Moldova's Election of a 'Pro-Russian' President: Implications for Europe

No.1

2017

PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WWW.UI.SE

Moldova’s Election of a

‘pro -Russian’ President:

Implications for Europe

Elvira Melin

In November 2016, Moldova elected Igor The two main directions in Moldovan Dodon as president in the first presidential politics are, simply put, the so called pro- elections since 1996. In his campaign, European liberal and the so called pro- Dodon promised to restore Moldova’s Russian communist or socialist directions, relations with Russia and possibly revoke respectively. People in practice, however, the Association Agreement (AA) with the often vote along identity lines: those who European Union. He also promised to identify with Romania usually vote for improve relations with Transnistria, a de pro-European parties, whereas minorities facto state within Moldova in which Russia (for example Gagauzians, Russians and deploys around 1,500 to 2,500 troops. In Ukrainians) and people who rather March Dodon sent a request to the disapprove of a union with Romania Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) to grant usually vote for pro-Russian parties.1 Moldova to become an observation country Moreover, citizens also adhere to to the union. However, the powers of the economic rationales when voting. Since its president in Moldova are limited, and it is independence, Moldova has experienced not certain that Dodon will have the chance economic turmoil, and is often referred to to implement all of his policies. What is as one of the poorest countries in Europe. the likelihood of Moldova leaning more This may be related to the fact that it is towards Russia, and what possible effects also among the most corrupt countries in could such a change have on Europe? Europe. 2 Politics have been infiltrated by

oligarchs, known to use economic leverage represents a new pro-EU party without any to gain political influence. In 2015, it was record of political scandals. However, revealed that one billion USD had been Sandu had herself previously been a stolen from three of Moldova’s largest member of the discredited Liberal banks before the parliamentary election in Democratic Party. She was expected to be 2014. The sum stolen amounted to about the most popular among Moldovans living an eighth of the country’s GDP, and abroad, which in 2015 was 18% of the caused a massive devaluation of the population,6 many of which were not able currency. 3 The scandal resulted in a to vote due to a poor organisation of governmental crisis, and the coming year polling stations abroad. Furthermore, the prime-minister post changed five times Dodon’s stance towards improving while popular protests lasted for 15 relations with Russia is arguably appealing months. In the summer of 2016, the former as this raises the potential for Russia to lift prime-minister Vlad Filat was sentenced the sanctions held on Moldova. Russia has for complicity to the theft. It remains held import bans and import duties on unresolved to what extent other politicians Moldovan products since the Association were involved. This scandal hit the pro- Agreement was signed with the EU. Other European coalition hard, specifically the attractive promises of Dodon concerned his Liberal Democratic Party which Filat social policies towards the poorer represented. It also lowered the trust population in rural areas, including the towards the EU in general, as Brussels was raising of pensions, and ensuring better seen as having neglected the government’s health care away from the cities. corruption schemes prior to the big theft in There were thus many factors 2014.4 contributing to Dodon’s victory, all of In a survey conducted in September which relate to the three most mentioned 2016, 90% of the 1,518 people questioned issues in the survey: corruption, low stated that politicians only govern in the income, and unemployment, and can interests of some groups, and 96% stated therefore explain Dodon’s success. that corruption was a big or a very big issue. Among the issues the survey What are the implications for Europe participants stated concerned them the and Moldova? most, the three most mentioned were Since Moldova is a parliamentary republic corruption, low income, and where the president has limited powers, it unemployment. A majority also contended will be difficult for Dodon alone to that Moldova was not moving in the right implement his promises. Nevertheless, he direction.5 did keep his promise of strengthening Dodon has managed to represent relations with Russia, and made his first promise of change. His party– the Socialist international visit to the Kremlin in Party–has not been openly involved in any January 2017. At the press-conference, scandals. The party also proclaims a switch President Vladimir Putin confirmed that from a pro-European to a pro-Russian Russia also wanted the Moldova-Russian foreign policy. Maia Sandu, leader of the relations to improve, and said they had Action and Solidarity Party, who came discussed an integration process of second in the election after Dodon, Moldova to the Eurasian Economic Union

(EEU).7 On March 21st Dodon sent a letter Russian rhetoric but no aim of giving up or to the president of the Supreme Eurasian renegotiating the relations with the EU as Economic Council, asking for Moldova to long as the relations are favourable. be granted observation status to the EEU. Already towards the end of his campaign The decision on granting the observation Dodon had softened his rhetoric and rather status will be given at the end of May than cancelling the Association when the heads of states of the member Agreement, he focused on ‘reforming’ it, countries will meet. This shows a or specifically the economic parts (the dedication by Dodon to pursue his Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade promises. Agreement, DCFTA) in order to facilitate The government has, however, not trade with Russia.10 shown any signs of changing their agenda. Since the EU is now Moldova’s The Moldovan Prime-Minister, Pavel Filip, largest trading partner, 11 a reformation of stressed before the elections that he hoped the AA or only DCFTA would likely have the elected president would understand the negative effects on the Moldovan importance of maintaining the EU- economy. It might also lead to the Moldova relations: “this government, in cancellation of the visa freedom that place until 2018, will remain strongly pro- Moldovans now possess to the EU. This European. I’m hoping for good teamwork; would not only be unpopular among we must keep Moldova’s best interests at Moldovans, it would also target the the center of our hearts and minds.” 8 economy as remittances from Moldovans Furthermore, Vlad Plahotniuc, leader of abroad contribute a significant share of the the Democratic Party, and the man known country’s total GDP (23% in 201512). Due to control the parliament, stated that he to these factors, neither Dodon, nor any would block every attempt for Dodon to other Moldovan politician is likely to cancel the AA. 9 Arguably, it is unlikely pursue a dramatic move away from that the government would make any Europe. decisions without the approval of For the EU, a change in the EU- Plahotniuc. Moldovan relations would have serious It thus seems unlikely that Dodon implications for its influence over and with the current government in place will relations with the ENP countries. The be able to implement his promises. foundation of the ENP lies in establishing However, Dodon’s Socialist Party is now security in the EU’s neighbouring regions the biggest party in parliament and may by promoting democracy and trade. If continue to grow, and by the 2018 Moldova would renegotiate or cancel the parliamentary election secure a place in a AA or DCFTA, the idea and concept of the new government. The question then ENP might be under threat. It could imply becomes whether they will pursue a that the EU is no longer the most powerful change or not? Former President Vladimir or beneficial ally, and also move the Voronin and the Communist Party claimed Russian sphere of influence closer to the to be pro-Russian but entered the European EU’s borders. From a Russian perspective, Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003 influence over Moldova, as well as other when it was perceived beneficial. neighbouring post-Soviet countries, is Similarly, Dodon might have a pro- essential in regards to domestic politics

