The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World Is Mative Action, Summarizes the Arguments for Explicit Not Bedtime Reading

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World Is Mative Action, Summarizes the Arguments for Explicit Not Bedtime Reading BOOK REVIEWS THE OXFORD COMPANION experts in their respective fields. In fact, the editors TO POLITICS OF THE WORLD, have sought out recognized authors for almost every entry — more than 500 contributors are listed, and Second Edition almost every one has been published. This means that Editor in Chief Joel Krieger the handbook is a useful research tool despite its lack London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1018 pages, $79.95. of bibliography and footnotes. Want to know more Reviewed by Major David Last about war? Jacek Kugler wrote the entry. Look him up and you will find his books on political capacity, power icture your first interview with a new com- transitions, the stability of deterrence, and his classic, manding officer. You stand at her door, The War Ledger, which examined the statistics of vio- salute, sit down — what the heck is that brick lent conflict. Did you think Marxism died with the end on the desk? This can’t be a good sign. What of the Cold War? Read August Nimtz on the contribu- muddy-boots soldier or eagle-eyed knight of the air tion of Marxism to the democratic breakthrough, Pwould have The Oxford Companion to World Politics on “…seldom in history has a writing been so prescient as the desk? Times sure have changed. Or have they? the 150-year-old Manifesto of the Communist Party. Look at it from her point of view. Did she get there Much of the document reads better today than when it because of affirmative action? Will she censor the jun- was written…” (529). Like many entries in the hand- ior officer’s critique of defence policy before it is sub- book, this provocative and stimulating reading will mitted to Canadian Military Journal, or censure him leave you wondering how much other stuff was left out after it appears? What do politicians expect of her in of your education. the next ‘humanitarian intervention’ planned for a hot and nasty corner of the world? What will she do with The shorter entries are succinct, but no less the civilian peacebuilding advisor attached to her com- thought provoking. While you are waiting for peace mand (I’m not making this up!)? When the CIDA liai- to break out in Bosnia, read what the grand old man of son officer bleats about democratiza- peace studies, Johan Galtung, has tion and development priorities, or to say on the subject of ‘peace.’ ADM(HR-Mil) sends out a CAN- Galtung participated in the FORGEN on gender equity, are you International Peace Academy’s first going to trust McLean’s for the deep peacekeeping seminars in Vienna in thoughts that will help you make 1970. He was behind the defini- sense of it all? tions in The Peacekeeper’s Handbook, which was adopted by The Oxford Companion to the Canadian Forces as our peace- World Politics will never replace keeping manual until we got around the platoon commander’s tactical to writing our own book in 1993. manual (it won’t fit in a pocket). After you have digested the distinc- But it is as useful as any single tions between positive and negative source can be to make sense of con- peace, as well as physical and cepts that affect the way soldiers do structural violence, those protesters business, or the way citizens are against globalization won’t look influenced by the world around quite the same, and you will have a them. Organized alphabetically like better idea of what you are waiting an encyclopaedia, it has 672 entries, for in Coralici. The extensive more than 80 new ones since its index also makes The Companion first edition. Six essays on critical easy to use. Are you too young to issues provide conflicting perspectives to hone your remember Richard Holbrooke or Jimmy Carter? Look mess-hall debating skills. On the United Nations, for them up in the index! Getting mixed up in Stan-land? example, Lloyd Axworthy writes that it has a vital role Find Turkmenistan, Tajikstan, Uzbekistan and in world affairs. John Bolton retorts that it is a deeply Kyrgyzstan on the handy maps at the back, and more flawed institution. Maybe they are both right, and that than a dozen entries in the index (once you learn how is part of the complexity of the world we need to to spell them). understand as managers of violence. Did I mention affirmative action? Glen Loury, once a critic of affir- The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World is mative action, summarizes the arguments for explicit not bedtime reading. It keeps me awake to realize how public efforts to reduce inequality. Lani Guinier, a much I don’t know. It is a valuable tool for anyone try- Harvard law professor, argues that neither ‘merit’ ing to follow world