Hierarchy in Moldova-Russia Relations: the Transnistrian Effect Crandall, Matthew
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Call from Members of the Nizami Ganjavi International Centre to the United Nations Security Council to Support the UN Secretary
Call from Members of the Nizami Ganjavi International Centre to the United Nations Security Council to Support the UN Secretary-General’s Urgent Call for an Immediate Global Ceasefire amid the COVID-19 Pandemic We are deeply alarmed that the United Nations Security Council has not been able to reach agreement on a draft resolution put before it on COVID-19. This draft resolution called for an end to hostilities worldwide so that there could be a full focus on fighting the Covid-19 pandemic. If passed it would have given powerful backing to the call made earlier by the Secretary-General. Yet, agreement could not be reached on the resolution in the Security Council because of its reference to “the urgent need to support…. all relevant entities of the United Nations system, including specialized health agencies” in the fight against the pandemic. The failure to reach agreement saddens us at this time when our world is in crisis. The Covid-19 pandemic has brought about immense human suffering and is having a devastating impact on economies and societies. It is exactly at times like this that the leadership of the Security Council is needed. It should not be silent in the face of the serious threat to global peace and security which Covid-19 represents. Global action and partnership are vital now to deal with the global pandemic and its aftermath. This is the time for the premier institution responsible for leading on global security to show strength, not weakness. We support UN Secretary-General António Guterres in his call for an immediate global ceasefire, in all corners of the world, amid the COVID-19 pandemic. -
Vladimir Voronin, President of Moldova (2001-2009) Anna Sous, RFE/RL Date of Interview: May 2015
Vladimir Voronin, president of Moldova (2001-2009) Anna Sous, RFE/RL Date of interview: May 2015 ************************ (This interview was conducted in Russian.) Anna Sous: You're not only a former president, but also a working politician, an opposition politician. You've been the leader of the Communist Party of Moldova for more than 20 years. Even at 74 years old, you're very active. How long is your typical workday? Vladimir Voronin: As long as necessary. Longer than people who have a standard working day. From 16 to 18 hours is normal. Anna Sous: Vladimir Nikolayevich, the Communist Party of Moldova is the only Communist party among the countries of the former Soviet Union that has managed to become the ruling party. How do you think Moldova's Communists differ from those in Russia? Vladimir Voronin: In ideological terms, our action plan isn't really any different. We don't differ from them in terms of being Communists, but in terms of the conditions we act in and work in -- the conditions in which we fight. Anna Sous: You were Moldova's minister of internal affairs. In 1989, when the ministry's building was set on fire during unrest in Chisinau, you didn't give the order to shoot. Later you said you wouldn't have given the command to shoot even if the ministry building had burned to the ground . Maybe this is how Moldova's Communists differ from those in Russia? Vladimir Voronin: Of course, the choices we had, and the situation we were in, were such that if I had given the order to shoot, it would have been recognized as constitutional and lawful. -
LETTER to G20, IMF, WORLD BANK, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS and NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
LETTER TO G20, IMF, WORLD BANK, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS and NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS We write to call for urgent action to address the global education emergency triggered by Covid-19. With over 1 billion children still out of school because of the lockdown, there is now a real and present danger that the public health crisis will create a COVID generation who lose out on schooling and whose opportunities are permanently damaged. While the more fortunate have had access to alternatives, the world’s poorest children have been locked out of learning, denied internet access, and with the loss of free school meals - once a lifeline for 300 million boys and girls – hunger has grown. An immediate concern, as we bring the lockdown to an end, is the fate of an estimated 30 million children who according to UNESCO may never return to school. For these, the world’s least advantaged children, education is often the only escape from poverty - a route that is in danger of closing. Many of these children are adolescent girls for whom being in school is the best defence against forced marriage and the best hope for a life of expanded opportunity. Many more are young children who risk being forced into exploitative and dangerous labour. And because education is linked to progress in virtually every area of human development – from child survival to maternal health, gender equality, job creation and inclusive economic growth – the education emergency will undermine the prospects for achieving all our 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and potentially set back progress on gender equity by years. -