and in the international arena. It is difficulties implementing all of his policies perceived to advance Moscow’s before the elections in 2018. If the geopolitical sphere in relation to Europe, Socialist Party continues to grow and do and continue to hold cultural influence well in the next elections, chances of a over neighbouring countries. Previous reorientation might increase. However, advancements in the region have also since breaking off with the EU will have increased Putin’s domestic support; the economic consequences, even a future more activist foreign policy boosts the Socialist Party led government might image of a more powerful Russia. prefer to pursue a policy keeping the Both the EU and Russia have geostrategic status quo. Thus, absent any interests in Moldova and other major changes in the EU’s or Russia’s neighbouring countries. However, unless engagements with Moldova, the Moldovan either of them will intensify their government is not expected to dramatically engagement with Moldova, the current alter its current politics. Therefore, even position of Moldova is likely to remain. the election of a more pro-Russian Finally, the Transnistrian issue is another president might not necessarily have any important contributor to the status quo of great implications for Moldovan foreign Moldova’s foreign policy alignment. That policy alignment. Moldova does not fully control its own territory and borders hinder domestic Elvira Melin, intern at the Russia and reform, and thus a deepening of the EU- Eurasia Program Moldova relationship. From a Russian perspective, troops in Transnistria are an important element in ensuring its influence over Moldova, and maintain a geostrategic status quo.

Summary Dodon was elected president of Moldova due to a number of reasons. He represented a relatively new party with no records of corruption and that also proclaimed a pro- Russian direction, as a change to the previous pro-European. A change was desired as the previous coalition had been involved in massive corruption scandals, making the population distrust the members of parliament and the general direction politics were heading. Dodon also made concrete promises to improve the livelihood for the rural population. However, with the current government being pro-European and the presidential powers being limited, Dodon will have

Endnotes http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/countries/MD/ 1 Johansson, A., ‘Dissenting Democrats. events/53744 Nation and Democracy in the Republic 8 Government of Republic of Moldova, of Moldova’, 2011, Department of ‘Moldova’s Prime Minister Committed to a Pro- Political Science, Stockholm University, Europe Path’, 14 September 2016, p.154 http://www.gov.md/en/content/moldovas- 2 Moldova ranks 123 of 176 on prime-minister-committed-pro-europe-path Transparency International’s ‘Corruption 9 Moldova.org, ‘Vlad Plahotniuc to Perceptions Index’ 2016. 1 is the least President Dodon: We will block every corrupt and 176 is the most corrupt attempt of cancelling the EU Association countries, Agreement’, 18 January 2017, https://www.transparency.org/country/MD http://www.moldova.org/en/vlad- A plahotniuc-president-dodon-will-block- 3 The Economist, ‘Moldova’s Economy: every-attempt-cancelling-eu-association- Gutted’, 1 August 2015, agreement/ http://www.economist.com/news/finance- 10 Osrodek Studiow Wschodnich, ‘Igor and-economics/21660165-banking- Dodon has won the presidential election in scandal-set-bankrupt-europes-poorest- Moldova’, 14 November 2016, country- https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ana gutted?zid=307&ah=5e80419d1bc9821ebe lyses/2016-11-14/igor-dodon-has-won- 173f4f0f060a07 presidential-election-moldova 4 Osrodek Studiow Wschodnich, ’The 11 Cantir, C., and Kennedy, R., ‘Balancing Unfinished State. 25 Years Since on the Shoulders of Giants: Moldova’s Independent Moldova’, 14 December Foreign Policy toward Russia and the 2016, pp.67-68, European Union’, 2015, Foreign Policy https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/os Analysis11, pp.397-416 w-studies/2016-12-14/unfinished-state-25- 12 The World Bank, ‘Personal Remittances, years-independent-moldova received (% of GDP)’, Retrieved 10 5 International Republican Institute, ‘Public February 2017, Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova’, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TR September 2016, F.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?contextual=region&l http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiw ocations=MD yg/iri_moldova_september_2016_moldova _poll_for_review.pdf 6 International Organization for Migration, ‘Republic of Moldova’, Retrieved 10 February 2017, http://www.iom.int/countries/republic- moldova 7 Kremlin, ‘Joint news conference with Moldovan President Igor Dodon’, 17 January 2017,

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