events, or complete courses or Staff placement nor affirmative action produce real equali- College. At over 1000 pages, this book is thick enough ty. How do we decide what is fair in a unit? Other to hold up your monitor ergonomically, but if it is on essays address censorship, the limits of democracy, your CO’s desk, you might want easier access to it. The entitlements, and sustainable development. reading room of the Officer’s Mess, beside the regimen- tal standing orders, would be a good spot for it, but you The 23 interpretive essays each provide a few thou- might want to chain it down. sand words on key concepts. From class and politics to socialism and war, these entries have been written by Dr. David Last teaches political science at Royal Military College. 66 Canadian Military Journal ● Spring 2002 BOOK REVIEWS BASTARD SONS: Although this began with the 1st Canadian Parachute AN EXAMINATION OF CANADA’S Battalion, this capability was not established, as some might think, to meet operational requirements evolving AIRBORNE EXPERIENCE 1942-1995 in Europe. Horn notes that the stated purpose of the unit By Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn was for home defence, even though the rationale of St Catherines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001, 288 pages, $40.00. home defence had been rejected previously for lack of IN SEARCH OF PEGASUS: relevance — there was no credible threat to Canada. THE CANADIAN AIRBORNE EXPERIENCE 1942-1999 At the end of the war, the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion was disbanded. Army Headquarters anticipat- By Bernd Horn and Michael Wyczynski ed no requirement for airborne forces in the post-war St Catherines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001, 254 pages, $39.95. Army — an Army that was expected to return to the Reviewed by Major J.C. Stone small cadre that existed before the war. What saved the capability was the need to provide an airborne and/or air astard Sons is the first assessment of transportable force as part of the 1946 US/Canada Base Canada’s airborne experience that goes Security Plan. beyond the Canadian Airborne Regiment’s Somalia mission of the early 1990s. The Next, Colonel Horn discusses the MSF being used book relies heavily on primary source mate- as the rationale for the paratroop capability. Within Brial, and is not limited to a simple discussion on the the MSF, specific infantry rifle companies were desig- demise of the Canadian Airborne Regiment in 1993. nated for an airborne role, while the remainder of the The main thesis of the book is that the lack of a clear- infantry battalions were to be air-transportable. Horn ly defined, credible and enduring role for the use of argues that the MSF was in large measure a concept airborne forces in Canada undermined any chance for rather than a reality and, like the airborne capability, long-term and substantive political and military sup- was never fully accepted as being credible. The MSF port for an airborne capability. and the airborne/air-transportable Lieutenant-Colonel Horn argues that capability it represented diverted this has always been so, whether limited military resources from UN deciding to follow the British and and NATO tasks — the real tasks American deployment of airborne throughout the 1950s and early forces during the Second World War 1960s. However, in the 1960s, a as the spearhead for operations into change of government, unification of Europe, or to act as the primary the three services and a change in defence of Canada in the 1970s and defence policy focus rekindled the 1980s. Colonel Horn notes that the discussion about the need for a para- “Canadian attitude to airborne troop capability. forces has always been schizo- phrenic and driven by political pur- Horn discusses the creation of the pose rather than doctrine and opera- Canadian Airborne Regiment, a 1200- tional necessity.” man parachute special force to be kept at high readiness and able to The essence of this issue is that deploy worldwide at a moment’s the leadership, both military and notice. Horn demonstrates that it was political, never believed that airborne only the determination of the Minister forces represented a credible national of National Defence and the Chief of requirement. For example, in the the Defence Staff that ensured the aftermath of the Second World War, unit’s creation — too many other peo- the government used airborne forces as part of the ple thought it would not come to fruition if enough Mobile Striking Force (MSF) to defend against a hostile obstacles were put in place. More important, however, incursion into the Arctic. Airborne forces were an inex- the rationale for its existence was never really recon- pensive option during a time when reducing defence ciled with a valid and justifiable operational require- expenditures was a government priority.