Moldova: Background and U.S. Policy
Moldova: Background and U.S. Policy Steven Woehrel Specialist in European Affairs April 23, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS21981 Moldova: Background and U.S. Policy Summary Although a small country, Moldova has been of interest to U.S. policy makers due to its position between NATO and EU member Romania and strategic Ukraine. In addition, some experts have expressed concern about Russian efforts to extend its hegemony over Moldova through various methods, including a troop presence, manipulation of Moldova’s relationship with its breakaway Transnistria region, and energy supplies and other economic links. Moldova’s political and economic weakness has made it a source of organized criminal activity of concern to U.S. policy makers, including trafficking in persons. U.S. and Moldovan experts have expressed concern about whether Russian President Putin’s annexation of Crimea and attempted destabilization of eastern Ukraine presages a similar effort toward Moldova, including Russian recognition of the independence of Transnistria. After July 2009 parliamentary elections, a group of opposition parties to the then-ruling Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) formed a governing coalition that pledged to carry out reforms with the goal of closer integration with the European Union. There are few ideological differences among the governing parties, which are mainly vehicles for key political leaders and politically connected big businessmen. New parliamentary elections are expected to be held in November 2014. Moldova is Europe’s poorest country, according to the World Bank. Moldova’s GDP grew by a rapid 8.9% in 2013, spurred by strong consumer spending and a good agricultural harvest, rebounding from a drought the previous year. -
THIRD SECTION CASE of URECHEAN and PAVLICENCO V
THIRD SECTION CASE OF URECHEAN AND PAVLICENCO v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA (Applications nos. 27756/05 and 41219/07) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 2 December 2014 This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. URECHEAN AND PAVLICENCO v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA JUDGMENT 1 In the case of Urechean and Pavlicenco v. the Republic of Moldova, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of: Josep Casadevall, President, Luis López Guerra, Ján Šikuta, Dragoljub Popović, Kristina Pardalos, Valeriu Griţco, Iulia Antoanella Motoc, judges, and Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 4 November 2014, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1. The case originated in two applications (nos. 27756/05 and 41219/07) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Moldovan nationals, Mr Serafim Urechean (“the first applicant”) and Mrs Vitalia Pavlicenco (“the second applicant”), on 26 July 2005 and 10 September 2007 respectively. 2. The applicants were represented by Mr D. Graur and Mr V. Gribincea, lawyers practising in Chișinău. The Moldovan Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr V. Grosu. 3. The applicants alleged, in particular, that their right of access to a court had been breached on account of the fact that they could not bring libel actions against the then president of the country by virtue of the immunity enjoyed by him. -
Russia-Georgia Conflict in August 2008
= :88.&8*47,.&=43+1.(9=.3=:,:89=,**2a= 439*=9=&3)=251.(&9.438=+47=_ _=39*7*898= .2=.(-41= 5*(.&1.89=.3= :88.&3=&3)=:7&8.&3=++&.78= &7(-=-`=,**3= 43,7*88.43&1= *8*&7(-=*7;.(*= 18/1**= <<<_(78_,4;= -.0+2= =*5479=+47=43,7*88 Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress :88.&8*47,.&= 43+1.(9=.3=:,:89=,**2a=439*=9=&3)= 251.(&9.438=+47=__= 39*7*898= = :22&7>= In the early 1990s, Georgia and its breakaway South Ossetia region had agreed to a Russian- mediated ceasefire that provided for Russian “peacekeepers” to be stationed in the region. Moscow extended citizenship and passports to most ethnic Ossetians. Simmering long-time tensions escalated on the evening of August 7, 2008, when South Ossetia and Georgia accused each other of launching intense artillery barrages against each other. Georgia claims that South Ossetian forces did not respond to a ceasefire appeal but intensified their shelling, “forcing” Georgia to send in troops. On August 8, Russia launched air attacks throughout Georgia and Russian troops engaged Georgian forces in South Ossetia. By the morning of August 10, Russian troops had occupied the bulk of South Ossetia, reached its border with the rest of Georgia, and were shelling areas across the border. Russian troops occupied several Georgian cities. Russian warships landed troops in Georgia’s breakaway Abkhazia region and took up positions off Georgia’s Black Sea coast. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, serving as the president of the European Union (EU), was instrumental in getting Georgia and Russia to agree to a peace plan on August 15-16. -
Moldova's Election of a 'Pro-Russian' President: Implications for Europe
