who wanted to inform UNAMIR of highly important intelligence. l On the evening ofthat day, the informant, code-named Jean Pierre, met with Colonel Luc Marchal. Jean Pierre explained that it was his job to monitor the general security within the MRND, that he had to make sure that the different "cells" throughout Kigali were supplied with weapons and that he was a trainer of the militia. He added that he received his orders directly from Mathieu Ngirumpatse, the president ofthe MRND. He explained his reason for unfolding his story to UNAMIR by saying: "As long as it is about warfare with the RPF I have no feelings ... But since I have been asked to localize and to make an inven tory ofall Tutsi in Kigali, I realize innocent people will be killed ... As my own mother is Tutsi, you understand I cannot agree with what is happening."2 The story that followed was most extraordinary and went beyond anything that Marchal could have imagined.3 After two hours of talking, Marchal and Jean-Pierre decided to stay in contact through the Belgian Captain Frank Claes who had been present at their meeting.4 Marchal went straight to the residence Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, p. -
Preventing the Bloodbath: Could the UN Have Predicted and Prevented the Rwandan Genocide?
Preventing the Bloodbath: Could the UN Have Predicted and Prevented The Rwandan Genocide? A. Walter Dorn Jonathan Matloff Jennifer Matthews CORNELL UNIVERSITY PEACE STUDIES PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER #24 ©November 1999 © 1999 Cornell University Peace Studies Program. All rights reserved. ISSN 1075-4857 Preventing the Bloodbath: Could the UN Have Predicted and Prevented the Rwandan Genocide? A. Walter Dorn, Jonathan Matloff, and Jennifer Matthews The Peace Studies Program was established at Cornell in 1970 as an interdisciplinary program concerned with problems of peace and war, arms control and disarmament, and more generally, instances of collective violence. Its broad objectives are to support graduate and post-doctoral study, research, teaching and cross-campus interactions in these fields. Copies of Occasional Papers may be ordered from: Peace Studies Program 130 Uris Hall Cornell University Ithaca, NY 14853-7601 PREVENTING THE BLOODBATH: Could the UN have Predicted and Prevented the Rwandan Genocide? A. Walter Dorn, Jonathan Matloff and Jennifer Matthews CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .............................................................1 BACKGROUND ..............................................................3 Historical Review .......................................................6 UN Mandate for Monitoring and Prevention...................................9 EARLY WARNING SIGNALS .................................................15 Illicit Arms ............................................................15 Conscientious Informers -
A Failure to Protect in Peacekeeping Operations: a Commander’S Responsibility? Obligations and Responsibilities of Military Commanders in UN Peacekeeping Operations
Sprik, Lenneke H.M. (2017) A failure to protect in peacekeeping operations: a commander’s responsibility? Obligations and responsibilities of military commanders in UN peacekeeping operations. PhD thesis. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/8613/ Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Enlighten:Theses http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ [email protected] A Failure to Protect in Peacekeeping Operations: A Commander’s Responsibility? Obligations and Responsibilities of Military Commanders in UN Peacekeeping Operations Lenneke (H.M.) Sprik Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Law College of Social Sciences University of Glasgow October 2017 Abstract Inaction by UN peacekeeping troops in the face of the commission of genocide in Srebrenica and Kigali raised significant questions regarding the duty owed by UN peacekeeping forces to those under their protection. Recent court judgments have recognised that the Netherlands and Belgium were to a certain extent legally responsible to protect those under the care of each state’s peacekeeping troops, and that also the role of individual peacekeeping commanders may be questioned. -
The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World Is Mative Action, Summarizes the Arguments for Explicit Not Bedtime Reading