Recommended publications
  • JOURNEY to JUSTICE Continued from Page 145 a Continual Anxiety Over Her Personal Safety
    J O U R N E Y t o J USTICE Barbara Mulvaney pursued criminals from Malibu to Miami before her own life and family fell apart. Then she found a new mission: bringing the accused perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide to a reckoning By KENNETH MILLER Photographed by ALESSANDRA PETLIN 138 HAIR AND MAKEUP KIM GOODWIN FOR CLOUTIERAGENCY COM STYLIST MICHAEL CIOFFOLETTI SHIRT AND JACKET EILEEN FISHER ILLUSTRATION OPPOSITE PAGE JOSE FERNANDEZ : . : . : . , : C International t o 2OO7, January Mulvaney, he United Nations Nations United he riminal Tribunal riminal n a rare break from from break rare a n 139 139 “Everyone has rewritten history to protect themselves,” Mulvaney says, with rueful cynicism. “How the hell can you blame them?” On this warm December afternoon, Mulvaney is enduring a round of testimony she finds merely irritating. The witness, a Belgian colonel who was second in command of U.N. peacekeepers in Rwanda during the genocide in 1994, has recently turned against the prosecution. The colonel, Luc Marchal, lost 10 of his own men on the first day of the massacre, and has spent the past decade publicly agonizing over whether he could have done more to stop the killing. But now he is testifying for one of the accused; he has joined a minority of international observers who believe that Tutsi rebels brought the massacre on their own people by provoking the Hutu. In his dealings with the Rwandan military before To reach Trial Chamber 1 the slaughter, Marchal insists, “I can say sincerely that [the of the United Nations International Criminal U.N.] received high-quality cooperation.” Tribunal for Rwanda, you take a creaky His claim sends a ripple of reaction around the packed elevator to the fourth floor of a conference gallery.
    [Show full text]
  • The International Response to Conflict and Genocide:Lessom from the Rwanda Experience
    The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience March 1996 Published by: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda Editor: David Millwood Cover illustrations: Kiure F. Msangi Graphic design: Designgrafik, Copenhagen Prepress: Dansk Klich‚, Copenhagen Printing: Strandberg Grafisk, Odense ISBN: 87-7265-335-3 (Synthesis Report) ISBN: 87-7265-331-0 (1. Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors) ISBN: 87-7265-332-9 (2. Early Warning and Conflict Management) ISBN: 87-7265-333-7 (3. Humanitarian Aid and Effects) ISBN: 87-7265-334-5 (4. Rebuilding Post-War Rwanda) This publication may be reproduced for free distribution and may be quoted provided the source - Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda - is mentioned. The report is printed on G-print Matt, a wood-free, medium-coated paper. G-print is manufactured without the use of chlorine and marked with the Nordic Swan, licence-no. 304 022. 2 The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience Study 2 Early Warning and Conflict Management by Howard Adelman York University Toronto, Canada Astri Suhrke Chr. Michelsen Institute Bergen, Norway with contributions by Bruce Jones London School of Economics, U.K. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 3 Contents Preface 5 Executive Summary 8 Acknowledgements 11 Introduction 12 Chapter 1: The Festering Refugee Problem 17 Chapter 2: Civil War, Civil Violence and International Response 20 (1 October 1990 - 4 August
    [Show full text]
  • EYEWITNESS Dilemmas of Protection
    EYEWITNESS Dilemmas of Protection: The Log of the Kigali Battalion ASTRI SUHRKE The shooting down of President Habyarimana's plane over the Rwandan capital Kigali on 6 April 1994 set off multiple crises. There was the genocide itself - the systematic hunting down and killing of several hundred thousand persons - and a smaller civil war which unfolded alongside it. The events produced something akin to a crisis as well in the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda. Deployed half a year earlier to help implement the peace agreement, UNAMIR was suddenly in the midst of a situation that was totally different from what it had been prepared and equipped for. It was soon to become a classic in the annals of UN peacekeeping gone awry. As a general failure of UN peacekeeping, the Rwanda case has been well documented.' Although this article does not focus on the political and diplomatic dimensions of the crisis, it is obvious that the mandate and configuration of the peacekeeping forces reflected the political attitudes of the permanent members of the Security Council. Effective UN action was obstructed by the major powers who had their own priorities.2 From the perspective of the forces on the ground, however, much has remained unexplored and unknown. What did the transformed situation mean to the UN contingent in operational, policy and moral terms? At the outset of the crisis, ten Belgian blue berets stationed in Kigali were killed by Rwandan soldiers. Rumours of force evacuation followed. Systematic 'cleansing' and killings took place all around them. This article presents the consequent dilemmas of protection as they appeared to the Belgian battalion in Kigali (KIBAT), which by virtue of its location and strength in UNAMIR as a whole took the brunt of the question of how to respond.