No.1 2017 PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WWW.UI.SE Moldova’s Election of a ‘pro -Russian’ President: Implications for Europe Elvira Melin In November 2016, Moldova elected Igor The two main directions in Moldovan Dodon as president in the first presidential politics are, simply put, the so called pro- elections since 1996. In his campaign, European liberal and the so called pro- Dodon promised to restore Moldova’s Russian communist or socialist directions, relations with Russia and possibly revoke respectively. People in practice, however, the Association Agreement (AA) with the often vote along identity lines: those who European Union. He also promised to identify with Romania usually vote for improve relations with Transnistria, a de pro-European parties, whereas minorities facto state within Moldova in which Russia (for example Gagauzians, Russians and deploys around 1,500 to 2,500 troops. In Ukrainians) and people who rather March Dodon sent a request to the disapprove of a union with Romania Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) to grant usually vote for pro-Russian parties.1 Moldova to become an observation country Moreover, citizens also adhere to to the union. However, the powers of the economic rationales when voting. Since its president in Moldova are limited, and it is independence, Moldova has experienced not certain that Dodon will have the chance economic turmoil, and is often referred to to implement all of his policies. What is as one of the poorest countries in Europe. the likelihood of Moldova leaning more This may be related to the fact that it is towards Russia, and what possible effects also among the most corrupt countries in could such a change have on Europe? Europe. -
Moldova, Early Parliamentary Elections, 11 July 2021
INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION Republic of Moldova, Early Parliamentary Elections, 11 July 2021 STATEMENT OF PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS The 11 July early parliamentary elections were well administered, competitive and fundamental freedoms were largely respected. While lower-level commissions enjoyed trust, key decisions of the Central Election Commission brought into question its impartiality. Candidates had ample opportunities to campaign and voters were provided a wide range of alternatives. The lack of effective campaign finance oversight left potential breaches unaddressed. Numerous televised debates allowed voters to be informed of contestants’ policies, but the majority of monitored news outlets displayed bias. The legal framework does not adequately regulate electoral dispute resolution, and the handling of electoral complaints further highlighted the importance of strengthening judicial independence. Election day was calm, transparent and the process was assessed overwhelmingly positively despite isolated cases of overcrowding and non- adherence to procedures. The legal framework is generally conducive for the conduct of democratic elections. The parliament’s 101 members were elected under a proportional representation system, which was reintroduced more than one year prior to its application and following an inclusive consultation process, in line with international good practice. Some key aspects of the electoral framework were also revised, including the lowering of thresholds for parties and blocs and strengthening the gender quota for candidate lists by introducing a placement requirement, in line with previous ODIHR and the Venice Commission recommendations. While some previous ODIHR and Venice Commission’s recommendations were addressed in recent amendments, further improvements are needed in particular to the legal framework on the complaints and appeals process and campaign finance oversight. -
11 Georgia and Moldova: Staying the Course
11 Georgia and Moldova: Staying the Course Mamuka Tsereteli The West’s response to the recent Russian aggression in Ukraine has clearly demonstrated the limited immediate ability of the United States and the EU to challenge Russia’s actions. The U.S. and the EU are, however, in search of a long-term strategy that could, if needed, impose substantial costs on the Rus- sian Federation. Some elements of the strategy were embedded in the EU’s Eastern Partnership project, which was designed after the Russian-Georgian war and the ensuing Russian occupation of Georgian territories. The intent of the project is to ex- pand the area under the umbrella of Western values and to promote economic rules and trade with countries in the immediate vicinity of the EU which aspire to further European integration. While participant countries were not provided with a perspective of membership, the project was clearly initiated to bring those countries closer to the EU. The Eastern Partnership initiative, led by Sweden and Poland, was launched in 2009, and by November 2013, Georgia and Moldova had initialized an Association Agreement (AA) with the EU, which they signed in June 2014. The magnitude of Russia’s resistance to the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative was vividly demonstrated by Moscow’s steps to prevent Armenia from initial- izing the AA, as well as by the pressure applied to Ukraine, which Russia per- suaded not to sign the AA, just days before the Vilnius Summit (These cases are studied in detail in the contributions of Armen Grigoryan and James Sherr to this volume). -
Moldova: Background and U.S