BOOK REVIEWS THE OXFORD COMPANION experts in their respective fields. In fact, the editors TO POLITICS OF THE WORLD, have sought out recognized authors for almost every entry — more than 500 contributors are listed, and Second Edition almost every one has been published. This means that Editor in Chief Joel Krieger the handbook is a useful research tool despite its lack London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1018 pages, $79.95. of bibliography and footnotes. Want to know more Reviewed by Major David Last about war? Jacek Kugler wrote the entry. Look him up and you will find his books on political capacity, power icture your first interview with a new com- transitions, the stability of deterrence, and his classic, manding officer. You stand at her door, The War Ledger, which examined the statistics of vio- salute, sit down — what the heck is that brick lent conflict. Did you think Marxism died with the end on the desk? This can’t be a good sign. What of the Cold War? Read August Nimtz on the contribu- muddy-boots soldier or eagle-eyed knight of the air tion of Marxism to the democratic breakthrough, Pwould have The Oxford Companion to World Politics on “…seldom in history has a writing been so prescient as the desk? Times sure have changed. Or have they? the 150-year-old Manifesto of the Communist Party. Look at it from her point of view. Did she get there Much of the document reads better today than when it because of affirmative action? Will she censor the jun- was written…” (529). -
Nov-Dec 2011 News Letter
ICTRPublished by the Comm unicationNewsletter Cluster—ERSPS, Immediate Office of the Registrar United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda NOV-DEC 2011 The Editorial Committee wishes you a Happy and Prosperous New Year! ICTR Completion Strategy: President Updates UN Security Council The President of the Interna- the Appeals Chamber delivered tional Criminal Tribunal for two appeal judgments, in the Rwanda (ICTR), Judge Khalida Setako and Munyakazi cases. Rachid Khan, on November 7 The Appeals Chamber also ren- presented to the United Nations dered 1 decision disposing of an Security Council an updated re- interlocutory appeal, 4 decisions port on the implementation of the concerning post-appeal requests, Tribunal Completion Strategy. and 64 pre-appeal orders and The report covered the period decisions. Two other appeal from 13 May 2011 to 4 November judgements were still expected to 2011. According to Judge Presi- be delivered in 2011, for a total dent Khan, the Tribunal had com- of six appeal judgments for the pleted the work at the Trial level year. Judge Khan assured the with respect to 76 of the 92 ac- Council that four appeal judg- cused, which included two refer- ments are to be delivered in rals to national jurisdictions, two 2012, five by the end of 2013 Judge Khalida Rachid Khan withdrawn indictments, and two and the remaining three appeal indictees who died prior or in the judgments will be delivered in Contents course of the trial. The Tribunal 2014. ICTR Completion Strategy .................. 2 has delivered 50 first-instance Appeals Chamber Affirms referral of judgments involving 70 accused, With regard to staff manage- Uwikindi case to Rwanda ................... -
The Role of Non-African States in the Rwandan Genocide
THE ROLE OF NON-AFRICAN STATES IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE by Howard Adelman I Preamble This paper will analyze the role of three1 non-African states in the Rwandan genocide – Belgium, France and the United States. The three will be discussed in alphabetic order, and the discussion will focus on the controversies surrounding each. Belgium is included because it was the colonial power that administered the Trusteeship for Rwanda from World War I to independence and remained intimately involved with Rwanda since then. France and the United States were the two permanent members of the Security Council most involved with Rwanda. In any case, the United States could not be excluded, if only because it is the great power in the world since the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The unipolar world commenced at the same time as the RPF invaded Rwanda at the beginning of this decade. However, the United States has to be considered as well because of its major role in preventing the use of the UN peacekeepers intervening in the genocide. That role is judged by many to be so destructive that Gourevitch (1998) wrote: "The desertion of Rwanda by the UN force was Hutu Power's greatest diplomatic victory to date, and it can be credited almost single handedly to the United States." (p. 150) Alan J. Kuperman (currently a PhD student at MIT researching the US role in Rwanda) repeated Gourevitch's accusation. In an op-ed piece in the 24 December Washington Post, however, he restricted the American failure to the period prior to 6 April, but broadened the accusation to cover the entire realm of prevention rather than just the withdrawal of UNAMIR.