    [Show full text]
  • ORIGINAL: ENGLISH TRIAL CHAMBER I Before: Judge Erik Møse
    International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda ORIGINAL: ENGLISH TRIAL CHAMBER I Before: Judge Erik Møse, presiding Judge Jai Ram Reddy Judge Sergei Alekseevich Egorov Registrar: Adama Dieng Date: 18 December 2008 THE PROSECUTOR v. Théoneste BAGOSORA Gratien KABILIGI Aloys NTABAKUZE Anatole NSENGIYUMVA Case No. ICTR-98-41-T JUDGEMENT AND SENTENCE Office of the Prosecutor: Counsel for the Defence: Barbara Mulvaney Raphaël Constant Christine Graham Allison Turner Kartik Murukutla Paul Skolnik Rashid Rashid Frédéric Hivon Gregory Townsend Peter Erlinder Drew White Kennedy Ogetto Gershom Otachi Bw’Omanwa The Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION........................................................................................ 1 1. Overview ................................................................................................................... 1 2. The Accused ............................................................................................................. 8 2.1 Théoneste Bagosora ................................................................................................... 8 2.2 Gratien Kabiligi ....................................................................................................... 10 2.3 Aloys Ntabakuze ...................................................................................................... 10 2.4 Anatole Nsengiyumva .............................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 8 the Genocide Fax and the Prohibition From
    CHAPTER 8 THE GENOCIDE FAX AND THE PROHIBITION FROM U.N. HEADQUARTERS TO ACT 8.1 MARCHAL MEETS INFORMANT JEAN PIERRE January 10, 1994, was the date on which UNAMIR received the most impor­ tant warning about the unfolding genocide. Faustin Twagiramungu, the Prime Minister-designate, had insisted on a pri­ vate meeting with General Romeo Dallaire, Canadian Force Commander of UNAMIR, for the afternoon ofMonday, January 10. He told Dallaire about an informant from inside the Interahamwe who wanted to inform UNAMIR of highly important intelligence. l On the evening ofthat day, the informant, code-named Jean Pierre, met with Colonel Luc Marchal. Jean Pierre explained that it was his job to monitor the general security within the MRND, that he had to make sure that the different "cells" throughout Kigali were supplied with weapons and that he was a trainer of the militia. He added that he received his orders directly from Mathieu Ngirumpatse, the president ofthe MRND. He explained his reason for unfolding his story to UNAMIR by saying: "As long as it is about warfare with the RPF I have no feelings ... But since I have been asked to localize and to make an inven­ tory ofall Tutsi in Kigali, I realize innocent people will be killed ... As my own mother is Tutsi, you understand I cannot agree with what is happening."2 The story that followed was most extraordinary and went beyond anything that Marchal could have imagined.3 After two hours of talking, Marchal and Jean-Pierre decided to stay in contact through the Belgian Captain Frank Claes who had been present at their meeting.4 Marchal went straight to the residence Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, p.
    [Show full text]
  • Preventing the Bloodbath: Could the UN Have Predicted and Prevented the Rwandan Genocide?
    Preventing the Bloodbath: Could the UN Have Predicted and Prevented The Rwandan Genocide? A. Walter Dorn Jonathan Matloff Jennifer Matthews CORNELL UNIVERSITY PEACE STUDIES PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER #24 ©November 1999 © 1999 Cornell University Peace Studies Program. All rights reserved. ISSN 1075-4857 Preventing the Bloodbath: Could the UN Have Predicted and Prevented the Rwandan Genocide? A. Walter Dorn, Jonathan Matloff, and Jennifer Matthews The Peace Studies Program was established at Cornell in 1970 as an interdisciplinary program concerned with problems of peace and war, arms control and disarmament, and more generally, instances of collective violence. Its broad objectives are to support graduate and post-doctoral study, research, teaching and cross-campus interactions in these fields. Copies of Occasional Papers may be ordered from: Peace Studies Program 130 Uris Hall Cornell University Ithaca, NY 14853-7601 PREVENTING THE BLOODBATH: Could the UN have Predicted and Prevented the Rwandan Genocide? A. Walter Dorn, Jonathan Matloff and Jennifer Matthews CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .............................................................1 BACKGROUND ..............................................................3 Historical Review .......................................................6 UN Mandate for Monitoring and Prevention...................................9 EARLY WARNING SIGNALS .................................................15 Illicit Arms ............................................................15 Conscientious Informers
    [Show full text]
  • A Failure to Protect in Peacekeeping Operations: a Commander’S Responsibility? Obligations and Responsibilities of Military Commanders in UN Peacekeeping Operations
    Sprik, Lenneke H.M. (2017) A failure to protect in peacekeeping operations: a commander’s responsibility? Obligations and responsibilities of military commanders in UN peacekeeping operations. PhD thesis. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/8613/ Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Enlighten:Theses http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ [email protected] A Failure to Protect in Peacekeeping Operations: A Commander’s Responsibility? Obligations and Responsibilities of Military Commanders in UN Peacekeeping Operations Lenneke (H.M.) Sprik Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Law College of Social Sciences University of Glasgow October 2017 Abstract Inaction by UN peacekeeping troops in the face of the commission of genocide in Srebrenica and Kigali raised significant questions regarding the duty owed by UN peacekeeping forces to those under their protection. Recent court judgments have recognised that the Netherlands and Belgium were to a certain extent legally responsible to protect those under the care of each state’s peacekeeping troops, and that also the role of individual peacekeeping commanders may be questioned.