Moldova: Background and U.S. Policy Steven Woehrel Specialist in European Affairs August 27, 2012 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS21981 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Moldova: Background and U.S. Policy Summary Although a small country, Moldova has been of interest to U.S. policymakers due to its position between NATO and EU member Romania and strategic Ukraine. In addition, some experts have expressed concern about alleged Russian efforts to extend its hegemony over Moldova through various methods, including a troop presence, manipulation of Moldova’s relationship with its breakaway Transnistria region, and energy supplies and other economic links. Moldova’s political and economic weakness has made it a source of organized criminal activity of concern to U.S. policymakers, including trafficking in persons. From 2009 until March 2012, Moldova suffered a protracted political and constitutional crisis, over the inability of the parliament to secure a needed supermajority to elect a president. The dispute triggered three parliamentary elections in two years. Finally, in March 2012, the Moldovan parliament elected as president Nicolae Timofti, a judge with a low political profile. Prime Minister Vlad Filat has said he is focused on dismantling the country’s Communist legacy and building a state ruled by law. Moldova is Europe’s poorest country, according to the World Bank. Living standards are low for many Moldovans, particularly in rural areas. Remittances from Moldovans working abroad amounted to 22% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product in 2010. The global financial crisis has had a negative impact on Moldova. -
Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (2) Republic of Moldova
Pridnestrovian War Cabinet Public Character Profiles (1) Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (2) Republic of Moldova Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic Igor Smirnov - President of Transnistria ● Focus: Transnistrian independence and recognition, sustained territorial control ● Responsibilities: Military, Ideological, Cultural ● Resources: Full standing Transnistrian military (Shares this with Atamaniuk and Chitac) An active member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union since 1960, Smirnov has played an integral role in the politics of Moldova and , later, the PMR for decades. He served as the director for a number of different electrical plants, which allowed for him to build his political reputation. In 1989, he became the chairman of the city council of Tiraspol and only a year later the president of the PMR. Aleksandr Lebed - Co-Commander of the Russian 14th Army ● Focus: Expanding Russian influence in Transnistria, re-establishing Russian influence in Moldova ● Responsibilities: Military, Ideological ● Resources: Russian 14th Army A decorated Russian military commander, Aleksandr Lebed successfully lead campaigns in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Afghanistan before being given co-command of the Russian 14th Army. Understanding that Commander Lebed held a firm sense of Patriotism, the Russian government trusted him with leadership of the 14th Army knowing that he would possess the same goals as his native Russia. Yury Netkachev - Co-commander of the Russian 14th Army ● Focus: Strengthen and support the Transnistrian military ● Responsibilities: Military ● Resources: Russian 14th Army The former independent commander of the Russian 14th Army, he was responsible for supplying the separatists in the newly founded PMR with a wealth of weapons. Moscow was not in favour of the commander letting arms fall into the hands of a potentially dangerous faction. -
CDL-RA(2003)001</A>
Strasbourg, 13 March 2004 Diffusion restreinte CDL-RA (2003)001 . EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION) THE VENICE COMMISSION IN 2003 ANNUAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES Venice Commission Secretariat DGI - Council of Europe F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex Tel.: +33 388 41 22 05 Fax: +33 388 41 37 38 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.venice.coe.int Codices data base: www.codices.coe.int TABLE OF CONTENTS Statement by Mr Jeffrey Jowell, Vice-President of the Venice Commission to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe I. WORKING FOR DEMOCRATIC STABILITY AN OVERVIEW OF VENICE COMMISSION ACTIVITIES IN 2003 1.......... VENICE COMMISSION INTRODUCTION 2.......... THE COMMISSION IN 2003 II......... COUNTRY SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES 1.......... ALBANIA a. Election Law and Administration b. The Constitutional Court 2.......... ARMENIA a. Constitutional reform b. Draft law on the human rights defender of Armenia c. The law of the Republic of Armenia on Political Parites d. Election law and administration e. Seminars, Conferences and Workshops 3.......... AZERBAIJAN a. Election law and administration b. Draft law on the Constitutional Court c. Seminars, Conferences and Workshops 4.......... BELARUS a. The draft law on the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus b. Co-operation between the Venice Commission and the Constitutional Court of Belarus 5.......... BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA a. Draft Framework law on Higher Education b. Termination of mandate of the Human Rights Chamber 6.......... BULGARIA a. Reform of the Judicial system b. Law on the Ombudsman 7.......... CROATIA Constitutional law on the rights of national minorities 8.......... GEORGIA a. Draft law on Extremist Organisations and Unions b.