    [Show full text]
  • The Role of Non-African States in the Rwandan Genocide
    THE ROLE OF NON-AFRICAN STATES IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE by Howard Adelman I Preamble This paper will analyze the role of three1 non-African states in the Rwandan genocide – Belgium, France and the United States. The three will be discussed in alphabetic order, and the discussion will focus on the controversies surrounding each. Belgium is included because it was the colonial power that administered the Trusteeship for Rwanda from World War I to independence and remained intimately involved with Rwanda since then. France and the United States were the two permanent members of the Security Council most involved with Rwanda. In any case, the United States could not be excluded, if only because it is the great power in the world since the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The unipolar world commenced at the same time as the RPF invaded Rwanda at the beginning of this decade. However, the United States has to be considered as well because of its major role in preventing the use of the UN peacekeepers intervening in the genocide. That role is judged by many to be so destructive that Gourevitch (1998) wrote: "The desertion of Rwanda by the UN force was Hutu Power's greatest diplomatic victory to date, and it can be credited almost single handedly to the United States." (p. 150) Alan J. Kuperman (currently a PhD student at MIT researching the US role in Rwanda) repeated Gourevitch's accusation. In an op-ed piece in the 24 December Washington Post, however, he restricted the American failure to the period prior to 6 April, but broadened the accusation to cover the entire realm of prevention rather than just the withdrawal of UNAMIR.
    [Show full text]
  • June 2: Failure to Protect Session 3 – “Inside the UN Security Council
    June 2: Failure to Protect Session 3 – “Inside the UN Security Council, April – July 1994” TOM BLANTON: Good morning everyone. Today’s focus is “inside the UN Security Council” April – July 1994. Materials from the Security Council informal sessions are in Volume 2 of the briefing book, from five different viewpoints. It’s a luxury for historians and analysts to be able to look at the same discussions from five different points of view, which are mostly congruent but have interesting divergences as well. Our challenge in this morning’s session is to connect those discussions [in New York] with the actual experiences of people on the ground who saw the genocide begin, who saw (in the field hospitals that they deployed) what was actually happening, who were reporting back in various ways as early as April 11, 1994, on the front pages of American newspapers by April 21, and using the word genocide by April 28 in reports from the Red Cross, The Washington Post, Médecins Sans Frontières and others. Our challenge is to merge those two perspectives: what is happening on the ground and what is happening in New York. I am going to start us with two provocations: one from Michael Barnett, who was in New York, in the US Mission to the UN, who has written a great book about those deliberations and has some focus questions. And then David Scheffer who was first in Washington and New York, bridging the two parts of US policy in exactly this period. They are going to pose some core questions for this session.
    [Show full text]
  • THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL for RWANDA 2 3 CASE NO.: ICTR-98-44-T the PROSECUTOR 4 CHAMBER III of the TRIBUNAL 5 V
    1 1 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 2 3 CASE NO.: ICTR-98-44-T THE PROSECUTOR 4 CHAMBER III OF THE TRIBUNAL 5 v. 6 ÉDOUARD KAREMERA 7 MATHIEU NGIRUMPATSE 8 JOSEPH NZIRORERA 9 10 THURSDAY, 23 NOVEMBER 2006 11 0902H 12 CONTINUED TRIAL 13 14 Before the Judges: 15 C. M. Dennis Byron, Presiding 16 Emile Francis Short 17 Gberdao Gustave Kam 18 19 For the Registry: 20 Ms. Rose-Marie Kouo 21 Mr. Vincent Tishekwa 22 23 For the Prosecution: 24 Mr. Don Webster 25 Mr. Iain Morley 26 27 For the Accused Édouard Karemera: 28 Mr. Felix Sow 29 30 For the Accused Mathieu Ngirumpatse: 31 Ms Chantal Hounkpatin 32 33 For the Accused Joseph Nzirorera: 34 Mr. Peter Robinson 35 Mr. José Patrick Nimy Mayidika Ngimbi 36 Court Reporters: 37 Ms. Donna M. Lewis 38 Ms. Ann Burum 39 Ms. Sherri Knox 40 Ms. Verna Butler 41 1 KAREMERA ET AL THURSDAY, 23 NOVEMBER 2006 1 I N D E X 2 3 WITNESS 4 For the Prosecution: 5 FRANK CLAEYS 6 Cross-examination by Ms. Hounkpatin.............................................................................................................3 7 Cross-examination by Mr. Sow.......................................................................................................................31 8 9 EXHIBITS 10 11 Exhibit No. D. NG47........................................................................................................................................31 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 2 DONNA M. LEWIS - ICTR - TRIAL CHAMBER III - page i 1 KAREMERA ET AL THURSDAY, 23 NOVEMBER 2006 1 P R O C E E D I N G S 2 MR. PRESIDENT: 3 Good morning, everybody.
    [Show full text]
  • We Couldn't Believe the UN Was Going to Let Us Die' by Chris Mcgreal Guardian Unlimited Wednesday December 22, 1999
    'We couldn't believe the UN was going to let us die' By Chris McGreal Guardian Unlimited Wednesday December 22, 1999 The last time Helena Nwitizina saw United Nations soldiers they were driving off to rescue white people. She was not among those Rwandans who begged the Belgian peacekeepers to administer a quick death rather than abandon them to the men with machetes. But the 30- year-old petrol pump attendant was no less terrified. A few hours later Ms Nwitizina was one of the few survivors to crawl out of the first big massacre of the Rwandan genocide. "We could not believe that the United Nations was just going to let us die," she said. "We were always hearing on the radio how they were there to help us. But when the killers were looking us in the eye and saying we were going to die, what did the UN do? It saved white people." Last week Kofi Annan expressed his "deep remorse" for the UN's shortcomings in Rwanda five years ago, after an independent report offered a damning assessment of the organisation's failure to even attempt to halt the murder of 800,000 Tutsis. The UN secretary-general was not spared. He was head of UN peacekeeping in 1994. The report criticises him for ignoring repeated warnings that a genocide was in the offing. It also condemns members of the Security Council, including Britain but principally the United States, for blocking calls for rapid intervention. The most prescient warning came from the head of the UN military contingent in Rwanda, General Romeo Dallaire.
    [Show full text]
  • In the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma
    IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 1) MADAME HABYARIMANA; ) in her own capacity and on behalf of the estate of the ) deceased President of Rwanda, ) JUVÉNAL HABYARIMANA; ) CIV-10-437-W ) Case No. 2) MADAME NTARYAMIRA; ) in her own capacity and on behalf of the estate, of the ) deceased President of Burundi, ) CYPRIEN NTARYAMIRA; ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) VS. ) ) 1) GENERAL PAUL KAGAME; ) 2) JAMES KABAREBE; ) 3) FAUSTIN NYAMWASA KAYUMBA; ) 4) CHARLES KAYONGA; ) 5) JACKSON NKURUNZIA, a.k.a Jack Nziza; ) 6) SAMUEL KANYEMERA, a.k.a. Sam Kaka; ) 7) ROSE KABUYE ) 8) JACOB TUMWINE ) 9) FRANCK NZIZA ) 10) ERIC HAKIZIMANA ) ) Defendants. ) COMPLAINT WITH JURY DEMAND (WRONGFUL DEATH AND MURDER; CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY; VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS OF LIFE, LIBERTY, AND SECURITY; ASSAULT AND BATTERY; INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS; VIOLATIONS OF THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT; TORTURE; AND CONTINUING CONSPIRACY IN FURTHERANCE THEREOF) JURISDICTION 1. The Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, provides federal jurisdiction for "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." This Court also has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction); 18 U.S.C. SEC 1332 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act). 2. Further, the U.S. Federal Extraterritorial Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2340A, provides federal jurisdiction over “whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture” or conspires to commit torture, if said person is a national of the United States or is present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality of the victim or alleged offender.
    [Show full text]